The Responsibility to Protect and the risk of double standards
A study of the interventions in Darfur and Libya
Nina van Douwen, 10011579 14 juni 2014 1st reader: Anne de Jong 2nd reader: Martijn Dekker 13489 words
Abstract
In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published its report on the Responsibility to Protect. This report, adopted by the United Nations, proclaims that states have the responsibility to protect their citizens from Mass Atrocity Crimes – genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. However, this principle is highly contested, and one of the problems associated therewith is the issue of double standards.
To examine whether or not double standards play a role in implementing the Responsibility to Protect, a qualitative content analysis was used to observe a possible difference in the decision making of the international community regarding whether or not to intervene in Darfur (2003-2005) and Libya (2011).
The document analysis suggested double standards in the decision making concerning these interventions. While in both cases there was evidence of Mass Atrocity Crimes being committed, the international community did implement the Responsibility to Protect in Libya but not in Darfur. Moreover, in Libya the international community seems to have felt the need to respond to the ‘legitimate’ demands of the population, while the protesters in Darfur were seen as rebels.
Index
List of abbreviations 7
1. Introduction 9
1.1. Research objectives 10
1.2. Research questions 11
1.3. Academic and social relevance 11
1.4. Interdisciplinarity 12
1.5. Chapter outline 13
2. Theoretical framework 15
2.1. Humanitarian intervention 15
2.2. From right to responsibility 16
2.3. The Responsibility to Protect 17
2.3.1. The Responsibility to Protect as umbrella concept 19
2.3.2. The Responsibility to React 20
2.3.3. Problems associated with the Responsibility to Protect 21
2.4. Double standards 22
3. Methodology 23
3.1. Research strategy and design 23
3.2. Sampling the cases 23
3.2.1. The situation in Darfur 24
3.2.2. The situation in Libya 25
3.2.3. Comparing Darfur and Libya 25
3.3. Research method and instrument 26
3.3.1. Sampling the documents 26
3.3.2. Approach for analysis 26
3.4. Ethics 28
4. Qualitative analysis 29
4.1. Darfur 29
4.1.1. Sovereignty 29
4.1.2. Protection 30
4.1.3. Mass Atrocity Crimes 30
4.1.4. Intervention 32
4.2. Libya 33
4.2.1. Sovereignty 33
4.2.2. Protection 34
4.2.3. Mass Atrocity Crimes 35
4.2.4. Intervention 36
4.3. Comparing Darfur and Libya 37
5. Conclusion 39
5.1. Conclusion 39
5.1.1. Double standards in the Responsibility to Protect 39 5.1.2. Double standards in Darfur and Libya 40
5.1.3. Main conclusion 41
5.2. Discussion 42
Bibliography 45
Appendixes 49
Appendix 1. Outcome document of the 2005 World Summit 49 Appendix 2. Security Council resolution 1674 51 Appendix 3. General Assembly resolution 63/308 52
Appendix 4. List of qualitative documents 53
List of abbreviations
AU African Union EU European Union
GoS Government of the Sudan ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
R2P Responsibility to Protect UN United Nations
UNAMIS United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan
US United States [of America]
1. Introduction
“We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, [….] and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights […] have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945).
After the end of the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) was established to strive for a more peaceful world. Especially after the Cold War, the call for UN humanitarian
interventions increased (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001), but a majority of these missions were failures, and in many other cases the international community did not manage to respond in a timely manner. In order for the international community to prevent disasters such as Rwanda and Srebrenica from happening, the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” emerged at the beginning of the millennium (The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).
The Responsibility to Protect is both an emerging norm in international politics and a principle on which the international community may act. The general idea underlying the Responsibility to Protect is that sovereignty is not merely a right but a responsibility, and, consequently, that states have the responsibility to protect their citizens. This is defined strictly as the protection from Mass Atrocity Crimes, which include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. If a state is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community has the responsibility to provide political assistance or, if this is deemed insufficient, to intervene the state in question (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001). The
principle of the Responsibility to Protect was adopted by the UN World Summit in 2005 and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2009 (Bannon, 2006; Melber, 2012).
The principle, however, is highly contested, as there are several problems associated with the Responsibility to Protect. According to Hamilton (2006), there are three main
problems challenging the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect: there is often a lack of political will, a lack of operational capacity and a lack of authorization. Accordingly, there remains debate about when the Responsibility to Protect applies and, if it is applicable, what measures the United Nations should take (Hauff, 2012). One of the problems related to the lack of political will, is the danger of double standards in deciding whether or not the Responsibility to Protect should and will be invoked. In principle similar cases should be
treated equally, but is this the case when the UN decides whether or not the Responsibility to Protect should be practiced?
In this research, double standards in the Responsibility to Protect will be studied by comparing two cases: Darfur and Libya. The case of the intervention in Libya in 2011 was chosen because this intervention was a clear situation in which the Responsibility to Protect was used to legitimize intervention. Darfur was selected because there has been no
international intervention based on the Responsibility to Protect in this conflict, while many scholars (Williams & Bellamy, 2005; De Waal, 2007, Matthews, 2008) believe that this was a case in which the Responsibility to Protect should have been invoked.
1.1 Research objectives
The Responsibility to Protect is an important emerging norm in international politics. There are, nonetheless, many risks associated with the implementation of this norm. The purpose of this research is to gain insight in and understanding of one of these risks: double standards. The possible risk of double standards in implementing the Responsibility to Protect implies that the UN would not treat comparable cases equally and, thus, the UN would state that the Responsibility to Protect should be invoked in one case but not in the other. This risk has been mentioned by several scholars (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001; Ayoob, 2004; Weiss, 2004) and was even addressed in the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), the report that established the idea of the Responsibility to Protect. Despite the attention that double standards have received, none of the articles nor the report discuss how likely it actually is for this risk to take place. Moreover, while the report first establishing the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has been written more than ten years ago and the principle was accepted by the World Summit eight years ago, no research has been conducted on the Responsibility to Protect and the risk of double standards.
