The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in comparison : why some resistance movements turn violent, whereas others do not

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Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc Political Science – International Relations Track Master Thesis

The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in comparison

Why some resistance movements turn violent, whereas others do not

Name: Brian Pieneman Student ID: 10535365

Mail: brianhouten@gmail.com

Research Project: Violence, resistance and restraint in war and genocide Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause

Second Reader: Dr. Dimitris Bouris Submission Date: June 22, 2018 Words: 23,810

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2 Abstract

According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), nonviolent resistance movements are more successful in accomplishing political and social change than their violent counterparts. And yet, some nonviolent resistance movements turn to violent strategies in their endeavour to establish political and social change. This decision seems counterproductive and is worth studying. This thesis argues that mass mobilization is a double-edged sword – i.e. on the one hand, mass mobilization is required to accomplish the objectives of a nonviolent resistance movement, but mass mobilization appeals to people with different motives to participate in a nonviolent resistance movement, on the other hand. To elaborate this argument, the (nonviolent) Orange Revolution and the (violent) Revolution of Dignity are extensively studied and compared. These case studies indicate that different motivations for participation in a nonviolent resistance movement can be problematic in case of a lack of leadership and unity within the resistance movement.

~ Nonviolence, Social Movements, Orange Revolution, Revolution of Dignity ~

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Jana Krause for her moral guidance and encouraging words during the thesis process. I admit that my process was far from flawless, it has been a true struggle and without the help of my supervisor I would, in all probability, not have been able to write this thesis and to submit this thesis today. Thank you very much for your never-ending efforts to keep me on track. Herzlichen Dank für ihre Mühe. I also grateful to Dr. Dimitris Bouris for the time and consideration he will put in reading my thesis as a second reader. I am happy to have such a well-known academic in the field of European integration and Ukrainian affairs like Dr. Bouris as my second reader.

I cannot leave without mentioning my fellow students, my fellow students contributed to a great in-class atmosphere that inspired me to work hard. I express my gratitude to my friends who encouraged me to keep on working, even during the night, and who have helped me with proofreading my thesis.

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1. Introduction

Whereas some people attempt to adjust themselves to the circumstances that flow from a political or social system and others may envision a gradual change of this system, only a few are actually prepared to challenge either a political or social system, or both, in order to achieve change. This preparedness to bring about change is what could be considered resistance. Throughout space and time, people have challenged political systems and social systems alike in different ways through divergent methods. This challenging of either the political system or the social system, or both, could occur as both the performance of a single act – e.g. non-obedience to authorities – and a persistent campaign of protests. The ultimate objective of such a campaign is either to accomplish concessions of the political system and social system or, more drastically, regime change.

As resistance, intrinsically, is an extensive concept, this thesis will explicitly focus on resistance movements that initially intended to accomplish political and social change or regime change through the use of nonviolent strategies. These nonviolent resistance movements are worth studying because Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) observe that nonviolent resistance movements are, in general, more successful in achieving their objectives than their violent counterparts. This observation leads to the inference that nonviolent resistance movements are more common than their violent counterparts and to the reasoning that it would be counterproductive for nonviolent resistance movements to resort to the use of violence. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of nonviolent resistance movements that resorted to the use of violence in their strive to accomplish political and social change. An explanation for this change in strategy could be the decreasing effectiveness of nonviolent resistance methods. Chenoweth (2017: p. 89) does neither observe data that points to an increase of violent resistance nor to a greater effectiveness of violent strategies between 2010 and 2016; on the contrary, nonviolent resistance strategies prevail over violent strategies. Therefore, the research puzzle that is identified in this thesis is the decision of resistance movements to resort to violent means, whereas these resistance movements initially attempted to achieve political and social change through the use of nonviolent resistance methods.

The decision to resort to violent means could be affected by different factors. These factors could, for example, be disagreement about the objectives of the resistance movement, discontent with the progress which is being made in achieving these objectives, and state repression. I will discuss two protest campaigns in order to develop a deeper and greater comprehension of the factors that are determinant in the decision of actors in a nonviolent

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resistance movement to resort to violent means. These campaigns are the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. Both revolutions were a series of protests which focused on rapprochement with the European Union and the promotion of civil and human rights. These series of protests were given force through the mass mobilization of people who demonstrated in favour of these demands. The mass mobilization of people in such protests is, however, a double-edged sword – i.e. on the one hand mass mobilization is required to accomplish the objectives of a nonviolent resistance movement, but mass mobilization appeals to people with different motives to participate in a nonviolent resistance movement, on the other hand. These motives could differ to such an extent that the demands of the various collective and individual actors which participate in such a nonviolent resistance movement are incompatible and will eventually conflict. Such internal conflict in nonviolent resistance movements could be an indicator for the shift to violence of an initially nonviolent resistance movement. Thus, the topics that will be discussed in this thesis are, first and foremost, violence and nonviolence. Furthermore, this thesis will examine motivations for social mobilization and the diversity within resistance movements. These theoretical concepts will be studied in the cases of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity.

The objectives of this thesis, therefore, are to (1) identify the roles of various collective and individual actors within a nonviolent resistance movement, (2) to determine which factor(s) contributed to the decision of a nonviolent resistance movement to resort to the use of violence, and (3) to compare the presence of these factors in order to discover either the existence or the nonexistence of a pattern of factors which may be determinant for the decision to resort to the use of violence. The central question that is derived from these objectives is: “Why do nonviolent resistance movements turn violent?” This question can be divided in three subquestions. These questions are: “What collective and individual actors participate in a nonviolent resistance movement?”, “What kind of violence emerges when a movement turns violent?”, and “Why does violence emerge?”

According to Cunningham (2013) and Butcher and Svensson (2016), nonviolent resistance movements require mass mobilization to achieve social change. I argue that mass mobilization causes dissent within a resistance movement. In other words: collective and individual actors that participate in a nonviolent resistance movement may have different motives to participate in this movement. Furthermore, these collective and individual actors may expect, or even demand, distinct objectives. Therefore, the leadership of a nonviolent resistance movement may be satisfied with the objectives achieved, while collective and individual actors that participated within the nonviolent resistance movement, are not satisfied with either the proposed or reached

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objectives, or both. This could lead to the decision of a part of the movement to resort to the use of violence in order to achieve different objectives.

