Democratic legitimacy in metropolitan governance: Researching the Dutch context

Graduation Thesis

Democratic legitimacy in

metropolitan governance:

Researching the Dutch context

Author:

J.F. van Ettinger

s1316745

Supervisors:

Dr. J. Schalk

Dr. R. de Ruiter

Democratic legitimacy in metropolitan governance: Researching the Dutch context

by J.F. van Ettinger

This graduation thesis has researched the perception of municipal councillors on the demo-cratic legitimacy in a Dutch new regionalist governance arrangement: the Metropoolregion Rotterdam-Den Haag (MRDH). The field of democratic legitimacy in new regionalism has fairly recently been of interest to the field of public administration, fueled by the emergence of new organisations that operate in this context. Two perspectives on the democratic legit-imacy of new regionalist governance arrangements exists: the optimistic and the pessimistic perspective. The optimistic perspective holds that new regionalism represents an opportu-nity for the democratic legitimacy of representative institutions. The pessimistic is based on an intrinsic tension between the authenticity and effectiveness of state actions. New re-gionalism sacrifices input legitimacy in favour of output legitimacy, and as such, represents a threat for representative institutions. As the optimistic perspective has little to offer for municipal councillors, the pessimistic perspective is adopted in

The MRDH is a very recent and voluntary new regionalist governance arrangement, as it is active since early 2015. The MRDH encompasses 23 municipalities in the province of Zuid-Holland, and works on two policy issues: public transportation and economic development. It is characterised by a strong representation of both aldermen and municipal councillors. Municipal councillors take part in ‘advice committees’, in which they can advice the alder-men on policy issues. Municipal councillors can influence metropolitan policy through a municipal opinion procedure in their home municipal council.

The research aim of this thesis is exploratory in nature, with a focus on two specific elements of democratic legitimacy: accountability and responsiveness. The situation both before and after the introduction of the MRDH is used to analyse the effects on the democratic legiti-macy in metropolitan governance. Four hypotheses are used to check if municipal councillors feel responsible for the aggregate policy outcome in metropolitan governance, if an increased feeling of technocratic policy decisions had an impact on the perceived influence of municipal councillors in metropolitan governance has changed since the introduction of the MRDH, if there are any difference between perceptions of municipal councillors in core and fringe municipalities, and which effects the introduction of the MRDH has on the perception of municipal councillors regarding responsiveness in metropolitan governance. Qualitative re-search, through ten semi-structured interviews with municipal councillors, is used to answer the research question and find evidence for the hypotheses. Limitations and methodological restraints are also presented.

This thesis finds no evidence for a relationship between the introduction of a new regionalist governance arrangement and a changed perception of municipal councillors regarding their perceived responsibility for the aggregate policy outcome. The introduction of the MRDH has shaken up the current status quo and significant changes have been recorded, but overall,

a municipal council, others adopted the role of representative of the people. Municipal councillors can be found on both ends of the spectrum and everywhere in between.

Municipal councillors perceive less influence in metropolitan governance since the introduc-tion of the MRDH. The average grade given by municipal councillors has dropped from a 6,35 to a 5,2. Municipal councillors agree that policy decisions at the MRDH are very tech-nocratic in nature, but they do not relate this to a decrease of influence. Instead, especially the upscaling of metropolitan governance from two metropolitan areas to a single area, is-sues in the democratic process of the MRDH and less policy isis-sues debated in metropolitan governance have reduced the perception of municipal councillors regarding their influence. Municipal councillors in core municipalities were theorised to experience a more pronounced drop in perceived influence compared to their counterparts in fringe municipalities. How-ever, an inverse effect has become visible: councillors from the smallest fringe municipalities perceive a more pronounced drop in perceived influence. Stronger informal ties with key decision-makers and more organisational capacity were identified as reasons for this percep-tion.

Responsiveness of municipal councillors in metropolitan governance was found to be low both before and after the introduction of the MRDH, for both core and fringe municipalities. Especially the distance between metropolitan governance and the citizen and the tangibility of policy issues were identified as causing this divide between political reality and citizen awareness.

As such, evidence has been found supporting the pessimistic perspective. Especially the perceived drop of influence of municipal councillors corresponds well to the established theory that new regionalism reduces the democratic legitimacy of representative institutions. The responsiveness of municipal councillors can be deemed problematic, as an impasse between the citizen and municipal councillor regarding metropolitan governance appears to exist: on the one hand: attention for metropolitan governance appears to be lacking. On the other hand, municipal councillors are not very proactive in engaging citizens about metropolitan governance. In the final chapter, policy advice regarding this situation, is presented.

Leiden, June 7th 2016

It is odd writing a preface for a thesis after months of work: it signals that now, finally, truly, almost, your work is done. After two false starts writing this thesis, I am very happy to conclude that the third time is indeed the charm. Before getting into the specifics of this research project, I want to take some time to thank a few people.

First of all, my thanks to the staff at the university: In particular Mr Schalk and Mr de Ruiter. I also want to thank all ten respondents for their time and candor when discussing their perception of metropolitan governance with me. Special thanks to Mr van Nieuwen-huizen and Mr de Vries, who have been vital in shaping the premise of this thesis. Also thanks to the people at Coolblue and D66 Vlaardingen who have supported me while writing this thesis.

Evidently, there is no way to way to end this preface without thanks to my biggest supporters: Leo and Pita, and Ellen. Your support has been extremely important to me and it is very likely that without your support, it would have been a lot harder to finish this thesis. I emerge from writing this thesis with more appreciation for everything you have done for me. Never forget that we did this together, this success is as much yours as it is mine.

Thank you.

AB - Algemeen Bestuur - General Board. AC - Adviescommissie - Advice Committee. BC - Bestuurscommissie - Governing Committee.

BDU - Brede Doeluitkering - Financial contribution from central government to provinces or municipalities.

DB - Dagelijks Bestuur - Daily Board.

EV - Economisch Vestigingsklimaat - Economic Development.

MRA - Metropoolregio Amsterdam - Metropolitan region of Amsterdam.

MRDH - Metropoolregio Rotterdam-Den Haag - Metropolitan region of Rotterdam and The Hague.

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

OLR - Openbaar Lichaam Rijnmond - Public Governmental Body Rijnmond. Plusregio - Plus Region, metropolitan region under the WGR paradigm.

Stadsgeweest Haaglanden - Plusregio and predecessor of the MRDH, specifically for The Hague and its fringe municipalities.

Stadsregio Rotterdam - Plusregio and predecessor of the MRDH, specifically for Rotter-dam and its fringe municipalities.

VA - Vervoersauthoriteit - Public Transport authority.

WGR - Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regeling - Law concerning intermunicipal relationships.

