The relationship between regime type, economic dependency and the effectiveness of sanctions: A case study of Iran

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T H E R E LA T I O N S H I P B E T W EE N

R E G I M E T Y P E , E CO N O M I C

D E P E N D E N C Y A N D T H E

E F F E C T I VE N E S S O F S A N C T I O N S :

A C A S E ST U D Y O F I R A N

Master’s Thesis

Leiden University – Faculty of Social Sciences

Program: MSc Political Science – Specialization in International Politics Author: Bo Weterings

Student Number: s2291177

Supervisor: Dr. Roos van der Haer Second Reader: Dr. Corinna Jentzsch Date: June 11, 2019

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Abstract

Sanctions and their corresponding effectiveness are often described as ambiguous, making it necessary for scholars and policy-makers to investigate their utility as a foreign policy tool. With studies focusing on the outcomes of sanctions, the achievement of the proposed goals and the costs, a lack of attention on the target’s role in the sanctions process creates a gap in the literature. In order to achieve a broader understanding on the effectiveness of sanctions, my thesis focuses on the target’s role in the sanctioning process by examining Iran as a targeted single-case study. Therefore, two factors, regime type and economic dependency, are analyzed in order to determine whether sanctions were effective and could be related to the target’s reaction and the relationship between the target and the sender. This authoritarian within-case study is examined within the period of 2006-2010. My qualitative research applies theory existing in the literature, whereby the mentioned factors are considered to have influenced the sanctions process, establishing evidence of the ineffectiveness of sanctions in the selected case.

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List of Abbreviations

AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran CNN Cable News Network

EU European Union

EU-3 Member States of the European Union: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons P5 Permanent Five Members of the United Nations

Security Council

UN United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council

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Acknowledgements

My gratefulness goes to my parents for this opportunity, support and love from long distance. To the love of my life for the unconditional encouragement and patience. And to my thesis supervisor and second reader for the learning process and ability to make me use less ‘direct citations’.

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I: Introduction

EMPIRICAL PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

“Mr. Ahmadinejad said the economic pressures on Iran caused by the sanctions would never force it to compromise on the country’s uranium enrichment program, which Iranian leaders say is purely peaceful but the West suspects is a cloak for developing nuclear weapons capability” (Erdbrink, 2012).

Over the last half-century, sanctions in international politics have been seen as a coercive foreign policy option (Baldwin, 2000; Tsebelis, 1990). The ongoing war in Syria exemplifies the idea behind imposing sanctions in an armed conflict, by demanding the country to comply with international norms and to enter peace negotiations (Lektzian and Regan, 2016). Other cases involving nuclear proliferation, such as in North Korea, illustrate that unacceptable policies and behavior need to be punished (Galtung, 1967). Hence, sanctions are one of the many foreign policy options used in foreign affairs, including diplomacy and military intervention (Peksen, 2017).

By opting to impose sanctions in such cases, when human rights are violated, or with known involvement in terrorist activities, policy-makers need to be well-informed about other foreign policy tools and what the consequences of sanctions might be (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; Tsebelis, 1990). Although some scholars repeatedly argue that sanctions cannot be effective, policy-makers still opt to impose them (Lektzian and Regan, 2016; Pape, 1997). In the case of Iran, here is a salient example that has tested the effectiveness of sanction as a foreign policy tool. The previous statement made by the former Iranian President, Mr. Ahmadinejad, underscores the difficulties and begs the question: what factors could influence effective sanctions?

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Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990; Tsebelis, 1990). The body of research in international politics suggests that a hegemonic country imposing sanctions or the involvement of an international organization has a positive influence on the effectiveness of sanctions (Major, 2012; Tsebelis, 1990). This is due to the fact that the involvement of major powers will increase the credibility of the threat, generating a reaction by the target, making it more likely to comply (Lektzian and Regan, 2016). A huge part of this, as Escribà-Folch (2012) argues, is that the decision to comply or deny is reflected in the way leaders respond to imposed sanctions. Therefore, the likelihood of the target to comply is tied directly to the political costs potentially brought on government leadership (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Brooks, 2002; Peksen, 2017).

In much of the literature, the costs brought on the target depend on the regime type (Ibid). By examining a democratic and an authoritarian regime, the difference between the two lies in the manner in which the harm of sanctions results in political liability (Brooks, 2002). Due to its political structure, the regime type of the target, or the country receiving sanctions, can serve as a predictive indicator as to how the sanctions will be interpreted. In this sense, some argue that sanctions will be more effective in democratic regimes than in authoritarian regimes (Brooks, 2002; Major, 2012; Peksen, 2017). A notable example of this scenario is the sanctions imposed on South Africa to end Apartheid. The impact on their society caused the public to hold the government accountable (Brooks, 2002). Additionally, the political liability involved weighed heavily on the government leadership, who was afraid of being removed from office, and opportunities arose for other politicians to “use policy change as a vehicle for mobilization in electoral politics” (Brooks, 2002: 23).

Conversely, politicians in authoritarian regimes are, by nature, not concerned with political liability, having competitive positions or being removed from office (Allen, 2005; Brooks, 2002). This phenomenon is highlighted by the sanctions imposed on Iraq for trying

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to create nuclear weapons, which have proven mostly ineffective, since the goal of destruction or removal was not achieved (Brooks, 2002). The actions of the Iraqi government can be explained by its political structure and by the economic profit derived from the imposed sanctions. By imposing sanctions on Iraq, it was possible for its government to have an even tighter control of its economy, as “sanctions enrich important constituencies, and strengthen the state, even as they weaken Iraqi society” (Brooks, 2002: 37). This case, amongst others, made it clear that to understand on which factors the effectiveness of sanctions is contingent, both the sender and target need to be taken into consideration (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000). Looking to the importance of the target in the sanctions process, Iraqi’s authoritarian regime demonstrated complete resistance towards international pressure and demands.

