Right Place, Right Time? Placing Right-wing Extremism on the EU Decision Agenda

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Right Place, Right Time?

Placing Right-wing Extremism on the EU Decision Agenda

Master Thesis Student: Antonia Gough Student number: s2684381 Supervisor: Dr Lety Elias Carrillo Second reader: Dr Silvia D’Amato a.e.gough@umail.leidenuniv.nl August 9th 2020 Word count: 24,000 words (excluding title page, abstract, table of contents, list of abbreviations and references)

Leiden University – Campus The Hague Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs (FGGA) Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) MSc Crisis and Security Management

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Abstract

Against the backdrop of rising Islamist terrorism, a prolonged economic and severe refugee crisis, coupled with what Ebner (2017) terms a global identity crisis, far-right parties and extremist groups are on the rise, both in and outside of government across the continent. Despite this environment, public debate has not accorded the same level of pertinence to right-wing extremism, this gap between reality and perception having resulted in various undesirable outcomes such as incorrect threat assessments of far-right radicalisation and the normalisation of right-wing groups in contemporary society. An actor and policymaker that has also not traditionally devoted attention to RWE is the European Union, for whom tackling right-wing extremism – and more specifically formatting a strategy towards right-wing extremism – has not been a policy agenda item. However, in August 2019 the European Union placed tackling right-wing extremism on its decision agenda in the form of two Council Presidency papers that set out a strategy to specifically target right-wing extremism, no specialised treatment of the specific threat posed by RWE as a problem meriting its own strategy being present on the EU policy agenda during the years 2010 to 2018. This thesis thus poses the question How can the

emergence of a strategy addressing right-wing extremism onto the EU decision agenda in 2019 be explained? To answer this question, the thesis adopts Kingdon’s Multiple Streams

Framework and utilises causal process tracing to unearth the materialisation of the EU’s decision agenda change. The thesis concludes that the strategy towards right-wing extremism appeared on the EU decision agenda predominantly along the lines suggested by the Multiple Streams Framework. More specifically, what made the strategy take hold and grow on the decision agenda was a combination of effective stream coupling by the Commission and the opening of a fortuitous policy window following the Christchurch and Halle terror attacks.

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Against the backdrop of rising Islamist terrorism, a prolonged economic and severe refugee crisis, coupled with what Ebner (2017) terms a global identity crisis, right-wing extremist parties and groups are on the rise, both in and outside of government across the European continent (Ravndal, 2018). Attacks in Western countries motivated by anti-Muslim or xenophobic sentiments are happening 50% more often than those inspired by Islamist ideology (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019; Ebner, 2017; Koehler, 2016), right-wing political violence being an underestimated form of political violence (Abbas, 2017; Ebner 2017). Figures from European governments demonstrate that referrals for Islamist inspired attacks – although still the majority – are dropping, whilst those for right-wing extremism (RWE) are rising (Pickard & Gray, 2019). Certain European countries have had more citizens killed in right-wing motivated attacks than Islamist, namely Germany, Sweden, and Norway (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019). Koehler (2019) goes so far as to name RWE one of the greatest threats to European democracies.

Notable incidents demonstrating this threat include the murder of British Member of Parliament (MP) Jo Cox in February 2016; the attack on a synagogue in Halle, Germany, in October 2019; and two mass shootings in Hanau, Germany in February 2020. These incidents are simply those that received media coverage, countless other events with similar motivations not making the headlines. Indeed, the national and EU level are increasingly interlinked – particularly regarding security issues – on the one hand as a result of an emerging internal-external security nexus (Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009), and on the other because of Europeanisation (Alecu de Flers & Müller, 2012; Wong & Hill, 2011). Right-wing violence often has cross-border impacts, as RWE movements are becoming more networked, organised and transnational (Onnerfors, 2019; Ramalingam, 2014a; The Soufran Center, 2020; United Nations, 2020). Indeed, Mammone, Godin and Jenkins (2012) argue RWE is “at the same time a national, European and a local phenomenon” (p.5). Such an outlook is present throughout the thesis.

Despite these alarming trends in Europe, public debate has not accorded the same level of pertinence to RWE as it has other types of extremism such as Islamist extremism (IE)

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attacks with higher numbers of casualties (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019), Europe having spent much of the past two decades tackling the IE threat (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019; Ramalingam, 2014a). This has created a disconnect between the reality and perception of policymakers and the public about the RWE threat level (Ravndal, 2018).

RWE and IE are important to consider together within this wider puzzle for two reasons. Firstly, there is a growing literature forming around a phenomenon named cumulative radicalisation – the idea that one form of extremism can feed off and magnify other forms (Eatwell, 2006). In other words, RWE can amplify IE and vice versa (Ebner, 2017). Secondly, this thesis claims that RWE has been overlooked. For this to have happened, (at least) one other phenomenon must have been stealing the limelight. IE is the variant most often argued by scholars to be the extremism responsible for this overlooking in comparison to other forms (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019; Koehler, 2016; Kundnani, 2012; Ramalingam, 2014a). Thus, the incorrect RWE threat perception can be in part explained by the high level of attention paid to IE, which in turn has resulted in less time and resources being available to focus on RWE. Despite these two links between RWE and IE, the focus of this research is on RWE only, IE being a contextual phenomenon that helps explain why RWE has traditionally been under-assessed as a threat. As Ramalingam (2014b) puts it, RWE has been “relegated to a second-tier security threat” (para.2).

A policymaker that has also not traditionally devoted attention to RWE is the European Union (EU), for whom tackling RWE – and more specifically formatting a strategy towards RWE – has not been a policy agenda item. The EU itself acknowledges the spotlight has been on IE (European Commission, 2016a; Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2017), the 2018 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) report attributing only 3% of foiled, failed and completed terror attacks to RWEs (Europol, 2018). The EU admit their current reporting practices have been “shaped by their experience with jihadist terrorism” (Council, 2019d, p.2).

However, in August 2019, the EU placed addressing RWE on its political decision agenda in the form of two Council Presidency papers distributed to national delegations within the Council’s Terrorism Working Party (TWP). These expressed the desire to specifically target right-wing extremism (RWE) and set out a strategy to do so (Council, 2019c; 2019d), one of the papers admitting “there is a need to further strengthen the EU approach to tackling right-wing extremist violence” (Council, 2019c, p.1) and that the Council feels an “urgency to address the matter” (p.2).