Abstract ii

Preface iv

Abbreviations v

List of Tables ix

1 Introduction 1

1.1 The background of this research project. . . 1

1.2 Research aims and research question . . . 3

1.3 Theoretical and practical relevance . . . 3

1.4 Reader‘s Guide . . . 4

2 Theoretical Framework 5 2.1 Introduction . . . 5

2.2 The concept of democracy . . . 5

2.3 The concept of democratic legitimacy . . . 7

2.3.1 Theoretical and normative basis of democratic legitimacy . . . 8

2.3.2 Input, throughput and output legitimacy . . . 8

2.3.3 Other definitions of democratic legitimacy . . . 10

2.4 Democratic legitimacy in new regionalism . . . 11

2.4.1 The pessimistic perspective . . . 12

2.4.2 The optimistic perspective . . . 13

2.4.3 The two perspectives: Empirical evidence. . . 14

2.5 Expectations for this research project . . . 15

2.5.1 Accountability. . . 15

2.5.2 Responsiveness . . . 16

2.6 Summary . . . 16

3 Case Description 18 3.1 Introduction . . . 18

3.2 The situation before the introduction of the MRDH . . . 18

3.3 The MRDH: An introduction . . . 19 vi

3.4 Organisational structure of the MRDH . . . 20

3.4.1 Daily Board . . . 21

3.4.2 General Board. . . 22

3.4.3 Governing Committees . . . 23

3.4.3.1 Governing Committee Public Transportation . . . 23

3.4.3.2 Governing Committee Economic Development . . . 23

3.4.4 Advice Committees . . . 24

3.5 Democratic legitimacy of the MRDH . . . 24

3.6 Summary . . . 25

4 Research Design 27 4.1 Introduction . . . 27

4.2 Methodology . . . 27

4.2.1 Research strategy . . . 27

4.2.2 Units of analysis & observation . . . 28

4.3 Single case study and case selection . . . 28

4.4 Data collection . . . 29 4.4.1 Semi-structured interviews . . . 30 4.4.2 Selected respondents . . . 30 4.5 Operationalisation of variables . . . 32 4.5.1 Coding . . . 32 4.5.2 Accountability. . . 32 4.5.3 Responsiveness . . . 33 4.6 Limitations . . . 34 4.7 Methodological restraints . . . 35 4.7.1 Construct validity . . . 35 4.7.2 External validity . . . 35 4.7.3 Reliability . . . 36 4.8 Summary . . . 36

5 Results & Analysis 37 5.1 Introduction . . . 37

5.2 Results H1 - Perception of policy making at the MRDH level . . . 38

5.3 Results H2 - Perceived influence of municipal councillors . . . 41

5.4 Results H3 - Loss of control in core and fringe municipalities . . . 44

5.5 Results H4 - Responsiveness of municipal councillors . . . 46

5.6 Summary . . . 51 6 Conclusions 52 6.1 Introduction . . . 52 6.2 Conclusions . . . 53 6.3 Further Research . . . 57 6.4 Summary . . . 59 7 Policy Advice 60

7.1 Introduction . . . 60

7.2 Democratic legitimacy versus effectiveness . . . 60

7.3 Elections . . . 61

7.4 Enhancing democratic legitimacy . . . 61

7.5 Summary . . . 62

Bibliography 62

A Interview Questions 67

B Interview Van Nieuwenhuizen 69

C Interview Plomp 73 D Interview Verheij 78 E Interview Swart 84 F Interview Oosterman 89 G Interview Schotel 94 H Interview Don 99 I Interview Jense 104 J Interview Rogier 109 K Interview Guernaoui 114

3.1 Details of connected municipalities [39]. . . 22

4.1 Overview of Respondents . . . 31

5.1 Overview Results Hypotheses . . . 37

Introduction

Metropolitan governance in the Netherlands has adopted a new dimension in January 2015, when all forms of mandatory municipal co-operation were abolished in favour of voluntary arrangements. The establishment of the Metropoolregio Rotterdam-Den Haag (abbreviated as MRDH) poses new and interesting questions regarding the democratic legitimacy of insti-tutions never seen before in the Dutch field of public administration. This thesis attempts to establish the perceptions on democratic legitimacy and role of municipal councillors within this changed context. As paragons of democracy at work at the local level and as a strategic beacon for policies, municipal councillors are perceived to lend legitimacy to the institutions they oversee and ensure the democratic workings of government. The institutional design of the MRDH may not offer them enough space to exercise this role, and as such their role within the MRDH and perception of its democratic legitimacy is examined. In Section 1.1, the subject of this thesis will be introduced. Next, Section1.2 will provide the research aim and research question of this thesis. Section 1.3 will provide the theoretical and practical relevance of this thesis. This first chapter will conclude with a reader‘s guide in Section1.4.

1.1

The background of this research project

An ongoing debate in the field of metropolitan governance has been present since the early twentieth century. Two different schools of thought have been at odds with each other, attempting to solve the question of which school has the most to offer for metropolitan gov-ernance. The two sides of this debate can be conceptually divided as consolidation versus fragmentation: one big metropolitan government versus many different and smaller munic-ipalities. The first side, which dates from the early twentieth century and has been called the metropolitan reform tradition, attempts to create one government for a metropolitan area. It proposes to do so through creating one big government for a single economic and social metropolis. This goal is achieved, according to the metropolitan reform tradition, through the annexation of smaller municipalities by one bigger municipal core, or through the outright creation of a metropolitan government. Polar opposite from the metropolitan reform tradition is the public choice school, present in the literature since the 1950s. Instead of consolidation, the public choice school argues that fragmentation of the metropolis is the way to ensure a more efficient and effective service delivery. Municipalities are in competi-tion with each other as they attempt to provide the best cost-to-service delivery possible.

Municipalities that do well are rewarded by citizens moving to those municipalities and vice versa, also known as the concept of ‘voting with ones feet’ [30]. However, no conclusive evidence for either side of this debate has been presented, effectively rendering the outcome of this debate undecided [25].

If these two schools of thought make up the first two waves of metropolitan governance, the third (and so far, final) wave of metropolitan governance has been conceptualised as new regionalism. It has, to some extent, broken the deadlock of the debate, by reconcep-tualising how scholars look at metropolitan governance. New regionalism has been a staple in metropolitan governance literature since the 1990‘s and is more focused on providing functional policy results, irrespective of how these policy results are reached [48]. New regionalism is closely related to the shift from government to governance: instead of a rela-tively static and hierarchical organisation to a more network oriented organisation [30]. As a result, new regionalism is characterized by the inclusion of many new actors, from within the state (agencies at various levels), but also non-state (private organisations and other forms of non-governmental organisations) [48].

With regards to its democratic legitimacy, new regionalism has caused a divide among scholars. Especially accountability as a source of democratic legitimacy has been disputed in new regionalist governance arrangements [30]. It becomes increasingly problematic for citizens to identify the decision-makers and their decisions because of the inclusion of many new actors and their networks, both state and non-state [40]. Two different perspectives on the democratic legitimacy in new regionalist governance arrangements have been developed: an optimistic and a pessimistic perspective. While the optimistic perspective regards new regionalism as a way to strengthen the democratic legitimacy mainly through the inclusion of civil society actors, the pessimistic perspective perceives new regionalism as a threat for the democratic legitimacy of representative institutions [32]. In other words: the pessimistic perspective believes that the role of municipal councillors as representatives of the people is diminishing or reduced, which is seen as problematic for the way democratic legitimacy is structured in a representative democracy.

