EU institutional interpretation of 'civil society'
and its influence on the ECI
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author: Milou Versluis
Main supervisor: Jamal Shahin Second supervisor: Marleen Rensen
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research Question 1
1.2 Structure and Methods 3
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework PART I: Definitions
2.1 Civil Society Defined 5
2.2 Civil Society Academic Interpretation 7
2.2.a The Citizens and Civil Society 8
2.2.b The Market and Civil Society 9
2.2.c The State and Civil Society 10
2.3 Civil Society EU Institutional Interpretation 11 PART II: Civil Society in the EU
2.4 Creating an EU Framework for CSOs 15
2.5 Academic Debate on Participatory Democracy 18 PART III: ECI
2.6 ECI Developments and Intended Output 22
2.7 Debate on the Functioning of the ECI 26
Chapter 3: Research Methods
3.1 Literature Review 29
3.2 Interviews 30
3.3 Methods (definitions used and research) 30
Chapter 4: Research
4.1 Successful Initiatives 32
4.2 Initiatives Refused Request for Registration 36
4.3 Initiatives Withdrawn by Organisers 37
Chapter 5: Results 46
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion
6.1 Discussion 49
6.2 Conclusion 50
6.3 Recommendations 50
Bibliography 51
ANNEX 1 Interview Antione Colombani 59
ANNEX 2 Interview Maarten de Groot 66
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research Question
The perceived ‘gap’ between the EU and its citizens is seen as a hurdle in contemporary politics. The main motivation for writing this thesis comes from an urge to explore to what extent citizens can actually exert influence on EU decision-making. The feeling of citizens that they are listened to and are able to make a difference is extremely important, especially in a time where several right-wing parties play in on feelings of ‘disconnection’ between people and the EU as a governing entity. The Brexit-campaign, the Hungarian Orbán government as well as more recent political developments in Italy (i.e. the Salvini-Di Maio coalition) illustrate a preference for less EU integration and even anti-EU sentiments within certain national governments. Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), charities, interest groups and other forms of civil society- in addition to national authorities- play a part in decision-making processes through different EU programmes (e.g. civil dialogue) and present themselves as a mediating device within European integration.
In their aim to legitimise policies on EU-level and to address the perceived ‘democratic deficit’, the European institutions have come up with a corresponding political instrument. The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was first introduced in 2002 during negotiations on a Constitutional Treaty at EU level. In 2012 the first ECI regulation entered into force. Regulation 211/2011 on the procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initiative was established in 2011 and- after four amendments and a follow-up report in 2015- is still in force today.
What does the European Citizens’ Initiative entail? In short, an ECI is an invitation of the European Commission to the people to propose legislation on matters in which the EU has competence to legislate. This invitation must be backed up by at least a million EU citizens coming from at least seven different member states. The Commission hopes to enhance citizens’ participation in the democratic life of the EU by creating this opportunity for EU citizens to invite the Commission to submit a proposal. At the time of writing this thesis there have been 72 ECIs in total, of which four were successful in reaching the required one million threshold.
According to the Commission’s regulation, the ECI aims to ‘afford citizens the possibility of directly approaching the Commission with a request inviting it to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union’. This seems to imply that the intended aim of the ECI policy concerns the democratic empowerment of EU citizens. However, some scholars argue that the ECI involves an approach to participation in decision-making that favours interest groups, or ‘organised civil society’, instead of the involvement of individual citizens. (Monaghan, 2012) Is a so-called European public space legitimised if it is characterised by groups functioning as policy networks and coalitions rather than individuals? (Louza Garcia, 2010) Kohler-Koch (2012) adds that civil society contributes little to the democratic legitimacy of the EU because it does not bring about the democratic empowerment of citizens and hardly achieves equal and effective participation. It is important to consider the view of European institutions on civil society. Several programmes of the EU are concerned with the promotion of civil dialogue and the funding of certain civil society organisations (CSOs). My hypothesis is that when the European institutions mention ‘civil society’ in their policy documents, legislative framework and speeches, they mostly mean organised civil society. If this is true, this would raise the question of whether ‘civil society’ is then sufficiently representative of Europe’s citizens. Policy instruments relying heavily on civil society support, such as the ECI, might encounter problems with this 'limited' institutional interpretation since ECIs without support of organised civil society might have difficulties realising their individual goals.
This thesis therefore aims to analyse in what way the EU institutional interpretation of 'civil society' influences the output of the ECI.
In order to weigh-in on this research question, the following topics will be addressed throughout the thesis:
1. What is ‘civil society’ and how do EU institutions interpret it?
2. In what ways are CSOs funded by the EU and what are the conditions?
3. What is the intended output of the ECI policy instrument and how does this relate to civil society?
1.2 Structure and Methods
After this introductory chapter, the thesis will continue with its theoretical framework, which is divided into three parts. The first part aims to clarify the general academic debate on the term ‘civil society’, as well as the EU institutional interpretation of ‘civil society’. How do the institutions interpret the term and how does this interpretation relate to other definitions? In the second part, the ways in which civil society organisations are funded by the EU will be specified, as well as the conditions of their funding. It will also discuss the academic debate on civil society in the EU specifically and participatory democracy in general. The third part will then try to outline the general developments of the ECI as a legislative tool as well as the academic debate on its functioning. In order to analyse the way that the EU interpretation of ‘civil society’ has affected the output of the ECI, we must understand what the intended output of the ECI is. The research done for the theoretical framework involves an extensive reading of academic literature on the topic as well as the analysing and understanding of different policy documents and legislation.
The third chapter will focus on the research methods applied. This includes the above mentioned literature review, but also three semi-structured interviews with different actors involved in the ECI policy area. These interviews were held in Brussels from January 31 to February 2, 2018 and featured Antione Colombani , Maarten de Groot 1 2 and Graeme Taylor . The content of these interviews will be used throughout the thesis 3 to illustrate and clarify perspectives of the Commission, ECI-initiators, NGOs and business with regard to the ECI. The chapter will conclude by pinpointing the definitions used in the research of this thesis.
Chapter four will feature the research itself. It will analyse all 72 ECIs until now, namely why they were either refused request for registration, withdrawn by their organisers, were successful in terms of signatures or were unsuccessful in terms of signatures. What role did EU civil society organisations play in the process and outcome of these ECIs?
