Testing the intergroup contact theory in the divided society of Israel : what explains the different Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians?

(1)

TESTING THE INTERGROUP CONTACT THEORY IN

THE DIVIDED SOCIETY OF ISRAEL;

WHAT EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENT JEWISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS

PALESTINIANS?

Master Thesis Political Science

International Relations

The Micro-foundations of conflict

Student:

Ian van der Velde

Student ID:

10127461

Supervisor:

Professor Seiki Tanaka

Second Reader: Dr. I. Harbers

Words:

22230

Date:

24/06/2016

(2)

2

4.2 Qualitative analysis ... 38 4.2.1 Analysis ... 38 4.2.2 Results ... 45 4.2.3 Expert interviews ... 46 4.2.4 Results ... 51 5. Discussion ... 51 5.1 Limitations ... 52 5.2 Alternative arguments ... 54 6. Conclusion ... 55 Literature ... 59 Appendix ... 68

(3)

3 1.Introduction

‘We do want peace, but they will not be quiet, they make a mess of it and therefor peace will not come. If they would take their guns down, there will be peace, but if we take our gun down, Israel would not exist anymore, that is the problem.’

This citation that is excerpted from an interview conducted with an Israeli military officer, represent the attitudes of Israeli people towards Palestinians in general. Since the official declaration of Israel as a sovereign state in 1948, Arabs and more specific Palestinians, form an ethnic minority group in Israel, which is considered as the ‘homeland’ for all Jews worldwide. During the past decades, many scholars published articles on the topic of attitudes towards ethnic minority groups in general (Pettigrew, 1998; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Savelkoul et al., 2010). These theories have been applied to the society of Israel on a much smaller scale, but previous studies have concluded that the majority of the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians were found to be mainly negative and argued how these micro-level attitudes contribute to the unsolvable character of the Israel-Palestine conflict at macro-level (Bar-Tal, 2003; Bourhis & Dayan, 2004). The conflict between Israel and Palestine is a broad and deep investigated topic in the academic world and is often called the most intractable and unsolvable conflict of the current era(Bar-Tal, 2013). Much research has been done at macro-level explanations for the continuity of the conflict as well as for the status-quo in the failing peace negotiations between the different state authorities (Gresh, 2003; Bregman, 2003; Dowty, 2008 ; Barak, 2005). The conflict has its effect on the Israeli Jewish society, and although the vision of the Zionists was that a Jewish state should unite al Jews (Gresh, 2003), the society actually is deeply divided. One specific topic regarding this matter, is the attitude of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians, which is mainly negative. Research from a micro-level perspective that aims to explain the variance in Jewish attitudes, is relatively under-examined in comparison with macro-level studies. This paper will take a step back from explaining the long-lasting conflict and analyse individual Israeli Jewish attitude towards Palestinians, that might be associated with the conflict process.

The attitudes of Israeli Jews on many topics were recently measured by a study of the Pew Research Center. Although the study did not examine the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards

(4)

4 Palestinians literally, the results of the study can be used to indicate the variation of the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians. Findings regarding the question ‘should all Arabs be expelled from Israel’ showed that 46 percent of the Israeli Jews agreed with the statement of transferring all Arabs out of Israel, while 42 percent of the Israeli Jewish population did not agree with the statement. The observation here is that there is huge variation in attitudes. The puzzle here is what explains this variation?

More empirical evidence that offers insights to the variation of the Israeli Jewish population is provided by the dataset of the European Social Survey (ESS). One question of the ESS that was asked in many different countries is: ‘Would you allow many/few immigrant of different race/ethnic group from majority of the country’. In Israel, the majority of the population is Jewish (74,8 percent) and form the major ethnic group of the country (Central Bureau for Statistics of Israel) . The other different ethnic group that the Israeli Jews encounter the most in their country is the ‘Arabs’ (Gresh, 2003; Pappé, 2006). The ethnic group of Arabs in Israel is mainly formed by Palestinians from which their ancestors lived already for centuries in the country that is now called Israel (Bregman, 2003: 47-50). Despite that fact, since Israel dispossessed the Palestinian territory, Palestinians are treated and seen as refugees or immigrants (Sa’di, 2002; Dowty; 2008). Therefore, we can assume that the European Social Survey result talks about Arabs and Palestinians for the case of Israel. The ESS results for the Israeli Jewish indicate again that the general attitudes towards Palestinians is mainly negative. The majority of the population, 66.6 percent, are allowing none or only a few immigrants for Israel, while 33.4 percent would allow some or a lot immigrants. Not only does the results of the ESS demonstrate the variation within Israeli Jewish attitudes, they also demonstrate how the Israeli population in general has relatively more negative attitudes towards other ethnic groups, compared with other democracies. In Germany for example, only 29.1 percent of the population is not allowing, or only allowing a few immigrants of a different race or ethnic group, while the majority of the population (69.3 percent) allows some or many. Denmark (38.2 percent allows none or a few, 59.1 percent some or many) and Poland (29.7 allow none or a few, 67.2 percent allow some or many) have comparable results with Germany.

Although the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians are not directly observed from these datasets, the findings show that the general tendency towards Palestinians is relatively negative. Furthermore, the unique data that is used for this thesis also empirically demonstrates that there is a huge variation in the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians. Of the 99 Israeli Jewish respondents collected during fieldwork in Israel, 43.4 percent have a

(5)

5 very negative or negative attitude towards Palestinians, while 38.4 percent have a positive or very positive attitude towards them. The rest of the respondents were neutral on this question. Why is it then that there is such a high amount of Israeli Jews with a negative attitude towards Palestinians? There are some studies that tried to answer this question already. For example, Giblin (2012) argued how territorial conflict could influence individual attitudes eventually as the conflict divides the society in in-groups and outgroups with both groups having prejudices and negative attitudes towards each other. Despite this possible effects, this theory is not able to offer a sufficient explanation for the variation in the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians. The argument offer only universal explanations for all individual attitudes in general, but do not demonstrate how attitudes of individuals within the population differ from each other. As mentioned earlier, research on this (micro) level has gained little attention in the academic world. A significant explanation for the variation in attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians in particular is missing. This paper will try to fill the gap in the academic literature on this topic, with examining if a geography-based contact theory can explain (a part of) the variation.