To examine the democratic legitimacy for new regionalist governance arrangements in the Netherlands, the abolition of the Plusregio provides an excellent starting position. These Plusregio‘s have been part of the Dutch government system since the late 1980‘s, acting as a fourth layer of government in the process. In order to establish more democratic legitimacy for intermunicipal co-operation, this fourth layer has recently been abolished. Instead, in-termunicipal co-operation is no longer mandatory. As a result, five of the pre-existing seven metropolitan governments have disappeared, with two cases of metropolitan governance re-maining: the Metropoolregio Amsterdam (MRA) and the Metropoolregio Rotterdam-Den Haag (MRDH). Of these two, the MRDH is the most ambitious, more distinct and has more responsibilities. Contrary to the MRA, the MRDH is centered around two core municipal-ities and includes 21 smaller municipalmunicipal-ities. These 23 municipalmunicipal-ities cannot be regarded as a single functional social or economic metropolis, as co-operation between Rotterdam and The Hague is far from traditional. When contrasted with the MRA, the MRDH is not only responsible for the public transportation policy field, but also the economic development of the region. The MRDH is characterized by strong mayoral support, but the organisation has not yet been noticed, much less embraced by the citizenry. These features have been hailed as ‘promising assets with which the MRDH has debuted in the Dutch institutional

arena’ [38]. Furthermore, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (abbreviated as the OECD) does not regard the democratic legitimacy of the MRDH as a direct concern. According to the OECD, oversight of municipal councillors has been incor-porated in the institutional design and is regarded the same as delegating responsibilities to any other governmental agency under indirect control. However, at face value, some issues can be raised with regard to the democratic legitimacy of the MRDH. Municipal councillors perceive their influence in metropolitan governance as reduced. Direct democracy as op-posed to traditional representative democracy is regarded as the future of policy-making in metropolitan areas [42]. If the MRDH relies on these traditional forms of the representative democracy, could its democratic legitimacy be flawed?

1.2

Research aims and research question

This thesis aims to provide an insight in the perception of the democratic legitimacy of mu-nicipal councillors within Dutch metropolitan governance. As such, the formulated research question is as follows: To what extent do new regionalist governance arrangements in the Netherlands lead to a perceived loss of democratic legitimacy by municipal councillors?

1.3

Theoretical and practical relevance

As has been mentioned, the literature on democratic legitimacy in new regionalist gover-nance arrangements has conceptually focused on two different perspectives: the optimistic and the pessimistic perspective [32]. While the optimistic perspective focuses on the bene-ficial features of new regionalism for the democratic legitimacy, the pessimistic perspective argues that new regionalism is a threat for the democratic legitimacy of institutions. Schol-arly research has been done with the aim to find support for either the optimistic or the pessimistic perspective, but so far, no conclusive evidence for either side of the argument has been presented. This thesis will feature a few dimensions previously not conducted: this thesis focuses on a different country, it has a metropolitan governance arrangement which has some different characteristics compared to those in other countries, it has been introduced as recently as early 2015, and it will focus on the role of municipal councillors as representatives of the democracy. Metropolitan governance and new regionalism have been the subject of various research projects in different European countries [30] [42], but so far, not much of this has spilled over to the Netherlands. Some research has been done on metropolitan governance in the Netherlands [49] [24], but the subject has not yet been covered extensively. The literature often lacks the component of democratic legitimacy as well, focusing on different parts of metropolitan governance in the Netherlands, such as its history [49] or the political barriers of spatial reorganisation [24]. The role of municipal coun-cillors in this respect has been largely ignored. As such, a first gap in the knowledge about this subject can be identified. Despite little attention for the subject of new regionalism in the Netherlands in the literature, far reaching reforms within the governmental structure have abolished a previous layer of metropolitan government (the Plusregio), as recently as early 2015. All intermunicipal co-operation is now voluntary instead of mandatory. This runs counter to developments in other nations, where metropolitan governance is designed by central governments [38]. In five Dutch metropolitan areas, metropolitan governance is now defunct, two other areas have established their own organisation. This big shift has occurred very recently, which allows further research on the democratic legitimacy of the

MRDH, as it works to either validate or invalidate previous research done on metropolitan governance in the Netherlands. The case of the MRDH may thus provide the field with new insights on new regionalism. Previous research shows a hesitant citizenry when it comes to the expansion of metropolitan governance in the Netherlands [24]. As representatives of the people, municipal councillors must translate these demands or this support to parliamentary arenas. As has been mentioned, the form of metropolitan governance in the Netherlands has drastically changed. New regionalism hints at a sacrifice of democratic legitimacy on the input side, while strengthening its legitimacy on the output side. In short: new regionalism is about finding solutions for problems and is supposed to not care much about how these decisions are reached [31]. The role of the municipal councillors has thus changed in this respect: the councillor has delegated authority to the new metropolitan organization and has backed the organisation financially. This thesis attempts to pinpoint the role of the municipal councillor in this new context and provide insight on the perspectives on demo-cratic legitimacy. As the optimistic perspective has little to offer in regards to municipal councillors, this thesis will attempt to find evidence to back the pessimistic perspective.

1.4

Reader‘s Guide

In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework and literature analysis on the topic of democracy and democratic legitimacy in metropolitan governance is provided. The case description of the MRDH is provided in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the research design of this thesis can be found. The results and analysis of the research done can be found in Chapter 5. The conclusions are provided in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, policy advice regarding democratic legitimacy in new regionalist governance arrangements can be found. Finally, the interview questions and summaries of the interviews conducted can be found in the Appendices.

Theoretical Framework

2.1

Introduction

In this chapter, the existing literature on democracy and democratic legitimacy is reviewed. The chapter will start out with a short exploration of the different elements of the concept democracy. Afterwards, the concept of democratic legitimacy is introduced with a brief summary of work done by Weber before defining three different modes of legitimacy: input, throughput and output legitimacy [51] [52]. Complementary views of these three modes of legitimacy are provided before looking at the democratic legitimacy in new regionalism governance arrangements. Scholarly research on democratic legitimacy in new regionalism has focused in particular on the shift from government to governance [30]. As this paradigm of governance has shifted in recent years, so has the question of democratic legitimacy. It becomes clear that research done on democratic legitimacy has often focused on output legitimacy, but in recent decades significant research projects regarding input and output legitimacy has taken place. This debate has focused on two opposing perspectives: an optimistic and a pessimistic perspective on democratic legitimacy in new regionalism gover-nance. This theoretical framework will conclude with a discussion on the empirical research done regarding these two perspectives and will provide four hypotheses going forward.

2.2

The concept of democracy

The concept of democratic legitimacy hinges on two separate concepts: democracy and legitimacy. Even though a thorough exploration of the concept of democracy is outside the scope of this thesis, a brief analysis of the different elements of democracy is given. The concept of democracy has been defined differently by a great number of scholars, but their concentrated efforts have not yet yielded one universally agreed upon definition [21]. In Section2.2, the most notable elements which are present in the literature on democracy are discussed.

The word democracy is derived from ancient Greek. Demos is the Greek word for people, krateo can be translated as ruling. As such, the word itself means the rule of the people. Most generally accepted elements of the concept democracy have their roots in the three principles

of the French revolution: equality, liberty, and brotherhood (nowadays often understood as a sense of communality - belonging to a community of sorts) [53].

