Humanitarian violence : a case study of Northern Uganda

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Camilla Kongsli Student number: 11683678

Supervisor: Dr. Michael Onyebuchi Eze Second reader: Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins

Humanitarian violence: a case study of Northern Uganda

Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations

Research project: African Renaissance and the Politics of Development

Word count: 16 259 22 June 2018

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to explore the impact and role of humanitarian aid organizations on the displacement situation in Northern Uganda, where the Acholi people were internally displaced for over a decade. The thesis argues that the intervention by the humanitarian organizations facilitated and sustained the government’s policy of displacement through providing material resources and symbolic legitimacy to the Ugandan government. In the displacement camps, the Acholi people faced structural injustice and violence, which debilitated the economic, cultural and political future of the Acholi community. In order to efficiently distribute humanitarian aid and ensure good behaviour by the population in the displacement camps, the humanitarian organizations acted through a process of Foucauldian governmentality. Consequently, the Acholi people were steered and disciplined towards the identity of a helpless victim in need of saving by the humanitarian organizations, which deprived the Acholi of agency and voice. Essentially, the humanitarian organizations

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Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Michael Eze for his guidance and knowledge through this writing process. I would also like to thank Anna Elise for her kind feedback on earlier drafts of this thesis. I am very grateful to my mom and dad, for their encouragement and support.

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5 ARLPI Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative

CSOPNU Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda HO Humanitarian Organization

ICC International Criminal Court

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDMC The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDP Internally Displaced People/Persons

LRA Lord's Resistance Army MSF Médecins Sans Frontières NGO Nongovernmental Organization NRA/M National Resistance Army/Movement NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

SPLA Sudanese People’s Liberation Army UN United Nations

UNDA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF The United Nations Children's Fund

UPDF Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces

WHO World Health Organization

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1. Introduction

This section will introduce the topic of the research project, the research question and the argument. The thesis will be a case study of Northern Uganda, with a focus on re(production) of structural violence against the Acholi people, during the time of mass internal

displacement, predominantly the years of 1996-2006. Moreover, the thesis will draw on some historical background prior to 1996 to place the conflict in its historical context. The thesis will explore the role of humanitarian aid organizations in facilitating the government’s agenda of displacement. Moreover, it will look at how humanitarian assistance reproduces structural violence against the Acholi people. The Acholi people, who are the predominant ethnic group in Northern Uganda, lived for a decade in so-called “protected villages” to shield and protect them from attacks by the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army. Humanitarian

organizations, such as World Food Program and World Vision, were given access to the camps to provide assistance to the Acholi population. At the beginning of 2005,

approximately 1000 people died per week in the camps due to the inadequate living conditions. Since the conflict began, about 1.8 million people were internally displaced in Uganda, with little opportunity to live healthy lives or receive an education (Irin, 2005). During the establishment of the displacement camps, most of the Acholi wanted to return to their homes, due to the conditions in the camps, but were denied this by the Museveni-led government (Branch, 2009: 478). At the high of the conflict about 90% of the Acholi population lived in the displacement camps (Finnström, 2008: 133). However, the

international media has often focused solely on the atrocities committed against the Acholi by the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army and its leader Joseph Kony, and largely ignored government violence and abuse committed by government soldiers. The analysis provided in this thesis is important and relevant because it can highlight critical sides of humanitarian assistance and give more nuance to a humanitarian crisis that has often been presented in a very narrow one-sided way. The motivation behind the so-called protected villages and the role of the state in perpetuating violence must be analysed and discussed in further detail. Moreover, the role of humanitarian aid organizations in the decade long displacement situation in Northern Uganda must also be questioned and subject to critical scrutiny. The involvement of humanitarian aid organizations in conflict situations will always have an impact and often produce unintended political consequence. However, the unintended consequences of aid are not merely the result of politicization or co-option of aid, but due to

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7 the very processes and ideals that drive humanitarian aid organizations and their need to deliver humanitarian assistance efficiently. The research question of the thesis is as follows: “How does humanitarian aid facilitate structural violence against the Acholi people in Northern Uganda?” The main argument of this research project is that: “Humanitarian aid is not solely used as a tool of war by the state, it (re)produces structural violence and injustice against the Acholi people through a process of governmentality.”

In order to support my argument, I will analyse qualitative data relevant to the conflict, such as secondary literature and also an interview conducted by the author. I will limit the focus to humanitarian organizations and the Ugandan government, to see the impact of these actors on the conflict. The thesis will not focus on external factors such as American or Sudanese influence on the region. This does not mean the significance of for instance the US-Uganda relationship is not taken into account, but it will not be the primary focus of this project. Moreover, the LRA will be mentioned but not subject to critical scrutiny since there is already much literature that focuses on the violence committed by the LRA.

The thesis is divided into several sections. The first section will outline the theoretical framework that will be used, then proceed to a literature review of existing literature on the conflict in Northern Uganda. The literature review is followed by the research design, which outlines the methodology of the thesis. The case study of Northern Uganda will be presented in section five and accompanied by an analysis section. I will contribute to the literature by highlighting how humanitarian organizations facilitate the conditions of structural violence as well as how the humanitarian organizations steer the Acholi people towards the identity of the helpless victim.

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2. Theoretical framework

To explore the effects of humanitarian aid intervention in Northern Uganda, the project will use critical theory and draw on the work of Robert Cox, Michel Foucault and Johan Galtung. It will use the terms governmentality and structural violence to explore the role and impact of humanitarian organizations in the displacement camps.

2.1 Critical and problem-solving theory

Robert Cox sets out the distinction between what he terms problem-solving theory and critical theory. Critical theory seeks to question established “truths”, whilst problem-solving theory takes the problem itself or its framework for granted. Problem-solving theory then seeks to find solutions or alternatives to the problem within the given context. Cox believes problem-solving theory focuses on correcting dysfunctions and takes existing power relationships as natural, thus it often reinforces the status quo. As Cox famously stated “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981: 128). Critical theory on the other hand attempts to question the world order and how it came to be. It seeks to challenge the structural

conditions that underpin our understanding of a problem (Cox, 1981: 129).

Often the critique of humanitarian aid missions takes a more or less problem-solving approach to the obstacles that occur. How can the organizations distribute food more

effectively in a refugee camp? How can technology fix catastrophes such as famines or lack of food in a refugee camp? The problem-solving approach attempts to correct the issues, such as a famine, with the use of humanitarian aid coupled with advanced technological fixes. This approach has its usefulness, but it fails to look at the underlying socio-economic or political causes of a conflict or problem. Perhaps the famine was not caused by a drought but by uneven distribution of food resources? Perhaps humanitarian aid would not have been necessary in Northern Uganda if people had not been forced to live in the displacement camps?

