Supporting civil society beyond EU borders: A case study of Russia

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Supporting civil society beyond EU borders:

A case study of Russia

MA Thesis in European Studies

Identity and Integration Programme

Graduate School of Humanities

University of Amsterdam

June 2016

Author: Maarten Labots Student number: 10000049

Main supervisor: dr. J.B.M.M.Y. Shahin Second reader: dr. M. Brolsma

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2.1.2. Civil society in the 1990s: challenges and pessimism p.25 2.1.3. Civil society under the Putin presidency p.28 2.2. Civil society as ‘partner’ of the Russian state p.30 2.3. Citizens participation and activism in Russia p.33 2.3.1. Russian CSOs and their constituencies: searching for p.34

connections?

2.3.2. What should Russian CSOs do? p.35 Expectations versus realities

3. The EIDHR and Russia p.39

3.1. The EIDHR in perspective p.39

3.2. Implementation: writing the calls for proposals p.41 3.3. TACIS and EIDHR: to directly supporting CSOs p.44

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3 4. Calls for proposals, neoliberal governmentality and normative power p.47

in Russian civil society

4.1. Calls for proposals: searching for the ‘right’ kind of CSOs p.47

4.2. Measurement p.49

4.3. Complexity p.50

4.4. Calls for proposals: neoliberal governmentality and normative power p.52 in the EIDHR

4.5. Towards a sustainable Russian civil society? P.54

Conclusion p.56

Annex: interviews p.59

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List of abbreviations

CBSS Country-Based Support Scheme

CSO Civil society organisation

CSO-LA Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities programme DCI Development Cooperation Instrument

DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development DG EAC Directorate-General for Education and Culture

DG ECHO Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

DG NEAR Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations DG RELEX Directorate-General for the External Relations

EACEA Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

EDF European Development Fund

EEAS European External Action Service

EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument

EOM Electoral Observation Mission

GPGC Global Public Goods and Challenges programme IBPP Institutional Building Partnership Programme IcSP Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace INSC Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation IPA Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

LIEN Link Inter-European NGOs

MFF Multiannual Financial Framework MIP Multiannual Indicative Programme

NGO Non-governmental organisation

PI Partnership Instrument

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Introduction

“The EU is well prepared to support and encourage a domestic political process in Russia that aims at the development of its democratic institutions and the rule of law, a modern economy and a vibrant civil society whose human rights are respected and whose aspirations for a more open and dynamic society are matched by the reforms undertaken by its government.”1

The above quote from former High Representative of the Union Catherine Ashton illustrates the EU’s strong commitment to support democracy and human rights in its external relations with Russia. Regarding this support, the EU has embraced civil society as an crucial force for change. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is therefore seen as the EU’s most promising and main funding instrument for supporting democracy and human rights, because it takes civil society organisations (CSOs) as the key agents of change.2 Over the last twenty years, the EU has therefore steadily increased the EIDHR’s budget.3

In Russia, independent civil society has been experiencing increasing (state) pressure, especially since Putin came to power at the beginning of this century. For example, the 2006 ‘law on non-commercial organisations’ has made it almost impossible for CSOs to continue their activities without obstruction from the Russian government. The EU’s support – both in moral and financial terms – seems therefore more welcome and desired than ever before. Nevertheless, it still remains very important to keep track of the actual effects of this support for the development of Russian CSOs. Therefore, the research question of this theses will be: ‘How does the EU’s support to civil society organisations in Russia influence their development, design and agendas?’

To answer this research question I will make use of Ian Manners’ concept of normative power Europe and in particular Foucault’s ideas on neoliberal governmentality. Briefly formulated, normative power Europe is understood as the EU’s ability to shape the conceptualizations of what is ‘normal’ in international relations. This makes the EU a changer of norms in the international arena. Neoliberal

1_{EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Russia for} the European Parliament, 1 February 2012, consulted via

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127779.pdf on 30 June 2016. 2_{H. Mühlenhoff, Funding Democracy, Funding Social Services? The European Instrument of Democracy and} Human Rights in the Context of Competing Narratives in Turkey, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, nr.1(2014), p.103.

3_{F. Bicchi, Dilemmas of implementation: EU democracy assistance in the Mediterranean, Democratization, nr.5} (2010), p.976.

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6 governmentality is explained as the process of guiding and moulding a subject to conform to a particular kind of freedom, namely freedom based on the principles of neoliberalism. As this thesis will show, both are very useful concepts for understanding the EIDHR’s support to civil society in Russia.

However, the EIDHR’s support of civil society should not be seen as an island on itself. Instead, the EIDHR’s support makes part of a bigger picture of societal, political and economic developments in Russia. This research takes into account the Russian societal and historical developments and contexts, since they are crucial to be able to understand the impact of the EU’s support on CSOs’ development. To further narrow down the analysis of ‘EIDHR support to civil society’ I have chosen to study the calls for proposals procedure in particular, since the calls are the EIDHR’s main method of allocating funding to CSOs’ projects. A call for proposals is the competitive process in which CSOs apply for EU grants to implement projects. Finally, I have interviewed officials from the Russian division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR).

The outline of this thesis will be the following. In the first chapter a theoretical framework will be presented, discussing the ideas of normative power Europe and neoliberal governmentality. Besides explaining these two theories, the chapter will give an introduction into the EU’s promotion of democracy and civil society. The second chapter will explain the crucial context of Russian civil society development and state-civil society relations. In the third chapter the background and functioning of EIDHR will be given, including a broader explanation on how the call for proposals work. Finally, the last chapter’s central focus is on how the EIDHR’s support of Russian civil society influences the development, agendas and design of Russian CSOs by making use of the earlier mentioned concepts of normative power Europe and neoliberal governmentality and by placing them in the Russian context.

The use of the concept of normative power Europe in the context of the EU’s external democracy promotion has been the topic of extensive academic debate and research, for example by scholars like Helene Sjursen, Michelle Pace and Richard Whitman. Besides this, scholars like Hanna Mühlenhoff and Milja Kurki already applied Foucault’s idea of neoliberal governmentality to the functioning of the EIDHR. Moreover, a great amount of research has been done on foreign donors’ support to Russian CSOs. The list of articles, papers and books written on EU-Russia relations and the history or current state of civil society in Russia is even more endless. All the more surprising is the fact that almost no research has been done that applied the ideas of Manners or Foucault to the EIDHR’s support to Russian civil society and the impact this has on Russian CSOs. This thesis will therefore try to be a first effort to fill this void.