The central question of this thesis and the additional subquestions encompass a set of essential concepts that need to be defined first. Therefore, in the first section of this thesis, I will define concepts such as “violence” and “nonviolence”. These concepts are an essential component of the theoretical framework of this thesis. Furthermore, I will elaborate on four motivations for participation in a social movement. Moreover, this theoretical framework includes a literature review on the knowledge that is already gathered about these concepts and attempts to contribute to the understanding of the gaps that still exist in our understanding of these concepts. For example, the different roles of collective and individual actors in a nonviolent resistance movement.

In the second section of the thesis, I will discuss the methods that are used in order to write this thesis. These methods include, inter alia, case studies and process tracing. The case studies that are examined and analyzed in this thesis are the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. Besides case studies and process tracing, this thesis will also include document and media coverage analysis in order to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the cases.

The third section of the thesis presents the actual case studies. These case studies will involve an extensive description and analysis of the events and developments that occurred prior to, during, and after the resistance campaigns. In particular, the preexisting conditions of each case will be taken into account, as these conditions provide an explanation for the resort to the use of violence of particular collective and individual actors within the resistance movements. In the fourth section of this thesis, I will attempt to make a comparison between the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in order to explore whether there is a pattern of factors that may have contributed to the decision of several actors in the nonviolent resistance movements to resort to the use of violence.

In the final section of this thesis, I will recapture and critically analyse my findings in order to formulate a comprehensive, yet concise, answer to the central question, and the additional subquestions.

In this thesis, I endeavour to contribute to the academic understanding of the decision on the behalf of collective and individual actors within a nonviolent resistance movement to resort to the use of violence. This decision seems rather counterproductive, as Chenoweth (2017) argues that nonviolent resistance is twice as likely to succeed as its violent counterpart. Furthermore, Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang (2017) argue that the diversity of participants in both

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nonviolent resistance movements is still under-researched. Therefore, I will attempt to identify various roles within a nonviolent resistance movement.

This thesis is of societal interest, as this thesis will attempt to identify and categorize the factors that cause the use of violence. As violent resistance is less likely to successfully accomplish social change than nonviolent resistance, violent resistance will, in all probability, instigate and inflame state repression which, in turn, could lead to mental and physical suffering of citizens. As this thesis is supposed to identify and categorize factors that could trigger the resort to the use of violence, nonviolent resistance movements, as well as state authorities, will possibly be able to prevent these factors to become dominant in a nonviolent resistance movement.

2. Theoretical Framework

§ 2.1 Literature Review

The question why some nonviolent campaigns turn violent, whilst other campaigns do not, has received particular attention over the last decade, but an accurate answer to the question is still lacking. Erica Chenoweth – a prominent scholar in political violence and civil resistance studies – argues that the reasons for a sudden turn in resistance strategies are manifold. To clarify, the strategies that are employed in a resistance campaign depend, among others, on features such as “intracampaign unity, intergroup competition, the presence of radical flanks, and regime responses (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: p. 416).”

In an attempt to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the change of resistance strategies, Chenoweth and Lewis identify and categorize 250 resistance campaigns of which 100 could be labelled as nonviolent and 150 as violent. A campaign is defined as “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics in pursuit of a political objective” (idem). Furthermore, campaigns are coordinated in such a way that at least 1,000 individual actors participate in a protest that has an evident political objective. These objectives are (1) the overturn of an existing regime, (2) the expel of foreign occupying forces, and (3) the achievement of self-determination. Chenoweth and Lewis study campaigns rather than particular events, as events are not always independent of one another. In other words, a campaign requires intelligence, planning, recruiting, and training of participants.

Although the database of Chenoweth and Lewis offers a good basis, the database also has various limitations. Examples of these limitations are the missing data on unsuccessful and post-2013 resistance campaigns as well as the lack of event-specific data. To elucidate, developments during a particular event could be an essential reason for the use of violence by

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a previously nonviolent resistance movement. Moreover, violence does not necessarily have to be inflicted by the radical flanks of a nonviolent resistance group.

The resort to violence seems to be counterproductive. Chenoweth (2017), Cunningham (2013), Jackson (2015), and King (2018) argue that nonviolent resistance has been more successful in the establishment of political and social change over time. However, these academics provide a different explanation for the shift to the use of violence by actors that participate in a nonviolent resistance campaign.

Chenoweth (2017: pp. 86-88) argues that the decision to use violence against the regime that is being challenged is triggered by state repression. To illustrate this argument, Chenoweth gives the example of protests in Ankara and Istanbul that opposed the decision of Turkish President Erdogan to strengthen laws regarding terrorism. These protests were initially peaceful, but severe violence erupted after police and security forces attempted to beat down the protests. This police violence caused the call for the removal from office of President Erdogan. However, the question can be posed, if the police actions were the sole factor that inflamed the resort to violence and the call for the removal of the President.

Cunningham (2013) argues that, in case of self-determination disputes, the resort to violence is a rational choice. In other words, nonviolent resistance movements base their decision of whether or not to use force on both the costs of such strategies and the anticipation of achieving success through these strategies. The use of violent insurgencies is more likely if a movement is of a large extent, has limited or no access to conventional politics, and receives external support. The potential access to conventional politics is an important component of Cunningham’s argument, as such access would allow a resistance movement to operate while limiting their operational costs. However, this does not mean that if a resistance movement has such access that this movement will limit its actions to conventional politics – i.e. a resistance movement may apply additional tactics in order to accomplish their political objective of self-determination. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these alternative means to attain specific political objectives include the use of violence, as the use of violence would lead to the exclusion of a resistance movement from the political arena. Hence, according to Cunningham, political and social change are most likely to be accomplished through conventional politics. Factors, other than the access to conventional politics, that also may encourage a resistance movement to resort to violence is the capability to mass-mobilize people for their cause and the external support of this movement. However, it has to be noted that mass mobilization and possibly external support for a resistance movement are also predominant in nonviolent resistance movements.