Of course, humanitarian organizations do not only discuss the practical matters concerning their operations, but are acutely aware that their work comes with ethical and moral dilemmas, nonetheless the organizations mostly continue to operate in the same way (Polman, 2010). Thus, in this thesis a critical approach will look at how and why the

displacement camps were put in place, not simply look at solutions to the technical problems that occurred once people were in the displacement camp.

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9 2.2 Governmentality

The French philosopher Michel Foucault coined the concept of governmentality, which refers to the ways a state (or other institutions) exercises control, seek to govern and manage its population by directing and shaping their behaviour. This construction and management of the population takes place through established institutions and procedures of discipline and

regulations. The modern bureaucratic state relies on a regulation aspect that utilizes statistics of birth, death and health to control the populace (Muller, 2011: 4). Through often mundane, small repetitive processes and institutions, the subject, which can be a particular population, is targeted and their behaviour disciplined. The disciplinary regimes are supported by statistical data that is collected and managed by the bureaucratic state (Muller, 2011: 3). These

processes produce identities of governed and governor, where the bureaucratic state has power over the populace (Christie, 2015: 44). The shaping of conduct then creates “docile bodies”. Through the disciplinary and regulatory regimes, individuals internalise the desired behaviour and become self-governing. The management of the populace is closely linked to biopolitics. Rather than power over death, it is the power and control of life that constitutes biopower (Muller, 2011: 7).

The concept of governmentality and biopower can be applied to humanitarian aid. It then refers to a power that is exercised over life in the displacement camps. Humanitarianism is an administrative regime, which through discipline and camp regulations, steer people towards becoming helpless victims in need. The humanitarian organizations want to help people in need, but also need people to be obedient victims in order to efficiently distribute aid. They do not want people who rebel or cause major conflicts in the camps. Hence humanitarianism re(produces) structural and symbolic violence against the Acholi through their own processes of controlling the displaced population. Thus governmentality is “enacted through the institutions, mechanisms, instruments and moral technologies that are mobilized in the governance of people and spaces deemed in need” (Lopez et al, 2015: 2232).

2.3 Structural violence

In the displacement camps in Northern Uganda structural violence was utilized as a tool for depoliticization, control and disempowerment. Johan Galtung defines violence as “present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations

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10 are below their potential realizations” (Galtung, 1969: 167). Galtung further distinguishes between several types of violence, such as physical and psychological violence. Most relevant to this study is his differentiation between direct and structural violence. Direct or personal physical violence is the action when someone is” somatically hurt to the point of killing” and there is a clearly visible actor (Galtung, 1969: 169).

Structural or indirect violence on the other hand, is indirect and at times without a clear perpetrator. The object of this type of violence might not perceive or realize the presence of structural violence at all. This way invisible violence is normalized (Galtung, 1969: 173).

The elite at the top of a structure, have a great interest in maintaining the status quo. When the structure that favours this elite is threatened, they might take measures to prevent this. Often action is taken against what is perceived to be the “real” conflict or crime, whilst leaving the structure intact. State militarization, political repression and violence against its own citizens can then be legitimized through the perceived conflict. Arguably, the elites in any given system have an interest in the reproduction of a system that is beneficial to the themselves (Cox, 1993). This way power structures are produced and reinforced through the actions of the state and the humanitarian regime.

2.4 Discourse of humanitarianism

The humanitarian discourse is motivated by normative ideals that seek to alleviate suffering, save lives and maintain human dignity (Salgado, 2013: 7). Aid organizations often provide medical assistance or material resources in response to complex emergencies or natural disasters (OECD, 2015). Most humanitarian organizations adhere to the seven principles set out by the ICRC, which greatly influence the humanitarian discourse (Barnett and Weiss 2011: 9). Among these are impartiality, neutrality and independence the core principles. These principles guide humanitarian action and means that the organizations strive to be neutral in politics and do not discriminate against anyone (Salgado, 2013: 8). By and large, humanitarianism is often understood as an “expression of the universal value of solidarity between people and a moral imperative” (Salgado, 2013: 7). Therefore aid organizations have traditionally sought to save individuals, arguably without too much concern for the underlying socio-political causes of a conflict (Christie, 2015: 39).

Humanitarian aid can be organized and distributed by local, national and international agencies. The United Nations (UN) coordinates humanitarian relief delivery through several

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11 bodies. Most notably are the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Relief aid has grown into a big industry with thousands of different organizations (Salgado, 2013: 7). Humanitarianism has also be used to justify intervention (both military and non-military) into the affairs of another state on the basis of saving human lives and protecting human rights (Fassin 2012: 2).

It is worth emphasising that humanitarian assistance is at times sorely needed to help people in emergencies, for instance in situations when a state is either unwilling or unable to help its own citizens. The important role of humanitarian aid should not be belittled or dismissed as an inherently negative concept. Humanitarian organizations enjoy international credibility and are often seen as a valuable resource in conflict situations or times of political transitions.

Even so, there are undoubtedly negative sides of providing humanitarian aid. It is well-documented that the involvement of humanitarian organizations can in fact exacerbate violence between non-state actors and prolong conflicts. Humanitarian aid has at times been implicated and linked to exacerbation of violence in already precarious situations, often related to looting and fighting over humanitarian aid resources(Nunn and Qian, 2014).

This loss is something aid organizations calculate into their budgets, effectively contributing to the war economy (Okumu, 2003: 130). Humanitarian aid personnel have also been attacked and killed in a number of missions, leading Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to reconsider their operations in Somalia (MSF, 2013). Thus humanitarian organizations have received criticism for their involvement in conflicts due to the unintended political consequences of aid. These criticisms belong to the so-called problem-solving approach to humanitarianism. The problem-solving critique does not challenge the fundamental ideas of humanitarianism even though it comes with harsh criticism of its operations. The conflict is still framed in humanitarian terms. Technical solutions are applied to any problem in an attempt to bring back the status quo, but not change the structure or overarching ideas of humanitarianism (Lopez et al, 2015: 2233).

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3. Literature review

This section will present and review some of the literature relevant to the conflict in Northern-Uganda, with a focus on the different scholars’ take on the “protected villages” and the conflict itself.