As demonstrated in the case of Iraq, nuclear proliferation has proven to be a challenging area for the application of sanctions. It has also showed that the target’s regime type and economy are interrelated factors. Similarly, Iran’s uranium enrichment program has been considered to be a threat to international peace and security over more than a decade (Gootman, 2006). However, due to the country’s economic importance derived from large oil reserves, it appears that the target’s economy is an essential factor in determining the effectiveness of sanctions (Chubin, 2006; McLean and Whang, 2010; Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). By imposing sanctions on Iran, it will undoubtedly create economic risks on a domestic and international level (Chubin, 2006). As an important exporter of oil, it makes it difficult for senders who rely on this commodity to impose sanctions on Iran, ultimately having a major impact on the effectiveness and willingness to implement (Ibid).

However, the majority of studies on the effectiveness of sanctions is focused on the sender, with only a few studies whereby the target is seen as an important factor (Brooks, 2002; Escribà-Folch, 2012; Major, 2012; Peksen, 2017). Some of these studies have

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demonstrated that to impose sanctions, the sender must have a better insight of domestic and international factors related to the target (Brooks, 2002; Escribà-Folch, 2012). Simply put, to comprehend on which factors the effectiveness of sanctions depends, both the sender and target need to be taken into account (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000). My research attempts to contribute to the literature by filling the gap by involving the target’s position in the sanction process to determine effectiveness. I consider how a target’s regime type determines its reaction towards the international directives, also taking into account variables such as its government and economy. As stated previously, different regime types have distinct decision-making processes, and their structure remains crucial in defining the effectiveness of sanctions. Thus, from this line of inquiry, a more specific research question can be constructed: Why is the enforcement of sanctions less effective in authoritarian regimes, such as Iran?

THESIS OUTLINE

My thesis will be structured as follows: After the introduction, I compile a literature review of studies that focus on the effectiveness of sanctions, demonstrating the lack of consensus in conceptualizing this. Thereafter, I will present my hypotheses regarding the relationship of regime type, economic dependency and the effectiveness of sanctions. This will be followed by a detailed explanation of the methodology in this thesis. This is further examined through the analysis of my thesis, in which the context of the situation is given, the sanctions process is illustrated, and domestic and international politics in Iran are analyzed. In the final section, I will draw conclusions that can be derived from this research and expand this on further research.

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II: Theoretical Framework

LITERATURE REVIEW

Sanctions are commonly seen as a threat to influence another’s state behavior (e.g. Baldwin, 2000; Bratton, 2005; Galtung, 1967; Tsebelis, 1990). The definition of sanctions is therefore often linked to coercion, since persuasion is used to obtain certain result (Baldwin, 2000). Despite of the lack of a concrete conceptualization, a good example of defining sanctions is by relating it to actions from one or more international actors (sender) against one or more others (target), whereby the goal is to punish the target and to make it comply with norms, considered important for the international community (Galtung, 1967).

Enforcing sanctions is, therefore, one of the many different foreign policy tools used to answer to the requirement of what the international community deems to be important (Lektzian and Regan, 2016). By opting for sanctions, studies have focused on the question why to opt for such foreign policy tool (e.g. Baldwin, 1990; Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Galtung, 1967; Lektzian and Regan, 2016). Concerning to the use of sanctions, Baldwin (2000: 86) affirms that “what rational policymakers really want to know is: How effective will they be, with respect to which goals and targets, at what cost, and in comparison, with which policy alternatives”. Whereas imposing sanctions is mostly related to rely on norms of the international community and to halt any disapproved behavior such as the violation of human rights, expropriation claims, nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the literature does not offer a consensus about the goals by imposing sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; Tsebelis, 1990). The unclear idea and lack of consensus about the goals of imposing sanctions makes it hard to define the effectiveness of sanctions (Baldwin, 2000; Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Brooks, 2002). Nonetheless, through the lens of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990), effectiveness depends on the type of goal that is desired. Hart (2000) has

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established on the idea by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) by affirming that there exists a variety of goals and, by achieving the sender’s main goal, sanctions are considered to have been effective.

Building on Hart (2000), Baldwin (2000) argues that the effectiveness is also influenced by the implied costs, both for the sender and the target. However, even though sanctions can present themselves as a costly tool, it still remains to be a considered alternative for policymakers (Ibid). Despite the expenses behind the use of sanctions, Lektzian and Regan (2016) argue that opting to impose sanctions in isolation will not be effective. They demonstrate that the effectiveness of sanctions depends on whether it is combined with military intervention. Further, Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) and Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) have demonstrated that sanctions are a more preferred and a more effective option, since military intervention is too costly. Nevertheless, the focus of Lektzian and Regan (2016) is placed on the ability of sanctions to shorten the duration of civil conflicts. This makes it clear that even though they have provided some insight, the effectiveness of sanctions is only conceptualized and defined by the duration of civil conflicts, not taking into account any other political goals.

Additionally, not only has the duration of civil conflicts taken place in the literature surrounding the effectiveness of sanctions, but also has the duration of sanctions itself (e.g. Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; Major, 2012). While Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) perceive sanctions as short-term option, Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) argue that the average length of a sanction episode is 16 years. More substantially, short episodes of sanctions are considered to have more effect in obtaining the sender’s goals than longer ones, which typically demonstrate a failure (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000).

