Political Ideals and Economic Opportunities: A Study of Violence
in the Colombian Armed Conflict
Author: Maurits Dumoulin Student Number: 1428950
Date: 05-07-2019
University of Leiden - Faculty of Humanities Word Count: 14778
Key Words: Colombian armed conflict, PSC, Violence, war system, FARC, right-wing paramilitarism, political economy
Abstract
The study questions how violence broke out during the Colombian protracted social conflict between the FARC and the Colombian state. By using the war system to study violence the research brings a new perspective on the Colombian armed conflict. The research’s findings suggest that the Colombian war system broke after the FARC expanded in the early 1980s. As a result, a set of events was set in motion related to the balance of power and the economic opportunities of the fighting actors. While the territorial expansion of the FARC provided new opportunities for the paramilitaries in terms of privatized protection, both actors grew rich on the Colombian coca boom. The study then uses Marxist Political Economy to analyze conflicting interests between the FARC and the paramilitary forces, leading to a struggle for land. The methods employed by the actors to pursue their goals translated into the exorbitant levels of violence that have characterized the conflict.
Table of Content
Abstract 2
Abbreviations 4
1. Introduction 6
2.1 Literature Review 7-9
2.2 The War System 9-13
3. Theory 13-15
4. Methodology 15-18
5. Chapter One: Rupture of the War System 19-26
5.1 Introduction 19
5.2 Expansion of the FARC 19-20
5.3 The Balance of Power 20-23
5.4 Escalation of Violence 23-24
5.5 The Origins of the Paramilitary Forces 25-26
6. Chapter Two: The War Economy 27-36
6.1 Introduction 27
6.2 Financial Expansion of the FARC 28-30
6.3 Financial Expansion of the Paramilitary Forces 30-32
6.4 The Struggle for Land 32-34
6.5 Second Wave of Violence 34-36
7. Chapter Three: The Reaction of the State 37-40
7.1 Introduction 37
7.2 Dynamics between the Military and the Paramilitary Forces 37-38
7.3 Modernization and the Balance of Power 38-39
7.4 Demobilization and Violence 39-40
8. Conclusion 41-42
9. Appendix 43-52
Abbreviations
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - United Self-Defenders of Colombia CNMH Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica - National Centre of Historical
Memory
CONVIVIR Cooperativas de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada - Special Vigilance and Private Security Services
ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional - National Liberation Army
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
IEPRI Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales - Institute for Political Studies and International Relations
MAS Muerte a los Secuestradores - Death to the Kidnappers MPE Marxist Political Economy
PSC Protracted Social Conflict
RNI Red Nacional de Información - National Information Network
RUV Registro Unico de Victimas - Unit for Victims Assistance and Reparation UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
1. Introduction
In his book Systems of Violence: the Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, Richani takes a new approach to the study of protracted social conflict (PSC). By analyzing the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian state, Richani tests the war system hypothesis. The war system explains the perpetuance of PSC by identifying three necessary factors; (1) a failure of the state and its institutions to resolve social issues between two or more groups; (2) a positive political economy of the non-state insurgency by accumulation of economic and political assets, resulting in a situation in which peace would bear higher costs than continuation of conflict; and (3) a balance of power between the fighting actors, which ends up in a 'comfortable impasse' (Richani, 2013). His thesis states that the presence of the mentioned variables (see figure 1.1) results in the emergence of a war system, which tends to perpetuate itself up to the point when any of the three variables is lacking. The rupture of the war system would most likely lead to a faster ending of conflict. The period between the rupture of the war system and the moment of conflict ending is characterized by high levels of violence (Ibid).
After having demonstrated the existence of the war system, Richani moves on to his central thesis. He argues that the Colombian war system broke due to the emergence of right-wing paramilitary groups in the 1990s, destabilizing the bipolar war system between the FARC and the Colombian state. Consequently, the extreme levels of violence that can be noticed in Colombia are attributed to the rupture of the comfortable impasse in the 1990s. More than eight million people suffered from some sort of violence since the beginning of the conflict in 1964 until its ending in 2016. Figure 1.2 underlines Richani’s argument and demonstrates a sharp increase in victims during the 1990s. Yet this thesis will study the possibility of an earlier rupture of the Colombian war system. The research question that will be answered is: how did the extreme levels of violence break out during the Colombian conflict between the FARC and the Colombian state during the 1990s and 2000s? Violence here is understood as the deliberate enactment of physical force, inflicting damage on the victim. Before elaborating on theory and measurement of violence, Richani’s work will be placed into a broader body of literature on PSC.
2.1 Literature Review
The notion of Richani's war system is built upon a larger body of literature on PSC. The concept of PSC was coined by Edward Azar. He was mainly concerned with defining the parameters of PSC and the variables making up the necessary conditions under which PSC emerges. In the context of the cold war, the discipline of conflict studies was concentrated on inter-state conflict and dynamics between superpowers. Studying the Arab-Israeli conflict, Azar became aware that the then existing theories were incapable of providing a satisfactory account of the origins and dynamics of the conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict was more complex, he believed. Recognizing that the structure of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the cause of more conflictual circumstances, Azar started to formulate a theory taking into account the issues of protractedness as well as the structure of the conflict. PSC then was defined as a long-enduring period of hostility between two or more groups, characterized by occasional outbreaks of open warfare, fluctuating in intensity and frequency, and with no clear point of termination (Azar, Jureidini & McLaurin, 1978).
Rapoport differentiated between PSC on the one hand, and enduring rivalries on the other hand, although the two terms have been and are still used interchangeably (Azar, 1983; Friedman, 1999; Goertz & Diehl, 1992, 2000; Schrodt, 1983). Nevertheless, at least two differences can be noted between these two types of conflict: first of all, enduring rivalries involve two nation-states, with the state as the main unit of analysis (Diehl 1994; Gochman & Maoz 1984; Wayman, 1982). Secondly, the engagement of states in active warfare is seen as a possible but by no means necessary condition for an enduring rivalry (Beaudoin, 2014). PSC, on the contrary, often involves the state as an important actor in the conflict, but non-state actors are the main unit of analysis (Azar, 1985). The conflict between the Colombian state and the FARC falls within the category of PSC.