Whilst the Council’s use of the term “further strengthen” implies there was at most, already some EU action taking place on RWE, and at the very least, acknowledgement of its

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existence as a form of extremism, any previous efforts to strengthen the collective EU approach to tackling RWE had not explicitly mentioned the existence or formulation of a strategy1. No

specialised treatment of the specific type of extremist threat posed by RWE as a problem that merited its own Preventing or Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) strategy was present on the EU policy agenda (neither the government nor decision agenda) during the years 2010 to 2018.

Despite the rise in right-wing motivated attacks and rhetoric within MS during those years, there is no mention of RWE specifically, let alone a strategy to counter it, in numerous landmark EU policy documents relating to terrorism and extremism. Whilst RWE was mentioned once in a communication on strengthening the EU’s response to preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism, this was as part of an EU recognition of a wider range of ideologies influencing extremism (European Commission, 2014a, p.2), rather than as part of any specific plans to address RWE explicitly. Although by 2016 the Commission acknowledged that preventing radicalisation should be prioritised, tackling RWE as a standalone radicalisation phenomenon was not mentioned (European Commission, 2016c). Policy regarding an RWE P/CVE strategy had not existed on the EU policy agenda before emerging in 2019.

1.2 Definition and Explanation of Key Terms

Many different conceptualisations of the agenda are found in the literature. The political agenda is defined as those issues that are up for serious consideration by decision-makers (Princen, 2007). This agenda is the principal object of analysis, as agenda-setting in the EU context is predominantly political, involving policymakers rather than the media or public. Furthermore, Kingdon (2013) differentiates between the governmental agenda – those topics receiving attention – and the decision agenda – those topics up for decision by policymakers (p.4). The two types of agenda are “affected by somewhat different processes” (Kingdon, 2013, p.4). Thus, differentiating between, and selecting one of, the two agenda-setting processes is necessary (Princen, 2009).

In the EU context, the European Council and Commission are government agenda institutions, and the Parliament and Council are decision agenda ones. This is because the Commission and European Council have formal agenda-setting powers to set the direction and

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focus of EU policy, whilst the Council and Parliament, although not possessing formal agenda-setting powers, are the institutions that vote a policy into place once it has reached the decision agenda (Nugent, 2010). They decide if policy agenda change will advance. The need to differentiate between the two agenda types is particularly crucial in the EU agenda-setting context because the institutions relevant to different agenda types constitute a different policy venue to one another (Princen, 2007). Therefore, it is likely that the process of agenda change that led to RWE appearing on the agenda would be different if the government agenda was analysed instead of the decision agenda.

In this research, the EU decision agenda is analysed. The decision to examine how and why an EU plan of action towards RWE appeared on the EU decision agenda was made as a result of where the abovementioned agenda change occurred, and hence where the research puzzle originated: from the two Council notes and a Parliament debate (Council, 2019c; 2019d; European Parliament, 2019c), the Council and Parliament being the two decision agenda institutions. The strategy documents and the Parliamentary debate demonstrated that in the late summer/early autumn of 2019, the preliminary stages of discussion of a strategy to tackle RWE began to form on the Council and Parliament’s decision agenda. Although no legislation has yet been made on an RWE strategy, agenda-setting does not have to refer to the creation of legislation (Kingdon, 2013, p.3). An issue just has to be considered for decision-making. Thus, the two Council notes outlining a strategy towards RWE, and a Parliamentary debate on the subject, are adequate manifestations of decision agenda change. The Commission and European Council are not analysed, as the government agenda is not where the agenda change happened.

The thesis uses the following working definition throughout for right-wing extremism formulated by the author, on the basis of Carter (2018), Koehler (2017), Ravndal & Bjørgo (2018) and Ravndal (2018): An authoritarian, anti-democratic, exclusionary, nationalist motivated, and potentially also xenophobic and racist, form of violence – or the support or

threat of its use – that promotes right-wing policies, has specific target victims, intends to

spread fear, and that can involve premeditation (but does not require this).

This definition broadly encompasses the most essential characteristics of RWE for this analysis, including non-violent, violent, and terrorist acts, allowing for both more flexibility and the ability to be precise and relevant enough to the specific research puzzle to avoid conceptual overstretching. Whilst RWE is the central concept used throughout this thesis, the synonym far-right extremism (FRE) is used occasionally when necessary and appropriate, for example when scholars and EU actors use this term and are being directly quoted. The author

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uses the term right-wing extremism as consistently and as singularly as possible otherwise. Finally, this research is concerned predominantly with the extra-parliamentary variant of RWE, meaning those actors outside of the party system (at both the national or EU level), for example, lone actors, street-level groups, grassroots organisations, and movements. MS or EU political parties are not considered within this research’s conceptualisation of RWE.

1.3 Research Question

Hence, the two aforementioned Council notes outlining an RWE-specific strategy demonstrate the beginnings of a specific plan tackling RWE having made it onto the EU decision agenda. Attention for the first time was paid to whether counterterrorism and P/CVE measures at the EU level need to be specific to right-wing threats (Council, 2019c). Thus, the purpose of this research is to ask:

How can the emergence of a strategy addressing right-wing extremism onto the EU decision agenda in 2019 be explained?

This research analyses how exactly this sudden agenda change occurred and why, a strategy towards RWE appearing not only after years of indications that the issue was becoming problematic at the EU level, but also the strategy’s appearance evidencing a puzzling type of agenda change. Namely, a strategy to address RWE emerged onto the decision agenda having not been on the government agenda beforehand, appearing to have bypassed it, landing directly onto the decision agenda. Any mention of a strategy combatting RWE is absent from both European Council meeting conclusions (those published between 2010 and 2019) and Commission President State of the Union addresses (those published between 2010 and 2019), appearing instead in Council notes. To explore this puzzle, the deductive analysis traces back the policy proposal to address RWE in the form of creating a strategy appearing on the EU decision agenda in 2019 via causal process tracing (CPT), employing the theoretical lens of Kingdon’s (2013) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF).

This model provides a theoretical explanation of why and how certain issues do or do not receive attention at particular times, laying out a set of factors that explain why agendas change as they do (Baumgartner, 2016). The MSF therefore permits aa comprehensive examination of how the European Parliament and Council of Ministers began to pay attention to creating a strategy addressing RWE in 2019. Since security challenges are becoming more

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as a security actor increasingly occupied with tackling such transnational security issues (visible through, for example, creation of the 2015 Agenda on Security), the flexibility and adaptability offered by the MSF makes it most suited to an EU security-related agenda-setting analysis. This space and flexibility further permit an investigation of alternative complex combinations of factors within the EU agenda-setting process that may have formed RWE’s path from an overlooked issue to one addressed on the EU decision agenda.