Consequently, the main objective of this thesis is to see whether double standards may in fact be seen when comparing two cases in which the Responsibility to Protect could have been or has been invoked. This will add to the body of knowledge and understanding of the
Responsibility to Protect in general and of this problem in specific, as it is assumed that double standards are a problem in implementing the Responsibility to Protect but there have been no academic studies supporting or contradicting this claim.
1.2 Research Questions
In order to conduct proper research on the Responsibility to Protect and double standards, the following research question is used:
To what extent was the decision whether or not to implement the Responsibility to Protect in Darfur and Libya based on double standards?
To answer this research question, the following sub questions have been composed: 1. What is the Responsibility to Protect?
2. What are double standards?
3. How are double standards operationalized?
4. What was the situation in Darfur in regards to the possible implementation of the Responsibility to Protect?
5. What was the situation in Libya in regards to the possible implementation of the Responsibility to Protect?
6. What are the main concepts in the Responsibility to Protect paradigm?
7. How may these concepts be seen in documents (resolutions, speeches) regarding the decision not to invoke the Responsibility to Protect in Darfur?
8. How may these concepts be seen in documents (resolutions, speeches) regarding the decision to invoke the Responsibility to Protect in Libya?
9. Considering these documents, to what extent was the decision to not implement the Responsibility to Protect in Darfur based on double standards?
10. Considering these documents, to what extent was the decision to implement the Responsibility to Protect in Libya based on double standards?
Sub question one to three and sub question six will be answered in Chapter two, the
theoretical chapter. Sub question four and five will be answered in the methodological chapter, as part of the case sampling. The last four sub questions will be answered by means of
qualitative empirical research. Together, these sub questions are deemed to be sufficient to answer the research question.
1.3 Academic and social relevance
This research on the Responsibility to Protect and double standards aims to fill a particular gap in academic literature. Since the idea of the Responsibility to Protect first arose at the
beginning of the century, a substantial amount of articles and books have been written concerning this subject, such as the ones by Evans & Sahnoun (2001), Thakur (2002) and Williams and Bellamy (2005; 2011). Nonetheless, despite the apparent interest for the subject, there is hardly any empirical research done. Moreover, an ample amount of articles have been written regarding problems the Responsibility to Protect may face in the implementation. Yet, much the same as on the Responsibility to Protect in general, virtually no empirical research has been carried out concerning these problems. Consequently, the academic relevance should be evident as this research intends to amplify the existing literature on the Responsibility to Protect and its possible problems by using empirical evidence.
Moreover, this research entails a social relevance. As may be apparent, the
Responsibility to Protect in itself is important for societies all around the globe since it orders states to protect their citizens from Mass Atrocity Crimes and legitimizes the international community to step in if states are unable or unwilling to do so. Therefore, the Responsibility to Protect may be seen as a factor in safeguarding human security (Paris, 2001). As the Responsibility to Protect is relevant for societies and peoples to remain safe and protected, it is equally as relevant to detect possible problems the Responsibility to Protect may face in its implementation. While there is a lot of literature on this subject, empirical research needs to be done in order to see whether these problems, in this case double standards, do in fact limit the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect.
In sum, the empirical core of this research thus has clear relevance both in the academic and social sense. It will add to the body of academic knowledge on double standards in international politics and the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, which will, hopefully, increase human security.
1.4 Interdisciplinarity
The research carried out in this thesis will be of an interdisciplinary character. According to Repko interdisciplinary studies is “[…] a process of […] addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline and draws on disciplinary perspectives and integrates their insights to produce a more comprehensive understanding or cognitive advancement” (2008:12). There are different forms to carry out interdisciplinary research. In this research “conceptual interdisciplinarity” (Repko, 2008:18) will be used. Conceptual interdisciplinarity is conducted when central concepts are integrative and interdisciplinary in itself, the questions posed in this kind of research have no single disciplinary basis.
The topic area of this research, the Responsibility to Protect, is interdisciplinary in itself as it encompasses political science, international relations and international law. Moreover, since two conflict cases will be analyzed, the research is related to the academic field of conflict studies, a field that is interdisciplinary by nature. Consequently, the questions posed in this research cannot be answered by employing only one academic discipline. Instead, the topic, concepts and questions are inherently interdisciplinary.
1.5 Chapter outline
The remainder of this thesis consists of four chapters. First, the academic theories behind the responsibility to protect, humanitarian interventions and double standards will be addressed. Subsequently, the research methodology will be described, including an explanation of the cases used in this research and the potential ethical problems that may arise. Third, the analysis and its results will be set forth. In the last and concluding chapter, the research questions will be answered and suggestions for further research will be made.
2. Theoretical framework
The theories described in this chapter will provide a theoretical background for the research that will be carried out. First, the basics of humanitarian interventions will be explained as interventions under the Responsibility to Protect principle may be seen as a specific kind of humanitarian intervention. Second, the principles of sovereignty as a right and sovereignty as a responsibility will be set forth, as this change in thinking from right to responsibility has been very influential in the establishment of the Responsibility to Protect. Third, the origin, idea and concept of the Responsibility to Protect will be explained, as well as several possibly related problems. Finally, the problem of double standards in international politics will be clarified.
2.1 Humanitarian intervention
In principle, international law prohibits interventions within another state, since this is considered a breach of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. As such, the United Nations Charter states that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state […]”(Chapter I, Article 2.7). Despite this, in some cases interventions are permitted under the UN Charter, namely if a state threatens international peace and security.
