New Trends, New Challenges
Panel on The governance of innovation and sociotechnical systems: design and
displacements – I, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark, October 17-20, 2012
Governance of the Discontinuation of Socio-Technical
Systems—An Exploratory Study of the incandescent
light bulb phase-out
By Peter Stegmaier, Vincent R. Visser, Stefan Kuhlmann
Work in progress! Don’t quote or share without permission. Commentaries and suggestions are welcome. For contact details, see at the end.
0. Introduction
The governance of socio-technical systems has preferentially been associated with advancement and innovation. Discontinuation of socio-technical systems1 is, at
most, discussed as regime change, innovation setback or failure—as if advance-ment and innovation was the only direction in which socio-technical developadvance-ment and its governance would go. This paper aims at a better understanding of the gov-ernance of the abandonment of socio-technical systems. As observed since Schum-peter’s (1942) insight concerning the symmetry of creation and destruction, the anticipation of discontinuation and fading out is as important as the driving force of expectations about innovation and progress itself. It is crucial to see how technolo-gies are recombined, getting unpopular, liquidated, how promises dissolve—in short: disappear over the horizon of a different future than the one, which was an-ticipated in the past.
The paper is divided into four parts: Firstly, we conceptualise the idea of ‘dis-continuation governance’; secondly, we provide an exploratory analysis of four exemplary cases placing exemplary emphasis on one of the cases, the phasing-put of incandescent light bulbs on EU and Dutch national level; thirdly, we outline a heuristic derived from some explorative cases analyses that spot light on four key dimensions of ‘discontinuation governance’; and we end with conclusions and outlook for further research and policy uptake of ‘discontinuation governance’ as a strategic challenge.
1. Discontinuation and its Governance
We study the governance of discontinuation by observing and analysing relevant
1
The paper is partially based on research ideas recently developed by a consortium of researchers from the Netherlands (Stefan Kuhlmann, Peter Stegmaier), United Kingdom (Andrew Stirling, Frank Geels), France (Pierre-Benoît Joly, Marc Barbier, Frank Dedieu), and Germany (Johannes Weyer, Marc Mölders). The group at STePS, University of Twente, has initially coined the core research question; with this paper we aim to develop a related research heuristic. In summer 2012, the consortium has been awarded with an Open Research Area Scheme (ORA) grant from NWO, DFG, ANR and ESRC for three years for the project called ‘Governance of the discontinuation of socio-technical systems’.
institutions, actor networks, governance strategies, and governance pathways in a multilevel perspective. We explore which forms and ways of termination can be empirically identified in the aforementioned sectors and which are conceivable in principle.
The patterns of development of socio-technical systems have been studied broadly (cf. e.g. Mayntz/Hughes 1988), in particular concerning the growth and the governance of large technical systems (Coutard 1999, Schneider/Bauer 2009), is-sues of path dependency (Garud/Karnøe 2001, Meyer/Schubert 2007) or the trans-formation of established systems, e.g. by regime change (Geels 2007; Geels/Schot 2007; Markard/Truffer 2006; Konrad et al. 2012). However, the success of a new technology goes hand in hand with the hybridisation, fading out, marginalisation, or failure of existing technologies. The number of studies addressing this kind of development is rather small.
Latour (2002) tells the story of an ambitious transport technology system called “Aramis” that was ceased politically after some years of intensive research and development at the height of the investment activities, but before the new transport technology could be brought into use. Here, the old systems survive and new ones are developed in the continuity of the old. Utterback (2003), while describing the role of technological evolution and innovation, also narrates how the U.S. harvest-ed ice industry demisharvest-ed as the result of the technical feasibility and economic suc-cess of first machine made ice and later electric refrigerators. In this case, an estab-lished and highly profit-yielding product and system has been driven out of the market. Its place was taken—sometimes abruptly, sometimes gradually—by other technologies and products still offering ice and refrigeration, but by other means. Utterback suggests:
“Generally, in any product market there are periods of continuity, when the rate of innovation is incremental and major changes are infrequent, and periods of disconti-nuity, when major product or process changes occur. Radical changes create a new business and transform or destroy exiting ones.” (2003: 84)
This summarising observation focuses on the level of markets for technologies and their innovations. Three dimensions inform the analytical framework: ‘discontinui-ty’ pertaining to a product or a process; a product substitution or a broadened mar-ket; for established industry, competence-enhancement or competence-destruction (2003: 89). A deeper elaboration has recently been suggested by Turnheim & Geels, emphasising a “neglected aspect of the transitions literature: the destabilisa-tion of existing regimes and industries” (2012: 1). Reviewing and integrating vari-ous literatures, they consider “industry destabilisation is best seen as a longitudinal process that involves both external pressures (...) and endogenous enactment (...)“ (ibid.: 3) across several stages, such as disruptive’ innovations causing the decline of existing industries, as an economic decline process, driven by economic perfor-mance problems and shrinking financial resources, as a de-legitimisation process (ibid.: 2-3). Abandonment of sociotechnical systems occurs more often, then one might expect at first. Companies cancel devices, technologies and systems; a state agency like the NASA has a long track of stopping systems before or after start-up. We will have to review the literature also from a management and organisational studies point of view in order to reconstruct patterns and knowledge about their exit strategies.
In contrast to ‘discontinuity’ as market phenomenon (Utterback) and ‘destabili-sation’ as a regime transition phenomenon (Turnheim & Geels), our attention is firmly focused on the hitherto somewhat neglected issue of explicit, deliberate, dedicated governance measures for the discontinuation of established
socio-technical systems and their associated regimes—in other words, on
‘discontinua-tion’ as purposeful governance action sui generis. The core question can be
formu-lated in a terminology that asks what discontinuation means as a problem of action for policy-makers. From this point of view, continuity and breaks can be investi-gated as ‘governance of problems’ (Hoppe 2010): the concept of ‘discontinuation governance’ becomes recognizable as effects of social action and tangible as for systematic empirical investigation.
The study combines the theoretical framework provided by actor-centred insti-tutionalism with an agency perspective that allows for an integrated view on struc-tures and actors (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 2000). The focus is on relevant (hard, soft) institutions, actors, and their relations and negotiations. The (boundedly rational) actors and institutions are analysed in terms of how they relate and inter-act in networks aiming to achieve discontinuation. This may include cabinet deci-sions and company strategic acts as much as public-private collaborations, public debate, regulation, and media as actors as well as more or less organised citizens’ groups. To an extent greater than in many other innovation studies, it is also neces-sary to consider the formative role of social movements and civil society organisa-tions—as ‘sub-political’ (Beck 1996) arenas for the institutionalisation of innova-tive normativity; as sources of distributed political pressures and as nurturing envi-ronments for niche experimentation (Smith 2007; Seyfang/Smith 2007; Stirling, 2011). Framed and sensitised through such considerations, but not limited to them, we develop a set of empirically grounded categories (Strauss/Corbin 1990) that allow us to find the appropriate concepts to describe, understand, and explain dis-continuation governance.