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When examining the length of a sanction’s episode, it is remarkable that the sender is prominent featured in determining the effectiveness of sanctions (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990). This is because once a sanction’s episode is longer or shorter, the responsibility of any effect is mainly placed on the sender. Hence, the sender’s position in the sanction process is crucial in achieving its goal by imposing sanctions (Ibid). This importance attributed to the sender is further seen once giving the example of imposing sanctions by a major power or a minor power. Some studies have found that sanctions will be more effective once imposed by a major power, since it will commit to its threat in case their interests are violated. Contrarily, a minor power would not easily send a signal of incentives to impose sanctions (Major, 2012; Tsebelis, 1990).

Although sanctions by a minor power will not have the same effect as it would have once imposed by a major power, sanctions imposed on a multilateral level are considered to be effective (Brooks, 2002; Lektzian and Regan, 2016). Lektzian and Regan (2016) have argued that unilateral sanctions do not have any effect, if not in combination with military intervention. Sanctions on a multilateral or unilateral level will influence the way the sender communicates its purpose of imposing sanctions towards the target, depending on this the target’s reaction (Escribà-Folch, 2012). While on a unilateral level the credibility is less, on a multilateral level the commitment is more secure and this needs to exist in order to create an effect (Baldwin, 2000; Lektzian and Regan, 2016). This credibility of the threat, which is determined by the sender, consequently, has a marked impact on the target. However, is the reaction from the target towards such threat of external demands not equally important in order to determine the effectiveness of sanctions? The way the literature demonstrates how sanctions can be effective makes it clear that it is important to take into account the way sanctions are imposed, thus, the impact of the sender is instrumental in determining the effectiveness of sanctions (e.g. Baldwin, 2000; Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Brooks, 2002;

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Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; Lektzian and Regan, 2016). This viewpoint brings to light a lack of academic scrutiny in studying the target’s impact on the effectiveness of sanctions, such as by examining the target’s ability to react, its regime, the implied costs and its economic and financial relationship with the sender (e.g. Allen, 2005; Brooks, 2002; Peksen, 2017; Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016).

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

When observing the target’s impact on the effectiveness, the way sanctions are perceived is seen as a key factor to determine such effect (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Escribà-Folch, 2012). The perception towards imposed sanctions is linked to the political costs brought on the target (Escribà-Folch, 2012). Since the impact of political costs is distinct on different regime types, the reaction to foreign pressure is not the same (Ibid). Studies suggest that the decision to confront foreign pressure and sanctions is contingent on a target regime’s ability to react, tempted to use repression or positive inducements to its coalition (Allen, 2005; Brooks, 2002; Peksen, 2017). Therefore, sanctions present a domestic political mechanism, since “sanctions impose economic pressure, invite opposition, thereby forcing a government to change its policies or risk replacement by a leadership more amenable to the demands of the sanction-imposing state (Brooks, 2002: 12). Furthermore, the reaction towards the imposed sanctions suggests two possible approaches: the target ceases or the sender relinquishes on the policy (Allen, 2005). This means that by maintaining or resisting sanctions, it provides political costs not only for the sender, but also for the target. These costs for the target are translated into the society judging the efficacy of foreign policy realized by its national leadership (Allen, 2005). Further, if the costs from the imposed sanctions are translated into policy change, this would contribute to the effectiveness of sanctions (Hart, 2000). It would seem logical that the target’s regime type will, therefore,

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influence the decision-making process towards the imposed sanctions. However, the difference between a democratic and an authoritarian regime is, as Allen (2005: 118) stated, “democratic publics have the ability to exact political costs on their leaders for failed or unpopular policy choices. In contrast, autocratic populations have fewer avenues of influence”.

The targeted regime’s response towards sanctions is not all in a uniform way, basing on its regime type (Allen, 2008; Hultman and Peksen, 2017). Democratic regimes hold competitive positions through elections and rely on public support and, therefore, they might opt for policy decisions that maintain their support (Allen, 2005). Contrarily, authoritarian regimes do not rely too much on public support. They are less accountable and experience less the fear to be removed from office (Ibid). Authoritarian regimes are not, as democratic regimes, constrained by institutional instruments, such as the checks and balance system and limit the power of the government’s branches (Peksen, 2017). Furthermore, in authoritarian regimes, the resources of the state are directly controlled by the leaders and, thus, their supporters are also protected from the burden of the imposed sanctions (Ibid). On these grounds, due to the low degree of political openness, mass political actions against the regime’s policy towards the imposed sanctions are limited in authoritarian regimes, lacking the opportunity to do such (Allen, 2008). Therefore, it seems that certain political costs on the target’s regime and political conditions define the effectiveness of sanctions. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The target’s authoritarian regime negatively influences the effectiveness of imposed sanctions.

Not only is a better understanding of domestic factors like regime type essential for the effectiveness, but also are international factors (Escribà-Folch, 2012). The costs that

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sanctions bring on the target are not only political but also economic and financial (Baldwin, 2000; Escribà-Folch, 2012; Peksen, 2017; Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). Regarding to economic and financial costs, it is argued that sanctions can affect the wealth of the target to the extent that its regime is forced to change its foreign policy behavior (Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). As a matter of fact, most sanctions lead to a disruption between the sender and the target with regard to financial and commercial flows (Brooks, 2002; Escribà-Folch, 2012; Peksen, 2017; Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). The impact on these international flows between the sender and the target are mainly influenced by the target’s major trading partners as they decide which side to take, support the sender and impose sanctions or support the target (McLean and Whang, 2010). The target’s lucrative market will make firms from the sender country more willing to abide from the sender’s purpose and continue with its economic flow (Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). However, in opting to impose sanctions, the target’s major trading partners play a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of sanctions due to their economic leverage over the target and its economy (Ibid). Hence, once there are greater trade flows, it would lead to a greater economic vulnerability felt by the target. Further, Drury (1998) has argued that sanctions will be more effective if, previously, there was a good economic relationship between the sender and the target. Sanctions are, thus, determined to be more effective once there is a closer trade linkage. Once this trade linkage relates to the target being economically dependent on the sender(s), it is deemed that the imposed sanctions will achieve its goals (Peksen, 2017).