Humanitarian interventions seem to slightly deviate from this norm in international law, as these kind of interventions are, logically, motivated by humanitarian objectives. Although these kind of interventions may not appear to threaten international peace and security, they are authorized under the UN Security Council. According to Evans and Sahnoun (2001: 99), humanitarian intervention is “coercive action against a state to protect the people within its borders from suffering grave harm”. Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003) give a more comprehensive definition of humanitarian interventions:
[…] the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory the force is applied. (Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003: 18)
This does not include nonforcible interventions, such as sanctions, or forcible interventions intended for the rescuing of a country’s own citizens. Nonetheless, this definition remains contested, as there is debate about whether a humanitarian intervention implies that there is no consent of the host state, or that these kind of interventions can also take place with consent.
In short, humanitarian interventions are forceful interventions into the internal affairs of a state in order to end human rights violations. These basic human rights are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. However, the idea of intervention on human rights grounds remains contested, as some consider it a breach of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. To find a solution to this debate, the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (2001: 11) states that the issue has to be seen not as an argument about the “right to intervene” but about the “responsibility to protect”.
2.2 From right to responsibility
Evans and Sahnoun (2001) state that there has been a shift in thinking about the essence of state sovereignty, as it has changed from having control over a certain territory to having to protect the peoples within this territory. Sovereignty is usually seen as the most important norm in international relations (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009), and its institutionalization is generally attributed to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Gross, 1948; Wallerstein, 2005). With this institutionalization, sovereignty came to be seen as the right of a government to do whatever it wants within its own borders (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009). Corresponding to the right of a state to exercise exclusive authority on its territory, states have the duty not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001).
Yet, in recent years, sovereignty has come to be seen less as a right and more as a duty or responsibility. Deng (1995) was one of the first to state that the essence of being a
sovereign state is not merely protection from outside interference, but that it is rather a matter of countries having the responsibility to protect the welfare of their people. Or, as Kofi Annan (1999), the former UN Secretary General, stated: “States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa” (p.1).
The increase in the impact of human rights norms and the influence of the human security concept has greatly contributed to this paradigm change (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001). Concerning the impact of human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its two Covenants on civil-political and social-economic-cultural rights (1966) have led to a transition from a “culture of sovereign impunity”, where, within the borders of their state, governments could do as they pleased, to a “culture of national and international
accountability”, where nongovernmental and international organizations are continually monitoring whether states act in line with international human right norms (ICISS, 2001: 14).
Moreover, the human security concept arose as a critique on the traditional definition of (international) security, claiming it to be too narrow. Whereas international security usually only encompasses “military defence of state interests and territory” (Paris, 2001: 87), human security shifts the focus to the welfare of ordinary people. As such, the human security
concept emphasizes the responsibility of states not only to protect their territory, but to protect their people as well. In conjunction with the increasing importance of human rights norms, this has led to a change in thinking about state sovereignty (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001), where states are held accountable for what happens within their territory.
Nowadays, not even the strongest advocates of state sovereignty will claim that a state has the unlimited power to do whatever it wants to its own citizens. Instead, sovereignty has come to imply dual responsibility, both internal and external (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001; Thakur & Weiss, 2009). The external responsibility entailed by sovereignty still means that states should respect each other’s sovereignty. Internal responsibility, on the contrary, implies that states have to respect the basic rights and dignity of all their citizens. This change in thinking, from sovereignty as a right to sovereignty as a responsibility, made it possible for the idea of the Responsibility to Protect to arise (ICISS, 2001).
2.3 The Responsibility to Protect
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report on the “right of humanitarian intervention” (ICISS, 2001: VII). This report aimed at answering the question when, if ever, states may take coercive action against another state in order to protect the citizens of the state in question. Military interventions have been
controversial both when they did happen, as in Somalia and Kosovo, and when they did not take place, as in Rwanda. Nonetheless, since the Cold War, there has been an increased call for humanitarian missions (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001).
In order to reach consensus on how the international community should respond to gross and systematic human rights violations, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in 2000. The Commission noted several changes in the nature of the international environment since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Firstly, the international community contains new types of actors, such as international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and terrorist groups. These actors face new security issues, such as a more interdependent world, in which conflicts on one side of the globe will have insurmountable impact on states on the other side, and increased vulnerability of civilians, as they get increasingly involved in conflicts. On the other side,
there are new demands and expectations, such as compliance with international law and human rights, and, finally, new opportunities for common action. As a response to these changes in the international environment, the ICISS set forth the principle of the
Responsibility to Protect. The principle was adopted by the UN World Summit in 2005 (see World Summit Outcome Document, Appendix 1), reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (see resolution S/RES/1674, Appendix 2, and endorsed by the General Assembly in 2009 (see resolution A/RES/63/308, Appendix 3).
The principle idea within the Responsibility to Protect is that, as has been mentioned above, sovereignty is not merely a right, but mainly a responsibility. This responsibility lies first and foremost with a sovereign state, as it has the responsibility to protect its population. If a state is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community first has the
responsibility to politically assist the state in question. In extreme cases and if political assistance is deemed insufficient, the international community has the responsibility to intervene in the internal affairs of the state, if necessary without its consent (ICISS, 2001; Evans & Sahnoun, 2001).
The UN 2005 World Summit Outcome Article 138 and 139 define the circumstances under which the Responsibility to Protect applies as the prevention of, and the protection of
populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – also called Mass Atrocity Crimes. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II defines genocide as:
[…] any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (p.1).
Both war crimes and crimes against humanity are defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). According to Article 7 of this statute, crimes against humanity entail:
[…] any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: murder;
extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender […], or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law […]; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health (p.3-4).
Moreover, Article 8 of this statute defines war crimes as “Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949” (p.5) and “[…] other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law” (p.6). Lastly, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001: 33) defines ethnic cleansing as:
[…] the systematic killing of members of a particular group in order to diminish or eliminate their presence in a particular area; the systematic physical removal of members of a particular group from a particular geographical area; acts of terror designed to force people to flee; and the systematic rape for political purposes of women of a particular group (either as another form of terrorism, or as a means of changing the ethnic composition of that group).