1.4 Academic and Societal Relevance: an Understudied Threat to Community Cohesion

1.4.1 Academic

Academic relevance is derived in part from both the phenomenon and policy area of RWE being comparatively underreported and under analysed (Abbas, 2017; Koehler, 2016; NCTV, 2018). When compared to its Islamist counterpart, Schmid & Forest (2018) identify “Far-right anti-Muslim violence in Europe” as one of 150 un- and under-researched topics in (counter)terrorism studies. The EU itself argues that policy derived from relevant research and statistics is crucial (Council, 2019c, p.5) and more research on RWE is required (p.6).

Further academic relevance is derived from the internal-eternal security nexus literature. The internal-external security nexus represents the idea security issues, in becoming more transboundary, should no longer be perceived as falling into divided categories of internal and external security (Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009). In analysing the EU agenda-setting approach relating to RWE, this research contributes to this thriving literature within Crisis and Security Management. Studying how agenda-setting within security policy is impacted by this nexus has become an especially ripe area of research (Erikson & Rhinard, 2009), scholars attempting to conclude, for example, whether policy outcomes indeed reflect a dissolving of this internal-external divide, whether the divide remains intact or somewhere in-between. This is especially interesting to explore given the nature of the RWE policy area within the EU – an issue of shared competence between the EU and MS. As the issue of RWE has not traditionally been addressed at the EU level, the author has not encountered literature discussing EU agenda-setting in either the RWE, or other related/synonymous, policy areas specifically. Fresh insights into the ever-evolving EU policy process can also be gained. Incentives for scholars to continue to gain an understanding of how issues arrive on the EU agenda remain strong (Princen & Rhinard, 2006).

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1.4.2 Societal

A major societal relevance comes from the impact RWE has on society’s safety, with the possibility that ignoring this violence will increase the risk of future domestic terrorism and acts of violence across EU MS (Kundnani, 2012). The right-wing’s aggressive rhetoric divides communities and undermines social cohesion (Neumann, 2013), leaving certain minority communities within the EU living in fear (Ramalingam, 2014b). Extremists are not only responsible for terrorist acts, but also street violence and public disorder across the EU (Neumann, 2013). In addition, how different genres of extremism are understood, perceived, and tackled in the policy world has an impact on P/CVE programmes implemented in societies across all 27 MS. Whilst these societal impacts of RWE can be contemplated on both the national and European level, their more severe, most extreme implications– large-scale terror attacks – are felt at an EU-wide level. Victims of right-wing violence and hatred come from every MS. Indeed, such violence not only threatens lives, but also the pluralist, liberal values on which European societies, and the EU, are built (Koehler, 2019; Neumann, 2019).

1.5 Research Structure

On this basis, the thesis is divided into the following six chapters. Chapter two outlines the conceptualisation of the central term – RWE – followed by the state of the art in various aspects of the current literature on RWE, EU agenda-setting and applications of the MSF to the EU. In chapter three, the chosen theoretical framework – Kingdon’s (2013) MSF – is explained and necessary adaptations to fit the EU context are outlined. Chapter four delineates the analytical framework. In chapter five, the analysis proceeds, structured along the lines of the operationalisation delineated in the previous chapter. Chapter six presents conclusions on the findings, answers the research question, lays out contributions and limitations, and makes suggestions for future research.

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2. From Conceptualisation to the State of the Art

2.1 Conceptualising Right-wing Extremism: a Never-ending Definitional Debate?

This section conceptualises the research’s essential concept: right-wing extremism. An incorrect conceptualisation of RWE is undesirable as it can lead to over- or under-estimation of the threat, inaccurate classification and reporting of incidents, and the use of ineffective countermeasures (Koehler, 2017). Thus, a conceptualisation requires first defining right-wing and then defining extremism. An understanding of RWE cannot be achieved without first understanding what the ideological core of being right-wing encompasses, and secondly, before pinpointing the characteristics that transform this ideology from a mainstream to an extremist one. As will become clear, the right-wing variant of extremism presents its own particular and complex challenges, further necessitating a detailed conceptualisation approach.

2.1.1 Defining Right-Wing

Europe’s right-wing scene is hard to precisely delineate (Fekete, 2016) and contains many dividing lines. Yet, it can still be defined. Whilst in the past, agreement was less widespread, today many scholars acknowledge relative agreement on what constitutes right-wing (Carter, 2018), most scholars shoright-wing consensus that ‘right-right-wing’ primarily describes an ideology (Carter, 2018; Mudde, 1996). It is what this ideology encapsulates that causes debate.

Carter’s (2018) more minimalist conceptualisation of right-wing is chosen. She has undertaken a comparison of fifteen of the most influential academic definitions and concluded that the right-wing ideology comprises three defining properties – authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary nationalism – alongside three accompanying characteristics – xenophobia, racism, and populism. This definition is most fitting for two reasons. Firstly, the conceptualisation, although derived from analyses based on political parties, can just as appropriately be applied to social groups or looser groupings or networks of activists (Carter, 2018). Secondly, the definition contains both essential and less essential characteristics which allows for flexibility, a necessity given the heterogeneity of the actors and acts considered part of the RWE scene in the EU.

Significant for the chosen conceptualisation of right-wing for this research is that the focus is on the variety of lone actors, grassroots and street-level groups, and movements rather than political parties. Examples of such actors within the EU context are movements such as Generation Identity, National Action, Sonnenkrieg Division, as well as those lone wolf individuals vulnerable to radicalisation who today can be EU or non-EU citizens. The choice to focus on the extra-parliamentary element was made for two reasons. Firstly, the difficulty in

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finding an agreed conceptualisation covering all types of right-wing activity necessitated some narrowing down of the object of analysis, and secondly, right-wing actors outside of the party system are less researched (see section 2.3). Such extra-parliamentary actors have a different impact compared to right-wing parties, acting and exerting influence outside of the political sphere, this influence felt at national and EU level.

2.1.2 Defining Extremism

Extremism is a term with similarly multiple definitions. A first noteworthy debate is around the role played by violence in extremism. Koehler (2017) asserts that whilst there is variety in the tactics and motivations used in right-wing attacks, violence is often a common theme, being not only the means to reach political goals, but also the essence of the ideological motivation. Yet, many RWEs do not partake in violent activity, especially as today the internet facilitates a substitute for street violence. Words and hate speech are also crucial. Thus,

supporting or threatening the use of illegal violence is included within the conceptualisation.

