Managing Accountabilities in Street-Level Bureaucracies

Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Managing Accountabilities in

Street-Level Bureaucracies

Master of Public Administration Thesis

Wouter Vendel, s1268945

06/06/2019

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Table of Contents

Managers and Accountability ... 14

The Chain of Command ... 16

Sensitizing Concepts ... 18

Methodology ... 20

Research Design ... 20

Data Collection Methods ... 21

Case Selection ... 22

Analysis ... 23

Analysis ... 24

Conclusion ... 41

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Introduction

Case Description

On September 5th, 2017, the inspection of the Netherlands’ Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) published a report in which they identified unexpected and unwanted diversity in the implementation of the Participatiewet (Participation law) among municipalities. This law was introduced to increase the effectivity and efficiency of unemployment policy by merging pre-existing laws and decentralising implementation to the municipal level. The report, entitled “Handhaving Arbeidsverplichtingen” discussed a study of the implementation of the policies and found that many municipalities were not implementing or enforcing the obligations encapsulated in the law and do not apply the minimal sanctions when clients do not comply. (Inspectie SZW, 2017). The Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) responded that the research was indicative of a struggle with the practicality of the Participatiewet on a municipal level. Municipalities generally prioritise high quality, customised treatment of individual cases over adherence to the control and enforcement of sanctions (Inspectie SZW, 2017). The Netherlands’ two largest municipalities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, followed notably distinct, if not opposing approaches to the Participatiewet. Amsterdam, like most other municipalities, lamented the expected strictness as formulated in the law and prioritised customised treatment and leniency. Rotterdam was characterised by adherence to the sanctions as formulated, implementing the law in a stricter fashion but recording similarly successful results regarding reintegration of jobseekers (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2017). The similarity of results but complete diversity in the way the law was implemented led to public debate between representatives of both municipalities (NOS, 2018). According to the VNG, municipalities benefit most when the formulated sanctions are used as a framework for client-managers to operate within rather than obligatory policy decisions. They emphasise that sanctions and control should not become goals in themselves. To this end, the VNG agrees that the law should be reconsidered as it does not connect well with the reality of implementation on a municipal level. (Inspectie SZW, 2017). In cooperation with Divosa (Association for managers of Dutch municipalities) they negotiated a period of experimentation for a handful of municipalities which showed initiative for implementing a different system to reintegrate jobseekers into the labour market (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2017a).

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The Participatiewet commissions municipalities to provide financial aid to residents that do not earn the minimum living wage and to help, through different channels, the recipients of financial aid back into the job market towards a position where they no longer depend on benefits. It also contains some of the obligatory tasks for unemployed citizens that need to be seen to in order to retain the right of financial aid. The law was implemented in 2015, replacing preceding laws dealing with unemployment and professional disability. It decentralises the responsibility to deal with unemployment towards municipalities, ordering them to provide financial support to those unable to otherwise obtain the necessary resources to live reasonably. Aid provided to the clients to help them towards (re)employment often involves education programmes or retraining when this is expected to significantly increase the participant’s chances of re-entering the labour force (Rijksoverheid, 2018b). The newly decentralised responsibilities were accompanied by a predetermined municipal budget, calculated nationally based on demographic data. The government stated that predetermined budgets would incentivise municipalities to keep their residents out of financial aid (Rijksoverheid, 2018a).

The inspection found that klantmanagers (client-managers; consultants), which is the professional title for the street-level bureaucrats in this case, determined the actual obligations and how these were subsequently enforced. As such, any invocation of sanctions, like the reduction of government payment, must be initiated by the client-manager. This mechanism, however, was not the desired practice of operation and enforcement of the original law, which was intended to be more prescriptive than it ended up being (Inspectie SZW, 2017). The apparent conflict between the needs of the lawmakers, municipalities and street-level bureaucrats raises questions about the prioritisation of interests, responsivity and accountability by the client-managers. The discrepancies between implementation across municipalities, whose decision-makers are dealing with the same legal framework, suggests that local and personal factors play a significant role in the decision-making procedure of the client-managers. To make an attempt at discovering the street-level importance of accountability in decision-making and, subsequently, what could explain the diversity in these mechanisms across various municipalities, I will aim to answer the following question: “How do street-level bureaucrats practice accountability in decision-making

and what is the role of managers in how these accountabilities are practiced?”. Examining how

street-level bureaucrats practice accountability is expected to provide useful results towards an explanation of decision-making motives. Personal records from officials implementing the

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Participatiewet in different Dutch municipalities will provide reliable and relevant insight into how accountability is practiced in decision-making. The second part of the question examines the role and influence of management factors within these municipalities as a possible cause for the diversity in outcomes. The management staff, in this case, are team leaders in their respective municipal departments. These managers usually head a team of five to fifteen client-managers. Different municipalities will be researched in order to discover the explanatory value of management on accountability prioritisation.

Scientific Relevance

This contribution aims to apply an academic framework for street-level decision-making, accountability and management mechanisms to the case of the implementation and enforcement of the Participatiewet in a small-n empirical research project. By collecting empirical data from the implementation structures and procedures in the Dutch context, I hope to contribute to understanding of accountability mechanisms in an environment that is known for being strongly institutionalised but with significant discretion reserved for officials. This research contains an important explorative component in dealing with a controversial policy which has taken on diverse shapes as a result of intended discretion and freedom in municipal organisation, as well as unintended municipal protest. It also allows for the collection of valuable new data regarding organisation-specific accountability mechanisms, which could improve academic understanding of public domain decision-making in many different contexts. Attention to both personal and contextual factors indicates a broad scope which remains open to a variety of different explanatory factors. As Hupe and Hill (2007) conclude, analysing the practise of accountability and bureaucratic action at the street-level remains open to empirical-comparative research. Previous research tends to focus on the personal and ideological drivers of street-level behaviour. The influence of organisational or systematic characteristics on the actions taken by street-level officials is often alluded to without going into the “how” or “why” these factors play a role in implementation and enforcement practices (Hupe & Buffat, 2014). Furthermore, accountability regimes and their appropriateness are highly context-dependent. The fact that accountability comes in so many different types makes its analysis a continuous empirical challenge in which time and context must be considered (Deleon, 1998). Regarding the focus on differences in management

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structures and strategies between municipalities, it has been commented that, despite their influence on street-level work, street-level “chief executive officers” have generally been overlooked in implementation research (Gassner & Gofen, 2018). Managers and leaders have especially been found to be crucially influential during times of reform, although the exact ways in which this influence is conducted is often unclear (Ridder, Bruns, & Spier, 2006). Despite this tendency, it can be hypothesised that management activities and functions may have significant effects on accountability prioritisation on the street-level. Managers themselves are not only part of the broad audience whom account is given to, but may also influence decision-making, e.g. through agenda-setting, internal policymaking or work evaluation.