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1. Theoretical framework

Before analysing the EU’s civil society support in Russia, it is necessary to give an insight into the theoretical underpinnings of the EU’s democracy promotion and support of civil society. What are the rationales behind this support and which motivations are leading these processes? This first chapter will start with a discussion of the idea of ‘normative power Europe’ and some explanations on the EU’s democracy promotion strategies. The second part of the chapter will look at civil society support and the idea of ‘neoliberal governmentality’ in more detail.

1.1. Normative power Europe: ‘norms and interests’

The idea of the EU being more than a military or a civilian power gained a major impetus when Ian Manners presented his idea of ‘normative power Europe’ in the early 2000s. Although the shift Manners made in the debate in thinking about the EU was not entirely new (Carr, Duchêne and Galtung for example already discussed similar ideas), his refocus away from empirical emphasis on the EU’s institutions and policies towards including cognitive processes was essential for shifting the centre of attention to the EU’s international identity instead of a debate over its state-like features.4 Manners emphasized the need to pay attention to the EU’s ability to shape the conceptualizations of what is ‘normal’ in international relations. To think of the ideational impact of the EU’s international role meant a focus on its normative function and its ‘power of example’ while leaving the Westphalian concept of statehood and the instrumental use of power as the basis of the debate.5 Moreover, his introduction of the concept of normative power was intended to overcome the outdated debate about the EU’s role as one of military or civilian power.6 The idea of ‘normative power Europe’ should thus be seen as independent of discussions between soft versus hard power or civilian versus military power.7 Vicki Birchfield therefore stresses the importance to acknowledge the cognitive dimension in the concept of normative power Europe: the idea that every international

4_{I. Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market Studies, nr.2} (2002), p.239.

5

Ibid., p.239.

6_{T. Forsberg, Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, Journal of}

Common Market Studies, nr.6 (2011), p.1185.

7

R. Whitman, Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations, in Richard Whitman (ed.), Normative Power Europe, Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2011, p.4.

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8 action taken by the EU is preceded by ‘an identification and legitimation internal process coupled with an external process of justification and projection.’8

When looking at the EU’s external relations of the last twenty-five years, it indeed shows an increasing commitment to put universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its own member states and the rest of the world. Its external relations are becoming more and more based on ‘a catalogue of norms’,9_{which are constitutionalized in the different treaties and which are} in accordance with for example the European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR), the universal declaration of human rights (UDR) and the principles of the United Nations Charter.10 The protection of fundamental rights and the strong commitment to human rights are one of the principle characteristics of the EU and therefore an ‘indispensable prerequisite for its legitimacy’11 and a defining element in the construction of the EU’s international identity. Manners continues by identifying five core norms that guide the normative basis of the EU: the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Supplementary to these core norms, four minor norms are suggested as well, including the notion of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and the principle of good governance.12 Altogether, the EU can be seen as being constructed on a normative basis and as a consequence of this will act in a normative way in world politics. The international role of the EU is thus conceptualised by Manners as a changer of norms in the international system and as redefining international norms by basing them on its own.13

1.1.1. Normative power Europe: critiques

Although the idea of normative power Europe has received a lot of criticism and reflection after its introduction, it is not my intention to explicate them all here in detail. I will nevertheless point at some critiques and responses to the concept of normative power Europe, which I perceive as relevant for the rest of the thesis.

Even though Manners rejects the idea that the backing of force and the willingness to use it in an instrumental way is necessary for becoming a normative power, he does acknowledge that a normative power Europe sometimes requires the willingness to impinge on the sovereignty of other states, to make interventions in the support of individuals and the necessity to intervene even

8_{V. Birchfield, A normative power Europe framework of transnational policy formation, Journal of European}

Public Policy, nr.6 (2013), p.910.

9

I. Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, p.241. 10_{Ibid., p.241.}

11

A. Von Bogdandy, The European Union as Human Rights Organization?, Common Market Law Review, vol.37 (2000), p.1307, as cited in: I. Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, p.241.

12_{Ibid., pp.242-243.} 13

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9 though material gains are absent or the possibility of facing opposition exists.14 However, it is exactly this willingness to intervene that is not always so self-evident. In a critical reflection on the real power of the EU as an international actor, Steve Wood emphasizes the limitations of the EU’s influential (normative) collective power as a consequence of the pragmatism of its individual components (i.e. member states and institutions).15 In his analysis of ‘pragmatic power Europe’, the EU is pragmatic in the sense that it is restricted by the self-interested behaviour of its member states.16 Peter Kotzian et al agree on this, stating that in the promotion of democracy it are the concerns of the member states that weight the most, for example when economic interests are involved. As a consequence, this could lead to a gap between a democracy-oriented EU and the more pragmatic member states being more interested in concrete gains.17 Moreover, the EU is an ‘pragmatic re-actor’ as its components accept the limitations of temporal, spatial and relational circumstances and because the export of its values are guided by ‘an assessment of the actual constraints and opportunities of a given context’.18 As a result, the value-driven ambitions sometimes need to be revised or adapted. This means that fundamental principles can be reconsidered when supporting them would imply jeopardizing existential security or essential resources.19 Alexander Warkotsch formulates this even more strongly, stating that ‘in practice the EU usually does not pursue its ethical agenda at the expense of vital national (security) interests’.20 Structural-realist scholars like Adrian Hyde-Price even reject the idea of the EU having a separate actorness. He argues that the EU is not a distinct actor on its own that supports universal values, but instead is an instrument of the member states for collectively exercising hegemonic power in order to achieve their long-term strategic and economic objectives.21

Tuomas Forsberg argues as well that in many cases normative interests are overridden by economic or strategic interests, especially in the EU’s relation with Russia.22 Richard Youngs is even more critical, demonstrating that the EU’s human rights policies are led by strategic considerations and could be explained as the outcome of rational utility calculations.23 Instrumental and normative

14_Ibid. 15

S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, Cooperation and Conflict, nr.2(2001), p.242. 16

Ibid., p.243.

17_{P. Kotzian, M. Knodt and S. Urdze, Instruments of the EU’s External Democracy Promotion, Journal of}

Common Market Studies, nr.5(2011), p.1014.

18

P. Baert, A Neopragmatist Agenda for Social Research, Londen: Routledge 2009, p.48., as cited in: S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, p.246.

19

S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, pp.246-247. 20

A. Warkotsch, Realpolitik and International Reaction to Non-Compliance with Liberal Democratic Norms,

Cooperation and Conflict, vol.45(2010), p.96, as cited in S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, p.247.

