Foreign Fighters: Setting of the Agenda at EU level

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Foreign Fighters:

Setting of the Agenda at EU level

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Student Name: Lenka Antálková Supervisor: Dhr. Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker

Student Number: s1292897 Faculty Governance and Global Affairs

Date: 12 March 2016 Leiden University – Campus The Hague

Master: Crisis and Security Management Second reader: Dr. Alistair Reed

Faculty Governance and Global Affairs Faculty Governance and Global Affairs Leiden University – Campus The Hague Leiden University – Campus The Hague

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to many different people who helped me, in their different ways, to finish this thesis. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Edwin Bakker for his expertise and guidance and, undoubtedly, for his understanding and patience while delivering this thesis.

Thank you, Gabriel and Janko. Words cannot express how thankful I am for your support and encouragement (and of course for helping me through the few tears I had to shred to have this done). I would also like to thank my friends for their great support and kindness.

Last but not least, I want to thank my family for their unconditional love and care.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to determine which agenda-setting route is taken at the European Union (EU) level in regard to the twenty-two directives related to the issue of foreign fighters and returnees. Said directives were introduced in 2013 by EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. To fulfill its task this thesis draws upon the Princen and Rhinard´s concept which distinguishes two agenda-setting routes which can be taken at EU level: the high politics route and the low politics route. Said routes move both along a four-stage issue career path –namely initiation, specification, expansion and entrance– to analyze in depth the issue and come to a conclusion about which agenda-setting route at EU level was taken. This thesis answers the questions of where the issue of foreign fighters was first initiated, how it was specified and how it expanded, and determines whether the issue entered the EU formal agenda by political momentum or by building impetus.

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It has been estimated that around 5,000 to 6,000 fighters from the eleven most affected European Union (EU) member states are fighting alongside the extremist groups, but the number can be significantly bigger (JP Updates, 2015). In any case, these figures represent a great menace to EU internal security.

At present EU member states do collect individual travel information about passengers coming and leaving their customs but they do not share these data with other EU members as the initiative to have common “Passenger Name Record” (PNR) was rejected by European

Parliament (EP) on the basis of privacy rights (Sage, 2013). As a consequence young people can in some cases travel back and forth from the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq undetected.

A major concern for the EU is the potential terrorist threat that the returning fighters represent. The exposure to radical ideas and fighting trainings most likely leads the fighters to stage a terrorist attack as they return to their homelands (The Guardian, 2013). The case in Verviers (Belgium) in January 2015, in which Islamist militants returned from Syria planned

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imminent attacks on police targets, made the issue of the returned foreign fighters a key priority for the EU (Archick, Belkin, Blanchard, Humud & Mix, 2015).

Returned foreign fighters may also make use of social media to recruit more volunteers. Aggressive poses with Kalashnikov rifles may trigger a sort of stature and respect in some young people but with no realization that they might fall into the hands of radical groups or even be killed in the conflict. In this respect, a close monitoring of the internet has been stressed by Gilles de Kerchove, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), to remove or ban “undesirable websites, photos and videos encouraging would-be jihadists” (Hughes, 2014,

p.1).

The EU CTC has addressed the issue of EU foreign fighters and how to best deal with the subject. In his video statement released on May 30th, 2013 Mr. de Kerchove called for better co-operation amongst intelligence and law enforcement services in the EU when dealing with the phenomenon of foreign fighters. He further pointed out that the number of EU foreign fighters departing to Syria and coming back to Europe has increased significantly and that the problem has become much bigger now when compared to the Afghan war over the past decade (Casert, 2013). De Kerchove indicates in his statement that the foreign fighters represent a great threat to “the European internal security” and calls for an urgent action to be taken by all EU states to prevent EU citizens to travel to Syria (Council of the European Union, 2013).

In order to advise and coordinate the EU states mostly affected by the departure of young individuals going to fight abroad, the EU CTC introduced a package of twenty-two directives related to foreign fighters and returnees to the Council of the European Union.

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The objective of this thesis is to analyze which agenda setting route was taken at the EU level to deal with the issues of foreign fighters traveling to Syria and other conflict zones and the subsequent returnees. This analysis responds to the Princen and Rhinard concept (2006) according to which the agenda setting process at the EU level takes two routes: high politics and low politics (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). Thus, in order to determine which agenda-setting route at EU level was taken to best deal with the issue of foreign fighters, the high and low politics routes are analyzed according to an issue career which follows a four-stage pattern: initiation, specification, expansion and entrance.

1.2 Outline

Chapter I of this thesis provides a general overview related to the phenomenon of the foreign fighters. A general overview and a definition of their functions are also given to the actors who, at the EU level, are involved in the issue of foreign fighters. Chapter II provides general information about the definition of the agenda-setting. Further on, the chapter focuses on the agenda-setting at the EU level and the specific concept related to Princen and Rhinard. Chapter III describes the research design and the methodology used in the present thesis. In Chapter IV the subject of foreign fighters on EU agenda is analyzed according to the concept of Princen and Rhinard. Chapter V provides the results related to said analysis and reflection related to this thesis.

1.3 Phenomenon of foreign fighters

The foreign fighters’ phenomenon is not a new one. The phenomenon can be dated back as far as the Spanish civil war when thousands of anarchists, communists and socialists joined the war for a variety of ideological reasons (Bakker, Paulussen & Entenmann, 2013). In recent years, hundreds of individuals who identified themselves with the militant Islamist

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ideology joined the Afghan-Soviet war during the 1980s or the civil war in Bosnia or Chechnya in the 1990s. In 2000 individuals joined the conflicts of Iraq and Somalia.

However, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was the first conflict in which the Muslims from all over the world were called upon in the name of Islam to join together and fight jihad against the Soviet occupation of a predominantly Muslim state. The victory of the jihad fighters also known as ‘mujahideen’ and the foreign fighters against the Soviet army received a widespread attention as they had defeated one of the leading super powers. The defeat of the Soviet army resulted in a great enhancement in the religious beliefs of the fighters as they embraced the idea that faith was the cause of the victory (McVey, 2012).