Societal Relevance

Knowledge about the internal processes that have led to the behaviour of client-managers and departments diverging from the intentions of law-makers is currently lacking. From a societal perspective, this research will provide essential practical insight that enables policy-makers to locate problems in the definition of the law and act accordingly. The divergence of implementation in this case is considered by many to be a threat to equality of rights between inhabitants of different municipalities. In addition to this threat to a pillar of democratic society, municipal disobedience regarding national laws or diversity between their interpretations of these obligations are red flags regarding the guaranteed provision of public service of a certain degree to all citizens. Thirdly, this case has challenged relationships between different municipalities, between municipalities and lawmakers and the hierarchies of different actors in the policy process. A well-functioning public sector requires proper adjustment of these actors to guarantee that their operations complement, not compete with each other. Finally, transparency in public sector decision-making systems and accountability structures paves the way for internal and external constructive analysis. Important considerations for future reform, be it in national or local policy, may transpire when professionals and the wider public are made conscious of contemporary practices.

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In the following chapter, an overview of existing literature on the subjects relevant to this research will be set out to establish the scientific foundations of this contribution. The two chapters after that will discuss the details of the data-gathering portion of this research. Firstly, the practice of using sensitizing concepts to benefit grounded-theory research and the reasons why it was used in this case will be explained. Secondly, the methods and precautions that were applied in the data-gathering process will be explored as well as the reasons for electing to use qualitative research to collect data on the subjects discussed in this contribution. The analysis chapter will treat the findings and provide an interpretation of the collected data based on the ideas and concepts provided in the theoretical framework. Finally, the conclusion will contain a succinct effort to answer the aforementioned research question and provide the researcher’s insight in possibilities for future research and considerations.

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Theoretical Framework

Street-level Bureaucracy

The concept of street-level bureaucracy (SLB) was first described by Michael Lipsky in Toward

a Theory of Street-level Bureaucracy (1969). According to Lipsky, these street-level bureaucrats

differed from other types of bureaucrats in several respects. Most notably, they are constantly called upon to interact with citizens in the regular course of their jobs. In these interactions with citizens, their actions have extensive impact on the lives of their clients. In addition to this, street-level bureaucrats, by definition, tend to have significant independence (discretion) in job decision-making. Lipsky continues to describe the working conditions of street-level bureaucrats, which are generally defined by relative unavailability of personal and organisational resources. Their constant interactions with the public also create the existence of clear physical and/or psychological threat to them whenever difficult or controversial choices must be made. Finally, their jobs are often subject to ambiguous, contradictory and in some ways unattainable role expectations (Lipsky, 1969).

Street-level bureaucrats are tasked with the representation of their government to the population. They do so in face-to-face interaction with the people on which their policies have an effect. In the context of government, the clients’ interaction with these bureaucrats is generally non-voluntary. Lipsky provides three examples of such officials with great influence on the lives of large numbers of people: police, teachers and lower court judges. Although these bureaucrats operate within a bureaucratic system, they often have notable independence and discretion. The dimension of discretion is exacerbated by the considerations that street-level bureaucrats face having to make decisions that affect their clients significantly (Lipsky, 1969, p.2). As a theoretical concept, bureaucratic discretion is controversial in different ways. Discussions have arisen over its existence in different administrations and whether discretion is generally ‘good’ or beneficial to public policy (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014). Nuanced views of discretion put it that discretion is not by definition good or evil, and that its appropriateness depends on individual situations. In line with this, the degree to which the notion of discretion is alive can only be measured on a situation-by-situation basis by measuring the different points and gradations of freedom granted to decision-makers in certain policy junctures (Evans & Harris, Street-Level Bureaucracy, Social Work and the (Exaggerated) Death of Discretion, 2004). Overall, street-level bureaucrats have specific

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expertise about the environments in which policies are expected to make a difference. Because of this, they hold a position of power over their superiors and the political sector when it comes to their knowledge about the frontline reality. This informational advantage makes a certain degree of discretion and influence in the policy-making structure seem unavoidable if not necessary. Another challenge identified by Lipsky are the expectations of street-level bureaucrats’ job performance. The evaluations of bureaucrats’ work include unattainable goal dimensions as a result of ambiguous and contradictory expectations. Unattainability of goals may be due to the lack of control of the client’s background and performance, and the fact that bureaucrats are not free to choose their clientele in the same way that the clientele is not free to choose their government representative. The degree to which bureaucrats consider themselves capable professionals will determine the degree of frustration they derive from institutional inhibitions or client uncooperativeness (Lipsky, 1969, p.7-8). The fact that the performance of bureaucrats will be judged by a variety of audiences (forums) with different interests or priorities means that conflicting expectations are a source of bureaucratic strain. Expectations from peers or the broader public are mixed with their own principles and expectations, making accountability even more convoluted. Conflicts of interest can also be a result of street-level bureaucrats’ roles being communicated through multiple conflicting reference groups (Lipsky, 1969). The challenges posed by these responsibilities are amplified by the fact that street-level bureaucrats work under an action imperative. Not taking a decision is never an option and in many cases the time allotted to them for the decision-making process may seem insufficient. Though not unique to bureaucracy on the street-level, this fact bears greater consequences in context of the previously mentioned challenges, like the threat of physical or psychological violence, of street-level bureaucracy. The issue of street-level accountability is expanded upon by Peter Hupe and Michael Hill. They propose two ideas to explain the accountability problem. First, the idea that actions in the public sector are nested in a multi-dimensional system of institutions and structures which determines the context in which actions are judged. All decisions taken by officials are influenced by the multi-layered context they are nested within and, subsequently, influence upcoming decisions taken by colleagues. The bureaucrats are thus held accountable not only ‘sideways’ in their own layer of governance, but also top-down and bottom-up. Second, different types of accountability exist in the public sector and are considered more or less appropriate in given situations. Bureaucrats

