The Rise of the
Algerian Hirak
How the Algerian government failed to frame the popular
movement in its favor
First demonstrations of the Hirak; Place du 1er Mai, Boy with vinegar scarf to protect from ‘bombes lacrymogènes’, Pictures taken by the author, 22/02/2019
Name: Kimberlynn Nina Chaves
Student Number: s1346474
Date: 12 / 01 / 2020
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. S.D. Willmets Second Reader: Dr. C.W. Hijzen
2 Foreword
To my mom,
Forever grateful for the perseverance and the solution oriented mind-set you thought me. The glass is ever half full, never half empty. I love you.
3 Table of contents
Abstract………4
Chapter 1: Introduction……….4
Chapter 2: Literature review……….7
I. Algerian revolutions: past and present………7
II. Algerian Press: past and present experiences………10
III. Algeria and the Arab Spring………..…13
IV. Framing the Arab Spring………...…14
V. Framing: a theoretical foundation……….…16
Chapter 3: Research Design………18
I. Conceptualization: Case, Definitions and Hypotheses……….18
II. Method: data selection, sample description and content analysis………20
A. Detection of (pre-defined) frames………..22
B. Proposed problem definitions………22
C. Given causes of protest...23
D. Solution portrayal………..24
E. Limitations and concluding remarks……….24
Chapter 4: Results………..26
A. How was the movement framed? ……….26
B. How was the movement defined? ………30
C. How was the movement portrayed? ……….32
D. Which solutions were described?……….…………35
Chapter 5: Analysis and discussion of the findings……….……39
A. Frames………...39
B. Problem definitions………...42
C. Diagnosis of the causes……….…43
D. Suggested solutions………..…44 Chapter 6: Conclusions……….46 Acknowledgements……….49 References………..49 Appendix………...54
4 Abstract
During the twenty-first century, upheaval has become common ground for the Middle-East and North-Africa. This thesis assesses how the Algerian Hirak was framed in state-run and independent media outlets during the rise of the movement leading up to president Bouteflika’s resignation. Analysis of French-language articles showed that the official newspaper’s first response was to frame the crisis as a conspiracy against the Algerian state. They downplayed its credibility and imposed the condition of peaceful demonstration as a threat. By threatening the demonstrators and ignoring to address the central demand of the uprising, the demand for resignation of president Bouteflika, the independent press issued a security frame covering the fear for security of the people. As the movement grew massively over the first weeks, the political elite was cornered and bound to address the apparent reality. Making a 180° pivot in strategy, the official narrative changed into sharing the need for ‘change’. This change was not articulated in the same manner within the state-run and independent newspapers and created popular confusion. The failure of the official newspaper to frame the Hirak in a way that benefited the narrative of the government resulted in the resignation of president Bouteflika.
Key-words: Framing, Algerian Hirak, state-run and independent media
Chapter 1: Introduction
Since the start of the protest movement on the 22nd of February 2019, millions of Algerians have taken the streets to demonstrate their discontent with the Algerian government and state structure. They demanded that all forms of corruption, nepotism and clientelism had to stop. Many felt that the government was causing an economic malaise creating lack of opportunity for the country’s young population (Kadi, 2019). In his 14th of July speech, the Ambassador of France to Algeria, Sir Xavier Driencourt, spoke of the unexpected nature of the movement: “Many of us did not see the tremendous power of change that this country held deep within. In a few days, we found ourselves in a transformed world, with redefined horizons, new perspectives and Algeria today is not the one I knew during my years here.” (Driencourt, 2019). Authorities failed to connect with their people and did not respond to voiced demands. After the first demonstrations, government newspaper El Moudjahid tried to repress the impact of the movement by downplaying the marches.
As the internet was severely slowed down by the government during the months in which the movement emerged, printed newspapers played a central role. For many, this was the main source of information on the protest movement, its demands, as well as the popular support it would receive. As such, there is
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a clear social relevance in examining how the movement was portrayed in newspapers in this initial phase. This is especially the case for the newspapers with close ties to the government, as this helps us to better understand the nature of the Algerian government, as well as its intentions.Understanding these intentions enables citizens to articulate their own position towards the government. Moreover, the people are then empowered to (re)claim their rights. Although individuals may not have direct involvement with recent events, they are dependent on media coverage to form opinions and make rational decisions. It is thus crucial to make sense of the different frames that the media uses to cover the demonstrations. This, to make sense of specific opinions and choices that are made by individuals in certain contexts. As the Algerian people does not feel represented by its government, it condemns the lack of actual democracy. This feeling and consequent crisis is not exclusive to Algeria, as numerous countries like Sudan, Egypt, Libya and Syria experience comparable situations (Clarke, 2019). A free press is a critical component of democratic involvement and participation. Therefore, if Algeria is to move towards a democratic society, it is essential to understand how political issues are reported.
Independent Algerian newspaper El Watan defined the movement with the nomination of Hirak which was defined as: “Word meaning ‘movement’ in Arabic, and adopted as such in other languages by the
media. The term is linked to the ‘Hirak el Djanoub’ (Movement of the South) of Yemen created in 2008 and to its armed wing, the resistance of the South. ‘Hirak’ has been applied to the current Algerian movement, sometimes with the specification of ‘Algerian-Hirak’ to limit confusion with Yemen. In Algeria, it is a national, peaceful and politically oriented popular movement.” (Ferhani, 2019, p. 16).
As the movement is relatively young and still ongoing, little scientific research has been done so far. This thesis aims to contribute to a diminishment of this gap by doing a holistic single-case study on the Algerian Hirak. Moreover, it attempts to assess how the Algerian government guided the frames within government led papers and (unintentionally) caused for the people’s indignation to rise, resulting in yet greater demonstrations, rather than a calming of the situation. To this end I propose the following research question (RQ):
Comparing three main events leading up to president Bouteflika’s resignation, how did the Algerian official government newspaper El Moudjahid, compared to the independent Algerian newspaper El Watan, frame the movement of the Algerian-Hirak?
By comparing the frames of the official and independent Algerian press, I emphasize to assess the regime’s attitude towards its citizens as translated by the official newspaper El Moudjahid. The research question (RQ) is appropriate for in-depth analysis of the crisis situation. It focuses on the framing of three main events that occurred in the mentioned timeframe (see figure 1). For the first event, the 22nd of February 2019 seems the most logical to start with. This was the first day of the demonstrations, meaning that the analysis of reactions to this day will be very informative. Primary reactions of the authority and the actual social society will be compared to each other. Secondly, the 3rd of March 2019
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marked an unpopular turn of events. On that date, Bouteflika addressed the population for the first time since the beginning of the demonstrations. Through a direct letter to the people, he announced his candidacy for a 5th mandate. This address to the people is important for our understanding of the president’s framing of popular demands. Furthermore, it will be interesting to see how the people’s reactions were covered in by the independent press. As third major event, the 11th of March 2019 marked a first step towards historical change. On this date president Bouteflika announced that he would no longer run for a 5th mandate. Again, he addressed the people through a direct letter and explained his terms of retirement. This event came as reaction to the weekly reoccurring demonstrations that had already attracted millions of people by then and created a massive response as well. The combination of demonstrations and the government’s incapacity to retain the movement led to the official resignation of president Bouteflika on the 2nd of April 2019.