In cases where one or several of these Mass Atrocity Crimes take place, sovereign states and the international community have the responsibility to protect. This responsibility may be divided in three distinct responsibilities, as will be explained in the next paragraph.
2.3.1 The Responsibility to Protect as umbrella concept
According to Evans and Sahnoun (2001: 2) the Responsibility to Protect is an “umbrella concept”, as the they state that it does not only entail the Responsibility to React – on which this study will focus – but also the Responsibility to Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild.
On the one hand, sovereign states and the international community have the
responsibility to prevent the committing of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the Responsibility to Prevent, the focus lies on both addressing root causes of conflict and addressing the more immediate triggers. Regardless, the essential task is to reduce or eliminate the need for intervention (ICISS, 2001).
On the other hand, the ICISS (2001) believes that after an intervention has taken place, the international community has the responsibility to rebuild the state in which it has
intervened in order to build durable peace and to promote sustainable development and good governance. The principles under which such an intervention is legitimized to take place will be described hereinafter.
2.3.2 The Responsibility to React
According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), the most important part of the Responsibility to Protect is a responsibility to react to situations of gross and systemic human rights violations. When preventive measures are insufficient and the state is unable or unwilling to address the situation itself, the international community has a responsibility to react with interventionary measures (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001). There is a broad range of possible measures, ranging from political to economic and judicial measures, but only in extreme cases, when these kind of measures are deemed inadequate, the
international community may intervene through military means. However, one might ask, what is an extreme case? While this topic continues to be debated, many agree that to justify military intervention, six principles have to be fulfilled: the “just cause” threshold, four precautionary principles, and the prerequisite of “right authority” (ICISS, 2001; Evans & Sahnoun, 2001).
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) is of the opinion that exceptions to the non-intervention principle should be limited. The first principle, the “just cause” threshold, is used to define under what circumstances military intervention for humanitarian purposes is justified. The ICISS puts forth two broad sets of circumstances: military intervention is justified when it is used to halt or avert either actual or apprehended large scale loss of life, or actual or apprehended large scale ethnic cleansing. It does not matter whether these circumstances are brought about by action, or deliberate inaction of a state, or if they are brought about by the failure or collapse of the state in question (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001).
The first of the four precautionary principles is “right intention”, meaning that the main purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering (ICISS, 2001). To ensure this, interventions should be collective or multilateral, and have the support of the countries in the region and the people for whose welfare the intervention is intended. Yet in most cases, a humanitarian motive will presumably not be the only reason for states to intervene, as national interests generally have a great influence on international politics. According to Evans and Sahnoun (2001), this does not necessarily undermine the principle of “right intention”. The contemporary interdependence of the world often causes national crises to have an international impact, and consequently, national interests may be served by
intervening in these crises. Nonetheless, a humanitarian motive should be at least part of the reason to intervene.
The second of these principles is “last resort” (ICISS, 2001; Evans & Sahnoun, 2001), which means that, before a military intervention can take place, there should be reason enough to believe that all other, non-military, options will not be sufficient to protect the people in question. The third is “proportional means” (ICISS, 2001), as a military intervention should only have a scale, duration and intensity necessary to reach the aim that has been set forth, and thus should be relative to the magnitude of the initial provocation. The last of the four precautionary principles is “reasonable prospects” (ICISS, 2001). This means that a military intervention can only be justified if there are reasonable grounds to believe it will be
successful in reaching its aims of halting or averting the Mass Atrocity Crimes that triggered it. Consequently, a military intervention is not justified if this cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of said intervention are expected to be worse than not intervening at all (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001).
Finally, the last of the six principles to justify military intervention is the requirement of “right authority”, as the question remains whose right it is to decide when a military intervention should take place. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) places this authority by the United Nations in general and the Security Council in specific, as the main purpose of the Council is to maintain international peace and security.
In sum, the Responsibility to React is at stake when preventive measures fail and the state is unable or unwilling to protect its own population. It does not only include military measures, rather, political, economical and judicial measures also fall within the
Responsibility to React. Military action is only justifiable in extreme cases and there are six principles that should be fulfilled for a military intervention to take place.
2.3.2 Problems associated with the Responsibility to Protect
Hamilton (2006) states that there are three major problems related to the Responsibility to Protect. The first is operational capacity as, even when the Responsibility to Protect applies and the international community should take military action, it remains difficult to find countries willing to send troops to an UN mission. The second problem Hamilton addresses is the authorization of an intervention. The Security Council is responsible for authorizing a Responsibility to Protect intervention, but the five members with veto power (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia) could easily misuse this power and veto a military intervention because this complies with their strategic interests. The last problem Hamilton discusses is the political will. As many member states of the United
Nations are often unwilling to get caught up in military interventions, especially when these interventions do not directly match their national interests. Moreover, as Bellamy (2008) argues, there remains confusion about whether the Responsibility to Protect constitutes non-consensual military intervention or that it is simply a new form of legitimizing humanitarian intervention.
One problem that may be associated with all the above mentioned issues regarding the Responsibility to Protect is the issue of double standards. This risk is discussed in many articles on the Responsibility to Protect and was even mentioned in the official report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
2.3 Double standards
While one may expect double standards in (international) politics to be studied extensively, this proved to not be the case, as there appears to be hardly any academic literature
concerning double standards in politics. The most applicable, but not specifically political, definition of the concept was found in Eichler (1980, cited in Axinn, Young-DeMarco & Caponi Ro, 2011: 418). He states that a double standard “implies that two things which are the same are measured by different standards”.