For the understanding of a PSC the definition of Beaudoin (2014) will be adopted. Beaudoin presents a concrete theoretical framework of the “descriptive and sustaining components” of PSC, existing of two parts. The first part considers the observable factors which are: the participation of non-state actor(s); the engagement of actors in violent conflict with the emergence of a war culture; a time frame of conflict consisting of at least twenty years; at least three incidents of conflict related violence over a time frame of twenty years; and 500 or more related deaths (Beaudoin, 2014). The second part of her framework lays down the sustaining factors of PSC: (1) the incapacity of the state to deal with competition
over finite sources, which include security in the form of basic needs such as food, shelter, physical safety and well-being, access over resources, territory, identity, autonomy, self-esteem and a sense of justice: and (2) the issues of identity and recognition of identity, which are considered the psychological motivation behind the outbreak of PSC (Ibid). The sustaining factors correspond with the first variable of the war system (hegemonic crisis) and the FARC their political goals.
After the end of the Cold War a renewed interest in PSC can be observed (Bloomfield, 1996; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Elbadawi, 1999; Keen, 1998; Licklider, 1993; Zartman, 1995) and different bodies of literature have adopted distinct approaches to PSC. Some of these approaches can be incorporated into Azar's interpretation of PSC, while others demand adaptation as they bring new perspectives to literature on PSC. International Political Economy, for example, with its focus on increased domestic inequality as a result of the destructing impact of global capitalism, coincides with Azar's observation that PSCs are predominantly taking place in the Third World (Duffield, 2001; Ramsbotham, 2005).
Other approaches are more difficult to incorporate into Azar's framework, and can therefore be seen as contributions to the theoretization process. While Azar has been interested in the factors of nationalism and ethnicity as causal factors of internal conflict, Lake and Rothschild’s (1996) research and findings of ethnic conflict contradict with Azar's conclusion that internal conflict as a result of ethnic tension is not caused by hatred but by a shared fear about the future (Lake & Rothschild, 1996). The most convincing objection to Azar's work is known as the ‘greed versus grievance’ dichotomy. According to the greed factor, civil wars do not have to be caused by reasons of political grievances. Economic factors could account for outbreaks of internal conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Keen, 1998). Central to the greed argument is the possibility of conflict outbreak due to socio-economic differences within a society. The protractedness of internal conflicts motivated by economic greed stems for a part from the neglection of the political economy at the negotiation tables (Berdal & Keen, 1997). While the main factor behind conflict outbreak in Colombia was political, the greed factor played an important role once conflict had commenced and other actors joined the war system.
The literature discussed so far has limited itself to definitions and identification of factors of conflict outbreak. The applicability of these approaches to the study of violence is therefore limited. Other bodies of literature have focused on conflict ending and
theoretization on the factors of protractedness. Ikle (1971) links the intensity of civil war to complexity of conflict ending. In doing so he identifies five variable clusters that explain the ending of internal conflict: issues which underlie the conflict; the internal politics of each side; the military balance; activities of third parties; and the terms of settlement (Ikle, 1971). Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom relate the duration of civil wars to structural conditions. They find income per capita, levels of inequality and moderate ethnic division to be structural factors that impact the duration of civil war. Factors that could shorten internal conflict include the commodities that the country exports and external military intervention on the side of the rebel group (Collier, Hoefler & Soderboom, 2004). Approaches to conflict ending are less relevant for this research as it is the relation between PSC and violence that will be studied. In addition, the factors of protractedness identified by Collier, Hoeffler and Soderboom differ from the factors of protractedness and do not link factors of PSC to violence. In conclusion the bodies of literature presented above focus on factors relating to conflict outbreak and conflict ending. Yet this research is particularly interested in the period between conflict outbreak and ending. It is in the ‘in between’ period in which violence is most likely to break out.
2.2 The War System
Richani’s contribution to the literature on PSC can be found in a systemic approach, covering the longevity and unsteadiness of PSC. The war system sets the conditions for a situation in which conflict ending and outbursts of violence are most probable. He states the conditions which make up the war system:
“[...] (1) the failure of the institutions, the channels and the prevailing political mechanism to mediate, adjudicate, or arbitrate conflicts among antagonistic social and political groups; (2) the antagonists' success in adapting themselves to conflict by establishing a “positive political economy” through accumulating political and economic assets that make the condition of war the best available option given the balance of power and the higher costs of peace; and (3) a balance of forces among the conflict in groups or actors that results in a comfortable impasse” (Richani, 2013, p. 3-4).
A lack of any of the following three factors results in a rupture of the war system. An unstable war system makes conflict ending and outbursts of violence more likely. By demonstrating the presence of the three variables in Colombia, Richani comes to the central
argument of his book. He asserts that the Colombian war system was interrupted by the emergence and the development of right-wing paramilitaries in the 1990s. The argument holds that the emergence of the paramilitary forces in the 1990s resulted in a clash with the FARC for economically strategic lands (Ibid). As a result, the variable of the positive political economy changed, destabilizing the war system. This claim is backed up by a threefold of evidential factors; (1) the number of violent deaths and massacres (2) the number of war-related fatalities and (3) the economic costs of war – which are examined between 1988 and 2000 (Richani, 2013). As it is not the war system that is questioned in this research but the moment of its rupture, the next parts will demonstrate the presence of the three variables to justify usage of the war system for this research and to introduce the Colombian internal conflict.
The first factor, the failure of state institutions to find a political solution to social conflict, can best be explained by setting out the origins of the conflict and the factors hindering a political solution before the war system came into existence. From the moment Colombia became independent from Spain in 1810, the division of land was a problem. Large pieces of land were granted to prominents of the War of Independence. On these lands colonial modes of agricultural production were continued. The peasants working on large farms for their landlords tried to improve their economic situation and demanded own land or wage. To illustrate the issue, from 1875 to 1930, 450 confrontations have been recorded between peasants and landlords (Zamosc, 1986). The landlords on the other hand sought to prevent this from happening, using their economic power and political connections, resorting to violence as an ultimate tool of oppression (LeGrand, 2003).
The land issue escalated during and after the civil war from 1948 to 1958, known as La Violencia(The Violence). Although La Violencia was mainly a political clash between the liberal and conservative party (Ibid), it bore important implications for the position of the peasants. During La Violencia, extremist liberals and members from the Communist Party fled from the capital to more remote areas escaping persecution. They proclaimed independent peasant republics in the distant areas and attracted peasants fleeing the violence inflicted on them by landlords (Gonzalez Arias, 1992). Some of the peasants and communists started to arm themselves in order to defend themselves against attacks from the army. Out of these self-defense groups the FARC would develop between 1964-1966.
A number of factors can be named to explain the hegemonic crisis of the Colombian state, exemplified by the inability of political institutions to resolve the social tensions on the Colombian countryside. Party affiliations, the influence of businesses and wealthy landowners, and Colombia’s geography characterized by rainforest and mountains are all factors which complicated the ability of the state to exert central power (Le Grand, 2003; Hartlyn 1985; Leal Buitrago & Dâvila Ladron de Guevara 1990). In addition, politics was mostly executed on a regional level (Roldan, 2002).