A second debate revolves around the relation between hate crime and terrorism. A hate crime is defined as “a criminal act that is motivated by a bias toward the victim or victims real or perceived identity group” (Blazak in Koehler, 2017). Whilst some do not differentiate between the two terms, others see their relationship as far too complicated to conflate. Are they “close cousins” (Mills, Freilich & Chermak, 2015) or “distant relatives” (Deloughery, King & Assal, 2012)? Koehler (2017) concludes that right-wing terrorism and hate crime share enough characteristics to merit them being linked with one another. The conceptualisation chosen for this research agrees with Koehler (2017), treating hate crime and terrorism as distinct, yet related, subsets of RWE, as close cousins rather than distant relatives. Mills et al. (2015) argue hate crimes are under-reported, under-investigated and under-prosecuted, attracting less media, police, and government attention. This is the principal reason hate crimes are considered part of the conceptualisation in this research. Not all hate crime is performed by (right-wing) extremists, however.

A third debate exists regarding whether right-wing motivated political violence can be considered terrorist in nature, as this type of violence sometimes does not have widely visible methods of communication connected to their attacks (Koehler, 2017). Whilst for Heitmeyer (2005), right-wing motivated acts should be considered terrorist as such acts place groups in states of fear, often attacks are small scale, not broadcast, and the perpetrators do not claim accountability. This lack of broadcast also makes it more difficult to ascertain whether specific

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terrorist. A further characteristic of RWE contributing to uncertainty around whether an event is terrorist is the nature of those targeted. Koehler (2017) claims what makes right-wing terrorism unique to other forms is that it often has specific victims and enemies, whilst other types are indiscriminate in targeting. Another differentiating characteristic is that right-wing violence, including hate crime, is often spontaneous, whereas terror attacks involve planning (Koehler, 2018; Mills et al., 2015).

Furthermore, whereas political motivation is a widely agreed characteristic of terrorism, Koehler (2017) claims right-wing attacks do not so clearly communicate this. According to Koehler (2017), a central difference between hate crime and terrorism is that terrorism has the additional intent to alter the political status quo, whilst hate crimes do not possess political strategies or aims. However, Ravndal (2018) contends that, although most attacks are never proclaimed or even explained, such attacks do exhibit political motivation to influence and deliver the message to a primary wider target audience that they are unwanted and to instil fear. The target selection may then in itself be seen as a political message (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018). Therefore, it is not the characteristic of political motivation that differentiates right-wing violence from right-wing terrorism, but that of premeditation (Koehler, 2018; Ravndal, 2018).

As a result of this discussion, the term wing violence is used in preference to right-wing terrorism. This allows for the inclusion of all types of violence that target based on beliefs and resultant opponents. A belief or act can be extreme without being terrorist. Every act of right-wing terrorism is an act of right-wing violence, but not every act of right-wing violence is an incidence of terrorism (Koehler, 2017; Ravndal, 2018).

Given the divergence between academics in both the conceptualisation of right-wing and extremism, the author’s conceptualisation of RWE attempts to encompass as wide a range of contexts and actors, especially necessary given these phenomena are studied in a 28-country context. Thus, the author’s conceptualisation of RWE is as follows: An authoritarian, anti-democratic, exclusionary, nationalist motivated, and potentially also xenophobic and racist, form of violence – or the support or threat of its use – that promotes right-wing policies, has specific target victims, intends to spread fear, and that can involve premeditation, but does not require this. This definition permits an appropriate observation of the RWE phenomenon as it captures several components present in the relevant literature, as well as the elements included by the EU itself in its definition of RWE (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019c, p.6).

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2.2 Right-wing Extremism’s Position on the European Union Policy Agenda Before 2019 Now that the conceptualisation of RWE is established, RWE’s historical position on the EU policy agenda in the years before 2019 is outlined. The specific instance of agenda change cannot be pinpointed and analysed without first gaining an understanding of this position. There is no mention of RWE specifically, let alone a strategy to counter it, in numerous landmark EU policy documents relating to terrorism and extremism, such as the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy (European Commission, 2010a), a 2014 Council note on the revised EU P/CVE strategy (Council, 2014a), the EU Agenda on Security (European Commission, 2015c), a 2016 Commission communication supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism (European Commission, 2016a), nor in the report produced by a special parliamentary committee on terrorism (European Parliament, 2018a).

Whilst RWE was mentioned once in a communication on strengthening the EU’s response to preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism, this signalled rather the EU’s recognition of a wider range of ideologies influencing extremism (European Commission, 2014a, p.2) than any specific plans to address RWE in its own right. This communication acknowledges “the trends, means and patterns of radicalisation have evolved and broadened” (European Commission, 2014a, p.2) and that the EU’s ‘broader’ approach addresses radicalisation in all its forms. The approach in 2014 was more focused on acknowledging a wider range of ideological influences on radicalisation within the EU than on treating RWE as an item to which specific attention was being, or should be, given. Indeed, it was this broader pre-existing focus the Commission and European Council had already taken towards extremism that allowed RWE to bypass the government agenda in the way it did. Extremism, most commonly IE, had already been discussed within the Commission and European Council at considerable length.

In a 2016 Parliament resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the Union, several trends, such as a rise in populism, extremism, racism and xenophobia, and hate speech within certain institutions, political parties and the media, are recognised. However, any explicit linking of these phenomena to either RWE as the cause or specific strategies to mitigate these phenomena are absent (European Parliament, 2016b). Whilst in 2016 the Commission stated, “the absolute priority must be to prevent more people from being radicalised and ensure that those who already are enter de-radicalisation programmes and are prevented from spreading terrorist propaganda and hate speech" (European Commission, 2016c, p.6), tackling RWE specifically as a standalone radicalisation phenomenon was not mentioned.

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The 2017 Council revised guidelines for the EU P/CVE strategy refer to various challenges and threats revealed by recent Europol TE-SAT reports, listing a “rise of right-wing extremism” as one (Council, 2017b, p.4), but again, this is where the discussion ended. Any mention of either explicitly incorporating RWE into the current P/CVE strategy or of RWE as a problem that merited its own specialised P/CVE strategy remained absent from this revision, and indeed from documents more generally before 2019.

Hence, the beginnings of an RWE-specific strategy emerged onto the EU policy agenda in 2019. The agenda change analysed is thus a sudden, rather than incremental, development in the form of a plan of action regarding RWE that had not existed before, neither within the Commission nor European Council government agenda, nor the Parliament or Council decision agenda. This specific instance of agenda change is non-incremental and discontinuous, an RWE-focused strategy suddenly, as Kingdon (2013) terms it, “hitting” or “catching on” (p.80) to the Parliament and Council decision agenda in 2019. The degree of sudden change was high, given the appearance of an RWE strategy on the early stages of the decision agenda, it having bypassed the government agenda.