Figure 1: Timeline covering the three triggering events within Algerian Hirak leading up to president Bouteflika’s resignation.
As many readers will probably be unfamiliar with the history of Algeria, I start the literature review by engaging with past and present revolutions of the country. To explain the current course of action of the county it is most important to understand its history. I will continue by describing Algeria’s press situation, followed by its confrontation with the Arab Spring, and will finish by laying down a theoretical foundation of the concept of framing. Second, I will describe the research design and elaborate on my case selection and methodology. By expanding the content analysis method proposed by Hamdy & Gomaa, presented to you in the following chapters, I aim to provide a catalyst research on the subject of framing crises that are confronted with popular upheaval. Thereafter, I will present the results and put these in a broader social and political context through discussion. Concluding this thesis, I intend to accept or debunk the hypotheses and answer the RQ.
1. 22/02/2019
• First manifestations by the people
• Massive amounts of people in demonstrations covering all main cities of Algeria
2. 03/03/2019
• Bouteflika announces his candidacy for his 5th mandate
• Letter to the people with his 6 engagements • People are outraged
3. 11/03/2019
• Bouteflika announces he won't run for a 5th mandate.
• Outgoing president announces he prolongs his 4th mandate to "enhance" smooth transition
02/04/2019 Abdelaziz Bouteflika
steps down from his presidency
7 Chapter 2: Literature review
I. Algerian Revolutions: past and present
The apparent reality of the Algerian Hirak, its goals, and used strategies by the media can only be understood and put in context and perspective trough understanding of the eventful modern history of the country. In 1962 Algeria gained independence from France after eight years of particularly bloody war in which over 1.5 million Algerians died (Zoubir, 2019, p. 2; Safir, 2019). Post-independence, the country became subject to an authoritarian and nationalistic system under the rule of the FLN (Front for National Liberation). The authority of the FLN, the single-lawful party for decades, was based on their important role during the war against colonisation – thus on historic events rather than democratic legitimacy (Safir, 2019). This transmission of power from clan to clan was perceived as an instrument for suppression of the masses. As the post-colonial government lacked legitimacy, it sought domination within the administrative and political machinery. By having the support of the army, the FLN generated bureaucratic approval for their policies and did not need popular support anymore. As a result, society became polarized and institutions were considered unable to represent the interests of the people. The rulers of the country gained their limited legitimacy from the war of liberation and distribution of hydrocarbon revenues (Safir, 2019).
In 1965 Houari Boumediène became president and the Algerian economy would quickly rise. Large investments were made in public assets as infrastructure and schooling. Nevertheless, even though the standard of living improved for the popular masses, the gap between rich and poor grew exponentially. Topped off with a lack of democratic mechanisms, apathy against the ruling system, distrust of the elites and the lack of civic-responsibility, a basis was made for the current clientelist structures (Nelson, 1994; Evans & Phillips, 2007). After Boumediène’s unexpected death in 1978, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid was sworn in as president. Facing economic recession following a collapse of oil prices, he attempted to e the economy and break up state corporations. Unfortunately, his reforms failed to end hardship and unemployment rates grew. Consequently, students and workers started a series of strikes in Algiers which eventually derailed into riots. The government responded by imposing the state of emergency and using military force to shut down the demonstrations. The government action against the movement, later known as ‘1988’s Black October’, was met with outrage by the people and fuelled Islamist activism. A year later, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) arose as the main hub of popular discontent. In the following elections Algeria was faced with the possibility of a complete FIS takeover. As the army and FLN did not intend to let this happen, Bendjedid was pressured to cancel the elections and dissolve parliament, followed by his forced resignation in 1992. Feeling ‘robbed’ of their electoral victory, the Islamists took up arms and demonstrations turned tense in the main cities of Algeria. As violence escalated, the Algerian population got increasingly stuck between the two warring parties and hundreds of thousands civilians lost their lives in a period of civil conflict between the military government and
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Islamist rebels (Nelson, 1994; Kalyvas, 1999, pp. 243-285). Islamist radicalism and terrorist violence reversed any progress that was made during attempted post-colonial reforms (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 4). In 1996, a referendum introduced changes to the constitution which enhanced presidential powers and banned Islamist parties. After 1999, when Abdelaziz Bouteflika won the first elections following the years of bloody war, he was credited with re-establishing peace in the country. This traumatic era is still widely referred to as: ‘La décennie noir’, the Black decennium in which many civilians became victim of Islamic extremist terrorist attacks and controversial government-led operations. Moreover, the new president redistributed hydrocarbon revenues which enhanced his legitimacy. As the president grew confident of his achievements he amended the 1996 constitution act limiting presidential terms to two and assured his (almost) lifelong presidency. The president surrounded himself by friends, family, and business associates to ensure his rule (Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Zoubir, 2019, p. 7). Dr. Yahia Zoubir, professor in geopolitics at KEDGE Business School, explains that opposition parties existed, but that they were corrupt and happy with ‘just’ a seat in parliament to ensure their salaries (and bonuses during election periods). The population lost trust in its politicians to produce any change from within. The extremely low turnout for legislative elections of 2012 and 2017 demonstrated this pessimism towards the political system (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 8).
While analysts became increasingly aware of the fragile political context (Zoubir Y. , 2016), the Bouteflika clan believed that the people could be tamed through distribution of oil revenues, cheap housing and food subsidies. However, the regime did not anticipate the massive demonstrations that erupted on the 22nd of February 2019. After smaller protests had broken out on the 16th and 19th of February, an anonymous call was spread through Facebook to demonstrate collectively against the luring initiative of the 5th Bouteflika mandate. This massive event was planned on Friday, just after the weekly collective prayer, to enhance participation (Safir, 2019). Officials had convinced themselves of the apathetic nature of the Algerian people. Since the country had been able to ‘avoid’ the Arab Spring (Zoubir Y., 2011), the authority thought it could easily overcome this new crisis as well (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 9).