A double standard may easily arise in the Responsibility to Protect paradigm, when two more or less equal cases are not treated uniformly. This problem is also mentioned several times by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty as the commission for example argues: “this [the fact that some countries have more power than others] raises again the question of double standards” (ICISS, 2001: 37). In its concluding words, the commission (2001: 74) states: “We want, above all, to strengthen the prospects for obtaining action, on a collective and principled basis, with a minimum of double standards […]”. However, the report lacks any directive on how to prevent double standards in the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. Consequently, this study focuses on whether or not double standards did play a role in the decision making regarding intervention in two separate cases.
3. Methodology
In the following chapter, the methodology of this research will be explained. First, the research strategy and design will be set forth. Thereafter, the general sampling of the two research cases will be explained. Following this, the research method will be described. Finally, the ethics regarding this research will be addressed.
3.1 Research strategy and design
As evidenced by the theoretical framework, hardly any academic research has been conducted on the Responsibility to Protect, nor on double standards in politics. Consequently, both concepts are not yet quantified. In order to do research on this subject then, the research has to be explorative and inductive, the focus has to lie on the generation of theory instead of testing existing theories. Hence, the strategy used in this research will be qualitative (Bryman, 2008).
The research design is a case study with comparative elements. In this research design two distinct cases will be studied in-depth. After this in-depth research the results will be compared in order to detect possible differences and resemblances between these two cases.
3.2 Sampling the cases
This research into the Responsibility to Protect and the risk of double standards will focus on two cases: Darfur and Libya. It was decided to study two cases in order to compare them and detect possible differences in the decision whether or not to implement the Responsibility to Protect. There are several reasons why Darfur and Libya were chosen. Firstly, both cases were chosen because the calls for intervention took place after the principle of the Responsibility to Protect was established in 2001, namely Darfur in 2003-2005 and Libya in 2011. In both cases the time period of analysis is chosen from when the conflict started unto actual involvement of the United Nations by implementing some sort of intervention. Libya was selected because this is, to date, the only case in which the UN has actually implemented the Responsibility to Protect (Bajoria, 2011; Williams & Bellamy, 2011). Darfur was selected because this is a case in which the Responsibility to Protect was not implemented but several scholars believed that the UN should have intervened by using this principle (Williams & Bellamy, 2005; De Waal, 2007, Matthews, 2008).
In the following paragraphs the situation in Darfur and Libya will be described concisely. This description will serve as background knowledge for the rest of the study and will serve as an answer to the following sub questions: What was the situation in Darfur in
regards to the possible implementation of the Responsibility to Protect? And, what was the situation in Libya in regards to the possible implementation of the Responsibility to Protect?
3.2.1 The situation in Darfur (2003-2005)
In 2003, two rebel groups - the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement - took up arms against the government of Sudan. These rebel groups claimed that their government marginalized the non-Arabic people living in the Sudanese province of Darfur (see: Figure 1). Williams and Bellamy (2005: 30) state that in response to the attacks by the rebel groups, the Sudanese government started to arm Janjaweed militias (Williams & Bellamy, 2005: 30). However, this analysis is contested as the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005) could not find sufficient evidence to support this claim. The government has only
admitted to mobilising what they called “self-defence” militias (BBC News, 2010). While it is uncertain whether or not the Janjaweed militias were supported by the Sudanese government, it is clear that these militias “subsequently engaged in killings, abductions, forced expulsions, systematic sexual violence, and deliberate destruction of crops, livestock and important cultural and religious sites” (Williams & Bellamy, 2005: 30).
In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions on the situation in Darfur,
inter alia imposing an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities in Sudan. Despite these resolutions, the situation did not improve. In March 2005, the United Nations Security
Council adopted a resolution that establishes a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, called UNMIS. This mission ended in July 2011 (United Nations, 2007).
Figure 1: Map of Darfur (Huffington Post)
3.2.2. The situation in Libya (2011)
Starting in December 2010, a wave of protests and civil wars swept over the Arab World. This period is referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’. In Libya (see: Figure 2) the protests began mid-February 2011. The Libyan protesters wanted their president, Gadhafi, to resign. As thousands of citizens gathered to demonstrate in Benghazi, the Libyan government tried to end the protests by sending in security
forces. Still, the protests continued and while the demonstrations slowly spread to the rest of the country, the
government’s response grew more and more violent (CNN Library, 2014).
When the media started reporting stories of thousands of people getting killed, the United Nations (UN)
responded by imposing several sanctions
on Libya, such as an arms embargo. Several weeks later, the UN also imposed a no-fly-zone. Gadhafi declared this to be a breach of national sovereignty and claimed that, under the UN Charter, Libya had the right to defend itself. On 27 February 2011, the protesters formed the National Transitional Council and gradually more countries accepted this Council as the legal representative of Libya, for example Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom. NATO agreed to take over control of the UN no-fly-zone on 24 March 2011 and, on 31 March 2011, started Operation Unified Protector, a mission that included “actions to protect civilians” (CNN Wire Staff, 2011).
On 20 October 2011, the Libyan president Gadhafi was killed by rebel groups. Three days later the interim leaders of Libya, as appointed by the National Transitional Council, declared the country’s liberation. On 31 October 2011 NATO official ended the mission in Libya (BBC News, 2013).
3.2.3. Comparing Darfur and Libya
The cases of Libya and Darfur should make for an interesting comparison. Both are fairly recent crises and both evolved from a group of people standing up against their own
government. The difference lies in the fact that the Responsibility to Protect was invoked in one case but not in the other. As such it should be possible to study whether double standards
Figure 2: Map of Libya (Voice of America)
were at stake. If the two cases appear to be similar, one could argue that double standards are at stake, since the response of the United Nations was different.