This paper will draw on the major contributions of Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998) for the intergroup contact theory, which is considered to be one the psychology’s most effective strategy for improving intergroup contact relation (Dovidio et al., 2003), opposite to the ethnic threat theory (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders , 2002). The theory argues how social contact between different ethnic groups can reduce prejudices and improve intergroup relations. This theory has not yet been tested sufficiently for the different ethnic groups in Israel who are in conflict with each other; the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians. Therefore, the research question of this paper will be: To what extent can the intergroup contact theory explain the variation in Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians?

The main argument of this paper will be that intergroup contact theory between Israeli Jews and Palestinians will have a positive effect on the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians. The Israeli Jewish attitude towards Palestinians will serve as depended variable in this paper, while ‘mixed neighbourhoods’ and ‘personal contact with Arabs’ will serve as the independent variables to operationalize the intergroup contact theory. The arguments of other scholars who offered explanations for the variation in attitudes like political socialization (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015) and exposure to violence (Maoz & McCauly, 2005 will serve as control variables.

Note here that the definition of the Israeli Jewish society is deliberately used in this paper. This paper argues how individual attitudes are shaped and can contribute to the

(6)

6 unsolvable character of the Israel-Palestine conflict, however this thesis will only lay the emphasizes on the attitudes of Israeli Jews, specifically towards Palestinians. How Palestinians and their attitudes could be important micro-foundations will not be discussed in this paper. Furthermore, it is important to provide a clear definition of Palestinians and show how they are different from the Israeli Arabs in Israel. Although the Israeli Jews have a negative attitude towards Arabs in general, their attitude towards Palestinians living in Israel are even more negative (Sa’di, 2002). The Arabs are a devalued national ethnic minority facing segregationist and exclusionist attitudes of the Israeli Jews (Sa’di, 2002). The Israeli Jews distinguish the Arabic population in Israel in Israeli Arabs and Palestinians. The difference is that the Israeli Arabs acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, respect its territorial integrity and reconcile themselves to the status of a minority within Israel, but they oppose Israel as a Jewish- Zionist state (Smooha, 1990). These Israeli Arabs live throughout the whole country and encounter with Israeli Jews regularly. Most of the Palestinians do not acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and wield Palestinian nationalism. This ethnic group only live in the West Bank and Gaza, in the occupied territories of Israel, and encounters between Palestinians and Israeli Jews do not happen often

As mentioned, the Israel-Palestine conflict is a relevant and highly investigated topic in the academic world. Much has been written about the intractable and unsolvable character (Bar-Tal, 1998) and the importance of micro-level dynamics for explaining fundamental origins of conflict (Verwimp et al., 2009; Justino, 2009). Micro-level explanations for the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians have been given by Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal (2015) and Maoz and McCauly (2005), but remain relatively under-examined. How negative attitudes towards Palestinians can serve as a micro-foundation for continuance in the Israel-Palestine conflict is observable in the Israeli society as well. Ben David, an Israeli ringleader has recently been convicted for burning a Palestinian youth, Mohammad Abu Khdair to death (BBC, 2016). The 16 year old Palestinian was randomly kidnapped from the street and murdered mainly because the intense hate of Ben David towards Palestinians. Extreme negative attitudes can translate into extreme measures of individuals, which eventually can lead to tension throughout the whole environment. A possible reason for why individuals have such negative attitudes towards Palestinians is because Israeli Jews and Palestinians in general live separate from each other. Israel is known for having a society in which different ethnic groups live only with themselves, as there are cities only inhabited by ultra-Orthodox Jews and villages populated completely by Arabs. Furthermore, the Israeli government continually keep building separation walls to divide

(7)

7 cities like Jerusalem, Hebron and Bethlehem in Jewish and Palestinian territories, making social contact between the ethnic groups difficult (Haaretz, 2016).

The research question of this paper will be answered with a mixed-method analyses with unique data which is collected with surveys and interviews during fieldwork in Israel. Two cities were chosen for the fieldwork, the first is Jaffa a city which is known for the mixed neighbourhoods and population, the second city is Ramat Gan which is characterized by having only Israeli Jews as the population, who consequently live separate from Arabs and Palestinians. A total of 99 respondents were randomly collected, 48 in Ramat Gan and 51 in Jaffa. Interviews were conducted randomly as well in multiple cities like Ramat Gan, Jaffa, Tel-Aviv, Jeruzalem and Herzliya. Furthermore two expert interviews were held with Israeli political leaders to gain insights from a different perspective. The results of this research provides empirical support for the argument that intergroup contact has a positive effect on Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians.

In order to answer the research question, the rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the literature on attitudes and the shaping of attitudes during conflict. The intergroup contact theory will be presented here and will serve as the theoretical framework for this thesis in which the argument for explaining the variance in Israeli Jewish attitudes will be demonstrated. Then the methodology and the research design will be displayed and the results of this paper will be presented. Finally, in the discussion and conclusion sections, possible implications of the argument will be discussed and the limitation of this research will be indicated.

(8)

8 2. Literature review and Theoretical Framework

The main focus of this paper is doing research on the variance in the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians. This section will analyze the literature on the concept of attitude and how attitudes can be formed and changed. Furthermore, this chapter will specifically focus on the shaping of individual attitudes in times of conflict and eventually the literature that offers explanation for the shaping of Israeli Jewish attitudes toward Palestinians will be discussed. This paper will indicate however that existing literature does not cover all possible explanations for the observable variance in attitudes and that there is no theory that provides solid evidence for this. Therefore, this paper will try to fill the gap in literature with using the ‘intergroup contact theory’ for explaining the variance of the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians.

2.1 The concept of attitude and its importance

Why is it important to do research about attitudes, how attitudes are formed and how they change? Attitudes are mainly important to analyze because attitudes of individuals guide the processing of information for them, and eventually influence their behavior (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). Attitudes determine what people think and do (Allport, 1935), and therefore attitudes of an individual is a core concept of the importance of psychology (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). Attitudes are vital for understanding human thought and behavior and the research performed on attitude plays an important role in understanding how opinions are formed and how they possibly change (Maio & Haddock, 2009).

Eagly and Chaicken (1993: 1) define the concept of attitude as ‘a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor’. The particular entity can be anything that a person holds in their mind, from abstract things to other people and ethnic groups (Bohner & Dickel, 2011: 392). Attitudes can be treated as a long-term memory structure, meaning that thoughts about an object are not easily altered (Fazio, 2007). However, attitudes are not enduring personal dispositions, as evaluative judgments are constructed with accessible information as well (Schwarz, 2007: 639).