The thesis will then attempt to summarise the detected results and interpret them in
Member of the Cabinet of Frans Timmermans and responsible for the ECI policy.
1
Campaign Coordinator for the NGO The ECI Campaign.
2
Director of Public Affairs at the European Crop Protection Association (ECPA).
relation to the research question. This concluding part aims to contribute to developing ideas on the implementation and future of the ECI as a platform for enhancing citizen participation at EU level. The final discussion will weigh-in on the feasibility, credibility, relevance and aptness of the research conducted.
A lot of academic research has been conducted on the reason for organisers to start ECIs, the democratic value (or shortcomings) of the ECI as a policy instrument or the European public sphere in general and lobbying at EU-level by CSOs. This thesis will attempt to focus on combining EU policy on citizens’ engagement (ECI) with EU policy on civil dialogue (CSO funding) and the relation between those two.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework PART I: Definitions
In order to debate on the meaning and forms of ‘civil society’ as interpreted by the European institutions, the next section will elaborate on the role that non-state actors play within the European Union, as well as the role of ‘community’. It will start with an attempted overview of literature on civil society in general.
2.1 Civil Society Defined
In 2013, the World Economic Forum issued a report on the future role of civil society, stating that ‘civil society today includes an ever wider and more vibrant range of organised and unorganised groups, as new civil-society actors blur the boundaries between sectors and experiment with new organisational forms, both online and off’ (World Economic Forum 2013, 5). This more vibrant and wider role of civil society is reflected in statistics: according to the Yearbook of International Organisations, the number of international NGOs is reported to have increased from 6,000 in 1990 to more than 70,000 in 2018 (Union of International Associations, 2018). This demonstrable increase in NGOs over roughly 30 years is impressive. But what does it say about the state of civil society? What is ‘civil society’ exactly?
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘civil society’ as a society considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity. According to this definition, civil society is not necessarily non-profit. Common interests or collective activities can also be attributed as a trait of businesses. The Collins English Dictionary describes civil society as organisations within a society that work to promote the common good, usually taken to include state-run institutions, families, charities, and community groups. Interestingly, the Macmillan Dictionary expresses a contrary definition, i.e. ‘civil society’ as part of society that consists of organizations and institutions that help and look after people, their health, and their rights, not including the government or the family (emphasis added). The definitions of both Collins and Macmillan seem to emphasise that civil society has to have something to do with collectively promoting the ‘common good’, or ‘looking after people’. The difference in interpretation by these three dictionaries is thus in the scope of their inclusion (family
and state) as well as the nature of the society. Whereas the Oxford dictionary describes a community of citizens, both Collins and Macmillan dictionaries mention organisations, suggesting a more formal type of actor. This brings up the first and most visible classification of ‘civil society’: the distinction between organised civil society and unorganised civil society. When civil society is organised in the form of an association, e.g. community-based organisations, faith-based organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), environmental organisations, labour unions, foundations and human rights organisations, then these are called Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). CSOs come in many different sizes and all work to achieve different goals worldwide. There is probably an CSO for most of the things you can think of: environmental protection, animal rights, human rights, access to healthcare, promotion of education, political activism, consumer services, etc. Coppedge et al. (2017) define CSOs as all domestic organisations that can be categorised between economy and state, consisting of self-organising citizens in pursuit of a common civic goal.
CSOs have been present in different strands in literature (Schrama & Zhelyazkova 2018, 1030), policy papers and political discourse- all attributing different roles to the organisations. Schmitter & Streeck (1999) state that the strength of CSOs depends on membership and influence. CSOs with a large member base make their voice heard and legitimises civic causes and if CSOs work with state actors, they are able to influence policies more. Mahoney & Baumgartner (2008) add to this that resources such as money and expertise help facilitate the access that CSOs have to political institutions. For this thesis, it is important to consider the role of EU institutions in particular in the funding of CSOs.
Unorganised civil society, on the other hand, is used to describe the part of civil society that does not manifest itself in associations or organisations per se, including direct action, physical protests (Hammett 2014, 135) and social movements. Media, youth, educators and the general public are also considered to be unorganised civil society (Petrova 2014, 127). Grassroots associations are sometimes categorised under 4 organised and other times under unorganised civil society.
generally described as locally based, voluntary groups.
As mentioned earlier, the main goal of the ECI is to enhance citizen participation in EU-policy making, a form of direct democracy. In theory, the ECI should therefore be accessible to ‘unorganised’ as well as ‘organised’ civil society, as long as citizens come up with a proposal.
2.2 Civil Society Academic Interpretation
Academic literature has an extensive variety of interpretations of the general term ‘civil society’. Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech (2014) have categorised certain existing concepts of civil society and underline an analytical distinction of conceptualising civil society, i.e. where civil society is located within society and what civil society is supposed to do. In other words, civil society can be seen as a ‘sphere’ or as an ‘actor’. Figure 1 illustrates this difference in approaches.
Figure 1. Fuhr & Worschech’s classification of civil society interpretations (Fuhr & Worschech 2014, 16).
As shown above, these two analytical distinctions have additionally been divided into two subsections each. Where civil society is seen as a sphere, the empirical-analytical approach conceptualises civil society as composed of voluntary non-profit organisations. This approach generally perceives NGO = civil society = democracy as the ‘civil society orthodoxy’, an assumed causality that can be deemed a little too simplistic (Fuhr & Worschech 2014, 17). NGOs do not equal civil society, but are rather part of organised civil society. The debate on the democratic value of civil society is still going on, but this will be discussed later in the thesis.
In the systemic approach then, civil society is seen as part of the community, fostering integration in modern societies. This approach focuses on communication, solidarity
and mutual agreements, regarding these as dominant interaction logics of civil society. The view of civil society as a sphere of ‘social interaction’, independent from the state and the market, encompassing formal and informal associations, NGOs, social movements and other processes of public communication has been a dominant view of scholars since the Cold War (Lupel 2005, 128).
Where civil society is seen as an actor, the Republican Idea refers to civil society as complementary to the state (e.g. Tocqueville, Putnam). Civil society here is based on ‘private and public associations and organisations, all forms of cooperative social relationships that created bonds of trust, public opinion, legal rights and institutions, and political parties’ (Fuhr & Worschech 2014, 18) The Liberal Idea on the other hand, sees civil society as a counterpart to the state, emphasising its ability to check and limit state power (e.g. Locke). Civil society is expected to defend the free civic sphere.