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Jackson (2015) and King (2018) argue that resistance movements tend to achieve external support for their cause. This cause could, inter alia, be regime change, self-determination, or anti-occupation. Resistance movements tend to use (social) media in order to mobilize participants for a resistance campaign and to gain international attention. A regime that is being challenged could impose a countrywide ban on these (social) media in order to prevent the opposition from gaining influence. This repression of a regime could, in turn, cause a resistance movement to decide to turn to violence in order to receive international attention for their cause. The mass mobilization of people is a recurring element in nonviolent resistance campaigns. Butcher and Svensson (2016) argue that “nonviolence is most effective (and feasible) when dissidents can induce mass mobilization quickly and from across broad sectors of society” (idem: p. 314). The mobilization of potential dissidents is supposed to be quick and from across sectors of society because this enables a resistance movement to impose costs on the regime which is being challenged. These costs include not only real financial costs but also moral costs – i.e. mass mobilization is able to weaken a particular regime’s legitimacy. Contrary to nonviolent resistance, violent insurgencies have an advantage in small-scale mobilization. Small-scale mobilization is an advantage for violent movements, as these movements are supposed to coordinate its members. This coordination involves the equipment, motivation, payment, and training of individuals that are prepared to fight for a political or social objective.

§ 2.2 Literature Gaps

Four years after the introduction of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang (2017) propose several future research directions. They emphasize that we need to take into account (1) the effect of external actors, (2) the diversity of actors in both a resistance movement and the regime that is being challenged, (3) interactions, patterns, and sequences in a resistance movement, and (4) the potential relation between various forms of nonviolent and violent resistance.

§ 2.3 Pattern of Violence

To understand the complex composition of a nonviolent resistance movement, a scholar should first distinguish between violence and nonviolence. This distinction between violence and nonviolence is a complicated one due to the broad sense in which the word violence is used. This broad interpretation causes circumstances in which a particular actor perceives the use of violence, while another actor does not notice any kind of violence. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011: p. 143) discuss the example of rock-throwing among Palestinian protesters in Israel. Whereas Palestinian protesters consider this act to be nonviolent, especially in

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comparison to the force which is used by Israeli militaries and settlers, the majority of Israeli citizens regard rock-throwing as an act of violence. Accordingly, an identical action may be interpreted in different ways by various actors. This diversity of interpretations and perceptions of what concerns the use of violence is related to the definition of violence which an actor uses. These interpretations and perceptions may also differ among cultures – i.e. whereas a particular act may be conceived as offensive or even violent in one culture, this act may be seen as acceptable behaviour, and by no means harmful, in another culture. Thus, it depends on which definition of violence is used and on what the context of a particular act is, to determine whether or not something could be considered as violence.

As mentioned, violence is a complex concept to conceptualize and operationalize. According to Gene Sharp (1994: p. 45) – who is a renown academic in the study of violence and non-violence – an act can be considered violent when “physical weapons are used to intimidate, injure, kill, and destroy”, while a nonviolent strategy is described as a “struggle [that] is fought by psychological, social, economic, and political weapons.” The distinction that Sharp makes is between the threatening with and the use of either physical or nonphysical means in order to accomplish an objective. Physical force could inflict instant harm to a given victim of violence, while nonphysical means do not, necessarily, cause harm to an individual actor, in the short term. These nonphysical means can, however, harm a target audience in the long term. Consequently, the question can be posed if the use of nonphysical means – such as psychological weapons – is not a kind of deferred violence which aims at causing harm to individual actors. Douglas Bond (1988: pp. 86-87) would categorize Gene Sharp’s definitions as principled pacifistic thinking rather than absolute pacifistic thinking. Bond distinguishes absolute pacifism from principled and pragmatic pacifism. Whereas absolute pacifists would endure suffering, eventually to death, principled and pragmatic pacifists reject the use of violence, either because of their principles or the pursuit of an ethic objective. The relevance of this distinction between communities of pacifists is that it may have explanatory power regarding a turn from nonviolent strategies to the use of violence amongst a resistance movement.

Although both Gene Sharp and Douglas Bond have made fine attempts to conceptualize violence and nonviolence, the dividing line between violence and nonviolence remains unclear and the exact interpretation of nonviolence remains unspecified. The World Health Organization endeavoured to take cultural differences into account in order to develop a universal definition of violence. The World Health Organization states that violence could be defined as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself,

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another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” (WHO 2002). Despite the extensive character of this definition, the inclusion of power in this definition leaves ambiguity, as power itself is a contested concept. This makes the definition of the World Health Organization only suboptimal. Another aspect which makes the definition of the World Health Organization suboptimal is the fact that the World Health Organization classifies the relationship of violence between the victim and the perpetrator within one of three categories. These categories are self-harm or suicide, interpersonal harm, and collective harm. As this thesis focuses on nonviolent resistance movements and the question whether or not these groups turn violent, this thesis will particularly concentrate on collective harm.

Collective harm – i.e. collective violence – is the use of violence by members of a particular group against individuals or a group of individuals who do not belong to the ingroup. The World Health Organization identifies three categories of motives for the use of collective violence: (1) economic motives, (2) political motives, and (3) social motives. With regard to political motives, Ted Gurr (1970) argues that violent strategies are “collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies”, while nonviolent resistance could be defined as an “organized popular resistance to government authority which – either consciously or by necessity – eschews the use of weapons of modern warfare”. This definition of nonviolence fails to address the question of whether or not the rock-throwing among Palestinian protesters could be regarded as violent behaviour. Therefore, this definition is inadequate. Dudouet (2013) describes nonviolent resistance as “an active and sustained collective engagement in resisting violence in all its forms (whether behavioural, structural or cultural)”. As comprehensive as Dudouet’s definition might be, the problem of calling whether a particular act is violent or not preserves.