Power of local influences such as landlords becomes more apparent when examining the efforts of several Liberal politicians concerned with the faith of peasants. Several laws and land reforms were being proposed and implemented. Yet their effectiveness was very limited due to the ability of landlords to exercise their local and national political power. Law 100 of 1944 and Agrarian law 135 of 1965 (which stipulated expropriation of unused lands to peasants) are examples of failed legal and political initiatives to better the situation of the peasants. Law 135 was so ineffective that by 1971 only 1% of the land eligible for expropriation had been redistributed (Richani, 2013). Hitherto it was the inability of the Colombian state to take care of all its citizens causing the creation of the FARC in the first place.
A positive political economy is the second variable of the war system. The dynamics of conflict are greatly dependent on the change in the balance of disposable assets. The assets are divided into economic and political tools. If one party experiences a negative political economy, the other party is less inclined to engage in negotiations other than complete surrender (Richani, 2013). Moreover, a positive political economy makes protractedness of conflict more likely. Richani measures political assets as the size of controlled area, the ability to influence public policy, and evaluation whether the opposite party gained or lost political recognition as a result of the use of political violence. The economic assets are defined as the income generated by a fighting actor.
In the case of the military, Richani connects the existence of the comfortable impasse to the strategy of low-intensity warfare of the Colombian military, underlined by the notion that state institutions and agencies can express their own objectives and carry them out (Skocpol, Evans & Rueschemeyer, 1985). Historically speaking, the Colombian military has enjoyed high levels of autonomy since the military regimes of 1953-1958. Before the Constitutional reforms of 1991, it decided almost exclusively on the national security strategy
and the execution of the military budget. Richani then proceeds connecting the strategy of low-intensity warfare to the financial benefits made possible by the high level of military autonomy. Over time, budgets, salaries and pensions increased, while ex-militaries profited from high levels of violence by setting up private security enterprises (Richani, 2013). The military thus had a key interest in maintaining a low-intensity warfare with the FARC.
The FARC traditionally relied on agriculture and colonization of uninhabited lands for their income (LeGrand, 2003). Moreover, the FARC had made kidnappings and extortion their trademark since their beginning. The FARC could also count on financial contributions from sympathisants and like-minded (Cook, 2011). Lastly, the territorial expansion of the FARC in the 1980s and 1990s corresponded for a part with the colonization of areas by the peasants it defended. The territorial expansion was accompanied by a radical development of their political economy. The largest part of their finances centered around the cultivation of coca (Bolivar, 2004). Over the years, Colombian cocaine production was booming, attracting the unemployed to settle in FARC territory and contributing to the capital of the FARC.
In addition to their economic growth and territorial expansion, Richani proves the political power of the FARC by referring to the four types of interrelated activities part of the notion of state-making coined by Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1985). Taking into account that the FARC engaged in war-making (eliminating enemies outside its territories), state-making (eliminating enemies within its territories), protection of their clients, and extracting resources to make possible the above, Richani claims that the FARC took over the hegemonic position of the Colombian state in the territories they controlled (Richani, 2013). The FARC collected taxes, invested in infrastructure and public facilities, and created and enforced their rules over the territory under FARC control.
The last variable, the balance of power, both explains contraction of social conflict as well as escalation. A change in the balance of forces could possibly lead to a change in the dynamics of war and behavior of the fighting actors. One of the key manners to study a perceived change in the balance of power is by examination of the goals and strategies. Richani stipulates two types of changes: symmetrical and complementary. While the first leads to a spiral in which the incumbents engage in either a race to the bottom or appeasement from one side, the war system gets disrupted as a consequence of the latter, with conflict continuation or termination as a result (Richani, 2013). In Colombia, the balance of
forces was basically ensured by the strategy of the military of low-intensity warfare and the hegemonic crisis, allowing the FARC to exist in remote areas.
The motivation for studying a different moment of a rupture to the war system can be found in the nature of Richani’s argument. The relation between a change in the political economy of the FARC, as a result of a struggle for economically strategic lands with the paramilitary forces, and the outbreak of violence seems illogical. There are two reasons to assume so. First of all, while the paramilitary forces had been present since the beginning of the conflict in the 1960s, their expansion can be observed in the 1990s. Claiming that the comfortable impasse suffered a blow due to a diminished political economy entails that the development of the paramilitary forces in the 1990s did not bring about a change to the balance of power before, because the political economy was the variable that was affected. Taking into account that the paramilitary forces expanded rapidly in the 1990s, up to an estimated 8000 men (Richani, 2013; Le Grand, 2003), Richani’s claim entails that the FARC were fighting the Colombian army and the growing paramilitaries at the same time, while the balance of power remained more or less equal. Consequently, the FARC would have had to grow simultaneously so that the balance of forces remained equal. The unlikeliness of this claim is demonstrated by the military successes of the FARC in the 1990s (Cruz Ricci, 2011)(see chapter one), which indicates that the balance of forces had already changed.
The second reason relates to the connection between a change to the political economy and violence. According to Richani, the struggle for economically strategic lands between the FARC and the paramilitaries resulted in a changed political economy of the FARC. This line of reasoning entails that it was violence as a result of the struggle for land which caused a diminished political economy. According to the war system theory, a change to any of the variables results in a situation of instability in which violence outbreaks are more probable. Ergo, using the war system to study violence would need a change in the political economy of an actor to cause violence instead of the other way around. It is for these two reasons that this study assumes a different cause of the war system’s rupture, which somehow relates to the struggle for land between the FARC and the paramilitary forces.
3. Theory
Both with respect to the origins of the conflict as with the by Richani identified cause of the war system’s rupture, the struggle for land as economic means of production was a factor of importance. For this reason Marxist Political Economy (MPE) will be used. MPE allows for understanding the origins of the conflict. The origins of the conflict between the FARC and the state fit into Marx's discourse of asymmetrical power relations between capitalists and wage labourers. Since Colombian independence from the Spanish Crown, the division of land had been an issue, creating social tension between landlords and the peasants working on their lands. The creation of the FARC can be placed in the struggle between capitalists and peasants and corresponds with its three main objectives: the fight against American imperialism and the empowered oliecharcy, and their striving for radical land reforms (FARC-EP Statute, 2007).
The raison d'être of the FARC remained relevant throughout the conflict, especially after the guerrilla movement had accumulated large amounts of capital itself. As will be explained, the FARC initially opposed participation in the drug economy. The decision to change their attitude can be understood by MPE. Participation in the international market economy of drugs was a mean to a higher political end. By participating in the world economy and the illegal production of cocaine, the FARC accumulated resources they used for their cause. The FARC were thus primarily a political actor, with economic motivations coming at second place.