Looking back, it appears that officials misunderstood the apparent reality of the situation, and made decisions that proved ineffective or even counterproductive. The government kept reminding the population that any massive revolt would result in situations like Syria, Libya or Yemen and historic events of the Algerian 90’s. What they overlooked in making such statements was that 70 percent of Algeria’s population is under 35 years old. This means, most of them had no experiences of the bloody decade of the ‘90s and were not easily deterred by such threats (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 9).
Over decades the Algerians had accumulated many grievances against the regime, but Bouteflika seeking a 5th mandate, while his poor health made it impossible for him to walk or give speeches, was the trigger to start the demonstrations. Illustrative of these grievances were the staggering proportions
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of corruption in the country (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 10). The prospect of Bouteflika, having disappeared from the public stage, while moving in a wheelchair and seeming unaware of his surroundings, to run for a 5th mandate was shameful and was perceived as an embarrassment for the population. It is important to understand the Algerian psyche, explains Zoubir. “This kind of humiliation or assault on [the Algerian’s] dignity (as was under colonialism) has always triggered rebellions, though the timing is often unexpected” (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 11). Algerians felt as fools to the international community as the elites insisted on their support for the Bouteflika clan. With nausea, the people understood very well that this support was fuelled by enjoyed elite privileges (access to contracts, high salaries and many more advantages) (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 11).
Characteristic of the protests of the 22nd of February, and all those that would follow, is their nonviolence. The ethos of non-violence, called in Arabic ‘Silmiya’ (Djelloul, 2019), is central to overcome the colonial trauma (Lazali, 2018). Social media, mostly Twitter and Facebook, played a considerable role in passing on this message of peacefulness. The presidency was taken off-guard by this nonviolence, and heavily misinterpreted the situation considering their intention of imposing a state of emergency. The latter would have enabled the government to intervene using military force. Adding to the miscalculation, military institutions outed they would not intervene, thus signalling to the population that they opposed the Bouteflika clan. Furthermore, the hands of officials were tied. The millions of demonstrators were peaceful, therefore contradicting any justification for the use of military forces (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 12). Considering the strength of non –violent protest more generally, one could refer to Hannah Arendt, who in her study on the sources of power stated that: “Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.” (Arendt, 2019, p. 56). By articulating the Hirak in a peaceful manner, the people enhanced legitimate support for their demands.
Step by step, fissures appeared within the ruling elite. The armed forces under the management of Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaïd Salah, issued article 28 of the Constitution. This article stipulates that: “[The National People’s Army] shall assume the task of protection of the unity of the country and the integrity of its land […]” (Conseil constitutionel, Edition 2016). As the president was reluctant to resign, he and his entourage were considered as a threat to the armed forces’ interest, as well as to national security more generally. Gaïd Salah changed sides and turned against his superior. He pressured the Bouteflika clan to prevent a fifth term. On the 26th of March, Salah went as far as calling for the application of Article 102 (Conseil constitutionel, Edition 2016). This article stipulates that the president can be relieved of his duties in case of serious and lasting illness, making him unable to perform his functions. As parties of the so-called Presidential Alliance supported the call, fractures within the regime were apparent and Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced his resignation on the 2nd of April 2019 (Zoubir Y. , 2019, p. 13). The resignation was met with joy from the population. Nonetheless, the Hirak grew yet bigger with slogans as “to little, too late”. The movement forwarded more and more claims to finally demand a total restructuring of the political system and the departure of the entire elite (Safir, 2019).
10 II. Algerian Press: past and present experiences
As a free press is a critical component of democratic involvement and participation, it is a crucial for Algeria to establish a safe platform for reporters to do their work. Since the post-colonial era, written Algerian press has grown exponentially. This press is published in three languages: French, Arabic and Tamazight (the local Berber language). Arabic newspapers include Echorouk, El Khabar and El Massa. French-language papers include, amongst others, El Watan and El Moujahid. On all days except the holy Friday, these papers appear in printed version but also online.
Macey (1998) described the Algerian press of the ‘90s to be ‘muzzled’. Few foreign reporters would venture to explore Algeria and report on the developments of the black decade. He described that it was left to Algerian novelists to describe life during these horrendous times (Macey, 1998). These tales tell the stories of powerless feelings and helplessness of the people (Djemaï, 1995; Assima, 1995).
Nonetheless, a transition for freedom of press was launched in the late ‘80s during the Bendjedid mandate. Considering the media openness since the beginning of the ‘90s, political elites build a significant apprehension regarding the capacities of the independent media. Despite the existence of a private and (mostly) independent press trying to break down this apprehension through verified reports, the semi-democratic Algerian authority still silently boycotts the transition started in the late ‘80s (Dris C. , 2014). The media in Algeria have not yet achieved its wished transformation and remain concerned with regulations and stakeholders1.
The Algerian government has played the game of exclusion and marginalization on the one hand, and inclusion and co-optation on the other. The authorities tend to create relations of dependence between media and the government, for instance through the strict issuing of journalist permits, thus resulting in allegiances from journalists. Nonetheless, we live in a globalized world where the internet, and most importantly social media, make it impossible to maintain the enforcement of censorship. The regime cannot retain complete control over the numerous flows of information. Therefore, the Algerian government put in place a subtle mix of official output and ‘free’ expression. In this way audiences are less suspicious of writings that enhance government wishes (Dris C. , 2012).
As opposed to other Arab authoritarian regimes, private media and contradictory political debates have emerged in the country. The authorities have democratized the use of the internet and claim to have never2 stopped its access. Cherif Dris, professor of political science at Algiers’ University for
1 At an Embassy meeting, I have met a journalist who was still doing his job anonymously. The journalist handed me a card with the job title: ‘travel agent’ and explained verbally that he was previously imprisoned for articles he had written. This anecdote showcases the concern of protection of journalists and the claim to freedom of press.
2 Until recently this might have been true. Personal experience during my internship at the embassy of the Netherlands to Algeria proves the contrary. During weekly Friday demonstrations the internet was slowed down to become impossible to use. Moreover, in June 2019, during national exams of higher education, the internet would be shut down completely during office hours. International institutions, therefore also our embassy, were
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journalism, explains: “Ultimately, we are in the presence of a neo-authoritarian media order where the motto is freedom of expression without freedom of the press.” (Dris C. , 2012, p. 303)
Algeria has a state owned and run, widely-propagated, newspaper called: ‘El Moudjahid’ (Arabic for
the warrior). While the official national language post-colonial era was changed to Arabic, the
newspaper is still written in French. The paper was founded in 1954 during the Algerian War, to inform FLN resistance ‘warriors’. After independence in 1962, as the FLN became the single-ruling party, El
Moujahid became the chief newspaper of Algeria. The FLN had created a very important propaganda
organ (Romeo, 2014).