3.3 Research method and instrument
The method used in this research will be document analysis. In this research method several types of official documents will be analyzed through a qualitative content analysis (Bryman, 2009). The qualitative content analysis will be carried out to identify main topics in the crises in Darfur and Libya. In order to do so, the analysis will be conducted on official documents by stakeholders in these crises.
3.3.1 Sampling the documents
In order to sample the documents used in the qualitative content analysis an institute selection was made. Several international organizations have written statements or resolutions on the crises in Darfur and Libya, all of them played a substantial part in deciding whether or not to intervene. The institutes selected for the document analysis are the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and, in the case of Libya, the League of Arab States. All resolutions or communiqués adopted in the between-period on the before mentioned crises by these institutions will be analyzed. In addition, official statements by stakeholders, such as the Secretary General of the United Nations, special advisers to the Secretary General and
presidents of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be taken into account. These include, for example, Bush’s president statement on the violence in Darfur (2004) and the Secretary General’s speech to the Security Council on peace and security in Africa (2011). An extensive list of all analyzed documents may be found in Appendix 3.
3.3.3 Approach for analysis
After conducting a qualitative content analysis on these documents, the outcomes will be grouped under different themes. This is also called a thematic analysis (Bryman, 2009). In this analysis, relevant parts and quotes from the before mentioned official documents will be linked to four themes from the Responsibility to Protect. These themes are: sovereignty, protection, Mass Atrocity Crimes and intervention. The objectives of these themes may be found in table 1, on the following page.
Theme Objective
Step 1 Sovereignty Sovereignty may be seen as
either a right or a responsibility. In the Responsibility to Protect paradigm it should be seen as a responsibility. The question is whether how sovereignty
is defined in the analyzed documents.
Step 2 Protection The protection of civilians is
the focal responsibility of both states and the international community
when it comes to the Responsibility to Protect. The question is whether this
can be seen in the analyzed documents.
Step 3 Mass Atrocity Crimes –
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing
The committing of one or several of the Mass Atrocity
Crimes is the only legitimization of intervention
according to the Responsibility to Protect paradigm. The question is
whether these crimes are mentioned in the analyzed
documents.
Step 4 Intervention In the Responsibility to
Protect Paradigm, intervention is what may occur when Mass Atrocity Crimes are committed. The question is whether and what
kind of intervention or sanctions the international community placed on Sudan
and Libya. Table 1: Objectives of themes
This analysis will serve as an answer to the final sub questions: How may these concepts [the main concepts in the Responsibility to Protect paradigm] be seen in documents regarding the decision not to invoke the Responsibility to Protect in Darfur? How may these concepts be seen in documents regarding the decision to invoke the Responsibility to Protect in Libya? Considering these documents, to what extent was the decision to not implement the
Responsibility to Protect in Darfur based on double standards? And, considering these
documents, to what extent was the decision to implement the Responsibility to Protect in Libya based on double standards?
3.4 Ethics
In a research focused on a topic within conflict studies, ethics play an important role. Therefore, the issue of ethics should be discussed in this study as well. However, as this research focuses entirely on the analysis of documents, there will be no participants involved that may be harmed by this study. Therefore, it may be evident that none of the four ethical principles as defined by Diener and Crandall (1978, cited in Bryman, 2009), namely harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception are at stake in this study.
Nonetheless, ethics within social research may also concern the consequences a certain research may have. Even though this research focuses entirely on the analysis of documents, the results may be misused to argue against the Responsibility to Protect. This could have far reaching consequences within international politics and humanitarian interventions.
Consequently, it is important to stress that the results of this research should be seen as a modest addition to the literature and contribution to the goal of the Responsibility to Protect, rather than a mere critique of the concept.
4. Qualitative analysis
In this chapter, the results of the first research method, qualitative content analysis on official documents regarding the crises in Sudan and Libya, will be set forth. As has been stated in the previous chapter, these documents will be analyzed by four thematic concepts: sovereignty, protection, Mass Atrocity Crimes and intervention.
Firstly, documents regarding the crisis in Darfur will be analyzed, documents
regarding the crisis in Libya will follow thereafter. The final paragraph of this chapter will be dedicated to a comparison of the documents related to Darfur and Libya.
4.1 Darfur
Regarding the situation in Darfur official documents of several international institutions have been analyzed. These institutions are: the United Nations Security Council, the African Union and the European Parliament. Moreover, the report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General has been used. Finally, several statements by the Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Sudan and the president of the United States have been analyzed.
4.1.1. Sovereignty
In its resolutions regarding the crisis in Darfur, the United Nations Security Council clearly values the sovereignty of Sudan. In all analyzed resolutions, a quote more or less identical to the following from resolution 1547 (2004, 19 November) may be found: “Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan, and recalling the importance of the integrity of Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation” (p.1). This quote shows that not only the sovereignty of Sudan is highly valued, but it indicates that sovereignty is linked to the principle of non-interference.
On the contrary, neither the African Union nor the European Parliament mention the principle of sovereignty in their communiqués respectively resolutions on the situation in Darfur. The European Parliament does remark on the Sudanese sovereign jurisdiction once, stating that “should the Sudan fail to exercise its sovereign jurisdiction, the international community will have to find a way of ensuring they [the planners and perpetrators of Mass Atrocity Crimes, red.] are brought to justice” (p.3, European Parliament, 2004, 16 September).
4.1.2. Protection
All international organizations mention the protection of civilians in Darfur in their
resolutions. On 31 March 2004, the European Parliament adopts its first resolution regarding the crisis in which it “calls on the Sudanese Government to protect its citizens in their villages” (p.3). Two months later, on 25 May 2004, the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union adopts a communiqué in which it “stresses the imperative need [...] for GoS [Government of the Sudan] to ensure protection of civilian population” (p.1).