In a similar way MPE helps understanding the position of the paramilitaries within the war system and subsequently the tension between the FARC and the paramilitary forces. The paramilitary forces capitalized on the economic opportunities provided by war system. Their decision to participate in the drug economy fits into their main goal, which was economic instead of political (see chapter two). The dissimilarities concerning the motives to participate in the war system and the drug economy will be relevant with regard to the understanding of the emergence and expansion of the paramilitaries, and helps studying the outbreak of violence in the 1990s.
Related to the emergence and expansion of the paramilitary forces is the connection between the paramilitaries and the Colombian army. While both the FARC and the paramilitary forces participated in the drug economy and used violence to reach their goals, the Colombian government condoned the existence of the paramilitary forces well into the
2000s. In article 42 of Law 356 of 1994, for example, the government authorized the creation of the CONVIVIR paramilitary forces to be employed in urban neighborhoods in response to increased guerrilla presence (El Tiempo, 1994). The condonation of the paramilitaries by the state can be explained by looking at the threat posed to the existence of the state by guerrilla movements. The most important objective of the FARC was to gain political power at the expense of the state. The paramilitary forces on the other hand, were primarily economic actors, paid for fighting the guerrillas.
While this study will attempt to identify an earlier rupture of the war system, the tension between the FARC and the paramilitary forces is still relevant as it helps accounting for the outbreaks of violence. The different objectives will be used to study the struggle between the FARC and the paramilitary forces for economically strategic lands. It will be argued that the opposing motives to participate in the war system and the drug economy are related to a ideological clash. In short, to analyze the actors of the war system and the outbreak of violence it is crucial to understand the means and ends of the actors, which is what MPE allows for.
4. Method
To research how violence broke out, the change from a stable to unstable war system will be studied. The independent variable taken is the war system and the dependent variable is the unstable war system. As discussed, the study assumes a different causal mechanism than assumed by Richani. Figure 4.1 displays Richani’s account of the destabilization of the war system, and thus the explanation to the question how violence broke out.
If Richani’s argument is valid and the emergence of the paramilitaries was indeed the rupture to the war system, either one of the two next scenarios needs to be true: (1) the initial expansion of the FARC did not bring about a change to the balance of power; and (2) the war system stabilized again before expansion of the paramilitaries. A simultaneous development of power is unlikely as the evolvement of the paramilitaries took place nearly one decade later. By means of a case-centric approach, this study aims at discovering a different causal mechanism.
In order to identify the causal mechanism and the consequent set of events, the study adopts process tracing as a method. The method is praised for its ability to identify causal mechanisms between independent and dependent variables. The complexity of the conflict,
which is reflected by the myriad of interacting factors and actors, requires a method which is able to isolate factors without losing sight of the connection between variables to fully understand the sequence of matters (Collier, 2011). The method thus helps maintaining focus on key factors out of a seemingly endless options of events and historical affairs. Together with the war system and the sequence of events, a number of external factors will be presented to explain how certain mechanisms are related. Apart from discovering the factors, process tracing allows to explore the order of events, with each answer to a sub-question leading to a new one. The answer to each question forms a chapter of this research. Together, the combined answers to each chapter will form the answer to the research question.
To demonstrate the connection between the independent variable, the causal mechanism and the dependent variable, critical data will be presented on violence and the victims of violence. Violence is measured by looking at the number of victims and the type of violence inflicted upon the victims. The link between the rupture of the war system and violence is measured by looking at the fighting capabilities of the FARC. Information on the victims mainly considers the time frame, location, executor of violence, type of violence and the amount of violence. Most of the information comes from the Colombian government or government-sponsored organizations researching the Colombian conflict. The CNMH (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historial) and the RNI (Red Nacional de Información) for example, have gathered information on the Colombian conflict to make known the atrocities that have happened during the Colombian conflict. In addition, data retrieved from a series of yearly reports of the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) has been used to analyze the Colombian drug economy.
Answering the research question commences with determining the causal mechanism to the rupture of the war system. The first chapter centers around the question if the war system was already broken before the expansion of the FARC, and if so how the earlier rupture impacted the war system. To answer the question is to refute or confirm the first scenario. As has been explained, one of the reasons to assume a different causal mechanism links to the assumed change to the balance of power and the time frame. The FARC expanded earlier than the paramilitary forces did (Cook, 2011; Pecaut, 2008; Torres, 2006; Velez, 2001). The chapter therefore studies whether the expansion of the FARC resulted in a change to the balance of power. By looking at the number of fighters, their territorial expansion and the number of incursions, it will be argued that the first scenario is not valid.
The last section underlines this claim by studying the outbreak of violence in relation to a changed balance of power.
The second chapter centers around the second scenario and tries to demonstrate a single and lasting broken war system. This would mean that the expansion of the paramilitary forces and the struggle for land has to be incorporated into the argument that will be made in the first chapter. The dependent variable, violence, would then be the result of an interrelated set of events set in motion by the causal mechanism which impacted the independent variable. The question will be asked how the outbreak of violence caused by the emergence of the paramilitaries in the 1990s links to rupture of the war system a decade earlier. Of relevance is the development of the war economy which preceded the struggle for land. The chapter will start with linking the war economy to the war system. Next, by using MPE the objectives of each actor in relation to the war system and the relation of the actors with the war economy will be analyzed. By studying the link between the expansion of the FARC and the expansion of the paramilitaries, a connection will be identified, refuting the second variable (thus confirming the validity of figure 4.2). Next the methods used to achieve their objectives will be linked to the second wave of violence. The data used for this chapter relates to the war economy, the political economy of the FARC and the paramilitary forces, and the outbreak of violence.
After having focused primarily on the FARC and the paramilitaries, the last chapter looks at the reaction of the state to the changed war system and the large amount of violence in the 1990s and 2000s. The central argument of the study will be strengthened by considering the role of the state in the conflict. It will be argued that before the 1999, the role of the military in the Colombian conflict was rather passive. After 1999 however, the military modernized. The third chapter will study how the expansion of the Colombian army relates to the war system and the levels of violence. This will be done by examining the balance of power vis-a-vis the FARC and studying the relation between the paramilitaries and the army.
