Blurring the boundaries of justice, freedom and security

Blurring the boundaries of Justice, Freedom and

Security

Miriam van der Vliet 6165842

First reader: B. Dimitris Second reader: J. Doomernik

Abstract

Migration as become increasingly framed as a security threat. It has been confirmed by several scholars that the EU tries to control its borders through discourses and policies, especially after 9/11. But these restrictions can cause more problems than it solves. Therefore, this thesis takes a closer look at these discourses at national level (the Netherlands) but also at supranational level (EU). In particular, the discourses of

economic stability, cultural identity and internal security that have become increasingly framed as being under threat due to migration and the risk of potentials terrorists. Examining these discourses before and after 9/11 may provide us with a better understanding of how these different discourses have been united through the

legitimization of a ‘common’ approach towards migration in the EU after 9/11. Also, it gives an opportunity to examine the boundaries and tensions that underlie this

‘common’ approach of migration in the EU

List of abbreviations

European Union (EU) European Commission (EC)

Introduction

After the Second World War a system of refugee protection was established that was divided into two structures. On the one hand, the arrangement of general principles and norms at the international level and on the other hand the individual responsibility of national states to provide protection at the national level (Lavenex 2001:856). However, a shift in discourse towards a security framework regarding immigration policy and the protection of refugees has emerged, that gained particular influence after the terrorist attacks on the twin towers on September 11 2001. This shift strongly promoted a cooperative ‘common approach’ at EU level between all member states. This shift also justified limitations on the system of refugee protection in the name of ensuring security among EU member states (Lavenex 2001: 858). Since then, the EU has increasingly called for measures to tighten the borders.

Recently, the phenomenon of foreign fighters has been high on the international agenda of the European Union (EU) as one of the most pressing transnational security issue. Media reports and academic researchers also confirm that the most pressing security threats are individuals travelling to fight with groups in Syria and Iraq with risk of radicalizing and returning home with hostile intentions on those they view as the enemy of Islam in the West (ICCT A: 1). EU member states have tried to respond to this development by designing and implementing various policies, focusing not only on discouraging potential foreign fighters but also on preventing the possible threat posed by returning fighters or potential terrorists (ICCT B:1). As a result, the EU’s Schengen agreement has been under scrutiny as it was clear that some of the terrorists may have posed as refugees to enter Europe before carrying out the attacks. The migration crisis

in the EU has resulted in a situation of chaos, which raised worries that terrorists might be able to easily enter countries of the EU (European Union), without having their identities checked. Borders controls would enable EU governments to regulate the large stream of refugees (Independent A).

Previous studies also have confirmed that immigration has increasingly been framed as a security threat (Bigo 2009; Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002; Karyotis 2007). As a result, borders and entry have become an issue of security. National immigration services, no longer grant permission on the basis of validity of documents but asses the risk of passengers as potential criminals, foreign fighters or terrorist by the use of security profiling and biometric data (Humphrey 2014: 84). “The security function of the state has expanded beyond national borders to encompass the protection of citizens through the intensification of surveillance of our organizationally and technologically complex societies to manage public anxiety about uncertainty” (Humphrey 2014:84).

It has been argued that there is a desire in the EU to control borders through discourses and law-making (Bigo 2009: 582). But a prohibitionist policy creates more problems than it solves as it does not prevent fraud, but causes it to become professionalized. There seems to be a tendency to systematically control foreigners entering the EU, in the name of the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration. However, claims have been made that that a technological regime that benefits the security industry does not necessarily help the citizens of the EU (Bigo 2009:583). According to Bigo (2009: 590) European (in) security professionals such as European agencies, informal networks or private groups providing police forces with technologies have played on widespread fears and threats to justify the EU’s security vision.

In addition, the securitization of migration has also been perceived as a ‘political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with the capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust’ (Huysmans (2006:11). Framing migration as a security issue gives it political priority and justifies exceptional legal, policy and policing measures (Humphrey 2014: 84). National governments have combined security (policing and surveillance) with the management of citizen’s insecurities and public perceptions of danger. However, by framing migrants as a security problem it potentially ‘misrecognizes structural issues

such as refugee flows, urban riots, crime and unemployment as the attributes of migrants that need to be policed and regulated’ (Humphrey 2014:84).

This thesis will built further upon Huysmans (2006) who traces the discourses and practices that connect concerns surrounding identity, welfare and security to the evolution and legitimacy of a European asylum and migration policy. Despite the importance of examining the contextual factors that encouraged this security framework. So far, very little attention has been paid to the role of different institutional arenas. Therefore, this thesis will examine how these diverse institutional and contextual arenas of national and supranational level were united in a common policy on immigration and also legitimized a security framework. The focus will mainly be on the contextual factors that encouraged this ‘common’ framework on border security and the use of exceptional security instruments. This thesis examines in particular the role of 9/11 in the EU and the Netherlands through a temporal comparative analysis before and after 9/11 in the EU and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the analysis will proceed by examining the tensions underlying the ‘common’ approach.

Methodology

Poststructuralism promotes a position different from both the traditional realist and idealist perceptions in IR and offers important understandings on “the construction of the national-international dichotomy, the relationship between national identity and security politics, the discursive character of the concept of security, and the late-modern transformation of security” (Hansen 1997:369). In addition it has been an important contribution to the debate on whether to expand the concept of security. It is often argued from the poststructuralist position, that security is a discursive practice. The essential point is not to examine if an objective relationship between the concept and the possible domains of security exists, but to study whether and how an issue is securitized (Hansen 1997:369).

The post-structuralism position emphasises the constitutive power of discourse, which constructs subjectivities and thereby excludes certain ways of thinking and

speaking. They argue that discourse represents a certain form of power in social relations (Stritzel 2012:551). A discourse is the practice of a certain language that puts into play sets of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers and themes (Shapiro 1990: 329).