The first resolution of the United Nations Security Council, adopted on 11 June 2004, does not mention the protection of civilians. A month and a half later, on 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council does remark on the protection of civilians, stating: “Recalling in this regard that the Government of Sudan bears the primary responsibility to respect human rights [...] and protecting its population within its territory [...]” (p.1, resolution 1556).
The first, and only, one to mention the responsibility of the international community in protecting civilians is Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Sudan. On November 4th, 2004, he makes his first statement on Darfur to the United Nations Security Council in which he states the following:
Action is required. The humanitarian catastrophe of 2003 and the first six months of 2004 was allowed to happen because the international community had not yet decided to act. That has changed with the adoption of two Security Council resolutions on Darfur. If the sorrow continues, it is despite these resolutions. [...] If militias and paramilitary attack unarmed civilians, a massacre would result despite the fact that the protection of civilians was the essential objective of the Security Council. [...]
Protection of people: that is the obligation of the Government of Sudan [...]. It is also the duty of the international community to consider further action if action taken so far has proved to be insufficient (p.3).
4.1.3. Mass Atrocity Crimes
The first, and only, international organization to claim the committing of a Mass Atrocity Crime in Darfur, Sudan, is the European Union, through a European Parliament resolution adopted on 31 March 2004. In this resolution the European Parliament “expresses its utmost concern at the continued reports of disappearances, abductions and rapes, which are clear violations of international law and tantamount to war crimes” (p.3).
Even though the United Nations Security Council does not term the violence in Darfur a Mass Atrocity Crime, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan does do so in quoting his
Emergency Relief Co-ordinator. On April 7th 2004, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan launches a so-called ‘Action Plan to Prevent Genocide’. In his speech, addressed to the Human Rights Council, the Secretary-General says the following concerning the
situation in Darfur:
Last Friday, the United Nations Emergency Relief Co-ordinator reported to the Security Council that “a sequence of deliberate actions has been observed that seem aimed at achieving a specific objective: the forcible and long-term displacement of the targeted communities, which may also be termed ‘ethnic cleansing’” (UN Press Release, 2004, p.5).
Several days later, on 11 June 2004, the UN Security Council adopts resolution 1547 “condemning all acts of violence and violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law by all parties” (p.1), and consequently, does not term the violence a Mass Atrocity Crime. Conversely, on June 22nd 2004, the United States Congress unanimously passes a resolution on the Darfur region of the Sudan in which the Congress “declares that the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide” (BBC News, 23 July 2004). On 4 July 2004, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union contradicts this statement by adopting a communiqué in which it “notes that, even though the crisis in Darfur is grave, with the attendant loss of lives, human suffering and destructions of homes and infrastructure, the situation cannot be defined as a genocide” (p.1).
Several months later, on September 9th 2004, US President George W. Bush (Office of the Press Secretary, 9 September 2004) endorses the resolution by the US Congress and states: “[...] Secretary Powell [Secretary of State, red.] later sent a team of investigators into the refugee camps to interview the victims of atrocities. As a result of these investigations and other information, we have concluded that genocide has taken place in Darfur. We urge the international community to work with us to prevent and suppress acts of genocide”. One week later, 16 September 2004, the European Parliament further supports this statement by
adopting another resolution on the Darfur region in the Sudan in which it: “urges the Sudanese authorities to end impunity and to bring to justice immediately the planners and perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and human rights violations, which can be construed as tantamount to genocide” (p.4).
Two days later, the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1564 through which it establishes an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, of which one of the tasks is “to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred” (p.4). This Commission releases its report on 25 January 2005. Concerning Mass Atrocity Crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan, the Commission states:
In particular, the Commission found that the Government [of the Sudan, red.] forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. [...] While the Commission did not find a systematic or widespread pattern to these violations, it found credible evidence that rebel forces, namely
members of the SLA and JEM, also are responsible for serious violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes. [...] Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. [...]the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned. [...] The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the militias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region. International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide (p. 3-4).
Moreover, the Commission states that: “Some argued that while it was sometimes argued that the Government [of the Sudan, red.] was unable to deal with all the problems, nobody could claim that it was unwilling” (p.108). Two months later, 24 March 2005, the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1590 on the crisis in Darfur in which it takes note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry and strongly condemns “all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Darfur region” (p.2).
4.1.4. Intervention
During the before mentioned speech by Secretary General Kofi Annan on 4 April 2004 at the launching of the ‘Action Plan to Prevent Genocide’, the Secretary General not only quotes the United Nations Emergency Relief Co-ordinator in terming some of the crimes committed in Darfur ‘ethnic cleansing’, he also calls upon the international community to take action by stating: “Whatever terms it uses to describe the situation, the international community cannot stand idle” (UN Press Release, 2004, p.5).
Two months later, on 11 June 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1547 and establishes the first UN mission in Darfur, a “special political mission” called United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS). Barely one month after the establishment of UNAMIS, the United States Congress adopts the before mentioned
resolution in which they term the crisis in Darfur ‘genocide’. In this resolution the Congress also calls upon the US government to “lead an international effort to prevent genocide” and urges the government to “seriously consider multilateral or even unilateral intervention to
prevent genocide should the United Nations Security Council fail to act”. On 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council adopts a following resolution in which it “expresses its intention to consider further actions, including measures provided for in Article 411 of the Charter of the United Nations on the Government of Sudan, in the event of non-compliance” (p.2).
The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, published on 25 January 2005, endorses the necessity to take action and states that: “The Commission is particularly alarmed that attacks on villages, killing of civilians, rape, pillaging and forced displacement have continued during the course of the Commission’s mandate. The
Commission considers that action must be taken urgently to end these violations” (p.3). Two months later, on 24 March 2005, the United Nations Security Council establishes the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The UN Security Council “emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur” (p.5) and establishes UNMIS as a peacekeeping mission that is “authorized, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (p.6).