21

R. Whitman, Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations, p.7. 22

T. Forsberg, Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, p.1193. 23_{H. Sjursen, The EU as ‘normative’ power: how can this be? Journal of European Public Policy, nr.2 (2006),} p.239.

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10 logics should therefore not be seen as in strict dichotomy, but as influencing each other. Diez and Pace stress that this entanglement of norms and interests is not always that obvious or clear. They argue that ‘although the EU’s aim of its external policies are often dressed in “the universal good” clothes, in practice, this masks the short-term focus of the EU’s self-interests.’24 This vision is shared by Mark Langan who argues that the EU uses moral norms for the public legitimisation and self-rationalisation of its geopolitical and economic interests.25_{On the other hand, the lack of (self-)} interest or indifference to some geographical areas will lead to a diminishing capacity of the EU to exert normative power in these places. It is thus of significance to explore the motivations actors have for exercising normative power in the different regions.26

Other authors are critical about the normative power idea as it would perpetuate the ‘norms versus interests dualism’, despite the fact that Manners acknowledged the risk of and warned against decoupling interest from norms in his later work.27 Helene Sjursen for example mentions the limitations of a debate opposing norms to strategic interests. She states that even if the EU’s normative policies are motivated by strategic considerations or self-interest, this should not automatically lead to the conclusion that these transferred norms are to be considered invalid and illegitimate.28 Lisbeth Aggestam endorses this position. Although she points at the role interests play in the EU’s foreign policy, she also argues that material interests and ethical considerations should be seen as closely entwined and that the EU must be understood as having mixed motivations.29 Even an ethical power Europe is not necessarily based on altruism alone, nor is it completely devoid of interests. Instead, the EU is combining ethical considerations with strategic and instrumental interests.30 In contrast to the vision of Diez and Manners – who state that normative power is not a foreign policy tool to be used for national interests31 – does Aggestam claim that normative action should not be contrasted with strategic or self-interested action, since both can also inform each other.32 Aggestam’s continues to explain the model of ‘ethical power Europe’. This focuses more on what the EU ‘does’ instead of what it ‘is’, which is different from Manner’s concept of normative power Europe (which is about what Europe ‘is’). The EU is seen as proactively changing the world according to its vision of the ‘global common good’ instead of only representing a ‘power of

24_{T. Diez and M. Pace, Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, Houndmills: Palgrave} Macmillan 2011, p.224, as cited in M. Martin-Mazé, Unpacking Interests in Normative Power Europe, Journal of

Common Market Studies, nr.6(2015), p.1288.

25_{M. Martin-Mazé, Unpacking Interests in Normative Power Europe, p.1288.} 26

Ibid., p.1287. 27

Ibid., p.1285.

28_{H. Sjursen, The EU as ‘normative’ power: how can this be?, p.239.} 29

L. Aggestam, Introduction: ethical power Europe?, International Affairs, nr.1(2008), p.4. 30

Ibid., p.8.

31_{T. Forsberg, Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, p.1195.} 32

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11 attraction’.33 This implies thinking about the EU’s actions and behaviour as justified by its responsibilities or duties beyond its borders, like defending universal values such as democracy and human rights.34

However, Forsberg asks the question of how the term ‘normative’ in normative power Europe can be distinguished from ‘non-normative’. Thomas Diez critique is that the normative power discourse gives the EU a self-identity at the expense of third states by dismissing them as ‘non-normative’ others.35 The EU risks communicating a message of Europe and its values and ways of doing being morally superior to others, who are deemed to be in need of change. With this self-construction as a normative power, Europe may disempower other actors and this could be perceived as a form of cultural imperialism.36 Because values or conceptions of ‘what is good’ are bound to specific cultural and social contexts, the EU’s self-identification as ‘force for good’ risk being a subjective definition based on particular European notions and contexts.37 Erik Eriksen therefore argues that ‘the propensity to act on honourable motives cannot itself represent the criteria for judging the polity’s normative quality because they may very well be arbitrary’.38 Even though policy is based on good intentions, it still may fail by neglecting other’s interests and values.39 Manners himself however, dismissed the accusation that the EU’s norms are actually cultural imperialism in disguise by stating that the EU also receives opposition from other developed OECD countries, for example in their support for abolition of the death penalty.40

Helene Sjursen adds to this debate that a conceptual apparatus is needed to distinguish the features of a normative power. Explicit criteria are required to assess if the EU’s normative power is a legitimate pursuit of norms instead of simply promoting its own norms in the same way historical empires and contemporary powers have done and still do. Moreover, she asks: ‘how do we know if “acting in a normative way” is actually a “good thing”?41 Is it possible that some norms are considered to be universal principles according to their intersubjective transcultural validity? According to Sjursen, the EU could be identified as a normative actor if its external actions rely on norms that are based on a (legal) principle of universalisation. Such a principle would indicate which norms may be considered valid and thus could function as a criterion for legitimate action in the international system. To ‘act in a normative way’ would thus mean to act in accordance to an

33

L. Aggestam, Introduction: ethical power Europe?, p.1. 34

Ibid., p.6.

35_{T. Forsberg, Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, p.1189.} 36

L. Aggestam, Introduction: ethical power Europe?, p.7. 37

H. Sjursen, The EU as ‘normative’ power: how can this be?, p.247.

38_{E. Eriksen, The EU – A Cosmopolitan Polity?, Journal of European Public Policy, nr.2 (2006), p.252, as cited in:} R. Whitman, Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations, p.8. 39

R. Whitman, Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations, p.8. 40_{I. Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, p.253.}

41

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12 universal legal principle, something that matches the EU’s emphasis on international law and multilateralism.42 Sjursen therefore suggest that a strong indicator of normative power would be to look at the kind of (universal) legal principles an actor’s external policy is based upon. A focus on strengthening the cosmopolitan dimension of international law would function as a such an indicator of normative power, emphasizing the rights of individuals instead of only the rights of states to sovereign equality.43_{Sjursen’s concludes from this that it is not so self-evident to define the EU as a} normative power, as long as its promotion of the multilateral system (which is based on external sovereignty) challenges its emphasis on universal principles (like human rights).44