Furthermore, as Galtung (1967) states, the target will be more vulnerable towards the imposed sanctions once its economy is contingent on one product and once this exportation of the product and importation of others depends on only one trade-partner. Such vulnerability will be converted by the target into complying or denying to the imposed sanctions. However, for sanctions to be effective, the sender needs to take into account that

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the target is able to opt for outside options to export its products to alternative markets and this is something that the sender should try to prevent (McLean and Whang, 2010; Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). Therefore, in case the target’s major trading partners demonstrate a credible commitment towards the sender and opt to impose the sanctions, the sender can reinforce its goal and influence the target’s perception and reaction (Lektzian and Regan, 2016). As a result, disturbing the economic flows with the target and its major trading partners assumes that the target will comply with the demands of the sender (McLean and Whang, 2010).

In other words, it seems that the economic relationship between the target and the sender(s), and the target’s economic dependency can help define the effectiveness of sanctions. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Economic dependency of the target positively influences the effectiveness of imposed sanctions.

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III: Methodology

RESEARCH DESIGN

The literature surrounding sanctions has offered a controversial idea concerning its effectiveness. The effectiveness of sanctions appears to be contingent on distinct factors, including the ability to change the target’s behavior. To alter the target’s behavior is seen, in many studies, as the main goal of the sender by imposing sanctions (Baldwin, 2000; Galtung, 1967; Pape, 1997). My thesis will measure the concept of effectiveness of sanctions through the lens of Hart (2000) focusing on the fact that goals of sanctions are diverse. Hence, the effectiveness of sanctions will be linked to the ability to change the target’s behavior and will be conceptualized as the “achievements of some or all of a sender state’s policy goals” (Hart, 2000: 268).

In order to obtain a deeper understanding of what might determine the effectiveness of sanctions, I relate it with regime type and economic dependency. To define regime type, I will use the database of Polity IV which provides a conceptual overview of different regime types in different periods of time (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2018). Bearing in mind that full democratic regimes receive a score of +10, full authoritarian regimes receive a score of -10. Authoritarian regimes are defined by a lack of institutionalized political competition and presenting a concern for political freedoms, applying this to the selected case which presents a score of -7 (Ibid). The other factor that is tested, economic dependency, will be defined by analyzing economic and financial flows between the sender and the target (Drury, 1998; McLean and Whang, 2010; Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). The target will be considered to be economic dependent once its economy depends on one product and having one trade-partner for the exportation of this product and importation of other products (Galtung, 1967).

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In this conceptualization and for the effectiveness of sanctions, a single, within-case study will be utilized. This is considered to be the best approach since it infers and tests explanations in how the independent causes the dependent variable (Van Evera, 1997). Moreover, a single-case study is considered a better option by taking into account the causal complexity in comparable case studies (Levy, 2008). In this line of research, “single-case studies can provide valuable contributions to science, but the connection between the empirical case and existing theories needs to be stronger than in the context of comparative, quantitative, or experimental research” (Toshkov, 2016: 285). Furthermore, as a within-case study, this qualitative research is not aimed to generalize the results regarding sanctions in this regime or other authoritarian regimes, but to offer contextualized insight into a phenomenon within one specific case.

CASE SELECTION: IRAN

The majority of former studies regarding the topic of this thesis are found to be on authoritarian regimes, being the number of targeted democratic regimes very small in contemporary politics (Brooks, 2002; Major, 2012; Peksen, 2017). The focus has been placed on long episodes such as Cuba, Iraq and North Korea (Major, 2012; Marinov, 2005; Peksen, 2017). As Marinov (2005) has mentioned “the amount of attention such episodes have commanded is unfortunate in the sense that it has thrown other cases out of focus” (575). Although Iran is intensively examined by scholars in the field of International Law and International Politics due to its nuclear program, this case is not often selected as a case study to examine the relationship between regime type, economic dependency and the effectiveness of sanctions.

In determining on which factors the effectiveness of sanctions depends, it is crucial to understand the reason of the imposed sanctions in this case: to attain a full and sustained halt

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of its nuclear activities, considered as a threat to international peace and security (Gootman, 2006). Partly to Iran being deemed to be one of the most sanctioned countries and its current international relevance, it further presents to have a substantive and scientific relevance (Chubin, 2010). First, imposing and receiving sanctions contains the possibility of obtaining political costs, governance and accountability issues and an impact on international relations. Second, the academic debate surrounding sanctions and its effectiveness is mostly focused on the sender’s position, by discussing issues such as the type of country imposing sanctions, the hegemony of the country or international organization, and the cooperation of the sender with third parties (Major, 2012). It is noticeable that less research has been done concerning the target’s position in the sanctions process. The emphasis on the target’s regime type is an even lesser research topic and, therefore, my thesis will try to fill this research gap and contribute to the literature surrounding the effectiveness of sanctions, including regime type.

OPERATIONALIZATION AND DATA COLLECTION

With the purpose of determining the effectiveness of sanctions, two hypotheses are established, related to the target’s authoritarian regime type and economic dependency. The authoritarian regime of Iran is expected to entail identical aspects to the causal relationship examined by former research, regarding regime type and economic dependency and the effectiveness of sanctions (Levy, 2008). Hence, this case selection will be based on a most-likely case since sanctions were imposed on this regime and former research indicated that an authoritarian regime and economic dependency would influence the effectiveness of sanctions.