Before proceeding with answering the sub-questions, the limits of this research will be mentioned. Related to the used method, this research covers a large variety of variables and data. The validity of the research could be affected by the scope of the research. While using a great number of variables and datasets is common with regard to the method, this could possibly impact the data-validity (Schimmelfennig, 2013). Another factor that could affect the validity of information is the fact that the data gathered is on a guerrilla movement
and a now illegal military-civilian group. Questions could thus be posed regarding the availability and reliability of critical data. Unfortunately, this is inevitable when conducting research on the FARC and the paramilitary forces. In addition, the cohesion of the final argument could be negatively impacted by the large number of variables and ground covered in this research, especially taking into account the small scope of this research.
5. Chapter One: Rupture of the War System
5.1 Introduction
In order to assess the outbreak of violence caused by the end of the comfortable impasse, it is necessary to determine what factor caused the war system to break and when. The question that will be answered in this chapter relates to the dilemma posed above: did the war system already disrupt before the escalation of violence in the 1990s and if so, how did the rupture impact levels of violence? If Richani’s argument is valid, and the emergence of the paramilitaries was indeed the rupture to the war system, the initial expansion of the FARC did not bring about a change to the balance of power (or the war system stabilized after the FARC their expansion before breaking again). In order to rule out the first scenario under which Richani’s argument could still hold, this chapter proceeds with studying the expansion of the FARC and its impact on the Colombian armed conflict.
5.2 Expansion of the FARC
In order to demonstrate the expansion of the FARC, the Seventh Conference of the FARC in May 1982 is taken as point of departure. The conference is generally mentioned as the starting point of the FARC their expansion (Cook, 2011; Pecaut, 2008; Torres, 2006; Velez, 2001). The goals of the conference will be explained and juxtaposed to the observable changes in their political-military strategy to assess the impact of the expansion. The change of name after the conference covers its most important implication. It was decided that to the original name, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the adjunct 'People's Army' would be added. The FARC no longer viewed themselves as an insurgency but as a military force. Referring to the lack of legitimacy of the Colombian government to rule in the context of state repression and violence, the FARC believed that this was the moment to increase pressure on the government and advance their political goals (Serres, 2000). Succinctly, the defensive and guerrilla-like manner of insurgency was changed for a more offensive strategy.
The change of name was accompanied by a number of political-military objectives. The literature on the expansion of the FARC lists six: (1) control of the Eastern Cordillera, the most eastern branch of the Colombian Andes, which allows to control the pass between the capital Bogota and the department of Meta, one of the traditional strongholds of the FARC; (2) the accumulation of more financial sources; (3) the creation of communication
networks linking the FARC with important routes to the sea, with the purpose of facilitating the trade of arms and drugs; (4) control of the border area with Venezuela, and later on control of the border area with Ecuador; (5) urbanization of the conflict by surrounding the metropolitan areas of Bogota, Cali and Medellin; and (6) control of areas hit by economic crises, such as the Eje Cafetero (Coffee Region) (Castillo, 2001; Echandia, 1999; Pecaut, 2008; Rangel, 1998). In the next part of this chapter the transformation of the FARC will be measured by assessing the success of fulfilling their objectives. For now, it suffices to mention that in the next two decades, the FARC grew in size, both in terms of manpower and capital.
5.3 The Balance of Power
In order to assess whether the expansion of the FARC altered the war system, the objectives of the territorial expansion of the Seventh Conference will be assessed in terms of success. In doing so, the balance of power between the Colombian military forces and the FARC will be used to test whether the transformation of the FARC resulted in a change of the balance of forces. Four indicators will be examined: the size of the FARC; the number of military fronts held by the FARC; the territory under control by the Colombian state; and the number of FARC incursions. If it can be demonstrated that the balance of power between the guerrilla movement and the national army got disrupted as a result of the changed strategy of the FARC, the first scenario can be refuted.
Considering the size of their army, the FARC grew significantly in the two decades after the Seventh Conference. In the year of the Seventh Conference the total of fighters was determined around 2000 (Echandia, 2015). By the year 1989 their number exceeded 5000 fighters and in 1998 they were over 10,000 men strong. By 2002 they had reached their highest number recorded, around 21,000 fighters in Colombia (Ibid).
Looking at the number of military fronts is a useful manner to estimate the combat potential of the FARC. The number of fronts can give a more concrete idea of how the increase of fighters affected their combat potential. A front consisted of around 50 to 500 men (FARC Statutes, 2007). With their fronts, the FARC controlled the areas they holded and attacked uncontrolled lands surrounding the fronts. The total of fronts together in a region formed a bloc. The blocs served to control certain regions of Colombia. As the FARC grew in size, the enlargement of their insurgency allowed them to open more fronts. At the
end of the 1970s, the fighters of the FARC were divided across 10 fronts. From 1982 to 2000, the number of fonts surged from 15 to 60 (Pecaut, 2008). Figure 5.1 shows the spread of their fronts after expansion. The importance of a front lies in its relation to conquer and hold land. The presence of the FARC in Colombia's municipalities accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1964, the FARC had been present in 4 municipalities, around 0,04% of all municipalities (Avila et al., 1997; Livingstone, 2003; Rochlin, 2003). From 1970 to 1979 presence rose from 54 to 100 municipalities, or from 0,50% to 9,00% and from 1985 to 1999 a surge can be noted from 15,0% to 95,0% of all municipalities (Ibid). It must be mentioned that presence does not equal control. Still this increase demonstrates a certain potential of power and expansion. The FARC thus managed to expand territorially as their number of fighters and fronts augmented. In other words, as a result of the expansion of the FARC, the Colombian state lost ground.
The territorial expansion of the FARC corresponded for a great part with the territorial objectives of the Seventh Conference (see figure 5.1). From the earlier colonized strongholds (parts of the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caqueta, Cauca, Córdoba and Meta), the FARC expanded into the majority of all departments. In terms of their strategic objectives, by 1990 the FARC had gained access to the Pacific ocean and the border areas with Ecuador and Venezuela. Moreover, while the Eastern Cordillera was not in total control (especially in the mountainous regions around Bogota the FARC remained small), the FARC had managed to establish themselves in the Andes. Yet the urbanization of conflict proved to be more difficult. From 1995 on the FARC attempted to gain a foothold in the urban cities, but the movement did not come further than presence in some of the poorest neighbourhoods of Bogota and Medellin (Pecaut, 2008). The FARC thus managed to translate the increase in manpower and the number of fronts into territorial expansion.