Nevertheless, the motivation for a fighter to join a foreign conflict is not based on struggling injustice at his/her homeland but “is usually specific and local: fighting against the invader or oppressor” (Bymen & Sharipo, 2014, p.5). It has also been argued that many young men leave to fight abroad not because of their religious believes but as an act of rebellion and need for adventure. Many just want to fight but, in general, have an unclear idea why. There is just a small proportion of foreign fighters who got contact to theologians or have any knowledge about the Koranic philosophy. Therefore, their youthful rebellion is rarely praised by their parents or the communities where they live in (Bymen & Sharipo, 2014).

The methods of recruitment are also vital to state. Although the recruitment of the fighters is happening on both local and global level it is important to mention that the Western foreign fighters are widely recruited via social media. The Islamic state, its supporters and its Western foreign fighters make a great use of social media to recruit new fighters and to promote their ideology by building a caliphate based on a strict Islamic law. On the other

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hand, it has been argued that social media can also be seen as counter-narrative. The campaign ´not in my name´ is one example of the attempts to draw the opinion of the public against the Islamic state and their interpretation of Islam (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014). But still as mentioned by Malet (2010) the recruiting messaging is framed in such a way that emphasizes the civil conflict as threatening to the identity group with which the recruit is closely associated either by shared ethnicity or religious affiliation. Therefore, the emphasis on preserving and defending a community is stressed in order to attract outsiders (Malet, 2010).

But once the foreign fighter arrives into the conflict zone it is up to the fighting group he/she is joining to determine which tasks will be assigned to him/her. As not all foreign fighters fight in the battle field, they are assigned tasks ranging from digging up latrines to being a ´martyr´ suicide bomber. Other fighters are prepared in training camps where they quickly acquire practical skills. Foreign fighters are taught “urban warfare and how to use weapons, including advanced technology” (Bymen & Sharipo, 2014, p.5). In addition, many of the foreign fighters are young men that are still very ideologically unshaped. Thus, it is easy for the fighting groups to shape foreign fighter´s worldview according to their opinions. The emphasis on teaching the ´true´ Islam, the obligation to get trained with weapons and do the jihad is an important element of teaching in training camps. Consequently, many foreign fighters might come back to their home countries ideologically changed, with a different set of goals and with the intention to commit attacks in their own homelands even though they might have no intention to plot an attack back home before they joined some war conflicts abroad (Bymen & Sharipo, 2014). As identified by van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, different pathways can be established for foreign fighters after the fight. The foreign fighter can either stay or leave the foreign country or he/she can even die in the conflict. If the foreign fighter

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decides to stay, he/she can integrate peacefully into the society or can engage in terrorist activity. If the foreign fighter decides to leave the foreign conflict, he/she can return to western or home country and reintegrate peacefully or can take part in terrorist activity. Other scenario for a foreign fighter that decides to leave is that he/she can go to a non-Western country and can join another foreign conflict or can take part in terrorist activity in some non-Western countries or he/she can integrate peacefully in said non-non-Western country (van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2014).

As stated by van Zuijdewijn and Bakker (2014) the foreign fighter’s journey after the fight is over will depend on his/her own motivation and background. In certain instances “the pathways are decided by or are the consequence of sheer coincidence” (van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2014, p.9).

Nevertheless, the influence the foreign fighters have on the foreign conflict is unprecedented. In many instances foreign fighters are seen as dangerous, radical, operationally effective and with little respect for local civilian population. It has been estimated that foreign fighters are responsible for more than 90 per cent of deadly attacks although they embody only 10 per cent of insurgents. And their ruthlessness and extreme force alienation from local civilians and other rebel groups are causes for more fighting (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014).

1.3.1 Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

As described in section 1.3 foreign fighters are not a new phenomenon. Many Western security officials fear that foreign fighters involved in the conflicts of Syria and Iraq represent a far greater threat to security than ever before. Firstly, because the number of foreign fighters in these countries is much greater compared to those in Afghanistan, Bosnia or Somalia. This

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is mostly due to the fact that traveling back and forth is much easier nowadays. Secondly, the Western foreign fighters represent a double threat. After returning from the war they will come back as “hardened veterans” with no fear of facing a danger and with combat experience: an ideal “terrorist recruiting material” (Bymen & Sharipo, 2014, p.2). When in combat zone some foreign fighters might form networks with other Western Muslims which are prone to jihadist ideas further radicalizing them, giving them training, weapons or other resources they might lack.

It has been stressed by the experts that the number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq will increase and become a long-term problem. Reports of 2015 show that the number of Western foreign fighters doubled to 5,000 compared to the reports from 2014. The Soufan Group (2015) has pointed out that more than 3,700 fighters out of 5,000 are coming only from four western European countries -specifically Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium-. The last two countries represent the highest number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. This is mostly due to the marginalization of the migrant communities in these countries which plays a big role in the radicalization process. The speed at which these recruits are being radicalized also represents a serious feature in the process, as these periods have been reduced from months to weeks. The alienation from Western culture goes in favor of the Islamic State propaganda that “offers and attractive alternative of belonging, purpose, adventure and respect” (The Soufan Group, 2015, p. 13). The Islamic State offers the new recruits a new identity. An identity that is not dominated by their past actions in their home countries. This represents an additional incentive for some recruits having criminal records or even been to prison. When considering the average age, most of the enlisted are in their twenties, some of them being even younger. (The Soufan Group, 2015).

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Although the propaganda of the Islamic State offers a new identity or a new sense of belonging, this message does not always match the realities of life on the ground. It has been stated that life under the Islamic State is harsh and disappointing. Some of the recruits might have been promised luxury goods or cars but in reality none of those promises are kept. Another disappointing factor is the alleged corruption amongst the commanders and emirs and the privileges they have. The mistreatment and killing of innocent civilians as well as the execution of fighters and hostages made some foreign fighters to defect from the Islamic State. Even when ultimately, as stated by Neumann (2015), the general concern of the defectors did not seem to be the brutality of those acts, but the outrage of the fact that the victims were Sunni.