In the 20th century, the topic of democracy within public administration was pushed to the forefront of the field in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s. Notable work done on democratic theory was done by Robert Dahl [10] [11]. According to Dahl [10], democracy has five distinct elements: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusiveness. Effective participation is about citizens having equal opportunities to participate in the political domain. Voting equality concerns the weighting of individual votes in elections: each vote should be worth the same. Citizens, through enlightened understanding, should have equal opportunities to find out which choice would best serve their interests. Control of the agenda is about the people having the opportunity to decide which policy matters should be up for deliberation. Finally, inclusiveness is about equality for the entire populace. Every citizen has a stake in political matters and as such, the political process should inclusive towards all its citizens. Furthermore, Dahl [10] argues that no state has yet fully achieved all five principles of democracy, which he describes as a theoretical utopia. The most advanced states can therefore be described as polyarchies: a form of government where power is divided between multiple actors. As such, it is not a dictatorship, but also not a true democracy. The more care is given to the aforementioned five principles, the higher the state is placed upon the polyarchy-scale.

Coleman and Porter [9] have devised a scale with six elements of democracy: transparency, openness to direct participation, quality of discourse, representation, effectiveness, and fair-ness. If interested observers can inform themselves fully on matters of interest, transparency is achieved. If concerned parties have equal access to processes of deliberation or decision-making, openness to direct participation has been achieved. Quality of discourse is about the communicative structure of the public debate. Debates should not be technical in na-ture, but should also include other elements, such as ethical reflection or the bargaining process. Representation is the formal mechanism to align the interests of citizens within a small group of actors. Effectiveness in this model is described as the institutional capacity needed to develop and implement policies. Autonomous funding and hiring of personnel are key indicators of effectiveness. Fairness concerns the shared principles of justice, on which a set of rules can be based. Fairness can then be useful to resolve possible disputes.

The third principle, quality of discourse, has been open to debate. Nanz and Steffek [36] have remarked that quality of discourse has four distinct features in itself, namely access to deliberation, transparency and access to information, responsiveness, and inclusiveness. It becomes apparent that a significant overlap exists between the remaining five elements of Coleman and Porter [9] and the four elements of Nanz and Steffek [36]. The latter two also distinguish between two modes of responsiveness, ex post and ex ante. Ex post respon-siveness concerns taking into account the wishes of the people regarding policy-making. Ex ante responsiveness is more about the participation of citizens: citizen proposals have to be on the agenda and have to be taken into account regarding the decision-making process. Nanz and Steffek [36] argue that ex ante responsiveness is thus more important than ex post responsiveness.

Olsen and March [34] have conceptualised the three elements of equality, liberty and com-munality into two different strands of democracy: the aggregative and integrative strands.

Theorists of the aggregative strand regard democracy as a means to regulate conflicts be-tween different individuals. This is done not only by voting, but also by a balancing of powers, such as checks and balances, or the trias politica. The aggregative strand defines equality as the equal formal access to political channels of influence for citizens, most effec-tively ensured through mass elections, including the ‘one man, one vote’ principle. Every voter thus has the same influence on the selection of political leaders. Liberty is defined as a negative concept: no collectively defined limitations on individual actions. This can be en-sured in two ways: through rules that protect minorities or through the existence of a sharp borderline between a large sphere of individual rule and a smaller sphere of collective rule. Finally, communality is defined formally as the legal citizens of a state. The community voice is produced through the democratic institutions that produce a majority voice. The integrative strand looks at democracy a bit differently: democracy is not defined as just a set of institutions that enhance collective decision-making, but by a shared political identity. In this sense, equality is more broadly defined as the actual influence citizens have in the decision-making process. In this case, just having the access to the same channels is not enough. Liberty is more positively defined: it focuses on the ability of citizens to achieve their dreams and ambitions. Collective decision making can enhance the ability of the citi-zen to achieve his or her dreams. Coercion in one aspect of life may (greatly) improve the liberty in another. Collective decision-making however, does not necessarily have to result in coercion. The decision might be created through reasoned debate. Communality is not a legally defined unity, but is seen foremost as a collective political identity. This identity is coloured by a set of rules, norms, and logics of appropriate behaviour. If there is no shared political identity, then there is no political community. As such, the creation of a nation-state or within the context of this thesis, a metropolitan government arrangement, does not directly create a shared political identity.

In this chapter many different definitions and elements of democracy have been provided. These different models show overlap between definitions and elements. Based on the litera-ture, democracy appears to include several components rooted in the principles of equality, liberty and brotherhood.

2.3

The concept of democratic legitimacy

Democracy has a few key elements which are present in most notable definitions of the concept democratic legitimacy. This section will link these elements to the question of legit-imacy. In recent years, democratic legitimacy has become an increasingly important subject of public administration research, fueled by research done on the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The literature on this subject is well suited for this theoretical framework, as the un-derlying principles of democratic legitimacy remain the same, irrespective of the institutions researched. This section will begin with the theoretical and normative basis of democratic legitimacy, found in work done by Max Weber [59] and David Beetham [4]. The elements of input, throughput and output legitimacy are introduced, as well as other, compatible explanations of democratic legitimacy.

2.3.1

Theoretical and normative basis of democratic legitimacy

The question of legitimate rule can be traced back to the three ideal types of legitimisation by Max Weber [59]. Weber broadly described three different kinds of legitimate authority: charismatic authority, which is based on the characteristics of the ruler. It concerns the right to rule because the leader has unique qualities (such as magical powers or heroism), not because of any tradition or legal basis. The second type of authority is traditional authority. This type describes a system which is deemed as legitimate because it has always been present and has always been regarded as legitimate, such as a monarchy. Finally, rational-legal authority is a system of rules which has its basis in law. Administrators are either appointed or elected based on legal procedures, with limited power. As such, rule is legitimate when these criteria have been met. This corresponds well with our current understanding of society. More narrow definitions of democratic legitimacy are available and have a firm basis in public administration literature. David Beetham [4] argues that the three types of authority described by Weber correspond well with different types of beliefs that form three different components of democratic legitimacy. As such, Beetham defines three different elements of democratic legitimacy: the performance of institutions, conformity to democratic values, and having a collective political identity. The performance of institutions is relatively straightforward and concerns the results and outcomes of these institutions. Conformity to democratic values is about the way values such as consent, representation, and accountability interact with the institution. Finally, a collective political identity is necessary to legitimize a system. Without a collective political identity, the right of a system to make decisions for the citizenry can be questioned. This is irrespective of any possible outcome of policies.

2.3.2

Input, throughput and output legitimacy

Although Beetham [4] did not define the first two of his three elements of democratic legiti-macy as such, they do correspond well with respectively output and input legitilegiti-macy. This particular take on democratic legitimacy was first mentioned by David Easton in 1965 [16]. He defined the input legitimacy of the political system as consisting of citizen‘s demands and support, not only through elections, but also through citizen identity. Output legitimacy was defined as government decisions and actions. Fritz Scharpf [50] [51] advanced the field of democratic legitimacy by defining input and output legitimacy as a two-dimensional concept and by grouping the different elements of legitimacy by Beetham and others. Scharpf‘s ideas are loaned from Abraham Lincolns famous phrase that democracy requires government by the people, of the people, and for the people. For Scharpf [50], input legitimacy refers to the quality of participation of the process leading up to laws and rules, output legitimacy to the effectiveness of these laws and rules. Input legitimacy requires mechanisms or pro-cedures to link political decisions with citizen opinions and preferences. These mechanisms within modern democracies are present through representative institutions, through which office holders can be held accountable for their actions and decisions. Conversely, democracy would be ‘an empty ritual’ if it was incapable of producing effective results. According to Scharpf, output legitimacy through effective outcomes are based on the perception of the citizen: ‘achieving the goals citizens collectively care about’ [50].