1.1.2. Norms vs pragmatism in Russia

When we look at the EU-Russia relations of the last decennium, the EU’s position towards Russia is characterized by the EU’s internal struggle of normative action versus strategic, self-interested action. In 2008, academic Hiski Haukkala stated that the EU’s strategy towards Russia had become one of pragmatism guided by a commonality of certain key interests, instead of striving for an ambitious partnership based on shared values and principles.45 Nevertheless, the pragmatism that is advocated by the EU is said to be a phenomenon of only the last fifteen years,46 when the optimism from the early 1990s about an Russian move towards more liberal forms of economy and politics and the compatibility of the EU’s and Russia’s value systems quickly slipped away. At the same time, the expectations altered as Russia showed a diminishing willingness to pursue a western democratic and liberal path, but instead implemented a modern variant of protectionist state capitalism.47 While the EU’s 1999 Common Strategy on Russia had ‘the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Russia’ as the first of its goals,48 developments inside Russia – especially since 2000 – have undermined the EU’s optimism about the progress of this objective. Haukkala even poses that ‘the Union has failed to reach practically any of its original objectives with Russia’.49 On the other hand, Russia has doubted the EU’s ability to serve as one of the principle guardians of

42 Ibid., p.245. 43 Ibid., p.249. 44_Ibid. 45

H. Haukkala, False Premises, Sound Principles: The Way Forward in EU-Russia Relations, Briefing Paper, nr.20 (2008), p.4.

46_{S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, Cooperation and Conflict, nr.2(2001), p.250.} 47

H. Haukkala, False Premises, Sound Principles: The Way Forward in EU-Russia Relations, p.3. 48

S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, p.250.

49_{H. Haukkala, Lost in Translation? Why the EU has Failed to Influence Russia’s Development, Europe-Asia}

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13 human rights on the Eurasian continent. Russia even questions the necessity of such a role for the EU, as they see the Council of Europe as a more appropriate actor.50

As a consequence, EU policy and attitude towards Russia have become characterized by realism and pragmatism instead of optimism or even naivety. Security relations are now a vital aspect of the EU-Russia relations and although the political dialogue with Moscow includes a wide range of themes, it remains rather shallow. Worst of all, the tensions between the EU and Russia are becoming increasingly frictional and persistent.51 Steve Wood therefore argues that the idea of a ‘strategic’ partnership between Russia and the EU has lost its credibility as a result of the deteriorated and unpredictable dynamic of the relations, the atmosphere of distrust and the internal European fragmentation between the member states on the EU’s position towards Russia.52 Even more interesting, Russia will probably be labelled a ‘strategic challenge’ in the EU’s new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. This also corresponds to Frederica Mogherini’s earlier statements about Russia. The High Representative of the Union already stated in 2014 that Russia was no longer a ‘strategic partner’ for the EU.53 On the other side, Fabrizio Tassinari does not see a more pragmatic and less patronizing attitude towards Moscow as a negative trend. He argues that the EU should refrain from clinging to a strategic partnership based on common values like liberal democracy, rule of law and human rights, while in the case of Russia these common values are clearly not that ‘common’. Instead, the EU should concentrate on the common interests that are beneficial to both sides.54 The EU could for example choose for separate agreements on areas of common interest, like trade, security cooperation or migration. Agreements in specific areas would be relatively more easy to reach than comprehensive agreements like the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, because the latter would have to contain references to a strategic partnership based on common values such as democracy and human rights.55

The dissonance between the member states about the strategy to pursue towards Russia is for a large part caused by the problem of balancing the weight of values against interests in EU-Russia relations.56 As explained by Wood’s theory of pragmatic power Europe, the pragmatism and self-interested behaviour of its member states limits the EU’s normative (value-based) power.

50

E. Klitsounova, Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to Improve EU Strategies, Centre

For European Policy Studies, nr.287 (2008), p.11.

51

D. Lynch, Struggling with an indispensable partner, in: D. Lynch (ed.), What Russia sees, Chaillot Paper, nr.74 (2005), pp.118-119.

52_{S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, p.250.} 53

G. Gotev, EU to label Russia as ‘strategic challenge’, Euractiv, consulted on 22 June 2016 via

http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-to-label-russia-a-strategic-challenge/.

54_{F. Tassinari, A Riddle Inside an Enigma: Unwrapping the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership, The International}

Spectator, nr.1 (2005), p.56.

55

European Union Center of North Carolina, The EU-Russia Relationship: A Flawed Strategic Partnership, EU

Briefings, March 2008, p.7.

56

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14 Human Rights Watch correctly argues that “it takes only one government with deeply felt parochial interests … German or Russia … to block an effective EU position”.57 Human Rights Watch continues by stating that for example Germany’s government and businesses prefer a more pragmatic approach based on accommodation with Russia over a value-driven approach that might antagonize the Russians. Frequently addressing Russia on its poor human rights records would for example be irreconcilable with the pragmatic goal of energy security for Europe. As a result, the dependence of Europe on Russian oil and gas gives Russia the opportunity to continue its undemocratic practices without too far-reaching consequences.58 Richard Youngs stresses that the EU’s short-term focused approach on energy security is difficult to combine with upholding its democratic values. As a consequence, the EU risks undermining its own international identity as normative power. According to Youngs, another trend in EU-Russia relations is that member states do not comply to the EU’s energy strategy. Instead, they conclude bilateral deals with Russia that undermine the European values of democracy and human rights and the idea of European unity.59 Lastly, Eleanor Bindman states that the lack of internal consensus on the importance of economic and social rights issues impedes the EU’s ability to raise these issues in its interactions with Russia on human rights.60

However, it is not only the member states who disagree on the EU’s position towards Russia. The internal debate between European policy-makers is intensifying as well. Those who want to place human rights and democracy at the top of the EU-Russia agenda – and thus advocate for inclusion of human rights clauses into for example Partnerships and Cooperation Agreements with Russia – face themselves against the advocates of a more pragmatic approach. The latter seem more willing to choose key issues like energy security over the problematic human rights records in Russia. Instead of holding on to clauses on the rule of law, democracy or human rights, they prefer ‘sectoral agreements’ in the fields of trade, transport, energy and investment that bypass delicate issues and criticism.61 And even when there is a general consensus on the importance of including value considerations in the EU’s foreign policy, the translation of these values into actual policy remains a problematic matter of debate.62 In an interview with Mr Jordi García, working at the Russian division of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Mr García for example explains that member states

57

Human Rights Watch, World Report, New York: HRW 2007, pp. 12-13, 17, 23, as cited in S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, p.252.

58

Human Rights Watch, World Report, New York: HRW 2007, as cited in S. Wood, Pragmatic power Europe?, p.252.