Method of analysis

Migration policy is not based on rational decision making in a given structure, but is an issue area that is constantly re-created and shaped by changing environments, interest and dominant agents (Sommer 2013: 44). In order to explain to explain the context that shapes migration policy, this thesis follows constructivist approach, analyzing social interaction and interests influencing the discourse and the process of constructing current migration policies in the EU and the Netherlands. Within the field of social constructivism, Huysmans’ (2000) ‘securitization’ approach on migration policy based on the Copenhagen school’s concept of securitization is applied. The key concepts and ideas of the concept of securitization capture the diversity of interests that that are influencing EU migration policy in three main areas. Here this thesis draws upon the three main discourses within the EU migration policy that are identified by Huysmans (2000) and Karyotis (2007): Internal security (security), welfare (economic stability) and cultural identity (societal issues).

Therefore using Lena Hansen’s concept of intertextuality as a method for security analysis will help deconstruct the security discourse. Hansen argues that “understanding foreign policy texts as intertextually linked across a variety of media and genres calls for empirical analysis of how these links are made as well as for thoroughly theorizing the way texts build authority and their capacity to speak about a particular issue” (Hansen 2006:55). Intertextuality implies a particular understanding of what texts are and how they generate meaning. It refers to the ‘linguistic turn’, where texts perform or constitute a certain policy and identity through other texts. The migration policy for instance is performed in links between texts across genres. These texts gain authority and gain a certain capacity to speak about security because it is interwoven with other texts (Aradau & Huysmans 2013:10). From an intertextual perspective, the creation of meaning needs to be perceived as always being part of a broader structure of meaning (Stritzel 2012:553). The nature of meaning within post-structuralism is typically used to

deconstruct the assumption of a stable meaning and to highlight that meaning is never complete or fixed.

This thesis argues that intertextuality can be found in securitizing moves with regard to migration. Securitizing moves are marked by a specific linguistic structure of priority and emergency within the Justice and home department of the EU, in particular the European commission, and governmental advisory boards in the Netherlands.

In order to understand the social success of particular securitizing moves that labels migration as a threat, it is important to study the particular logic of specific discourse strategies in which actors draw upon various linguistic resources “to create resonance with the audience’s expectations or emotional, cultural, symbolic appeals” (Striztel 2012:555). Here this thesis draws upon the logic of preemption in order to examine how potential terrorist are anticipated and acted upon in relation to a set of policy structures and events in relation to immigration in the EU and the Netherlands.

Data collection

Discourse is often used as a way to define and frame certain issues such as the securitization of immigration, asylum policy or the role of the immigrant in the economy. Or as Fairclough defines it: “to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power” (Fairclough 1995: 132). Korkut (2013: xi) argues that while institutions are important to understand policy and its implementation, the framing of policy gives us an understanding of how these institutions actually function. It is therefore important to examine how immigration problems are framed in specific ways and why one definition prevails over another (idem). According to Schattscheider (1960 in Guiraudon & Lahav 2013: 73) the way issues are defined in policy debates, is due to strategic calculations among conflicting political actors that try to mobilize an audience at which they are aiming. Korkut (2013:xii) argues that ‘the way these issues are defined by public authorities is an important aspect of policy making that is linked to which audience/public is mobilized and within which political arena policy decisions are taken for a specific purpose’.

In order to integrate migration policy into EU’s external policies, which requires accordance with key EU foreign policy interests concerning security, economy and human rights, there is a need to bring these interests into a coherent strategy (Sommer 2013:42). Sommer (2013:44) argues that migration involves diverse and seemingly conflicting interests that are articulated and framed differently. However, when considering the conflicts of interest within the EU’s migration policy, this paper examines how these diverse interests are addressed within a common approach. Therefore, this thesis will examine the link between three main discourses, in which it will identify their positions and underlying interests in EU migration policy and the Asylum policy in the Netherlands and how these discourses have shaped migration as security question.

Furthermore, Korkut (2013:3) argues that the expression of a discourse within formal institutional mechanisms and informal ideational mechanisms related to immigration set the tone of a certain meaning by policy and decision makers and as a result have an ideational impact on the policies that are applied in order to regulate for instance in this case immigration. The ability to make statements about the common good of a nation by these actors and impress certain views regarding language, ethnicity, religion and manners into authoritative knowledge without being challenged is for instance an example of social and political privilege.

Korkut (2013:3) argues that this not only limited to decision makers, but also for instance the media contributes to setting the boundaries of an acceptable discourse about migration. Therefore, Young (2000:108) argues that ‘the process that produces and reproduces discursive action gives us an understanding of how structural relations become inscribed in policy and ideational environments’. According to Korkut (2013:3) the discursive process is initiated through actors that develop a set of ideas by drawing upon existing cultural and ideological symbols. Korkut (2013:3) argues that this an iterative process and sometimes a struggle between political and social actors, and it is plays a role in the evolution of political institutions. The ideas upon which institutions are formed are subjected to discursive revision as actors reinterpret and debate the meaning upon which existing institutions are constructed (Korkut 2013:3). The discourse in which “actors engage in the process of generating, deliberating and legitimizing certain ideas about sociopolitical action in institutional contexts through certain forms of communication is called discursive institutionalism (Korkut 2013: 6).

From this perspective, institutions are regarded as an internal sentiment of actors and serve as a structure of thinking and acting. Hence, a problem definition is a contested process among players with varying levels of authority and persuasiveness (2013:6). According to Korkut (2013:6) this may explain why “many of the social problems that result from managing immigrants in receiving societies become political problems, requiring politicians to intervene with policy positions”.

Moreover, this thesis will thus be based on a qualitative analysis of documents published by the European commission and governmental advisory boards of the Netherlands. It based on an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research, whereby the findings are generated from theory. The epistemological position is interpretivist which stresses on the understanding of immigration policy through the interpretation that is proclaimed by governmental agencies and the context of time and place.

The policy documents that have been used in the discourse analysis set out general policy orientations and underlying visions on how to deal with immigration (in a security perspective) and the justifications of the application of certain policy measures and devices. This is more interesting from a discursive point of view than examining legislative documents that often contain very dry terminology. Moreover these documents provide a temporal sample of policy understandings regarding immigration in the EU and the Netherlands before and after 9/11. The sample of documents is structured also around the concept of illegal immigration and how this perception has changed during the course of time.

Exploring Boundaries

When examining the tensions that are produced through these discursive complexities and institutional struggles, Bigo (2002: 81) argues that the main technique of securitization is ‘to transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements permitting specific groups to be blamed, even before they have done anything, simply by categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends and projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual that falls within the risk category’. This technique aims at mastering a chaotic future with minimalist management focusing only on certain identified risky groups (Bigo 2002: 82).