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generally have different ways of dealing with challenges. Examples given are authoritarian coercion, using the formal or perceived informational and procedural authority of a public official, negotiating arrangements by bargaining for a solution satisfying the interests of both parties and, finally, persuasion, where rhetoric and personal approach are used to convince the other party. The appropriateness of behaviour, however, is ultimately a political question. Because their actions are always multi-faceted, bureaucrats must choose which dimensions to structure and which to leave uncovered. Bureaucrats will determine these choices not necessarily on ideological conviction but on practicality as well (Hupe & Hill, 2007) (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012).

In the following section, I will expand upon four different types of accountability that can be chosen, mixed or prioritised in street-level decision-making. Each type of accountability will be operationalised before the empirical section of this contribution. I will then discuss theoretical explanations, based on management and leadership, examining the role of street-level managers in how street-level bureaucrats practice accountability. In order to do this, it is best to compare different municipalities, because it allows for the study of different managers. Moreover, this might yield a possible explanation for diversity in implementation practices. Despite the considered focus on leadership on authority and management dynamics, this set of features will be kept in mind to more appropriately categorise findings. A brief summary of these features will be provided at the end of this section.

Street-Level Accountability

Public Accountability

Every public organisation or network is expected to be publicly accountable. In street-level bureaucracy, this subject becomes even more tangible as the public official is directly facing the person by whom he will be judged and on who’s life his or her choices may have a strong effect.

“Despite differences in their formal positions, within the labour division anchored in constitutional law and democracy and their institutions, street-level bureaucrats are public officials. As public actors acting in the public domain, they are held publicly accountable for the results of their work.” (Hupe & Hill, 2007, p. 283)

Contrary to previous research, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) pointed out that instead of applying discretion solely to make their own work safer, easier and more rewarding, many agents

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will discount these values and make their work more difficult, dangerous and less officially successful in order to respond to the needs of individuals they encounter (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). This established the distinction between the theoretical concepts of state-agents and citizen-agents. Decisions are not defined by their lawfulness or accountability to hierarchical authority but rather to their righteousness regarding the worth of the individual citizen. Their ideological judgment of their relationships with colleagues, peers, the public and the organisation are discovered to be at least as important during the decision-making procedure as state demands, rules and official goals (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). In Cops, Teachers, Counsellors:

Stories from the Front Lines of Public Services they provide examples of the moral dilemma’s

faced by street-level officials. Invariably, it is accepted that a decision-maker’s personality will influence their interpretations of laws and orders and of what should be considered successful implementation thereafter. Citizen-agency can be considered an indication of prioritisation of public accountability. Judgment from the public or clients (and, in many cases, the official’s conscience) is valued highly and considered the main driving force behind decision-making which means that responsivity and service are prioritised over formal procedures and lawfulness. Client-based evaluation of street-level bureaucracy, an element of public accountability, was advocated by Lipsky (2010) and has become more important in respect of participatory citizenship as a valuable contributor to representative democracy. Clients and collaborators from the public are held accountable by the government official they are appointed to but, conversely, the official, according to Hupe and Hill (2007), will be giving account to the public as well. The joint appointments and agreements made between these groups are criteria on which the performance of both parties can be judged. If necessary, the client may opt to formally appeal against the behaviour or results of the official. In other cases, depending on the behaviour and choices of the bureaucrat, clients will show more or less responsiveness in the shape of information they provide for the street-level bureaucrat to process. (Hupe & Hill, 2007).

Hierarchical Accountability

Another type of accountability for public officials to pay attention to is the hierarchy, within the organisation as well as from the organisation to potential overarching institutions. The way and the degree to which hierarchical accountability plays a role in a decision-making procedure depends on the organisational structure overarching the street-level bureaucrat. It entails the

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internal management of the department of which the official is a part as well as accountability to the political lawmakers beyond them. The expectations of the hierarchy have unique importance because in most cases it is this forum that determines many of the conditions under which the official operates as well as the resources available to them.

Much of the academic discussion surrounding hierarchical accountability in street-level bureaucracies continues to surround the concept of discretion and managerial control thereof. Lipsky emphasised the difficulty with which managers of street-level bureaucrats could direct their employees’ behaviour because of the information and expertise imbalance. Street-level workers’, by definition, instate their own rules and procedures to deal with the dilemmas they encounter. The relative distance from the managers to the clients and the contact taking place between the official and the public make it virtually impossible for them to accurately steer policy implementation and application (Lipsky, 2010).

The supposed necessity of hierarchical accountability, then, must be satisfied differently. Academically and practically, New Public Management (NPM) has been accepted by many as the standard for public sector reform and service provision since the 1980’s. The introduction of private sector principles in the public sector strongly affected approaches to management, accountability and performance standards. NPM favours hands-on management, which may decrease an employee’s (perceived) discretionary space but will promote a collegial relationship with managers and allow managers to be aware of the street-level reality and the problems facing their employees. Hierarchical accountability is then realised through professional and physical proximity of managers. At the same time, NPM popularised private-sector-like focus on efficiency, performance standards and output control. This radically changed the criteria on which employees and their managers are evaluated. Redefining ‘citizens’ as ‘clients’ not only increases the regard for efficiency as a part of public accountability to taxpayers, it also overturns “old” evaluation standards of bureaucratic performance which every street-level bureaucrat must report to their superior (Hood, 1991) (Riccucci, 2001).