A general, non-specific, notion for what is at issue here is ‘regime change’. A ‘socio-technical regime’ (Geels 2002: 14; Geels 2007: 399-400)—the extended concept of Nelson and Winter’s (1982) ‘technological regime’—can be defined as a socio-technical configuration that fulfils a societal function, such as energy pro-vision, transport, or housing (cf. Konrad/Markard/Truffer 2006: 2). This alignment and the interrelations of actors, institutions, activities and structures is a key for the stabilisation of the whole complex. Nevertheless, it can also give direction to change, making certain changes more likely than others, and “incremental changes more likely than radical changes” (Konrad/Markard/Truffer 2006: 2). To round off the picture of regimes, the surrounding macro-level socio-technical landscape, external to the regime, needs to be taken into account (Geels & Schot 2007: 400).
Regime change, as understood by Smith et al. (2005), is the interaction of two processes: (a) shifting (economic, legal, political, cultural) selection pressures on the regime, and (b) the coordination of resources available inside and outside the regime to adapt to these pressures (cf. Geels & Schot 2007: 400-1). This model is realistic in so far as it includes both external and internal factors, factors of interre-lation and factors of influence, as well as the agency dimension (transition trajecto-ries enacted by social groups; structuration of activities in local practices; strategies and strategic interactions of involved actors; intended plans and unintended behav-iour) (Geels 2011: 29-31; Geels/Schot 2007: 402). Although policy discourses often superficially encourage such interpretations, it is a mistake for analysis to assume transitions to be self-evident, technical and deterministic processes, coordi-nated unambiguously and ex ante from the outset in explicit, centralised ways. In reality, also the coordination of discontinuity is an emergent, distributed and intrin-sically ambiguous political phenomenon, unfolding in real time over the course of the transition itself (cf. Geels & Schot 2007: 400, 402).
the technological substitution pathway described by Geels & Schot (2007: 410) discontinuation can be thought of as the case when a technology drops off the pre-sent sociotechnical regime as the result of (or at least associated with) a specific moment of shock in the broader political-cultural landscape:
Figure 1: Adapted (emphasis added) from Geels/Schot (2007: 410)
Discontinuation can be interpreted as one kind of regime change. In the light of the technological substitution pathway described by Geels & Schot (2007: 410) dis-continuation can be thought of as the case when a technology drops off the present sociotechnical regime as the result of a specific moment of shock in the broader political-cultural landscape.
This may indeed hold true for the abandonment of nuclear energy right after the 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi disasters. The shock hypothesis does, however, obviously not apply to the ILB, DDT, and combustion car engine phase-outs. Rather it seems that more diffuse, less abrupt changes in the landscape and the offer of alternative technologies from niches (like energy-saving lamps and related technologies, less dangerous pesticides, and alternative car engine technol-ogies) can be associated with boosting discontinuation in these areas, in combina-tion with policies and political initiatives pertinent for changes.
Another aspect to be studied further is the fact that in some of the cases possibly no immediate technological alternatives are available, e.g. in the case of nuclear energy: while power plants in theory may be substituted by all kinds of non-nuclear energy generating systems, the grid infrastructure in Germany, in particular, is not yet ready to distribute large amounts of renewable energy across the country. The size, shape, and realisation of an appropriate grid is still furiously disputed among ministries (controlled by members of different parties) and local citizens’ initia-tives are taking a stand against wind turbines and transmission lines. Here, the po-litically intended destabilisation of the regime seems to lead into a vacuum, which cannot immediately be filled by the “emergence of multiple embryonic niche-innovations” (Geels/Schot 2007: 408) as perhaps in the other three cases. The de-alignment is thus sometimes decoupled from re-de-alignment (as the stabilisation of new actor networks, technologies and systems, regimes and policies), substitution and reconfiguration delays and the transformation romps around in a rather incon-sistent state.
Moreover, it remains to be seen how far the transition pathway (Elzen/Geels/Green 2004; Markard et al. 2012) and destabilisation (Turn-heim/Geels 2012) perspectives of existing regime change theory can be used, adapted, or substituted.
In the following, we take four quick explorations as starting basis for the develop-ment of a research heuristic. Instead of starting from hypotheses, which makes sense only in previously well-researched areas, we thus build both the search heu-ristic and the conceptualisation of the governance problems (questions and theory) on the grounds of the investigated phenomena themselves. This provides us with a preliminary heuristic for the analysis of discontinuation governance, which consists of the five problem dimensions:
Exiting Types of termination
Process dynamics Types of dynamics
Policy instruments Types of instruments
Scope Types of range and application
Legitimation Types of regulation and justification
Table 1: Preliminary heuristics for analysing discontinuation governance
The heuristic so far only implicitly addresses aspects like culture (e.g., as knowing what, when and how to discontinue and to build the necessary agendas and net-works) or power (enforcing something in coalitions). These aspects may be added to the heuristic if we will find that they help to draw the fuller picture. A closer look at the types of actors and interaction involved in and busy with the dedicated governance problem of discontinuing technologies and systems is necessary, too, if the concept of discontinuation governance shall encompass the full complexity of how structure, process and action is interwoven.
In the next section, we sketch four cases and derive first indications of the typi-cal structures and processes of discontinuation and its governance.
2. Patterns of Fading Sociotechnical Systems Out
There is a number of relevant present-day cases of purposeful discontinuation of socio-technical systems and their surrounding infrastructures. Recent examples of discontinuation discussed in this paper indicate the significant pace and political momentum that can be acquired in such initiatives.
The following four case studies are well suited to study the conceptual ques-tions sketched above. They have been selected due to their topicality, their dissimi-larity, but also regarding different policies in four countries, the Netherlands, Ger-many, France and the United Kingdom:
(1) the phase-out of the incandescent light bulb technology through the EU reg-ulation 244/2009, based on the Eco-Design of Energy-Using Products Directive 2009/125/EC, started in the EU in 2009;
(2) commitments to phase out nuclear power from its current major role in the energy sectors of several countries worldwide, with others ceasing earlier-planned nuclear expansion; discontinuation efforts have been accelerating since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Spring 2011;
(3) the synthetic pesticide DDT which was banned for agricultural use world-wide under the Stockholm Convention in 2004;
(4) a major trend in automotive drive engineering to replace fossil fuel
combus-tion car engine technology by (battery) electric engine technology, a trend that
has been speeding up since the global economic recession in the late 2000s. Key aspects of the four cases are compared in the following table:
ILB Nuclear power DDT Fuel combustion
Exiting Complete Complete (GER)
Reduction (F) Partial Slightest begin-nings
Dynamics Slow in prepara-tion, steady stepwise in run phase
1st ban decision,
back to extension of the service, and forth to 2nd ban decision (GER), Abrupt reduction decision (F) Partial, slow in preparation stage, then abrupt ban
Slow, selective, with postponements (in long-term per-spective even back and forth, never pervasive; only forklifts, electric pallet jacks, etc.)