Also Huysmans (2006:127) argues that the political community is built on a friend/enemy distinction which is the crucial force of the securitization process by framing the issue of migration as a threat to the community. While this thesis recognizes that discourse analysis is important to understand how the securitization of migration is intertextually intertwined with certain security logics, it also argues for a more interpretative approach to the use of certain instrumental and technological devices in order to examine how discursive boundaries/tensions are created that reflect a friend/ enemy distinction within immigration policies in practice. An analysis of these border security devices also take into account how legislative, technical and administrative resources and instruments that these actors rely on not only contextualize but also mediate bordering practices.

Reflection of validity and reliability

An important aspect is the reliability and validity of this discourse analysis.

Reliability refers to whether the results are repeatable. Validity measures whether the measure of concepts really reflect the concept (Bryman 2008:33). While the discourse analysis is based on a limited number of policy documents, the findings are based on assumptions that have been confirmed by multiple researchers, yet have not been neglected to be linked in relation to the tensions in institutional sense. In addition, this thesis emphasizes the importance of a contextual understanding of certain policy measures and securitizing practice. The findings are based on contextual analysis between the EU and the Netherlands. While this may limit the generalizability of the research in accordance of other member states, an effort have been to place this in a larger context through analyzing the consequences of this change after 9/11 in the application of certain technological devices throughout the EU that reflect these struggles that undermine the ‘common’ approach due to differences that are exacerbated different national contexts.

Chapter 1: Theoretical framework

1.1 The conceptualization of security

The concept of security can be traced back to the writing of Hobbes, Locke and Smith, who discussed the role of the state in relation to providing security and liberty. The formulation of security as the necessary precondition of liberty was among others further elaborated in the writings of John Stuart Mill, who regarded “security as a necessary precondition to freedom of action and simultaneously, the only ground upon which liberty can be justifiably be eroded” (Zedner 2009:29).

However, it not difficult to understand that the scope of security and liberty are ambiguous and essentially contested in academic literature and as result may imply many practices and scopes to justify controversial practices. Christou et al. al (2010:341) therefore defines security as the “objective threats to specific referent objects; as a series of relationships between states, framed by the existence of international anarchy; as a mode of power relations between different groups; as a socially constructed norm that can empower and repress; as a mode of governmentality by which those in authority control the population; as a positive norm, which if achieved, can emancipate the disempowered. It may be seen as ‘freedom from fear’, and/or as ‘freedom from want’; or more positively, security might be ‘freedom to’ rather than ‘freedom from” (Christou et al. 2010: 341).

However, the question of what security means is rather a contested debate. A key issue of debate is the question of wat could be covered by the concept of security. This has been referred to as the widening of the debate in which some argued that security was more than just military and that it also encompassed issues such as migration (Weaver 1995). The central point of the discussion referred to question of what is threatening and what is threatened. This however also has consequences for the knowledge that security experts develop, since it differed from military data. As a result, scholars have argued that widening the security concept to different areas have undermined the field of knowledge (Walt 1991:213).

1.2 The Securitization theory of the ‘Copenhagen’ school

Critical security scholars have raised concerns of the ethical and political implications of viewing social, political and economic problems through the lens of security (Zedner 2009: 44). ‘The securitization of political issues and socio-economic problems has a tendency to legitimize emergency powers, with the effect of depoliticizing these political issues’ (Zedner 2009:45).

The notion of ‘securitization’ is primarily associated with the ‘Copenhagen school’, which usually refers to scholars such as Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (1998). Their theory of securitization derives from a concern in applying the concept of ‘security’ onto a wide range of issues. They therefore argue that there is a need of some sort of principle in order to judge what is and what is not a security issue (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 76). According to the ‘Copenhagen school’ securitization takes place when “an issue is represented as posing an existential threat, to the survival of a referent object” and therefore “shifting the issue out of the realm of normal political debate into the realm of emergency politics”, legitimizing the use of exceptional measures (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 76). In other words, when an issue becomes a security issue, we treat it with the same degree of urgency as military threats and it therefore also becomes justifiable to use exceptional measures. Where the issue usually is politicized, meaning it is part of public debate, it is now securitized, which means the responses are justified even beyond public debate (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 76).

According to Weaver (1995:35) this process of securitization begins with a ‘speech act’. This occurs when an issue that was ‘previously not thought of as a security threat and comes to be spoken of as a security issue by political actors with authority’ (idem). Certain speech acts are known to be performative, whereby saying a certain word or naming certain concepts we also perform a certain social act and we may change the understanding of a problem (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 76-77). Furthermore, the issue is dramatized and presented as an issue that needs to be dealt with the utmost priority. However, according Buzan et al. (1998: 26), it is important to understand that the task of the researcher is not ‘to address an objective threat that really endangers some object that need to be protected, rather we need to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is regarded a collectively responded to as a threat’.

The events on 9/11 had a far-reaching impact on the framing of debates in Europe which provided an opportunity for the securitization of migration. Some scholars (Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2007) argue that migration has often been framed as a danger to public order, cultural identity and economic stability. Furthermore, it is claimed that the migration policy of the EU is tied to wider societal, professional and political dynamics (Huysmans: 752). For instance, it produced security logic between security professionals that articulated a link between borders, crime and migration (Huysmans: 761). Moreover, it opened up opportunities to correlate terrorism with immigration which led to legitimize practices and border control technologies that were usually reserved for emergencies (Boswell 2007:589).

There are some actors are better at securitizing than others and certain issues are easier to securitize. Successful securitization depends on the degree of acceptance between the speaker that performing a speech act and the relevant audience. The relevant audience has to accept the threat as credible (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 78). The Copenhagen school argues that certain ‘felicity conditions’ determine whether the securitization of certain issue is successful.