Professional Accountability

An important part of the micro-network within which street-level bureaucrats do their work are their colleagues and professional peers. The horizontal part of this micro-network allows them to consult with co-workers about their personal dilemma’s and compare treatment of clients. Within

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the organisation, these horizontal relationships are positioned between vertical relationships with managers and chiefs, of whom a degree of professional knowledge can be expected but who are essentially the first step of accountability on the hierarchical ladder towards the political policymakers. Despite their hierarchical insignificance, colleague’s opinions and practices will influence street-level bureaucrats’ behaviour (Hupe & Hill, 2007). The social dynamics of collegial influence on decision-making are more complicated than mere methods of gaining support or advice by a frontline official. Raaphorst & Loyens (2018) find that, even under highly regulated circumstances, uncertainty about facts and value conflicts cause decisions to be strongly influenced by colleagues, even if only by their mere presence. These findings place bureaucratic concepts like discretion and accountability in a social context that shapes them through a myriad of personal and organisational dependencies, relationships, pressures and negotiations (Raaphorst & Loyens, 2018). Both the structure and composition of the social network of peers that support the street-level bureaucrat will have an effect on their performance, meaning that their decisions are developed by and embedded in a contextual web of professional and organisational considerations (Siciliano, 2015).

The degree to which peers within a profession practice “collective self-management” (Hupe & Hill, 2007) varies strongly. Secondly, these peers may not always form unified groups. Relationships between professionals that are organisationally or geographically nearby may be weak while strong relationships may cross over to different professional groups when there is a mutual interest to do so. Accountability in this dimension is based on the expertise inherent to the bureaucrat’s vocation (Hupe & Hill, 2007). Mutual interest in professional socialisation has also been observed during the integration of new employees. Hatmaker et al. (2012) analyse two facets of the organisational socialisation process. On the one hand, managers try to shape the newcomers into productive and fitting employees by instituting organisational practices. On the other, newcomers will actively seek advice and support from seasoned employees to selfishly try and establish themselves as a part of the organisation’s community (Hatmaker, Park, & Rethemeyer, 2011).

Market Accountability

With the introduction of market principles in public policy, and the increased dependence on profitability or profit-based collaborators, a new type of accountability has taken to the forefront

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of street-level decision-making; market accountability. This concept is introduced by Thomann, Hupe and Sager (2018) in response to the accountability model laid out by Hupe and Hill (2007), which their article expands upon.

New public management (NPM) has sparked public sector reform towards privatisation, decentralisation and contracting out, creating a public sector in which government and for-profit actors cooperate in policy implementation. Changes in governance models are known to demonstrably influence the priorities of street-level bureaucrats (Considine & Lewis, 1999). Now, frontline officials must balance public sector values and expectations with those of the private sector, leading to tensions with which they can deal in a variety of ways (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). Thomann, Hupe and Sager sum up market accountabilities as “the economic incentives stemming

from the market that emphasize profit, competition, entrepreneurship and efficiency in policy implementation” (Thomann, Hupe, & Sager, 2018, p. 300).

Whereas previously I discussed the effects of NPM on existing hierarchical structures and accountability regimes, these publications discuss the introduction of an entirely new accountability forum that followed from the imposition of NPM principles on street-level bureaucracy and the resulting changes in professional attitudes. Instead of accounting for behaviour hierarchically in a manner that is reminiscent of private sector organisations, frontline bureaucrats are now argued to be accounting directly to market-actors for their behaviour and position within those markets and their ability to conform to its expectations.

Contrary to accountability based on formal rules (hierarchy), professional values, norms, and attitudes (profession) or societal expectations and client’s needs (public), market accountability focuses on cost minimisation, benefit maximisation, customer satisfaction, shareholder value creation and competition. It is clear from these principles that customers and shareholders are the primary forum to which account is given (Thomann, Hupe, & Sager, 2018). It is accepted that the introduction of these principles to the aggregation of accountabilities for street-level officials to consider has made decision-making more difficult. These new responsibilities tend to come in addition to existing ones, not in their stead. Private actors performing public tasks, however, are found to experience more dilemmas than public ones, for which the priority to serve the public comes more naturally (Thomann, Hupe, & Sager, 2018).

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Street-Level Management

Management dynamics have been considered important determinants for behaviour and outcomes in street-level bureaucracies since its theoretical inception by Lipsky. Changes in the way public organisations operated, like the introduction of New Public Management strategies and principles, put pressure on academics to reconsider their ideas about management and influence in frontline organisations (Sandfort, 2000). Managers’ roles in improving and supervising the quality and productivity of the organisation were clear. So became the conclusion that public managers in general face a challenge of aligning the goal priorities of their workers with those of the organisation and political superiors (Riccucci, Meyers, Lurie, & Han, 2004) (Meyers, Riccucci, & Lurie, 2001) (Brewer, 2005). More recently, different approaches to the unique characteristics and challenges of street-level management have been offered from different disciplines and transformed the way behaviour and differences are being analysed. This section will begin with an exploration of literature on the subject of street-level management and illustrate a dichotomy between two prominent approaches of this subject. On the one hand there is Lipsky’s approach to manager-worker relations which is based in managerial control of discretion and principal-agent problems. On the other hand, we have Evans’ critique of that very approach, which he counters with an approach taking into account professional and social statuses between managers and agents.

Managers and Accountability

Brodkin (2008) calls for a street-level approach to accountability precisely because management of street-level organisations was found to be defined by its struggle to balance discretion with accountability. Brodkin criticises New Public Management’s performance management and performance-based contracting tropes for being unable to deal with the more intricate goals and dimensions of performances in public sector street-level work. The adoption of these principles caused severe tension between simultaneous needs for accountability and responsiveness, making the management of discretion by street-level managers its main distinctive concern (Brodkin, Accountability in Street-Level Organizations, 2008) (Brodkin, 2011). In other words, New Public Management has increased the tensions between professional and managerial interests (Hupe, 2007). The changes to public sector management following the introduction of NPM resulted in what has become known as New Managerialism. This often-criticised phenomenon implies the increased prominence of managing functions in organisations at the cost of professional expertise

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and skill (Brodkin, 2011) (Öberg & Bringselius, 2015), which suggests a shift towards hierarchical accountability regimes. Contrary to Lipsky’s assumptions that managers are expected to control discretionary decision-making, Brodkin claims that public sector interests are better served with laissez-faire management strategies and that the managers’ behaviour should not be expected to be aimed at minimizing discretion.