To test the hypotheses of my thesis, I use content analysis through the observation of different documents. In addition to the use of the database of Polity IV to define authoritarian regime, secondary sources such as books and journal articles, both quantitative and

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qualitative research, are also used to construe economic dependency and relate it with the effectiveness of sanctions. Furthermore, without any sort of subjective political preferences, any kind of news articles regarding keywords of sanctions, Iran, and nuclear program will be used, such as Al Jazeera, CNN, Der Spiegel, New York Times, Reuters. These articles will be analyzed to obtain a general view and, for more evidence, international organization’s documents will be reviewed, such as policy papers, reports, and UNSC Resolutions.

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IV: Analysis

IRAN AND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM: CONTEXT AND INITIAL INCENTIVES

“We support the neighboring states of Pakistan, India, and Israel, which have already developed nuclear weapons, and which are also in violation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding their nuclear programs. Indeed, the United States is obsessed with Iran’s nuclear program – still many years away from producing an atomic bomb” (Zunes, 2010).

The obsession felt by the US and the International community regarding Iran’s nuclear program is explained by Iran’s firm points of view and plans. Noting Iran’s role in the region, its unpredictability is based on the idea that the country is either seeking to obtain a leading role in the Muslim world, or that Iran rejects the international system and laws entirely (Chubin, 2006). Iran, however, has justified its use of nuclear energy for peaceful uses.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy was encouraged by the US Atoms for Peace Program (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2019). In 1953, during the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the then President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, stated: “The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace” (Ibid). Eisenhower’s speech was the first step to deal with nuclear activities in the world and to make sure that the use of nuclear energy was solely used for peaceful purposes. This also turned out to be even more evident in Iran in the 1970s, by establishing as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Iran agreed to stop developing nuclear energy for nuclear weapons. In order to verify the compliance and the fulfillment of the obligation with the NPT, a safeguard system was created to prevent the non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This means that with

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signing the NPT, Iran is obligated to permit safeguards directed by the IAEA (Squassoni, 2006).

At first sight, the IAEA considered that Iran’s use of nuclear energy was for peaceful uses. Even though the Shah had ambitious plans in building 23 nuclear power reactors, this was not indirectly related to a nuclear weapons program since Iran was not searching for the necessary technologies (Al-Suwaidi, 2006; Squassoni, 2006). Any suspicion towards Iran’s nuclear plans and activities was abated due to the halt of nuclear activities after the Iranian revolution in 1979 and due to the end of the Iran-Iraq war. However, it was only in 2002 that suspicion could be warranted by finding that undeclared nuclear facilities were under construction (Squassoni, 2006). Even more shocking and alarming was that, in the absence of IAEA safeguards, Iran had been able to enrich uranium in undeclared facilities (Al-Suwaidi, 2006). Global concern has since then increased. Iran continued to justify its actions by affirming that domestic energy consumption is facilitated due to nuclear power, and that the country needed it to achieve foreign currency, through oil and gas (Squassoni, 2006). On the other hand, the international community remained suspicious since some do not believe that its nuclear activities are essential for its economy, as resources are directly controlled by the leaders (Allen, 2005; Squassoni, 2006),

In order to halt Iran’s hidden nuclear activities, diplomacy and negotiations were the first step taken. These negotiations were conducted on two levels: with IAEA inspectors and with the EU foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, known as the EU-3 negotiations (Squassoni, 2006). After months of resistance, Iran agreed in 2003 on stricter international inspections on its nuclear activity and, more importantly, also agreed on the suspension of the production of enriched uranium (Allen, 2005; Sciolino, 2003). Moreover, Iran did not indicate when it would start with the suspension.

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SANCTIONS ON IRAN: 2006-2010

Due to the uncertainty if Iran would actually comply to suspend its production, skepticism concerning Iran’s nuclear weapon aspirations started to be visible around the international community (Sciolino, 2003). This was intensified with the entrance of President Ahmadinejad in 2005 (Perkovich, 2006). Ahmadinejad clearly demonstrated his support for Iran’s nuclear program. In a speech at the UNGA, he argued that he believes it to be unfair that Iran is not allowed to make nuclear fuel while other nations are allowed, since it is the right of all under international law (CNN, 2005; Perkovich, 2006).

Iran’s reasoning was motivated by the domestic legitimation of its regime (Chubin, 2006). This is seen by its violation of the 2003 agreement and its withdrawal of its voluntary suspension, crossing the international red lines and raising distrust (Chubin, 2006; Perkovich, 2006; Squassoni, 2006). The authority and repression deposited by Iran resulted in the public having less avenues of influence in the decision-making process towards its nuclear activities (Allen, 2005). For this reason, Iran’s motivations and actions should be presented internationally and, within the rule-based international system, for the IAEA to report the case to the UN Security Council (UNSC).

Before imposing sanctions, the international community opted for diplomacy and decided to give Iran another chance in order to comply to the international demands in suspending its nuclear activities. Therefore, the first Resolution of the UNSC only consisted in illustrating the concern felt by the international community and sending a clear signal that they would impose sanctions, as seen in Table 1.

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Table 1: UNSC Resolution 1696 on Iran’s nuclear activities (UNSC, 2006).

Resolution Date UNSC measure

1696 June 31, 2006

Concern regarding the many reports of the IAEA Director General about the proliferation risks by the Iranian nuclear program. Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN. Demands that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.