An expansion of input legitimacy was found in the work of Christoph Meyer [35]. For him, legitimacy on the input side includes the authorisation of office holders through elec-tions, responsiveness in the exercise of power though involving the public, and accountability through the ‘answerability’ and sanctioning of office holders if necessary. Output legitimacy for Meyer is the performance of government, which corresponds closely to Scharpf‘s under-standing of democratic legitimacy. Meyer does argue that too often too much emphasis is placed on input legitimacy, in particular on authorisation through elections. More attention should be spent on the role of political communication in legitimizing democratic systems. Ward [58] argues that any conceptual definition of democratic legitimacy has both input and output elements. He names free and fair elections, adequate avenues for public par-ticipation and responsiveness by office holders, accountability, and a sense of belonging or identification with a system of government as necessary elements of input legitimacy, and ‘delivery’ or results for citizens as criteria of output legitimacy.

Missing in the picture above, however, is what is going on in the ‘black box’ of the political system [52]. Throughput legitimacy can be seen as the missing link between input and output legitimacy. It focuses on the quality of the processes of governance, which means not just efficiency, but also the accountability, transparency, and openness to the civil society. In this sense, accountability is about responsive policy actors who can be held responsible for output decisions. Transparency is defined as citizen access to information and openness to civil society concerns the level of access and influence of associations of citizens in interest groups in the decision-making process [52]. To summarize, even if they disagree with an outcome, political actors must accept the legitimacy of a decision if it was arrived at through an inclusive process of public discussion [61].

The lines between input, throughput and output legitimacy are blurred, which can make it difficult to distinguish between the three modes of democratic legitimacy. However, Schmidt [52] argues that it is still possible to differentiate these modes clearly: output legitimacy requires policies that work effectively while resonating with citizens democratic ideals, values and identity. Input legitimacy depends on citizens expressing demands institutionally and deliberatively through representative politics while providing constructive support via their sense of identity and community. Throughput legitimacy requires processes which work efficiently and inclusively while promoting constructive interaction. While it is possible to differentiate between these forms of legitimacy, these mechanisms are interdependent. Increasing or decreasing one mode of legitimacy has impact on the other two. This can have either positive or negative consequences for the other two modes of legitimacy.

Yannis Papadopoulos [40] regarded legitimacy as derived from the quality of outputs to com-pensate for a quality of input as inherently problematic. Such a form of legitimacy is not democratic in itself. Goods and services can be judged regardless of the democratic input: dictatorships are also capable of producing the same goods and services as democracies. Further, output legitimacy requires optimal outcomes in the long run: win-win situations. No one party may consider himself to be an outright loser. If this is the case, there is no democratic legitimacy. Even if analysts perceive an option as optimal, not all interested parties may agree on framing it that way because policy properties are constructed dif-ferently by social actors. Finally, Papadopoulos recognized a final problematic element of output legitimacy. A danger of spillover effects exists from dissatisfaction with ‘regime per-formance’ to dissatisfaction with ‘regime institutions’ [37]. In theory, it might be possible

to distinguish between being held responsible for results and being held responsible for the process. Frustration with the substance may lead to frustration with the procedures. Even though output legitimacy is strongly connected with substance, it cannot be disconnected from the procedural aspect of legitimacy. Papadopoulos [40] claims it is practically impos-sible to distinguish between being held responimpos-sible for results or the process, even though in principle it would be possible.

Throughput legitimacy, described by Papadopoulos [40] as the belief in procedural fairness, can enhance the democratic legitimacy of institutions [41]. Acceptance also rests on the belief of citizens that, whatever the costs of the decision, they were taken in a way it is considered fair. Throughput legitimacy is not democratic in itself either, as citizens may give their consent not because they are satisfied with the way their voice was heard in deliberations, but because legal-rational domination is accepted or because it is agreed that some policy matters may best be delegated to experts. However, throughput legitimacy may spawn conflict, as it is not only content that is debated, but also the definition of appropriate policy processes [40].

As the previous paragraphs have shown, certain risks are to be expected when analysing democratic legitimacy through the lens of the three modes of input, throughput and output legitimacy. Especially the blurring of the lines of accountability, the trade-off between the three modes of legitimacy and problems with legitimacy derived from the quality of output, such as the need for optimal outcomes with no perceived losers as well as the problem of the process being indistinguishable from the results. These risks and issues can be seen as problematic for new regionalist governance arrangements as well, as and such, will be explored in the following section.

2.3.3

Other definitions of democratic legitimacy

Even if a large part of the debate around democratic legitimacy has been framed around input, throughput and output legitimacy, other modes of democratic legitimacy can be found in public administration theory as well. In some cases, this literature is complementary to the existing literature which has already been mentioned. One example is the differentiating of formal and social legitimacy by Anthony Arnull [1]. According to Arnull, formal legitimacy is about how the entity in question has been established. If all legal requirements have been met, formal legitimacy has been attained. Social legitimacy is more difficult to attain and also more difficult to conceptualise. It is dependent on the general acceptance of the allocation and exercise of authority. Formal legitimacy can thus be regarded as a form of input legitimacy. Social legitimacy more difficult to place, as the general acceptance of authority has elements of input, throughput and output legitimacy. Klijn and Edelenbosch [29] discuss three possible sources of democratic legitimacy: accountability, voice, and due deliberation. Accountability concerns the formal mechanisms of deciding who is accountable and the procedures for imposing either rewards for good behaviour or sanctions for bad behaviour. Examples of these incentives are (re)election or the ability to remove rulers from office. Voice is a positive and active source of democratic legitimacy. Citizens are able to participate in concrete decisions and participate in the processes through which these decisions are produced. Much like the difference between equality in the aggregative and integrative strands of democracy, the ‘real’ involvement of citizens is stressed. Due

deliberation is the third and final source of legitimacy hypothesized by Klijn and Edelenbosch [29]. This source of legitimacy is connected to the way the interaction and deliberation process is organized. In this view, democratic legitimacy is reached out of good deliberative processes, guaranteed by clear and fair process agreements between actors where they share knowledge and explore possible solutions and exchange value judgments. The elements of these sources of democratic legitimacy can be grouped under Schmidts understanding of throughput legitimacy [52].

2.4

Democratic legitimacy in new regionalism

In the introduction of this thesis, the three waves of metropolitan governance have been described. The final wave of metropolitan governance has been described as new regionalism: a school of thought centered around the interaction of spatially relevant actors. These actors can be as varied as the context in which they operate: both state (central or decentralised) and non-state actors, such as the civil society, non-governmental actors or actors operating from the business world. Area wide governance is achieved through through co-operative arrangements and through flexible networks that define and organise the provision of public services. As has been mentioned, the emergence of new regionalism is closely related to the shift of government to governance [43].