After FLN was voted out of power in 1991, El Moujahid continued its publications. Today, the newspaper is no longer affiliated to the FLN party but rather to the voice of the incumbent government. Award-winning journalist Omar Belhouchet started his career at El Moujahid. He left the paper in 1990 with nineteen of his colleagues to found a new independent paper: El Watan. Little did he know that his newspaper would grow out to become the new chief of liberal and independent news report (Ibrahim, 1991).
El Watan is Arabic for the homeland. The newspaper is again in the French language and was one of
the first prominent and independent papers in modern Algeria. El Watan bases its editorial line on the objective of true information, developing relevant analyses, rigorous verification of published information and constant concern for the openness towards all political sensitivities within the country (El Watan, 2019). Its aim is to promote democracy and to give a voice to the Algerian opposition. It is adamant in its resistance to censorship and corruption, and was suspended several times in the ‘90s by the authorities. Moreover, editors and journalists have been jailed for various ‘offenses’ to the state and its elite. International press watchdogs, such as Reporters without Borders (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists, have reported that El Watan, and more specifically its reporters, has been targeted by government impeachments and Islamist insurgents (Reporters Without Borders, 2003).
When the demonstrations of the Hirak broke out, the ever brewing revolt within public media sector erupted too. Journalists refused to be silenced by the contested government. It is important to understand that there is no direct censorship in Algeria, yet laws are set with prison terms and fines for insulting or defaming the president, MPs, judges and the army (Algeria-watch, 2009). By these means the government still largely tries to control the private press. El Watan reported on the hardship of journalism in the context of the Hirak. Journalists in public and private media are under pressure from censorship, suspension of programs and threats of all kinds, preventing them from performing their mission properly (Iddir, 2019). Nonetheless, El Watan pledged to create an arena of debate and reflection
cut of the internet as well. The only way to have access to the net was through our private VPN. This article from ‘Le Monde’ confirms my claim: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/18/en-algerie-l-acces-a-internet-a-nouveau-bloque_5477922_3212.html. In 2018, internet was slowed too during the national exams nonetheless, the 2019 internet block was more intense than ever before.
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for Algerians. Its mission is to provide a permanent forum for discussing questions of democracy and the economic and social choices of the country, even in the context of the Hirak (El Watan, 2019). After weeks of popular protests, a great number of Algerian journalists decided to disobey the chokehold of this informal system of state-imposed censorship. An online article in ARAB NEWS reported that journalists working for state-owned media complained about boss-ordered news blackouts on rallies against president Bouteflika seeking a 5th mandate (ARAB NEWS, 2019). RSF reported that the government owned news outlets had received clear instructions by president Bouteflika’s campaign director and important figures from his personal circles (Berteau, 2019). As private media reported with headlines on the nationwide demonstrations, the journalists of El Moujahid were cornered.
After multiple reoccurring Friday protests, demonstrators grew more and more confident. Government-led news outlets were outed as ‘arse kissers’ and ‘reflectors of hatred’ by the protesters. KhaGovernment-led Drareni, a representative of RSF, explained that main private television channels blocking reports on the Hirak are owned by businessmen close to Bouteflika. These outlets would later try to redeem themselves by reporting in detail about the protests. Nevertheless, they have also reported alleged ‘manipulation’ of the movement and tried to undermine it (ARAB NEWS, 2019; Reporters Without Borders, 2019). Journalists organised sit-ins to demand more freedom in doing their jobs. Surprisingly, denouncing the censorship worked out (Berteau, 2019). Small but important changes were made. People with diverse political persuasions were given air-time and allowed to speak openly, and banned opposition figures were invited to opinion programs again. The most striking change occurred at the French-spoken government-owned radio station Chaine 3. When the Hirak started, Chaine 3 journalists were not allowed to comment nor address the issue (Berteau, 2019). The result was an awkward silence, clearly put in place by the government. After revolt from within, through journalist strikes and the resignation of senior directors, the station was given a green light to report on the protests. Chaine 3 now broadcasts live debates on the movement of the Hirak and openly discusses the issues at stake (ARAB NEWS, 2019).
After this step forward in the media arena versus censorship by the government, RSF came with a report confirming the censorship of Tout Sur l’Algérie (TSA) (Reporters Without Borders, 2019). TSA is considered the first French-language online media platform for news report in Algeria. On the 12th of June 2019 at 17h30, the board of TSA declared their national IP address to be inaccessible3 (Nadir, 2019). The platform remained accessible outside of Algeria. TSA had always been very critical of the Algerian government and the fact that access to their online news page is only blocked in Algeria, makes for the
3 As I was in Algeria at that time, I too can confirm the censorship of TSA in Algeria. The platform was very efficient in its life-blogs on the Friday demonstrations. It seems the government blocked the news outlet for the obvious reasons that it was too quick to be controlled.
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logical conclusion the site has been censured by the government in light of their open critique on the latter (Reporters Without Borders, 2019).
III. Algeria and the Arab Spring
As noted before Algeria did not suffer as much from the Arab Spring as the rest of North-Africa and the Middle-East. To this end, the government approached the crisis of the Hirak similarly as they approached the Arab Spring. But how can this authoritarian resilience of the Algerian regime be explained? Frédéric Volpi is of the opinion that “Algeria illustrates a type of authoritarian resistance to popular challenges that is based on pseudo-democratization, redistributive patronage, and an effective use of the security apparatus” (Volpi, 2013, p.104). Volpi describes that authoritarian regimes learn from their mistakes and that of others. Furthermore, ‘surviving’ the Arab Spring does not make for a stable nor strong state in that full sense. It only confirms that at a certain moment in time for particular issues at stake the state was not vulnerable to the crisis. In fact, the Algerian regime is rather unsteady, lacks legitimacy and has no truly institutionalised mechanisms for transfer of power (Volpi, 2013). The latter is actually why many believed Algeria was next in line to the Arab uprisings (Zoubir Y. H., 2011). Volpi (2013) explains Algeria survived the Arab spring due to a combination of factors, which are recognised through their approach to the Hirak. First, the authorities decoupled the unrest from political mobilization through effective state patronage and robust militarism. The government would state that ‘they heard the people in the streets’ while reminding them of the country’s bloody civil war (Achy, 2012). Second, the authoritarian rulers benefit from the pseudo-democratic multi-party system. In this way the opposition was divided, while it generated international recognition with empty ‘democratic’ structures. A third factor was the structuring of an economy based on patronage. By giving citizens much needed subsidies and cheap housing, the government long bought their tacit approval. Finally, the authoritarian regime was willing and able to use its monopoly on violence to put down social unrest (Volpi, 2013).
In 2011, contrary to the citizens of their neighbouring countries, Algerians did not consider the president’s incapacity to be the main cause of the country’s failure. Therefore, ousting the president was not expected to drastically improve their lives, and after the long war many preferred the substitute of peace instead (Volpi, 2013, p. 107). This has changed, content-analysis within this thesis is set to prove that Bouteflika is believed at the root cause for democratic failure.