An alternative view on public service provision, countering the principles of NPM, comes from the New Public Service approach. In New Public Service, a focus on democratic citizenship and benefiting civil society leads to the prioritisation of public interest and applying organisational resources and expertise to serve the citizens. Managers should then not operate entrepreneurially but commit themselves to optimising the societal contributions that they and their employees can produce (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Public accountability in New Public Service is prioritised strongly and should form the basis of how organisations and individuals are held accountable in other venues as well. Professional and hierarchical norms and values are valid as long as they are in the interest of citizens or demonstrably improve the effectivity or efficiency of service provided to them. New public service has gained a lot of traction in democratic western societies and can be expected to have had its effect on street-level accountability. In this case, accountability towards all forums is expected to revolve around the organisation’s public service and mission in some way. This implies that manager influence on decisions and attitudes of professionals, too, should ultimately be aimed at optimising public accountability as it will simultaneously improve the perceived output quality of by all other observers.

“Accountability isn’t simple. Public servants should be attentive to more than the market; they should also attend to statutory and constitutional law, community values, political norms, professional standards, and citizen interests.” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000, p. 555)

On the subject of managerial responsibilities, Gassner and Gofen (2018) propose a perspective on street-level managers that distinguishes them from street-level bureaucrats on the basis that their clients are not individuals, but the collective of clients served by those they oversee. To the managers, these groups of clients have shared characteristics and expectations regarding organisational behaviour in which it is in the interest of the managers that they will be satisfied. The authors propose the concept of a clientele-agent, one who is primarily concerned with the demands and relations of an organisation’s collective clientele, to be added to the formerly

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mentioned state-agent and citizen-agent dichotomy. Their results indicate that this addition is necessary based on the observed efforts of street-level managers to form a reciprocal relationship with the clientele through their main managerial functions (Gassner & Gofen, 2018). If street-level managers are empirically proven to consider themselves clientele-agents, it could be reasonably assumed that management strategies will focus on public relations and accountability strongly. To a lesser degree, it might advance professional accountability via the pivotal role of street-level bureaucrats in the relationship between the managers and their clientele. I consider this approach to be closely related to, although not necessarily a part of, New Public Service policy in its prioritisation of client interests as the basis of all other types of accountability. Whether this degree of manager involvement with the organisation’s clientele is compatible with the suggested levels of discretion and professionalism requires empirical testing.

The Chain of Command

In a study of budgeting reforms in German municipalities, Ridder et al. (2007) distinguish different prioritisations on different levels of management. Top-level managers considered reform to be necessary considering the need to modernise and would focus on improvements to efficiency and professionalism. Middle managers, meanwhile, were key in identifying threats and opportunities during the implementation and would focus on practicality and effectivity. It was up to middle managers to introduce the reforms into well-established routines and procedures on the street level. The researchers found that the cooperation and relative positions of different layers of management would ultimately determine the manner and chance of success of implementation. Organisational context, the type of clients the organisation deals with and the personal expectations of managers regarding reform policy are all factors to take into consideration. Managers of obligatory offices (institutions regulated by law) are more likely to reject reform due to scepticism or routinisation whereas managers of voluntary offices (regulated locally) were more receptive (Ridder, Bruns, & Spier, 2006). In other words, a strong difference in valuations of accountabilities has been observed between different layers of management but also within layers. A dissimilarity between the priorities and accountability structure of ‘local’ and ‘senior’ managers was also discovered by Evans (2011). In a study of several social services institutions he observed frustration in local managers with the senior managers’ focus on cost-cutting and meaningless performance targets. Local managers would identify more with their street-level colleagues than with their own superiors, showing a great commitment to professional standards. In doing so, they prove another

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obstacle, in addition to the limitations identified by Lipsky, to the ability of senior managers to control and direct street-level decision-making (Evans, 2011). It is expected that loyalty to the street-level over authority improves the chances of local managers to be inclined to follow client- or professional accountability values rather than hierarchically imposed ones. Still, their position and requirement of accountability towards higher levels of authority can be expected to put pressure on their commitment to these values, depending on context. Defining the conditions of these contexts and their subsequent influence on the development of organisational culture and practice is open to further research as it can be logically expected to affect policy implementation and, therefore, differences between organisations or governments.

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Sensitizing Concepts

As is common practice in qualitative research using grounded theory, sensitizing concepts, an approach conceived by Blumer (1954), will be used to alert the researcher to ideas and data provided through the interviews. The data in this study is derived from semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable experts in street-level bureaucracies. In order to maintain a broad scope and allow for a wide variety of data pointing towards explanatory factors, three general sensitizing concepts are proposed. Using the data gathered in the interviews, these concepts can be elaborated upon inductively, thus illustrating more clearly how they manifest themselves empirically. Collected data will be analysed for indicators, be they implicit or explicit, that give a better understanding of the professionals’ perceptions of these concepts, their degrees of importance and in which way(s) they are of importance.

Primarily, this study is focused on multiple accountability. The first set of sensitizing concepts result from the literature review on accountability in street-level bureaucracy. The four predefined accountability forums are the first set of sensitizing concepts; Public, Professional, Hierarchical

and Market accountability. As this contribution is aimed at discovering the way(s) in which these

forums are controlled by street-level bureaucrats, how their responsibilities to each relate to each other and to what degree they affect decision-making, the next sensitizing concept revolves around

Accountability Management. Keeping in mind the ways and directions in which behaviour or

decisions can be accounted for in street-level bureaucracy, the interviews give a clear indication of the balance of power between these forums, the perceived pressure from each of these groups and methods for coping with those pressures and satisfying expectations for each of them.