The territorial expansion of the FARC relates to another objective of the Seventh Conference, namely the accumulation of capital to finance expansion. Part of the explanation of the financial successes can be found in the expansion strategy. Whereas the FARC initially had presence in remote areas, the departments they expanded into provided new economic opportunities such as banana cultivation, gold mining and oil exploitation (Velez, 2001). Before 1982, the political economy of the FARC depended on financial contributions from sympathisants and criminal activities like kidnappings and extortions (Cook, 2011). During and after expansion, the FARC developed into a money-making machine. By 2015, their
annual income is estimated around $580 million (McDermott, 2017) . In addition, access to the Pacific Ocean and the establishment in the border areas facilitated contraband activities. A large share of the financial success depended on the cultivation of coca. The cultivation of coca crops and the development of the war economy will be set out in the next chapter. For now it suffices to notice the link between the military objectives and the development of their financial opportunities.
The last indicator considers the number of incursions of the FARC. A surge of incursions per year can be noted from 1982 on, when the number FARC attacks almost tripled (CNMH-IEPRI, 2016). After 1982, the number of incursions was highly unstable and kept reaching new peaks until 1999 (see figure 5.2). Only by the year 2008 had the numbers of incursions fallen back to pre-1982 levels (with the year 1985 as an exception).
The above mentioned indicators lead to the conclusion that after 1982 the FARC managed to change the balance of power. Taking into account their objectives, the FARC could expand their territories at the expense of the Colombian state. The increase in manpower and military fronts were effective enough to accomplish most of the objectives of the Seventh Conference. The scenario that the expansion of the FARC did not result in a rupture of the war system is thus refuted, as the balance of power between the Colombian army and the FARC had effectively been changed.
Before relating the rupture of the war system to the escalation of violence in the 1980s, the same argument will be strengthened by explaining the static reaction of the Colombian army to the expansion of the FARC. Former colonel Cruz Ricci explained that since the presidency of Belisario Betancourt in 1982, guerrilla groups were structurally ignored and underestimated (Cruz Ricci, 2008). This statement corresponds with the observation of Richani that within Colombian politics the idea prevailed that the guerrillas were not capable of bringing a change to the status quo as they were only present in remote areas (Richani, 2013). Administrations after Betancourt adopted a slightly more offensive stance towards the FARC, yet without much result. The 1990-1994 presidency of Gaviria was more occupied with fighting the Cali and Medellin cartels (Cruz Ricci, 2008). In addition, Richani explains that the state was not capable of responding to the expansion of the FARC. Insufficient finances and the quality of the equipment played a role, an argument in line with the low-intensity strategy followed by the military. As mentioned, the majority of the military's budget was dedicated to salaries and pensions (Richani, 2013). Lastly and related to
the former factor, the governments from the 1980s and the 1990s had the support of the United States to maintain low-intensity warfare instead of an all-in war (Ibid). From 1982 to 1988 therefore, no national security strategy was designed and the FARC had free way to expand and change the balance of power to their favor. The change in the balance of power was thus complementary, changing the war system’s power relations.
5.4. Escalation of Violence
Since the rupture of the war system has been proven, the remainder of the chapter will link the rupture of the war system to the levels of violence thereafter. An increase in the level of victims is expected due to the changed balance of power between the FARC and the Colombian state forces. By looking at three factors the link between the balance of power and levels of violence will be assessed. The first indicator has already been considered and displayed an increase in the number of FARC attacks during the 1980s. The second and third indicators measure the number of victims, both civilians and combatants, before and after 1982, using databases from CMNH.
Figure 5.3 shows the number of civilian victims and victims from the FARC and the state forces (military and police) made during war-related actions between 1971 and 1989. As demonstrated by the graph, an increase in the victims suffered by the fighting actors can be noted from the year 1981 onwards. Especially after 1984 the number of victims suffered by the fighting actors increased strongly. The same holds for the number of civilian victims. While until 1983 the number of civilian victims never surpassed the number of ten, in 1984 the number had more than doubled. After 1984 the number of civilian victims remained high.
Figure 5.4 demonstrates a similar image. The graph illustrates the civilian victims and victims suffered by the FARC and the army, made by attacks on populated areas. A sharp surge in the number of casualties can be noted from 1982 to 1983. The differences in both graphs is attributed to the nature of the confrontations that were responsible for the violence. While figure 5.3 considers the victims from violent confrontations between armed groups, figure 5.4 shows the victims from attacks on populated areas, which are more likely to be performed by guerrilla movements. Important to note is that both graphs clearly indicate an escalation of violence from the early 1980s on, both in number of civilian victims and casualties of the fighting actors. The time frame of escalation corresponds with the moment
the FARC decided to expand militarily and territorially. The data on the victims thus underlines the argument that the war system broke after the expansion of the FARC.
With regard to the graphs, two observation are in order. Firstly, the databases used include attacks and confrontations of other guerrilla movements such as the ELN and M-19. Yet it is believed that this does not influence the validity of the statements made above. The FARC was by distance the largest insurgent group in Colombia. In each year, except 1971 and 1988-1990 the number of FARC attacks exceeded the number of incursions of other guerrilla movements (ELN, EPL and M-19) (CNMH-IEPRI, 2016). From 1990 onwards, the number of FARC attacks exceeded the combined total of all other attacks. In addition, the expansion of the FARC could have influenced and impacted the dynamics of the conflict between the state on the one hand, and other insurgent groups on the other hand by taking territory and resources from the state. While this study considers the war system between the FARC and the Colombian army, one of the characteristics of PSC is the inclusion of multiple actors in the war system (the consideration of other guerrilla movements, however, lays outside the scope of this research. Nevertheless, since the FARC were by far the strongest and most influential insurgency, it is believed that excluding other guerrilla movements out of consideration will not affect the validity of the research too much).
The second observation relates to a general belief that the Colombian conflict escalated in the 1990s. Looking at the total victims made between 1985 and 2018, one might think that figure 1.2 indicates an escalation of violence during the 1990s. This study however, argues that the war system broke and that a first wave of violence can be observed in the 1980s. The incredible amount of violence that broke out in the 1990s obscures the smaller outbreak of violence in the 1980s, demonstrated by figure 5.3 and 5.4.
So far the first chapter has demonstrated that the expansion of the FARC broke the war system in the 1980s. The increased military capabilities are exemplified by the number of fighters, the territorial expansion, and the number of FARC attacks. More importantly, the level of violence surged after the expansion of the FARC. More civilian victims and victims of the combatants can be observed after the expansion of the FARC. The second chapter will focus on the outbreak of violence in the 1990s and attempts to link the expansion of the paramilitaries to the central argument of this chapter. As a prelude, the final section of this chapter presents the origins of the paramilitary forces.