The first one, which I already mentioned above, is an existential threat, is presented to legitimize the use of exceptional measures in order to tackle the threat (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79). There is a widespread perception that the threat of terrorism provided and excuse for the controversial practices and applications of instruments such as entry restrictions, border control, detention and deportation in

order to control migration (Boswell 2007:589-590). According to Huysmans (2000: 761) there is a bureaucratic network of security professionals in the EU. The knowledge it produces and the field of struggle plays a key role in the Justice and Home affairs of the EU. It structures a setting in which bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic agents struggle over issues such as the definition of migration policy, the distribution of resources and the identification of threats (Idem). As a result, migration has become a phenomenon that can be referred to as the cause of many issues.

This brings us to the second condition, namely the securitizing actor often has the authority and social and political capital to persuade the relevant audience of the existence of an existential threat (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:79). According to Peoples & Vaughan-Williams (2010: 79) ‘security experts’ are usually ‘assumed to have the capacity in constituting a security issue because of qualifications and background’.

However, Boswell (2007: 601) argues that there is little evidence of attempts to securitize migration in the EU through linking irregular migration and persons engaging in terrorist activities. She suggests a different dynamic at the level of practice where the linkage is evident in terms of migration policy tools by agencies involved in counter-terrorism activities. Boswell (2007: 601) refers here to policy tools such as databases providing information on foreigners, passenger information supplied by airline companies and checks at international borders in order to enhance the surveillance of suspected or potential terrorist.

The third condition is that it is ‘easier to present an issue as an existential threat if the issue is connected with historical inferences of threat, danger or harm or where a history of hostile sentiments exists’ (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:79).

1.3 Societal security

Huysmans (2000:751) argues that the political process of connecting migration to criminal and terrorist abuses of the internal market does not take place in isolation, rather it is related to a wider politicization in which immigrants and asylum-seekers are portrayed as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions. The Copenhagen school (Weaver et al. 1993: 17) does acknowledge that the state is not the sole referent object that is subjected to securitization. They use the term ‘societal security’ to argue that societal identities can also be treated as a collective unit, since the

boundaries of the state and societies are often not the same and state boundaries may hold multiple identity groups. Therefore, focusing only at states could fail to capture the process of securitization within the societal sector (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 83).

Within the societal sector securitization may occur when certain issues are accepted as threatening the existence of the identity of a certain group. According to Peoples & Vaughan-Williams (2010: 81) a large stream of migrants who have different values could be presented by certain securitizing actors as a threat to the existence of a culture of community for instance. The Copenhagen school argues that it is possible to consider societal issues as a security issue but only under certain conditions. It is important to distinguish what the referent object is and which types of threats fall under the label of security. Weaver (1995:49) warns us that when we focus on the welfare of individuals, we make everything a potential security problem. This leads to an over-expansion of the meaning of security, which makes it vague and impractical (Weaver 1995:49). Therefore, Buzan et al. (1998: 15-19) argues that the state remains the most important level of analysis or subsystems of states within the international arena where securitization provides internal coherence and unifies a diverse group of states.

“The supposed danger of immigration to the societal security of a state is not an objective and universal threat”, but rather a subjective threat, which depends on the ways in which the receiving state or supranational authority defines itself (Weiner 1992: 110). Huysmans (2000:757) argues that security policy is a specific instrument to mediate the belonging to a certain community. ‘It supports or transforms political integration and criteria for membership through the identification of existential threats. The community then defines what it considers what is good and safe, through the representation of societal dangers such as the criminal, the abnormal or the invading enemy’ (Huysmans 200:757). Furthermore, Huysmans (2000: 758) argues that migration is identified as one of the main factors that weakens national tradition, societal homogeneity and leads to an internal and external danger for the survival of the national community or western civilization. As a result, the discourse frames the question about the future as a choice that is for or against migration. This is according to Huysmans (2000:758) not a free choice because a choice for migration is represented as a choice against the survival of the state.

Threats do not operate in a void. It only functions when ‘something’ is threatened (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79). Huysmans (1995: 55) argues that what seems to be at stake for these characters is the continuation of their identity, public order or economic stability. The concept of societal security deals mainly with the issue of collective identity. Ole weaver (1993:23) refers to societal security as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible threats”. If we relate this to migration, it refers to the ways in which members of a state or the EU perceive their cultural, linguistic, religious or national identity is threatened by immigrant. According to Weiner (1992:103) the referent objects are then the values of the receiving country. The threatened object is then placed at the center of attention according to Huysmans (1995:55). This means that the security construct already involves some kind of constituted identity or idea of public order and economic stability. By placing these objects at the center of attention, it also creates a periphery. According to Huysmans (1995:55) the periphery is the outside environment, which is constituted from the position of the center and it is where outside threats are located.

The threatened object can only survive if the periphery (migrants) is controlled. Here the migrant appears to be as a unity. They are put into one box: the cultural other to be distrusted or feared. Differences between them are hidden inside the box ‘migrant’ or ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee’ (Huysmans 1995:61).

It is important to understand that there is a close relationship between the logic of security (threat of terrorism through migration) and the threatened object (identity, public order and economic stability). When the EU creates threats, they also create their definition of identity, public order and economic stability. This means that the referent object is never given, but they develop within the story by the definition of threats. Thus security tells us only one story threats and referent objects and the production and reproduction of their threat and values in a given time and space (Huysmans 1995: 57).

According to the Copenhagen school securitization is constituted in the intersubjective realm. They assume some kind of relationship between the speaker and the ‘intersubjective audience’ under certain way articulations and structural conditions (Weaver 2000:252). This raises some issues. Securitization in the EU cannot be considered in the same way as in national political context where statements are under extensive public debate. The securitization of migration in the EU may be identifiable,

but the relationship between that discourse and the reception, discussion, legitimization and actualization of policy proposals and changes is less clear (Neal 2009:336).

Also, Philippe Bourbeau (2011:40) argues that securitization theory overlooks contextual factors that limit or constrain a successful securitization. He argues that speech acts are always produced in a particular context and the social properties of these contexts provide speech acts with a difference of value systems. In other words, Bourbeau (2011:40) argues that an analytical framework for the study of securitization process should provide theoretical space for research on contextual values that may induce or constrain the process. In this way, the meaning and the construction of contextual structures is dependent on ideas and interpretation of agents. Conceptualizing the relationship between agents and contextual factors allows for feedback, multi-directionality in the analytical framework and an understanding of power in the securitization process according to Bourbeau (2011:45). Social structures/contexts have the power to legitimize, authorize, include/exclude as the exercise considerable power on agents, by accrediting authority to a particular agent. The social capacities of actors are not only socially produced but also shape the self-understanding and subjective interests of the actor as they produce subjectivity in the system of meaning (idem). In this perspective, the power of agents lies not only in the ability to try to convince an audience that international migration is a threat, but also the ability to reproduce and transform the meaning of the referent object (the meaning of identity, public order, economic stability).