The question of input or throughput democratic legitimacy in metropolitan governance arrangements has not always consciously been at the forefront of public administration. The debate between the first two waves focused on the question which of the two schools was able to provide the citizen with the most equitable, efficient and effective service delivery, as well as the competitiveness of metropolitan areas on a global scale. In short: the debate has been about economic arguments rather than the democratic quality of policy-making [55]. As input, throughput and, in particular, output legitimacy incorporate economic arguments to explain the democratic legitimacy of the metropolitan area, these elements have thus been implicitly available for democratic legitimacy research. However, in recent years, an increased sensitivity towards democratic processes and values in co-operative governance has been signaled [40]. The following paragraphs attempt to fuse the previously mentioned elements of democratic legitimacy with scholarly research on the question of democracy in new regionalist governance arrangements.

In Western European legal systems, representation and participation are strongly linked to territorial politics, but it is yet unclear how democracy exactly is affected by metropolitan governance. The legitimacy of the state and state policies is anchored in transparent pro-cedures. These procedures give good reason to to believe that decisions made and policies implemented are the result of public deliberations of free and equal citizens [19]. To ascer-tain democratic accountability and citizen control over state activities, mechanisms are in place to protect this system [23]. To account for the earlier mentioned shift from government to governance, it is clear that these new mechanisms bear scrutinizing. It is not without reason that Rhodes [43] considered governance as a considerable challenge for democratic accountability.

Papadopoulos [40] recognized two distinct and crucial threats to democratic legitimacy in governance arrangements: problems with responsiveness and problems with accountability. Responsiveness is about rulers being sensitive to the people‘s demands, accountability is

about the availability of formal channels of control [46]. Agents are responsive when their choices correspond with the principal’s wishes. Both responsiveness and accountability are related as mechanisms, as they give the citizen opportunities to look back at what has been done. To guarantee the accountability element of democratic legitimisation, office holders are required to give reasons for their deeds and to justify them. If citizens remain unconvinced, they can then punish the office holder for what has been done. This mechanism is crucial for democratic legitimacy, as voters believe they can render office holders accountable if they do not behave responsibly. Therefore, citizens agree before the event to authorise office holders to represent the citizen. Responsiveness is thus more about the substance of a policy and input legitimacy, accountability about the process and throughput legitimacy. However, several factors may contribute to undermine the cognitive ability of the citizen to identify decision-makers and their decisions: the presence of networks, procedures where bargaining plays a non-negligible role, the deformalisation of legal instruments, the particulars of each policy subsystem that make it difficult to enter a pre-established pattern of role division, and actor behaviour [40]. These factors are likely to establish feelings of alienation. Citizens are unlikely to accept a situation in which ‘the system’/ is said to have made a mistake [56]. Hence, the more citizens long for transparency, the more they may realise they do not, and cannot, master the rules of the game [22].

K¨ubler and W¨alti [32] distinguished two main lines of argument with the debate of demo-cratic values within metropolitan governance: the pessimistic and the optimistic view on governance and democracy. The shift from government to governance has either yielded a threat to democratic values, or opportunities. The following subsections will provide an overview of both the pessimistic and optimistic view on metropolitan governance and the impact of characteristics of metropolitan governance on the level of democratic legitimacy.

2.4.1

The pessimistic perspective

The pessimistic perspective looks at metropolitan governance as a threat to democratic legitimacy. The pessimistic perspective is based on an intrinsic tension between the authen-ticity and effectiveness of state actions: the democratic quality of input versus the quality of output [51], or citizen participation versus system effectiveness [12]. This perspective is rooted in the traditional sense of a representative democracy: municipal councillors repre-sent their electorate and can be hold accountable through elections. Municipal councillors are hypothesized as losing control if they are a part of a metropolitan governance arrange-ment. Consequently, this has negative implications for the democratic legitimacy from the pessimistic point of view, as this puts the traditional mechanisms of the democratic system under pressure. It regards new regionalism as way to ‘get things done’ , sacrificing the input side of democratic legitimacy in favour of effectiveness, the output side. Advocates of this theory argue that the shift from government to governance threatens democratic quality and legitimacy. Increasing the capacity to produce effective results may reduce the impor-tance of procedures which allows for the transmission of citizens interest into the process of governing through voting and systems of territorial representation. They see two threats in particular for democratic values: a threat to democratic bodies and a threat to the political community [32] [20].

Earlier in this chapter, it was shown that the rise of new regionalism cannot be explained without taking into account the shift from government to governance. Based on this logic, the self-governing networks which are a staple of new regionalism, would lead to a loss of im-portance of political decision-making. Governance would instead imply shared responsibility for all involved actors, both public and private. Increased co-operation of non-government actors would mean a modification of the relationship between politicians and their vot-ers. The lines of accountability then become murky [27] [13]. As a results of having self-governing networks, technical criteria are seen as the most important factor of governance. Policy-making would then become increasingly technocratic which means an increasing loss of control for politicians [32]. Finally, the rise of multi-level government could contribute to a disenfranchisement of parliament and councils on all levels [50].

Secondly, the argument that governance would affect the political community (or ‘community-identification’) rests upon two arguments. Governance networks are largely organized around single policy issues which leads to societal fragmentation. According to Gaudin [17], this would alter the identification and negotiation of common interest. The second argument holds that governance theories see citizens increasingly as taxpayers (who are the main consumers of public services), with less regard for their political role [47][15].

2.4.2

The optimistic perspective

The optimistic perspective on the effects of governance on democratic principles argues the relationship of the state and civil society as the key feature of democratic politics. It stresses two other key elements of democracy: inclusiveness and deliberation. It aims to identify the potential of new regionalism for the enhancement of these two democratic elements and can thus be characterized as the optimistic perspective [20]. Popular control is not only exercised through elected political bodies, but also directly through citizens and their associations. The basis of the optimistic perspective is the pluralisation of policy-making by giving a growing amount of new actors a voice and new instances of deliberation [32].

Self-governing networks which include not only state, but also non-state actors, can be seen as an important vector of pluralism and civic culture. The presence of civil society associ-ations in these networks increases the influence of civil society on public policy. It would also lead to more point of views being included in the policy-making process. Recruiting civil society organisations into public governance would be a step in the right direction of an egalitarian and democratic society [8]. Thus, the shift of government to governance would yield opportunities to empower citizens and pluralising the state [2].

Governance would also strengthen discursive processes which would lead to an increase of the deliberative quality of policies. Because classical hierarchy is notably absent and a great number of actors and agencies are involved, negotiation and compromise become increasingly important. The emergence of new ways to organise the policy deliberation of citizens (such as neighborhood forums or user boards) has been interpreted as increased importance of the discursive processes of public policy-making, which in turn can be contributed to the shift of government to governance [6][14][26]. However, Papadopoulos [40] notes that increasing civil society participation into the formulation and implementation of policy cannot be considered a process of democratisation. It replaces the influence of citizens, through elected representatives, by influence of sectoral or local expertise. The democracy of citizens is thus

replaced by a democracy of organised interests. In his view, the removal of policy networks from the parliamentary arena of the municipal council leads to a marginalized role of the legitimacy of elected bodies. This shift leads to more sectoral or local forms of legitimacy. In short, democratic renewal as a bottom-up initiative has potential, according to the op-timistic perspective. As this perspective has a focus on the opening up of the state to the civil society as the key to the democratic viability of governance, this perspective has been dubbed optimistic [32].