2.3 The Right-wing Extremist Threat: an Illness Difficult to Diagnose

Having outlined the situation of RWE on the EU policy agenda before 2019, this section discusses central debates within the RWE literature from the European/EU perspective. Specifically, debates around problematic MS definition of RWE, RWE threat perception, characteristics of RWE that contribute to this threat perception, and the significance of an imbalance in the literature towards analysing RWE parties over other actor types are explored. These debates are pertinent to the research as they help provide some context as to why an RWE strategy only recently emerged on the EU policy agenda.

Ravndal (2018) labels RWE literature as “diverse, disorganised and discontinuous” (p.4). Ravndal (2016) derives a large part of this assessment from the discrepancies and differences that exist in how MS define, report, and register right-wing violence which he extensively outlines. His biggest concern is that these differences make national comparisons impossible. Similarly, Koehler (2016) presents the difficulties met by security agencies in detecting and appropriately responding to right-wing political violence. These phenomena are relevant to the EU level as policymaking within the P/CVE area remains an MS competence. Hence, such discrepancies, differences and difficulties remain directly linked to policymaking at the EU level and are indeed reflected in the EU’s ability to make and enact policy in this

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area. The EU approach and ability to tackle RWE are directly affected by such national-level issues.

Ravndal (2018) also draws interesting conclusions about RWE threat perception. According to Ravndal (2018), the increasingly contentious public debate around RWE is two-sided: on the one side those in government who downplay the threat, and on the other, journalists and civil society who exaggerate the threat via anecdotes rather than systematic event data. Ravndal & Bjørgo (2018) contend that whilst media reports have generated a popular notion of a rise in an extreme-right terror threat in Europe, the exact nature of this threat and the possible driving factors remain misunderstood and poorly documented. Simultaneously, the authors identify a situation where the assorted theories around RWE do not “speak to each other” (p.5), worrying that this combination of a wider threat perception and a lack of understanding could become problematic.

There is, however, general agreement within academia that RWE poses a threat. Koehler (2016) emphasises that RWE violence attempts to blend in with wider societal currents and feelings to avoid or minimise countermeasures. Thereby, RWE can harm democracies because it supports minority victims in their perception that they do not enjoy equal protection from the state as other societal groups. Ebner (2017) agrees, believing extreme-right actors are getting better at camouflaging their beliefs, and thus mainstreaming their rhetoric.

The disconnect caused by differing threat perception has resulted in various undesirable outcomes, including incorrect threat assessments of right-wing radicalisation (Koehler, 2017; Kundnani, 2012), right-wing groups being absent from the policy discourse (Abbas, 2017), normalisation of right-wing groups in contemporary society (Kundnani, 2012; van Elk, 2016), and their influence on everyday political debate being substantially increased (Koehler, 2016; Ramalingam, 2014b). Kundnani (2012) claims that whilst Islamist terrorism is seen as a strategic threat, RWE has been viewed more as a problem of public order. Kundnani (2012) takes issue with what he perceives to be a widespread attitude of people believing they “know racism when they see it” (p.29), whilst racism and right-wing politics present as many problems of definition as the Islamist ideology. Oliveira Martins & Ziegler (2018) contend that the 2005 EU Strategy on terrorism reveals an already forming bias towards Islamist terrorism, given the omission of any reference to past EU engagement with other types of terrorist threat. They claim that, of all controversies surrounding EU counterterrorism policy, the largest is the disproportionate focus on Islamism as an ideological trigger for radicalisation.

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RWE remains a hidden phenomenon, encouraged by stronger penal codes in certain countries, social stigma, and RWE actors being more active online. Furthermore, differing country approaches to the categorisation of RWE events increase the difficulty to gain a comprehensive threat assessment (United Nations, 2020). The earlier discussed struggles around categorising RWE implies that reliable data on the more loosely organised forms of RWE violence are hard to obtain. Consequently, RWE violence ends up categorised and reported as something else, becoming part of a different set of statistics and thus falling under the government’s radar.

The vast majority of the literature in the European context is on extreme-right parties and political processes, with less attention paid to RWE violence carried out by grassroots level groups, social movements or lone wolf actors (Koehler, 2017; Rydgren, 2018). The overwhelming scholarly focus has been on right-wing political parties in Europe (see Allchorn, 2019; Art, 2011; Betz, 1994; Pirro & Castelli, 2018; Rydgren, 2017). Mudde is considered one of the leaders in the RWE literature. His main contributions have focused on radical and extreme right political parties on the European national level (Mudde, 1996; 1999; 2019), and populist parties in Europe (Mudde, 2007; 2012). Alongside Mudde, Rydgren has written extensively on the radical right. He argues that the emergence of the radical right in the mid-2000s signalled the rise of a new family of political parties (Rydgren, 2005). Comparative and single case studies of national radical or populist parties across Europe is a further common theme (Mudde, 1995; Rydgren, 2004; 2018). This literature reveals a gap, specifically regarding research on other manifestations of RWE outside of the party-political sphere, which this research contributes to filling.

2.4 Ambiguity and Bounded Rationality in the European Union Policy Process

In order to properly analyse the agenda-setting process towards RWE in the EU, it is crucial to explore literature on the EU’s policymaking character. Policymaking in the EU is often portrayed as fluid, complex, and incomprehensible (Zahariadis, 2007a). Richardson (2001) contends that the EU has acquired the policymaking attributes of a modern state across a wide array of areas, in a multi-level policymaking environment where policy is challenging to predict. However, he cautions against treating the system as more chaotic or unusual than it is, as it possesses several shared characteristics with the national policy context. This idea is echoed by Zahariadis (2007a), who asserts that just because the EU institutional makeup may differ from national systems, there is no reason to assume the activities of policy actors to be different. Richardson (2001) concludes that it is not the messiness of the EU policy process that should be the primary interest, but that any policy can be made at all despite the multiple

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interests present. In terms of theorising within the EU policymaking literature, Zahariadis (2007a) claims this is underdeveloped, being too narrowly focused on specific elements.

An important concept within both the policymaking literature and the theoretical framework used in this research is bounded rationality. Bounded rationality refers to policymakers having limited resources in terms of time, information, contextual knowledge, and attention span. As a result, they are obliged to make decisions based on some uncertainty. Problems do not receive attention simply because people think they merit it, and policymakers do not select solutions based on them being most effective (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016).