When looking at the civil war in Syria it is apparent that the internal and external factors have shifted. At the beginning of the war different coalitions were loosely created among external religious fighters and secular Syrian rebels to overthrown the Assad regime. The long-term goal for jihadists was to create a state administered by the Islamic law, but still for a majority of combatants the essential aim was to fight the regime first. However, with the growth of the Islamic State the goal of fighting Assad evolved into the establishment of the Sharia law and the creation of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq. It can be said that the civil war has been hijacked by jihadists “regardless of the wishes of the local Syrian population” to overthrow only the Assad regime (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 7).

The skills and networks which are formed in Syria and Iraq nowadays will be used in future years in case other grievances emerge. This fact has been compared to a “ticking time bomb” (Bymen & Sharipo, 2014, p. 3). The threat posed by foreign fighters today “can be pictured as a process from recruitment, to fighting abroad, to terrorism” (Bymen & Sharipo, 2014, p.3)

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The extremist groups in Syria and Iraq do still appear to be as strong as before despite their enormous display of horror, violence and brutality. It is still early to say what the evolvement of Russia and other European countries will have on Syrian civil war. Will it increase or reduce the flow of foreign fighters into the region? It might be a difficult question to answer because, as mentioned earlier, it is more about the personal motivation of the foreign fighter to join an extremist group than political motivation (The Soufan Group, 2015). As stated by experts, the foreign fighters’ involvement in Syria and Iraq is undeniably global.

1.4 Key actors at European level dealing with foreign fighters

The ever growing phenomenon of foreign fighters has become a central issue also to some EU institutions. The European Council -which defines the EU goals and priorities and plays a vital role in setting up the JHA strategic agenda with a main emphasis on the internal security- is one of these institutions. Other EU institution that is involved in the foreign fighters issue is the Council of the EU, which is an important decision-making body deciding upon the legislative procedures of the EU -also known as ´co-decisions´- and implements and defines EU´s foreign and security policy. Another key actor dealing with foreign fighters is the EU CTC, which generally focuses on the counter-terrorism issues and coordinates and brings together the officials of the Member States to better manage terrorism related issues.

The section below describes in more detail these three main actors which have an important role in relation to foreign fighters, the function of said actors, their establishment and the mechanics of their work.

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1.4.1 European Council

The European Council is one of the 7 EU institutions. At the time of the establishment in 1974 it was seen only as an informal discussion forum between the head of the states or governments of the EU. In later years the function of the Council advanced into a more responsible role by defining EU goals and priorities. Under the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, the Council obtained an official status.

The role of the council is:

 to deliver incentives;

 to put forward overall political guidelines for the EU and

 to set policy agenda.

During every meeting- consisting of heads of the states or governments of the member states, the President of the Council and the President of the Commission-, the European Council adopts ´conclusions´. The ´conclusions´ are mostly related to the EU´s issues of concern and the actions to take in order to achieve them.

Conclusions are also used for setting deadlines to reach agreements on certain issues or legislative proposals. Given the mandate, the European Council can effect and guide EU´s policy agenda. Thus, the Council has the power to influence and direct the policy agenda of the EU (Consilium, 2015).

In order to adopt conclusions before every meeting of the Council, the President of the European Council prepares steps for plans which are then debated at the General Affairs

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Council and later approved at the European Council meeting. Not all documents from the meetings are available in the public register. Some documents related to exceptional or informal meetings are not included (Consilium, 2015).

On top of the above mentioned conclusions the European Council recently adopted a ´strategic agenda´ which focuses on five priority areas:

 Jobs, growth and competitiveness – the main objectives of this area are to improve financial investments and competitiveness and creating more and more stable jobs.

 Empowering and protecting citizens – this area focuses on youth unemployment, tax evasion and fraud.

 Energy and climate policies – this strategy relates to sustainable energy and its implementation.

 Freedom, security and justice – terrorism and migration governance are the main objectives in this strategy.

 The EU as a strong global actor – covering the EU´s world affairs and its foreign policy (Consilium, 2015).

Since 2014 the European Council is responsible for setting the strategic agenda for Justice and Home affairs. The issue of freedom, security and justice has become an important aspect for the European Council. The main areas of focus of said agenda include:

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 Protection and promotion of fundamental rights – aiming to unify and reform the data protection framework and insure that the fundamental rights are protected within and outside of the EU.

 Migration, asylum and borders – focusing on the benefits that legal migration can bring to the EU. The attention is also directed to the protection of the people in need of asylum, the control of illegal immigration and the prevention of life losses of those reaching Europe.

 Security: combating crime and terrorism. The fight against terrorism comprises strategies which are set to:

o mobilize cooperation between judicial and police departments and;

o strengthen the role of Europol and Eurojust.

The above mentioned strategies are to be supported by an evaluation of the current internal security strategies, by improving cybersecurity and fighting cybercrime, by preventing radicalization and extremism and responding to the foreign fighters’ issue. In the past many actors were involved in terrorism related issues. Therefore, the Council established the figure of the EU CTC to coordinate all the work in connection to terrorist activities. At present, the priority of the EU CTC is the issue of the so called foreign fighters and the menaces that said issue might pose.

 Judicial cooperation – the main objective is to enhance the European justice where different legal and judicial systems are mutually respected and trusted.

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 Free movement – the main priority is to protect the right of the EU citizens and their free movement in other member states (Consilium, 2015).

The European Council is a significant institution in EU´s political and policy direction. Apart from traditional topics as, for example, economy, security has become an important element to be set on the agenda of the European Council.

1.4.2 Council of the European Union

The Council of the EU is also known as a Council of Ministers as the institution is formed by the ministers of the governments of the member states. It has been established in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome and since then the responsibilities of the Council of the EU have expanded over many areas of policy. On the other hand, the Council of the EU has lost some of its power to the European Commission due to introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). This means that the Council of the EU covers only the most important issues (James & Gracey, 2015).