2.4.3

The two perspectives: Empirical evidence

In the previous paragraphs, the pessimistic and optimistic perspectives on democratic values in metropolitan governance arrangements have been introduced. Scholars have attempted to find evidence for both perspectives. The outcomes of these research projects are discussed in this chapter.

The most notable of these research projects is empirical research done by the earlier men-tioned K¨ubler & W¨alti [32]. They have formulated four hypotheses, two for each perspective, and tested them in the Swiss context of metropolitan governance. The first two hypotheses concerned the pessimistic perspective. Their first pessimistic hypothesis assumes that gov-ernance leads to relativisation of the role of democratically elected bodies (H1); their second that governance leads to a fragmented vision of the political community (H2). Their first optimistic hypothesis is that governance would lead to pluralism and to the empowerment of citizens (H3). Their second hypothesis is that governance fosters deliberation and consensus as a main mode of policy making (H4).

The results of their research have been inconclusive. According to the researchers, H1 is falsified. The role of democratically elected bodies has not changed for governance vis-`a-vis government. They somewhat confirm H3, as they find that governance is more open to the civil society than government. However, H2 and H4 are neither confirmed nor denied, as they find no real differences between government and governance arrangements. In general, they conclude that it is far from certain that the transition from government to governance has intrinsic consequences for democratic values. In a review of their analytic framework, they assess their hypotheses and argue that they are still fruitful for structuring or orienting empirical research on issues of democracy with respect to metropolitan governance [32]. In a follow up article dating from 2007, K¨ubler & Schwab [31] again attempt to test both the pessimistic and optimistic perspectives in the Swiss context by picking the five biggest agglomerations (Zurich, Bern, Lausanne, Lucerne and Lugano) and examining four problem-atic policy areas (water supply, public transport, social services for drug users and cultural amenities). They again find no conclusive evidence supporting either of the two perspec-tives. Their evidence does suggest more inclusiveness for civic actors and a blurring of the lines of democratic accountability with respect to new regionalism. However, they find no intrinsic problems for democratic values rooted in the shift from government to governance. Where the aforementioned two research projects have failed to produce conclusive evidence on either the optimistic or pessimistic perspective, Pl¨uss [42] has found evidence to support the pessimistic perspective. Pl¨uss argues that the optimistic perspective has little to offer

for municipal councillors, as the optimistic perspective focuses on the inclusion of civic actors. However, municipal councillors are expected to modify their behaviour and assume a more strategic role and to ensure the democratic functioning of governance. Demanding strategic behaviour in this context thus seems unrealistic, as municipal councillors play a small to modest role on the metropolitan scale and are mostly excluded from functional networks [40]. The multilevel analysis done by Pl¨uss confirms the pessimistic perspective. Municipal councillors perceive their general sense of political influence, as well as their influence regarding inter-municipal co-operation, as being reduced. Traditional forms of participation are becoming less relevant in today’s metropolitan decision-making [42]. In Western-European style of governance the municipal council is ‘the central forum for the articulation of needs and demands and provides an appropriate state for the pursuit of discussion and criticism’ [21]. Based on the pessimistic point of view, the emergence of governance is a threat to democratic values and representative institutions. Traditional forms of participation and democratic accountability are becoming less relevant as citizen participation and democratic institutions are under pressure [20]. By design, metropoli-tan governance has excluded parliamentary arenas (such as municipal councils) while giving preference to a strong representation of executive bureaucracies and nongovernmental organ-isations [40]. Municipal councillors seem to take little part in metropolitan decision-making. Especially the selection of policy options and alternatives which take place in new regionalist networks are often inaccessible to municipal councillors [31]. These policy procedures are intransparent and are deemed difficult to control by representative bodies [5]. Thus, as a consequence new regionalism would appear to reduce democratic legitimacy [42].

2.5

Expectations for this research project

In the previous sectors, many elements of legitimacy within new regionalism have been de-fined. As has been mentioned, the optimistic perspective does not have much to offer when researching the role perspective of municipal councillors, as it is primarily focused on the interplay of different institutions and the civil society. Using the pessimistic perspective, two problem areas of democratic legitimacy have been identified: accountability and responsive-ness in new regionalism can be problematic, as Papadopoulos [40], K¨ubler & W¨alti [32] and Pl¨uss [42] have postulated. As such, these two elements of democratic legitimacy will bear closer scrutiny.

2.5.1

Accountability

The pessimistic perspective argues that the lines of accountability become murky in a new regionalist context. Governance arrangements, characterized by non-transparent negotia-tions, the inclusion of actors who are not democratically legitimized and the exclusion of local councils pose obvious problems for accountability [42]. With many different actors and policy networks, it can become unclear where the sole democratic responsibility of municipal councillors stops and where a shared responsibility of all actors begins. As K¨ubler and W¨alti [32] have argued, in a context where policy decisions become the product of a technocratic policy process, a loss of control for municipal councillors is to be expected. In the case of the MRDH, two expectations can be drawn up:

1. At the MRDH level, municipal councillors feel less responsible for the aggregate policy outcome compared to previous metropolitan governance arrangements.

2. Assuming that the more technocratic policy decisions are made at the MRDH level, involvement of municipal councillors at the MRDH level leads to a perceived loss of control of influence in metropolitan governance for municipal councillors.

2.5.2

Responsiveness

As has been defined earlier, responsiveness is about decision-makers being sensitive to the demand of the citizens [40]. The presence of new regionalist structures hinders citizens from attributing responsibility for policy decisions and holding these office holders accountable. Members of policy networks are therefore less responsive to respond to the citizens wishes and to justify their actions [42]. Pl¨uss has considered the role of municipal councillors in core municipalities vis-`a-vis the role of municipal councillors in the fringe municipalities of the metropolis. New regionalist governance arrangements are designed so that the core municipality cannot dominate the decision-making process [33]. Core municipalities are explicitly put at a disadvantage in terms of power and influence to be regarded as a suitable partner for co-operation with fringe municipalities, even though core municipalities often do provide most of the necessary administrative and financial support [42]. The same is true for the MRDH: even though the two core municipalities of Rotterdam and Den Haag account for over 50% of the population, their power and influence can never extend beyond the power and influence of the fringe municipalities combined. As such, the pessimistic perspective is hypothesized in this thesis as more pronounced in the core municipalities compared to the smaller municipalities. Because of this design, the second hypothesis states that municipal councillors have less reason to act responsive towards their citizens.

1. At the MRDH level, the perceived loss of control of municipal councillors is more pronounced in the core municipalities compared to the fringe municipalities.

2. At the MRDH level, municipal councillors feel less need to act responsive towards the citizens of their municipality.

2.6

Summary

In this chapter, the concept of democracy has been introduced and different elements of democracy have been listed. Most definitions of democracy incorporate the elements with roots in the three values of equality, liberty and communality. In turn, much of the concept of democratic legitimacy is based on these values.