5.5 Origins of the Paramilitary Forces
The origins of the paramilitaries go back to the 1960s. In the context of emerging left-wing guerrilla movements, the creation of right-wing civil defense groups was legalized by a presidential order. Their main purpose was to defend properties of landlords against guerrilla attacks. Later on, paramilitary forces were hired by the narcobourgeoisie to protect their lands and means of production (Guaqueta, 2003). The idea of the paramilitaries was to train, equip and employ civilians in the fight against guerrillas. Although mainly in the form of military support, intelligence and logistical help, paramilitaries were not excluded from actual combat (McClintock, 1992). In the 1960s and 1970s the paramilitaries were relatively small in size, not well organized and still under control of the army.
In the 1980s, the paramilitary forces started to act more autonomously, while still relatively small in size. In 1981 political violence escalated when, in response to kidnappings by guerrillas, the narcobourgeoisie, the Colombian army, politicians and American corporations supported the creation of the paramilitary group Death to the Kidnappers (MAS) by narcotraffickers (Medina & Tellez, 1994). MAS quickly switched from targeting left-wing guerrillas to anyone opposing them (Echandia, 1989). Moreover, MAS engaged in the assassinations of politicians, judges and civilians. During the presidency of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986), MAS started killing members of the Patriotic Union, a political party representing anyone not affiliated with the dominant political parties, including (ex-)guerrillas. Former civilian defense minister of Colombia, Pardo, stated that by the end of the 1980s, the paramilitaries formed the largest threat to internal security (Pardo, 1996).
As indicated by Richani’s thesis, the paramilitary forces became an actor of relevance during the 1990s. During the period 1984 to 1994, the paramilitaries grew in size, but acted locally still working for the landowners and narcobourgeoisie. By 1997 however, different groups of private armies started to organize themselves in the north under the Self-defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidos de Colombia: AUC). In this decade, the AUC grew rapidly and consisted of around 8000 men (Richani, 2013; Le Grand, 2003). Moreover, the paramilitaries started to spread throughout Colombia. In her account on the Colombian internal conflict, LeGrand states that the expansion of the paramilitaries corresponded very much to the expansion of the FARC, as landlords and military commanders placed paramilitary groups in areas where the FARC was strong (LeGrand, 2003).
The brief depiction of the development of the paramilitary forces demonstrates a great sense of reactionary tendency towards the FARC. The legalization of civil-military groups to defend property against the then newly created FARC is a first indicator of this argument. Next, the creation of paramilitary groups such as MAS can be considered a response to the acting of the FARC, their kidnapping activities in this case. Lastly, the notion that paramilitary forces were stationed in areas where the FARC was strong not only explains the spread of the paramilitaries, but also demonstrates that the paramilitary forces mainly reacted to the expansion of the FARC. The way this was done reflects their primary political-military function. Being a civil-military group in essence, the paramilitaries were to provide security in response to left-wing guerrillas, protecting property of landlords, enterprises and other strategic assets against raids of the FARC.
6. Chapter Two: The War Economy
6.1 Introduction
After having demonstrated that the expansion of the FARC did result in a rupture of the war system, the second chapter will continue exploring the relation between the rupture of the war system in the 1980s and the escalation of violence in the 1990s. The objective of the chapter is to study the possibility that the rupture of the war system in the 1980s was not followed by a period of stabilization before the explosion of violence in the 1990s. The outbreak of violence in the 1990s would in that case be part of the same broken war system. Looking at the number of total victims, figure 1.2 does not seem to indicate a period of stabilization, hinting towards a single destabilized war system. The question that will be answered in this chapter relates to this assumption and asks how the expansion of the paramilitary forces in the 1990s relates to the expansion of the FARC one decade earlier. Following the argument of Richani, the expansion of the paramilitaries is associated with the outbreak of violence in the 1990s. With the study’s research question in mind, answering the question of this chapter would ideally link the expansion of the FARC to the expansion of the paramilitary forces. Since the expansion of the paramilitary forces is generally accepted to be the main force behind the explosion of violence in the 1990s, demonstration of the chapter’s assumption would establish a relation between the rupture of the war system in the 1980s and the outbreak of violence in the 1990s.
To answer the chapter’s sub-question, the main focus will be on the political economy of both the FARC and the paramilitary forces. The motivation for this can be found in the way the FARC expanded, the political-military purpose of the paramilitary forces, and the main argument of Richani. Recalling his central thesis, he asserted it was the expansion of the paramilitaires and consequently the struggle for economically strategic lands between the FARC and the paramilitaries that led to the escalation of violence in the 1990s and 2000s. It will be paramount to explore how the tension between the two opposing actors unfolded exactly. It is for this reason that MPE will be used, allowing for an understanding of the main objectives of both actors and the methods employed to pursue their primary goals. The chapter will commence with discovering how the political economies of the FARC and the paramilitary forces expanded.
6.2 The Financial Expansion of the FARC
Before 1982, the political economy of the FARC depended on financial contributions from sympathisants and activities such as kidnappings and extortions (Cook, 2011). Part of the explanation of the financial successes in the 1980s and 1990s can be found in their expansion strategy. The objectives of the Seventh Conference reveal part of the strategy. Whereas the FARC initially had presence in remote areas, the departments they expanded into provided new economic opportunities such as banana cultivation, gold mining and oil exploitation (Velez, 2001). In addition, access to the Pacific Ocean and the establishment in the border areas with Ecuador and Venezuela facilitated contraband activities. Protection rents were another source of income, although the FARC charged higher prices than the paramilitary forces (Richani, 2013). Yet the largest share of the financial success depended on the cultivation of coca in FARC territory and the taxes levied on drug merchants and narcotraffickers (McDermott, 2017). Although estimations of profits from the coca economy deviate, it has been estimated that in the early 1990s the FARC collected between $60 and $100 million annually (Granada & Rojas, 1995). By the mid-1990s, 65% of FARC income originated from coca-related practices and by the end of the 1990s the FARC were making approximately $180 million per year with the coca economy (Ibid).
Zooming in on the coca industry, after 1982 the FARC started supporting the cultivation of coca crops on their lands. Turning to the literature on their economic development, it remains unclear whether the support for coca farmers was a strategic and conscious decision (Cook, 2011), or the result of contingent factors more or less occurring simultaneously (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). In any case, allowing the cultivation of coca and other illicit plants such as poppies allowed the FARC to provide the farmers with a viable income. For Colombian farmers, the cultivation of coca plants provided a lucrative economic alternative to cultivation of other agricultural products such as potatoes and yuca (El Tiempo, 1999), even more so when the agricultural sector was in decline.