In January 2011, Algeria began to feel the economic consequences of the Tunisian uprisings. While unrest in Tunisia held on, this caused deregulation of the economy, price hikes and shortages. Protests broke out in Algiers and Oran, the two main political and economic cities of Algeria (Volpi, 2013; Zoubir Y. H., 2011). As the rioting spread, shadows of the black decennium started to loom over the events. The national press explicitly made this connection and government was only too eager to exploit it. By contrast of 1988 - when riots leaded by the FIS were beaten down by the army in suburbs and
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key urban areas - security forces concentrated on protecting government buildings, leaving the suburbs to the rioters. Days after the start of the riots, the government announced the reversal of price increases and lowered the tax on food imports. These actions seemed to meet the protestors’ demands causing the revolt to lose momentum. Furthermore, as the security forces had not used full violence on the protesters, as had happened in Tunisia, state repression had not become the trigger of any further protests (Volpi, 2013, p. 107).
As such, the Algerian regime succeeded at undercutting a popular revolt at this specific point in time. This does not mean they have found ‘the correct’ combination for stopping any revolt against the regime. In the aftermath of the riots, non-violent forms of contestation towards the regime started to rise. “The National Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD) […] issued a call for greater democracy, social justice, [the] end to the state of emergency, relaxation of media laws, and the release of imprisoned protesters, as well as more job opportunities” (Volpi, 2013, p. 108). Moreover, football stadiums became hubs for discussing political issues such as: increasingly high costs of living, poor housing conditions, unemployment, and the feeling of abandonment by a regime characterised by nepotism, favouritism and corruption. Algerian citizens were limited in their participation in political life, hindered in democratic freedom and victim of violated dignity (Zoubir Y. H., 2011, p. 1).
The protests of 2010 and 2011 have undoubtedly worried the established regime. Bouteflika may have refused to give a direct response, yet the state of emergency that had been in place since February 1992, was lifted on the 23rd of February 2011. Moreover, the authorities met the people with economic remedies while passing new legislation. The latter allowed for the military to fulfil their role as they did under the state of emergency, and forbade demonstrations in Algiers (Zoubir Y. H., 2011).
IV. Framing the Arab Spring
Academics have intensively analysed the events of the Arab uprisings, and most debates have been directed at the identification of circumstances that facilitate these. The uprisings are generally believed to have been a direct outcome of social, economic and political failures, creating a crisis of authoritarianism (Goodwin, 2011). Frames may generate perceptions of a window of opportunity for protesters to create de facto political change through a popular revolt (Volpi, 2013). The idea that citizens can create their own opportunity for revolution, while nothing significant changes, massively expands the possible prevalence of revolutions (Volpi, 2013).
A great number of scientific articles were written during and after the Arab Spring that linked online newspapers to the concept of framing. Earlier articles compared framing by general Arab outlets like Al-Jazeera, Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic (Bruce, 2014; Bebawi, 2016; Sadig, 2019), or international platforms like CNN (Guzman, 2016).
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Michael Bruce (2014), in his article “Framing the Arab Spring”, demonstrates that many scholars have suggested that media outlets are following various strategies in covering conflict events (Konstantinidou, 2008; Fahmy, 2010; Dobernig, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2010). These scholars have proposed generic and issue-specific frames applicable to analysis of news content, including conflict, violence, graphic, human interest/human impact, economic consequences, morality, moral-outrage, responsibility, casualty, political strategy, public engagement, public opinion, terrorism, victory, defeat, race/religion/culture, technical, anti-war, pro-war, and self-referential (Matthes, 2009).
Many frames have been identified through the years, but not all are relevant to this study. As my research question described, I am researching how official and independent newspapers framed the Algerian Hirak. To this end, I will briefly describe the frames that have been identified during the Arab Spring and which I will use within my document analysis of newspaper articles concerning the Hirak (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).
The Human interest frame is found to be the most commonly used frame in news coverage (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Matthes, 2009). It is used to bring an emotional angle to the issue/event at stake (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) researched social media outlets during the Egyptian uprisings and concluded that the prominent frame in social media was that of human interest (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). Framing news with the Human Interest Frame is a way to personalize, framatize and emotionalize news (Valkenburg, Semetko, & Vreese, 1999).
The Conflict frame emphasizes the tensions between individuals (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). The frame is closely related to strategy coverage (Jamieson, 1992; Patterson, 1993). It enhances the coverage of concepts of winning and losing, and puts central the language of war , games, and competition. All the latter with an emphasis on the performance of certain individuals or groups (sucha as a political party) (Jamieson, 1992). As the Algerian government started using the language of war during riots of the Arab Spring, the same strategy is expected as response to the Hirak.
The Responsibility frame is used to frame an issue as to give responsibility for causing an issue or solving a problem to a government or individual groups. Media can shape their public’s understanding of who is to blame or whom is responsible for solving certain societal problems (Valkenburg, Semetko, & Vreese, 1999). As the Hirak was build on blaming president Bouteflika of the lack of democracy in Algeria, the independent press has plenty fuel to work with. This frame is therfore expected to be much present in El Watan.
The Economic consequences frame explains which economic consequences a certain event, problem or issue will have on a specific entity. Most often the news is framed so as to potentially impact the audience that reads the article (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). Gamson goes thus far to insinuate that news producers use the consequence frame to make the discused problem more relevant to the audience (Gamson, 1992). Hamdy and Gomaa explained that the Egyptian government expressed concerns with
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the economic consequences of popular revolt. It will be interesting to see if such concerns are copied for the Algerian context.
The Sensational interest frame focusses on the effects on the human sensory system. It emphasises emotions for emotion’s sake and seeks to arouse empathy (Grabe, Zhou, & Barnett, 2001). Tannenbaum and Lynch decribe news stories as ‘underdistanced’. This means the story violates a comfortable psychological distance between the audience and their perceptions of issues in the actual world (Tannenbaum & Lynch, 1960). In other words, the sensational frame intensionaly provokes the emotional reactions aimed for by the frame-prescriber. Sensational news is mostly designed by journalists to attract attention in the name of high viewership ratings (Scott & Gobetz, 1992; Berkowitz, 1993). This frame is interesting to include in the research as to identify wether the official or independent press sensationalised the movement or not. More over, would this sensationalisation then enhance support or avert it?
The Public affairs frame, or political strategy frame (Nisbet & Huge, 2007), is based on the actions of presidents, government agencies, political officials and authorities. It depicts reliance on political authority to index viewpoints of important political issues. This frame is often used in times of celebrations or upheaval, and allows leaders to underline their power (Beson & Hallin, 2004). As the Algerian Hirak can be seen as synonymous to upheaval for the government, this frame us expected to be much present in the government-run newspaper El Moudjahid.