A second concept, pertinent to both EU policymaking and the MSF, is the idea of ambiguity. This label comes from the idea the EU policy system often contains participants that do not operate via clearly defined goals, the overall process being so complex it is poorly understood by the majority (Zahariadis, 2007a). Ambiguity has numerous implications in the EU context. Participant goals are often unclear, participation in decisions are fluid, organisational technology remains opaque, and problems often remain unclear, with constantly shifting definitions (Zahariadis, 2007a; 2007b).

The existence of ambiguity suggests the more traditional, rationalist policy approaches are of limited utility. This rational approach argues that policymaking involves the pursuit of interests or goals when making decisions. Such an approach, however, is difficult in the EU context because these are rarely ascertained beforehand (Zahariadis, 2007a). Collecting entirely relevant information is also challenging (Zahariadis, 2007a). As problem definitions and national preferences are in constant flux and the EU is often unable to control these, policies are not always capable of addressing problems (Zahariadis, 2007a; 2007b). Consequently, political manipulation becomes the underlying logic of analysis, rather than any idea of rationality.

2.4.1 Agenda-setting in the European Union: a Prospective Agenda-setter’s Paradise?

Academic debates on agenda-setting in the EU are now examined. In political systems of any kind, the point of departure of policymaking is setting the agenda. Agenda-setting concerns the process of persuading policymakers to first actively select (Cobb & Ross, 1997, p.3), and then seriously consider, an issue (Kingdon, 2013, p.31). It defines the process that can turn public issues into actionable government priorities (Zahariadis, 2016). The agenda is defined by Kingdon (2013) as the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and closely associated people outside of government, are paying serious attention to at any

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time (p.3). This attention is a matter of degree, one of the most significant characteristics of an agenda being that it reflects prioritisation in some form or another (Zahariadis, 2016).

Not all policy issues can reach the policy agenda because of time and cognitive constraints. In the EU context, agenda-setting poses an additional challenge as policymakers must also be persuaded the EU is the right actor to manage an issue (Princen, 2011). Such processes are vital because they determine which problems are (likely to be) progressed to decision-making (Princen, 2007). No policy will be formulated if its underlying issue cannot first appear on an institution’s agenda (Peters, 1994). Thus, the central importance of analysing the driving forces behind this particular case of early-stage decision agenda-setting is derived from this process being the first step in potential future policymaking on creating a specific strategy towards RWE in the EU.

Despite studies in agenda-setting at the EU level becoming more popular in recent years, an analysis of agenda-setting within the RWE policy realm is something the literature would benefit from. Analysing how the agenda is set in the EU is valuable both because the level of understanding of this process directly influences policymaking in general (Princen, 2007) and because agenda-setting in the EU context is fundamentally different to that on the national level (Peters, 1994).

One of the most profound divides in the agenda-setting literature relates to the rationality assumption. Whilst certain scholars see EU policymaking to be guided by rationality and strategic choice (Princen, 2007), others question this (Zahariadis, 2003). Both camps agree, however, on the importance of framing (Moschella, 2011). Framing is an influential concept in the agenda-setting literature, taking on an additional dimension within the EU context (Princen, 2007). Framing no longer only refers to how problems and solutions are portrayed, but the appropriateness of the EU as a venue to address such issues presents a further layer of framing that must occur (Princen, 2007). Not only must the argument be made that an issue is problematic and worth tackling, but the case of the EU as a solution venue must be argued.

A characteristic of the EU that becomes relevant in agenda-setting is the many access points, decision-making rules and processes that the EU possesses (Princen, 2007). As Peters (1994) first argued, these multiple entry points make it relatively easy for an issue to reach the agenda of at least one involved actor. Yet, it is this very feature that also leads to complications. With many points of access come many points of veto. Princen (2007) contends it is far easier to get an issue considered than to have that same issue ascend on the political agenda. For this to be successful, a high degree of consensus on the need to address the issue within the EU is

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required (Princen, 2007). A discussion of the literature that has applied the MSF to the EU policymaking context follows.

2.5 Previous Application of the Multiple Streams Framework to the European Union

The MSF was first applied to the EU as early as the mid-nineties by Peters (1994), who, having considered the EU policymaking process in-depth, concluded that this process fits very well within the garbage can model on which the MSF is based. Peters (1994) in particular argued for the importance of policy entrepreneurs2 in the EU policy environment, an

environment characterised by selection, indeterminacy and multiplicity of actors and solutions. A further impetus to this developing literature was given a decade later by Zahariadis (Zahariadis, 2003; 2008). Zahariadis (2008) outlines various adaptations to features of the MSF that are necessary when applied to the EU, namely how focusing events can either be national or international in character, that the politics stream requires almost complete transformation (see section 3.3), and the importance EU institutions have in empowering actors involved in the central coupling process. Zahariadis (2007a) argues that the MSF is a lens that stresses temporal order and political manipulation, and hence is the model best suited to studying EU policymaking. EU MSF literature frequently mentions the Commission as policy entrepreneur (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Copeland & James, 2013; Iusmen, 2013; Kaunert, 2010; Huisman & de Jong, 2014).

Ackrill & Kay (2011) attempt to further develop certain elements of the MSF theory in three main ways: firstly, regarding the role of policy entrepreneur; secondly interpreting ambiguity for the first time within the EU institutional context; and thirdly formulating a broader understanding of spillover than Kingdon’s (2013) original conceptualisation, terming this “endogenous spillover” (Ackrill & Kay, 2011, p.73). Their most crucial finding regarding endogenous spillover was that it can hold policy windows open for a longer time than Kingdon (2013) suggests. This has the potential to manifest itself in the EU context as a result of many policy problems spanning (several) different policy areas. Regarding policy entrepreneurs, Ackrill & Kay’s (2011) principal contribution was to advocate distinguishing between both entrepreneurial individuals, and entrepreneurship as a process. Furthermore, they present the idea that policy solutions may not make the agenda as a result of being sold by skilful

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entrepreneurs, but instead because EU policymakers have already selected appropriate policy solutions to be considered.