59_{R. Youngs, Europe’s energy policy: economics, ethics, geopolitics,}

https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/eu_energy_4235.jsp, consulted on 15 May 2016.

60_{E. Bindman, The EU’s strategy on economic rights and social rights in Russia: a missed opportunity?, East}

European Politics, nr.4 (2013), p. 461.

61

E. Klitsounova, Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to Improve EU Strategies, p.12. 62_{S. Saari, What Went Wrong with the EU’s Human Rights Policy in Russia?, EU-Russia Centre Review, Brussels} 2010, p.17.

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15 debate about the use of ‘discrete and silent’ diplomacy or ‘open’ diplomacy in its critiques on Russia on for example human rights violations:

“It is a big debate. Some member states say it is better – especially with the Russians […] – to be discrete. But others say the situation has reached a level where you need to be very open and vocal and criticize them frequently. It is a tricky balance to be found.”63

Academic Milja Kurki therefore argues that divisive contestation over the kind of democracy promotion and strategies, as well as questions of normative, political and ideological nature tend to be avoided within the EU and between member states and EU actors. Instead, in many occasions the choice has been made for a de-politicisation of the discussion and to shift the debate towards programs and other technical issues.64

1.2. Democracy promotion, civil society and neoliberal governmentality

The first part of this chapter has given some explanation on the idea of the EU as a normative power in its external relations. The aim of this second part is to take a deeper theoretical look at the EU’s promotion of democracy and civil society, especially in its neighbourhood and near abroad. For this, I will make use of the ideas of neoliberal governmentality.

1.2.1. Democracy promotion

It is only since the last two decades that external democracy promotion has become an explicit, formal and general aim of the EU and that the EU has developed into an agent of international democracy promotion – especially in its neighbourhood. The development and consolidation of democracy have become important elements of the EU’s development cooperation, its Common Foreign and Security Policy and the external trade and aid agreements.65 According to the EU’s treaties, the EU’s external actions should be guided by the same principles and values that have inspired its own creation. These principles and values should be safeguarded and disseminated in the wider world to construct an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.66 The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of an EU

63_{Interview with Mr García, see annex.} 64

M. Kurki, Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies, International Political Sociology, nr.5(2011), p.351.

65

S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?, Democratization, nr.4(2011), pp.885-886.

66_{Article 21(1-2) TEU, as cited in P.J. Cardwell, Mapping Out Democracy Promotion in the EU’s External} Relations, European Foreign Affairs Review, nr.16(2011), p.24.

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16 Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External Relations have been important developments as well, since both have been confirmations of the importance of democracy promotion in the EU’s external relations and its connection to the EU’s foreign policy.67 Processes of political liberalisation and democratisation based on the European model of liberal democracy are to be exported outside the EU, while this is considered as a necessarily ‘good’ thing.68

Michelle Pace however, emphases the importance to ask why liberal democracy is the model that has to be exported and how and why this model received a taken for granted status.69 She critiques the assumption in EU democracy promotion that what worked for Europe will work for other regions as well. In her opinion, the EU tends to universalize a form of democracy promotion from its own Western European circumstances and specific cultural-historical dynamics.70 Pace also stresses that the EU has to give more attention to domestic agents of change (like CSOs) and activities of democracy promotion within regions like the Mediterranean, instead of focusing primarily on external democracy promotion. The latter has the risk of framing democracy as an Western concept exterior to non-EU regions like the Mediterranean.71 Finally, she shows that the EU’s concern with stability and security goals is its ultimate objective instead of democracy in itself. This trend is motivated by the member states’ own interests, which hinders a coherent democracy promotion strategy.72 Richard Youngs mentions the member states’ concerns with security and stability as well. Member states would be mostly worried that democracy promotion and political change in the Mediterranean would cause instability and more migration for Europe in the short term.73 The southern member states in particular expressed these concerns, since they would be confronted more directly with destabilizing developments in this region. According to Youngs, the north-south split within the EU on democracy promotion strategies has been more significant for the Mediterranean region than for most other regions.74

Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig distinguish three models within the EU’s democracy promotion. The model of ‘linkage’ focuses at the societal preconditions that are needed for the development of democracy and aims at supporting democratic opposition and other civil society actors. ‘Leverage’ induces the target countries to implement democratic reforms via conditionality. The third, so called ‘governance model’ gained prominence since the early 2000s and

67

P.J. Cardwell, Mapping Out Democracy Promotion in the EU’s External Relations, p.22. 68

M. Pace, Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: the limits of EU normative power, Political Science and International Studies, nr.1 (2009), p.39.

69 Ibid., p.40. 70 Ibid., pp.48-49. 71_{Ibid., pp.50-51.} 72 Ibid., p.42. 73

R. Youngs, The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?, Democratization, nr.1 (2002), p.42.

74

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17 consists of the EU promoting democratic principles through policy-specific, functional cooperation.75 According to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, the success of the leverage model is dependent on the prospect of membership for the third countries. However, the practical relevance and accomplishments of this model have been limited for the EU’s relations with countries without enlargement prospects. This resulted in the increased attention for the third model of democracy promotion: the promotion of democratic governance norms through third countries’ approximation to EU sectorial policies.76 This functional cooperation focuses at individual policy fields and the democratic principles related to these fields. Subsequently, these democratic principles are transferred via the transgovernmental, horizontal ties between the public administrations of the EU and the third countries involved. This means that lack of cooperation on for example democracy, human rights, rule of law in one field does not prevent intense cooperation in other sectoral policies. Altogether, this could be seen as a shift in the EU’s democracy promotion strategy: from the promotion of democratic regimes to the promotion of democratic governance.77 It is not about changing state institutions anymore, but about changing rules and practices. This shift thus builds on an understanding of democracy as being defined more by underlying principles than by the specific institutions which are propagating them. The goal of democratic governance is therefore to incorporate these democratic principles into the administrative standards, rules and practices of the individual policy sector of a third state,78 even if this policy sector in itself is not directly connected to principles like human rights or democracy.

Peter Kotzian et al have written about the instruments available to the EU for promoting democracy and the factors influencing the choice of instruments. This choice is seen as driven by internal motives, but also influenced by external conditions. The promotion of democracy by the EU outside its borders is mainly motivated by the fact that a political system like the EU desires to be surrounded by political systems based on the same principles and values. Having democracies in its (near) neighbourhood will increase the possibilities of safety and welfare and the avoidance of instability and bad governance for these regions and the EU itself.79 Besides these internal motivations Kotzian et al are also pointing at external constraints such as the available resources and properties of the third countries involved, security interests, the context of the international system and the relationship between the EU and the third country (and its alternatives).80 The gas and oil

75_{S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to} governance?, p.886.

