Framing China’s behaviour in the South China Sea
U.S. official discourse about the territorial disputes in the South China Sea
Jamie de Groot
Student number: 10541292
Master thesis Political Science: International Relations
Research Project: Power Transition in the 21st Century: The Rise of China in IR
Supervisor: Dr. Julia Bader Second reader: Dr. Seiki Tanaka
University of Amsterdam 24 June 2016
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Table of contents
List of abbreviations ii
List of figures and tables iii
Abstract iv
Introduction 1
1. Background
1.1 The South China Sea dispute
1.2 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
3 3 6
2. Literature review 8
3. Theoretical framework 10
3.1 The ‘China threat’ 10
3.2 Framing 12
3.3 Assertiveness 13
4. Methodology
4.1 Method and data 4.2 Limitations
15 15 16
5. Analysis 18
5.1 The U.S. and the South China Sea dispute 18
5.2 Problem statement: Regional stability and freedom of navigation 19
5.3 Causes: Identifying China as the troublemaker 21
5.4 Moral judgment: From neutrality to confrontation 26 5.5 Remedies: Negotiations, rebalancing and alliances 27
6. Conclusion 32
7. Bibliography 36
Appendix A: List of statements 41
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List of abbreviations
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations (member states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam)
DoD United States Department of Defense DoS United States Department of State EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operation PLA People’s Liberation Army of China PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy of China
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List of figures and tables
Table 1: Timeline of major events in the South China Sea dispute (1988-2016) 5 Figure 1: Problems attributed to the South China Sea dispute 21
Figure 2: China as the cause of increased tensions 26
Figure 3: Proposed solutions to the South China Sea disputes 31
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Abstract
This thesis uses Entman’s framing approach to examine the U.S. official discourse about China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. Western media described China’s behaviour in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea from 2009 onwards as ‘newly assertive’. At the same time, the Obama administration introduced a “rebalance to Asia”. China’s activities in the South China Sea appear to have been used as a justification for this rebalance, leading to the main question of this thesis: In what ways have U.S. officials framed China’s foreign policy behaviour in the South China Sea since 2009? By examining a total of 71 statements from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense this thesis argues that the U.S. government’s rhetoric did not mirror the media’s ‘assertive China’ discourse. In official statements the State Department and the Pentagon would not start to actively point out China as the main cause for an increase in tensions in the South China Sea before 2013. From 2013 onwards, in order to justify the U.S. foreign and military policy towards Asia, the U.S. government engaged in discursive acts to frame China’s behaviour in the South China Sea as increasingly problematic. The U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense started to single out China as the main cause for increased tensions in the South China Sea dispute. At the same time a significant shift in U.S. policy towards the dispute has taken place. The U.S. became more actively involved in the dispute by strengthening alliances and security partnerships, and increasing the U.S. military presence in the area.
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Introduction
In recent years the territorial disputes in the South China Sea have been extensively covered in international media. The renewed attention of news media in the disputes seems to follow an increase in controversial activities by the main claimants in the South China Sea. Most attention has been centred on China’s efforts to consolidate its territorial claims on nearly all disputed islands. Western media were quick to regard China’s behaviour in the South China Sea from 2009 onwards as a sign of a more assertive posture in its territorial disputes (Friedberg, 2015: 133).
While the media were quick to note a change in China’s policy towards its territorial disputes, some academics have challenged this claim by arguing that this ‘new assertiveness’ is not new, but rather a continuation of China’s earlier policies toward its territorial disputes (Johnston, 2013; Lee, 2013; Jerdén, 2014). China might have increased activities in the South China Sea in recent years, but these activities have not necessarily been more assertive in character than events that took place in past decades. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has become more actively involved in the conflict since the 2010s. In 2011 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a rebalance of U.S. diplomatic, economic and strategic efforts to the Asia-Pacific region (Clinton, 2011a). One part of this rebalance was a renewed U.S. commitment to solving the South China Sea dispute (Clinton, 2011a: 61).
Although not a claimant, the U.S. government stated its desire for a peaceful solution to the disputes and a continuing commitment to upholding the freedom of navigation in international waters. To substantiate this commitment the U.S. navy, as of October 2015, conducts so called Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPs) in the area. The U.S. recognized the urgency to deter China from claiming territory in the South China Sea by increasing its naval presence and the continuation of FONOP patrols. It is therefore expected that the U.S. engaged in discursive acts to frame China’s behaviour as a threat to justify its policies. By invoking a frame that labels China a threat to the existing order, the U.S. government provides a justification for its policies in the Asia-Pacific and will be able to muster support for them. This leads to the main research question of this thesis: In what ways have U.S. officials framed China’s foreign policy behaviour in the South China Sea since 2009?
Moreover, it is expected that the U.S. government engaged in a similar discourse as most Western media, i.e. claiming that China has become more assertive since 2009, to justify a stronger policy towards the South China Sea dispute.
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The research question is approached by applying a framing approach on official U.S. discourse from the U.S Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State from between January 2008 and December 2015. By doing so this thesis contributes to the debate about Sino-U.S. competition in the South China Sea in multiple ways. Firstly, it enables to ascertain the priorities of U.S. officials in dealing with the issue of territorial claims in the South China Sea. Secondly, it illustrates the perceptions of U.S. policymakers when discussing China’s behaviour. Lastly, it gives insight in the policy options that are brought forward by U.S. officials.