Instruments EU regulation
244/2009 Atomic Energy Act 2011, agreement between German government and energy supply com-panies 2000 (GER) Announcements of governing parties 2011 and president 2012 (F) UN Stockholm
Convention Permits, bans National research and purchase subsi-dies
European Green Cars Initiative
Scope EU wide Single countries Worldwide Single countries, within limited EU framework, single cities
Legitimation Eco-design
Di-rective Technological innovation and leadership Available alterna-tives for replacement (push to use alterna-tives) Fukushima-Daiichi National safety reviews Technological innovation and leadership
Health issues Greenhouse gas reduction Technological innovation and leadership
Table 2: Key aspects of the four research cases
Each case exemplifies in different ways the policy pace, political will and institu-tional momentum required in order to transform wider governance environments so as to achieve such large-scale shifts in socio-technical infrastructure. Further re-search will enrich and deepen the above comparison of key aspects.
Main emphasis in this paper is put on the first case, the phase-out of incandescent light bulb (ILB) technology as governance project of the European Union and how it is realised in the Netherlands as one exemplary EU members state.
2.1 Phase-out of the incandescent light bulb technology
Although many new types of energy-efficient light bulbs have entered the market, the ILB is often used for domestic lighting. Although this bulb has proven itself over the years, the bulb is under discussion because of its attributed energy waste. As a result, several policy initiatives for the phasing-out of the energy-inefficient light bulb are introduced all around the globe (Edge/McKeen-Edwards 2008: 2-7). Also in the different European Member States the discontinuation of the ILB was discussed as a policy issues. We have reconstructed the Dutch ILB ban governance as documented in policy documents (section 2.1.2). Finally in 2009, an EU
di-rective was presented for the gradual phasing-out of household lightning to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions (European Commission, 2009c). This is described in detail in the following section. As a first step, in a pilot study (Visser 2012), the setting of the agenda for governance changes (“establishing the problem”) was reconstructed from online available policy documents.
2.1.1 ILB phase-out governance on EU level
The phase-out of the ILB technology through the EU regulation 244/2009, based on the Eco-Design of Energy-Using Products Directive 2009/125/EC, started in 2009. Thus, the European Union, and also Switzerland and Australia, come four years after Brazil and Venezuela who were the first to start phasing ILB out in 2005; Argentina started the phase-out in 2008, Australia and New Zealand started the phase-out in November 2008 and ended in November 2011 (European Com-mission 2009a: 59). In the EU, the immediate discontinuation applies only to gen-eral-purpose, non-directional incandescent bulbs. The limit will be gradually moved down to lower wattages, and the efficiency levels raised by the end of 2012.
Figure 2: EU phasing-out plan of „inefficient“ light bulbs (European Commission 2012)
Different speeds can be observed also between official and private phase-out re-garding the usage: retailers in many EU countries have reported bulk purchasing through consumers, who thus extend the phase-out in private realms beyond the official deadlines.2
In the case of domestic lighting, the policy-making trajectory of the eco-design regulation for the discontinuation of the ILB started with an omnipresent push for the phasing-out of the ILB in order to stimulate the use of energy-efficient light bulbs. The agenda setting of this discontinuation issue has a long history and in-volved many different actors, like the industry, green NGOs and political parties on multiple levels. The need for a ban or discontinuation of ILBs was pushed bottom-up by different interest grobottom-ups and was also part of global policy diffusion. An important reason for this policy diffusion was the low-cost of the discontinuation
2 Many shops in Germany sold 80-150 % more light bulbs in the first half of 2009, as Spiegel (www.spiegel.de/spiegel/vorab/0,1518,638227,00.html [16.02.2012]) reports.
policy and its ease of implementation due the widespread support from industry and environmentalists (Edge/McKeen-Edwards 2008: 2-7). The need for a policy to oppose ILBs was mainly argued from a sustainable reason. The wide sharing of this reason was reflected in proposal of the European Lamps Companies Federation (ELC) to phase out the ILB before there was any regulation (ELC 2007). Also sev-eral member states had introduced or discussed first policy initiatives to phase out ILBs (European Parliament 2007).
The policy-making process for a final regulation on the discontinuation of the ILB was mainly facilitated and structured by the European Commission, due to its embedding in the eco-design directive. The eco-design directive (European Union, 2005, 2009) is a framework regulation meant for improving the environmental performance of energy using products through eco-design requirements. Eco-design requirements aim to set new standards for the Eco-design of a product to im-prove its environmental performances, or imim-prove the supply of information on its environmental aspects. This eco-design framework operates on the supranational level to overcome separate national legislation and preserve the free movement of goods. For domestic lighting, an eco-design regulation was proposed to improve the energy-efficiency performance of lamps and their environmental performances.
A graphical model of the policy-making trajectory of the discontinuation of the ILB provides the following figure:
Figure 3: EU policy-making trajectory of the discontinuation of the ILB
The push for discontinuation of the ILB led to the inclusion of domestic lighting as a product group in the eco-design framework. Within the eco-design framework the policy-making process of eco-design requirements was facilitated and pre-structured by the European Commission with the help of fixed approaches and methods during its policy-making trajectory. After domestic lighting was recog-nized as product group, the second step within the eco-design framework included an open stakeholder project (Vito 2009b). This project facilitated stakeholders to participate in the development of scenarios for the phasing out of inefficient light-ing and set eco-design requirements. To be able to formulate eco-design require-ments for domestic lighting, the European Commission installed an EUP4light project, to do a technical, environmental and improvement analysis of domestic lighting in a fixed format (Vito 2009a). After the study was done, the Commission proposed different scenarios for the phasing-out of inefficient domestic lighting (European Commission 2009c). During the third phase of the eco-design trajectory, a closed stakeholder participation project was set up that included experts and rep-resentatives of member states to discuss the formulated scenarios. This was called
Eco-‐design framework
Lighting be-‐ comes eco-‐ design product group EUP4light project (as partof MEEUP)
Consultation forum discussion on
scenarios
Push for ban on ILB SCENIHR light sensitivity report
Final draft regulation
He alt h Co nce rn s C FL s
the Consultation Forum and enabled the representatives of member states and in-vited experts to discuss possible eco-design requirements and propose a final dis-continuation scenario (Consultation Forum 2008a). After these scenarios were discussed in the Consultation Forum, the Commission proposed a draft regulation to the European Parliament. Before this draft regulation could be amended, an ad-ditional step had to be introduced in the policy-making trajectory, namely a ‘light sensitivity report’ (SCENIHR 2008). This need for this report resulted from the pressure of societal actors that had articulated their concerns about the consequenc-es of using energy-efficient lighting. After this report concluded that the proposed health concerns were mostly ungrounded, the way was free for the Commission to define their draft regulation. After the European Parliament had amended this draft, regulation the start of the discontinuation of the ILB was introduced and imple-mented in the member states (European Commission 2009c).