In much of the literature, democratic legitimacy takes the form of input, throughput and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the quality of participation of the processes leading up to laws and rules. Input legitimacy hinges on citizens expressing their demands institutionally and deliberately through representative politics while providing constructive support via their sense of identity and community. Output legitimacy is based upon the perceived effectiveness of the outcomes of the policy processes by citizens. Policies need to work effectively while still resonating with the ideals of citizens. Throughput legitimacy

requires processes which work efficiently and inclusively while promoting constructive in-teraction. These modes of legitimacy are interdependent: increasing one parameter has a direct and noticeable influence on the other two.

Democratic legitimacy within new regionalism has been conceptualised as having an opti-mistic as well as a pessiopti-mistic perspective. This is closely related to the shift from government to governance. The pessimistic perspective acknowledges that an intrinsic tension between authority and effectiveness of the state exists. The input side of democratic legitimacy is sac-rificed in favour of the output side. Increasing the capacity to produce effective results may reduce the importance of procedures which allows for the transmission of citizens interest into the process of governance through voting and systems of territorial representation. The pessimistic perspective identifies two main threats: a blurring of the lines of accountability, threatening democratic bodies and a threat to the political community.

The optimistic perspective argues that instead of being a threat, new regionalism brings new opportunities for democratic legitimacy. Because new regionalism places more importance on the role of the civil society, its influence on policy-making is increased. Because citizens and their associations are empowered, this increases the democratic legitimacy. Secondly, new ways of organising policy deliberations of citizens have emerged, which has been inter-preted as strengthening discursive processes. This is perceived as beneficial for democratic legitimacy.

These two perspectives have been tested in theory as well as in practice. So far, scholars have been unable to provide conclusive proof for either the pessimistic or the optimistic perspective. Keeping in mind the stated research aim of this thesis, the pessimistic perspec-tive does have more to offer than the optimistic perspecperspec-tive, as the optimistic perspecperspec-tive bypasses the role of representative bodies almost completely. Therefore, the expectations resulting in four hypotheses are based on the pessimistic perspective.

Case Description

3.1

Introduction

In this chapter, the case of the MRDH will be introduced. In order to assess the results of the introduction of the MRDH, an overview of the period before the MRDH will be provided in Section 3.2. Information on the transition from the Plusregio‘s to the MRDH will be included. Afterwards, the goals and organisation of the MRDH will be detailed in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, the issue of democratic legitimacy at the MRDH level will be discussed. In a recent report by the OECD commissioned by the MRDH, this issue was discussed in detail and provides some information on the subject. This chapter is concluded with a summary in Section 3.6.

3.2

The situation before the introduction of the MRDH

Metropolitan governance in the metropolitan areas of the Netherlands has a rich history, which can be traced back to the 1950‘s. In 1950, the Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regelin-gen (WGR) came into force. Under the flag of the WGR, many forms of intermunicipal co-operation were arranged. This law was used to determine the co-operation between municipalities, provinces and water boards and has seen several modifications, the last mod-ification dating of January 1, 2015. The last modmod-ification concerned the abolition of the former Plusregio‘s, which is directly responsible for the eventual foundation of the MRDH. One of the earliest forms of metropolitan governance under the Dutch WGR paradigm was the Openbaar Lichaam Rijnmond (abbreviated as OLR and popularly referred to as Rijnmondraad). The OLR was introduced in 1964 as a metropolitan governance arrangement for the region consisting of 24 municipalities including the core municipality of Rotterdam, introduced to better facilitate the growth of the Rotterdam harbour. Instead of opting for annexation of fringe municipalities or a multitude of bilateral relations between Rotterdam and fringe municipalities, a new supralocal entity was created. The OLR was structured as a council with representatives of the people, which could be elected directly from the populace and as such, could be regarded of an early experiment regarding metropolitan governance with more attention for democratic values. The OLR was abolished in 1986,

after which tasks were transferred either to the previously participating municipalities, or to the province of Zuid-Holland.

The direct predecessor of the MRDH was the Plusregio (popularly referred to as the Stadsre-gio). Enacted in 2006, the Plusregio was a public body tasked with the regional mandatory co-operation between municipalities. The current metropolitan area covered by the MRDH was home to two different Plusregio‘s: Stadsgewest Haaglanden and Stadsregio Rotterdam. These Plusregio‘s were the result of a new law: the Kaderwet Bestuur in verandering. Ac-cording to this law, Plusregio‘s were scheduled to be transformed into municipal provinces. The plans to form the municipal provinces has since been dropped, the Plusregio‘s remained, now under the previously mentioned WGR. The Plusregio‘s were an extra layer of govern-ment in the Netherlands, next to the municipal, provincial and national level. As this extra layer of government had no direct elections, this lack of a democratic component was seen as a disadvantage of the Plusregio‘s [44][38]. As such, plans to reform the Plusregio‘s were designed by the national government: instead of top-down and mandatory co-operation through an extra layer of government, metropolitan governance would now be voluntary and bottom-up. This new design yielded some initial criticism, most notably from the Raad van State [57]. In a report, the RvS concluded that there was no basis for the abandonment of the Plusregio‘s, as the all actors involved were perfectly happy with the way metropoli-tan business was conducted [57]. The Raad van State referred to a recent report on the status of the Plusregio‘s, were actors involved with the Plusregio‘s on all levels were in-terviewed and perceived the Plusregio‘s as a positive influence on metropolitan governance [7]. The RvS evidently considered the output of the Plusregio‘s as being superior to the (lack of) democratic input. Initially, the Plusregio‘s most important task and its respective financing, public transportation, would be transferred to the provinces [44]. Municipalities previously had a direct say in public transportation policy issues and the way the budget (through the BDU) was distributed, which was perceived as a threat to the autonomy of the municipalities previously united in the Plusregio‘s. The former Plusregio‘s Haaglanden and Rotterdam banded together and introduced the MRDH, the Plusregio of Amsterdam introduced the MRA. The introduction of these metropolitan governance arrangements was able to halt the plans to transfer the public transportation policy issue and its funding to the province [38]. As such, the number of metropolitan governance arrangements in the Netherlands was reduced from seven Plusregio‘s to two Metropoolregio‘s.

The Stadsregio Rotterdam was home to fifteen different municipalities since 2010, after the annexation of Rozenburg by the municipality of Rotterdam. The Stadsregio encompassed 1.2 million inhabitants. Policy issues being discussed at the level of the Stadsregio Rotterdam were traffic and public transportation, smaller scale infrastructure, the exploitation of public transportation, youth care, spatial planning and the construction of houses. The Stadsgewest Haaglanden encompassed nine different municipalities with about one million inhabitants. The Stadsgewest Haaglanden discussed the same policy issues as the Stadsregio Rotterdam.

3.3

The MRDH: An introduction

The MRDH is a voluntary, bottom-up metropolitan governance arrangement for 23 munic-ipalities in the province of Zuid-Holland, based on two core municmunic-ipalities (The Hague and Rotterdam) and 21 fringe municipalities. An overview of the metropolitan area can be found in3.1. Distinctive features of the MRDH in metropolitan governance in the Netherlands are