Sociologist Kurt Schock (2003: p. 705) provides a more narrow definition of nonviolence. Schock defines nonviolent action as the active collective pursuit of political and social objectives without the use of physical force or the threat therewith against human beings. Norman Geras (1990: pp. 21-58) reflects on Schock definition by claiming that violence is “the exercise of physical force so as to kill or injure, inflict direct harm or pain on, human beings.” Both Geras and Schock would recall violence in terms of intentionally causing physical harm and nonviolence in terms of refraining from physical harm to another human being. These definitions are, like Gene Sharp’s conceptualization of violence and nonviolence, limited in the sense that these definitions do not take psychological harm into consideration.

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The definition of Richard Audi (1971: p. 58) has the advantage of including intentionally caused psychological trauma. Audi argues that: “violence is the physical attack upon, or the vigorous physical abuse of, or vigorous physical struggle against, a person or animal; or the highly vigorous psychological abuse of, or the sharp, caustic psychological attack upon, a person or animal; or the highly vigorous, or incendiary, or malicious and vigorous, destruction or damaging or property or potential property”. Although the offense is perspicuously included in Audi’s concept of violence, the result(s) of such an act remain(s) unidentified. Guiliano Pontara attempts to not only identify the physical and psychological attack against another living organism but also discusses the result(s) of such an act with reference to the victim of the act, which is harm and suffering. Pontara (1978: p. 19) states that violence is “an action, a, performed by an agent P (person or group) as part of a method of struggle M in a situation of conflict S, is an act of violence [if] 1) there is at least one human being, Q, such that (i), P's performance of a, in S as part of M, causes that Q dies, suffers or is injured, and (ii), it is in S against Q's will to be killed or made to suffer; and 2) P, in S, believes 1) to be the case.” This analytical concept of violence includes notions of intention, and immediate harm and (psychological) suffering. The problem which this definition poses is the notion of (psychological) suffering, as this notion complicates the definition of nonviolence. Nonviolent resistance is generally seen as a struggle of a particular individual or group of individuals against an opponent. The act of resistance will, in all probability, lead to some sort of suffering of both the perpetrator and the victim. Pontara describes this as the nonviolence dilemma. According to Pontara (1978: p. 28), “the difficulty is still more aggravated by the fact that if methods of nonviolent struggle shall have a chance of being put forth as credible alternatives to the traditional methods of violence there must be some good reason to believe that they are efficacious means for the attainment of at least some desirable ends (which violence in certain situations undoubtedly has been). But here lies the dilemma of nonviolence, as the demand of efficacy and the demand of nonviolence would seem to clash. Or are there efficacious methods of nonviolent struggle?” As a consequence, the use of either less violent or violent strategies seems to be more successful in comparison to nonviolent struggle. This makes nonviolent struggle rather impossible. Pontara provides the example of the boycott of British cotton by the Indian people under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. The rejection to buy and use British cotton caused collateral damage to the British economy, whereby labourers in the United Kingdom lost their jobs and suffered the consequences of this boycott.

The point Pontara makes is that certain nonviolent strategies cause unintentional risks which could be explained as violent behaviour. Therefore, Pontara argues that truly nonviolent

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strategies do not exist. In order to organize effective protests, a minimum degree of violence within a nonviolent resistance movement is supposed to be tolerated. The question is where does one draw the line with regard to this minimum degree of violence. John Smith (1969) states that “the advocate of nonviolence is torn between the conviction that nonviolence is “right” come what may and the thesis that it is in fact the most effective instrument for achieving some desired results.” The minimum degree of violence that is justified to use in order to accomplish political and societal change is hard to define. To put it differently, the threshold in the suffering caused by nonviolent struggle remains up to debate. This threshold is up to debate because there is no single moral justification for the use of even limited violence. For this reason, the distinction between nonviolence and violence is still a topic to contemporary debate and discourse. The relationship between nonviolent resistance movements and opposition struggle is troublesome in essence. Therefore, the definitions of nonviolence and violence are imperfect in this thesis. In this dissertation, violence is regarded as a comprehensive concept that refers to either the use, or threatening with the use, of physical force which either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, or psychological harm. Nonviolent resistance movements eschew the intentional and unintentional use of, or threat with, violence against individuals that are, or a group of individuals which is, not a part of the movement. Our understanding of physical force is not limited to the actual killing of people, but also includes targeted and indiscriminate acts of violence that could cause emotional and psychological injury and disability.

§ 2.4 Social Movement Theory

According to Cunningham (2013) and Butcher and Svensson (2016), nonviolent resistance will only be effective in accomplishing social change in case a movement manages to mass mobilize people that support their cause. This mobilization process attracts participants due to various reasons. These reasons can be explained through the use of social movement theories. Therefore, I will discuss several social movement theories in order to elaborate on the mobilization process that can [potentially] explain nonviolent resistance.

Participation in a nonviolent resistance movement is participation in collective action. Generally, an individual actor is believed to participate in such collective action if this actor shares an identity with a collective. According to Stephen Wright (2001: p. 413), “it is simply obvious that in order to engage in collective action the individual must recognize his or her membership in the relevant collective.” Although group membership may be an essential motive to participate in collective action, an individual who adheres to a particular collective

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does not necessarily act collectively. Whereas group identification plays an important role in collective action, cognition and consciousness of, and emotions and motivations related to, this group identification are decisive in the decision of an individual actor whether or not to participate in collective action. Besides, identity is subject to change. A – sometimes sudden – change of identity can be explained by both collective actions and collective experiences. Richard Jenkins (2004) argues that identity is something active – i.e. identity is not just there as a constant factor, but as a dynamic factor, continuously in motion.