The table below presents an overview of the governance dimensions of ILB dis-continuation that were proposed and discussed during the EU policy-making trajec-tory, as well as the involved trade-offs. These governance dimensions represent the policy choices that were considered by the involved actors for the design of a dis-continuation policy.
Governance dimensions of discontinuation Trade-offs
Policy instruments Efficacy requirements vs. additional requirements Implementation Immediate ban vs. gradual transition
Strictness Exceptions for use vs. no exceptions for use Monitoring Business as usual vs. additional regulations Policy level National vs. supranational
Table 3: The governance dimensions and the trade-offs on EU level
In the following, the governance dimensions are described on the basis of relevant policy documents.
Policy instruments
The discussion on the discontinuation of inefficient lighting in a dedicated way was notably focused on the use of appropriate policy instruments. An important policy instrument that was debated among all the actors was the introduction of efficacy requirements for domestic lighting. The ELC was one of the first par-ties that presented a plan for the termination of the ILB by setting efficacy re-quirements: “For each phase, there would be minimum efficiency specifications
based on an energy efficiency classification [...], and on luminous efficacy or lumens per watt [...].” (ELC 2007: 1). Subsequently, efficacy requirements for
domestic lighting were also an important part of the eco-design framework. The aim of the eco-design framework was to set a new standard for the production of light bulbs, which eventually would lead to the termination of inefficient lighting like ILBs. The EUP4light project did a comparison of the different eco-design scenarios for phasing out inefficient domestic lighting. These eco-eco-design scenarios were mainly based on raising the energy efficiency classes of lighting with subsequent phases, so the inefficient lamps that could not satisfy these ef-ficiencies would have to be phased out or need to be improved3: “In the tables presenting the scenarios (except for the BAU), minimum requirements (i.e.
min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min- min-
3 ‘Improved bulb’ is the general term that is used for the light bulb that replaced the filament for a halogen
lamp. These bulbs have the same characteristics as the classical bulb, but are 25% more efficient. They are allowed until 2016 as a way to make the transition easier.
imum energy class) are set for each tier. In order to analyse these scenarios, a specific lamp technology is used as replacement lamp” (Vito 2009a: 242) as a
way to reach the requirements.
Within the final eco-design regulation, minimum efficiency requirements were a central aspect for the phasing out of inefficient lighting. The European Commission underlined that “efficiency requirements should be set at levels
that would lead in practice to a phase out of traditional incandescent bulbs (GLS) used for general lighting purposes” (European Commission 2008).
How-ever, besides energy efficiency, the European Commission also addressed the need of additional requirements for lamp functionalities and product infor-mation for the replacing lamp types: “requirements are also set on the
function-alities of the concerned lamp types [...] and on the product information to be displayed to allow the consumers to better select the appropriate lamps for a given purpose among the alternatives to conventional incandescent lamps.”
(European Commission 2009a: 17).
So, raising energy efficiency requirements for domestic lighting formed an important part of the policy instruments for the dedicated discontinue of ILBs by setting new standards for domestic lighting. Besides the discussion on the appropriate efficacy requirements for a discontinuation policy, also additional requirements were increased. These additional requirements for phasing out of ILBs were discussed to overcome certain consequences of a phasing out and to establish an appropriate discontinuation trajectory. Thus energy-efficiency re-quirements were not the only means for governance dimensions needed for phasing-out. As the dimension ‘policy instruments’ is concerned additional eco-design requirements (besides setting new energy-efficient requirements) were discussed as well. Different requirements were discussed, but all related to the identified discontinuation barriers/trade offs that were found in the sources.
Implementation
The previous section showed that the main focus of the discontinuation policy was to phase out ILBs and other inefficient lighting by setting energy-efficiency requirements. However, the pace of this phasing out was highly debated as a distinctive part of the policy. From the start, a gradual discontinuation was pre-ferred for an immediate ban. The European Commission explained that a ban would have an advantage for energy savings, but would mitigate impact on in-dustry and supply: “Staged introduction of requirements (in particular banning
incandescent bulbs in several stages) would affect accumulated savings up to 2020 but mitigate impacts on industry and should avoid risk of supply shortage; the annual savings as from 2020 would remain more or less unchanged.”
(Eu-ropean Commission 2009d: 56). Although there was consensus about the ad-vantages of a gradual replacement of lighting, there was discussion about the timing and ambition of this replacement: “All the examined options lead to a
to-tal phase out of traditional incandescent bulbs (GLS) used for general lighting purposes [...]. The main questions for debate are the level of ambition beyond phasing out GLS and timing” (Consultation Forum 2008a: 2).
The decision on the pace of discontinuation was argued to be influenced by the level of ambition of the setting of the eco-design requirements and the tim-ing for the setttim-ing of these requirements. The Consultation Forum members di-vided two types of timing: ‘ambitious timing’ and ‘cautious timing’ (Consulta-tion Forum 2008a: 9-10). The ‘ambitious timing’ was proposed during the
EUP4light project: a phase-out with three stages in five years (Vito 2009a). The lighting industry (ELC and CELMA) proposed a phase-out of five stages in nine years (CELMA 2008). Besides the ambition of timing, also the ambition of the requirements for these stages was discussed among the stakeholders. The EUP4light discussed several options and proposed three of them to the EC and the Consultation forum (Consultation Forum 2008a: 7-8). ‘Option one’ con-tained a final minimum energy efficiency requirement of level A: only efficient CFLs allowed. ‘Option two’ had a final minimum energy efficiency require-ment of level A with some exemption in level B+ and B: this would have al-lowed improved incandescent light bulbs in some cases. The least ambitious ‘option three’ that put the energy efficiency requirement on level C would have phased out all ILBs, but left some options for halogen lamps.
So, besides defining the appropriate policy instruments for a discontinuation policy, also the implementation of the policy was widely discussed. A major part of the actors appeared to be in favour for a gradual termination of ineffi-cient lighting. However, the ambition and timing of the implementation of the proposed requirements were highly debated. Several different scenarios were developed and discussed, but the European Commission and the Consultation Forum had the final say.
Strictness
The above plans led to a discussion about room for exceptional use of the continued lamp types. In the EUP4light project the need for the use of the dis-continued lamps in specific circumstances was explicitly mentioned: “Banning
of products or technology from the market based on its ‘efficacy’ could there-fore cause serious negative side effects for other light source applications.”