The war or conflict in Northern Uganda is often described as a conflict between the Ugandan government and the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It is reported that the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, wants to rule Uganda based on the Ten Christian Commandments. International attention has focused on the horrible atrocities committed by the LRA, which put it on the US terror list (Treasury.gov, 2016). Accordingly, the mainstream narrative has turned Joseph Kony into the main reason the conflict in Northern Uganda has not ended. Rebel groups such as the LRA are often depicted as greedy rebels with little political or ideological motivations (Quinn, 2008). According to the Ugandan government the army has not been able to capture Kony over the years of the conflict and he has been unwilling to attend peace talks to find a solution to the conflict. The government is trying to protect its citizens by shielding them from LRA attacks in the “protected villages”. In the literature on Uganda internally displaced persons’ camps are often referred to as “protected villages”, reflecting the official government policy of protection from the rebels (Gersony, 1997). Internally displaced people (IDP) are defined as people who are on the run in their own country, which means they have not crossed any borders. According to the UNHCR, internally displaced persons are among the most vulnerable people in the world (UNHCR, 2012). In this context, external actors such as humanitarian aid organizations provide sore relief to the people in the protected villages. Their role is crucial to assist the government and save the lives of the Acholi people. Their presence is a benevolent factor in the conflict. The humanitarian organizations run, maintain and feed people in the camps to keep them safe and alive.

However, not all scholars agree with this view. Scholars such as Sverker Finnström and Adam Branch have written extensively on Uganda, through a critical lens. Both have detailed the political, economic as well as cultural impact of colonialism and the regimes of Obote and Amin on the region. Finnström focuses on the impact of the war on the Acholi people and rejects the simplistic explanations of ethnic violence and the obsessive focus on the LRA. Finnström’s work is an ethnographic study of the cultural lives of the Acholi people and how they cope with the conflict (Finnström, 2008). Finnström discusses how there is

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13 interconnectedness between the lack of protection from the government and humanitarian assistance.

Branch focuses on humanitarian intervention, violence and human rights. In his book

Displacing Human Rights he details the history of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Branch

explains the complex intra and inter-ethnic relationships that are present in the government, rebellions and the north-south divide. Branch argues the state and international humanitarianism developed a mutual dependency and relationship. The Ugandan state wanted the Acholi population in the displacement camps to control and repress political organization and used humanitarian aid to this end (Branch, 2009: 477). He argues humanitarian aid is seen as the “good” side in international politics when framed in a moral language. Therefore, it brings legitimacy to its own actions, but also to the actions of the state (Branch, 2009: 479).

Further, Branch argues humanitarian aid organizations were not simply used as a tool of war by the government, but that humanitarian aid is intimately linked with violence. Aid organizations are complicit in facilitating the government’s agenda, but they also favour the same structure of control within the camps to effectively deliver aid. Humanitarianism is focused on management, logistics and technical solution to the camps. which control people and leaves little room for political organization. Instead, it creates helpless victims in need of saving by the humanitarian organizations (Branch: 2009, 488).

Moreover, Uganda has been recognized for its cooperation with the West as an ally in the War on Terror, which has given it a favourable international reputation. It was Uganda’s connections to the US and its international standing that enabled the politicisation and instrumentalization of humanitarian aid. Branch also states that humanitarian aid can serve the interests of Western states by proxy by providing aid to Western allies, such as Uganda (Belloni, 2007). One can draw the conclusion here that this argument draws on a neo-colonial or postcolonial critique of humanitarianism.

Another scholar that has worked extensively on the conflict in Northern Uganda is Christopher Dolan. In a similar way to Branch, Dolan argues it was partly Uganda’s connections to certain Western states that enabled the Museveni-government to get away with its actions against the Acholi people. The implementation of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and Uganda’s role as a model of development gave it a favourable reputation in the West, especially with the United States, which meant more aid donations and little interference with the governance of the country (Dolan, 2005).

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14 Dolan conducted fieldwork in Uganda and his findings led him to formulate the argument and concept of social torture. Dolan argues that the acts of the government against the Acholi people amounts to social torture, which has been disguised by the war against the LRA. Dolan argues the conflict is not a war primarily between LRA and the Ugandan government. The LRA could easily have been captured and overthrown by the Museveni-government at some point throughout the decades of conflict. There is a disparity between the government’s actions and their stated intentions, and there is no viable explanation for the long duration of the war. Dolan concludes the government is not interested in peace (Dolan, 2005: 38). Dolan’s argument is that social torture has been used to systematically subordinate the Acholi people, who could have otherwise posed as a threat to the incumbent government. The location of this social torture is the “protected villages” and it affects whole societies, rather than only individuals. Social torture indicates “subordinate inclusion of the population” (Dolan, 2005: 40). The Acholi people are thus brought into the national structure to be controlled by the Museveni-government.

Dolan implicates other actors, not only the government, in perpetuating and facilitating the conditions of social torture. He argues the humanitarian organizations focus too much on terms such as complex emergencies and do not see their impact on the conflict, but only see the roots of the conflict as internal to Uganda (Dolan, 2005: 17). Dolan argues that humanitarian organizations assume “that third parties come in solely to help the conflicting parties sort out their internal muddle and play no generative role in creating that muddle” (Dolan, 2005: 18). Dolan however, believes the humanitarian organizations do in fact play a role in creating that muddle. The humanitarian organizations, donors and NGOs become complicit observers, whilst the Acholi people become dependent on humanitarian aid. Instead of relieving suffering they keep people alive to suffer further in the camps (Dolan, 2005: 2). Essentially, social torture functions as means of oppression against the Acholi people by denying them their political and social rights to their own livelihood, healthcare, education and physical protection.

Another scholar that is vocal in criticising the Musevni-government is Olara Otunnu, a former UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. His argument is that the Ugandan government’s actions against the Acholi people amount to genocide. Otunnu points to the systematic abuse of human rights and the creation of the internally displaced persons’ camps as evidence of destruction of a particular ethnic group. Otunnu argues the Acholi are “systematically destroyed physically, culturally and

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15 economically” in the “protected villages” (Otunnu, 2006: 45). Currently, Otunnu is the leading scholar that argues a genocide took place in Northern Uganda. A local Bishop in Kitgum district, Nelson Onono-Onwen has also been vocal in calling the displacement camps an act of genocide (Mackay, 2006). It is true that the Acholi people in the camps lived in horrible conditions with inadequate access to food, medicine and sanitation, which resulted in a humanitarian crisis. Still, to claim the policy of the “protected villages” were part of a policy of genocide is highly contested and a very bold claim. It is a claim that is hard to defend and it is difficult to establish that there was any deliberate intent of genocide, in accordance with the UN Genocide Convention from 1948 (UN, 2018). The government alleges it created the displacement camps to protect, not harm the Acholi. In fact, since there were a number of humanitarian organizations operating in Northern Uganda this contradicts Otunnu’s argument of genocide. It might be more likely that the death toll in the displacement camps is to blame on indifference and neglect by the Ugandan government rather than intent to destroy, which is a potential for further analysis.