There are a number of factors which help to understand the rapid expansion of coca production in Colombia, which will briefly be explained. The first factor can be found in the influx of peasants after the FARC started stimulating peasants to cultivate coca (Marcy, 2010). The number of peasants migrating to FARC territory increased in the 1990s after the economic reforms (to be further explained below). In the 1980s, the FARC created new fronts and expanded into the departments of La Caqueta, Magdalena, and Meta, which became key
regions of coca production in Colombia (Echandia, 1999). Whereas before Colombia had protected its domestic sectors with tariffs, exposure to the international market made many Colombian small farmers uncompatible and unprofitable. In the years after, unemployment in the agricultural sector rose and more peasants were attracted to areas controlled by the FARC. In figure 5.1 the relation between the territorial presence of the FARC and the coca regions in Colombia can be seen. The red and yellow parts indicate areas of coca cultivation. At the highest point, the FARC controlled approximately 70% of all coca crops in Colombia (McDermott, 2017).
The second factor relates to the declining production of coca crops in Bolivia and Peru. Until the 1990s, coca production in Colombia was relatively modest, with Bolivia and Peru as the main producers of the crop (UNODC, 2002). The coca plant is a natural crop in these countries and both Bolivia and Peru were among the top global producers of coca in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1988, the United States decided to change its strategy in regard to its anti-drugs efforts. From the mid-1990s coca production declined rapidly in Bolivia and Peru, with Colombian farmers ready to take over their place (Ibid). Figure 6.1 demonstrates the growth of coca production in Colombia.
The third factor that facilitated coca production in FARC territory has to do with the dismantling of drug gangs in the 1990s, especially the Cali and Medellin cartels. When the cartels seized to exist, a power vacuum emerged and the FARC stepped in (Cook, 2011). The FARC made use of the moment and started to take over the same strategies of the narcotraffickers, making contact with international traffickers. Consequently, some of the FARC fronts started selling the cocaine themselves (McDermott, 2017).
The way the FARC grew rich on the coca cultivation on their territories relates to their control of the market. The guerrilla movement provided protection and technical assistance to help the coca farmers on their lands (Richani, 2013). More than just physical protection against landlords and narcotraffickers, the FARC supported the peasants economically, regulating the coca markets and setting prices. In return el gramaje was imposed, a 7%-15% tax imposed on the farmers' coca income (Labrousse, 2005). Together with a tax levied on narcotraffickers, equal to 7%-10% of the market value of a kilo of coca paste and a protection rent levied on narcotraffickers and merchants, the FARC profited tremendously from the cultivation of coca. By regulating the market and controlling prices,
the FARC assumed an active role in the drug economy. Consequently, the war system started to get entangled to the war economy.
6.3 Financial Expansion of the Paramilitary Forces
The paramilitary forces were dependent on two sources of income: protection rents and narcotrafficking. While the protection rents were the traditional source of income, the development of the war economy created momentum to expand financially. This part sets out how the paramilitary forces capitalized on the new opportunities provided by the destabilized war system.
Three factors can be observed which increased the opportunity to expand the extraction of protection rents. Being created as civil security forces, the paramilitaries relied on cooperation with the landlords, the narcobourgeoisie and (multinational) enterprises. To start, the expansion of the FARC led to an increased need for protection demanded by landlords, the narcobourgeoisie, and enterprises. As has been mentioned, the paramilitary forces were placed in areas with strong FARC presence (LeGrand, 2003). Figure 6.2 shows all paramilitary groups created between 1977 and 2003, which were all situated on lands close to or within the blocs of the FARC. The factor thus underlines the claim that the paramilitary forces expanded in reaction to the FARC.
The second and third factors regarding protection rents are external factors to the war system. These factors made the value of land rise. For a part this had to do with land speculation. Capitalist actors participated in land speculation during the 1980s and 1990s in order to launder profits made with narcotrafficking and minery. It is estimated that between 1979 and 1988 drug cartels purchased more than one million hectares of land (Guaqueta, 2003). The Cali cartel, for example, started to buy lands in the department of Antioquia. In the municipality of Caucasia the land price per hectare rose in a short time from about $350 to $850 after the cartel had bought lands (Richani, 2013). The paramilitary forces profited from the higher value of land as demand for protection against guerrillas rose.
The third factor impacting the push for protection is related to the economic reforms of the 1990s and the development of the mining and oil sectors. In 1991 a set of Constitutional and economic reforms was announced which transformed the Colombian economy and financial system. The reforms had the purpose of stimulating the private sector and shifted government activity and resources from state-owned enterprises to social welfare
and education (Montenegro, 1995). As the Colombian economy and financial system gradually liberalized, a surge in the influx of FDI could be noticed (World Bank Data).
The sudden surge in incoming FDI contributed to the development of mining and oil sectors in the 1990s and 2000s. Since 1994, 40,2% of FDI has been going to the mining and oil industry (Colombia Reports Data, 2018). Partly thriving on the commodities boom, these sectors experienced an explosive growth. Yet it should be noted that the largest part of FDI to these sectors came in after 2000 (Fedesarrollo, 2007). Consequently, as the mining and oil sectors rapidly developed, the Colombian economy started to depend on export of related commodities. While in 1980 the percentage of exports consisting of mining and oil products equaled 4% of total Colombian exports, by 1990 this number was 30% and by 2010 it had risen to 72% (Ocampo, 2009).
The booming mining and oil sectors provided opportunities to the paramilitaries in at least two ways. In the first place, a number of foreign companies, such as British Petroleum, Compania Minera Arcangel, Corona Goldfields S.A.Total and Triton, entered Colombia in the midst of an escalating conflict (Richani, 2013). This provided the FARC with new kidnapping opportunities. In the second place, as the mining and oil industries became crucial for the Colombian economy, the FARC started sabotaging oil wells and pipelines. Pipeline bombings became a common tactic of the FARC to target the Colombian economy. For the paramilitaries, the increased threat posed by the FARC to the multinationals and economic assets were a new opportunity to extract protection rents from multinationals and landlords. According to Richani, it is difficult to estimate how much the paramilitary forces extracted from the multinationals and landlords, but the amount depended on the area and the intensity of FARC presence (Ibid).
The protection rents explain for a part how the paramilitary forces could expand in reaction to the FARC. The territorial expansion of the FARC and its greater military power increased the demand for privatized security together with the rising land prices and economic assets. Yet, as former AUC leader Carlos Castaño has declared, the protection services of the paramilitary forces accounted for only 30% of its income (Guaqueta, 2003). The majority of its income was made by narcotrafficking. The activities of paramilitary forces in the narco-industry can be called remarkable, insofar that it was not the initial purpose of its creation. Nevertheless over time the paramilitaries got vertically integrated in the production chain of cocaine.