(Vi-to 2009a: 298). Examples of the application of special purpose lamps were summed up by the ELC: “In the domestic market: Oven lamps, Fridge lamps
and other appliance lighting ... Other applications that would be severally im-pacted ... would be Theatre, Stage, studio & the entertainment industry. Also indicator lamps, airfield & aircraft lamps.” (Vito 2009b: 90). Exceptional use
of discontinued lamps was also requested for people that are sensitive for light: “Following the precautionary principle, there is also a need to keep alternatives
to CFL lamps for some patients with alleged health issues. This means leaving certain transparent halogen lamps on the market” (European Commission
2009d: 55). A solution for these issues of special uses of inefficient lighting was proposed by the ELC by lowering the efficacy requirements of 25 Watt lamps: “The majority of the lamps under 25W [...] have a lower environmental impact
due to their power [...] frequency of use [...] and their market size [...] Fur-thermore, cost-effective, energy efficient alternatives for many of these lamps are not yet available on the market.” (ELC 2008: 4).
In the final regulation, the European Commission left room for the use of less energy-efficient lamps in two ways. First of all, they left the option open to allow the production and use of improved incandescent light bulbs:
“current-day compact fluorescent lamps and light emitting diodes cannot provide the same type of light as the conventional incandescent lamps [...] improved incan-descent bulbs with halogen technology do, and consumers who are keen on conventional incandescent light quality for aesthetics or health reasons should have access to it.” (European Commission 2009a: 9). And secondly, they made
exceptions for special purpose lamps in their final regulation: “the following
all forms of product information [...]: (a) their intended purpose; and (b) that they are not suitable for household room illumination.” (European Commission
2009c: 76).
Thus the phasing out of inefficient lighting also stirred up the debate on the need for exceptional use of the discontinued technology. It was argued that for some occasions energy-efficient lighting was not appropriate or feasible. This opened the debate about the room to lower the strictness of the governance of discontinuation for some cases. In the final regulation, the European Commis-sion chose to allow the improved incandescent light bulbs temporarily and give special purpose lamps a formal exception for the efficacy requirements.
Monitoring
Besides the constitution of a discontinuation policy for inefficient domestic lighting, also the involved actors discussed the monitoring of this policy. The enforcement of the policy by market surveillance was often called an important condition for the enforcement of a fair competition. The ELC argued that effec-tive Member State enforcement for market surveillance was needed for a suc-cessful outcome of the legislation: “Without this [effective Member State
en-forcement], ELC fears that illegal free riders will undermine the potential bene-fits of the legislation, to the detriment of consumers, companies making genu-inely conforming lamps, and ultimately well-intentioned legislators.” (ELC
2005: 1). Also during the Consultation Forum the issue of effective market sur-veillance by Member States was noted (Consultation Forum 2008c: 6). Howev-er, it was believed that there was no additional regulation needed to improve this market surveillance for the enforcement of the discontinuation policy. A member of the European Commission, Günther Oettinger explained: “The role
of the Commission is to provide (where appropriate) opinions on the decisions taken by the Member States in the framework of their market surveillance activ-ities, and to keep the other Member States informed of the decisions taken by a particular Member State.” (European Commission 2010). This shows that the
monitoring of the discontinuation policy was mainly perceived as part of the framework of the usual market surveillance activities of the member states.
Another part for the monitoring discussed was the evaluation of the regula-tion through time. The European Commission explained that monitoring not on-ly includes market surveillance, but also the monitoring of the appropriateness of the policy through time: “The appropriateness of scope, definitions and
con-cepts will be monitored by the ongoing dialogue with stakeholders and Member States. A review of the measure should be planned taking into account market evolution and in particular the development of LED technology.” (European
Commission 2009d: 17). Although there did not seem to be a concrete deadline for the revision of the eco-design regulation, the policy-makers assured that the appropriateness of the policy is monitored as well.
In brief, the monitoring of the established policy was discussed from two perspectives. First of all, market surveillance was perceived to be needed to monitor the enforcement of the discontinuation policy. However, no additional policy measures were discussed, because the existing framework of market sur-veillance was argued to be effective enough. Secondly, the evaluation of the ap-propriateness of the discontinuation policy was also seen as an important part of policy monitoring. This evaluation was especially linked to innovations in the field of lighting.
Policy level
The level of policy-making for the ILB discontinuation was not much debated by the involved actors during the formal policy-making trajectory. The im-portant legitimisation for this supranational approach was the subsidiary princi-ple. A member of the European Commission, Andris Piebalgs, explained a su-pranational policy will discontinue inefficient lighting in a harmonised way: “The subsidiarity principle is respected, as diverging national requirements on
products [...] would have posed obstacles to the free movement of goods within the Community.” (European Commission 2009b). Also the costs for different
national legislation were mentioned as an important reason to choose for a su-pranational policy: “The form of the proposed legislation is a regulation which
is directly applicable in all Member States. This ensures no costs for national administrations for transposition of the implementing legislation into national legislation.” (European Commission 2009d: 43). In this way, the supranational
level of the policy-making was perceived to be beneficial because of the stand-ardisation in the different Member States.
However, not all actors agreed that a supranational legislation on the EU level would fulfil the needs of a discontinuation policy. On the one hand, in a petition, several Members of Parliament wrote a declaration for the need of in-ternational discontinuation: “Urges the Commission to use the proposal for a
new international energy efficiency Agreement to launch a global ban on the use of incandescent bulbs.” (European Parliament 2007a: 2). On the other hand,
MP Nuttall doubted the democratic legitimacy of the banning of the ILB, due to its underhand and undemocratic procedure: “The initial directive handed
im-plementing measures to the European Commission which, in effect, meant that the regulation was allowed to pass without the consent of this farce of an As-sembly or of my real parliament at Westminster.” (European Parliament 2009a).
This shows that some of the opponents of the supranational level wanted to transcend the standardization to an international level. Other opponents argued that a supranational level had overruled the policy initiatives on the national level and was not democratic legitimate.
So, the choice for the level of the discontinuation policy did stir up some de-bate about the legitimization of the supranational level a discontinuation policy. Within the EU policy-making trajectory the level of policy was not really de-bated. It appears that among the involved actors the legitimization of the supra-national policy was mainly argued from its output as a harmonised regulation that counts for all member states and the internal market.