1.4 Instrumental security devices

Discursive approach tends to present discourses but they do not analyse how this discourse is embedded. Huysmans (2006:85) argues that there is a spill-over of the internal market (Europeanization) into an internal security field. The development and application of technological devices such as European visa, databases, and technocratic routines structure the relation between freedom and security (Huysmans 2006: 85).

Understanding security politics through technological devices provides the possibility the take a closer look at issues concerning agency, discretion or ambiguities. Moreover, it reveals how the struggle over different discourses and interests are reflected in tensions. Therefore, understanding border security controls in the European

union and the securitizing moves that are operating in that context requires an examination of how discourses are reflected in everyday practices of governmentality of fear and unease and to analyze “the correlation between these rationalizations via practical justifications and the (in) securitization moves that may vary depending on the social universe in which they are deployed” (Bigo 2014: 211)

In recent years, material objects, technologies, and devices have gained increased attention in the critical study of (in) security (Jeandebosz et al. 2015; Neal 2009; Boswell 2007). In order to advance these discussions we need to know what is at stake when we approach security practices through devices. A device is an artefact, an instrument made for a particular purpose. “To use the notion of a device is therefore to call for the simultaneous consideration of object, purpose and effect” (Jeandebosz et. al 2015:294). They are “techniques and instruments embedded in social practices, deployed in configurations of power, and creating modes of thought…methods, metaphors, scenarios, statistical calculation, knowledge accumulation, planning, measuring or benchmarking” (Jeandebosz et al. 2015:297). Exploring the use of certain devices when it comes to border security practices involves not just speech acts, but also the fact that security professionals are equipped with a diverse set of devices that perpetuate a security framing. This technological approach gives us an understanding of how the framing of danger has been spilled-over in implementations bureaucratic and instrumental procedures (Huysmans 2007:92).

Jeandebosz et al. (2015:297) state that each device is related to a certain history. It is based on negotiated standards and functionalities that represent the sociopolitical issues that are at stake. The specific characteristics that is internal to the device (technical, logical, cognitive) both constrain and enable the action of their users. These instruments are not static, “their force of action also depends on processes of production, translation, circulation, appropriation, experimentation, or resistance” (Jeandebosz et al. 2015:297). As result, the communication between a socio-technical device and a certain type of action depending on the context of each instrument may produce unexpected or negative side effects (Jeandebosz et al. (2015:294). States use modern technology to channel people through certain procedures that determine the conditions of entrance for different categories of people (Huysmans 2006: 95). These categories thus create boundaries between insiders and outsiders or friends/ enemies.

Contemporary societies are characterized by “a political preoccupation with the problems technology poses” (Jeandebosz et al. 2015:296). Technology and technique are often used substitutable and may be defined as a formalized frame of knowledge and a categorization of processes that contribute to the organization of social relations. From this perspective, technology is understood as part of “broader matrix of social action” that is structured by the tension between certain of gaining power and techniques of the self (Jeandebosz et al. 2015:296).

The political sociology of public policy instruments also has incorporated a Foucauldian perspective on governmentality. Governmentality presupposes an operation form of ‘rational’ and technical procedures’ as a central activity in governance (Foucault 1997:203). In other words, a public policy instrument is not a tool with intrinsic neutrality, but a socio-technical device that represents a summarized form of governmentality (Jeandebosz et al. 2015:296). “Governmentality is the art of governing a population not a territory” (Huysmans 2006: 98). In other words, statistical mapping and probability calculations are mixed with normative judgements about change (Huysmans 2000:100). Every device or instrument refers to a certain knowledge frame about how to exercise social control and the relations between the immigrants and border security services according to the representations and meaning these instruments carry. They provide form of analysis to describe and categorize social problems in order to prescribe a certain action. These devices project ideas, interpretations, and representations that reflect certain norms and values that are underlying these devices (Jeandebosz et al. 2015:296).

A number of authors (Grove 2015; Kelling 1996) claim that these devices produce racialized effects that privilege Western international norms. For example, measuring a certain phenomenon by statistics may ignore important values. Moreover device may not always match intention and action. The selection, construction and articulation of devices contribute to the production of knowledge and the framing of behavior. ‘Security instruments’ relate to the problems that are posed by choice of instruments and the use of instruments that allow governmental action to be made operational (Halpern et al. 2014 in Jeandesbosz 2015 et al 2015: 296 ). Some authors such as Debbie Lisle et al. (2015) have already explored how security devices are the result of struggles, controversies and translations between diverse actors, heterogeneous conceptions, numerous interests, goals and values. This means that public policy instruments are in

some way affected by the sociopolitical contexts in which it is made and deployed (Jeandebosz 2015:297).

Moreover, devices may play a different role in different circumstances. While it may not change the course of a social process in some cases, in other cases it can mediate or transform action (Jeandebosz 2015:97). Security discourses are embedded in powerful technological processes that govern everyday practices on the basis of routines, regulations and devices that control freedom (Huysmans 2006:97).

1.5 The logic of preemption

A growing literature in security studies has argued that expecting for the worst is a central element in contemporary security culture. Marieke de Goede (2014:411) argues that certain imperatives have made their way into routine practices and bureaucratic operations. De Goede (2014:411) has analyzed how routinizing the imagination plays out in practice in different policy domains. De Goede (idem) refers to preemption as a “security practice that aim to act on threats that are unknown, and recognized as unknowable, yet deemed potentially catastrophic, requiring security intervention at the earliest possible stage”. It is fundamentally unknown not because of missing data or incomplete calculations, according to Hildebrandt (2014 in De Goede 2014:413) it is because there is a lack of recognized human knowledge and reliable parameters in a certain domain. According to De Goede (2014: 413) from this logic, security preemption turns the contestability of uncertain futures into commodities in the form of action plans, while producing its own benchmarks of success. Furthermore, De Goede (2014:413) argues that preemption is a productive force in the notion of performativity. De Goede (2014: 413) refers to performativity as the iterative constitution of objects and subjects through discursive practice and it is through this lens that meaning is understood not only as linguistic, but also through its enactment in contingent practical contexts. Moreover, De Goede (2014:416) security exceptionality materializes within durable and changing relations and routines. Therefore, security must be examined

when iteration occurs, at the point in which the urgent and the exceptional materialize. Reiteration is here understood as “the means through which a certain effect is established time after time” (De Goede 2014:417).