What becomes clear from these definitions is that civil society is seen as connecting citizens to the state (or any other type of governing polity such as the EU), as in pursuit of a common goal and as somehow connected to markets. The following literature is categorised by its interpretation of civil society: as by definition connected to either the citizen, the market or the state.
2.2.a The Citizens and Civil Society
Wollebæk & Selle (2007) see civil society as an intermediary structure providing opportunities for citizens to mobilise in collective action. This is a more bottom-up approach to civil society, where civil society is formed by citizens. In a similar way, Habermas (1996) considers civil society as an important part to a discursive process of democratic will-formation. He sees strong communication between civil society and the public sphere as a condition for the public sphere to fulfil its democratic function. ‘Public sphere’, in Habermas’ view, is an area in social life where public opinion is formed. It consists of citizens dealing with matters of the general interest that come together and freely express their opinions (Habermas 1996, xxxii). This could be in different types of places, including -for example- a bar or cafe. He interprets civil society as the place where citizens first perceive and identify social issues, excluding state institutions, political parties and economic interest groups (Beichelt & Merkel
2014, 48). The public sphere therefore connects the state to civil society: state institutions represent citizens better if the public understanding informs them. Public discussion is also important in evaluating the extent that different CSOs serve the public good. Although the ideal public sphere would have all participants speak as equals, the reality is that inequality often influences the transmission of ideas (Calhoun 2011, 2-10). Related to Habermas’ notion of public sphere, author and political scientist Robert D. Putnam has written extensively about the importance of social capital. Whereas physical capital relates to physical objects and human capital to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals, social networks and the ‘norms of interdependency and trustworthness that arise from these’ (Putnam 2000, 19). Social capital can refer to social networks (in nature reciprocal), membership clubs such as the Rotary Club, parent-teacher associations but also college roommates, extended family or even weekly drinks with colleagues. It is a broad concept with different shapes and different uses. In terms of political participation in the United States, Putnam notes that mass marketing (financial capital) has steadily replaced grassroots citizen networks (social capital) as the most influential power. This echoes the general trend he discerns within the US: the decline of social capital from the mid-1970s onwards. Although the number of voluntary associations- charities, foundations, advocacy groups and social welfare organisations- has tripled, the average membership has decreased by 90% (Putnam 2000, 49). What does this say about the involvement of US citizens in civil society? Apart from less citizens involved in these types of associations and political organisations, the organisations will also be more ‘distant’ from them. No face-to-face interaction with members means that there is no immediate feedback or direct responsibility necessarily. ‘Politics without social capital is politics at a distance’ (Putnam 2000, 341).
Hegel (1821) famously stated that civil society reflects a struggle to reconcile individual self-interest with the achievement of an ethical community.
2.2.b The Market and Civil Society
Although less present in the typical literature on civil society, the importance of markets in civil society has been advocated by economist and philosopher Adam Smith. Some say he regarded the market as almost synonymous with what we now refer to as ‘civil society’ (Hill 2010, 451). It boils down to the principle of self-interest. Contrary to
Hegel’s view, Smith saw self-interest as indeed stimulating ethical communities. According to him, markets produced a moral benefit by creating a collective good out of self-interested individual action (Calhoun 2011, 4), leading individuals to serve the collective welfare. This would make social self-organisation possible.
2.2.c The State and Civil Society
The following academics interpret civil society by definition as related to the state, although in many different ways.
In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were the first philosophers that started thinking of society as a social contract, instead of something given. Hobbes believed that civil society was only allowed to grow successful when the state is strong, as the state guarantees peace and self-preservation. Locke, on the other hand, viewed the freedom of individuals, and their rights, as paramount to social life. These individuals firstly create a form of civil society and then create the state. Locke can therefore be categorised as a proponent of the Liberal Idea . Although very different views, both 5 Hobbes and Locke see civil society as opposed to the ‘state of nature’ (Pietrzyk 2001, 6 8-21). Moving into the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville was one of the first philosophers that discussed the phenomenon of civil society in detail. He saw free associations in which citizens can realise their social freedom and equality (civil society) as a promotion of democratisation and revitalisation of society. The government therefore should limit the freedom of social and political associations only if the public law system and social peace would be in danger (Woldring 1998, 372).
Karl Marx advocated a stronger role for the state. He argued that a powerful political apparatus was necessary to transform civil society, since the latter has been ‘pervaded by commodified relations’ (Ehrenberg 1998, 38–39). His view thus challenges Smith’s view directly. These ‘commodified relations’ can include market processes and in modern times arguably- funding. In a critique on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx theorised the division between civil society and the liberal state as being in tension, with the liberal state being unable to resolve the conflicts arising from civil society (Avineri 1968, 31-34). Marx naturally advocated the Marxist/Communist state, but civil society
see figure 1: Fuhr & Worschech’s classification of civil society interpretations.
5
the real or hypothetical condition of human beings before or without political association.
as a reflection of Capitalism is something we still see today, especially since CSOs need funding to survive and in order to exert influence . 7
DeWiel (1997) then, argues that three elements are essential to the understanding of civil society: its autonomy from the state, its interdependence with the state, and the pluralism of values, ideals and ways of life embodied in its institutions. This seems to presume that civil society must consist of institutions with a variety of different values and causes. This would, of course, only be possible in a democratic state.
Held (1999) brings forward a more balanced argument: the state and civil society must be the condition for each other’s democratic development. Pietrzyk (2001) supports this view, explaining that
the limited state cannot be deprived of a necessary power to maintain the conditions of a well-ordered society such as the rule of law, security and justice. On the other hand, a strong civil society can flourish only within a strong state - in the sense of its legitimacy and the effectiveness of its political institutions, rules and orders. A weak and contested state can be a major impediment for the development of an active citizenry (Pietrzyk 2001, 6).
This argument emphasises the (indirect) power of the state in influencing the development of civil society.
Immanuel Kant was the first-known philosopher to introduce civil society as a concept not only possible within the boundaries of the traditional state, but also among states themselves. He viewed civil society as a necessary political actor, stating that ‘all men ought to enter a civil society or juridical state of affairs’ (Kant 1999, 37).
His innovative view is relevant in examining civil society within international political entities like the EU.