The trade-off between collective action and collective identity was first emphasized by sociologists. These sociologists argued that collective identity was at the basis of the emergence of a social movement. Alberto Melucci (1995) states that “collective identity is an interactive, shared definition produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to groups.” Individual actors engage in collective action “any time that they are acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group” (Wright 2001). Collective action is, therefore, the decision of an individual actor to act on behalf of a collective due to shared interpretations and perceptions considering the outside world. These common interpretations and perceptions foster the establishment and preservation of a social cognition, emotion, and motivation. These three aspects could, when in interaction, shape a feeling of group identification. This group identification, in turn, limits the importance of personal identity. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) refer to this phenomenon as depersonalization. They argue that individuals “think, act, and feel like group members because they incorporate elements of a collective identity into their social identity” (p. 12). Although group identification is not as strong as depersonalization, group identification does affect the way people feel, think, and act, often in relation to the group to which individual actors belong. The question should be posed when group identification leads to collective action, as group identification does, despite shared ideas, feelings, and interests, not necessarily imply a readiness to undertake action. According to Gurin, Miller, and Gurin (1980: p. 30), group members will experience an increasing consciousness of shared grievances and will have an unequivocal idea about who is responsible for those grievances. This process could be referred to as ‘we-versus-them thinking’ in which the ‘them’ group is perceived to be intentionally and willfully disadvantaging the ‘we’ group. This thinking process triggers cognitive reinterpretations of the surrounding world. The surrounding world is conceived to be hostile towards the ingroup and should, therefore, be challenged through collective action. Thus, a greater collective consciousness could initiate a transformation of social categorization – i.e.

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instigate ‘we-versus-them thinking’, which, in turn, could cause a change of political beliefs and action orientations of the ingroup.

The above theory particularly enhances the idea that individuals participate in a particular collective due to perceived or real deprivation.The reason for an individual to participate in a non-violent resistance movement, which aims at the establishment of political and social change, can, however, be two-fold. On the one hand, a particular individual may weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages of participating in such a movement to decide whether to or not to participate in this movement, while, on the other hand, another individual may actually feel emotional attachment to the movement due to its position in society. The shortly discussed theory is related to the idea of relative deprivation, while the theory in which an individual actor accumulates the advantages and disadvantages of participation in a resistance movement could be referred to as the rational choice model. This thesis will provide an in-depth discussion of both theories.

§ 2.4.1 Group identification

Group identification plays a fundamental role in how the relative deprivation theory accounts for the differences in individual engagement in collective action. Such group identification can be based on ideology, socioeconomic position, personal preferences, physical characteristics, and sexual orientation. These characteristics are part of an individual actor’s self-concept and determine the potential emotional significance that an individual actor attaches to her or his belonging to a particular group. According to Tajfel (1978), the concept of identity contains a cognitive aspect (awareness of membership), an evaluative element (the values associated with the membership), and an emotional element (feelings towards one’s group membership as well as others standing in relation to the group). In other words, identity is a self-imposed concept that not only defines a particular individual but which also defines this individual’s standing toward other individuals (Jenkins 2004). This concept is subject to change; identity is a continuous process rather than a constant factor (idem).

Identity consists of two aspects: (1) the personal identity and (2) the social identity. Whereas the personal identity determines the personal attributes of an individual, social identity refers to the group membership(s) of a person. Personal identity is what makes an individual different from other individuals, while the social identity defines the self in relation to a collective that an individual adheres to due to shared characteristics. As individual actors endeavour to improve their position in society, individual actors align themselves with collectives that provide them with a greater status in society. Tajfel and Turner (1979) describe this

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phenomenon as controlling intergroup behaviour. They argue that individual actors either attempt to attain a higher position in society through gaining relevance in the group they have membership of, or seek membership of a group that enjoys higher respect and more prestige in society. This leads to the situation in which individual actors participate in collective action in order to improve their group status if they perceive their current low status as illegitimate, and if they are unable to associate with another group (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). The transition of group membership indicates a rather weak collective identity. To put it differently, the shared cognitions which a group member shares with other group members is not strong if an individual actor easily switches from one group to another. According to Huddy (2001), the strength or weakness of collective identity and social identity may make a difference in an individual actor’s decision to participate in collective action. This preparedness to participate is considerably strong if a group identification is acquired, as this signifies the willingness of an individual to be a member of a particular collective (Huddy 2003). Polletta and Jasper (2001: p. 415) would argue that emotion attached to group membership comes into play if an individual actor voluntary associates with a collective.

Another aspect which may influence the decision of an individual actor whether or not to participate in collective action is related to salience. Individual actors may feel attached to more than a single group at a time, which can raises the question at what moment self-categorization into a collective identity occurs. Turner (1987: p. 118) states that a particular identity is salient if it is “functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behaviour.” The salience of group membership strengthens if there is an explicit delineated ingroup and outgroup. This delineation generates a perception of intragroup grievances and problems. These grievances and problems are, in turn, translated into common interests, needs, and objectives. Although these interests, needs, and objectives are not considered to be equally important by all group members, the translation into these demands is a crucial first step towards the politicization of a group’s collective identity (Simon and Klandermans, 2001).

§ 2.4.2 Cognition

Cognition implies the awareness of shared grievances and group belonging. Cognition is, according to Carlston (2001: p. 2), essential for our understanding of collective (political) action, as “cognition emphasizes the cognitive processes that mediate between environmental stimuli and interpersonal responses and […] links cognition to action.” In other words, an individual actor that is conscious of her or his group membership will interpret and evaluate the

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political and social environment accordingly, which, in turn, will affect the individual’s preparedness to participate in collective (political) action (McGraw 2000). There still remains some obscurity with regard to the transition of cognition into participation in collective action. Shweder and Bourne (1984) state that the knowledge of an individual about certain political and social situations cannot be separated easily from the way this individual processes new information. This cognition process, in particular in relation to movements, requires further study.