1.6 ‘Desecuritization’

Some scholars (Aradau 2004; Huysmans 2006) argue that security is not always a positive good and we should keep in mind that the securitization of an issue also leads to “a particular type of emergency politics where the space and allowed for deliberation, participation and bargaining is necessarily constricted” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 83). Therefore, Weaver (Buzan et al. 1998:4) argues that we should aim for ‘desecuritization’ which refers to the process of shifting issues out of the mode of emergency and into the normal political sphere of public deliberation.

Desecuritization can be used as strategic device which deconstructs issues of their security element back into the political realm.

Jeff Huysmans builds further on this premise by suggesting three possible strategies. The first one is the objectivist model, which is favored by realists. It is based on a traditional objective–subjective conception of security, where “security has an objective content against which subjective notions of threat will be either real or illusory” (Roe 2004: 286). The second strategy Huysmans (1995: 66) calls the constructivist model, refers to understanding how issues become part of a security-drama. Desecuritization here is built upon a heuristic principle in order to understand the internal dynamics of the social construction of threats (Balzacq 2014: 106). The goal here is not focused on determining whether something is a threat or not, rather to understand how the process of securitization works (Huysmans, 1995: 66). The third strategy refers to a ‘deconstructivist’ strategy. This strategy emphasizes the restructuring of the world through a recounting of the story, assuming that world can be ‘handled’ differently (Huysmans 1995:67). It builds upon the principle that by telling a story in a particular way, he/she contributes to the production and reproduction of the social world. In this way desecuritization is meant to produce a meaning of social relations in the sense that it takes down the current meaning of security formations in a certain issue (Huysmans 1995: 67).

According to Huysmans desecuritization does not originate from an objective strategy but from creative political narratives that characterize the political sphere in terms of complexity and plurality of daily human activities. Huysmans (2006: 127-128) argues that the political community is built on a friend/enemy distinction which is the impacts the securitization process by framing the issue of migration as a threat to the community. Therefore, scholars need to examine routine encounters that make up the intrinsic complexities of political communities (Balzacq 2014: 107). Huysmans (in Balzacq 2014: 107) refers to this as a ‘political aesthetics of everydayness’, where security questions become contextualized within wider economic, social and political practices.

While Claudia Aradau’s approach (2004:13 is similar to Huysmans, she does not agree with the “implicit endorsement of flexibility of subjectivities and a possibility to challenge what is constructed as dangerous”. She argues: “Rather than celebrating a fragmented and fluid identity that would be more welcoming of difference, it is important to see how a specific form of ordering social relations according to the logic of friend/enemy can be unmade, how this can be re-thought. Desecuritization is a process of re-thinking the relations between subjects of security, and of imagining localized, less exclusionary and violent forms of integration” (Aradau, 2004: 19).

Chapter 2: The securitization of migration before 9/11

Introduction

There have been two sides in the debate on whether a new security agenda on asylum and immigration in the EU has emerged after 9/11. Some researchers argue that the attacks of 9/11 had a significant impact on the way the EU has shaped its migration policies which led to the fact that security concerns became more prominent (Baldaccini 2008:31). On the other hand, this view is challenged by authors who claim that 9/11 did not create a new policy agenda and that the security framing of asylum and immigration policies predated the events of 9/11. This chapter deals with the question of how the context before 9/11 contributed to the changing discursive strategy that was applied in relation to immigration policy, by examining how the restriction of immigration flows

was mainly justified through an economic discourse in dealing with irregular migration before 9/11 in the EU and a cultural justification in the Netherlands.

In the previous chapter it is already explained how the securitization of migration after 9/11 is connected to a wider historical politicization in which immigrants are represented as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions. One of the conditions of successful securitization is that is easier present an issue as a threat if it already has historical implications of a threat (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:79).

This chapter shows how ‘speech–acts’ concerning the danger of immigration were already present before 9/11. However, in order for the audience at national and supranational level to accept the threat as relevant two different discourses emerged. While in the EU the ‘threat’ was predominantly referred to as illegal immigration and measures to ‘control’ it were suggested through a ‘common’ approach, the problem of immigration had different dimension at national level, which put the integration and the effect immigration had on society more at the heart of the debate.

Eventually, the fear of illegal immigration has eventually has led to become to be perceived as a security threat and resulted in the form of a common policy on illegal migration. However, as this chapter will make clear, both national and supranational had different motives and interests.

2.1 An economic justification

Migrants are also often portrayed as an economic threat. The stream of migrants into the Europe is often subject of debate, particularly in the context of high unemployment and slowing economic growth (Karyotis 2007: 10).The migration policy in the EU has predominantly emphasized the need for restrictions of population flows (Huysmans 2000:756). According to Huysmans (2000:756) these developments were shaped by a change in the problematisation of migration. From the 1980s migration was a subject of policy debates concerning protection of public order and domestic stability. Huysmans (2000: idem) argues that these debates also represented migration as a challenge to the welfare state. Access to social and economic rights is an important aspect in the governance of belonging in the welfare state. Immigrants, asylum –seekers and refugees

are increasingly seen as having no legitimate right to social assistance and welfare provisions.

While migrants may not directly cause concern for economic survival, it often does highlight fear in the minds of the population of member states that it may cause economic destabilization. According to Karyotis (2007:10) some discourses ‘intensify the idea that the large stream of economic migrants might drive down wages and create unemployment and drive up the cost of housing and other goods’.