Authors have advanced various developments to Kingdon’s (2013) policy window concept. Natali (2004) introduces the idea that policy entrepreneurs are able to open policy windows themselves, an idea that is further built on by Corbett (2005), Ackrill & Kay (2011) and Huisman & de Jong (2014). Nugent and Saurugger (2002) advance the policy window concept by linking the length of time a window is open to the magnitude of the agenda change that takes place. Copeland & James (2013) apply the MSF to the relaunch of the EU’s economic reform agenda in 2010, finding that two policy windows can open, and in fact overlap. Huisman & de Jong (2014) contend that a policy idea’s shelf life can be much longer than that of a fleeting policy window, the window kept open by EU policymakers. Regarding the policy stream, Bache (2013) argues this stream needs to be seen as more transnational than Kingdon (2013) envisaged, linking this to the wider idea that the three streams must be considered not only in temporal, but also spatial terms. Ackrill et al. (2013) discuss the implications of the potential power held by the Commission as policy entrepreneur given its unique position within the EU policymaking structure.

Various bodies of literature within different spheres of academia have now been outlined. Analyses linking agenda-setting with RWE are, however, currently limited. There is no literature (that the author has encountered) discussing EU agenda-setting in either the RWE, or other related/synonymous, policy areas. This is most likely for the reason RWE and a strategy to counter it have not traditionally been addressed at the EU level (see section 2.2). The use of the MSF, combined with the current state of RWE research, leaves countless research possibilities vacant. This research contributes to the narrowing of this gap by conducting a CPT analysis to ascertain how the EU agenda-setting process unfolded to result in the eventual emergence of a strategy towards RWE on the agenda.

This research links to Crisis and Security Management via broader trends occurring within crisis and security concerns at the European level. For example, phenomena such as Europeanisation, security governance and the development that cross-border security issues have challenged traditional divides between internal (national) and external (foreign) security (Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009). It is pertinent to gain further insights into how security issues are governed at the EU level. The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework.

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3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Multiple Streams Framework as Most Appropriate

Before explaining the functioning of the MSF, its use as the theoretical framework within this thesis is justified. The MSF has been chosen in preference to two other notable theories of agenda-setting: Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), and the issue attention cycle (Downs, 1972) for a number of reasons. Whilst the crux of Downs’s (1972) model is that attention to issues goes in a cycle, rising suddenly, before exhibiting a gradual decline, Baumgartner & Jones’s (1993) PET argues that policymaking is never in constant equilibrium, issues always being redefined and institutions always changing. Baumgartner & Jones (1993) and Downs (1972), although theorising the policymaking process differently, do not present direct opposition or confrontation to the MSF.

The theoretical rivalry between these three theories was not particularly fierce when Kingdon (2013) wrote his original publication. This lack of contention remains today. Indeed, Kingdon (2013) refers to Downs’s (1972) issue attention cycle occasionally (for example p.105), and Baumgartner himself was a student of Kingdon for many years. PET in fact derives its evolutionary background from the MSF (Cairney & Jones, 2015), Jones acknowledging that PET does not intend to reject Kingdon’s approach but instead wishes for the two to operate side by side (Cairney & Jones, 2015). Evolution is what most connects these theories. In the context of the agenda-setting theoretical literature, evolution refers to the cumulative, long-term development of policy solutions.

Given that the issue attention cycle and PET do not exhibit wildly different underlying logics to the MSF, one might ask why one of these was not selected instead. However, the MSF is best suited to this specific research for various reasons. Security challenges are becoming more international, this development being further complicated by the sui generis nature of the EU as a security actor increasingly occupied with tackling such transnational security issues (visible through, for example, the creation of the 2015 Agenda on Security). Consequently, the flexibility and adaptability offered by the MSF makes it most suited to an EU security-related agenda-setting analysis. This space and flexibility further permit an investigation of alternative complex combinations of factors within the EU agenda-setting process that may have formed RWE’s path from an overlooked issue, to one addressed on the EU decision agenda. The MSF is the most established of the available policymaking theories (Jones et al, 2015). The model does not negate entirely the value of rational arguments, whilst also having the capacity to go beyond these (Kingdon, 2013). Use of this theoretical framework is thus most suited to this

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More generally, the theory is a “thriving field of study” (Cairney & Jones, 2015, p.53). The MSF possesses an “unparalleled empirical richness” (Jones et al., 2015). This is shown by its application to a range of geographical and political contexts, political levels, and research methods. This richness relates to another of its strengths – a high level of portability (Jones et al., 2015; Zahariadis, 2007b) across time, countries, and policy domains. Many scholars view critical characteristics of the EU to lend it appropriateness to the garbage can idea fundamental to the MSF (Baumgartner, 2016; Richardson, 2001; Peters, 1994). The MSF is well-suited to analysing the EU because of how it underlines the importance of ambiguity as an indispensable element of the EU policy process (Zahariadis, 2008). In stressing political manipulation and temporal order over rationality, the MSF provides a better fit to an EU policy analysis than other theories (Zahariadis, 2007a), Kingdon’s choice to embrace both randomness and structure more closely fitting the EU agenda-setting process.

Critiques of MSF are not absent, however. Bendor et al. (2001) criticise the MSF for not specifying causal variables, this however being less problematic here given the qualitative CPT approach taken (see section 4.2.2). Furthermore, Ackrill & Kay (2011) assert that it is precisely the application of the MSF to other contexts that has revealed its theoretical underdevelopment. However, many of these underdeveloped elements will either be addressed in the below sections on adaptation and operationalisation.

3.2 Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework

Just as there are multiple ways policy can be formed in the EU, there are multiple theories used in policy analysis. Based on the research’s aim to achieve a greater understanding of how RWE’s presence on the EU decision agenda surfaced, Kingdon’s (2013) MSF is chosen. The MSF is derived from Cohen, March & Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model. This model theorised decision-making processes in universities and demonstrated how four independent streams (problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities) move through an organization and come together in a ‘garbage can’ to create change (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). Kingdon (2013) adapts and reduces the number of components in the theory, keeping the idea of the garbage can whilst identifying new streams, each with their own original logics.

The framework identifies three processes – problem recognition, policy solution, and

political events – which are metaphorically conceptualised as streams (Kingdon, 2013, p.87).

More specifically, each stream relates to a particular dynamic. Firstly, the recognition or perception held by policymakers that a problem exists. Secondly, the generation of policy proposals that will contribute to a solution to the issue. Thirdly, political developments and

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activities such as elections and shifts in public opinion that can either constrain or facilitate the elevation of an idea up the political agenda (Kingdon, 2013, p.87).