The cognition process of an individual actor is limited in the sense that a human being is unable to process all information that exists. As a consequence, an individual actor has to limit her or his absorption of information. Individuals tend to focus on negative information, or information that approves the self-concept, and information that is provided by either people or institutions that the individual trusts (Stangor and Ruble 1989; Sears and Funk 1991; Brewer and Steenbergen 2002). This limited processing of information could lead to circumstances of uncertainty in which an individual either prefers to stick to the interpretation and perception of the collective or to withdraw from the political and social environment (Schank and Abelson 1977). This decision to adjust to a collective or to withdraw in solitude, likewise social-cognitive learning, are necessary for human survival. These acts provide essential benefits to both self- and social-regulation. The principle of social-cognitive learning also comes with costs. These costs are engendered through biases in memory, judgements, and decision-making (Higgins 2000). With regard to the limited information processing of humans, Gamson (1992) poses an intriguing question by asking why so many people do participate in social movements while they are either uninterested in or ill-informed about political and social issues. After having conducted research on this question, Gamson argues that a combination of experiential knowledge, media discourse, and popular knowledge contribute to the decision of an individual actor whether or not to participate in a collective action. As these forms of knowledge input differ for each individual, the reasons to participate in a social movement are manifold. Gamson notes that these reasons could be brought back to three essential components: (1) agency – i.e. the awareness of the possibility to alter conditions, (2) identity, which refers to the definition of the in-group and the out-group based on interests and values, and (3) injustice or moral indignation.

§ 2.4.3 Emotions

Emotions are closely related to the decision of an individual whether or not to participate in collective action, as emotions are a determining factor in how an individual perceives the

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political and social environment. Emotions structure the way that individuals think and act. Therefore, we need to understand what emotions are, how emotions work, and how emotions interact with cognition, identification, and motivation in order to grasp a deeper comprehension of participation in collective action.

According to Jasper (1998), emotions influence all stages of protests like the recruitment phase, persistent participation, and the decision to no longer take part in protests. As emotions are socially constructed, some emotions are stronger than other emotions. These emotions are, frequently, related to cultural and historical perceptions of the surrounding world. For example, the French Revolution affects protesters in their beliefs that change could be accomplished through protesting. For this reason, a social movement takes cultural and historical accounts into consideration when encouraging potential demonstrators to participate in collective action. These social movements endeavour to create feelings of arousal and avoidance within their target audience in order to motivate potential demonstrators to participate in collective action and to prevent authorities from attempting to repress protests. Besides anticipating on the feelings of potential demonstrators, social movements provide an environment in which individual actors are able to exchange their experiences and to express their feelings with regard to the political and societal environment. This opportunity to express feelings could strengthen the relationship within a group.

§ 2.4.4 Motivation

Demands for political and social change stem from an idea of belonging (identification), and an experienced grievance (cognition) combined with feelings related to this grievance. The consciousness of belonging to a group could turn an experienced individual grievance into a collective grievance. Gurin et al. (1980: p. 31) state that motivation underlies the transition from collective grievance to collective action. Motivation can be defined as the desire of either an individual or a group, or both, to achieve an objective through action. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) identified four types of motivation: (1) group-based anger, (2) identity, (3) ideology, and (4) instrumentality.

Firstly, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) discussed non-instrumental motives for participation in collective action. These motives relate to emotions such as group-based anger. This anger could be based on both emotions and problems. Lazarus (1991: p. 48) argues that group-based anger could trigger a mindset in which an individual actor actively copes with perceived problems. The individual actor defines the surrounding world based on the information it obtains from fellow group members. This information will convince an individual actor to mobilize and to

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act, on behalf of the group, with the purpose of changing reality. Whereas, according to Smith (1993), dealing with problem-based issues is related to the instrumental pathway of collective action; coping with in emotions grounded issues provides the basic of group-based anger. This group-based anger engenders feelings of perceived and real unfairness considering a group’s position in society. These feelings and emotions are related to the disadvantaged position of an individual actor and will function as accelerators in the willingness of both individuals and collective actors to undertake action in order to establish political and social change. In their study, Van Zomeren et al. (2008) find that efficacy, identity, and injustice – both separately and in combination – have an effect on potential participation in collective action. Furthermore, feelings of injustice more likely lead to participation in collective action than awareness of injustice. Finally, politicized actions reach a greater audience than non-politicized actions. Thus, feelings of injustice with reference to either an individual actor or a group, or both, are more likely to motivate people to participate in collective actions that aim to accomplish political and social change.

Secondly, the chance that an individual actor will participate in collective action due to identity motives increases in case this individual has a strong connection with the identity of a group and tight relations with other group members (Huddy 2003). Individuals who act out of identity motives are more likely to define themselves in terms of “we” rather than “I” (Brewer and Gardner 1996). These individual actor have the perception that they are personally responsible for the emulation of group aims, objectives, and values and that shared grievances affect the person they are (Simon et al. 1998). An individual actor does, in this case, no longer distinguish between individual costs and benefits and group advantages and disadvantages, but will in any circumstances advocate what is in the interest of the broader collective. Simon and Klandermans (2001) suggest that individual actors that value their collective identification are more willing to participate in collective action and to politicize their activist identification when they are connected to a disadvantaged group. Thus, the level of commitment to a collective identity of an individual actor affects the willingness of this individual to participate in collective action.

Thirdly, the ideology of a particular movement may motivate its members whether or not to participate in collective action. This ideological aspect could, for example, refer to the political or religious orientation of a social movement or to explicit rights within society such as citizenship rights and civil rights. Although ideological motives seemed to have been primarily relevant throughout the 20th century, ideological motives have recently regained attention in social movement literature. This literature focuses on the platforms provided to individual

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actors to express their political and societal views. Although these individual actors actively use the platforms which they are given to perform on, they do not, necessarily, advocate political or social change. Frequently, these individual actors are already satisfied with a platform on which they could express their emotions and share their ideas and narratives about how the political and social environment could improve through gradual, rather than thorough, changes. A kind of change that could be established through discourse rather than through collective action. This kind of participation in a social movement is rather about the assessment of an individual actor’s feelings and values, which possibly were violated, rather than the enforcement of political change. Although these individual actors do not aim at the organization of, or participation in, collective action, the values that these individual actors share may generate the belief in a social movement that collective action should actually be undertaken. In short, participating in collective action is one of many possible reactions to a perceived violation of an individual actor’s values, but this action will not necessarily occur (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013).