76

Ibid., p.887. 77_Ibid. 78

T. Freyburg et al, EU promotion of democratic governance in the neighbourhood, Journal of European Public

Policy, nr.6(2009), p.917.

79_{P. Kotzian, M. Knodt and S. Urdze, Instruments of the EU’s External Democracy Promotion, p.996.} 80

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18 resources of Russia will for example be likely to determine the choice of instrument the EU will use. In general the EU is less likely to use negative instruments when a country is resourceful.81 Another example is that the use of bottom-up instruments is limited by the EU in internally unstable countries.82

Kotzian et al describe three different main instruments of democracy promotion: support of civil society through the EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) allocations, agreements with third countries and sanctions. EIDHR allocations is a positive instrument supporting democratization from within via a bottom-up approach. As a result, the process of democratization often takes place outside the third state’s government control, which makes it a highly intrusive instrument.83 Agreements are positive as well, but based on conditionality and leverage, while sanctions are a mostly ad hoc, negative and specific instrument.84 The next sections will focus on the support of civil society in particular.

1.2.2. Civil society support (and the European Neighbourhood)

The European Commission sees CSOs as bringing together the principal structures of society outside of the government and public administration, although it acknowledges that it is difficult to find a commonly accepted definition of the term.85 Furthermore, it sees non-state actors (which includes CSOs) as independent of the state, seeking to bring social changes and being active in different fields from poverty reduction to environmental issues.86 Civil society is also considered to be very important to the EU internally. The participation of CSOs at the EU level would contribute to a bottom-up perspective on European integration that reaches beyond the ‘political elites’.87 Involving civil society in EU governance has been given increasing attention as an answer to the EU’s legitimacy crisis – especially after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.88 Participatory democracy via civil society involvement is seen as an important supplement to representative democracy: the EU’s democratic legitimacy would be strengthened by input-oriented governance ‘by the people’. Moreover, it should improve more output-oriented effective governance and problem-solving.89 The 2001 Commission 81 Ibid., p.999. 82 Ibid., p.1002. 83_{Ibid., p.1003.} 84 Ibid., pp.1004-1005. 85

European Commission, Communication from the Commisson: Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue, Brussels: COM(2002) 704 final, p.6.

86

European Commission (EuropeAid), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/civil-society_en, consulted on 27 February 2016.

87_{H. Pleines, Is this the way to Brussels? CEE civil society involvement in EU governance, Acta Politica, nr.1/2} (2010), p.230.

88

B. Finke, Civil Society Participation in EU governance, Living Reviews in European Governance, nr.2 (2007), consulted via http://www.europeangovernance-livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2007-2/, p.4.

89

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19 White Paper on European Governance for example assigned a key role to civil society for improving participatory governance and the implementation of good governance.90

Manal Jamal defines civil society as addressing “the conditions of citizenship in a given polity, both the virtues and dispositions of individual citizens, as well as a descriptive category for an arena of political participation. Civil society serves as a mechanism to interact with the state and demand citizenship rights.”91_{In this view civil society thus contributes to democracy through its strengthening} of citizenship (rights) and as facilitator of political participation. Moreover it can play an important role in countering state power and it could serve as a political arena.92 He continues by indicating several characteristics and contextual factors that influence the functioning of civil society. A more dense and plural civil society for example will stimulate the deepening of democracy and a broader range of citizens participating.93 Furthermore, a distinction is made between horizontal and vertical linkages between civil society organisations. Horizontal linkages between CSOs are preferred, because it will lead to the incorporation of other grassroots constituencies into civil society. This in turn leads to a better organisation of interests and the growth of cooperative networks. Moreover, social capital in the form of social trust and ‘norms of reciprocity’ will be generated. In contrast to horizontal linkages will vertical ones reinforce existing hierarchy and polarization. Cooperation between CSOs is than less likely, just like citizens participation and engagement.94

Liam O’Dowd and Bohdana Dimitrovova point at the importance to acknowledge the link between the concepts of civil society and the state and stress that civil society is not a stand-alone concept. They argue that the EU’s attempts to promote civil society cooperation should be seen in this light as well. These attempts are part of an agenda of reshaping state institutions in third states in order to facilitate a positive and mutually supportive relationship between civil society and state institutions and to stimulate the dialogue between civil society and the government.95 Furthermore, civil society itself and its relation towards the state is understood differently in both the West and the East. This has mainly to do with different historical traditions: the Western idea of civil society defines it as being autonomous from the state, which differs from the ‘Eastern traditions of absolutist states where “civil society” is extremely weak and dominated by an all-powerful state.’96 The fact that there seems to be a dichotomy between a Western and Eastern notion of civil society

90

Ibid., p.4.

91_{M. Jamal, Democracy Promotion, Civil Society Building, and the Primacy of Politics, Comparative Political}

Studies, nr.1(2012), p.12. 92 Ibid., p.12. 93_Ibid. 94 Ibid., pp.12-13. 95

L. O’Dowd and B. Dimitrovova, Promoting Civil Society Across the Borders of te EU Neighbourhood: Debates, Constraints and Opportunities, Geopolitics, nr.16(2011), p.178.

96 Ibid.

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20 does not automatically mean that there is a unambiguous or uniform conceptualization of what civil society means and its role and significance in society within the West and the EU. This debate makes a clear transfer of a Western model of civil society therefore rather problematic.97

Three schools of thought can be distinguished in the debate about civil society in the West. The first sees civil society as autonomous and separated from the state. However, this vision overlooks the crucial role of the state as protector of civil society and as ‘referee’ in intra-societal disputes. It is therefore better to understand the relationship between civil society and the state as a harmonic and interactive coexistence, while civil society will often be dependent on the state for its security.98 The second vision on civil society defines it as active or responsible citizenship through community development. Social partnerships between state agencies and the community will eventually have as result the decentralisation of power to the community.99 Finally, the third model understands civil society as a discursive public sphere that functions as an arena for citizens for deliberation and association and institutional collaboration.100

However, all three models have their limitations when deployed in the context of Eastern European societies, mainly as a consequence of the above mentioned different understandings of civil society between the West and East. The idea of civil society as autonomous of the state is for example complicated in a very restrictive state where all activities and funding are controlled by the government. Passivity and lack of interest in politics from citizens in post-communist states hinders active citizenship and community development. This attitude is often the result of decennia of mistrust in formal organisations from the communist era, which developed into disappointment with the new institutions. The communist way of organising the public sphere also left its marks on the current opinions about civil society and citizen participation. Membership in different organisations was compulsory in the communist states and the public sphere was under heavy control and surveillance of the state authorities. Mistrust of volunteerism and the image of CSOs as unnecessary and dangerous have been the negative outcome of this.101

Finally, it is important to take into consideration the fact that ‘civil society’ is in origin a Westernized concept. Therefore, David Lewis questions if the concept of civil society is even useful as an analytical construct for understanding social and political processes or as policy tool for development in the context of non-Western societies.102 Moreover, he argues that civil society is a historically specific concept, sensitive to differences of history, culture and economy. According to 97 Ibid., p.179. 98 Ibid., p.186. 99_{Ibid., p.187.} 100 Ibid., p.188. 101 Ibid., pp.186-189.