Attitudes are time-dependent and not ‘static things’ that are stored in memory (Conrey & Smith, 2007: 718). The attitude of individuals can be subject to change and their attitudes are based on the situation they find themselves in. To some extent, the attitude of an

(9)

9 individual is based on ‘stored memory’, however, this is not invariable and the availability of evaluative information is the basis for possible attitude formation and attitude change (Bohner & Dickel, 2011: 397). Having said that, attitudes do affect how people process information. People generally expose themselves more selectively to information that confirms their attitude (Frey, 1986). This means that once a person has formed his attitude about a specific subject, it is hard to alter this attitude and individuals only absorb information that strengthens their thoughts about the subject and their position towards it. A core assumption of the cognitive dissonance theory is that people are motivated to maintain a form of consistency in their attitudes (Festinger,1957).

What importance can individual attitudes have? People with similar attitudes towards certain objects and subjects eventually gather and form groups. In conflict, scholars speak of the forming of in-groups and out-groups (Giblin, 2012: 26), which will be analyzed later in this paper. In politics, the gathering of individual attitudes towards certain topics can translate into a public opinion.

Individuals influence each other and are affected by each other’s thoughts (Latané, 1981: 343). To a certain extent, this will lead to the mobilization of attitudes because individuals tend to change their attitudes towards the attitude that surrounds them and they eventually form groups (Nowak, Szamrej and Latané, 1990: 368). The opinions of individuals merge into a public opinion which then becomes representative of the mindset of all individuals in that group. When these attitudes are generalized, public policies can be affected by them (Nowak, Szamrej ans Latané, 1990: 363).

In democratic countries, most scientists agree that public opinions influence public policies and the more salient the issue to the public, the stronger the relationship is likely to be (Burstein, 2013: 29). It seems, a component of a democracy is that the public’s opinion is important to the politics of a state. However, it is acknowledged that even a democratic government sometimes ignores its public (Page & Shapiro, 1983). There is a debate in the literature on those who believe that public opinion never affects public policies and those who believe that democracy gives citizens genuine control over their government, and the research is not close to a consensus (Burstein, 2003: 30).

One of the early and important articles in terms of the influence of public opinion is ‘Effects of Opinion on Policy’ by Page and Shapiro (1983) who argue that there is empirical evidence for theories that support the claim that public opinion affects politics, however, they conclude that is unwise to draw normative conclusions about the extent of democratic responsiveness in policy making (Burstein, 2003: 30). Since then it has been argued that

(10)

10 democracies are operating as they should be, public officials are continually responding to the shifts in public opinion (Stimson et al, 1995). Although, it is also argued that modern politics are too complex to be responsive due to legislative rigidity; for example (Jones, 1994; Arnold, 1990: 271-272). Further research has shown a correlation between public opinion and policies (Page, 1994; Wlezien, 1996).

However the different theories have not enhanced each other in terms of credibility, and this is partly because the scholars regularly describe their conclusion in too vague a term to be useful (Burstein, 2003: 30). S. Hays, Esler, and C. Hays (1996: 58) for example, argue that state regulation is ‘quite responsive’ to public opinion, and Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993: 80) argue that the relationship in America between opinion and policy is ‘awesome’. In other words, there is no agreement on the impact that opinion has in policy in absolute terms (Burstein, 2003).

Therefore Burstein (2003) used others’ research data to create a dataset to research if there is a positive correlation between public opinion and policy and if it was significant. Major literature reviews out of journals regarding this subject were used to ensure a conclusion of high-quality. It is concluded that the impact of public opinion on public policy is significant and policy is definitely affected by public opinion, most of the time (Burstein, 2003: 32). Furthermore, salience of a specific issue enhances the influence that public opinion has on public policy regarding this issue (Burstein, 2003: 34). The impact of public opinion will increase, when salience increase

2.2 Explanations for the shaping of attitudes

The literature mentioned previously, described the concept of attitudes, what their importance is and how individual attitudes can develop to group attitudes and eventually a public opinion. But besides looking at the possible effects of individual attitudes, there needs to be explanations for how attitudes are shaped in the first place. During the next section, literature will be analyzed that offer general explanations for the forming of individual attitudes, as well as literature that argues how attitudes are shaped during conflict.

Firstly, a component that offers explanations for the shaping of the attitude of individuals is the political context they find themselves in. The political environment for individuals has an important impact on their attitude and how this attitude changes (MacKuen & Brown, 1987: 471). The theory of public opinion argues how this opinion has an effect on public policies and moreover, it also demonstrates how an individual is an elementary actor in

(11)

11 politics and in society in general (MacKuen & Brown, 1987: 471). When it is argued that an individual has this influence and importance in the society, there needs to be an explanation for how these attitudes are formed. A reciprocal argument is that the political society itself plays a role in the shaping of people’s attitudes (MacKuen & Brown, 1987).

The general argument is that the political context of the environment shapes individual attitudes. It affects the way individuals see politics, become active and how they form opinions on different subjects. Finkel (1985) argues how individuals who are engaging in political activities are shaping different individual attitudes. Societies, like democracies, where political participation of individuals is possible and encouraged, will influence the citizens’ attitudes. These attitudes will differ from the attitudes of people living in more authoritarian governments

The political environment subsequently influences the political ideology of individuals. The political left-right dimension, or liberal-conservative dimension (Jost et al., 2009: 310), is a particularly important aspect of political ideology that influences individual attitudes in general and how they judge politics.

For this left-right distinction, two aspects are interrelated, namely advocating versus resisting social change (as opposed to tradition) and rejecting versus accepting inequality (Jost et al. 2009: 310). Individuals who adopt a right orientated political ideology are characterized by concepts like nationalism, capitalism and individualism, while individuals who adopt a more left orientated political ideology are in favor of concepts like equality, solidarity and socialism (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990: 213-214). The left-right distinction is acknowledged as a significant dimension in political discourse and decision-making (Jennings, Jost et al. 2009: 311). A society with more left political orientated individuals tends to be more ‘revolutionary while a society with more right political orientated individuals tends to hold on more to the status quo and are against possible revolutionary changes.