Fourthly, instrumental motives refer to the mobilization of resources and to the access to the political process. With regard to instrumental motives, movement participation is generally considered to be a rational choice in the sense that participants take potential outcomes and the costs of these outcomes into account. Klandermans (1984: p. 584) claims that individual actors take reactions of other individuals and groups into consideration while accumulating the potential advantages and disadvantages of their participation in a collective action. As a consequence, individual actors are never entirely rational in their decision-making. Therefore, Klandermans disagrees with the rational choice theory and instead discusses what he calls an expectancy value theory. This theory does not concentrate on the real outcome of social behaviour, as real-life outcomes are unpredictable, but focuses on the expected outcome of social behaviour. This expectancy-value theory assumes individual rational thinking. The problem with individual rational thinking is that individual actors tend to free ride, as they expect to achieve an identical outcome without participating in collective action. This freeriding problem could cause a vast majority of potential demonstrators to decide not to participate in collective action which inhibits the possibility of bringing about political and social change. Klandermans argues that individual actors will only participate in collective action if they possess information regarding the decision to participate in collective action of other individuals. Whereas the access to this information remained limited in the time that Klandermans first developed his argument, social media have drastically changed this situation, as nowadays people are able to freely and easily communicate about their decision whether or

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not to take part in collective action and are able to reach a large audience when doing so. For this reason, social media are often used by the organizers of protests to encourage people to participate in protests, and to convince people that their participation is of importance. The decision whether or not to participate in collective action, thus, depends on the expected collective benefits and social and non-social selective incentives. The value of an individual actor’s participation in collective action greatly determines her or his willingness to do so.

3. Methodology

In this thesis, several research methods are employed in order to gain a deeper and greater comprehension of the structure of resistance movements and the strategies applied by these movements. This thesis contains two case studies: (1) the Orange Revolution and a study of (2) the Revolution of Dignity, which both occurred in Ukraine. These cases are selected for the reason that the preconditions of both series of protests are, more or less, the same – i.e. in both series of protests people demonstrated for more democracy and a shift in focus of foreign policy toward the European Union. Furthermore, these series of protests are interesting as the Revolution of Dignity turned violent, whereas the Orange Revolution remained its nonviolent character throughout the demonstrations process.

§ 3.1 Case studies

As this thesis particularly studies the resort to violent strategies of a resistance movement a comparison between the (nonviolent) Orange Revolution and the (violent) Revolution of Dignity is required. This comparison can only be made based on extensive studies of each case. Therefore, this thesis incorporates cases studies of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. According to Gerring (2004: p. 342) a case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. A unit is understood as a spatially bounded phenomenon which is observed at a single point in time or over a delimited period of time (idem). In general, case studies are supposed to be descriptive, explanatory, and focused. This focus involves the in-depth description of a single or small number of units. The shortcomings of a case study are the limited breadth and confirmatory power of a study (idem: pp. 346-352).

In order to subtract explanatory power as of why one series of protests turned violent, while the other series of protests remained nonviolent, several research methods will be employed. These methods are: (1) process tracing, (2) discourse analysis, and (3) document analysis. Process analysis will be used in order to identify a certain point in time during which the

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Revolution of Dignity turned violent, while discourse and document analysis will be employed in order to explore and identify the personal motivation of individual actors and sub-group actors to participate in the collective actions described. While public and private discourse in the form of interviews may provide insight in the motivations and objectives of individual actors during both series of protests, document analysis provides information about developments within the resistance movements and the response of the government to the resistance movement.

§ 3.2 Process tracing

Process tracing is an essential qualitative research instrument that advances the systematic analysis of political and social phenomena, as well as causal claims, at a particular point in space and time. Snapshots of these phenomena and claims are taken in order to study these over time. An advantage of these snapshots is that these phenomena and claims can be contrasted against each other in order to investigate whether or not there are indications of a consecutive and interlinked campaign. Furthermore, the study of particular phenomena and claims as well as the relation between these could provide an academic with an inferential leverage. This kind of leverage is often lacking in quantitative analysis (Collier 2011: pp. 823-824).

Process tracing consist of two research tools: these tools are description and sequence. Description is used in order to identify and characterize events at a particular point in time, while sequence is used in order to identify and characterize a process. This process is composed of a series of events that are potentially related to one another. A combination of description and sequence can contribute to, among others, (1) the identification of novel political and social phenomena, (2) the evaluation of existing hypotheses as well as the formulation of new hypotheses, (3) the comprehension of causal mechanisms, and (4) the addressing of research problems such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias (idem: p. 824).

§ 3.3 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is a research method which focuses on the use of sign, written, and vocal language (Van Dijk 1993: pp. 249-281). An essential component of discourse analysis is the study of the way in which language is used in order to cover a particular message to a target audience. This coverage could take place through, for example, the repetition of a particular word or sentence (Wilson 2015: p. 787). Therefore, discourse analysis focuses its research on the structure of sentences, the propositions which are used in a speech, and the explicit and implicit meaning of words. As Ornatowski (2012: p. 7) argues: "words, actions, and events work together; words interpret events or actions, as well as constitute political facts, while

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actions in various ways help words gain their political efficacy." For this reason, Jonathan Charteris-Black (2004: pp. 30-31) states that it is of great importance to be aware of, and to critically consider, the way politicians use language in order to convince their audience of their argument. In other words, messages will be addressed in such a way as to appeal to the audience.