V. Framing: a theoretical foundation
As the broad variety of frames identified during the Arab Spring demonstrate, framing is used in many different forms. In an effort to clarify the concept, Robert M. Entman (1993) described its basic characteristics: “Whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text” (Entman R. M., 1993, p. 51). By identifying frames, we can reveal which influence is practiced on the human consciousness by the communicator (Edelman, 1993; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1993; Gamson, 1992; Goffman, 1974). This means that the identification of frames within my document analysis will reveal the intentions of the official press representing the government’s narrative and the independent press representing the narrative of the people.
When framing an issue, people develop particular conceptualizations of that issue and reorient their thinking. The major premise of framing theory is the flexibility of taking different perspectives to construct values and considerations for a certain subject or issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105). It is therefore expected to encounter different and possibly opposing frames by analysing official and an independent newspaper artticles. Entman (1993) goes on by describing framing as dependent on selection and salience. His definition of the concept: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
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problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the
item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe.” (Entman R. M., 1993, p. 52). But how do these frames actually work? “Frames highlight some bits of information about an item that are the subject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Entman, 1993, p. 53). Giving salience to certain subjects means enhancing the information, making it more noticeable, therefore memorable to the readers of the information. Placement, repetition or association with culturally familiar symbols are manners within texts to make particular information more salient (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Entman, 1993, p. 53).
When receivers are only presented with the framed information and very little alternative interpretation, the intended effect of the frame will be diminished. Thus, if many articles in the independent press state the contrary information as to what the official newspaper, I may conclude that the effect of the frame used by official newspaper will be diminished. As politicians continuously seek support for their cause, they compete with journalists over the news frames to use in coverage of political news. The obscuring and revealing of information triggers different reactions from the audience. Framing plays a major role within the execution of political power (Entman R. M., 1993, p. 55). Reflecting on this play of power, texts may present homogeneous framing at one level of analysis and compete on others levels. To illustrate this, politicians and journalists may agree on the same problem definition, yet have different frames on the remedies for these problems. Gamson (1992) stated that great social power can lay within certain frames when encoded with affirmative action. This suggests that once a subject gets widely accepted, to change (frame) this term is to risk credibility towards your audience (Gamson, 1992; Entman, 1993).
At the same time, as people most often are not exposed to only one frame of an issue or problem, citizens receive different views on the issue. Therefore, the presentation of consequences of certain policies does not necessarily change respondents’ considerations (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). In fact, individuals can choose the alternative that is consistent with their own ideas and values. Being exposed to competing
frames increases the consistent position taking on specific policies and underlying principles (Sniderman
& Theriault, 2004, p. 147). To confirm this claim, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) argue that issues need to be (a) of major importance, (b) longstanding and (c) competitively contested (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 112). As the Algerian Hirak was set up by the people, and is a result of longstanding frustrations, whilst finding competing frames, I may conclude that respondents (the people) will follow the position in line with the Hirak.
In general, people are expected to be more susceptible to follow framed issues at early stages of exposure to that issue. This is the case because, people are less knowledgeable of possible consequences of the issue at that point. In other words, people are more malleable in an early stage. In line with this argument, it is then expected that the effects of framing diminish by active engagement of citizens with specific
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issues. Biased representation of these issues would then be less influential as citizens get to know alternative arguments (Chong & Druckman, 2007, pp. 118-119). Building on the latter theory, I do not expect much success as in the government, through El Moudjahid, framing the movement to their benefit.
Chapter 3: Research Design
I. Conceptualisation: Case, Definitions and Hypotheses
Due to its peaceful and long-enduring character, the case of the non-violent Algerian Hirak is substantially different from other revolutions that have occurred during the Arab-spring in the Middle-East. Therefore, in order to gain in-depth knowledge thereon, a single-case study design is the most suitable. As I was interning at the Dutch embassy in Algiers during the beginning of the demonstrations, I have lived and worked with the effects and consequences of this crisis on a daily basis. Living in Algeria has made me vividly aware of the lack of democracy, opportunities for the youth, shortfall of equality between men and women among many more issues. Nonetheless, Algeria is the largest country in Africa (since the division of Sudan of 2011), has important oil and gas reserves, and has the potential to become an A-list tourist destination with at some point simultaneously 4 seasons within its borders. There are countless opportunities for Algeria to be created and the most important key to this bright future is the new government that is to come as a result of the peaceful revolution of the Hirak. It occurred to me as logical to grasp this opportunity for my master thesis as I have lived a piece of Algerian history in the making. Furthermore, due to its geographic closeness to Europe, Algeria is one of the focus countries within the MENA region for many European states, including the Netherlands (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019). Therefore, this research on this contemporary event is highly relevant.
According to Yin, as my research question (RQ) is a normative ‘how’ question, and based on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, it seems fit to use a single-case study design (Yin, 2003). The RQ is embedded in a specific timeframe, location, subject and entities facing each other. More specifically, I have limited this research to the period between the beginning of the demonstrations on the 22nd of February 2019 and the resignation of president Bouteflika on the 2nd of April 2019. Limiting the research to this timespan will enable rich and in-depth discussion on different aspects that went on in these 1.5 months. Moreover, I made it clear that the aim is to explore the concept of framing, more specifically through printed and online newspapers. The working definition of framing for this thesis is as follows:
The concept of framing offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text. A prevalent issue is conceptualized by selecting specific aspects of reality, promoting a particular
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definition, causal relation and resolution recommendations (Entman R. M., 1993; Chong &
Druckman, 2007).
In the presented literature review I have advanced a careful examination of existing literature relevant to the Algerian history and the birth of the Algerian Hirak, national press’ freedoms and limitations, the country’s experience during the Arab Spring, experiences on frames that have been used during the Arab Spring, and an overview of the concept of Framing. This review of existing knowledge has led to the following hypotheses.
It has become clear that the aim of the Algerian government’s agenda was to shut down the movement of the Algerian Hirak. In the previous chapter I have argued how the Bouteflika clan influenced the government-owned news-outlets, El Moudjahid included, through specific instructions to reflect the government’s narrative. Based on experience of the Arab Spring period, authorities were confident this strategy would recall the same reactions as in 2010-2011. In theory, as Entman (1993) proposed, the effect of an imposed frame will be detectable when the framed information is confronted to very little alternative interpretations (Entman R. M., 1993). As has been demonstrated previously, the latter was not the case in Algeria. The private press, demonstrators, and international players ousted the government-led news platforms for their censoring actions. Therefore I propose the following hypotheses:
H1: Due to large divergence between the coverage of the protest movement in the governmental
newspaper El Moudjahid and the apparent reality of the movement as exemplified by newspaper El Watan, the movement could not be framed in a way that served the interest of the government.