Finally, the role of managers in street-level bureaucracy will be investigated. Specifically, the way(s) in which they affect the aforementioned accountability regimes will be studied. Their notable role as the first following shackle in the chain of hierarchy gives them a potentially crucial role to play in the management of accountabilities on the street-level, hence the importance given to them in this study. In the literature, several examples of management types can be distinguished which emphasise various roles a manager can fulfil. These types of management will make up the remaining sensitizing concepts constituting my analysis. First, resulting from the debate around a manager’s relationship with discretion on the street-level, attention will be paid to the idea of a

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necessary for the organisation’s public service provision or delimit it to establish organisational control and hierarchical accountability. Contributions to the approach of New Public Service will signal indication to a Manager of New Public Service, where the perspective’s ideals regarding client interests and the prominence of public accountability overarching all other types of accountability could be traced in manager behaviour. Thirdly, Gassner & Gofen’s (2018) concept of a Clientele Manager will be analysed to examine the relationship between a manager of street-level officials and the public that is served by those he manages. Finally, literature regarding the manager’s position in a chain of command and, specifically, Evans’ (2011) contribution about local managers’ loyalty to the professionals rather than superiors, leads to the final sensitizing concept; the Professional Manager. The degree to which this concept is empirically supported depends on the distribution of attention paid to professional accountability and hierarchical accountability when managers are confronted with conflicting expectations.

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Methodology

Research Design

The goal of this contribution is to uncover the “accountability regimes” at work within municipal departments tasked with the implementation of the Participatiewet and explore management-related explanations for the diversity of implementation outcomes between municipalities. To find data related to these subjects, qualitative research was expected to yield the most relevant results as a result of the potential for variance and depth in answers given to questions that are of an exploratory nature. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with policy directors/managers and frontline implementing officials across different municipalities. In each of the four municipalities, one street-level official and one manager were interviewed. In addition to interviews with professionals on their respective municipal departments, one interview was held with a coordinator at the Werkgeversservicepunt (WSP; Service organisation for employers) in The Hague. The WSP is a key organisation in any municipality, with the objective of managing relationships with employers and assisting those who are capable of re-entering the labour market in finding suitable employers. Semi-structured interviews are the preferred method of research in this case because of their ability to uncover detailed data, especially in relatively unknown research areas. The explorative part of this contribution would not have been possible without semi-structured interviews with professionals who, in many cases, provided new and unique insights that could not have been predefined through either logic or literature (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003). The interviews were set up semi-structured, with a strong emphasis on concepts and perceptions put forward by the respondents, to accomplish honesty and internal validity in the results. No assumptions were made in advance about the presence of accounting pressures or the role they could play in decision-making and respondents were encouraged to apply their own weight to the topics at hand. This is considered a neutral and consistent way of gathering data, ensuring that no bias from the researcher is present and that respondents would produce similar data when presented with the same process at another time (Krefting, 1991).

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Data Collection Methods

Respondents were made aware of the role of their contributions to the research and encouraged to focus on their personal experiences and organisation. Frontline officials were specifically asked to share experiences of routine and non-routine client interactions in order to get an understanding of their work and identify where difficult decision-making moments may lie. It was expected that asking the respondent to recall a challenging situation facing a client will allow them to explain which difficulties they experience and how those might affect their decision-making. Following the examples given by the respondent, questions were then asked about their personal and professional relationships with clients, colleagues and hierarchical superiors. Getting an image of the considerations made in these situations shed light on the prominence of accountability forums and the ways in which they manifest themselves at different stages of the respondent’s work. In addition to illustrating the context of actors within which decisions are taken, the respondent was also asked to define the relationships between these actors and how they (could) influence decisions. The relationship with the manager and their role within the wider organisation received extra attention as questions aimed to uncover intended and unintended ways in which they affect street-level behaviour. Naturally, more light was shed on these mechanisms in the interviews with managers, where the pivotal role they play, both between colleagues and between the organisation and higher echelons of hierarchy, was further examined.

This research is open to a wide variety of answers regarding the accountability systems of street-level bureaucracy. Therefore, much of the content of the interviews will be determined based on the data and leads provided by the respondents. They were given the opportunity to speak freely about their experiences and perceptions of the working environment by asking open questions regarding their daily work and asking further questions on topics they imply to be of significance. Not only was this expected to yield more accurate and in-depth results, it was also expected to motivate respondents to provide a more thought-out and satisfying response. In addition to aforementioned measures that have been taken to guarantee neutrality in the interview process, there was no expected threat to the truth value of the data collected as a result of either biased questioning or contentious topics being discussed. Significant effort has been put in guaranteeing the internal validity of results to improve the trustworthiness of outcomes (Krefting, 1991).

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Case Selection

Interviews were conducted with a street-level official and a manager at the municipalities of Delft, Den Haag, Leidschendam-Voorburg and Pijnacker-Nootdorp. These respondents are street-level klantmanagers (consultants) who manage a caseload of civilian clients that are affected by the Participatiewet. In Delft, Leidschendam-Voorburg and Pijnacker-Nootdorp interviews have taken place with managers of the consultants in their respective departments. With slight differences across municipalities, these managers command the consultants, a section of the consultants or consultants as well as professionals in another section that is not directly related to the Participatiewet. In Den Haag, the respondent was a manager/coordinator of the

Werkgeversservicepunt (WSP), a separate municipal organisation responsible for the mediation

between employers and the municipality’s caseload.

Differently sized municipalities within the Zuid-Holland provincial region were selected to avoid bias resulting from the size of the organisation and the population served influencing the perceived relationships between accountability forums. Provincial differentiation and variance on the controlling political party were not considered issues of any importance to the implementation of the Participatiewet. No empirical or logical argument for differences across geo-provincial or party-political lines has been discovered, neither in the ministry’s inspection’s publications nor responses given by municipal actors and the VNG. This assumption follows mainly from the fact that administrative policy and structure transcend political cycles and policy directors and not politically appointed. Neither the ministry’s inspection’s report nor media publications following it suggested political or geographical discrepancies and passed political-ideological influence as a relevant factor. Following the first interviews at Leidschendam-Voorburg, established contacts between respondents there and colleagues at the other municipalities allowed for easy and focused identification of other respondents. Street-level respondents or facility staff were then able to provide contacts with their respective managers. In Den Haag, a managerial contact at the Werkgeversservicepunt, a department adjacent to the Participatiewet and tasked with the implementation of many of its duties, was contacted to provide a more comprehensive and diverse perspective on the implementation.