2.3 Civil Society EU Institutional Interpretation
For the purpose of this research it is of interest to not only examine the different definitions attributed to civil society by academics. The definitions and interpretations
Chapter 2.4 will elaborate further on the terms and conditions of EU funding of CSOs.
of the term ‘civil society’ that EU institutions employ, though perhaps influenced by academic literature, are crucial to our understanding of the functioning of the ECI.
Kohler-Koch & Quittkat (2009) have conducted a research in which they have presented an online survey to 100 academics that have published work on civil society. The survey listed 38 EU-level associations and asked participants to say whether these associations would qualify as CSOs or not. The participants were then asked to pick one of the four given definitions on civil society, choosing the one they think is closest to their understanding of civil society. In short, the four definitions described the core of civil society as 1. representation (political pluralism is an asset) 2. public discourse (civil society provides infrastructure of well-functioning of public sphere) 3. self-constitution (civil society serves to stabilise social differences and self-government) or 4. public well-being (active citizenship is necessary for democracy).
They concluded that the image of civil society that EU institutions propagate fits with a relatively limited conception of the term. Whereas the European Commission generally employs the first definition of civil society, the scholars that participated to the survey had difficulties classifying the presented EU-level associations as part of EU civil society (Kohler-Koch & Quittkat 2009, 21). This research illustrates a possible discrepancy between the interpretation of civil society by EU institutions and others. When looking at the official website of the Commission, its discourse indeed seems to match the first definition of the research most: ‘an empowered civil society (…) represents and fosters pluralism and can contribute to more effective policies, equitable and sustainable development and inclusive growth’ (ec.europa.eu, accessed 16/09/2018).
This inclusive, representative definition of civil society can be seen in most EU discourse. Eur-lex defines ‘civil society’ as referring to
all forms of social action carried out by individuals or groups who are neither connected to, nor managed by, the State.
The above reflects on the EU institutional interpretation of civil society in general, but as we have seen earlier, there is a distinction between ‘organised’ and ‘unorganised’ civil society. Civil Society Organisations are described by the Commission as follows:
The EU considers Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to include all non-State, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals, whether political, cultural, social or economic. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations.
(ec.europa.eu, accessed 18/09/2018)
Although the European Parliament underlines the importance of CSOs in ‘contributing to a more inclusive democracy’ (europarl.europa.eu, accessed 10/06/2019), Eur-lex employs a more descriptive definition:
A CSO is an organisational structure whose members serve the general interest through a democratic process, and which plays the role of mediator between public authorities and citizens. (eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed 16/09/2018)
The concept of ‘general interest’ or ‘common good’ is reoccurring. This is however a broad term and can be interpreted differently. Since CSOs can apply for EU funding- although a long and bureaucratic process- there is a risk of ‘general interest’ morphing into ‘EU interest’. CSOs could be more likely to receive funding if they benefit EU policy-making and processes. The Commission may unintentionally be reducing the credibility of the information it receives from CSOs and interest groups, as these have ‘an interest in providing information to the Commission which they think will help them continue to be funded’ (Hix & Høyland 2011, 173).
In the conclusions on EU engagement with civil society in external relations, the Council recognises the multiple roles that CSOs play as ‘promoters of democracy, defenders of rights holders and of the rule of law, social justice and human rights’ (Council of the European Union, 10279/17). The Council also stresses the essential role of CSOs in complementing the role of the State in providing services. This corresponds with Fuhr & Worschech’s Republican Idea, as well as the views of Putnam and Tocqueville.
the roles of civil society focuses on the importance of the representative, pluralistic and democratic values of CSOs. Consequently, the EU interpretation of civil society generally concentrates on CSOs, rather than including or mentioning unorganised civil society. This could cause confusion since CSOs are not synonymous with ‘civil society’.
PART II: Civil Society in the EU
2.4 Creating an EU framework for CSOs
We have discussed different interpretations of the term ‘civil society’ in the previous part, concluding with the EU institutional interpretation. This part will elaborate on the legislative framework through which the EU institutions deal with the financing of CSOs and the promotion of civil dialogue.
It is important to note that the Commission White Paper on European Governance (European Commission, 2001) is seen as a turning point in the relation between the Commission and interest groups. Before the paper, interest groups were viewed by the Commission as beneficial to the output legitimacy, i.e. mainly the support and expertise of stakeholders. After the paper, interest groups were considered to be a source of input legitimacy as well. After the release of the White Paper, EU institutions started calling the interest groups ‘civil society organisations’ (Bouza Garcia 2010, 89; Armstrong 2002).
The terms and conditions for EU funding of CSOs have been consolidated within the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme, established by the Commission in 2014. This programme aims to foster European citizenship, contribute to citizens’ understanding of the EU and encourage democratic participation of citizens at EU-level. Priorities for 2018-2020 specifically include raising citizen’s awareness of the importance of civil society: ’the objective [of the programme] is to show that civil society, free media and open debate are an indispensable element of democracy’ (EC 2018, Priorities of the Europe for Citizens Programme for 2018-2020). Top priorities for 2019 include to stimulate debates on dates of European significance, ultimately fostering a common culture of remembrance and to support activities that cover civic participation and democratic engagement. Figure 2 shows the budget breakdown for these priorities in 2019, which amounts to roughly 25 million euro. CSOs will thus be able to receive funding if they initiate projects that fall within the three strands of the programme. Although the previously mentioned ‘general interest’ of CSOs are in danger of becoming ‘EU interest’ if these CSOs want to receive funding, some scholars see EU funding of CSOs as a positive development: ‘EU funds currently support many groups
that voice the concerns of excluded citizens and thus certain imbalances in the system of interest representation are being addressed’ (Salgado 2014, 350).
Another funding mechanism concerning civil society is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is called the Civil Society Facility (CSF), established in 2008. The facility financially supports national and local civic initiatives, activities carried out in partnership between CSOs and member states and a People-2-People programme that provides a chance for local and transnational civil society to visit EU institutions and exchange experiences (ec.europa.eu, accessed 07/03/2019). The CSF is supported since 2014 by the DG Enlargement Guidelines for EU support to civil society in enlargement countries, 2014-2020. This means that the CSF now primarily aims to promote the involvement of civil society in the pre-accession process of neighbourhood countries. The financial support to these CSOs is subject to certain conditions, such as the monitoring of rights of freedom, the enabling of a financial environment supporting CSOs, dialogue between the government and civil society and transparency (DG Enlargement Guidelines for EU support to civil society in enlargement countries, 2014-2020). To give an indication of the budget, the EU contribution to the Eastern partnership of the CSF amounted to 8 million euro for the period of 2017-2020 (C(2017) 7963 final).