§ 3.4 Policy documents

Documentary analysis is a qualitative research method in which a wide range of different kinds of sources are analyzed. These sources include, among others, autobiographies, diaries, letters, mass-media outputs, virtual objects, and official documents that either derive from private sources or from the state. In this thesis, official documents will be used in order to gain a greater comprehension of internal state affairs in Ukraine. These official documents are supposed to provide information concerning state policies and statistics. The policies that are interesting for this [piece of] research are those that depict the position of national minority groups throughout time, while statistics could provide an overview of the economic position of these groups within the central state. An advantage of documentary analysis is that documents have not explicitly been developed for the purposes of social research. Therefore, “the possibility of a reactive effect can be largely discounted as a limitation on the validity of data” (Bryman 2012: p. 543) An disadvantage of documentary analysis is that the researcher is biased in its interpretation of these documents. In other words: the researcher, who is analyzing a diversity of documents, could already have an opinion on a particular topic. This opinion could affect the interpretation of the documents that are being analyzed. Therefore, the researcher is supposed to present the original content of documents as much as possible (Idem: pp. 543-551).

4. Case Studies

§ 4.1 The Orange Revolution

The Orange Revolution was a series of demonstrations and protests which challenged electoral fraud, political corruption, and voter intimidation in Ukraine after the presidential elections of 2004. The initiators of these demonstrations and protests attempted to fight corruption and endeavoured to declare free and fair presidential elections. These objectives were supposed to be achieved through civil disobedience, civil resistance, and strikes throughout Ukraine. Although fraudulent elections and the lack of economic and political reforms led to the mass mobilization of people which, in turn, caused the demonstrations and protests during the Orange Revolution, public unrest already dated back to the kidnapping and murder of Internet-based opposition journalist, Georgiy Gongadze, in September 2000. The Ukrainian authorities

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supposedly targeted Gongadze for reporting about the corruption and unethical behaviour of politicians in the Kuchma government. Gongadze also accused the government of suppressing the freedom of speech (Goldstein 2007).

The perception that the Ukrainian authorities were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Gongadze and the lack of economic and political reforms caused discontent with the political and social elite of Ukraine in the post-Soviet era. This dissatisfaction and the rise of Viktor Yushchenko, who was believed to be able to challenge corruption and to pursue economic and political reforms, provided the population of Ukraine with an opportunity to organize a resistance movement which was capable of challenging the political and social elite. This movement endeavoured to mobilize through the use of the Internet, as the Internet provided the movement and aligned opposition journalists with the opportunity to criticize the Kuchma-led government and to freely spread information about demonstrations and protests. An obstacle to the use of the Internet as a recruitment tool was the limited Internet access in the early 2000s in Ukraine. As a consequence, Andriy Igantov – who was one of the pioneers of the Internet-based media and founder of Maidan (public square) – stated that “in order to cover a larger audience, we had to attract our target audience from people who are usually better networked than the rest. We strived to reach investigative journalists, human rights lawyers, entrepreneurs, and students. In short, we wanted to reach the most networked people in Ukraine (Kyj 2006: pp. 71-80).” Despite the limited Internet access, the Internet was at the basis of the Orange Revolution. In other words, the Internet was actively used in order to spread jokes, to raise political awareness, to provide training regarding the observation of elections, and to report about demonstrations and protests during the Orange Revolution. This kept participants in the Orange Revolution informed about developments elsewhere in Ukraine (Goldstein 2007: pp. 1-10). Although the Internet was a factor in the mass mobilization of people during the Orange Revolution, it is an immense step from reading something on the Internet to participating in collective action on the street. To develop a deeper understanding of this transformation, I will develop a timeline which indicates essential events in the Orange Revolution, research interviews and a focus group, and analyze the discourse of speeches given by opposition leaders on Independence Square.

§ 4.1.1 Timeline

The months prior to the Orange Revolution were dominated by a race for the Presidency of Ukraine in 2004. The two dominant candidates which struggled to acquire the Presidency were Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. Yushchenko was the essential opposition

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candidate, while Yanukovych was received support from resigning President Kuchma. During the political campaigns, there was an attempted murder on Viktor Yushchenko through the use of dioxin poisoning. Despite the poisoning having dramatic consequences to the health and well-being of Yushchenko, Yushchenko decided to continue his campaign and to compete for the Presidency. The first voting round which was held on October 31, 2004 resulted in a slight win for Yushchenko. Yushchenko gathered 39.87 percent of the votes, while Yanukovych obtained 39.32 percent of the electoral support. Since no candidate gained over 50 percent of the votes, the Ukrainian law mandated a run-off vote between the two leading candidates; Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko. This second voting round was supposed to take place on November 21. Whereas research organizations estimated that Yushchenko would eventually win the second voting round, the exit polls turned out to be different i.e. the exit polls provided Yanukovych with a 3.6 percent lead over Yushchenko. Responding to the outcome of the exit polls, Yushchenko announced that he did not trust the accountability of the Central Election Commission. Moreover, Yushchenko encouraged his supporters to gather in Kiev on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in order to protect their freedom. According to the supporters of Yushchenko, the presidential elections were nothing less than a complete falsification. The supporters of Yushchenko, among whom members of Pora1 (It is time), initiated building encampments in Kiev on Independence Square. Later that night, Yushchenko announced that: “We have received information that authorities want to destroy our tent city at 3 a.m. … At two o’clock there should be more of us than now. We must defend every chestnut tree, every tent. We must show to the authorities we are here for a long time… There must be more and more of us here every hour.” This statement of Yushchenko initiated the occupation of the Independence Square in Kiev (Copsey 2010; Kuzio 2010).

On November 22, 2004, between 100 and 150 thousand people gathered on Independence Square to listen to a speech by the opposition leaders. While Yushchenko called upon all Ukrainians to participate in the resistance movement which challenged the election results, Yulia Tymoshenko called for the start of mass strikes in both industrial sectors and educational institutions throughout Ukraine. Furthermore, Tymoshenko asked the Ukrainian population to block airports, railways, and roads. While the demonstrations and protests against the proclaimed illegitimate voting results continued to take place in both Kiev and throughout Ukraine, the international community responded to the voting results. President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation congratulated Viktor Yanukovych with winning the presidential

1_{A student organization which espoused nonviolent resistance and advocated an increased national} democracy.

The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in comparison : why some resistance movements turn violent, whereas others do not