The five governance dimensions distinguished above represent different trade-offs for constituting a discontinuation trajectory for inefficient lighting by setting new technical standards for domestic lighting. Different choices were considered to constitute a discontinuation policy: not only energy-efficiency requirements, but also other policy means were discussed. The involved policy choices functioned as a way to overcome certain discontinuation issues, as the following table indicates:
Governance dimensions Problem-types Discontinuation issues
Policy instruments Burdens of replacing
tech-nology Performance issues Impact of production and use of resources Recycling
Health issues
Burdens of/for users Awareness raising for need of discontinuation Need of knowledge for replacement
Comparison of light output of new lamps Image-issues
Stockpiling of ILBs Costs of discontinuation Burdens of infrastructure Need for new eco-labelling Implementation Challenges for industry Capacity for new production
Production loss due to discontinuation Strictness Burdens of replacing
tech-nology Performance issues Burdens of infrastructure Retrofitting
Dim-installation Monitoring Burdens of replacing
tech-nology Recycling Health issues Burdens of/for users Image-issues
Challenges for industry Circumvention of industry Policy Level Existing regulations National level
Supranational level International level
Table 4: The governance dimensions and the related problems on EU level
The table is the result of the reconstruction of the governance dimensions that were attributed to the different discontinuation problems found in the analysed policy documents. However, the involved actors did some issues not identify as a govern-ance task, as explained in the first part of this chapter, and others were aimed to be solved with regards to more than just one governance dimension. The ‘perfor-mance issues’ (burdens of replacing technology) and the ‘image issues’ (burdens of/for users) are mentioned twice, because they were attributed with two different governance dimensions. Absent are the ‘need for improvement (burdens of replac-ing technology), ‘change of use’ (burdens of/for users), ‘retrofittreplac-ing’ (burdens of infrastructure), and ‘costs of discontinuation’ (challenges for industry) because they were not perceived as issues that should be solved as a governance task.4
In order to make clear with which governance problem-types the discontinua-tion issues correlate, this nexus is discussed the following paragraphs.
Burdens of replacing technology
Several policy instruments addressed the fact new and efficient lamps needed to replace the discontinued lamps. First of all, the attribution of additional re-quirements for new technology was an issue. For some of the performance is-sues, additional requirements were introduced to force the industry to improve specific functionalities of the new lamps. Additional directives regulated both the environmental impact of the production of energy-efficient lighting and the need for recycling. The health issues5 that were seen to be related to the usage
of new illuminants also entailed an additional policy instrument, namely the ex-amination by health reports. Besides concrete policy instruments, the eco-design requirements were lowered in order to overcome performance issues of the new lightening technology. This doesn’t mean the final requirement of new lighting was changed, but only the transition time was altered. For example, the ‘improved bulb’ will also phase out in 2016. So, the transition time was extend-ed, so that the industry could adapt to it and improve the new technology. Sub-sequently, effective monitoring of the consequences of the recycling and health
4 This table shows that the actors identified not all problems as a governance task, which means that the
problems were raised, but not linked to one of the dimensions that were said they needed to be solved.
5 Light sensitivity (flicker, electromagnetic fields and ultraviolet/blue light radiation), skin sensitivity, mercury
issues was seen as important governance tasks. In contrast, the need for im-provement of energy-efficient lamps was not perceived as a governance task, but was believed to be solved by technological innovations over time.
Burdens of/for users
Improvement of consumer education and the raising of awareness was the main strategy for solving the issues related to the usage of the replacing lighting technology. Policy instruments for the stimulation of information to consumers were proposed for the issues of awareness, need of knowledge for replacement, and image issues. The costs of discontinuation were also aimed to be solved by more provision of information about the improved life cycle costs of the new lighting. A more specific policy instrument was attributed to the issue of light output comparison. This issue needed a standardization of the output level that is presented on the packaging. Lastly, the rebound effects discontinuation as the result of the changing behaviour or the stockpiling of ILBs was not seen as a governance task.
Burdens of infrastructure
The existing infrastructure was seen to cause different discontinuation issues. Through a temporary lowering the strict of the efficacy requirements solved the issue of retrofitting and the inapplicable dim installations for the new lighting technology. Besides the use of so-called “improved ILBs”, the issue of harmon-ic interference was not seen a governance task. Ultimately, the issue of the out-dated eco-labelling system was solved by introducing a new and update system as an additional policy measure.
Challenges for industry
The implementation of the discontinuation was seen to be main issue for the in-dustry. Discussing the pace and timing of the phasing out of the ILB addressed the issues of new production capacity and production loss. It was often argued that the manufacturing changes needed a considered implementation pace. An-other challenge for industry, the circumvention of discontinuation requirements by other industrial actors, was mostly tackled as monitoring task.
Exiting regulations
Existing regulations were mainly discussed with regards to the question what the appropriate level of discontinuation governance would be. The supranation-al level for discontinuation regulation was not much debated. However, existing policy initiatives or legislation were often argued that they would best be solved by a supranational policy.
This review of governance issues reveals that the selection of tasks for direct gov-ernance efforts and those for further technological development under mere moni-toring were subject to negotiation. Thus it is justified to speak of a governance of discontinuation, as there was a process in which roles and responsibilities were distributed between various actors and across different governance levels. The discontinuation in the case of ILBs was linked to expectations about and achieve-ments of the technological innovation—the discontinuation, in this case, is built upon the availability of a replacing technology. Although the replacing technology is, from some points of view, not yet seen as perfect, the discontinuation of the old
was acceptable for most stakeholders in the moment were the technology and it’s related infrastructure had reached a level of perceived maturity. It has furthermore become clear that not only the old technology was subject of abandonment, but also the technical standards, which were lowered for allowing more flexibility with the not yet fully comparable quality and usability of the new illuminants.
To contrast and complement this analysis of the purposeful governance of ILB on the supranational level, in the next chapter the focus of analysis moves to the Dutch national level.
2.1.2 ILB phase-out governance on Dutch national level
In the further course of the project various actors’ governance problems and strate-gies of ILB discontinuation in the Netherlands will be analysed. We start from assessing proceedings of the Dutch parliament (in which questions were officially asked by members of parliament and answered by the government; partially, the questions and answers were exchanged in written form), at times before and after the ILB discontinuation was finally decided on EU level.
Four governance dimensions were at stake in the Dutch parliamentary debate:
Governance dimensions of discontinuation Trade-offs
Policy instruments Exiting strategy vs. burdens for users
Implementation Burdens of technology replacement vs. burdens for usage Strictness Forced introduction with no exceptions vs. soft strategy Policy level Existing supranational policy instead of national policy
Table 5: The governance dimensions and the trade-offs on the national level
The analysis of the debate in parliament resulted in a typology of six governance problems as discussed during the negotiation of a discontinuation policy for the Netherlands (see table 5 below). In the following, it shown which discontinuation issues they included, as it was done for EU level before. Finally, these findings on the national level will be compared with the findings of discontinuation governance on the supranational level in order to present a more complete picture of the pur-poseful governance of ILB discontinuation governance in the EU.