Apart from funding, CSOs can also exert influence on EU decisions by means of a so-called civil dialogue.
Arguably the most institutionalised voice of organised civil society in Europe is the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), created in 1957. Initially its main goal was to reflect the interests of employers and employees, but through the years civil society organisations have become another important ‘social partner’.
The EESC is consulted by the Parliament, the Council or the Commission on certain policy areas, mostly industry and social policies. The Committee may additionally be consulted on policy areas that the institutions consider appropriate. Apart from issuing between 160 and 190 opinions and information reports a year (eesc.europa.eu, accessed 06/03/2019), it also organises annual initiatives and events that focus on citizens’ participation and civil society. These most notably include the Civil Society Days, the ECI Day, the Civil Society Prize and the Your Say youth plenary.
Figure 2. Budget Breakdown of the Europe for Citizens Programme of 2019. (C(2018) 7384 final)
Hönnige & Panke have conducted a quantitative research- based on a comprehensive survey- on the effectual influence of the EESC (and the Committee of the Regions, CoR). They found that although the consultative committees do have influence on policy-making, it is limited: 40 % of the respondents fully ignored the advice given by the EESC and CoR (Hönnige & Panke 2013, 467).
In 2004, the Committee has set up a Liaison Group- composed of EESC members and European CSOs- in order to be more open, representative and effective. It plays the role of an ‘institutional bridge’ between CSOs and EU institutions. The Group also offers
CSOs and networks a forum in which to meet and discuss relevant issues (EESC leaflet, 2018).
As mentioned earlier, the formal consultation of organisations and entities outside of the EU have been embedded within EU legislation since 1957. This has been called ‘social dialogue’: the involvement of representatives of labour and management in European law-making. There is a difference between social dialogue and civil dialogue.
The legislative framework for a a so-called ‘civil’ or ‘structured’ dialogue has been consolidated in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Article 11(2) of the treaty states that ‘institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’ (1992 O.J. C 191/1) .8
Civil dialogue refers to regular meetings between the Commission and approximately 50 key organisations interested in European active citizenship where they discuss the implementation of the Europe for Citizens programme (ec.europa.eu, accessed 11/05/2019). Most civil dialogue groups that participate in this dialogue advocate agricultural and rural development. They are for example active in the following fields: animal products, climate change, milk, organic farming and international aspects of agriculture. They are consulted over primarily social policy matters.
2.5 Academic Debate on Participatory Democracy
The above mentioned legislative framework on civil dialogue has been established to stimulate the exchange of ideas between civil society and the EU. This is related to the emerging public perception of the EU as an undemocratic entity.
Since the late 1990s, EU institutions have tried to implement strategies to battle the so-called democratic deficit of the EU. Most of these strategies involved the contributing factor of civil society to the input and output legitimacy of EU policy-making (Oleart & Bouza Garcia 2017, 4).
Monaghan (2012) argues that such an output legitimacy approach is difficult in a European context, since participation in EU policy-making predominantly focuses on
In 2014, with the launch of the Europe for Citizens Programme, the ‘structured dialogue’ was re-designated
8
as ‘civil dialogue’ (European Commission. Framework for civil dialogue with matters covered by the ‘Europe for Citizens’ Programme 2014-2020).
the involvement of organised civil society, or interest groups, instead of individual citizens. This model of democracy would be more associative than participatory (Monaghan 2012; Salgado 2014). Bouza (2010) calls the involvement of CSOs in the EU a paradoxical legitimising effect on the public space : EU rules and proposals of the 9 European Convention (2001-2003) were in favour of a participatory model of democracy between CSOs and the EU as opposed to of a more direct approach to democracy, such as collective action registers and public mobilisation. In practice it makes sense: if the choice for any type of government is between collaborating with protesters or with an NGO, the easiest choice would arguably be the latter. An NGO is already organised, has its shared views written down and can in theory be held accountable. As a general rule, political institutions almost always prefer to have a dialogue with stakeholders rather than have them ‘shout abuse through the letterbox’ (Jordan & Halpin 2003, 319).
How does that work? How can legislative change or expertise be transferred from the individual to the public institutions? The easiest route is to make use of some kind of connecting agent, much like political parties in a representative democracy. CSOs can be seen as the main ‘connecting agents’ in EU policy-making today. Ideally the situation would be like this:
Citizens passionate about a certain topic are able to join an organisation that represents their interest. This organisation is in dialogue with a political entity like the EU, trying to exert influence. This is, however, an increasingly unrealistic scenario within the EU. Bouza (2010) argues that the European public sphere is segmented and characterised by the fact that it is constituted by groups operating as policy networks and coalitions rather than individuals. Social actors, such as civil dialogue groups, retain a key role in the creation and enlargement of this sphere. He concludes that if CSOs did not play a
See 2.2.a The Citizens and Civil Society.
9
citizen group of citizens with collective
decisive role in associating the general public to the debate on democracy in the EU, this is because it was not necessary or efficient (Bouza Garcia 2010, 101). In other words, he argues that CSOs direct the attention of citizens towards certain flaws that they would not have thought were a problem by themselves. Voices coming from outside the segmented public space are consequently not listened to. This would make the situation quite different:
In this scenario, CSOs play an active role in making the public aware of certain topics, stimulating the debate. At the same time, these CSOs try to exert influence on political decision-making in the EU, supported by the citizens they mobilised. This would contribute little to the democratic legitimacy of the EU, because ‘it does not bring about the democratic empowerment of citizens and hardly achieves equal and effective participation’ (Kohler-Koch 2012, 821).
Graeme Taylor, Director of Public Affairs at the European Crop Protection Association (ECPA), illustrates this with an example:
I know that for the glyphosate ECI, We Move Europe [a European citizens’
movement] employed six people full-time to go and drive getting those one
million signatures. I was their job, you know. It was a job for people to go out and get those signatures. So it’s not the same as just, you know, an uprising of citizens concern. There were people out there targeting people and getting their signatures. (…) EU institutions need to be careful about who they consider to be representing to be the voice of citizens. (Taylor
2018, Brussels interview ) 10
See full transcription of interview in Annex
10
group of citizens with collective activity/interest
citizen political entity
Judging from the debate described above, scholars seem to be sceptical about these so-called ‘connecting agents’ such as CSOs. The segmentation and ‘oligarchic’ structure of a select few CSOs within the public sphere does not ensure equal participation of European citizens in EU decision-making.