By examining a selection of articles for the frames that I have defined in my literature review, I expect to encounter contradictory and most different frames by comparing official and independent news outlets. My first goal is thus to find out which frames have been used in the Official newspaper and which frames have been used in the independent newspaper. When confronted to contradictory – and therefore alternative – frames between the two news platforms, the prediction of my first hypothesis will be accepted. This will support the argumentation that the government’s frame of the Hirak failed to enhance the effect of its ultimate goal: keeping president Bouteflika in power.
Sniderman and Theriault (2004) argued that being exposed to competing frames increases consistent positions, by taking on specific issues and underlying principles (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, p. 147). To confirm this claim an issue needs to be of (a) major importance, (b) longstanding, and (c) competitively contested (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 112). In the literature review it became clear that (a) the ruling of president Bouteflika and his use of the system to his own benefit instead of that of the people, became largely contested and was considered a clear cause for the country’s structural economic underperformance. This issue is of (b) longstanding character and has grown to active resistance over the years. As the government tried to neutralise the resistance, (c) the private press was eager to condemn
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the lack of democracy, economic opportunities and cover the issues inflated by the Algerian government. The conclusion given by Chong and Druckman (2007) is that the biased representation of issues by the government becomes increasingly less influential as citizens become aware of alternative arguments (Chong & Druckman, 2007, pp. 118-119). Therefore, following this conclusion, my second hypothesis follows:
H2: The large discrepancy of the government narrative presented by El Moudjahid compared
to the apparent reality exemplified by El Watan confirms that the demonstrators were on the right track and that influence of the government was declining.
Again, the authoritarian Algerian regime showed to have a blind spot with regard to problem-solving. One of their goals was to neutralise the movement of the Hirak, yet they only fuelled the movement by making claims contradictory to that of the independent press. This lack of empathy and understanding of their own people led to the eventual downfall of president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. My second goal is to identify the different problem definitions, causes of protest and possible solutions given by the official and independent media outlets. In line with this goal, as repetition is a within text manner to make particular information more salient (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Entman, 1993, p. 53), asserting which outlet covered the Hirak the most by the number of addressed articles, will enhance accepting or debunking by second hypothesis. When competing problem definitions, causes of protest and possible solutions are identified, the hypothesis will be accepted. This will enhance the argumentation that the position of the movement’s – and thus, citizens’ – demands are consistent and that the government’s position becomes increasingly less influential.
II. Method: data selection, sample description and content analysis
As mentioned, I aim to explore the concept of framing through printed and online newspapers. A content analysis guided by the deduction of (pre-defined) frames will be conducted on two entities: Official (Algerian government newspaper), and Independent (liberal Algerian newspaper). Because of limited time and the purpose to produce an in-depth analysis, I have attributed one leading news platform to each analysed entity. For the official level, El Moujahid, the government-owned and French-language newspaper will provide input for analysis. The government-run paper will provide the official narrative and reflect the government’s intentions. For the independent level, I have selected newspaper El Watan due to its prominence in the country and the fact it is again a French-language paper4. The paper presents itself as enabling the voice of the people through the arena of debate that they offer. Three specific
4 Thanks to my doublenationality I am perfectly able to analyse French-written articles and distillate underlying meaning of certain words and phrases. Unfortunately I would be unable to do so with Arabic-written articles.
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events leading to the resignation of president Bouteflika have been selected for their level of salience and the creation of reaction. My unit of analysis consists of manually filtered and non-randomly selected articles within specific editions of El Moujahid and El Watan. An article within filtered editions is selected based on the headline, phrases and portrayal of connection with at least one of the three presented main events.
The first event is the start of the Algerian Hirak on the 22nd of February 2019. It is aimed to measure direct and close reaction to the event through analysis of newspaper articles. As the 22nd was on a Friday, the holy day and the first day of the weekend in Islam-based culture, no printed reports were issued on that day. Most often the written press outlets have their weekend edition issued on Saturday5, yet the Sunday edition is considered to have a greater audience as it marks the start of a new workweek. Therefore the issues of Sunday 24th, Monday 25th will be analysed. This will enable analysis of close (potential) reactions to the events of the 22nd. Twenty articles were identified as suitable for analysis regarding this event in El Watan, and four articles addressed the event in El Moudjahid.
For the second event, I have attributed the 3rd of March 2019. This was the last day that individuals could present their candidacy to the presidential elections that were to take place on the 4th of April 2019. Late at night, Bouteflika announced in a direct letter to the people that he was running for a 5th mandate. This letter was then published by state owned newspaper El Moujahid on the 4th of March. As the people were protesting on consecutive Fridays, and rejecting the idea of Bouteflika running for a 5th term, I will analyse the newspapers of the Sunday 4th and Monday 5th of March. In this way I will be able to reflect on direct reactions to the personal letter by president Bouteflika. In El Watan this event was greatly discussed by 43 articles, El Moudjahid only addressed 7 articles towards the matter.
For the third major event I have selected the 11th of March. Late at night, the Bouteflika’s spokesperson released a presidential letter addressed to the people. In this letter Bouteflika announced he would not be running for a 5th mandate. Instead, he envisioned to prolong his 4th mandate and enhance ‘smooth’ transition. Little surprisingly, this event sparked a reaction of the Algerian people. Thereafter, to analyse reactions and coverage by the official and the independent newspapers of this turn of events, I will focus on papers released on Tuesday 12th and Wednesday 13th of March. Respectfully, El Moudjahid covered the event with 8 articles addressing the event and El Watan with 54 articles.
Lastly, Bouteflika wrote his final letter to the people on the 2nd of April. In this letter he announced his definite and direct resignation from the post of president. This letter too, will be analysed as I deem it is a logical conclusion, marking an end to the Bouteflika era. Therefore, final reflections will be based on newspaper issues of the 3rd of April.
5 The Friday and Saturday in Islamic culture can be compared to the Saturday and Sunday in a western culture based weekend. In line with that comparison, ‘Arabic’ Sunday is equal to ‘Western’ Monday, the start of the week.
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A total of 136 articles has been analysed manually with four goals in mind. The first was detecting which frames have been used with the possibility of several in the same article. The second goal was to research and understand the different problem definition given to the movement. Thirdly, the aim was to consider the causes ascribed the demonstrations. The fourth and last goal within the content analysis was to line-up the proposed solutions to the crisis. This time-consuming method was deemed most suitable as it allows for careful identification of the different categories. In the remainder of my methodology section I will explain how I proceeded with my analysis and enlighten my readers by describing every step that has been taken.