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Analysis

The data gathered from these interviews was analysed for indicators pointing towards the leading factors that have determined street-level behaviour. Put together, these indications are expected to sketch a clear image of the dynamics that have shaped the nation-wide implementation procedure of the Participatiewet. To formulate an articulate answer to the question at hand, indicators in the answers provided by respondents ought first to have been organised for comprehensive results to be conceivable. The indicators were initially coded exploratively (holistically) to identify broad themes within the responses. This was useful in further determining what the broad categories of data were, which would be of help during the formulation of answers to the research question. The emerging categories are then further elaborated upon by focused coding, using thematic and conceptual similarity to specifically organise data with the help of spreadsheet software capable of sorting and organising the data (Saldaña, 2009). The emerged dataset was then able to be structurally analysed to formulate more detailed discussion of the relevant concepts, encompassing similarities and differences between responses from all respondents. The following chapter will provide an overview of the findings resulting from the analysis of data collected through the interviews.

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Analysis

Conversations with knowledgeable professionals at the frontline of policy implementation have provided valuable insight in the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch Participatiewet policies on the street level. Semi-structured interviews gained insight in decision-making procedures and accountability considerations that play a role in the day-to-day application of the Participatiewet. All quotations in the following sections are excerpts from the transcripts translated from Dutch by the researcher.

Public Accountability

Klantmanagers (consultants) and their managers relate strongly to the broader societal goals that

underlie their professions and justify decisions. A keyword that is featured very often is ‘maatwerk’ (a bespoke, custom-made or tailored service). Consultants value their discretion and professional judgment as crucial elements of their capacity to provide the service that is expected from them and the organisation they represent; to help their clients re-enter the labour market as soon as possible. Public accountability is achieved predominately through the relationship that is forged between the official and the client. Consultants stress the importance of an honest and reciprocal relationship between them and their clients that is based on cooperation and a common goal rather than any hierarchical or punitive positioning. In order to provide clients with the most fitting solutions, they must be prepared to keep an open mind on both ends of the procedure. Namely, when meeting the client and determining where their problems lie and, subsequently, in seeking out the most fitting path for them to regain access to the labour market. This is where discretion and the aforementioned ‘tailoring’ come to play an important role in the executive capacities of these organisations and why I argue that providing trajectories tailored to the personal circumstances of the client is the most significant way in which public account is given.

They (consultants) will sometimes ask me whether we can buy a specific service for a certain type of client when they think there is something lacking to help them back to work. In those cases, we’ll usually look at it and do it. There is a lot of flexibility in that and we are able to provide tailored services. Manager – Municipality Leidschendam-Voorburg

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In line with Maynard-Moody & Musheno’s findings, street-level bureaucrats are willing to make their own jobs and lives more difficult than it must be in order to provide the best services, to the benefit of their clients.

It's possible for it (tailoring) to contribute to a larger workload but that is what it’s all about. That is what we are trained to do and I believe it makes my profession more beautiful and enjoyable to be able to provide bespoke services and not do the same thing every time; to really see who my client is, what their talents are, what their motivations and limitations are and how we are going to help them. Consultant - Municipality Den Haag

Managers, too, encourage tailored service provision and are willing to help their consultants provide optimal services to their clients by seeking the limits of what is administratively possible.

If one of our candidates requires something that seems impossible by current policy, let’s see if there is anything we can do in line with the intention and scope of the law, without breaking it, to realise that. I believe we are beginning to treat the law with more nuance lately and that makes me glad. Across the entire social domain, you’re beginning to see more and more programmes originating from municipalities and national government to provide tailored services and solutions to the public., Manager - Municipality Delft

Similar to Brodkin’s (2011) findings, managers in street-level bureaucracy do not appear to be concerned by their employees’ discretion. Instead, they encourage professional judgment by applying themselves as an instrument for consultants to find and, in some cases, shift the boundaries of what is achievable in public service. Through this mechanism, managers become aware of the challenges faced by both their employees and their clientele whenever policy is lacking. It is the manager’s role to relay street-level experiences to the higher echelons of administrative and political hierarchy as well as introducing changes and reform being imposed on their department. To a certain degree, this can be considered clientele-management. The manager’s main managerial functions are linked to the performance of their department, which, in turn, is strongly associated to the amount and quality of service provided to the clientele. Managers are therefore required to keep their fingers on the pulse of the clientele to become aware of their qualities and limitations. That way they know the challenges of their staff and what the public requires.

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Should clients feel inclined to file complaints or appeal a decision taken by their consultant, this can not only lead to a loss of face for the official and organisation concerned but is also likely to severely bruise the relationship between the client and the official. To clients, the possibility to appeal any decision taken by their consultant is a way of claiming accountability. Consultants deny having to consider the risk of appeal in regular proceedings but are kept aware of its possibility by internal documentation standards and requesting client approval on many of the steps taken.

When you impose a sanction, you will get a different relationship. You’re no longer the man helping them find work, you’re also the bogeyman who’s touching their money. It’s something to consider that when you strike them financially you will get a different relationship, which could make the trajectory to a job more difficult. (…) It must be very well thought out by the consultant. Consultant – Municipality Leidschendam-Voorburg Professional Accountability

The consultants seek to provide tailored solutions for each of their clients and, as a result of that, often depend on a range of input and cooperation from colleagues in their own department and across other governmental services in the social domain. Most of the contact with other professionals is of an informal nature and is started by consultants when they judge a client’s problems in a certain area to be severe enough to make it practically or ethically unreasonable to expect them to work until it is seen to. In severe cases, multidisciplinary teams can be organised formally within a municipality to attend to the situation of a particular client which, in many cases, puts the search for a job to the side but does not separate the client from their ‘klantmanager’. Examples of issues that need to be dealt with are addiction, child-care, (temporary) mental or physical health problems, debts and the home-situation.