Would it not be great to have a policy instrument that addresses citizens directly? A place where citizens can have a voice without the meddling and influence of CSOs?
Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič, the first responsable person for the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) policy instrument, explicitly referenced the contribution the ECI might make to the ‘development of a real European public space’ (Šefčovič, Press Release: 15/12/2010).
PART III: ECI
2.6 ECI Developments and Intended Output
The European Citizens’ Initiative is a relatively new policy on the European level. It differs from the Commission’s established partnerships and dialogue with organised interests by focusing on direct forms of wider citizen participation. It is designed to answer to the lack of influence that citizens experience over EU decision-making.
It also is the world’s first transnational citizens’ initiative, with aspirations to help build an EU-wide public sphere (Greenwood 2018, 1).
The next section will briefly describe the legislative origins and developments of the ECI as an instrument for participatory democracy and the role of the EESC.
The term ‘decentralised cooperation’ was mentioned by the European Commission in 1989 as a cooperation policy, although mostly for developing countries (COM 95/290). Three years later, EESC wrote a report on the need for a ‘Citizens’ Europe’ that would consist of equal opportunities for individual citizens, filling the democratic deficit at European level and putting participatory democracy to work in the interest of the EU (92/C313/14).
It was not until the draft of the Constitutional Treaty- and the Constitutional Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002-2003 leading up to it- that the European Citizens’ Initiative was first introduced. The draft treaty was eventually not ratified because of a rejection from both French and Dutch voters in national referenda. Article 46 of the draft concerned the principle of participatory democracy, with section 4 stating that ‘no less than one million citizens coming from a significant number of Member States may invite the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution. A European law shall determine the provisions for the specific procedures and conditions required for such a citizens' initiative’ (CONV 850/03).
The Constitutional Treaty was revised and reformatted into the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed by all member states in 2007. Article 11 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) is almost identical to article 46 of the draft Constitutional Treaty, stating
that 'not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’ (2007/C 306/01). It seems that ‘within the framework of its powers’ was added to the TEU. Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) adds that ‘the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the provisions for the procedures and conditions required for a citizens' initiative within the meaning of Article 11 of the TEU, including the minimum number of Member States from which such citizens must come’ (2008/C 115/01).
In 2009 the European Commission issued a Green Paper on the ECI after the 11 European Parliament adopted a resolution in May 2009 requesting the Commission to submit a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the citizens' initiative (008/2169/INI). The Commission’s Green Paper described issues for consultation such as the eligibility to support ECIs, the minimum number of signatures per member state, requirements for the signatures, registration processes, time limits and how the European Commission and others can respond to an ECI (COM 2009/622).
In February 2011, the rules and procedures concerning the citizens' initiative were finally set out in a regulation which was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council and entered into effect on 1 April 2012. All Member States have implemented the regulation (COM 2015/145). Regulation 211/2011 established the procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initiative and defined the issues that were described in the 2009 Green Paper in a more detailed way. It has been amended four times since 2011 and these amendments have provided the regulation with annexes concerning specific requirements for each member state.
In order to successfully carry through a citizens’ initiative, citizens must form a citizens' committee composed of at least seven EU citizens being resident in at least seven different member states. The members of this committee must be EU citizens old
A government document that anyone who is interested can study and make suggestions about, especially
11
enough to vote in the European Parliament elections, which differs per member state . 12 The committee must register its initiative on this website before starting to collect statements of support from citizens. Once the registration is confirmed, organisers have one year to collect signatures coming from at least one quarter- i.e. seven- of all member states. Organisations may also promote a citizens’ initiative, provided that they do so with full transparency.
Once a citizens’ initiative gets one million signatures, the Commission will examine the initiative and its representatives will meet the initiative’s organisers so they can explain in detail the issues raised in their initiative. They will also have the occasion to present their ECI at a public hearing. Within three months the Commission must set out its conclusions on the ECI and the action it intends to take in an official communication, which will be made public. The reasons for the Commission to take action or not take action must also be written out.
An ECI expert group, composed of member states authorities, has been set up by the Commission in order to exchange views and coordinate member states in relation to the implementation of regulation 211/2011. Finally, the Commission must present a report on the application of the regulation by 1 April 2015 and every three years after that (OJ L 65/1). The ECI procedure of regulation 211/2011 is visualised in figure 3 below.
The Parliament carried out a study on the implementation of the ECI in 2014. The study aimed to identify difficulties faced by ECI organisers and analysed possible solutions. A practical recommendation put forward was the setting up of some sort of ‘Citizens’ Initiative Centre’ that would consist of an office and online platform in order to support and inform ECI organisers. Another recommendation was a revision of article 11(4) of the TEU that should clarify whether the ECI can propose EU primary law amendments and also whether the ECI is a citizens’ right of initiative proposing a specific legislative act or rather an agenda-setting tool to raise issues of concern for EU citizens (PE 509.982).
18 in all member states except Austria, where the voting age is 16.
Figure 3. ECI procedure according to regulation 211/2011 (COM 2017/482).
In 2015 the Commission issued its report on the application of regulation 211/2011. At that point, two ECIs had received a formal response from the Commission: Right2Water and One of Us. The report put forward some statistics on the members of citizens’ committees from which can be concluded that most members of committees hold the French nationality (40%), with Germany coming in second (+-24%) and Italy third (+-18%). Around 75% of the members are between 21-30 years old. The report furthermore described the funding of different ECIs, number of signatures and collection methods. It concluded that the ECI has been fully implemented, although there is still room to improve. It highlighted the lack of legal personality of the citizens’
committees and the need to simplify requirements for signatories. It proposed among others that attempts should be made to ensure that stakeholders or experts representing different perspectives are heard in public hearings. The report furthermore announced that the Commission has indeed established a point of contact for ECI organisers, the Europe Direct Contact Centre (COM 2015/145).
The EESC organised an ‘ECI Day’ in April 2015 during which the ECI Campaign presented an open letter to Frans Timmermans, First Vice- President of the Commission whose cabinet is responsible for the ECI. The letter was signed by 21 ECIs and called on the Commission to propose a meaningful amendment to regulation 211/2011.