As evident from this review, there exist a few comprehensive studies regarding the situation in Northern Uganda from a critical perspective. The studies mostly, but not only, focus on acts committed by the government or the government exploiting and manipulating humanitarian organizations. Consequently, further research can be done to illustrate the role of humanitarian organizations in perpetuating structural violence specifically, as well as the dependence between the state and the humanitarian paradigm. Further, more can be said on how the humanitarian organizations portray the displaced people as victims and the consequences of this. All of these elements will be explored in the thesis and contribute to the literature and understanding of the impact of humanitarian aid on the displacement policy and camp situation in Northern Uganda from a critical perspective.

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4. Research design

4.1 Methodology

This section will outline the methodology used in the thesis as well as the case selection and data collection. To gain a comprehensive and detailed view of the effects and role of humanitarian aid organizations I will use a qualitative single-case study as my research design. A case study research method is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1984: 23). Even though a case study can have disadvantages, a qualitative case study method allows for richness of depth and understanding of a particular social phenomenon (Crowe, 2011: 1). This methodology will allow close analytical examination of the effects of humanitarian aid and the displacement policy in Northern Uganda. It would be too comprehensive to explore the role of humanitarian aid in all of Africa in this thesis. Therefore the focus is narrowed down to a geographical area, namely Northern Uganda.

A single-case study enables a holistic exploration of the displacement policy in Northern Uganda and can investigate how it affects the lives of people over a longer time-period (Zainal, 2007). A case study also benefits from prior theoretical propositions to guide the research (Yin, 1994: 13). Further, case studies are often used when one wants to explore the why and how of a phenomenon, where one cannot change the actors or their actions (Yin, 2003). I want to explore the how and why of humanitarian aid and its effects on the Acholi people, justifying the case study approach.

A case study is at times considered questionable because of potential lack of precision as a research tool. In addition, biased conclusions made by the researcher can at times influence the results of the case study (Yin, 1994). Another criticism of a qualitative case study approach is the difficulty in drawing generalized conclusions and its weakness when applied to other humanitarian emergencies or cases (Zainal, 2007).Whether humanitarian aid organizations operate in the same way in another context is a difficult assessment to make based on a single-case study approach. Even so, based on the theoretical grounding and supported by the data, some tentative speculations might be made based on the findings of this thesis.

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17 Furthermore, I will also use critical theory to analyse the role of humanitarian organizations in the displacement camps. The thesis will apply existing theory and concepts to question and explore the role of humanitarian organizations, but also to question assumptions and established “truths” about humanitarian aid (Crowe et al, 2011). The critical approach is useful to question the common narrative of the war in Uganda and the commonly accepted positive role of humanitarian aid organizations. Critical theory will question why the displacement camps were put in place, not simply examine the humanitarian solutions to the problems within the camps.

4.2 Data collection

To gain a thorough view of the concept of humanitarian violence the data will consist of primary and secondary literature such as reports, news articles, books, journal articles and an interview. It will mostly be qualitative material, but statistics from the time period will also be used to support the argument. When conducting research it is important to collect numerous sources and analyse them critically and to keep in mind who the articles or reports were written for and by. An interview shows the subjective opinion of the interviewee and reflects his or her position, but it can be useful data to understand how the conflict is perceived in Northern Uganda from people with knowledge or experience of the situation. Due to the protection of the interviewee’s privacy the name will not be disclosed. Reports from humanitarian organizations, such as World Food Program or Norwegian Refugee Council, can give a unique look into how humanitarian organizations operate, rationalise their goals and operations, and to understand their priorities and assessments. Further, news articles are useful to gain an understanding of how a particular issue is presented to the wider international community. The data collected is mostly from the time period of 1986 to 2006, but some data from earlier and later time periods are also used to give context to the situation.

4.3 Case selection

The case of Northern Uganda has received some serious academic scrutiny in recent years, but more research is needed on the topic, especially in relation to the role of humanitarian organizations. The conflict in Northern Uganda is academically relevant and interesting due to a number of factors. The conflict in Uganda has lasted for over two decades, during which a high number of children have been kidnapped, conscripted and trained as child soldiers. The death toll in the “protected villages” has been excessive, which does not match with its stated

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18 policy of protection. Seemingly more people die from diseases and the conditions in the camps than from the actual war – and that warrants investigation (Irin News, 2005). Moreover, there have been several attempted peace talks between the government and the rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and the lack of success is usually blamed on the rebel group. The media narrative demonstrates a lack of critical analysis, which should be addressed. The LRA leader, Joseph Kony, is often presented in a highly demonised image, such as in the infamous KONY 2012 video made by a group of activists called Invisible Children (Invisible Children, 2012). The video pays little attention to the conflict’s historical context or the actions of other actors in the conflict.

Further, the displacement camps received international attention in 2004 when then UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, Jan Egeland, called it a neglected humanitarian crisis and asked the international community to step up their relief efforts (Guardian, 2004). The accumulation of internally displaced persons’ camps in Northern Uganda, only a few kilometres from people’s original homes, as well as the fact that the camp inhabitants were mostly from one ethnic group, the Acholi, makes this case somewhat unique. In addition, several humanitarian organizations, such as World Vision, International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Program have worked in the camps in Northern Uganda, and an assessment of their impact is necessary. It is especially pertinent after the humanitarian organizations essentially spent ten years of funding and maintaining the displacement camps.

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5. Case study: Northern Uganda

Figure 1: a map overview of the number of people displaced in each region in Northern Uganda in

May 2004 (Reliefweb, 2004).

5.1 Historical overview of the conflict

This section will outline the main points of the conflict in Northern Uganda and put the conflict in its historical context. Due to the word limit of the thesis, a comprehensive and thorough explanation and elaboration of the conflict is not possible. I will highlight key points and events of the conflict, whilst paying special attention to its relevance to my current analysis.