The notion that attitudes of individuals are affected by the cultural environment surrounding them is a broad research topic since Tingsten (1937) provided evidence for this relation. Since then, empirical studies suggested that individual attitudes and behavior are partly formed by the social environment and the political context (MacKuen & Brown, 1987: 471). MacKuen and Brown (1987) investigated the contextual influence of the society on attitudes of individuals and concluded that indeed individuals’ views are subject to the political context of the society. An example of this political context influence is the voting behavior of individuals (MacKuen & Brown, 1987; Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954).

(12)

12 The study of MacKuen and Brown (1987) concluded more specific, but important indicators for the relation between political context and the attitude of individuals were the interactions with friends and neighbors. The empirics show that personal relations, rather than the general community, are the proximate cause for the shaping of individual attitudes about political subjects and voting behavior (MacKuen & Brown, 1987).

Further important literature argues how economic factors are influential for the shaping of attitudes (Dustmann & Peterson, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Collier et al., 2003; Justino, 2009). Mayda (2006) empirically demonstrates economic determinants are as important as non-economic factors with a cross-country analysis. The findings show that individual attitudes towards other ethnic groups and immigrants are related to the labor market concerns (Mayda, 2006: 510).

Justino (2009) argues how the economic well-being of individuals and households can offer explanations for shaping an attitude that can be a cause for conflict and the duration of the conflict. The poorer the households are during the start of a conflict and during the process, the more likely they are to support conflict narratives or even participate in the conflict (Justino, 2009: 315). Furthermore, empirics show that low income per capita is one the most robust explanations of internal conflict and person’ attitudes (Collier et al., 2003 ; Fearon, 2004; Do & Iyer, 2007; Justino, 2009: 315).

2.3 The shaping of attitude during conflict

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the variation in Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians can be explained. The Israeli society is overshadowed by the conflict between Israel and Palestine that has been afflicting the country since Israel became an independent state in 1948 (Bregman, 2003: 47). Therefore, it is necessary to analyze literature that offers explanations for how attitudes are shaped during times of conflict.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is often characterized as a conflict based on territory, it is argued by (Gresh, 2003; Bregman, 2003; Pappe, 2007; Dowty: 2008). Dowty (2008: 4) that ‘the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the claim of two people to the same piece of land’. Whether territory is the main reason for the conflict between Israel and Palestine, this will not be discussed in this paper as this is not the aim of the research. Rather, there will be analysis on how territorial disputes can shape the attitudes of the population. Territorial disputes often lead to conflict, generating a recursive domestic political environment (Vasquez 2009: 135-138). Those of the public that will be most concerned with

(13)

13 the conflict will have a higher probability of it affecting them. Those individuals who live in fear of conflict, will turn to their leaders for security, allowing the state more and more power in the process, which also encourages more centralized institutions (Gibler, 2012: 26).

Territorial disputes are most often likely to result in conflicts and affect individual attitudes (Gibler, 2012). Bremer (1992) demonstrates that contiguity is the most important predictor of the likelihood of war, however, it cannot be a cause of war solely (Vasquez, 2009). The states who lie next to each other, are more likely to have disputes over their borders and these territorial issues can result in conflict and war. Furthermore, territorial disputes are three times more likely to result in war than any other possible cause for conflict (Hensel, 1996). In addition, territorial disputes also lead to the most casualties and most severe use of force which makes them also the most war-prone for individuals (Sensese, 1996). This leads to the conclusion that territory is a typically sensitive area for individuals, who are more willing to fight for it than for any other issue (Vasquez, 2009).

Ethnic diversity is an important cause for territorial conflicts as well; certain territories are symbolic sources for national identity and pride of the population (Saideman, 1997; Toft, 2003; Kornprobst, 2008). In that case, identity is the cause of conflict and the symbolic nature of territories can be the trigger for the conflict (Gibler, 2012: 28). This argument can be related to the Israeli-Palestine conflict, which is more than a conflict just based on land. Ethnicity and religion are essential factors in the conflict as well. The country of Israel holds a place of great importance for both the Arabs and the Jews. Israel is the ‘promised land’ for Judaism and the only country in the world where Jews form the majority of the population. For Muslims, Jerusalem is important because that is the place where the Prophet Muhammed ascended to heaven.

In addition to the argument of ethnicity as cause for conflict, in the Arab-Israeli wars ethnic ties between the Arabs living in Israel and the surrounding Arabic countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria etc.) resulted in conflict as well as these countries wanted to protect the Arabs that formed a minority in Israel. Neighboring countries with different ethnic groups only enlarge the possibility of territorial conflict (Gibler, 2012: 26).

Territorial disputes often create direct threats to the lives of individuals and this threat can overshadow all other environmental factors that determine a personal and political attitude as well as the tolerance for others (Gibler, 2012: 28). Individuals are anxious when there is the risk of war and citizens seek security of the state during these times, this only allows the state authority than to enhance an large army (Gibler, 2012: 32-33).

(14)

14 The individual’s drive for survival is triggered in times of conflict and territorial conflicts activate their attachment to their homeland (Gibler, 2012: 28). Attitudes of individuals are reformed during times of conflict and people gather themselves and form ‘in-groups’, those who do not belong to the native population become the ‘out-group’ (Gibler, 2012: 29-30). As Coser (1956: 38) argues ‘conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups’. An external threat will increase the internal cohesion of the in-group and nationalist attitudes of citizens will increase (Gibler, 2012: 30).

The conflict contributes to the shaping of positive and negative images (Bar-Tal, 2003). A society that is engaged in conflict develops and maintains societal beliefs that create and strengthen a positive ‘in-group’ image (Bar-Tal, 2003). During times of conflict when experience with violence occurs, people are more motivated to engage more with the in-group (Bar-Tal, 2003: 365). These in-groups put more effort in creating positive images, self-glorification and self-praising. Furthermore, they create the collective feeling that they are superior towards the ‘other’, that are seen as the enemy, they share the idea that there is the salient difference between ‘them’ and us’ (Bar-Tal, 2003: 365).

Negative beliefs towards the enemy are being developed and portrayed simultaneously with the development of positive beliefs towards the in-groups. Delegitimizing terms, categorizing groups extremely negative and excluding them from human behavior (Bar-Tal, 2005: 365), are used and shared with in-group members, to enhance the general shared negative attitude towards others (Bar-Tal, 2003: 365).