In April 2017, Frans Timmermans announced the Commission’s plan to revise the ECI regulation to further improve its use, stating that he wants to ‘make the ECI more accessible and citizen-friendly’ (EC, Press release: 11/04/2017).
The Commission indeed sent a proposal to the Parliament and Council on the ECI in September 2017, writing that ‘the experience of the first five years of implementation of the European Citizens' Initiative shows clearly that the Commission must provide the organisers with much more concrete technical organisational and legal support so that they can efficiently run their initiatives’ (COM 2017/482).
The new proposal aims to improve the functioning of the ECI by addressing the shortcomings identified in its implementation, with as main policy objectives to make the ECI more accessible and easier to use for organisers and supporters as well as to achieve the full potential of the ECI as a tool to foster debate and citizen participation at EU level and bring the EU closer to its citizens.
Some practical changes include reducing the voting age for signatories to 16, extending the collection period to 5 months and the creation of a central online collection system that is provided by the Commission, instead of organisers of separate initiatives.
The Parliament and Council are currently discussing the proposal. If they approve it, it will enter into force on 1 January 2020, when regulation 211/2011 is repealed.
2.7 Debate on the Functioning of the ECI
Before we go into the research chapters of this thesis, it is conducive to briefly examine the academic and public responses to the new policy instrument.
The initiative has been received with initial enthusiasm in the academic world, but many scholars have declared their concerns about the democratic value of the ECI. Kohler-Koch (2012) feels that the ECI is an attractive tool for some NGOs to put pressure on the Commission, aiming to demonstrate to their members as well as EU institutions that they can deliver. The ECI would therefore not deliver its intended aim, i.e. to enhance citizen participation, but would help CSOs gain a powerful position. Some CSOs however may find the ECI a threat to the civil dialogue agenda, which is centred on them (Greenwood 2012, 333).
The European Parliament sees the initiative as a substitute for the denied agenda-setting power of the Parliament. A type of collaboration between the Parliament and the ECI is argued by some as a recipe for successful democratic participation in the future (Kohler-Koch 2012, 821).
By far the biggest part of ECI-related academic research focuses on profiling ECI organisers (Bouza Garcia & Greenwood, 2014; Conrad & Steingrímsdóttir, 2016). Kentmen-Cin (2014) however, has analysed the perspective of citizens and Kandyla & Gherghina (2018) have recently written an article on who is likely to use the ECI and why. The latter identified three major results. Firstly, European citizens are far from excited with the ECI. Secondly, individuals who have reaped more benefits from EU integration have a higher expected value of the ECI, outweighing the costs of participation. This determines the intention to use the ECI policy. Thirdly, the ECI seems considerably more appealing to a specific type of citizens: the politically sophisticated who feel comfortable in dealing with the complexity of EU politics (Kandyla & Gherghina 2018, 1234-1235).
In terms of public responses to the process of starting a ECI, collecting the required signatures and the mandatory follow-up of the Commission (if one million signatures are reached), most organisers seem to agree that without substantial support from existing CSOs it is nearly impossible to reach this threshold. Maarten de Groot is a Campaign Coordinator for the ECI Campaign (an NGO) as well as an organiser of the ECI ‘More than education - shaping active and responsible citizens’. He confirms the importance of support within the process:
We also knew to a considerable degree, I am not sure if everyone knew, that the best practices, or the lessons learned from the previous ECIs is that, one of them, that you need a coalition of 100 organisations already backing up a particular idea before you start collecting signatures (De Groot 2018, Brussels interview).
He also mentions a critical note concerning the Commission’s procedure within the ECI policy. As we know, the Commission has committed to issuing a follow-up, when an ECI has reached the one million signatures. Even if the official follow-up does not mention any future plans to revise EU legislation, the Commission has in any case caught up with her obligation and has ‘taken the ECI into account’.
So they [the Commission] claim victory, to some extent. Organisers perceive this as a dressed-up rejection. And this is the main problem. If you have an instrument of participatory democracy, if you give citizens (at least on paper) a say in the future of Europe and on specific policy issues, and then people still put a lot of effort and time in it, to have their say, if they still don't feel taken seriously it can lead to more popular disillusions and disenchantment. And that is very critical for the ECI (De Groot 2018, Brussels interview).
The research chapter of this thesis will indeed show that the follow-ups of successful ECIs include limited to no effective action by the Commission to the issues raised by ECI organisers until now.
Chapter 3: Research Methods
Taking into account the previous theoretical framework- the extensive debate on the definition of civil society, functioning of the ECI, as well as the democratic value of both of these- it is in the interest of this thesis to try and apply these different views and issues to the interpretation of this research.
Before diving into the research, this part will explain and account for the research methods used to examine the way that the EU institutional interpretation of 'civil society' influences the output of the ECI.
It will also pinpoint the definitions that will be used in the research chapter and conclusions, as well as the reasons why these definitions are considered the most appropriate for this particular research.
3.1 Literature Review
By far the biggest part of this research concerns the reading, interpretation and processing of academic literature and non-academic sources such as proposals, regulations, treaties, opinions, press releases and guidelines issued by different European institutions. A close reading of these documents, especially in part II and III of the theoretical framework, reveals a factual and legislative overview of definitions of civil society and CSOs, but also a perspective on empirical observations concerning the execution of the ECI as a policy instrument. These observations were i.a. used to compare the total of 72 ECIs in terms of registration, number of signatures, reason of 13 withdrawal by the organisers and the Commission’s follow-up.
In terms of the academic literature, different articles and books have been consulted. In the first part of the theoretical framework not only contemporary scholars were used to come to an understanding of the term ‘civil society’, also the now-common paradigms of philosophers such as Hegel, Locke, Smith, Marx and Habermas have been discussed. The combination of 1. analysing academic literature on definitions and interpretations of civil society and 2. comparing the data of all 72 ECIs to evaluate the output of these ECIs makes this research a so-called mixed method research, combining qualitative
As of December 2018
(literature review) and quantitative (comparing actual data) approaches.