The role of the Council of the EU is to negotiate, adopt EU laws and coordinate policies. It is an important decision-making body. In general, the Council of the EU together with the European Parliament decides upon the legislative procedures also known as ´co-decision´. Co-decision is an act in which the Council of the EU has an exclusive or shared competence with member states. However, in certain decisions the Council of the EU acts on its own, especially in consent and consultation procedures where the role of the European Parliament is limited (Consilium, 2015).

The Council of the EU also does not have any power to propose new legislation, as this is the responsibility of the Commission. But the Council of the EU together with the

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Parliament votes for any new law to be passed or any EU budget to be agreed upon. The Council of the EU also has the power to sign international agreements with non-EU countries (James & Gracey, 2015). The work of the Council of the EU is to implement and define EU´s foreign and security policy based on the guidelines set by the European Council. Regarding to the security policy, the Council of the EU together with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy make certain that the unity, stability and efficiency of the EU´s external actions are met (Consilium, 2015).

The way the Council of the EU works is that the Commission proposes the majority of the issues discussed during the Council meetings. The proposals of the Commission are then considered by whichever ministers are responsible for the item. Said ministers then have the power to commit their governments to the new policies. Before any Council of the EU meeting, an important role is played by Committee of Permanent Representatives of the member states´ civil services (COREPER). The committee helps the governments of the member states to find common ground regarding certain issues. Apart from COREPER the Council of the EU is also governed by strong bureaucracy and a General Secretariat (James & Gracey, 2015).

Each member state holds the Presidency of the Council and chairs the meeting of the Council of the EU on a six-month rotating basis. However, the Council of Foreign Ministers is chaired by the EU´s High Representative of Foreign and Security Affairs (James & Gracey, 2015).

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1.4.3 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC)

The EU counter-terrorism Coordinator plays an important role in the counter-terrorism issues. The issue of foreign fighter falls therefore under his competences. But before the EU CTC was established many EU actors and institutions were engaged in the EU counter-terrorism framework. A more comprehensive and coordinated approach needed to be done in order to respond systematically to the threats of terrorism. After the Madrid bombing- known as 11-M in Spain- the EU member states adopted a wide-ranging declaration on terrorism during its spring session in March 2004 (Consilium, 2004). The main objectives of said declaration are to protect the EU citizens from the acts of terrorism and to deliver practical advanced security based on shared common values of all EU member states. While adopting the declaration on terrorism, the EU reaffirmed its determination to confront the terrorist threat relentlessly and comprehensively (Council of the European Union, 7906/04, 2004). It was at this forum that the decision to appoint the EU CTC was made, noting that such appointment would help to improve the coordination and visibility of the EU’s actions on fighting terrorism (Bureš, 2006).

This decision was welcomed by the European Council while adopting the report on implementation of the Declaration of March 2004. Gijs de Vries became the first EU CTC and he pushed the EU to adopt some counter-terrorism measures. Nevertheless, de Vries was criticized for his lack of expertise when it came to intelligence matters and his inadequate knowledge about the internal functioning of the EU (Mackenzie, Bureš, Kaunert & Léonard. 2013). After his resignation Gilles de Kerchove was appointed and is present EU CTC.

At the time of the establishment of the office in 2004, the EU CTC was given three main tasks:

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 To analyze the work that has been done so far and how it can be done in a more efficient manner;

 To set up a preparatory work, so that the ministers of the interior can have as much information as possible to make serious decisions when they meet in the Council;

 To make sure that once a decision has been made collectively by the European Union, said decision is implemented by every country at a national level (QCEA, 2012).

In September 2007, as the incumbent EU CTC came into office, Javier Solana- then the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy- issued a press

release with updated functions/tasks of the EU CTC which included:

 Coordinating the counter-terrorism work of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council (including a multitude of working groups and working parties);

 Maintaining an overview of the relevant EU instruments in this area; ensuring effective follow-up of Council decisions;

 Monitoring the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including making reports to the Council; fostering better communication between the EU and third countries;

 Ensuring that the EU plays an active role in the fight against terrorism as a whole EU community (Consilium, 2007).

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The appointment of EU CTC has resulted in greater efficiency amongst the member states in their efforts to combat terrorism. The EU CTC brings together often skeptical interior ministers and officials to deal with counter-terrorism and negotiate coordination options.

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Chapter II

Theoretical framework

2.1. Agenda-setting

The study of agenda-setting processes is greatly documented in the political science literature but the most significant step forward came in 1970s by Cobb, Ross, and Ross. Their approach to agenda-setting consisted of combining different agenda ‘styles’ with different political regimes. They studied how the agenda-setting process varied according to the political regimes (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). In order to further develop their model of agenda-setting the Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976) studied the Cobb and Elder (1972) pattern of informal public agenda (systemic) and formal state agenda (institutional). In the Cobb and Elder approach the systemic agenda represents all issues (public problems) that are taken up and discussed by the members of a political community. But as not all public problems are given serious consideration by the political community it can be said that issues that enter the institutional agenda are those which are accepted by the government. In other words, once the government acknowledges that something needs to be done about a certain problem then it moves to the institutional agenda. Thus, in Cobb and Elder approach the issues (public problems) follow a straight forward pattern. First, public problems move to the systemic agenda. Once the problems are accepted then they move to the institutional agenda (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). However, after the analysis of systemic and institutional agendas the study of Cobb, Ross and Ross came to the conclusion that the pattern of the issues to move from one agenda (systemic) to another (institutional) does not follow a straight forward pattern as earlier initiated by Cobb and Elder. Cobb, Ross and Ross developed three types of models depending on the agenda dynamics: “where an issue comes from and how it subsequently

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moves through other agendas” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1120). In their first outside initiative model they have identified that issues are first initiated by non-governmental groups which then can expand and reach the public agenda (systemic) and later move on to the formal agenda (institutional). Next, in the mobilization model the issues are initiated by decision-makers and are basically placed on the formal agenda by the government with no prior consultation about the real need of it, even though no grievances were recognized by the public. Finally, in the inside initiation model the policy is initiated by influential groups or actors that have access to the government’s decision-makers. The intention of said group is not to expand or contest the specific issues in public (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). In all, as each agenda-setting model represents different agenda dynamics Cobb, Ross and Ross identified that each model differs “in terms of four stages of ‘issue careers’: issue initiation, issue specification, issue expansion and issue entrance” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1120). In the end it has been concluded that it is not so much about the political regime in which the agenda-setting takes places but it is more about the sector in which it takes place.