The struggle over the distribution of social goods such as housing, health care, unemployment benefits, jobs and other social services has become competitive. Citizens of member states often fear that they will have to compete with low-paid immigrants for the scarce jobs and services available and even might lose jobs to them (Karyotis 2007:10). Scarcity makes immigrants and asylum seekers rivals to national citizens in the labor market. As a result, offering welfare provisions is framed as “a magnet pulling migrants into the EU” that are illegitimately claiming social rights (Huysmans 2000:767). Limiting social assistance and other social rights for immigrants and asylum seekers can then be justified as an instrument for limiting the number of applications for asylum and immigration.

Huysmans (2000:768) argues that welfare chauvinism often portrays migrants as profiteers who try illegitimately gain benefits from the welfare system of a community they do not belong. They are strangers that exploit the society that is kind to them. Faist (1994:61) argues “the migrant is transformed from a competitor into someone committing welfare fraud”. A more moderate version links the necessity for restricting migration to economic recession which limits their employment opportunities and therefore also raises the cost in sustaining them. According to Huysmans (2000:768) in this version one tries to limit the social rights of asylum seekers not because they exploit the system but because a society should first provide welfare for its ‘own’ people.

Welfare chauvinism is also conceivable through the expressions of metaphors such as an ‘invasion’ or ‘flood’ of asylum seekers (Faist 1994:61). In a welfare state struggling to guarantee social-economic rights, these metaphors portray immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees as a serious threat to the survival of the welfare system (Huysmans 2000:769). Furthermore, they dramatize the problem of the welfare state by framing it in a security discourse. Experiences of economic and social uncertainty are translated into opposition and fear of immigrants and asylum seekers (idem).

According to Sommer (2013: 50) the idea to ‘manage’ migration has been developed as a popular concept in migration EU policy. It allows for a pick- and- choose admission system, which allows only access for the migrants that are desirable and who economically benefit the country of destination. On the other side, Menz (2009: 2) argues that ‘undesirable’ migrants are stopped from crossing borders with restricted immigration rules and border surveillance. According to Menz (2009:2) it is an attempt to move migration away from “a subjective, emotional, human rights-based discourse” to a more “pragmatic, strategic, managerial, restrictive and economistic” frame.

However, these discourses that have a negative impact are often being challenged (Karyotis 2007:11). Economists often argue that migration is rather beneficial and has long-term benefits for the economy. For instance, they may fill in jobs where there are shortages. In addition, while they may lower wages on the one hand, these losses are offset by the gains made by employers who make higher profits. Migrants are in particular beneficial to fill in gaps that are caused by the falling birth rate in the EU and aging population. A report of the United nations (UN 2000 in Karyotis 2007:10 ) even states that the EU need 700 million immigrants for the coming 40 years to sustain growth and their social security systems.

2.2 Development of the EU migration policy

Huysmans (2006:65) argues that in the 1950 and 1960s migrants were perceived as an extra workforce in Western European countries. The economic situation and the labor market required a cheap and flexible workforce that was scarce at that time. Also, Boswell (2007:90) states that labor migration was considered crucial to postwar economic construction in a number of continental European countries. Even after the shift towards restriction, labor migration still continued to fill labor gaps in a number of branches in many countries.

In the late 1960s and 1970s immigration started to become a subject of concern and led to more control-oriented and restrictive policies (Hollifield 1992:66-73).These restrictive policies were mobilized by changes in the labor market which triggered the desire to protect the social and economic rights of the domestic workforce (Huysmans 2006:65). Heisler and Layton-Henry (1993:157), argue that economic recession and social changes were by then already linked with large-scale immigration since the

1970s. The connection of asylum and immigration with crime was also reinforced by the intergovernmental fora which aimed for a cooperative regulation on migration (Schlentz 2010:3). As a result, the intention to reduce the number of asylum-seekers was even highlighted in the restrictive entry regulations (idem). Thus even before the Maastricht treaty, which brought asylum and immigration into the three-pillar structure of the EU, securitization was already in place (Schlentz 2010:4)

However since the late 1990s, high-skilled migration has been increasingly considered as contributing to economic competitiveness in a knowledge-based economy, and as a potential instrument for addressing the negative impact of aging populations on economic growth and welfare provisions. States therefore often approach migration from a positive stance as migration may enhance legitimacy through its positive economic impact (Boswell 2007:90). On the other hand, Boswell (idem) states that “public opinion is skeptical about migration and this positive impact is largely unacknowledged in public debates, states have often avoided publicly advocating liberal migration policies, which may well undermine their legitimacy in other ways”.

2.2 Europeanization of migration

A significant Europeanization of migration took place in 1980s. Policy coordination and development were increasingly institutionalized in European interstate cooperation, the EU, and European transnational cooperation between functional organizations such as the police. Migration first became an important issue in intergovernmental fora (Trevi, The Ad Hoc group on immigration, the Schengen group). Hence, in the framework of intergovernmental and bureaucratic fora, transnational and intergovernmental policy networks developed which aimed for a cooperative regulation of migration.

While these fora were not part of the European integration process, they did pre-structure the development of the migration policy in the EU (Huysmans 2000:755). Following from these developments the Treaty on European Union (1992) introduced a Third Pillar on Justice and Home affairs in which migration became subject of intergovernmental regulation within the EU (Huysmans 2000:755).

At the Tampere European Council in October 1999, the EU adopted of a ‘common European asylum system’ which falls under the community method of integration. In short, the community method of integration is based on a strong agenda role for the

European commission, the role of amending proposals by the European parliament and a decision-taking role for the European council (Lavenex 2001: 852-854). While trans-governemental cooperation may take place outside the EU, however contrasting to supranational legislation of European commission, these are not legally binding agreements (lavenex 2001:854).

In the area of external border management, the main aim of the EU is to develop an integrated border security framework that ensures a high and uniform level of control of persons and surveillance at the external border (Leonard 2009: 373). “Integrated border management” (IBM) covers all the activities of the public authorities of the member states associated with border control and surveillance. This concept was defined in 2006 by the Council and outlined five dimensions: (1) border control, which includes border checks, border surveillance and the analysis of risks at the border; (2) the detection and investigation of cross-border crime; (3) the “four-tier access control model”, which includes cooperation with neighboring third countries, controls at external border sites and inland border control activities in the Schengen area; (4) interagency cooperation for border management and international cooperation; (5) coordination and coherence of the activities of the member states and institutions, as well as other bodies of the European community and the EU (Leonard 2009:373).