3.2 Interviews
In terms of ‘field work’, three semi-structured interviews with actors involved in the ECI policy area have been conducted. These interviews were held in Brussels from January 31 to February 2, 2018. The first interview was held with Antoine Colombani, a member of the Cabinet of Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the Commission. Colombani is responsible for the ECI policy as well as transparency. This interview helped to determine the role of the Commission in the process of implementing the ECI policy and its institutional response to successfully registered ECIs. Secondly, Maarten de Groot, Campaign Coordinator for the ECI Campaign- a non-profit organisation working to successfully introduce and implement the ECI- was interviewed. De Groot has additionally been involved in initiating the ECI ‘More than education - shaping active and responsible citizens’. This interview helped to determine the role of civil society in the process of initiating, registering, and supporting ECIs as well as the perspective of an ECI-organiser first hand. The third and last interview was with Graeme Taylor, Director of Public Affairs at the European Crop Protection Association (ECPA), which represents European crop protection industries. This interview has helped to determine the role of business in the process of gathering support for and following up successful ECIs.
3.3 Methods (definitions used and research)
For the purpose of this particular research, the definitions of DeWiel (1997) and Kant (1999) will be used when referring to the term ‘civil society’.
DeWiel understands civil society as being autonomous from the state, interdependent with the state, and as having a pluralism of values, ideals and ways of life embodied in its institutions. This seems to correspond to the situation that the EU finds itself in currently, as the institutions aim to stimulate a pluralistic and representative European public sphere. Kant introduced the concept of civil society as possible among states, not just within the state. This is extremely relevant in researching any form of civil society in the European Union. He also saw civil society as a necessary political actor and argued that all men should enter a civil society. This definition of civil society as a
necessary political actor seems appropriate when analysing civil society in relation to a policy-instrument of direct democracy such as the ECI.
Chapter 4: Research
In order to analyse the way in which the EU institutional interpretation of ‘civil society’ influences the output of the ECI, the research in this thesis has been structured around the following sub-questions:
1. What is ‘civil society’ and how do EU institutions interpret it?
2. In what ways are CSOs funded by the EU and what are the conditions?
3. What is the intended output of the ECI policy instrument and how does this relate to civil society?
4. What has been the real output of the 72 ECIs until now?
The first, second and third questions have been addressed in the theoretical framework, which leaves us with the fourth question. This question will have to be answered in order to research a possible connection between the institutional view on ‘civil society’ which concentrates on the representative, pluralistic and democratic values of CSOs- i.e. organised civil society- and the ECI output until now. The following section will analyse all ECIs and divide them into categories. The focus of this analysis will be on the connection between ‘civil society’ and the output of these ECIs. So whether CSOs or other forms of civil society have had any influence on 1. the funding of initiatives and 2. other support mechanisms such as public mobilisation or promotion. In turn, the financial data of these forms of ‘civil society’ will have to be researched: where do they get their contributions from?
It has to be noted that there has been a total of 72 ECIs mentioned on the Commission’s website as of December 2018, the time of writing this thesis. Any ECIs that have been registered after this have not been covered in this research.
These 72 ECIs consist of successful ECIs, ECIs that were refused request for registration, ECIs that were withdrawn by their organisers, ECIs that collected too little signatures and open initiatives.
4.1 Successful Initiatives
Since the introduction of the ECI policy mechanism in 2012, there have been four ‘successful initiatives’, in the sense that they collected one million signatures from
citizens from at least seven members states. These are:
‘Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!’
Registration date: 10/05/2012 Commission decision date: 19/03/2014
Funding: €140,000 Signatures: 1,659,543
The main objective of this Right2Water ECI was to invite the Commission to propose legislation on water and sanitation and promoting the provision of water and sanitation as essential public services for all European citizens (ec.europa.eu, accessed 23/06/2019). The total amount of funding came from the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), which represents 8 million public service workers from across Europe.
In her communication in response to the ECI, the Commission committed to reinforce implementation of its water quality legislation, as was presented in the 7th Environmental Action Programme and the Water Blueprint. She also committed to launching an EU-wide public consultation on the drinking water directive, improved transparency for the data management of drinking water and a more structured dialogue between stakeholders on transparency in water management, among others. The Commission finally called on member states to step up their own efforts to guarantee the provision of safe, clean and affordable drinking water and sanitation to all (COM(2014) 177 final). The public consultation was indeed realised in the same year. In February 2018, The Commission issued a proposal for the revision of the 20 year old directive on drinking water, 98/83/EC. On her official website, the Commission underlines that the proposal is a direct reply to the Right2Water initiative. The proposal updates existing safety standards and most importantly, empowers authorities to better deal with risks to water supply and engage with polluters (ec.europa.eu, accessed 25/06/2019). Member states will be required to set up equipment for access to drinking water in public spaces and launch campaigns to inform citizens about the quality of their water (EC, Press Release: 1/02/2018).
EPSU, the only sponsor of this initiative, has deemed the proposal insufficient: ‘there are no clear and unambiguous legal obligations on member states to ensure people access to safe and clean drinking water (…) and there are too many loopholes’ (EPSU,
Press Statement: 06/03/2019).
Despite the disappointment of EPSU in terms of the content of the proposal,
Right2Water has been and remains the only ECI until now that had legislative action
taken by European institutions. The other three ECIs, as we will see, have not encountered tangible legislative activities.
Ever since the European Parliament has proposed amendments to the revised drinking water directive in October 2018, inter-institutional negotiations are still taking place at the moment.
‘One of us’
Registration date: 11/05/2012 Commission decision date: 28/05/2014
Funding: €159,219 Signatures: 1,721,626
The main objective of this ECI was to urge the EU to establish a ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of human embryos, in particular in the areas of research, development aid and public health. Funding came from three sponsors, all of them private foundations. By far the biggest contribution (€120,000) came from the Fondazione Vita Nova, an Italian foundation ‘in favour of human life since conception’ (fondazionevitanova.it, accessed 24/06/2019). The foundation gets its contributions from selling its assets, granting the use of its property, direct contributions as well as interest-free loans.
The official response of the Commission was clear: although she will continue to strictly monitor and verify rules concerning human stem cell research, the Commission concludes that the EU ‘currently has the necessary legal framework to effectively manage EU development funding in a way that helps minimise the number of abortions performed in developing countries’ (COM(2014) 355 final).
‘Stop vivisection’
Registration date: 22/06/2012 Commission decision date: 03/06/2015
Funding: €23,651 Signatures: 1,173,130
The main objective of Stop vivisection was to urge the Commission to repeal directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes and to present a