From the analysis, six different types of governance problems were distin-guished. This is a first overview:
Governance problems Issues
Exiting mode Stimulation vs. ban
Costs of discontinuation Price policy vs. return of investment for purchase Old infrastructure Retrofitting vs. need for improvement
Innovation policy Forcing quick vs. facilitating slow innovation Overcoming burdens of technology replacement Need for exceptions for usage vs. no exceptions Reach of policy Use of added national vs. existing supranational policy
Table 6: Governance problem related issues on the national level
The various governance issues that were reconstructed from the policy documents are elaborated in the following paragraphs. The governance problems are de-scribed, as discussed by the involved actors, in light of the discontinuation issues.
Stimulation vs. ban
On the national level, there was an on-going discussion about the choice for stimulating the use of efficient lighting or banning inefficient lighting. From the start, the responsible minister of VROM (Dutch ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and Environment) was clear about her goal to ban ILBs. However, various members of the Dutch parliament (MP) disagreed on a ban and argued in favour of discontinuation by stimulation of the use of energy-efficient light-ing (Tweede Kamer 2007c: 3763-5). The critique on a ban was the high degree of choice containment of consumers in favour of the collective interests. Alt-hough the ministry acknowledged that a ban is a ‘steering measure’ (VROM: 2010: 12), the minister believed that there are enough alternatives, so there will be a low degree of choice containment (Tweede Kamer 2007c: 3763-5).
On the level of the Dutch parliament, there was no disagreement that energy-efficient lighting should become the norm. However, there was a discussion on how this norm should be established. Stimulating the usage of the new illumi-nants would contain positive sanctioning, and banning inefficient lighting would include negative sanctioning. This discussion showed that the choice for an exiting strategy involves an important decision on the type of policy instru-ment that is used for discontinuation. This strategy issue did not appear on the supranational level. Here, the eco-design framework already prescribed the ban on the design of particular “inefficient” lighting by setting norms. On the Dutch national level, the responsible minister was in favour of a ban, despite some Members of Parliament arguing that this strategy would have too much impact on the choice of consumers depriving people from making their own choices in a free market.
Price policy vs. return of investment for purchase
Both on the national and the supranational level, the costs of discontinuation due to replacement of lamps were a topic of discussion. On the national level, a possible intervention on the high prices of bulbs was a particular subject of dis-cussion. The purchase costs were seen by some of the Members of Parliament as a major burden for users to replace ILBs for the new energy-efficient light-ing. To overcome the high purchase costs of energy-efficient lighting, Members of Parliament asked for measures from the government. A first measure that was discussed is the stop on import levy on energy-efficient lighting (Tweede Kamer 2008a: 8). The government agreed on this measure and explained that they would try to deal with this on EU level. Another measure that was asked from the government is a VAT reduction on efficient lighting (Tweede Kamer 2009a: 361-2; 2009b: 8355-6). In both documents, Members of Parliament asked the minister of VROM whether she wanted to install a VAT reduction. The minister replied that the return of investment speaks for itself, and that she believed that the growing demand for efficient lighting will let the manufactures innovate and lower the prices automatically (Tweede Kamer 2009a: 361-2; 2010: 2).
So, while some of the Members of Parliament asked to come up with a poli-cy measure addressing the economic effects of discontinuation of ILB, the min-ister replied that these costs can be regulated through innovation. The minmin-ister of VROM agreed that these high prices could raise a threshold for discontinua-tion (Tweede Kamer 2009b: 8356). However, she did not want to put an effort in eliminating this threshold, because she argued that the total return of invest-ment is far more than the purchase costs, the lamps use less energy and have a better durability. So, there was an agreement in parliament that the purchase costs of discontinuation can be an economic obstacle. To deal with this situa-tion, instead of focusing on fixing this economic obstacle, she focused on the
return of investment of the efficient bulbs as a major driver for ILB discontinua-tion.
Retrofitting vs. need for improvement
On the national level, the old infrastructure of domestic lighting was discussed as issues for discontinuation. An important disadvantage of energy-efficient lighting is that these bulbs do not always fit the used lamps. This is a result of the different shapes of the new bulbs in comparison with the old bulbs. Conse-quently, there is a chance that new bulbs do not fit in the old armatures of lamps (Tweede Kamer 2007c: 3763-4; 2008a: 8). To overcome this burden of the old infrastructure, and additional transition period was proposed. However, the re-sponsible minister was not in favour of a slower implementation phase for these infrastructural problems and adjustments (Tweede Kamer 2007c: 3763-4). She argued that when retrofitting will become a problem, manufactures would be forced to solve this issue. So, the minister did not believe that the design obsta-cles of the discontinuation of the ILB had a need to be solved by an adjusted implementation as governance dimension, but a total ban would force the manu-factures to solve this obstacle automatically.
Forcing quick vs. facilitating slow innovation
Another discussed burden of the new light bulbs was the need for the stimula-tion of innovastimula-tion for improving the new technology. While the phasing out of the ILB was taking its first step, the discussion about the feasibility of the dis-continuation reoccurred. In particular, the practicability of the energy-efficient lighting on the market was openly questioned, due to the slow pace of innova-tion. One Member of Parliament asked the minister of VROM whether there was a possibility to make exceptions for the use of certain ILBs and slow the implementation of the discontinuation down as a reaction on the slow innova-tion of energy-efficient lighting (Tweede Kamer 2009b: 8375-8). However, the minister underlined that making exceptions for the use of the discontinued tech-nology should stimulate innovation. She argued that manufactures need to in-novate, therefore exceptions will not be necessary and innovation will be forced upon them. So, while a Member of Parliament perceived the technological de-velopment of efficient-lighting as a feasibility problem for a total ban of the ILB, the minister wanted to improve the feasibility by sticking to the ban. This shows that in the case of a need for improvement to overcome the burden of the new technology, the pace of the implementation of discontinuation can be used in two ways in favour of innovation.
Need for exceptions for usage vs. no exceptions
As a reaction on the raised performance issues and need for improvement of ef-ficient lighting, the strictness of discontinuation became a topic of discussion in the Dutch parliament. The ILB has a broad spectrum of light and is believed to produce more natural light. Energy efficient lighting is often accused of produc-ing artificial or ugly light. As a result, the discontinuation of the ILB was be-lieved to harm light sensitive people. Therefore, a Member of Parliament asked to leave room in the discontinuation policy for exceptions for usage of ILBs (Tweede Kamer 2009b: 8357-8). However, the minister did not want to leave room for the usage of ILB in specific cases. She argued that exceptions would not be needed when you force the manufactures to innovate and overcome these exceptions with the help of a total ban (Tweede Kamer 2009b: 8357-8). In
addi-tion, the Minister explained that the improved Halogen light bulb could act as a temporal solution for these types of problems (Tweede Kamer 2007c: 3765). So, the strictness of governance was discussed as a way to overcome the bur-dens of the replacing technology. However, exceptions for usage were not per-ceived by the responsible minister as a way to find a solution for these burdens of new light bulbs. The minister believed that a strict regulation would be most effective for overcoming these burdens.