The conflict in Northern Uganda can be traced back to the colonial days of the British Empire when Uganda was a British colony. The British’s strategy of “divide-and rule” deepened the ethnic north-south divide in Uganda, which had consequences long after independence. The British assigned specific tasks to the different ethnic groups, such as military training to the Acholi, creating an image of a strong and belligerent people. A

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20 concept that lingered in Uganda for a long time. The North was largely excluded from economic development plans and considered a labour reserve (CSOPNU, 2004: 26). The Acholi were still a large proportion of the Ugandan Army under President Obote’s first regime, following independence in 1962. Many northerners joined the army due to lack of other employment opportunities (CSOPNU, 2004: 26). The proportion of Acholi in the military service contributed to the reputation of the Acholi as a warrior people. Obote, himself of northern origin largely favoured the North and marginalised other ethnic groups. In 1971 Obote was toppled by his own army chief Idi Amin (CSOPNU, 2004: 27). During the regime of Idi Amin (1971-76), which was characterised by human rights abuse and repression, the Acholi people were excluded from the army and much of the civil service in an attempt to reduce the power of the north (Branch, 2011).

Milton Obote was in power for a second period from 1980-1985 before the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M), led by Yoweri Museveni overthrew the second Obote government (Quinn, 2008: 56). Museveni remains in power in Kampala today (2018). The NRA/M committed widespread human rights violations against civilians in the years after seizing power. The excessive violence and force deployed by the Museveni government led to the creation of several insurgent groups (Overstoom, 2016: 369). The different rebel groups responded to the NRA/M treatments of the North and attempted to gain power in Acholiland. Most notably was the tribalized Holy Spirit Movement led by Alice Lakwena, which consisted only of the “true” or “pure” Acholi people. Joseph Kony found inspiration in her movement and founded the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Kony stated that he wanted to unite Acholiland under a Christian leadership, and was convinced any Acholi that worked for the government was not a “true” Acholi. In addition, Kony claimed people living in the protected camps were enemies of the Acholi. Kony enjoyed less support than Lakwena in his movement, and had to rely on brutal tactics of intimidation, maiming and kidnapping to gain recruits (Branch, 2009: 69). The LRA abducted and conscripted Acholi children, forcing them to carry supplies and commit horrible acts as child soldiers (Relief Web, 2002).

Since the rise of the LRA, the Ugandan government has conducted several military operations, as well as attempted peace talks to end the conflict. Operation North in 1991 was an attempt to wipe out the LRA by military means. It became a campaign of violence, massacres, torture and arbitrary arrests. Perhaps not surprisingly the attempted peace talks in 1993 collapsed and violence and attacks from the LRA intensified as a consequence

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21 another military offensive against the LRA. However, it resulted in increased state

militarization and displacement and did little to end the LRA rebellion (Quinn, 2008: 59). These operations have been brutal and characterised by atrocities and violence. As evident in figure 2, displacement increased massively after Operation Iron Fist and continued to increase in the following years. Another turn in the conflict came in 2004 when President Museveni requested the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Joseph Kony, which some believe contradicted the Amnesty Act of 2000. The Amnesty Act had promised amnesty for all rebels that surrendered to the government (Quinn, 2008: 64).

The actors involved in the conflict are many. The LRA has received support from the Government of Sudan, whilst the Government of Uganda has supported the Sudanese

People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) – adding a complicated proxy layer to the conflict (CSOPNU, 2004: 29). In the international context, Uganda has enjoyed a close relationship with the US and been hailed as a success story for the international development community in terms of its work in HIV prevention and development goals (Branch, 2011: 80). This also means Uganda has received a lot of financial aid and donations.

The first displacement took place already in 1988 when about 100 000 people were moved in Gulu district (CSOPNU, 2004: 64). However, it was not until eight years later that forced displacement became a political policy. In September 1996, in what was said to be an attempt to shield the Acholi people from attacks by the LRA, the government systematically forced people to move to the “protected villages” by intimidation and threats (Sounds of Africa, 2011). People were told if they refused to move they would be treated as rebels (Gersony, 1997: 49). Once inside the “protected villages” the state offered minimal military protection and little access to food or sanitation. People had to follow strict curfews and were not able to return to work in their fields (Finnström, 2008: 144). Lack of proper security in and around the camps also made the camps an easy target for the LRA (Branch, 2009: 481). Reports of abuse of civilians in the displacement camps by both LRA and government troops were widespread (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

The displacement camps were established mainly in Pader, Gulu and Kitgum districts (Oosterom, 2016). The Ugandan government requested international humanitarian aid, and the World Food Program came in with assistance at the end of 1996. Together with World Vision, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) they helped sustain and care for the displaced population, who remained in the camps for over ten years (Branch, 2009: 93).

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22 Little humanitarian aid was needed in Northern Uganda before the creation of the camps and only a few humanitarian agencies were present in the area. As the displacement situation escalated, a number of humanitarian agencies began to operate in Northern Uganda (Oosterom 2016: 371). The UNHCR reports that about 250 camps were established over the 10-year period of displacement to host approximately 1.8 million people (Klein, 2012).

After several years operating in the country, the UNHCR decided in 2006 to begin closing the 250 camps in Uganda. The process took several years, and it was not until 2012 that the UNHCR indeed left. The situation is thought to be relatively stable today, and the UN reports that 98% of the internally displaced people have left the camps (UNHCR, 2012). However, some of the Acholi people have little opportunity to return to their old life and land. There are a number of disabled people or people who fell out of their social network still living in what is left of the camps in Gulu district in 2012 (Klein, 2012).

Figure 2:

Figure 2 shows the increase in displacement numbers from Northern Uganda in the Acholi, Teso and Lango regions. The graph shows an increase in the number of people displaced after Operation Iron Fist in 2002, as more insecurity followed. Further, there is an increase in displacement after 2004 when more international organizations arrived. In 2005 approximately 1,117,000 of these people are found in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts alone. (Data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) for Norwegian Refugee Council – formerly known as the Global IDP Project).

0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000 1,600,000 1,800,000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

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6. Analysis

6.1 Humanitarian aid and the displacement camps

This section argues that humanitarian assistance provided by the World Food Program was instrumentalized and politicised by the Ugandan government to facilitate the policy of

“protected villages.” The humanitarian presence offered international legitimacy and external support to this policy. The humanitarian assistance, by sustaining and maintaining the survival of the displacement camps, legitimized and facilitated political oppression and structural violence against the Acholi.