As suggested by Lektzian and Regan (2016), after the use of diplomacy, the international community opted for sanctions in order to reinforce its goal in suspending Iran’s nuclear activities. However, two veto-wielding permanent members of the UN, Russia and China, ruled out sanctions once that was given as a foreign policy option (McMahon, 2006). Later, they refrained from using their veto and the Permanent Five Members of the UNSC (P5) agreed on imposing sanctions (De Pauw, 2010). Hence, to impose sanctions was not only a threat made by the West and Iran needed to realize that escaping to the East was not an option, since all of the world’s major powers were persuading Iran (Perkovich, 2006). In other words, as suggested by Lektzian and Regan (2016), the cooperation between different nations and major powers demonstrated the ability of signaling a credible commitment. This multilateral support was essential in order to decrease any enforcement problem of sanctions (McLean and Whang, 2010). However, it is argued that because of the initial shortage of the unified international pressure towards Iran, it bolstered decision-makers in Iran to cease the suspension (Perkovich, 2006).

In spite of the demands of the international community, Iran did not change its policy. As suggested, the reaction towards imposing sanctions could be that Iran would cease with its nuclear activities or that the senders would relinquish on the policy (Allen, 2005). However, the international community felt a greater responsibility to punish Iran, making it comply to

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projections, reaction and violation of international demands (Chubin, 2006). Through the lens of Iran’s authoritarian nature and avoidance in suspending its nuclear activities, the UNSC decided to opt to relinquish its policy and to impose sanctions, calling for Iran’s compliance with the requirements of the IAEA, as is summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Overview based on UNSC Resolutions and measurements regarding Iran’s nuclear program (UNSC, 2019).

Resolution Date UNSC measure

1737 December 23, 2006

Imposing sanctions against Iran. All States shall freeze funds, other financial assets and economic resources. Establishment of a new sanctions committee.

1747 March 24, 2007

Recalling on UNSC previous decision to impose sanctions. Banning Iranian arms exports, imposing a freeze on financial assets of 28 individuals and entities.

1803 March 3, 2008

Extension of sanctions. Constraining Iran’s development of sensitive technologies. Addition of 13 individuals and entities for a travel ban and asset freeze. Inspection of cargoes to and from Iran.

1835 September 27, 2008

Response to the September 15th 2008 report of IAEA. Reaffirming previous Resolutions that call for Iran’s commitment to the NPT and approving sanctions.

1929 June 9, 2010

Concerning about Iran’s lack of compliance with previous resolutions. Inspection of cargoes to and from Iran. Reinforcement of sanctions: restriction on arms, finance, shipping and other proliferation sensitive activities.

(INTERNATIONAL) POLITICS IN IRAN

The report published by the IAEA in September 2008 demonstrated that Iran was still involved in nuclear activities (Chubin, 2006). According to Iran, its nuclear program is an inalienable right under the NPT, not feeling any obligation on its regime to change the policy (Allen, 2005). For the international community, the emphasis is put on the security risks and on the possible advantages that acquiring nuclear weapons might bring. Iran’s purpose was

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seen as being justified by playing the nationalist card and this led to characterizing Iran’s relationship since the 2003-2005 period with the IAEA and the EU-3 as defensive (Chubin, 2006).

Iran’s defensive and assertive approach regarding its nuclear program was clear in its behavior towards the imposed sanctions. In an interview, Iran’s former Chief Nuclear Negotiator, Saeed Jalili, clearly demonstrated the confidence the country had in its nuclear program. This persistency in its ideals was also reflected by Iran’s reaction towards the imposed sanctions and possible further sanctions. Asked about sanctions, Jalili assuredly answered: “And do you really believe there are sanctions that can hit us that hard? They do not frighten us. Quite the opposite – we welcome new sanctions” (Bednarz and Follath, 2009). Welcoming new sanctions demonstrates the persistent approach Iran is taking even though it might affect the relationship between the sender and the target (McLean and Whang, 2010). As a matter of fact, Iran is not frightened of sanctions since it tries to use its resources carefully and achieve self-sufficiency (Chubin, 2006). Taking into account the possible economic disruption between the sender and target, the approach towards Iran will bring costs on the country, but also on the sender (Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016).

Hence, Iran’s behavior towards the international community intensifies the deep concerns about its nuclear plans and ambitions (Allen, 2008; Chubin, 2006; Hultman and Peksen, 2017). Whereas in certain regimes a domestic political mechanism would take place towards the imposed sanctions, this was not the case in Iran (Brooks, 2002). In fact, neither did the imposed sanctions create any pressure on Iran’s government, nor did it force the government to replace its leadership or change its policy. Aligned with Hultman and Peksen (2017), the targeted response towards sanctions is not uniform and this is observable in a letter directed to former President Bush. Here, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offered a perspective of the mentality of Iran towards its nuclear ambitions. In fact, Iran’s

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focus was placed on the rights of the country and on sovereignty equality. In other words, Iran’s position reflected its authoritarian nature, ignoring any kind of submission from the international community (Hauser, 2006; Peksen, 2017). As suggested by Brooks (2002), this is seen as one of the characteristics of an authoritarian regime, since a democratic regime would obey to the demands of the international community, with the fear of being removed from office if it would disobey.

Characteristics of an authoritarian regime are further seen in Iran since the “decision making for national security has been concentrated in a few hands, most notably where the nuclear program is concerned” (Chubin, 2006: 48). This idea is supported by Allen (2005) by considering Iran’s regime type, which does not rely too much on public support. In other words, the decision-making process with regard to Iran’s nuclear activities was under Iranian government’s watch. Moreover, when looking at national security concerning the public, polls consistently show evidence about the support by Iranians for its nuclear program, as seen in Figure 1 (Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015; Chubin, 2010). This figure illustrates the importance given to Iran in developing its nuclear program, which has been increasing since 2006. Otherwise stated, in the period 2006-2010, when sanctions were imposed, Iranians indicate to have expanded their support by finding it very important from 78% to 87%. However, this support is contingent on how the issue is framed. As indicated by Chubin (2006), if Iran’s nuclear program is framed in terms of rights and sovereign equality, Iranians clearly support it. Iranians public opinion also consists in linking the nuclear program to progressive technology, scientific progress and self-sufficiency (Ibid). Nonetheless, “the Iranian public has not judged whether a nuclear weapons option is desirable on its own merits but only on the proposition that Iran should be denied technology to which it is entitled” (Chubin, 2006: 31).