According to Leonard (2009: 357) three factors explain the need for increased cooperation on external border controls amongst EU member states. First, migration has become the object of controversial debates in Europe since the 1990s, which has prompted European states the examine ways of reinforcing border controls to restrict access of migrants and Asylum seekers. Second, the enlargement of ten new Member states in 2004 raised concerns that these member states would not be able to effectively control the new external borders of the EU. Also, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 led to a wide range of measures that were aimed at reinforcing “homeland” security, including the strengthening of external border controls (Leonard 2009:377).

The Europeanization of migration is in particular important when it comes to refugee policy, which cannot be justified on the basis of material interest unlike economic migration. Rather it concerns a normative and moral dimension. Lavenex (2001: 852) argues that by adopting a multi-level perspective on this process of Europeanization neglects a supportive policy frame concerning the protection of asylum seekers. The limitations on domestic asylum procedures and fast-track asylum

processes have been argued to intrude on the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1951 that include the notion of solidarity and non-refoulement. The latter forbids sending back immigrants when in need of protection (Lavenex 2001: 857).

2.3 ‘managing’ European migration

The period after the Maastricht treaty relates to the most important documents that were published in the context of migration. The Title VI of the Maastricht treaty was the starting point of viewing migration as a matter of common interest together with drug trafficking, international crime, fraud and terrorism amongst others (Maastricht treaty 1992: 131-132). As a response the Commission published a statement “On immigration and Asylum policies” (Commission 1994). In this report the Commission acknowledged for the first time that a comprehensive approach is needed in order to fight illegal immigration and control migration flows (Commission 1994: 11+27). In other words, illegal migration is perceived to be a problem that affects not only the national economy of member states but requires a transnational ‘common’ strategy. The report states:

“Preventive measures and more systematic border controls of the kind envisaged above will be important in combatting illegal immigration, but cannot be completely effective in stopping it. Measures which permit the identification of persons within the Community in an irregular situation will therefore continue to have an important role to play as well”

(European Commission 1994:28).

Further examination of this response shows how the idea that illegal migration can be controlled is emphasized. The report argues “controlling migration does not

necessarily imply bringing it to an end: it means migration management. Defining grounds for admission in clear terms makes it possible to translate those concepts into practical policies. The definition and implementation of policies in order to deal with irregular forms of migration will be another essential element in the control of migration flows”

(European Commission 1994:20). According to Bigo (2002: 81) the main technique of securitization is “to transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements permitting specific groups to be blamed, even before they have done anything, simply by categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends and projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual that falls within the risk

category”. This technique tries to control a chaotic future with minimalist management by focusing only on certain identified risky groups (Bigo 2002: 82).

The Amsterdam treaty was enacted 1 may 1999 and transferred important areas from the third pillar to the first pillar of the Union. This meant that the EU finally acquired competence over most of issues related to asylum and immigration, including irregular immigration. This transfer is an important change. While intergovernmental cooperation in the third pillar takes place within the domain of public international law. Cooperation between member states within an intergovernmental framework was now replaced by Community action and under supranational legislation (Hailbronner 1998: 1048). One of the most important goals was “to maintain and develop the Union as an

area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”(Amsterdam treaty 1997:8). In other words, illegal immigration is considered to be danger since it

undermined the area of freedom, security and justice. First, by challenging a free movement of persons (freedom). The treaty of Amsterdam also underlined the connection between the illegal immigrants with crime which established a link to perceive illegal immigrants as a threat to public order (security). Moreover, the treaty argued that controlling illegal migration required police and border security cooperation between all member states, thereby linking it to the area of justice. Buonfino (2004:24) argues that the idea that Europe was perceived to be an ‘area’, also resulted in a Us versus Them logic, administering a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion and legitimizing restrictive measures to the migrants that do not belong (Monar and Mitsilegas 2003:59).

The European Council at Tampere in 1999 started a plan to create a ‘Common European Asylum System’ (CEAS) with a uniform method of determining asylum within the member states of the EU (Levy 2005:27). After the Tampere meeting, the Commission called in a report ‘on community immigration policy’ to the Council and the Parliament stating that “channels for legal immigration to the Union should be made

available to labor migrants” (European Commission 2000: 2). The Commission argued “given the present economic and labor market situation the … that it is now time to review longer term needs for the EU as a whole, to estimate how far these can be met from existing resources and to define a medium-term policy for the admission of third country nationals

to fill those gaps which are identified in a gradual and controlled way” (European

Commission 2000: 2). Here, the commission referred to the growing shortages of labor and the declining and aging populations in Europe (Karyotis 2007:7).

The report also states that an efficient control of migration flows needs monitoring in order to safeguard legal channels, while at the same time combat illegal migration. This includes police –cooperation and border controls (European Commission 2000:12). While the commission does acknowledges that “large numbers of

third country nationals have entered the Union in recent years and these migratory pressures are continuing with an accompanying increase in illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking” (European commission 2000:3), at this point in time no link is yet made

with terrorism, in fact the word ‘terrorism’ is not mentioned at all in this report. Rather, the influx of migrants is perceived to be controlled to benefit of the economy by stating: “This mechanism is designed to enable the Community to provide a coordinated reaction

both to fluctuations in migratory pressures and to changes in the economic and demographic situation in the Union” (European commission 2000:4).

2.4 A cultural justification

According to the Copenhagen School, the primary referent object for the securitization of migration is related to situations when states and societies perceive a threat in identity terms (Karyotis 2007:8). Huysmans (2000:762) argues that discourses representing migration as a cultural challenge to social and political integration are an important source for mobilizing security rhetoric and institutions. Immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are often presented as challenging national cultural homogeneity. The protection and transformation of cultural identity is one of the most important issue through which the politics of belonging and migration is connected according to several authors (Huysmans 2000; Van Houtum & Pijpers 2007). This insecurity often grows from a fear that the presence of immigrants could in time alter the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic structure of the host country, a fear that is often amplified the high birth rates of immigrant groups (Karyotis 2007:9).

According to Huysmans (2000:762) migration policy is part of a political spectacle in which the criteria of belonging are struggled upon. This political spectacle refers to the