102_{D. Lewis, Civil society in non-Western contexts: Reflections on the ‘usefulness’ of a concept, Civil Society}

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21 him, this makes it important to question its meaning and relevance outside the context it originally evolved.103

1.2.3. Neoliberal governmentality

Several shifts have taken place in the EU’s democracy promotion strategy and its support for civil society. The first shift is that instead of focusing on facilitating the functioning of the democratic state and its institutional bases and structures, the EU’s recent efforts moved the attention towards supporting the ‘right kind’ of democratic culture from below. This new ‘soft edge’ democracy promotion strategy is intended to be culturally and locally sensitive and aims at local ownership of democratisation processes.104 Their aim is to change views, mindsets and assumptions of target states’ populations and CSOs. It is not about forcing the state to adopt democratic processes, but about facilitating pressure from below by building the capacity of CSOs and the population to challenge the governments authoritarian practices and rules.105 At the same time, there has also been another shift in the EU’s approach, namely a change in the actors that are targeted for support. For a long time the EU used a too narrow definition of the kind of CSOs eligible for funding and support, which limited the plurality of the CSOs being supported. Whereas in the past the EU aimed too much at well-structured, Western-style non-governmental NGOs, it now tries to support a wider spectrum of potential actors of change.106 Another shift can be identified towards more differentiation and tailored relations towards the third states. Finally, the EU is now also increasingly supporting states that are in the early phase of democratisation or even still autocratic instead of focusing support on the ones that need help in consolidating their democratic achievements.107

However, academics like Milja Kurki and Hanna Mühlenhoff have used the concept of neoliberal governmentality to show that – in contrast to the above – the EU is still promoting a very narrow and specific kind of civil society and CSOs. The EU’s activities should therefore be seen as ‘a deep-running form of governmental control over the nature of individuals, society, and governance’.108 Kurki uses Foucault’s ideas of neoliberal governmentality to explain the processes that are at work. Foucault’s ideas have shown that a central element of neoliberalism is that subjects have to be guided and moulded to conform to a particular kind of vision of freedom and prosperity. Mühlenhoff notes that according to Foucault, the idea of government is not restricted to politics or the implementation of laws alone. Government is not only political power, but should be seen in

103

Ibid., p.3. 104

M. Kurki, Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion, p.349-350. 105_{Ibid., p.356.}

106

S. Giusti and E. Fassi, The European Endowment for Democracy Promotion in the EU Neighbourhood, The

International Spectator, nr.4(2014), p.113.

107_{Ibid., p.123.} 108

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22 more broader term as it refers to how ‘the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed’.109 Moreover, the government of others is based on shaping the conditions for those others to govern themselves. Or in the words of Foucault: ‘successful government of others is often thought to depend on the ability of those others to govern themselves, and it must therefore aim to secure the conditions under which they are enabled to do so’.110 Foucault therefore argues that the concept of local ownership and the idea of shifting power away from the state to for example civil society organisations only has the appearance of self-regulation, self-control and ownership. In reality however, local ownership remains framed by the rationality and the particular ideas of freedom of the state or other authorities.111 Foucault referred to these rationalities of government as ‘governmentality’.112 Via this governmentality civil society and CSOs are shaped to conceptualise the world in specific ways and to see certain forms of actions and behaviour as normal or appropriate and others as less possible.113

What distinguishes ‘neoliberal governmentality’ from governmentality is that neoliberal governmentality applies market principles to all spheres: from the state and the economy to civil society. In the sphere of civil society, this means that a CSO is expected and formed to behave according to the principles of neoliberalism: it becomes an efficient, cost-benefit calculating homo economicus.114

Kurki and Mühlenhoff continue by stating that the EU’s ‘soft edge’ democracy promotion strategy – sensitive to local particularities and directed at local ownership of democratisation processes – is subjected to neoliberal economic rationalities and governmentality techniques.115 It is explained that the EU implicitly promotes a quite specific kind of civil society and CSOs via the predefined objectives, projects, funding processes (calls for proposals) and standardized logical framework of its democracy promotion strategy. All civil society projects funded by the EU have to be done according to EU formats, bureaucracy and mentalities. CSOs therefore complain that they have to re-prioritise their agendas to comply to the EU funding programmes and instruments. This is especially a point of criticism across the ENP countries.116 I will elaborate on the role of neoliberal

109

M. Foucault, The subject and power, Critical Inquiry, nr.4 (1982), p.790 as cited in: H. Mühlenhoff, Funding Democracy, Funding Social Services? The European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights in the Context of Competing Narratives in Turkey, p.105.

110

B. Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, Oxford: Blackwell 1996, p.105 as cited in : H. Mühlenhoff, Funding Democracy, Funding Social Services? The European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights in the Context of Competing Narratives in Turkey, p.105.

111

M. Kurki, Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion, p.353. 112

H. Mühlenhoff, Funding Democracy, Funding Social Services? The European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights in the Context of Competing Narratives in Turkey, p.105.

113

Ibid., p.106. 114

Ibid.

115_{M. Kurki, Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion, p.351.} 116

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23 governmentality in the EU’s promotion of democracy and human rights CSOs in Russia in chapter four.

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24

2. Russian civil society: development and characteristics

The aim of this second chapter is to give explanation on the characteristics and features of Russian civil society. Important aspects that will be discussed here are the relationship between civil society and the state, the historical background and development of civil society and the role of citizen participation. Altogether, the discussed themes in this chapter give the context for a greater understanding of the EU’s support of Russian civil society.