During the territorial dispute, the attachment to their homeland becomes the most important value for the group, making political tolerance, trust and other democratic values more difficult to maintain (Gibler, 2012). This is partly because the territory of the state is seen as the property of all the civilians and an attack on the state is experienced as an attack on the individuals’ property. Attitudes and identity are shaped by territorial threats because the threats lead to personal fear. An example of literature that provides empirics on this mechanism is ‘The rally around the flag’.

The rally round the flag effect demonstrates how in times of international crisis, the public set aside their political differences for a coherent support for their government, specifically their president or other national political leader (Mueller, 1970).The president can elicit patriotism among the citizens and gain more public approval for his administration and policies during times of conflict (Baker & Oneal, 2001: 365-366). Although this theory is originally founded and tested only for the American public and politics, other studies showed

(15)

15 that the theory is applicable as well in other countries (Chowanietz, 2010). In general, both the public and other mainstream political parties become less critical of the government during times of crisis (Chowanietz, 2010: 144).

As already mentioned, the public opinion is characterized as a relatively stable counterweight that political leaders at least should take into consideration (Baum & Potter, 2008). Responsiveness to the public is cornerstone for democratic governance (Habermas, 1996). The long liberal tradition with its origins in the work of Kant, Rousseau and Mill, views the engagement of citizens as crucial to well-considered policies and peaceful international relations (Baum & Potter, 2008). During times of crisis, political leaders obtain more public support, which gives them more opportunities to conduct controversial measures.

The rally round the flag phenomenon is an effect that emphasizes the short-term opinion dynamics. The increase in public support and state unanimity regarding public policies is only occurring on short. The effect is described as a ‘knee-jerk’ public reaction to the public policies, which is the consequence of rational responses of individuals based on the information provided at that certain moment and pre-existing individual preferences (Baum & Potter, 2008: 45). In times of crisis, they rely more on the expertise of political leaders and follow the elite positions, partly due to information disadvantage. Therefore the rally effect results from a market equilibrium formed by highly informed political leaders and the public who is less informed (Baum & Potter, 2008: 50).

This theory seems most applicable in times of war as rallies are only triggered through ‘sudden events, when changes in public attitude are most likely to be diffused (Mueller, 1973). This theory can be related to the situation of Israel, who have faced multiple wars with the Palestinians who rebelled against the Israeli government.

What all these theories have in common is their argument that attitudes of individuals are shaped collectively by macro-level causes. These theories assume that the attitudes of individuals are universal and individuals of one ethnic group would have homogenous characteristics and attitudes. This would mean that variation within the attitudes of individuals in ethnic groups would not be directly observable, but this is not the case for the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians.

These theories answer the reasoning behind Israeli Jews negative attitudes towards Palestinians but it does not explain why there is such a huge variation observable within the ethnic group of Israeli Jews. The question than is: How can the variation of the Israeli Jewish

(16)

16 attitudes be explained? The next section will analyze literature which demonstrates how specific variation in Israeli Jewish attitudes is possible.

2.4 Explanations for variance in Israeli Jewish attitudes

The previous mentioned literature demonstrated many different explanations for how attitudes of individuals are formed, and specifically how they are shaped during conflict. However, what is important to note here is that the literature describes the attitudes of individuals as unified and universal for all individuals in the country. According to the arguments of the literature, all the attitudes of individuals in Israel should be affected by territorial disputes, or should be subject to the rally round the flag effect. Despite those possible effects, there is still variation observable within the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Arabs and Palestinians as is shown by the Pew Research Center, but also mentioned by different scholars (Bar-Tal, 2003; Bourhis & Dayan, 2004: 120). This section will analyze literature that offers explanations for the specific variation in Israeli Jewish attitudes.

The state of Israel can be characterized as having two integration policies, an assimilationist policy for Jewish immigrants who are ‘valued’ and an ethnic policy for the national minority which are the Israeli Arabs who are ‘devalued’ (Bourhis & Dayan, 2004: 120). This has its effects on the Israeli Jewish population, creating segregation and exclusion towards Israeli Arabs and Palestinians and endorse Jewish migrants (Bourhis & Dayan, 2004: 120-121).

However, Bourhis and Dayan (2004: 120) argue that the attitudes of Israeli Jews are not to be generalized as psychological profiles have distinct orientations. The population of the Israeli Jews can be divided between those who are tolerant towards ethnic diversity and those who tended to be less tolerant towards ethnic diversity. The individuals who are tolerant towards Israeli Arabs are characterized as secular Israelis and Labour Party sympathizers, while those individuals who were less tolerant towards the minority group are characterized as Jewish nationalists, Orthodox Jews and Likud Party sympathizers (Bourhis & Dayan, 2004: 120).

A first study that demonstrates how different Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians can be explained is provided by Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal (2015), who argues how the political socialization of children contribute to the shaping of negative attitudes. Political socialization is defined as the process through which individuals in a society shape their beliefs, attitudes, motivation and patterns of behavior that relate to the realm of the political

(17)

17 world (Greenberg, 1970; Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015: 2). Pre-teenager children and adolescent children are affected by different actors like parents, teacher, mass media and friends (Barret, 2007, Sapiro, 2004). This political socialization may have a lasting influence on children’s attitudes, already starting from the age of 2 or 3 years old (Connoly, Smith & Kelly: 2002).

In this case for Israel, children are born in an intractable conflict (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015). These children literally ‘grow up’ in conflict where negative attitudes towards Arabs are formed in the early stages of life. When the children learn about Arabs as social groups, they develop negative connotations towards them. The research of Bar-Tal (1996) demonstrates that young children describe Arabs as violent and aggressive by the time they go to kindergarten. These negative connotations follow from the strong Israeli stereotype of Arabs which is predominant in the Israeli society and influence the children attitudes. This particular stereotype is that the Arab is ‘the enemy who wants to claim Israeli territory and is responsible for thousands of Israeli casualties, violence and terroristic acts and war (Bar-Tal, 1996). Furthermore, Arabs are given negative characteristics like primitive and cruel, the concept of an Arab has become a symbol of negativity among Jews in Israel (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015).

The social environment of a child is the basis for forming their attitudes towards Arabs (Bar-Tal, 1996). The image of Arabs is one of the first social concepts that Israeli children learn within social groups, this process begins already when they are 30 months old (Bar-Tal, 1996). The process of political socialization of young children in Israel takes place in three different ways; observation, instruction and direct experience of violence (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015). Children first of all observe the environment in which they grow up and absorb information by being exposed continuously to information about conflict (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015: 7). They hear discussion between family members or visually observe violent representations of the conflict and listen to information provided by the media about the conflict. Children continuously experience the conflict during their early years and consequently they develop preferences for the conflict and biased understandings (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015: 7). They specifically learn to categorize the actors in the conflict; the in-group and the rival outgroup, who are the Arabs.