In sum, the international community established several missions to avert the situation in Darfur. In 2004 the United Nations establishes UNAMIS, a special political mission that should serve as a peace support operation. One year later, the UN launches UNMIS, as a peacekeeping mission that is authorized to protect civilians. UNMIS ended in July 2011.
4.2 Libya
Regarding the situation in Libya official documents of several international institutions have been analyzed. These institutions are: the United Nations Security Council, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the European Parliament and the European Council. Moreover, several statements by the presidents and governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France have been used.
4.2.1. Sovereignty
Regarding the crisis in Libya, the United Nations Security Council values the sovereignty of Libya, both resolution 1970 (26 February 2011) and resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) state: “reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and
1 Article 41 of the United Nations Charter: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severence of diplomatic relations”.
33
national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” (p.2). Moreover, the Council of the League of Arab States Meeting at Ministerial Level declares in its outcome document: “recalling its commitment to preserve Libyan unity, territorial integrity, political independence [...] and to ensure [...] the national unity of the Libyan people and their independence and sovereignty over their territory [...]” (p.1). Nonetheless, there is a difference in the wording of the quotes by the United Nations Security Council and the Council of the League of Arab States. While the United Nations Security Council focuses on the sovereignty of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, meaning the sovereignty of the country of Libya, the League of Arab States focuses on the sovereignty and independence of the Libyan people over their own country. The African Union, the European Parliament nor the European Council mentioned the principle of sovereignty in their communiqués or resolutions.
4.2.2. Protection
On February 22nd 2011, seven days after the start of the protests in Libya, the United Nations Security Council issues its first press statement on the crisis in which “the members of the Security Council called on the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population” (p.1). The following day, 23 February 2011, the Peace and Security Council of the African adopts its first communiqué on the situation in the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in which it supports the statement by the UN Security Council by calling “on the Libyan authorities to ensure the protection and security of the citizens” (p.1).
The following weeks, these statements are echoed by several international institutions, states and people. On 25 February 2011, the United Kingdom makes a statement during the United Nations Human Rights Council Special Session on Libya and declares: “it is clear that the regime is shamefully failing in its responsibility to protect its people [...] from the very forces that should be upholding their human rights” (p.2). That same day, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon speaks to the Security Council on peace and security in Africa. Concerning the crisis in Libya, he states: “[...] when a State is manifestly failing to protect its population from serious international crimes, the international community has the responsibility to step in and take protective action in a collective timely and decisive manner. [...] The challenge for us now is how to provide real protection and do all we can to halt the ongoing violence” (p.2-3). The following day, 26 February 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopts its first resolution on the crisis in Libya in which it recalls “the Libyan
authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” (p.2). On 10 March 2011, the European Parliament adopts a resolution on the Southern Neighbourhood and Libya in particular in
which it: “stresses that the EU and its Member States must honour their Responsibility to Protect, in order to save Libyan civilians from large-scale armed attacks; points out that no option provided for in the UN Charter can therefore be ruled out” (p.4). The following day, 11 March 2011, the Extraordinary European Council adopts a declaration in which it states: “The use of force, especially with military means, against civilians is unacceptable and must stop immediately. The safety of the people must be ensured by all necessary means” (p.2). On 12 March 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States Meeting at the Ministerial Level issues its before mentioned outcome document “recalling its commitment [...] to ensure the safety and security of Libyan citizens [...]” (p.1). Lastly, on 17 March 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopts its second resolution on the crisis in Libya in which it places great emphasis on the protection of civilians:
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians. [...] Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas. [...] Demands that the Libyan authorities [...] take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs (p.1-3).
4.2.3. Mass Atrocity Crimes
On 22 February 2011, the same day as the first press statement by the United Nations Security Council and seven days after the outbreak of violence in Libya, the United Nations Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect also issue a press statement on the crisis:
[...] we are alarmed by the reports of mass violence coming from the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Widespread and systematic attacks against civilian
populations by military forces, mercenaries, and aircraft are egregious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. If the reported nature and scale of such attacks are confirmed, they may well constitute crimes against humanity, for which national authorities should be held accountable (p.1).
The following day, 23 February 2011, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, holds a speech on the situation in Libya and states:
Like all governments, the Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from violence, to allow humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, and to respect the rights of its people. It must be held accountable for its failure to meet those
responsibilities and face the cost of continued violations of human rights (p.1).
On that same day, the French president Sarkozy states: “The international community cannot stand by in the face of these massive human rights violations” (p.1). Also on 23 February
2011, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopts its first communiqué on the situation in Libya in which it “[...] strongly condemns the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protestors, in violation of human rights and
International humanitarian Law” (p.1).
On 26 February 2011, the United Nation Security Council adopts resolution 1970 on peace and security in Africa:
Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights [...] and international humanitarian law that are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. [...] Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity (p.1).
4.2.4. Intervention
During the before mentioned speech of the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, on peace and security in Africa to the Security Council, the Secretary General says: “It is time for the Security Council to consider concrete action [in Libya, red.]” (p.3). The following day, on the 26 of February 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1970 in which it does decide to take action. Firstly, the Council decides to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Moreover, the Council imposes an arms embargo, implying, inter alia, that Libya may no longer import or export arms, a travel ban for certain individuals and an asset freeze for certain entities.
On 10 March 2011, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopts a communiqué in which it “reaffirms its strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form” (p.1). Two days later, on 12 March 2011, the Council of the League of Arab states echoes these words, however with a slightly different conclusion: “Recalling its commitment [...] to reject all forms of foreign intervention in Libya, and to emphasize that the failure to take necessary actions to end this crisis will lead to foreign intervention in internal Libyan affairs” (p.1). Moreover, the League calls on the Security Council to “take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people” (p.1).
On 17 March 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1973 through which it:
Authorizes Member States [...] to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [...],