Professional accountability is achieved by involving peers from various fields, using their judgments to support or reimagine the best road to take with the client and coming to an agreement on a professional level before further steps are taken. In some cases, professionals are organised in multidisciplinary teams aimed at tackling a specific case or type of case. Most of the time, contact between the disciplines is situationally instigated by the consultant.

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So, you can submit your own case to one of these multidisciplinary teams, where it will be discussed, and thoughts are shared. It’s a great instrument to bring in cases you’re getting stuck on, when you’re thinking;” Oh my, there’s a lot going on here. I can’t figure it out”. For example, they have children at youth services or are dealing with psychic problems – those are real multi-problems. Consultant – Municipality Leidschendam-Voorburg

Respondents also emphasised the great amount of informal deliberation and discussion that takes place between consultants as they consult each other informally for different outlooks and second opinions on what to do with their cases at hand. The management of these micro-networks takes a lot of the consultants’ time but is crucial to their being able to perform the tasks that they are expected to carry out. Managers point out the professionalism of their consultants and support the creative and deliberative processes that take place, hoping that the tailored solutions that follow will succeed in contributing towards the organisation’s goal of maximum outflow (from their population of people entitled to unemployment benefits). Consultants give account for their decisions towards their colleagues by informally deliberating over the many options that are presented to them regarding each client. This phenomenon is closely related to the considerable discretion granted to each professional and the professionalism they are expected to possess when guiding their clients.

We’re sitting next to each other in our unit, so there’s automatically a lot of contact with colleagues. Whenever I say; “I’ve had a difficult situation”, we can always talk about it. We also have a weekly team meeting where cases can be brought in so we can have a look at what you’re getting stuck on or doubting. Me and my team then have an opportunity to provide feedback. Consultant – Municipality Den Haag

Strikingly, contact between officials across different municipalities on the street level is minimal when compared with the amount of contact among officials within municipalities. Sporadic meetings or events are organised, formally, to enable discussion and diffusion of practices, though little enthusiasm or interest is shown for these occasions. Consultants value these contacts only when they are directly of influence on their caseload but will generally see no value in spending time on maintaining these relationships. Higher levels of management will have policy-related contacts with nearby municipalities and create formal collaborations like the ‘Arbeidsmarktregio” (Labour market region). These projects formally streamline practice and prevent unnecessary

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collision or competition between municipalities, but do not bring together street-level officials physically or idealistically.

As it stands, they’ll incidentally try to set up regional projects stemming from the Werkgeversservicepunt in cooperation with Lansingerland, Zoetermeer and Pijnacker; that’s it. But to say that there is mutual collaboration? No. It’s mostly related to the labour market, because the hierarchy decided that we must participate. I don’t think it has any added value, it’s only a waste of time. Consultant – Municipality Pijnacker-Nootdorp Hierarchical Accountability

Hierarchical accountability is given predominately by documenting every interaction and decision taken and, where applicable, referring to the appropriate legal articles to justify those decisions. The degree to which attention is then paid to these documents varies between municipalities. In some cases, reports are always checked before a decision taken by a consultant is ratified.

The consultant has the conversation and does their research. They then formulate an advice; to allot benefits, for example. They then submit it to a colleague for review. The colleague tests and approves it, which all happens digitally. Once it’s been provided with a colleague’s paraph, I can sign for it myself. Manager – Municipality Pijnacker-Nootdorp

Some respondents showed frustration with the amount of documentation that needed to be provided in various systems, indicating a cost of time and effort that is perceived to be better spent otherwise.

It is registered in our AFAS-system, a client tracing programme. Besides that, we have the ‘Suite’ process-tracking system of the municipality in which statistical data for the CBS (Statistics Netherlands) is also registered. Those are mandatory proceedings. You can imagine that with AFAS and Suite we must enter a lot of information twice. […] We don’t like doing double administration, we want to work with the people. Consultant –

Municipality Delft

It is important to note that these systems vary across municipalities and, therefore, may play a role in consultants’ perceptions of the relative importance of different accountabilities. Hierarchical accountability, in this case, could negatively affect consultants’ performances and therefore

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impede the organisation’s chances to reach its targets. Generally, however, the dossiers that are written by consultants are of little interest to their superiors or colleagues if the client agrees to what is decided. Considering the rarity of serious conflict arising over decisions taken by consultants, documentation is seldom scrutinised. When the client’s wishes are not granted, however, or they are to be sanctioned, documentation needs to be tightened up legally in order to be able to withstand the threat of appeal. At this point, colleagues with a legal background are often deployed to check and edit the dossiers, bearing in mind the possibility of future lawsuits.

We’ve made the arrangement internally that when a request for a certain provision is not going to be procured, a jurist will be available to examine my work. They will go through the entire resolution to see whether it is properly argued and whether the correct legal grounding has been used. That’s not to say that no mistakes are ever made, but the testing already takes place at that point. When I do approve the full provision, there is no need for the jurist to look at it; the client won’t appeal anyway. For that reason, the arrangement has been made to implement a separate judicial test whenever you deviate from the client’s wishes, as a double check. Consultant – Municipality Pijnacker-Nootdorp

This practice emphasises the importance of public accountability to the street-level officials and its pervasiveness in other areas of accountability. Despite the client’s right to gain insight into their own dossier at any time, it is predominately an instrument for hierarchical accountability over made appointments. The hierarchical importance, however, of these documents is inseparable from the public accounting taking place within the decisions underlying them.

Political control and influence on decisions taken by consultants are minimal. The municipal departments that are tasked with the implementation of the Participatiewet are told by their political principals what is expected of them but given considerable freedom in the way they decide to fulfil their mission. Consultants give account to their managers by managing their own caseload as their contribution to organisational targets. The organisational targets are generally reducible to 1) directing a number or percentage of people back into the labour market (outflow) and 2) maintaining or decreasing the total number of people entitled to unemployment benefits. Consultants have formal and informal contact with their manager about the management of their caseload, giving managers a perspective on potential issues that prevent outflow from taking place. Managers are not the ones with the greatest knowledge about Participatiewet legislation, nor are