These streams evolve separately, show distinct dynamics and can come together at fortuitous moments when successfully coupled by skilful individuals – policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2013, pp.19-20). The independence of the streams is derived from the assumption individuals can only attend to one or a limited number of issues at once (Kingdon, 2013, p.78). Entrepreneurs attempt to couple these streams, selling their packaged proposals of problem linked to solution to a hopefully receptive political audience (Zahariadis, 2007a) to achieve policy change (Zahariadis, 2007b). The likelihood of policy agenda change is higher when these streams are coupled.

The agenda is set by either problem recognition or political developments – the two types of windows that can open – whilst the policy alternatives are formulated in the policy stream (Kingdon, 2013, p.20). An important distinction within the framework highlighted by Herweg, Huß & Zohlnhöfer (2015) is between those processes that create opportunities for agenda change, such as problem identification or political change, and those processes that lead to the agenda change once the opportunity has arisen, such as the stream coupling and persuasion by the policy entrepreneurs. Kingdon (2013) has applied the idea of residual randomness. He views the agenda-setting process as being structured by certain factors, but also involving a level of randomness, for example, a policy window closing unexpectedly (pp.189-190). This is noteworthy because it reveals why Kingdon speaks of probability of policy agenda change rather than actual predictions (Baumgartner, 2016).

Another important characteristic of the MSF is ambiguity. Ambiguity manifests itself in the EU policy process in the following ways: there are many ways to frame a problem, there is competition in terms of attention for such problems to make it onto the agenda, there is limited time to make decisions, and decision-making processes can be irrational (Cairney & Jones, 2015). Ambiguity permeates the policy process (Ackrill et al., 2013; Kingdon, 2013, p.206-208). Who pays attention to what and when is critical in understanding what decisions are made and why (Zahariadis, 2007a). In summary, the chance a policy option will be adopted increases when the three streams couple, is dependent on the type of window that opens, and the resources, skills, and strategies used by the entrepreneur to focus attention (Zahariadis, 2007a). The MSF is a model that explores which actors participate during a policy window and how policy entrepreneurs politically manipulate this process (Ackrill et al., 2013).

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3.2.1 The Problem Stream: Problems Emerging from Conditions

Kingdon (2013) defines problems as conditions that, when measured by certain signals, are defined as problematic (p.19). Problems focus attention on an issue and propel it high on the agenda (Zahariadis, 2007a). Within the problem stream, conditions attract attention via indicators, focusing events, and feedback. Policymakers use these to find out whether conditions can be considered problems.

Indicators are utilised to assess the existence of a condition and/or its magnitude and scope of change (Zahariadis, 2007a). These can then be used “politically” to measure the size of a change in the attempt to catch “official” attention (Zahariadis, 2007a). When indicators do not show problems to be so self-evident, focusing events can call attention to the problem, themselves being a specific category of problem (Birkland, 1997). Although tricky to categorise, such events are vivid, have a highly visual impact, and are relatively conducive to agenda-setting campaigns (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016). Feedback refers to the evaluations of existing policies (Kingdon, 2013, p.100), such appraisal potentially bringing problems to people’s attention. Feedback helps highlight what works and what does not. These three mechanisms, however, are not sufficient for the transformation of conditions in problems. A fourth element is required. Kingdon (2013) asserts that not all conditions become problems, problems containing a “perceptual, interpretative element” (p.110). Conditions become problems at the moment politicians recognise them as such and decide something should be done (Kingdon, 2013, p.109).

3.2.2 The Policy Stream: Competition Between and Softening Up of Ideas

The policy stream is the ongoing discussion of policy options amongst experts – often largely ‘invisible’ individuals such as Commission officials, parliamentary staffers, national Ministry experts, academics, and civil servants – who pursue policy change in a certain political area. Policies are solutions developed by specialists to address pressing problems. The stream is composed of what Kingdon (2013) terms a “primeval soup” (p.116), made up of the ideas put forward within both EU and national policy networks. Whether a solution is ready to be adopted will depend on whether or not it is present in this stream (Zahariadis, 2007a).

Within this stream, the noteworthy process of “softening up” (Kingdon, 2013, p.117) refers to the often-long time it takes for solutions to be floated, drafted, amended, popularised and their validity to be solidified (pp.128-130). This process is necessary for policy success. The stream feeds off two things: competition of policy ideas and the structure of the policy networks in which such ideas ‘germinate’ (Zahariadis, 2007a). Without available solutions

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existing, the stream is not likely to form. The solutions that have staying power during this softening up fulfil certain characteristics, Kingdon (2013) identifying ones such as value acceptability and technical feasibility (pp.131-139). The policy stream is also where policy entrepreneurs reside (see section 3.2.4).

3.2.3 The Politics Stream: the Most Independently Flowing Stream

The politics stream provides the broader environment within which policy is made, encompassing the factors that create an environment conducive to agenda change (Ackrill & Kay, 2011). Kingdon (2013) identifies three components of this stream: national mood, turnover of personnel, and organised political interests (p.146). National mood fluctuates, this change having impacts on policy agenda change outcomes (Kingdon, 2013, p.146). Turnover relates to events within government itself, such changes in personnel being capable of bringing new priorities onto the agenda as a result of such turnover (p.153). Organised interest is constituted by political elites, political movements and pressure groups (p.150).

Something that distinguishes this stream from the others is how it flows according to its own rhythm and rules (Kingdon, 2013, p.162). Developments within this stream have a powerful effect on an agenda, as the stream allows new items to become (more) prominent (Kingdon, 2013, p.145). The politics stream is very “visible” in the sense there are multiple ways for political actors to signal to the public that they seriously consider something a problem and want to solve it via a new policy (Greer, 2015). The stream also consists of the more visible figures, such as politicians and civil servants.

3.2.4 Policy Entrepreneurs: Entering the Policy Spotlight

To deal with the disconnect between lurching attention (problem stream) and slow policy development (policy stream), actors known as policy entrepreneurs develop solutions in anticipation of future problems, seeking the right time to exploit or encourage attention to their solution via a relevant problem (‘solutions chasing problems’) (Cairney & Jones, 2015). These individuals constantly search for ways to promote their policy solutions, crafting meaning which they then spread to policymakers so attention or support can be activated (Ackrill et al., 2013). Their ultimate aim is to couple solutions to problems and then to couple these to politics (Kingdon, 2013, p.20, p.182). Entrepreneurs in the EU context have the added task of straddling both national and EU policy venues in a way that both fosters support on the domestic level, but also a diverse enough range of audiences (Ackrill et al., 2013).

Right Place, Right Time? Placing Right-wing Extremism on the EU Decision Agenda

Right Place, Right Time?

Placing Right-wing Extremism on the EU Decision Agenda

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