Another way for children to be political socialized in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict is because of direct instructions (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015: 7). This means talking to children, teaching the children conflict and debating it with them. The main sources

(18)

18 for direct instructions are parents and teachers once again, where parents were significantly more important with providing sources for children’s knowledge (Raviv, Bar-tal 1990).

The last and most influential level of political socialization is when children directly or personally experience the conflict (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015: 7-8). A family member may be injured or the neighborhood may be subject to a bombardment. Children growing up with direct experience have a larger chance of developing negative attitude towards the enemy, there are noticeable differences between children born in peaceful societies to those born in intractable conflicts (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015: 8).

Empirical findings of different studies demonstrate how the attitudes of Israeli Jewish children are formed towards Arabs and Palestinians. Research of Bar-Tal (1996) demonstrated how 78.5 percent of children aged between 2.5 and 6 years old described Arabs as negative and violent. The study of Ovadia (1993) indicated that 65.9 percent of the children who were shown a picture of an Arab expressed negative intentions and 43.9 percent of the children suggested that the man should be killed.

Primary sources for the development of children’s concepts and attitudes towards Arabs are from their parents or other family member (Bar-Tal, 1996). Other sources like teachers and the media are influential as well. Empirics showed that 86.7 percent of the children from the research of Ovadia (1993) mentioned the media as primary source for information about Arabs, while 80.6 percent mentioned their parents and 28.1 percent mentioned the teachers of the kindergarten.

That these negative attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Arabs are developed at early age, show some deep-rooted causes for the conflict. Even though children have little knowledge in their early ages, they already have negative connections towards Arabs (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015). These negative attitudes do not simply change and affect the individual attitudes of Israeli Jews when they are in adulthood and for that reason, those negative attitudes are an obstacle in possible peace negotiations (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015). As the study of Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, (2015) mentions, the personal or direct experience with conflict is the most influential factor for the political socialization of Israeli children and the shaping of their attitudes towards Arabs. The hostile climate in Israel and violent encounters between Israelis and Palestinians create negative climate that contributes to the shaping and propagation of negative narratives towards the other ethnic group (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015). Bourhis and Dayan (2004) stresses that the feeling of security is an important determinant for the shaping of Israeli attitudes, besides factors like religion and political ideology. To be tolerant towards the other ethnic group requires a feeling of

(19)

19 security.

There are multiple studies that argue how the exposure of violence to individuals can affect their attitudes (Maoz & McCauly, 2005; Canetti et al.,2015). Theories that explain the effect of exposure to violence, disaggregate from the theory of how territorial conflict shapes unified attitudes of individuals and ethnic group. Exposure to violence provokes support for the ethnic conflict and hinders support for possible peace compromises (Canetti et al., 2015). How personal experience with violence translate into political consequences and affect personal attitudes is a relevant topic in the academic world (Bonnano & Jost, 2006, Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). A general conclusion from these studies is that exposure to political violence increases support for exclusionist policies and noncompromising attitudes (Kimhi and Shamai 2006; Canneti-Nisim et al., 2009). The relation between exposure to violence and intergroup attitudes have been tested in multiple conflict zones and correlation were found in for example Northern Ireland (Hayes & McAllister, 2001)

Canneti et al. (2015) test the mechanism of exposure to violence on the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians and possible peace negotiations. Their findings showed that for the case study of Israeli Jews, exposure to violence does have a significant effect on their attitudes. Those individuals who experienced violence of the ethnic group of Arabs and Palestinians, were less supportive for political compromises and possible peace with the Palestinians and in general had a more negative attitude towards the other ethnic group (Canneti et al., 2015).

Maoz and McCauly (2015) argue how one of the dominant frameworks in

International Relations theories, realism, is applicable not only to states, but also to ethnic group and individual. Perceptions of threat and power together with exposure to violence effect individual attitudes. During state failure and conflict, ethnic groups find themselves in the context of anarchy (Posen, 1993). The relation between Israeli Jews and Palestinians can also be judged as an anarchic competition where both ethnic groups form threats towards each other and attitudes are influenced (Maoz & McCauly, 2005: 792-793). The threats that other ethnic groups produce ultimately determines individual attitudes. Furthermore, these threat perceptions result in zero-sum assumptions of individuals (Maoz & McCauly, 2005: 793). Because of experience with violence from Palestinians, Israeli Jews form the perception that they can profit only to the extent that the Palestinians loses, there is no possibility of an agreement where both ethnic groups would have mutually gains (Maoz & McCauly, 2005: 793).

(20)

20 The Israeli Jews who are exposed to violence and experience threats of the Palestinians, form more negative attitudes towards the Palestinians and their perceptions on possible peace and compromises with them are influenced negatively. Maoz and McCauly (2005) provide empirical evidence for this mechanism and demonstrate that these zero-sum perceptions of Israeli Jews generally follow out of the believe that Palestinians are a threat to the Israeli society and would destroy Israel completely if they could.

Another possible factor that could explain the variation in the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians is education. Multiple studies have found empirical evidence that there is a negative correlation between the level of education of respondents and their prejudice, or attitude, against ethnic minorities (Wagner & Zick, 1995). The higher the education of an individual, the lower their rejection is towards relevant minority ethnic groups (Wagner & Zick, 1995).

Other possible explanations for explaining the variation in Israeli Jewish attitudes are focusing not on the level of education, but on how individuals are educated. The study of Donita-Schmidt et al. (2004) argue how the teaching of spoking Arabic as second language on Israeli Jewish schools affect the attitudes of Israeli Jews. Their empirical findings indicate that students who encounter Arabic as second language on their school, develop more positive attitudes towards Arabs and Palestinians (Donita-Schmidt et al., 2004).