A. Detection of (pre-defined) frames
Understanding how frames work allows for measuring the distance of the Algerian government preferred version of the Hirak’s narrative and the ways the independent media actually reported on the movement (Entman R. , 2003).
As depicted in the literature review, six frames were pre-defined as possibly present within the written articles on three major events leading to Bouteflika’s resignation. These frames were: 1. Human interest frame, 2. Conflict frame, 3. Responsibility frame, 4. Economic consequence frame, 5. Sensational interest frame, 6. Public affairs frame. To achieve my first goal, when analysing the articles, I primarily searched for these pre-defined frames. Nonetheless, I remained vigilant to the possibility of finding other frames.
In order to find other frames I looked for: 1. Alternative definitions of the problem by pointing out which causal agent produced which costs and what benefits with what effects or conditions. Then 2. Alternative
diagnoses of causes identified by the entity creating the problem were looked for. This was followed by
a search for 3. Alternative moral judgments by evaluating the effects created by the causal agent or all those involved. Lastly, 4. Alternative suggested remedies were considered, by presenting solutions and their outcomes to the recently identified problem(s) (Entman R. M., 1993, p. 52; Entman R.M., 2003, p. 417). The alternative frame to my pre-defined frames may not necessarily perform all four functions. Many studies identify more than one frame per unit (Matthes, 2009). The selected articles may therefore contain multiple frames simultaneously.
B. Proposed problem definitions
In their work, Hamdy and Gomaa explain that Egypt’s news industry is three-faced: independent media, state-run media, and social media. The semi-official newspapers, directly influenced by the government, seized the momentum to support the regime by framing the protests against Mubarak in ways that denied
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the existence of a stong social movement. In the meantime, social media and independent media challenged this pro-government setting and attempted to tell the ‘truth’ from the streets (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). The study provides for interesting categories of problem definition, causes of protest, and solution portrayal that were applied to the Egyptian protests. As the Algerian Hirak is struggling with issues very much comparable to the Egyptian ones, both ‘uprisings’ are believed to be a direct outcome of social, economic and political failures creating crisis of authoritarianism (Goodwin, 2011). I used Hamdy and Gomaa’s cathegories (in a slightly adapted version) to analyse the 136 selected articles of the research. As all suggested categories are given in English and the respective newspapers in French, I have translated the pre-defined categories for the pre-defined frames, problem-defenition and given causes of protest.6
To uphold my second goal, each article was researched for its problem definition: how was the protest defined by the article? Using content-analysis, the following definitions were looked for: 1. Unrest, 2.
Uprising, 3. Protest, 4. Revolution, 5. Conspiracy, and 6. Chaos. Though the Algerian Hirak very much
resembles the Egyptian revolution, structural differences, such as social and historical ones, exist as well. Because of this and the fact that I did not want to exclude possible alternative problem definitions, I added the category: 7. Other, to enable an expansion of the existing theory.
This method was applied to both news outlets and accordingly selected articles. The nominal occurrence of every problem definition was kept and concluded for in a clear and organised table. This table, presented to the reader in the following chapter, enhanced the making of conclusions for the hypotheses. Whenever a change in problem definition was found, I searched for the underlying qualifying idea by using qualitative content analysis.
C. Given causes of protest
As Hamdy and Gomaa defined categories of problem definitions, they have done the same with causes of protest. Towards the execution of my third goal, these pre-defined causes were, once more, tested for within the selected articles. The categories of causes of protest were as follows: 1. Dictatorship, 2.
Corruption, 3. Oppression, 4. Poverty, 5. Injustice, 6. Foreign Influence, 7. Satellite channels (T.V.), 8. Political groups, and 9. Unemployment.
Again, I did not want to exclude the possibility of other given causes for the Algerian Hirak. Therefore, I added the category: 10. Other, to remain open minded to alternative causes of protest. A clear table was again provided reflecting on the amount of repetition of certain causes per news outlet, and per event.
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D. Solution portrayal
For my fourth and last goal within this content analysis, solution portrayal was searched for through the identification of proposed solutions. As the Algrian Hirak differs most prominently from the Arabic Spring in its physical expression, I chose to explore the proposed solutions manually. These solutions provided for categories comparable to those of Hamdy and Gomaa, and were outlined in comparable tables as described for problem definition and causes of protest. A total of 21 different proposed solutions were identified.
E. Limitations and Concluding remarks
As I ended up with different problem definitions, causes of protest, proposed solutions, and data on identified frames, the next step was to compare the results of El Watan to those of El Moudjahid. Due to time restraints I have limited my research to these two newspapers and I do not claim to cover the entire Algerian media coverage on the events of my time frame. I am well aware of the limited generalizability, yet I am convinced of the added value of my work because it provides a close look at an ongoing and very complex development in the Arab world. As protest movements have erupted in different corners of the world in 2019 – Sudan, Hong-Kong China, Lebanon, Chili – this research provides a valid methodology for the research of these political events. It has been brought to my attention that I might have a slight observation bias as I work alone. This bias will be singled out by discussion with my supervisor, as well as multiple proof-readers who have experienced internships at different embassies in Algeria at the same time. Furthermore, there certainly are limitations to single-case design studies. I expect my pre-planned structure to encounter several logistic obstacles as I am focusing on the country of Algeria, one of the few countries where official communication is still conducted via faxing-machines. Nonetheless, I have grown used to the Algerian ways and have understood that with patience and passion one can achieve his/her goals, ínshallah.
In chapter 4 I will introduce tables and graphs that provide an overview of the data that was collected as described above. Then the reader will be presented in chapter 5 with the analysis and detailed discussion of the retrieved data. Through this discussion the goal is to make sense of the data and to put the numbers into context and perspective. I am very much aware of my confirmative bias as I have been present, and with the people, during the beginning of the Hirak. Throughout the execution of my data collection and analysis I have been very critical and aware of the necessary objectivity. In spite of the potential (yet nearly inevitable) cherry picking, and as I was very much aware of this limitation, through awareness of this pitfall, I have tried to limit its possible negative impact.
The analysis of “Bouteflika’s letters to the people” printed in El Moudjahid may be considered as sensitive. This because the letters may or may not have been written by the president himself due to his
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physical health. Therefore, when mentioning Mr. Bouteflika’s letters, the reader must understand that the words of the president reflect the ideas of the government.
To conclude my thesis, I will discuss the Hypotheses and accept or debunk them. The first hypothesis regards the position of the government vis-à-vis its citizens, and the effects this had for its framing effort. The second hypothesis is more concerned with the position of the citizens in the movement of the Hirak. The most interesting will be to see which entity can be found to have suffered or gained most from its employed framing strategy.