The “protected villages” policy has been controversial and several critics have argued the camps were not primarily created to protect the Acholi, but as a counterinsurgent strategy against the LRA (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002: 6). A report from CSOPNU shows that there is minimal evidence to suggest the security of the Acholi population improved by being in the “protected villages” and that the camps had little impact on the rate of children

abducted by the LRA (CSOPNU, 2004: 10). Interestingly, the Ugandan government had attempted the same displacement strategy against rebel groups twice before, first in 1988 and then in 1990, but these attempts were completely unsuccessful (ARLPI, 2001: 15). Certain leading politicians have also admitted that the “protected villages” were created primarily as a military strategy and not to actually provide protection, which can explain the inadequate facilities in the camps (UNDHA, 1996). The government of Uganda had done nothing to prepare for health facilities or food assistance when the Acholi people arrived in the camps (Gersony, 1997: 49). The poor living conditions and inadequate military protection of these camps make it plausible to believe that the Ugandan government did not care much for what happened to the Acholi people in the so-called “protected villages” (Quinn, 2008: 57).

The displacement camps were located in the economic and administrative centres of the different towns, referred to as trading centres. A military unit was set up in the area, and people from surrounding villages were told to congregate there. The result was several thousand people crammed together in a rather small area (Dolan, 2005: 78). A UN report from December 1996, about three months after the mass displacement occurred, states the government of Ugandan claims that the Acholi people spontaneously gathered around the military posts for protection against the LRA. This highly contrasts with peoples’ own perceptions and accounts of what took place (UNDHA, 1996). The people interviewed in

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24 Gulu during the time period of the first displacement, state they were not fleeing their homes at all, but were coerced and threatened to leave the comfort of their homes by the army (UNDHA, 1996). Apparently, people were told they would be treated as rebels if they were found in the rural areas after the three-day deadline of moving to the camps (Gersony, 1997: 49).

From very early on the displacement camps did not enjoy much popular support and most of the Acholi people wanted to go home to their villages. Many felt unsafe in the camps, where they had neither proper shelter nor food (UNDHA, 1996). The displacement policy has been perceived as punitive and there was never any mention of how long the displacement would last. After people had cramped together in the camps, there were continued threats and physical violence to prevent the Acholi people from leaving the camps (Gersony, 1997: 52). Simply by keeping the Acholi people in the displacement camps, the government was able to control and monitor these communities under the guise of protection, that had long showed resistance to the current regime (Interview with an Acholi informant by the author 22 March 2018 + Finnström, 2008: 142).

The government clearly wanted to keep people in the camps to control the population, but it did not have a long-term strategic plan of how to provide food security for all these people. At the end of October 1996 the government came up with a plan that would provide food for 100,000 people in Gulu, but by that point the displaced population had nearly doubled. The government was reluctant and was not capable of providing food for everyone over a continued time period (ARLPI, 2001: 15). Thus natural solution would have been to dismantle the camps. Instead, the government requested food aid in late 1996. A UN report on the situation in Northern Uganda mentions the camps in Gulu and states that the viability and sustainability of these “protected villages” would depend entirely on the assistance provided by the humanitarian agencies.

“Whether or not protected villages develop over the coming weeks will also depend on the ability of aid agencies to provide the services which are lacking, and certainly beyond the means of the local authorities” (UNDHA, 1996).

Some organizations, such as the World Food Program and World Vision, were quick to respond to the requests for assistance (Gersony, 1997: 51) and this was crucial for the viability of the displacement policy. The World Food Program was already in late December

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25 trying to supply food aid and were planning a delivery for 100 000 people in Gulu and the surrounding areas. The humanitarian organizations, spearheaded by the WFP, started to register people for feeding programs in the government created displacement camps. Quickly a few other organizations followed such as Oxfam, MSF-Holland and ICRC as well as the Church of Uganda – working on different relief projects (UNDHA, 1996).

The government was able to politicize the aid distribution to its advantage. The WFP was only allowed by the government to provide food aid in areas defined as “protected villages,” essentially the government-controlled camp areas (Ockwell, 1999: 12). In the camp areas it would be easier for the government to maintain control and to observe the Acholi communities. The WFP was not allowed to provide assistance to people that were in need in the surrounding villages (Finnström, 2008: 151). Relying on food aid was a quite unnecessary turn in the Acholi community, as people depended mostly on subsistence farming. The Acholi people had food in their homes and in their fields, but were physically isolated in the camps with little means of defending or providing for themselves, which made them depend on humanitarian aid to survive. Many people were forced into the camps right before the harvest of their agricultural produce (Gersony, 1997). Hence, the farmers were prevented from accessing their crops and could not use it for subsistence or sell it in the market (UNDHA, 1996). The crops, however, were left available for the LRA to harvest for their troops (Sounds of Africa, 2011).

Due to the already inadequate living conditions in the government camps and the uncertain conflict situation in Northern Uganda, many proponents of humanitarian aid will argue that the humanitarian assistance is a benevolent factor that makes life and survival easier for thousands of people. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that most of the Acholi people wanted to leave the camps at its inception and were prohibited from doing so by government threats, the humanitarian contribution to the camps is arguably less positively. The humanitarian assistance did provide food and resources for people to survive, but it also kept them isolated and locked in the camps. Normally, the work of the humanitarian agencies would be seen as a positive contribution to a community, however, by setting up a few schools and clinics in the camps, they assisted and supported the policy of displacement by creating institutions in the camps. Further, the assistance was not at a high enough level to prevent malnutrition and disease from flourishing on a massive scale in these camps. Only 11 % of people in the camps actually died of direct physical violence, most people died of diseases or malnutrition (Finnström, 2008: 133). Life in the displacement camps became

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26 simply about sheer survival, not about dignity or a fulfilling life. Arguably by keeping people locked in the camps and by providing a minimal level of assistance - the humanitarian intervention in fact contributed and made possible the very conditions that it sought to alleviate. The humanitarian intervention created and reinforced the conditions of structural violence and debilitation against the Acholi (Dolan, 2005: 331 + Branch, 2009: 485).

It seems it was only the arrival, funding and legitimacy of the humanitarian organizations that created the possibility of making the displacement camps semi-permanent. Scholars believe that without the intervention and the following support from the international aid organizations, the government would have been unable to keep the camps open only by force (Sounds of Africa, 2011). People would have most likely resisted the internment and left for their homes (Branch, 2009: 484). Essentially humanitarian aid was instrumentalized and politicised to further a campaign of forced displacement (Finnström, 2008: 141). The result was that the Acholi population was displaced in the camps for 10 years. The camps, with the assistance of humanitarian aid agencies, did not resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda or protect the Acholi people, but made displacement a viable long-term strategy for the Ugandan government, and the civilians had to pay the price (Branch, 2009: 486).