The importance of the social environment for the Israeli Jews for shaping their attitudes towards Palestinians is emphasized by the previous mentioned studies. Bourhis and Dayan (2004) stresses the importance of feelings of perceived threat and insecurity for individuals and its effect on their attitudes. The theory of political socialization demonstrates how children form prejudices and negative attitudes towards Israeli Arabs and Palestinians (Nasie, Diamond and Bar-Tal, 2015). A basic assumption underlying political socialization research is that political views and attitudes formed at young age, tend to persist into adulthood (Greenstein, 1965; Greenberg, 1970; Marsh, 1971; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz, 1976). However, critics have charged the assumption of this attitudinal persistence into adulthood as this assumption is largely untested (Marsh, 1971)

Furthermore, the theory of how the feeling of threat and exposure to violence affects attitudes of Israeli Jews is only tested for their support towards political compromises and possible peace Maoz & McCauly, 2005). The attitudes of Israeli Jews towards other ethnic groups, in specific Palestinians, are not tested and therefore, these theory does not offer explanation for this specific variation.

(21)

21 This paper will try to fill the gap in the academic literature on this topic, with examining if a geography-based contact theory can explain (a part of) the variation. This paper will draw on the major contributions of Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998) for the intergroup contact theory. The theory is considered to be one the psychology’s most effective strategy for improving intergroup contact relation (Dovidio, Gaertner and Kawakami, 2003: 6). Despite this statement, the theory has not been tested sufficiently for the case of Israel and the intergroup relation between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. As it is stressed in the previous mentioned literature, the social environment is an important factor for influencing individual attitudes, however the role of social contact between ethnic groups as determinant for individual attitudes within this environment is neglected in the literature.

2.5 The intergroup contact theory

The intergroup contact theory demonstrates how prejudices towards other ethnic groups diminish when individuals have more social contact with each other (Pettigrew, 2008). This will result in more positive attitudes of individuals towards the other ethnic group. Before analysing this theory in depth, the ethnic competition theory, which offers contradicting arguments, needs to be discussed first .

The ethnic competition theory in general offers explanations for negative attitudes of individuals towards other ethnic groups. The theoretical framework for this theory refers to two complementing and influential paradigms, the ´realist conflict theory´ and the ´social identity theory´ (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002).

The realist conflict theory argues how the competition over scare resources between social induces conflict of interests and is the main indicator for antagonistic intergroup attitudes (Coser, 1956; LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Savelkoul et al., 2010). Coser (1956) argues that each social system is characterized by completion over scare resources between different ethnic groups. Competition for this resources are mostly studied from a macro- or meso-level, however on micro level, competition between individuals from different ethnic groups occur as well. This competition consequently might affect individuals perceptions and attitudes as the other outgroup members are perceived as an economic threat, which eventually induce hostile and negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Scheepers et al., 2002).

(22)

22 Blalock (1967) demonstrates how negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities are linked with actual and perceived competition over scare resources, as well as how the competition is perceived as a competition between ethnic groups and not between just individuals. Bobo (1988) indicates how perceived competition predicates perceived threat, which is the most direct determinant for negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Furthermore, hostile and negative attitudes are strongly related to positive attitudes towards the in-group members (Adorno et al., 1950; Brewer, 1986; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 1990). The social identity theory applies a more psychological perspective for explaining negative attitudes of individuals towards ethnic minorities and a central determinant for group identification is the process of categorization (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; Savelkoul et al., 2010). The theory assumes that individuals have the fundamental need to perceive them and other in-group members as superior to other outgroups, like ethnic minorities (Savelkoul et al., 2010). This mechanism operates through the process of social identification and social contra-identification (Billiet, Eisinga and Scheepers, 1996; Savelkoul et al., 2010). While the individuals apply all favorable characteristics of the in-group towards themselves as to other in-group members, the outgroup members are simultaneously characterized as negative and this assumption is generalized for the complete ethnic minority.

The ethnic competition theory demonstrates how the social identity theory and the realist group conflict theory complement each other. The processes of social- identification and social contra-identification intensify when there is the competition on scare resources between ethnic groups (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002). The competition is a mediating effect for individuals attitudes towards ethnic minorities, specific towards ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002). Individuals will perceive ethnic outgroups as threats on economic and cultural level, resulting in more negative attitudes towards them. This mechanism is even stronger for the individuals who are less-educated and have lower incomes, as well as for the unemployment people (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002).

However, McLaren (2003) argued how negative attitudes towards outgroup members

of ethnic minorities are reduced if contact between the groups is possible. A contact situation provides the opportunity for individuals to learn that beliefs and goals could actually be similar. The intergroup contact theory introduced by Allport (1954) in general explains how prejudices of different groups towards each other can decrease when groups experience more contact with each other. It is predicted that intergroup contact lead to reduced intergroup

(23)

23 prejudice and in general more positive attitudes towards the other (Pettigrew,1998). The intergroup ‘contact’ is defined as face to face interaction between members of clearly defined groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The different ethnic groups of Jews and Arabs in Israel are perfect examples of different groups in the same society. The application of the intergroup contact theory is only possible when four optimal condition are reached, according to Allport (1954).

These optimal conditions are, equal group status within a society, the different ethnic groups need to have common goals, there need to be intergroup cooperation and at last, there need to be support of the authority, law or custom (Allport, 1954). These optimal conditions are problematic for testing the intergroup contact theory, as Dixon et al. (2005) argues that the four conditions that Allport demands as necessary for the application of the theory can only be reached in an ‘ideal world’. It is more unique than common that in one society, different groups all have an equal status, have common goals, are cooperative and are supported by their authority, for this reason Dixon et al. (2005) provided ‘a reality check’ for the optimal contact hypothesis. Although the contact theory provide good opportunities to reduce group’s prejudices and negative individual attitudes in general, its optimal conditions are utopian (Dixon et al., 2005).

Furthermore, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006: 757) demonstrate with a meta-analysis that these optimal conditions are not necessary to achieve positive outcomes. There is still a positive relation between reducing prejudice and intergroup contact, but it is only less strong. Therefore should the optimal conditions that were introduced by Allport, not be seen as completely necessary but rather as facilitating conditions (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006).

There has been inconsistency and even conflicting results of studies that tested the predictions of the intergroup contact theory. Some scholars argue that contact between different races will only breed suspicion, fear and disturbance and at times open conflict (Baker, 1934), other argue that contact between different groups and interracial experiences could lead to ‘mutual understanding and regard’(Lett, 1945: 35). There is also the argument that when groups live isolated from each other, prejudices and conflict will only ‘grow like a disease’ (Brameld, 1946: 245).