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Figure 1: Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program (Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015).

It stands to reason that Iranian’s opinion is contingent on the political and economic costs the nuclear program and the respective sanctions might bring on the country (Allen, 2005). Concerning possible political costs, several actors and institutions are involved in Iran’s nuclear policy (Perkovich, 2006). Even though President Ahmadinejad has shouted his way on to center-stage in determining Iran’s nuclear policy, he is not the only key decision-maker (Ibid). What is clear from Iran’s decision-making process is the way its nuclear policy is framed, considering public opinion to be a background factor in its respective debate (Green, Wehrey and Wolf, 2009). In fact, as argued by Allen (2008), Iranians showed to have fewer avenues of influence, since the decision-making process is only contingent on Iran’s government.

However, Iran’s regime has repeatedly stated that there exists a national consensus concerning its nuclear program but, in reality, there had not been an open debate (Chubin, 2010; Green, Wehrey and Wolf, 2009). According to Allen (2008) and Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2018), this exemplifies the low degree of political openness that characterizes Iran, and it demonstrates that Iranians barely influence their domestic and international policy. This is linked to the characterization of authoritarian regime regarding the repression used in

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Iran (Allen, 2005). Not only were the media and the coverage of Iran’s nuclear program controlled by the regime, but also were the alternative policies in the hands of its leaders (Green, Wehrey and Wolf, 2009). Simply put, Iran’s nuclear policy could not be referred as a national consensus but more as an elite consensus. Consequently, this elite consensus resulted in the society starting to judge its national and international policy. Moreover, in line with Allen (2008), due to the political influence of the Iranian’s government, the ability to exact political costs on Ahmadinejad and its regime were limited and this was also reflected in the limitation for mass political actions (Allen, 2005; Chubin, 2006).

Despite Iran’s control over its nuclear policy and debate, the public is certain about their domestic economic needs and that this should not be restricted by its nuclear program (Chubin, 2006). When examining domestic economic needs, the regime justifies its nuclear program by mentioning that nuclear power is crucial for domestic energy consumption (Galtung, 1967; Squassoni, 2006). As argued, “in trying to fathom the interplay among interest groups, politics, national security, religion, economic policy, and social policy, the general precept ‘to follow the money’ may be especially relevant in Iran compared with other states” (Green, Wehrey and Wolf, 2009: 15). Iran is strategically important since it contains not only a large amount of fossil fuels but also due to its geographic location. It exports approximately one-fifth of the global oil revenues (Chubin, 2006). Taking into account the importance of Iran in possessing oil and gas, it presents to have several good economic relationships by exporting such goods (Drury, 1998). Although oil and gas are main products being exported, neither is Iran economically dependent nor does Iran only have one trade-partner (Galtung, 1967). Therefore, in line with McLean and Whang (2010), it is up to Iran’s major trading partners to decide which side to opt for in the sanctions process. By supporting the sender and imposing sanctions, an impact on these exportations will be possible. However, the case of Iran does not support this idea, as seen in Figure 2. It is visible that

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during the sanctions period of 2006-2010, the amount of oil exported has been stable (US Energy Information Administration, 2019).

Furthermore, according to the Center of Strategic & International Studies (2014), the five major trading partners of Iran during 2008-2012 were: China (21.8%), EU (16.5%), Japan (9.2%), Turkey (9.0%) and India (8.3%). According to Peksen (2017), once the target is economically dependent on the sender, the imposed sanctions will be more effective. What is noticeable is that the opposite is seen, since the five major trading partners of Iran tend to be more dependent on Iran’s revenues than vice-versa, continuing to import oil (Center of Strategic & International Studies, 2014).

Figure 2: Iran’s Exports of Crude Oil Including Lease Condensate – Thousand Barrels Per Day (US Energy Information Administration, 2019).

In line with what is argued by McLean and Whang (2010), these five major trading partners played a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of the imposed sanctions on Iran. The impact of the imposed sanctions was not intensively notable on Iran’s wealth, therefore not forced to change its foreign policy behavior (Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016). Since the major trading partners did not restrict its economic flows with Iran, none of them had an impact on Iran’s susceptibility. Through the lens of Galtung (1967), Iran exemplifies the idea

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that depending on the vulnerability of the target, it will comply or deny. The lack of Iran being vulnerable towards the imposed sanctions made the country disobeying the international demands.

It was only in 2011, however, that due to new sanctions imposed by the EU and the US, Iran demonstrated to be vulnerable towards the imposed sanctions. Former UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, argued in a report to the UNGA that the imposed sanctions of 2006-2010 “have had significant effects on the general population, including an escalation in inflation, a rise in commodities and energy costs, an increase in the rate of unemployment and a shortage of necessary items, including medicine” (Nichols and Charbonneau, 2012). More importantly, the imposed sanctions were expected to hurt the government but showed the opposite.

The goal of the imposed sanctions was, therefore, not fulfilled. It is clear that Iran’s regime type had a negative effect on the effectiveness of sanctions and that an influence on economic relationships and economic dependency could not be supported in the period of 2006-2010. Iran’s persistence towards its nuclear activities brings suspicion and, therefore, the international community is still trying to solve this threat for international peace and security, condemning Iran for its violation of international norms (Chubin, 2006; Squassoni, 2006).