In 1980s a more sophisticated approach to the agenda-setting was developed by John Kingdon (1984). In his multiple-stream model -based on US federal system- he focused on the state and non-state influences on the agenda-setting. According to his view the role played by the policy entrepreneurs is coming not only from the government but also from outside of the government, seizing the window of opportunity (policy window) and moving issues onto governmental agenda (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). He further distinguishes between governmental and decision agendas and explains why certain issues make it to the agenda while other issues do not and why certain optional policies are considered while others are not. The governmental agenda deals with issues that are brought up to the attention of the government from within, while decision agenda deals with issues “that are up for an active

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decision” by decision-makers (Kingdon, 1984, p. 4). Three independent streams or processes - problem, policy and politic- must be present for an issue to be taken up by the government thus seizing the window of opportunity. The problem stream represents a “focusing event” which means that a problem come to the attention of the government either by unexpected crisis or through responses to an ongoing program. The policy stream represents the solutions or suggestions to a problem. The politic stream is characterized by administrative turnover, public opinion or by pressure from interest groups (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Once these three independent streams come together at one point then a policy window opens and certain issues make it into governmental agenda. But Kingdon (1984) pointed out that while the development in the problem and the politic streams causes the policy window to open; this is not so much the case for the policy stream. On the other hand, said three streams are not enough for an issue to enter the governmental agenda as policy entrepreneurs play also a very important role in the whole process. Policy entrepreneurs are described as “advocates who are willing to invest their resources -time, energy, reputation, money- to promote a position in return for anticipated future” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 179). In other words, once the policy window opens, policy entrepreneurs seize their chance to push for their desired solutions to the problem or they push for an attention to a certain problem. Nevertheless, Kingdon's model was criticized for not been detailed enough when it comes to the three independent streams because although “the model provided an excellent discussion of agenda-setting dynamics, it failed to address adequately the existence of an agenda-setting stability” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 138).

From the earlier works related to agenda-setting it can be concluded that the main aspect of analysis is how an issue becomes an issue and the way it enters the formal or public agenda. The issues either get attention from the decision makers or the issues receive a great

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concern from the public interests. Overall, as stated by Princen (2007), “agenda can be defined as a set of issues that are seriously considered in a polity” (p. 28).

2.2 Agenda-setting in the European Union

Agenda-setting means getting attention for an issue to be considered by the decision-makers. Therefore, the agenda-setting is an important element for policy-making for politicians, interest groups or administrators because if an issue does not get much attention from the decision-makers then there is no precondition for an issue to be taken up for a decision. Thus, an issue needs to be considered by the decision-makers and then “there is a chance that some decision on some issue will be taken” (Princen, 2011). The agenda-setting is a key component of strategies that political actors pursue. But the process of agenda-setting in EU is more complex mostly due to the transnational nature of the EU and the involvement of many state and non-state actors in the EU policy process (Mazey & Richardson, 1993). As stressed by Princen (2011), two challenges are at stake for an issue to be considered by the EU. For him the first challenge as for any other agenda-setting is to get and gain attention and supporters for an issue at stake. The second challenge is to form the necessary credibility for the EU to deal with the issue. But even for these challenges Princen (2011) points out that “even if an agenda-setter can convince others that an issue is important, this is to no avail if they are not also convinced that the EU is well-placed to deal with the issue” (p. 929).

In EU the first and foremost agenda-setter is the European Commission (EC) which submits formal proposals for approval. But to think that said formal proposals are solely done by the EC would be wrong. In many circumstances the incentives for the proposals lie outside of the EC (Princen, 2007). The European Parliament (EP), the member states or the Council of Ministers also frequently persuade the EC to turn up with certain proposals. On the other

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hand, not only the above mentioned EU institutions influence the EC agenda-setting. Many interest groups try to influence the agenda as well, either directly or indirectly. The interest groups can also seek help outside the political route by obtaining ruling from the European Court of Justice which can force other EU institutions to react (Pollack, 1997, p.105).

As most of the researches on EU agenda-setting focused specially on the EU institutions and its relationships with member states, the need for a more profound approach to study EU agenda-setting was addressed (Sauter, 2010). Princen and Rhinard (2006) developed a more profound concept to understand the agenda-setting in the EU. Their concept is based on the work of Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976). While the Cobb, Ross and Ross agenda-setting model is based on three models (see section 2.1), Princen and Rhinard applied just two of the models for their study: the outside initiative model and the inside initiative model. They argue that the mobilization model is not really applicable in the EU context because “as the literature on EU governance shows, public involvement in EU decision- making is very limited” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1121). Although important public issues are being discussed at the EU level, it is still very difficult for political actors to appeal to a European public because the interest of Europeans is more focused on domestic political issues rather than on EU issues (Baumgartne, Green-Pedersen & Jones, 2006). This means that the citizens’ political loyalty still lies within their individual countries (member states).

In addition, makers at the European level -in contrast to the national decision-makers- do not really have to justify their decisions to the European public. For instance, the members of the European Parliament are elected by EU citizens but “studies show that these elections are still dominated by national issues” and not by European issues; the members of the Council of Ministers are indirectly accountable to their parliaments but the European

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issues are not really at the top of the agenda of the parliaments of the individual member states; the Commission is not accountable to any public as they are appointed by the Council (Princen, 2007, p. 31). Thus, it can be concluded that decision-makers at the EU level do not really have to seek the public mobilization when it comes to accessing an agenda. Furthermore, the dynamics of the public agenda at the EU level are less relevant than in the public agendas of the national polities (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen & Jones, 2006).