2.1. Development of Russia’s civil society

To comprehend the complex situation of civil society in Russia, it is necessary to look at its origins and development. Especially the (late) Soviet era and the 1990s have been an influential period with far-reaching consequences for the role of CSOs within Russian society and their position in relation towards the state. Moreover, the specific cultural and societal norms that developed in the Soviet period continue to shape contemporary civil society in Russia until the present day.117

2.1.1. Soviet era and perestroika

Just as the Russian society has undergone significant economic, political and societal transformations, so has the idea of what civil society means and the role it should play in Russian society altered considerably over the last decades. During the Soviet regime, civic organisations were first and foremost products of the Communist Party and the state, their functions being restricted to helping the government implementing social policies.118 Most of the civil society organisations were state-controlled: as a result, citizen participation in these organisations was more based on coercion than on voluntary association or activism. Participation was a patriotic duty, which limited the development of a culture of voluntary participation. Instead of being separated from the state and monitoring the government, third sector organisations were a means of the state to constrict autonomous collective action by citizens and to monitor citizens and society. Soviet civil society was thus institutionalized within the state and an organized arena of control.119

As a consequence, a society of two halves had developed. The top half was characterized by a political ruling elite, while the bottom half existed of ordinary citizens whose primary focus was to form networks of family and friends. An autonomous civil society that functioned as intermediary

117_{S. Ljubownikow, The state and civil society in Post-Soviet Russia: The development of a Russian-style civil} society, Progress in Development Studies, nr.2(2013), p.154.

118

E. Belokurova, Civil Society Discourses in Russia: The Influence of the European Union and the Role of EU-Russia Cooperation, European Integration, nr.5 (2010), p.459.

119

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25 middle ground was non-existent as both halves’ mainly focused on informal and personal networks of cooperation within their own spheres. These state-society relations have clearly left their marks on the development of Russian civil society and CSOs.

However, it was at the end of the 1980s that civil society gained new impetus as a new post-modern concept. Interestingly, it all started in Central and Eastern Europe as a concept connected to the resistance to socialist states. Popularized by Central European intellectuals and oppositionists like Vaclav Havel, the ideas of civil society soon found resonance in scholarly and political circles in the United States and Europe as well.120 At this time civil society was also rediscovered in Russia: it was interpreted as being connected to the social mass movements that formed an alternative to the totalitarian rule of the state and aimed at creating an active citizenry having more responsibility in society.121

Rooted in protest and the demands to change the Soviet system, new ideas of civil society received even more space to develop during the Perestroika period. From the mid-1980s, the Perestroika period – Michael Gorbachev’s restructuring process for democratising and liberalising the Soviet political and economic system – left space for the development of civic (mass) movements and initiatives, some of them also challenging the state. These civic movements are seen as having formed the basis for the civil society organisations of the first years of the post-Soviet era. Most of them indeed transformed into non-governmental organisations (or political parties) after the fall of the Soviet Union.122

2.1.2. Civil society in the 1990s: challenges and pessimism

During the Soviet period many of the civic organisations remained informal due to a lack of political and legal authorization from the government. As a result, these organisations neglected their organisational development, which hindered the institutionalization of an autonomous civil society.123 The consequences of this for Russian civil society came to the fore in the post-Soviet era, especially in the 1990s under the new president Boris Yeltsin. The independent civic movements that had come up in the Perestroika period found it difficult to connect and cooperate with each other in the new situation. They splintered into a large number of different single issue groups, most of them having a local focus.124 Moreover, the new Russian political elite showed little interest in providing the facilities for the functioning of an autonomous civil society. It did not see a role for CSOs in

120

J. Hemment, The Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, International Aid, and NGOs in Russia,

Anthropological Quarterly, nr.2(2004), p.219.

121_{Ibid., pp.219-220.} 122

E. Belokurova, Civil Society Discourses in Russia, p.459. 123

S. Ljubownikow, The state and civil society in Post-Soviet Russia, p.157.

124_{S. Henderson, Selling Civil Society. Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia,}

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26 Russian society, since it dismissed civil society as nothing more than voluntary organisations or a topic of academic discussion. This attitude had as result that almost no policies were initiated at the federal level to contribute to the development of a civil society or CSOs.125 Overall, the Yeltsin presidency could therefore be characterised as being negligent towards civil society and CSOs: it did not try to hinder the development of independent civic organisations, but at the same time the initiatives or legislation to encourage this development were scarce. For example, a policy machinery that could offer CSOs the opportunity and channels to communicate and influence government policies was missing.126

So, although the beginning of the nineties knew some optimism, it was rapidly taken over by pessimism about the future of Russia’s civil society. Andrew Arato for example argued that civic movements were less and less seen a the building blocks of Russian society and an overall decline in their importance was taking place, as was the case in other East European post-socialist states as well.127 Alfred Evans speaks of a weak civil society in the mid-1990s and explains that independent CSOs had a marginal role in society and politics.128 The impact of the civic movement was criticized for being limited, as it would be too much focused at the subversion of the old totalitarian Soviet state instead of building up a new social order. Furthermore, Russian scholars in the mid-1990s argued that civil society was actually lacking in Russia and that perspectives were not so bright.129

This pessimism was not entirely unjustified. Most problematic was that CSOs experienced difficulties in engaging the broader public and in finding popular support for their activities. The Russian public in their turn only had the Soviet experience of ‘forced’ association and voluntarism, leaving them with little knowledge about how to deal with voluntary civil society organisations.130A societal detachment of third sector organisations from society was the consequence of this. The construction of an autonomous civil society as bridge between the individual and the state failed to be realised and civic movements continued to operate in each of the two halves of society.131

In addition to this, the unfavourable economic environment made it hard for CSOs to find enough financial resources to survive, let alone to grow.132 Russian citizens did not have the financial means to support CSOs in these economic difficult times and the financial support from Russian

125_{E. Belokurova, Civil Society Discourses in Russia, p.462.} 126

S. Henderson, Civil Society in Russia, State-Society Relations in the Yeltsin Era, Problems of

Post-Communism, nr.3(2011), p.12.

A. Evans, Vladimir Putin’s Design for Civil Society in: A. Evans, L. Henry and L. McIntosh Sundstrom (eds.),

Russian civil society: A critical assessment, Armonk, NY: Sharpe 2006, p.147.

S. Henderson, Selling Civil Society. Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia, p.141.

131_{S. Ljubownikow, The state and civil society in Post-Soviet Russia, p.159.} 132

Supporting civil society beyond EU borders: A case study of Russia