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V: Conclusion

DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH

On the effectiveness of sanctions, the existing literature appears to be focused on the relationship between the imposed sanctions and the sender(s) (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). Few studies, however, examine the target’s role in determining the effectiveness of sanctions (e.g. Brooks, 2002; Escribà-Folch, 2012; Peksen, 2017). There has been no systematic research concentrated on examining the relationship between the effectiveness of sanctions, the target’s regime type and economic dependency under the imposed sanctions. My research filled that gap through a single-case study of Iran, in which these themes played a central role, by examining the research question: “Why is the enforcement of sanctions less effective in authoritarian regimes, such as Iran?”.

My thesis established the effectiveness of sanctions as stated by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990: 10): “sanctions are part and parcel of international diplomacy, a tool for coercing target governments into particular avenues of response”. Thus, sanctions are determined effective if the target is directed or moved towards a desirable response, achieving the sender’s main goal (Hart, 2000). In other words, if the sender is able to change the target’s behavior through sanctions, in this case, the adherence of Iran to international nonproliferation, then this would be characterized as effective.

Although the sanctions during the time period of 2006-2010 might have imposed some pressure on Iran, the theoretical framework establishes through solid empirical evidence, that the sanctions were in fact not effective (Maloney, 2010). As suggested by Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2018), Iran can be classified as an authoritarian regime due to its lack of concern for political freedoms. In an interview with Iran’s former Chief Nuclear Negotiator, Saeed Jalili, he bluntly stated that Iran’s prisons are filled with opposition

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supporters of its regime and policies (Bednarz and Follath, 2009). Since opposing to Iran’s policy would lead to these kinds of repressive measures, Iran’s nuclear policy cannot pretend to have a national consensus, but more so an elite consensus (Allen, 2008; Green, Wehrey and Wolf, 2009). Due to Iran’s authoritarian nature, the imposed sanctions did not pressure its regime in changing policies. In fact, Iran welcomed sanctions since it believed that imposing sanctions would harm the sender more (Bednarz and Follath, 2009). Despite the pressure, Iran was able to react in this way mostly because of the lack of institutionalized political competition (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2018). Being that Iran’s nuclear policy was referred to as an elite consensus by not involving the public, the government was able to continue with its policies because it did not fear removal (Peksen, 2017). With the express goal of sanctions being to end Iran’s nuclear program, its continuation further underscored a lack of effectiveness of the imposed sanctions, confirming the first hypothesis: The target’s authoritarian regime negatively influences the effectiveness of imposed sanctions.

Not only did the political costs, but also the economic costs determine the effectiveness of the imposed sanctions. As predicted by Iran, the imposed sanctions hurt the sender more than actually the target (Bednarz and Follath, 2009). Due to Iran’s continuation of exporting oil to the senders, the senders were demonstrated to actually be more economically dependent on the target than vice-versa (US Energy Information Administration, 2019). The fact that sanctions hurt the sender explains why Iran welcomed new sanctions, as their oil reserves provided them with enough income to establish self-sufficiency (Bednarz and Follath, 2009). In fact, imposing sanctions on Iran did not even effect its regional influence and global role as intended. By leveraging prior economic relationships with major trading partners, Iran was able to undermined the effectiveness of the imposed sanctions, because they were not hurt economically (Drury, 1998). Taking into account Iran’s and the senders’ economic dependency, the second hypothesis: economic

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dependency of the target positively influences the effectiveness of imposed sanctions, can be rejected.

During the period of 2006-2010, sanctions on Iran proved to be ineffective changing the policies in the regime, however, the later period of 2011-2012 proved to be a different story altogether. Although the imposed sanctions by the EU and US during 2011-2012 did also not achieve its goal in making Iran halt its nuclear activities, it did create a bigger impact on its regime. When looking to the sanctions of 2006-2010, the public was mostly affected rather than the regime (Nichols and Charbonneau, 2012). The case of Iran exemplifies the idea that “sanctions to be effective should target either the central government or the core groups whose support is essential for the regime to remain in power” (Escribà-Folch, 2012: 688).

In examining the target’s role, further ideas need to be related with it in order to determine the effectiveness of sanctions. For instance, the different imposed sanctions during 2006-2010 and in 2011-2012 have expanded the idea that different types of sanctions have an unequal effect on distinct regime types (Brooks, 2002). Moreover, the fact that the sender was different in both sanctions’ episodes might have had an influence on its effectiveness (Lektzian and Regan, 2016; Major, 2012). Despite the focus of my research being placed on the target, the sender’s position is similarly important to determine the effectiveness of sanctions. Although my research was limited in including all types of factors, further research should emphasize external factors such as different sanctions and different senders to analyze its internal effect on different regime types. This will provide a more comprehensive overview surrounding the effectiveness of sanctions.

My research, through the complex case of Iran between the years 2006-2010, shows a tangible example of how theory meets reality. The lessons learned from this particular sanctions episode on Iran provide essential insight into the applicability and effectiveness of

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sanctions. Iran is held accountable for the ineffectiveness of the imposed sanctions due to its ability to mitigate and avoid international demands, and due to its exposed resistance to economic pressure (Maloney, 2010). The findings in this case related to regime type and economic dependency offer a fuller picture of the key components in the enforcement of sanctions, establishing that these factors can influence effectiveness dramatically. Not only did examining these factors provide insight, but it also put emphasis on the target’s role in the sanctions process. Furthermore, the case of Iran has proven to be a masterclass in the intricacies and study of sanctions, in that it further establishes the link between the lack of accountability in authoritarian regimes and the ineffectiveness of sanctions, but showed the holes in some prevailing theory related to economic dependency. Therefore, my research demonstrated that, in order to approach sanctions in a holistic and comprehensive way, and to determine their effectiveness, policy-makers must be required to examine both sides of the sanctions process, the sender and the target.

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The relationship between regime type, economic dependency and the effectiveness of sanctions: A case study of Iran