Therefore, as argued by Princen and Rhinard (2006) it is better to analyze EU agenda-setting according to two routes, namely ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’. Issues are placed on EU agenda either from above (high politics) by the European Council -this route is more political- or from below (low politics) by experts working groups and parties -this route is more technocratic- (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

The two routes follow four stages of issue career as implicated by Cobb, Ross and Ross: initiation, specification, expansion and entrance.

2.2.1 Issue initiation

It refers to the formation process of an issue. In the high politics route, issues are initiated by high political leaders in the European Council. The cause of placing an issue onto the agenda is that certain common political problem occurred, said political problem being preceded by a specific event. On the other hand, in the low politics route issues “arise as a result of professional concerns among people working in the same issue area, which operate as an ‘epistemic community´” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1121). Said two routes can in a certain point intertwine as the different interpretations of views of a certain issue can come closer to one and other.

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2.2.2 Issue specification

Here the general issue is further explained and specific demands, for example proposals, are put in place. This process is mainly related to issue framing, a well known process in the agenda setting field (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). In issue framing a particular venue is open in order to discuss the specific issue that has been framed (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). In the high politics route -in the European Council- a common political consensus to the general approach on how to deal with specific issues is agreed, while the details are left to lower level institutions to resolve. On the other hand, in the low political route the expert groups or working parties submit clearly detailed proposals to the higher level of the decision-making structure. In many instances, depending on which sector the expert group or working party is coming from, sectoral preferences can be reflected in their proposals (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1121).

2.2.3 Issue expansion

In this stage, issues are moved from the primary actors of a particular sector to the broader spectrum of participants. When it comes to the high politics route, the issues are moved from the European Council to other institutions such as the European Commission or the Council of Ministers to make official decisions. In contrast, in the low politics route the issue is expanded towards higher level institutions that have to make decisions on given proposals (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1122).

2.2.4 Issue entrance

It takes place when a specific issue enters the EU formal agenda. But, as presented by Princen and Rhinard (2006), issues can enter the formal agenda in different venues depending

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on the route taken. Each route in the issue entrance represents certain advantages and disadvantages. When it comes to high politics route the main advantage is that political and institutional inaction can be overcome by making a great political stimulus for transformation. The main disadvantage is that sometimes the political and institutional inaction reappear especially if attention is shifted towards a new issue and the political stimulus for the previous issue is declining. When it comes to low politics route the main advantage is that the issue receives a great interest from political actors and is expanded further towards the EU agenda. The main disadvantage is also said expansion towards the bigger actors as the issue is no longer uniquely inscribed in the inner-circle of the low politics route. The issue receives bigger attention and it can end up by being blocked or hijacked as the circle of participants expands (Princen & Rhinard, 2006).

Princen and Rhinard summarized the two routes as follows:

Table 1. Characteristics of the two agenda setting routes(Source: Princen & Rhinard, 2006: p. 7)

Stage in issue career High politics route Low politics route

Initiation By political leaders because of politically salient event.

Out of professional concerns in epistemic communities. Specification Formulation of political

consensus on an EU response in the European Council.

Formulation of specific and technical policy proposals in Expert Groups and Working Parties.

Expansion Toward lower levels of decision-making in the EU.

Toward higher levels of decision-making in the EU. Entrance By creating political

momentum.

By gradually building impetus.

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Princen and Rhinard (2006) also acknowledged that the two routes do not occur in their ´pure forms´ although they are clearly identified. They have recognized three ways in which the two routes can be linked:

1. The issue can be initiated by decision-makers at the intermediate level therefore the agenda setting process takes place somewhere in between.

2. Issues can be considered differently as the time passes. Hence the dynamics of the agenda will also be subjected to changes. A low politics issue may gain political weight because of a focusing event or a common opinion at the high politics level. The opposite can also happen: an issue initiated at the high politics level may lose its interest with the time and be finally taken up by lower level representatives.

3. The high and low politics routes can develop simultaneously, each one of said routes influencing the other. For instance, issue initiation may happen primarily through the high politics route, while issue specification is more affected by low politics route. Any combination of the two processes is feasible during the stages of agenda setting (Princen & Rhinard, 2006).

Princen and Rhinard concept also offers an empirical evidence which helps to better understand the constrains and limitations of the agenda setting at EU level. Section 2.3 here below further elaborates on Princen and Rhinard’s empirical expectations.

2.3. Empirical expectations

Princen and Rhinard concluded that two empirical expectations can be formulated from their concept. The first empirical expectation relates to the institutional structures and their role on the issue career agenda. In the case of issue initiation and specification,

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institutional structures can have an influence on which frames can be achievable and operational. For instance, the creation of an issue initiation can be limited or shaped in accordance to EU´s legal limitations. In addition, the existence of EU’s multiple venues “means that several different ´issue specifications´ may emerge from low-level processes” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1123).

The second empirical expectation concludes that in the expansion stage due to the EU´s complex institutional structures different actors seize the opportunities to push forward their proposals into specific venues as well as in many instances where they “call upon sympathetic expert communities to build support” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1123). The second empirical expectation then suggests that the new actors and new venues are seen as problematic especially to “those who desire the placement of an issue on the EU agenda in a particular form” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1123). The arrival of new actors and venues delays the entry of an issue on the EU´s political agenda.

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Chapter III

Research design and methodology

3.1 Research question

The aim of this thesis is to answer the following research question:

Which agenda setting route (high politics vs. low politics) was taken at the EU level to deal with the issue of (returning) foreign fighters?

In order to answer the research question a number of sub-research questions need to be answered which are related to the Princen and Rhinard concept about high vs low politics route. Here I stem from the approach of Sauter (2010, p.61) and the questions are as follows:

- Issue initiation: Why and how was the issue initiated (by political leaders or out of professional concerns in epistemic communities)?