Moreover, due to their moral stance as an impartial third party, the presence of humanitarian agencies provide a symbolic legitimacy to the Ugandan government (Lopez et al, 2015). It strengthens the government's agenda of displacement and contributes to further the status quo. The way the conflict is narrated and framed internationally, with the LRA as a brutal rebel group with little political grounding, the government is the only legitimate armed force (LeRiche, 2004). A few organizations, such as Human Rights Watch (1999) and Amnesty International (1999), did point to and condemn government abuse against civilians in the North. Others however, such as WFP and UNICEF, seemed to blame all the violence and suffering in Northern Uganda on the LRA (Dolan, 2005: 333). Accordingly, with the moral support of the humanitarian agencies, it was fairly easy for the government to justify militarization and its harsh treatment of the North (Branch, 2009: 480). Some of the Acholi people in the displacement camps were suspicious that the government was plotting to dispossess the people of their land, and therefore kept them in the camps. People point to the fact that LRA is a relatively small rebel movement, and people do not understand how Kony and his followers have avoided capture considering the alleged effort the Ugandan government has put in on his arrest (Bøås, 2014: 55). A lot of people felt resentment and anger towards the government and the army for their situation.

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27 The government has spent very little of its budget on relief programs for the Acholi people or conflict resolution efforts, but rather prioritised and focused on the military (CSOPNU, 2004: 11 + Interview with an Acholi informant by the author 22 March 2018). The CSOPNU report from 2004 estimates that the conflict has cost roughly USD 1.33 billion since the 1990s (CSOPNU, 2004: 11). The intervention and legitimacy of the humanitarian organizations allow the government to divert its funds to militarization, which is essentially used to contain and control the Acholi population, not protect them. It also secures the

government’s grip on power (Branch, 2009: 487 + Interview with an Acholi informant by the author 22 March 2018). There is also evidence that suggests senior officials in the military enjoyed benefits from the continuation of the war (Lomo and Hovil, 2004: 41). There were several failed military operations, such as Operation Iron Fist in 2002, which led to increased displacement and violence. However, the failed military campaigns turned into a profiting business for the national army, as some of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) officers allegedly took up the salaries of so-called “ghost soldiers” (Dunn, 2004: 142-143).

The government of Uganda instrumentalized humanitarian aid to maintain and further the displacement camps it had created for the Acholi people. The humanitarian presence provided symbolic legitimized and facilitated this displacement, which would not have been possible without their intervention and material resources. This contributed to the disempowerment of the Acholi, who remained in the camps for a decade. The next section will explore how and why the displacement camps, which were attractive to the government because it could easily facilitate control of the population, were attractive to aid agencies for the very same reason.

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6.2 Humanitarian governance

As the previous section highlighted, the displacement camps would not have functioned without the helping hand and management provided by the humanitarian aid organizations. This section will focus on how humanitarian aid organizations manage and control their operations through a process of Foucauldian governmentality. Arguably, the displacement camps are convenient sites for humanitarian aid organizations because they function as spaces to operationalize emergencies and determine what services are needed. However, the camps are also attractive because they function as a tool to control people and resources efficiently, as a form of biopower (Nibbe, 2015: 421).

The humanitarian governance functions through aspects of regulation and discipline. The regulation aspect of humanitarianism operates in line with a certain logic. The humanitarian organizations invoke a crisis or emergency language, where the emergency is too complicated to be solved other than by external intervention. The use of such an emergency language often results in simplifications of complex conflicts and sees the refugee or IDP-movement as a problem that can be fixed. The focus shifts to the pressing humanitarian needs that exist in the displacement camps, such as hunger and disease, which leads the suffering in the camps to be defined in statistical terms. This allows for a technical solution to the problems of hunger and disease in the displacement camps. The sole focus of the humanitarian organizations become measuring, addressing and solving the biological needs of the displaced people in the camps to restore the population to a certain norm of survival (Branch, 2009: 490). In addition, the humanitarian organizations become the best-suited actors to deal with a humanitarian crisis of bio-statistical needs by establishing an image of themselves as experts in the field. By focusing on their knowledge, the operational and technical expertise of humanitarian emergencies they legitimize their own intervention (Branch, 2009: 489).

Humanitarianism functions as a zone of exception, where politics is put aside and universal humanity is the sole focus (de Waal, 2010: 134). The technical, problem-solving mentality shift the attention away from the complex political aspects of a conflict to universal humanity. This means the crisis and death toll in Northern Uganda is seen as a purely humanitarian issue, the suffering is not seen as a result of the displacement policy (Branch, 2009: 487). The focus is now on the efficient, technical solutions to the human suffering in

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29 the displacement camps, instead of simply allowing people to return home. Arguably, there was not a pressing humanitarian emergency in 1996 when the camps were created. People were attacked by the LRA, but the “protected villages” did not keep people safe. Indeed, by shifting the focus away from the political question and away from questioning the viability and legitimacy of the displacement policy, this contributed to the continuation of the camps for ten years.

Camps are alluring to humanitarian organizations because they function as a space where it is fairly easy to access, secure and maintain control over people and resources. The aid agencies set up a camp system, which included an administration to oversee and evaluate the camps (Branch, 2009). The camp itself can be seen as a tool of control, where people are reduced to what Giorgio Agamben terms a state or bare life (Agamben, 1998: 139). People exist in a bare physical state, living a life deprived of rights and dignity. People simply exist as bodies or entities, they do not live or control their own political, legal or social lives in a meaningful way (Nibbe, 2015: 421). Consequently, humanitarian organizations gain legitimate control and biopower over the camps and the lives of people in the displacement camps. The population is effectively an object of control.

Furthermore, this technical problem-solving approach relies on structured and numerous needs assessments of the population (Nibbe, 2015: 421). The aid agencies measure the “population against certain bio-statistical norms” (Branch, 2009: 490). After these needs assessment have been conducted and evaluated, there follows targeted interventions to alleviate hunger, disease or other pressing issues in the camps. The needs assessments carried out in the displacement camps contribute to the focus on technical accuracy and efficient aid delivery, whilst taking the attention further away from any political questions of why the people were in the camps in the first place.