Supporters of the intergroup contact theory in the academic world suggest that intergroup contact reduces intergroup prejudice (Cook, 1984; Harrington & Miller, 1992; Jackson, 1993; Patchen, 1999; Pettigrew, 1971, 1986, 1998). But there are also many scholars who reach different conclusion. Amir (1976) stresses that under optimal conditions, intergroup contact tends to reduce prejudices indeed among different ethnic group and

(24)

24 individuals, however these prejudices may not be generalized to entire outgroups, because when contact occurs under unfavorable conditions, intergroup tensions and conflict and negative prejudices may even increase (Amir, 1976: 308). The meta-analysis of Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) is a major contribution to the field of the intergroup contact theory, as they conclude that after observing 713 independent samples from 515 studies, intergroup contact does reduces prejudices and improve mutual attitudes.

The intergroup contact theory is fundamental for the arguments of this paper. The aim of this research is to analyze how intergroup contact can explain the observable variation in Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians. The argument of this paper is that intergroup contact between Israeli Jews and Arabs will have a positive effect on the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians and can partly explain the variation in the attitudes of Israeli Jews. The Israeli Jewish attitude towards Palestinians will serve as depended variable in this paper, while ‘mixed neighbourhoods’ and ‘personal contact with Arabs’ will serve as the independent variables to operationalize the intergroup contact theory. If the theory is correct, it should be observable that those Israeli Jews living in mixed neighbourhoods will have more positive attitudes towards Palestinians than those who live in separate neighbourhoods. And secondly, if the theory is correct, it should be observable that those Israeli Jews who have more personal contact with Arabs, should have more positive attitudes towards Palestinians than those who have little personal contact or no personal contact at all.

As mentioned already, the intergroup contact theory has not yet been sufficiently tested for the ethnic groups of Israeli Jews and Palestinians. One study (Maoz, 2011) recognized this as well as the majority of the existing research does not study the effectiveness of intergroup contact intervention in Israel. Therefore Maoz (2011) examined with a qualitative longitudinal study, contact interventions between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel. The study of Maoz (2011) focusses on explaining temporal variation, while this research focusses more on explaining the spatial variation as different neighbourhoods are analysed.

It is important to explain here the difference in the definitions of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians. Many studies write about Palestinians and Arabs as they are the same ethnic groups, however there are some notable differences.

First of all, both ethnic groups live in Israeli territory, but the Palestinians live mainly in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza (Sa’di, 2002). The Palestinians and Israeli Arabs share many ethnic characteristic and both are a devalued ethnic minority within Israel who are facing segregationist and exclusionist attitudes of the Israeli Jews (Sa’di,

(25)

25 2002).

The Palestinians are the individuals who, after the official declaration of Israel as sovereign state, remained in Israel and became refugees (Dowty, 2008). Israeli Arabs are mainly the individuals who migrated towards Israel after that it was officially a state (Sa’di, 2002).

The most important distinction that is made by Israeli Jews is that the Israeli Arabs acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, respect its territorial integrity and reconcile themselves to the status of a minority within Israel, but they oppose Israel as a Jewish- Zionist state (Smooha, 1990). These Israeli Arabs live throughout the whole country and encounter with Israeli Jews regularly. The Palestinians do not acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and wield Palestinian nationalism. This ethnic group only live in the West Bank and Gaza, in the occupied territories of Israel, and encounters between Palestinians and Israeli Jews do not happen often.

The two different ethnic groups are treated differently by the Israeli government, as the Palestinians are denied civil and political rights and are excluded from multiple laws like the integration law (Smooha, 1990: 389). The Israeli Jews see the Palestinians as protestors to the state (Smooha, 1990: 389). Israeli Arabs on the other hand are not always Muslim, but some are Christian or Druze and even serve in the Israeli Defense Force. However there is deep solidarity between Israeli Arabs and Palestinians and there is a rising Palestinian nationalism trend observable in Israel (Smooha, 1990: 397). Furthermore, both ethnic groups want Palestine to be acknowledged as independent state as well (Smooha, 1990: 398)

Because the ethnic group Palestinians live mostly in the occupied territories like the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, personal contact between Israeli Jews and Palestinians is hard to measure. For that reason, personal contact with Arabs is used as second best proxy to measure the influence on the attitudes towards Palestinians. It is not optimal to test intergroup contact this way, however as argued here above, both ethnic groups do not differ much and share many characteristic. As McLaren (2003) argued, contact situation provide the opportunity for individuals to learn that beliefs could actually be similar. Personal contact of Israeli Jews provide the opportunity to learn about the beliefs of Israeli Arabs, which are almost similar to the beliefs of Palestinian. The one important distinction is the recognition of Israel. Therefore, contact with Israeli Arabs can reduce prejudices towards Palestinians and shape more positive attitudes of Israeli Jews towards the Palestinians.

(26)

26 In the appendix, correlations and frequencies will show why personal contact with Israeli Arabs is the second best proxy and the best way to test the intergroup contact theory for this research. This will be further analyzed in the results section.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research design

The main task of the empirical analysis of this paper is to test the relation between intergroup contact and the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards Palestinians. For that purpose, a mixed method research is conducted. The data used in this study is derived from own fieldwork in Israel that was done in May 2016 and was collected by a combination of structured surveys and qualitative semi-structured interviews. Because this study is using both quantitative as qualitative methods, the relation between the Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians can be tested and more in-depth insights are collected as well.

The mixed-method research design is used in this paper because more complete answer to the research question can be achieved as gaps left by one method can be filled by the other (Bryman, 2012). It is argued that quantitative research tends to bring out a static picture of social life and qualitative research is more processual (Bryman, 2012). Using a mixed methods research approach offers the ability to combine both elements.

3.2 Data

The research for this study is based on unique data that is collected during the fieldwork in Israel. For testing the relation between the intergroup contact theory and Israeli Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians, structured surveys were used. These surveys were personally handed out in two cities in Israel, Ramat Gan and Jaffa. Because the author of this paper is not able to speak Hebrew, only English speaking Jews were able to participate. These cities were deliberately chosen for testing the effect of intergroup contact. Ramat Gan is a city which is mainly inhabited by Israeli Jews who consequently live in neighbourhoods only populated by Israeli Jews and do not encounter Arabs or Palestinians often. Jaffa is a city which has a mixed population as both Israeli Jews and Arabs are living in the same neighbourhoods and

Testing the intergroup contact theory in the divided society of Israel : what explains the different Jewish attitudes towards Palestinians?