- Issue specification: How was the issue specified (by political consensus or technical proposals in expert groups and working parties)?

- Issue expansion: How was the issue expanded towards the lower or higher levels of decision-making in the EU?

- Issue entrance: How did the issue enter the agenda (political momentum or gradually building impetus)?

Apart from answering a number of sub-research questions, time period is added due to ever changing character of the foreign fighters’ issue. At the time of the writing of this thesis a terrorist attack took place in May 2015 in Brussels and in November 2015 in Paris. Foreign fighters coming from Syria were involved in both attacks. Said events are not included in the

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analysis, therefore, the research is limited from early 2013 -when the issue of foreign fighters came into attention during a Council meeting regarding the Sahel/Maghreb crisis and the EU CTC was asked to take further work in relation to foreign fighters to beginning of 2015 -when an informal meeting of JAH ministers in January after the Charlie Hebdo attack took place and Riga joint statement was released as a response to further counter-terrorism actions..

3.2 Operationalization of key concepts

Due to EU complex structure and mixed arrangements Andersen (2003) in his article argued that it is important to know “what to measure and not primarily how to measure” when it comes to EU (p. 6). Therefore, in order to answer to this method, three steps are used to operationalize the theoretical framework of Princen and Rhinard. In the first step the issue career –issue initiation, issue specification, issue expansion and issue entrance- is clarified. The specific issues are then analyzed according to the sub-research questions and the last step consists of where the issue of foreign fighters on agenda setting ended and whether certain policies were established by European Community.

Besides the clarification of the issue career according to the theoretical framework of Princen and Rhinard the issue of foreign fighters will be studied from the point of view of its initiation to determine whether said issue was initiated from below -low politics- or from above -high politics-.

The issue career will help to identify the empirical analysis in order to structure the agenda-setting related to foreign fighters. The variations between the different stages of issue career are quite fluid. Issue initiation operationalization will be established by determining if the issue of foreign fighters was originated from the commonly shared

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political concerns from the high politics or was initiated out of professional concerns from the low politics. The precedents of the issue at this stage can either be originated by the Council decisions, the epistemic communities or from certain officials from the EC. The operationalization of the issue specification will refer to the phase when the issue is being framed into proposals. In this phase the issues that are being framed are the twenty two measures presented by the EU CTC. The operationalization of the issue expansion will move “beyond the initial actors in specific venues to a wider set of participants” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1122). Depending where the issue of foreign fighters was initiated the issue can move from the Council of the EU or the European Council to the lower level of decision-makers such as the European Commission or the European Parliament. The Issue entrance operationalization will depend on “when an issue gains access to the formal agenda of EU decision-makers” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1122). At this stage the issue can enter the formal agenda of the Council or can be further put on the formal agenda of other European institutions.

Princen and Rhinard (2006) paper puts forward two examples to better explain their provided theoretical framework. The two examples will serve as a good guiding model to analyze which agenda setting route was taken to deal with the issue of foreign fighters. In the first example, related to anti-smoking policy, Princen and Rhinard identified that the issue evolved thanks to the expert communities which led to establishing proposals related to the effects of smoking on health. The issue was, therefore, driven by the ´low politics route´ gaining lots of attention from the EC. The European Council was determined as ´high politics´ actor that put the issue on the EU agenda (Princen & Rhinard, 2006). In the second example, relating to bio-terrorism policy, Princen and Rhinard acknowledged that the events of anthrax attack in US in 2001 was the moving

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moment for the EU leaders to put this issue forward at the European Council meeting (´high politics route´). But Princen and Rhinard further recognized in their analysis of bio-terrorism policy that the ´the low politics´ also shaped the way how the issue arrived on the EU agenda. Different units at the Council and EC (´low politics route´) were involved in drawing up alternative and preferred proposals before putting it on the EU agenda (Princen & Rhinard, 2006).

The analyzed cases portrayed that the framing of an issue in the right moment is an important element in the EU agenda setting and “framing processes are closely linked to the institutional venues in which an issue is discussed” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1129).

3.3 Data collection

The aim of this paper is to determine which agenda setting route (high politics vs. low politics) was taken at the EU level to deal with the issue of foreign fighters and its returnees. To be more specific, it will be determined whether placing the issue of foreign fighters on the agenda setting achieved any execution from the European Community.

As the case study is based on the empirical evidence -which usually takes an explanatory path- the collection of data is based on desk research. Online articles, books and journals were used to describe the process in order to analyze the agenda setting in the EU. The Princen and Rhinard model of high and low politics route at EU level was the main document related to the agenda setting in EU. It also served as main theoretical framework

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for this thesis. Further, the online database of Leiden Library and Google Scholar were used to search for articles related to agenda setting in EU.

Next, video statements of the EU CTC, archives of the Council and papers related to foreign fighters were searched and relevant Council documents (see ANNEXES) were analyzed. Another good source of research was the Statewatch website which provides analysis related to the statements of EU CTC on foreign fighters. The database also outlines further steps taken at the EU level.

3.4 Data analysis

According to Miles and Huberman (1994) qualitative data can be analyzed and grouped into three sections: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction represents transformation and simplification of original documents to move closer to the actual research question. Data display is characterized by the previously reduced datasets which are compressed and organized in such a way that conclusions can be drawn and verified. Conclusion drawing/verification represents the beginning of what things mean. Decisions are made about regularities, patterns, explanations and configurations (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10-11).

My research follows the Miles and Huberman model of analyzing data. The theoretical framework of Princen and Rhinard serves as an overall strategy for data analysis. Relevant documents related to the issue of foreign fighters at EU level were summarized and subsequently analyzed according to the theoretical framework.

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3.5 Limitations

The first set of limitations is associated to the EU agenda-setting itself. The EU is very transnational in nature and many state and non-state actors can be involved in certain issues. Therefore, the agenda-setting at the EU can become quite complex. Moreover, for an issue to be considered at the EU level in certain instances a powerful focusing event needs to happen in order to get and gain attention from the EU decision-makers.