Use of added national vs. existing supranational policy
Also on the national level, the level of the proposed discontinuation policy was an omnipresent issue. From the beginning the focus of the government was in favour of supranational regulation. In a first reaction on the written questions about a possible ban on the ILB, the minister of Economic Affairs and the state secretary of VROM at that time explained that they focused on an European ap-proach for ILB discontinuation (Tweede Kamer 2007b: 1933). In a subsequent round of written questions from the same Member of Parliament, the same min-ister and the same state secretary explained that they could not initiate a nation-al policy, because this topic was nation-already discussed on the supranationnation-al level for the making of an eco-design directive (Tweede Kamer 2007a: 2457-8). The new installed minister of VROM also made it clear that she strived for a European approach as well (Tweede Kamer 2007c: 3763-5). In one document, the minis-try of VROM acknowledged that supranational policy in relation to the envi-ronment is often more efficient and effective in comparison with national poli-cy. However, due to the specific characteristics of individual countries, they thought it could be justified to develop a national policy as well (Tweede Ka-mer 2008b: 1-3).
Although in the parliamentary discussion, the supranational focus had not been contested much, the minister wanted to underline that the Dutch delegation had much influence on the issue and the manner of phasing out (Tweede Kamer 2008a: 31). In general, the responsible ministers and state secretaries—besides those from VROM also those from the ministry of Economic Affairs and the af-ter 2010 to the new ministry of Infrastructure and Environment—explained that the Dutch government was not able to develop a national regulation due to the existing European policy-making on the same topic. However, they assured to put much effort in a supranational policy instead. Although they left space open for specific national policy, the legitimacy of supranational policy appeared not to be a point of discussion.
The following table presents a structured overview of the discontinuation issues that were identified by the actors in the previous section and of how the related discontinuation issues substantiate the governance problems. Here, we integrate the national discontinuation issues with those on EU level in order to establish compa-rability:
Governance dimensions Problem-types Discontinuation issues
Policy instruments Exiting strategy Positive vs. negative sanctions Burdens of/for users Costs of discontinuation
Implementation Burden replacing technology Need for improvement Burdens of infrastructure Retrofitting
Strictness Burden replacing technology Performance issues Need for improvement
Policy level Existing regulations Supranational level
The following subsections elaborate briefly on the abstracted discontinuation issues that could be identified in the described governance problems. In addition to these issues, also the governance dimensions that were considered in the Dutch discourse to solve these issues are noted.
Exiting strategy
The Dutch debate introduced an additional problem-type to the analysis of the constitution of a discontinuation policy. Although there was no discussion on the need of more efficient lighting in the parliament, there was a discussion about the strategy to establish a discontinuation. The government preferred a negative sanction by banning inefficient lighting. Other members of the parlia-ment argued in favour of stimulating discontinuation in order to preserve the choice containment of consumers. The government acknowledged that a ban is a steering measure, but it won’t be so steering because they presumed that there were alternative lamps options available.
Burdens of/for users
On the national level, as on EU level, the purchase prices of efficient lamps were seen as an economic obstacle for the use of these lamps. The parliament was in favour of policy instruments: to lower these prices either by cutting the import levy or adding a VAT reduction. Finally, the minister did not agree on any policy measures. She argued that consumers should focus on the return of investment of an efficient lamp or that these purchase costs had to be regulated by the market through innovation.
Burdens of replacing technology
It was argued in the parliament that there was a need for the improvement of the available efficient lamps for a proper discontinuation of the ILB. Both the par-liament and the government explained that the pace of the implementation of a discontinuation regulation could stimulate the improvement. The parliament wanted a slow implementation to solve the issues of the efficient lamps. The government argued that a policy needed to be implemented in a fast pace, be-cause this would be an incentive for the industry to improve their lamps.
Burdens of old infrastructure
In the Dutch debate, retrofitting was also mentioned as a discontinuation issue due to deviant designs of efficient lamps. The parliament discussed the need of an additional transition period for the implementation of discontinuation to overcome this issue. However, the responsible minister argued that when retro-fitting becomes an issue after discontinuation, this issue will be solved by the market through innovation.
Existing regulations
National initiatives for the discontinuation of ILB discontinuation were not pos-sible due to the policy plans on the supranational level. Some of the parliament members approached this as an issue, but the government claimed to be in fa-vour of a supranational policy. They argued that a supranational policy is more efficient and effective than national policies. Besides that, the minister under-lined that she had access to influence this supranational policy and could ac-count Dutch concerns as well.
Although the Dutch government did not have the authority to constitute a national policy on discontinuation, several governance dimensions were considered in the parliamentary debate.
2.1.3 Overview and comparison of issues and governance dimensions
Finally, this last empirical part presents a comparison of the discussed governance dimensions and the related discontinuation issues on the national (table 4) and EU level (table 7). The findings on both levels are compared and complemented for a better understanding of the purposeful governance of discontinuation on both lev-els.
A first look at both tables shows that many of the distinguished governance dimensions have been discussed on both levels. From five dimensions on the su-pranational level, four dimensions had been related to the discussed discontinuation problems on the national level. Only the governance dimension of monitoring did not occur explicitly in the Dutch debate. This can be explained as the result of the supranational approach for the final regulation. The final regulation on the ILB discontinuation was framed within the EU governance frame, and automatically made its monitoring an issue of supranational market surveillance. Another expla-nation relates to the on-going phasing out of the ILB. As long as the ILB is not yet completely phased out, through the monitoring the last step can still become an issue on the national level.
Secondly, the table of the supranational level includes many more discontinua-tion issues than the nadiscontinua-tional level. This shows that the discontinuadiscontinua-tion governance on the supranational level included a wider pallet of discontinuation issues that were identified by the involved actors. An explanation for this difference in quanti-ty of discussed issues could be result of the multi-actor constellation in the EU policy-making trajectory. Another explanation could be the more in-depth discus-sions on the supranational level that resulted from the responsibility to define a final discontinuation regulation. This may finally indicate that the ILB ban is obvi-ously a mainly EU level governance issue, which was not completely called into question on Dutch national level and fought at every turn.
The integration of both tables shows the overlap of both discontinuation situa-tions6:
Governance dimensions Problem-types Discontinuation issues
Policy instruments Burdens of replacing technology Performance issues
Impact of production and use of resources Recycling
Health issues
Burdens of/for users Awareness raising for need of discontinua-tion
Need of knowledge for replacement Comparison of light output of new lamps Image-issues
Stockpiling of ILBs Costs of discontinuation
6 The single underlined issues correspond on both levels and the double underlined issues were not present at