Furthermore, these assessments also serve the purpose of control and management. In fact, the whole ordeal can have a rather humiliating and damaging effect on the people in the camps. The Red Cross conducted numerous population assessments in Northern Uganda, collecting personal information on age, gender and who they were living with. Some of the camp residents describe the process as a quite humiliating and infantilizing experience, where people were counted as sheep (Finnström, 2008: 134). The assessments were often done in the early hours when most people would be sleeping in their homes (Branch, 2009: 492).

The food distribution itself was carried out hastily in a top-down style in collaboration with the UPDF (Finnström, 2008: 151). The World Food Program distribution was

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30 regimented and strict, where the Acholi people were divided up by village and household. Then the people were made to stand in line for hours to receive their food rations. To be efficient people had to fill out cards with their information and remain silent (Branch, 2009: 492). They were simply to be fed and do nothing. The camp residents found the process to be humiliating and stressful. At times a person was not given his or her share of food because they lacked some crucial information on another member in their household (Dolan, 2005: 188). This of course caused extreme psychological stress, as well as physical pain, and life in the camps became about sheer survival.

The evaluation and response from these assessments rarely address the actual needs of the Acholi community. Often the feedback was very abstract and irrelevant or focused mostly on how to distribute and organize the food aid more efficiently. Some of the initiatives that the humanitarian organizations came up with were undoubtedly more patronizing than helpful. For instance, there were workshops in the camps that aimed to educate and teach people farming technique. Agricultural tools and equipment were not of much use in the camps and people were prohibited from accessing their own land, therefore these workshop seems rather pointless (Finnström, 2008: 134). Another odd initiative came from World Vision, which focused on producing beans and maize in Gulu and thereafter sell the products to the WFP, which used the products as food aid in Sudan. World Vision meant this contributed to the local economy in Gulu. However, this strategy ignores the fact that people in this region had been self-sufficient and had great experience in farming, but now found themselves in a situation where they could not access their own land (Dolan, 2005: 192). It appears this strategy almost put some of the blame back on the displaced people for being reliant on food aid.

These schemes work in the humanitarian space and take attention away from what is the real political issue – the displacement policy – to focus on more quantifiable interventions and solutions that can easily be addressed within the setting of the displacement camps (Dolan, 2005: 278). This approach ensures people are kept in the camps in a semi-permanent state against their will, and it licenses the government’s policy. The next section will explore how discipline is a crucial aspect of the humanitarian governance.

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6.3 Discipline and the docile bodies

As Foucault stated to control the populace and shape the desired behaviour of “docile bodies” the state, or in this case the humanitarian organizations, must rely on some form of discipline. (Muller, 2011: 7). Humanitarian agencies do not see the individual people in need, but see clusters of biological humans that will quietly accept the aid they receive, without creating any trouble or stealing food. In fact, the aid organizations need the Acholi people to be docile, helpless victims in order to deliver aid and continue their operations. In order for this to happen there must be a high level of discipline in the camps, thus the humanitarian organizations come to rely on the Ugandan military to discipline the camp inhabitants for efficient aid delivery. The effect of this discipline is that the Acholi people are steered towards the identity of the helpless, docile victim, that cannot change their own situation. People come to internalise the victim identity and the “good” behaviour that fits within the narrative of aid delivery.

The Uganda People's Defence Force (previously known as the NRA/M) protect and guard the humanitarian convoys that go into the displacement camps. According to a WFP evaluation report, the WFP food distribution relied solely on the national army to protect convoys and personnel from 1994 – 1998. The report states that the Ugandan government lacked resources to provide security for the UN personnel, hence the WFP and other organizations paid either the salaries or other incentives for police and security personnel. These agencies also at times paid for fuel or rental of vehicles used in the transportation of the security forces (Ockwell, 1999: 50-51). The report acknowledges that this is a controversial policy within the humanitarian community, but necessary in some exceptional circumstances. However, the report does not expand on what exceptional circumstances signify within the humanitarian community. Some scholars might argue that armed military soldiers at a food distribution are necessary to protect the UN aid workers against rebels and to prevent scenes of chaos in the camps. However, that is not the only purpose and effect of the armed soldiers. The military presence emits a strong threat of violence. The humanitarian agencies depend on an army that has breached numerous human rights and abused civilians with impunity. According to Human Rights Watch, the government of Uganda has failed to prosecute those in the army who have abused, killed and beaten members of the Acholi population. The complaints against them are rarely followed through (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Then the fact that humanitarian organizations essentially fund sections of the Ugandan military is

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32 highly disturbing considering their past abuses of civilians. With the past abuses in mind, the military presence on humanitarian convoys and at the food distributions becomes even more threatening. The military presence creates a highly sinister and aggressive image and the message is clear: if the Acholi do not behave they might lose their ration of food or be punished in other ways.

It seems humanitarian assistance goes together with military oppression (Finnström, 2008: 132). Arguably the aid organizations were not simply instrumentalized by the Ugandan government, but came to depend on the Ugandan military to keep a high level of discipline. Essentially the military is there to repress political resistance and quell any protests against the conditions in the camps (Branch, 20009: 486). There should be no political organization or demands of better or more food made of the humanitarian aid workers at the food distribution. The military is there to ensure compliance and make sure people behave in line with the identity of the docile and helpless victim that has been assign to them (Branch, 2009: 494). Indeed, it is not even necessary to resort to physical violence, simply the symbolic threat of violence is enough to silence and restrict the people that have now come to rely on humanitarian aid for survival in the camps. Through the disciplinary measures, people develop the self-governing mentality and internalise the “good” and desired behaviour that the humanitarian regime favours. This identity limits people’s behaviour and agency.

Additionally, not only did the military make up a menacing and repressive presence in the camps, they did little to provide any physical protection to the camps, which was their stated purpose (Dolan, 2005: 216). Many scholars point to the fact that the military barracks were placed in the middle of the camp centre in most of the “protected villages.” In case of an LRA attack, the civilians would actually work as a human shield for the army and not the other way around (Mukwana and Ridderbos, 2008: 21).

Humanitarian aid organizations rely on discipline to efficiently organize and distribute food aid, with the effect of steering people into helpless victims. This is because the humanitarian organizations indeed need people to be docile victims that will receive humanitarian assistance without any difficulties. The discipline is carried out with the help of the Ugandan military and emits a threat of physical violence that serves to quell opposition or undesired behaviour in the camps. The actions together of regulation and discipline produce and control the helpless victim, depriving them of their voice and agency. This governance is a way to control the displaced population to behave in the correct way according to the identity of the helpless victim.

Humanitarian violence : a case study of Northern Uganda