The second set of limitations is related to the analysis of the Council documents dealing with the foreign fighters. After the initial introduction of twenty-two measures by the EU CTC, additional documents [doc. 16768/13 or doc. 16002/14] related to the foreign fighters and returnees coming from Syria were produced and additional measures were implemented by JHA Council, but said documents were not accessible via the public register and access to obtain them was denied.

The third set of limitations refers to the number of Western foreign fighters who left for or returned from Syria. I had to solely rely on on-line articles which provided only rough estimates about foreigners fighting along the extremist groups in Syria or Iraq. Thus, the actual number of Western foreign fighters in said countries can differ from the figures disclosed in this work.

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Chapter IV

Case study: Foreign fighters and its returnees on EU agenda

The foreign fighters traveling to Syria and other hotspots and its returnees have become a great security concern in EU. Since 2013, foreign fighters have been gaining increasing attention. The international policy makers and media started to question “the identity of those who were travelling to the region in order to join the rebel groups” (Qureshi, 2014, p. 6). Chapter IV will focus on the analysis of the foreign fighters’ agenda setting according to Princen and Rhinard’s (2006) concept.

4.1 Issue Initiation

The initiation of the issue referring to foreign fighters and returnees was somewhat similar to the Princen and Rhinard´s (2006) analysis of EU bioterrorism policy because it was preceded by a dominant focusing event. In their analysis, the 2001 anthrax attack in US played a main role as a powerful focusing event because “European leaders made a swift call for more EU action against bioterrorism” right after the attack. Emergency meeting in Ghent Belgium was held by the European Council to enhance the importance to strengthen the anti-bioterrorism efforts in Europe (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1126). As indicated by Princen and Rhinard the issue initiation of EU bioterrorism policy was driven from above ´high politics´ as the issue received a great attention from political leaders.

The foreign fighters´ focusing events were the developments in Mali and the terrorist attack on the gas facility In Amenas, Algeria. The implications of Sahel/Maghreb crisis paved

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the way to hold a meeting (in February/March 2013) concerning the EU internal security by the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Council. Indications were made at the meeting that EU was (and still is) facing “a serious terrorist threat from the Sahel/Maghreb, both for EU citizens and interests in the region and potentially in Europe” (Council of the European Union, 6983/13, 2013). Among other issues, the EU CTC was asked in this forum to take the work forward regarding the foreign fighters.

The main points addressed at the meeting to the EU CTC to monitor and prevent the movements of foreign fighters were:

 To analyze the responses of the practices of the criminal justice on the foreign fighters phenomenon and make proposals about the necessary measures to be taken. Eurojust was proposed to make a tactical meeting to start information sharing between law enforcement services and prosecutors.

 To draw up recommendations on how to make best use of information exchange, especially through the use of Europol Information System and develop a more cohesive response concerning accessing data.

 Increased cooperation was requested when it came to foreign fighters not only from the Sahel region but also with Turkey to monitor the flow of fighters going to Syria (Council of the European Union, 6983/13, 2013).

The referred points addressed not just internal issues of the EU but also the need of setting up external lines of action.

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Like the Princen and Rhinard´s EU bioterrorism policy the issue of foreign fighters was initiated by the political leaders. Thus, the issue took the path from above -´high politics route´-.

4.2 Issue Specification

When it comes to issue specification a common political consensus regarding the foreign fighters was agreed at the Council and the details were left for lower level institutions to collaborate further on the issue. As mentioned above EU CTC (lower level EU unit) was assigned to take further work concerning the foreign fighters.

Therefore, for the EU CTC it was important to frame the issue of foreign fighters and its returnees in such a way that it would become responsive to EU action. And because there were no indications that the returned foreign fighters will stage a terrorist attack or any act of violence after their return to EU, concerns were made that “the extremist groups in Syria will switch their (the foreign fighters) attention to Europe” (Qureshi, 2014, p.7). The engagement in fight, the subsequent experience, training and probable radicalization let to believe that the returned foreign fighters can plot a terrorist attack in EU.

On the other hand, the recent developments related to a migrant crisis of 2015 suppose that foreign fighters from ISIS are being smuggled to Western European countries to stage an attack. As reported by the BuzzFeed News already a number of foreign fighters (although not all of them are European citizens) are in Europe and ready to attack (Giglio, 2015). The migrant crisis might put a whole new perspective to the reports that ´fighting abroad and coming back to home country to engage in violence is somewhat exaggerated´ (Qureshi, 2014).

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Nevertheless, in April 2013 EU CTC distributed a memo among the Council of Europe ministers stating concerns about how EU countries were responding to EU individuals travelling to Syria. The initial memo stated that:

“Foreign fighters travelling to Syria are a major security threat to the EU and its Member States. While the primary responsibility of dealing with this threat lies with the Member States, the EU can and should play a supportive role” (Qureshi, 2014, p. 6)

The memo delivered by the EU CTC and stating concerns about the foreign fighters travelling to Syria relied on the information that was provided to him from “right-inclined think tank, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR)” (Qureshi, 2014, p. 6). The ICSR claimed that about 2,000 – 5,000 foreign fighters left for Syria to join either the rebel or jihadist groups (Qureshi, 2014, p. 6). The EU CTC took into account also contributions from the Commission services, the European External Action Service (EEAS), Member States and relevant agencies (Council of the European Union, 9946/13, 2013).

Subsequently in May, after the initial memo that was distributed among the Council of Europe ministers, the EU CTC put together twenty-two measures (proposals) to be taken for action by the EU. But in order to specify which measures were the best to deal with the foreign fighters the EU CTC worked closely with EU´s lower-level units of decision making bodies specifically the Commission and EEAS (Statewatch, 2013).

The published paper ´Foreign Fighters and Returnees from a Counter-Terrorism Perspective, in Particular with Regard to Syria´, outlining the twenty-two measures,

Foreign Fighters: Setting of the Agenda at EU level

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