In short, this thesis has found that U.S. officials characterized regional instability and obstruction of the freedom of navigation as the foremost problems caused by tensions in the South China Sea. China’s behaviour in the territorial disputes was brought forward as the main reason for the increase in tensions. China’s conduct was seen as “inconsistent with international law” and detrimental to a peaceful solution of the disputes. While the ‘assertive China’ literature was quick to call out China for its behaviour, U.S. officials remained more reserved in accusing China of provocative behaviour up until the latter half of the period 2008-2015. During this period U.S. officials reiterated their desire for a multilateral solution, while, at the same time, suggesting that the U.S. military presence in the region as well as security partnerships with (Southeast) Asian allies are fundamental for regional peace and stability.
The thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter will provide a brief overview of the history of the South China Sea dispute and the applicability of international law on the issue. In the second chapter an overview of the existing literature on perceptions of Chinese ‘assertiveness’ in foreign policy and the construction of a ‘China threat’ in U.S. society will be presented. The third chapter will introduce a theoretical framework based on Entman’s framing approach. Thereafter, the research design and the collected data will be discussed. Following this, the results will be presented and interpreted. This thesis concludes by summarizing the results and discussing the implications of these findings on U.S. policy concerning the South China Sea dispute.
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1. Background
1.1 The South China Sea dispute
The South China Sea is a highly contested area. China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei all claim parts of the South China Sea. Two groups of islands are at the heart of the disputes: the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. The waters surrounding these islands contain some of the world’s richest fish grounds. Moreover, it is estimated that substantial reserves of oil and natural gas are present below the surface (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). Besides the islands, the sea itself carries great geostrategic significance. The South China Sea is one of the world’s major shipping lanes. Over half of the world’s commerce in tonnage enters the South China Sea through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda each year (idem). Most East Asian economies are reliant on this shipping route for exporting goods to European markets and importing oil from the Middle-East.
China claims sovereignty over nearly the whole South China Sea based on ‘historical evidence’. In 1947 the Kuomintang government published the so called “Nine dash line” map which depicted the South China Sea as Chinese territory. It was argued that the historical settlement of multiple islands in the South China Sea by Chinese fishermen, warranted these territorial claims. After the Chinese Civil War, the newly formed People’s Republic of China (henceforth China) upheld the belief that the South China Sea was an inherent part of China. Over the course of the following decades China engaged in multiple armed skirmishes with Vietnam over territory in the South China Sea. Vietnam claims both the Spratly and the Paracel Islands. Just like China, Vietnam claims ownership based on historical arguments.
In 1974 the two countries fought over the Paracel Islands after which China gained control over the whole island group. Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed once again in 1988, this time over territory in the Spratly Islands. As a result of this military engagement, China occupied territory and established a foothold in the Spratly Islands. In 1994 China occupied Mischief Reef despite claims from the Philippines on the island. This last event turned the attention of ASEAN towards the dispute. ASEAN expressed the desire for an end to destabilizing behaviour in the South China Sea (Thayer, 2013: 76). In order to reduce tensions, ASEAN and China sought to normalize relations in the South China Sea by establishing confidence building measures.
In April 2001 a U.S. surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in the Chinese exclusive economic zone off the coast of Hainan. The collision, resulting in an emergency landing
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by the U.S. plane and the death of the Chinese pilot, sparked a diplomatic incident between the U.S. and China. China detained the U.S. crew for several days until the U.S. delivered a statement of regret (Harress, 2015).
In 2002 ASEAN and China agreed upon a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, hoping to avert further escalation of tensions. In the Code of Conduct the ASEAN countries and China agreed that they would refrain from any activities that would complicate or escalate the dispute. Although the Code of Conduct was a non-binding agreement, it was seen as a significant step towards more responsible behaviour in the South China Sea (Thayer 2013: 77).
Between 2002 and 2009 the situation was relatively calm, with few major incidents between the claimants. However, since 2009 tensions seem to have risen again (see Table 1). According to many scholars, the increased tensions in the region can be attributed to more assertive behaviour by China in its territorial disputes (e.g. Swaine, 2010; Yahuda, 2013; Zhang; 2014; Friedberg, 2015). Since 2009 there have been multiple incidents between Chinese maritime security forces and other claimants in disputed waters (see Table 1). Moreover, China has stepped up construction activities on Chinese occupied islands. China has constructed airstrips and port facilities on disputed islands in both the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
According to a 2015 report by the U.S. Department of Defense, China has complete control over the Paracel Islands ever since 1974. In the Spratly Islands China occupies eight territorial features (occupied after the 1988 military engagement with Vietnam), Malaysia five, the Philippines eight, Taiwan one, and Vietnam 48 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015a: 7). Most of the territorial features in the South China Sea are small, often submerged, islands, reefs or rocks that are unfit for human settlement. As a result of this, some claimants, including China and Vietnam, have begun land reclamation activities to increase the strategic potential of these features (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016).
5 Source: BBC News (2015), Harress (2015), Lubold (2016)
Table 1: Timeline of major events in the South China Sea dispute (1988-2016)
March 1988 Naval battle between Vietnamese and Chinese forces over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands. China occupies Johnson South Reef alongside multiple reefs and atolls. Apr. 2001 Collision of a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane with a Chinese J-8 fighter jet approximately 70
miles from Hainan.
Nov. 2002 ASEAN and China agree to a code of conduct in the South China Sea.
Jan. 2005 Chinese ships fire on two Vietnamese fishing boats near Hainan, killing 9 and detaining 8 people.
March 2009 The U.S. surveillance ship USNS Impeccable is harassed by five Chinese vessels approximately 75 miles from Hainan.
June 2009 The U.S. destroyer USS John S. McCain collides with a submerged object, possibly a PLAN submarine in the South China Sea.
Feb. 2011 A Chinese warship fires warning shots at a Philippine vessel near Jackson Atoll in the Spratly Islands after ordering it to leave the area.
July 2011 Chinese soldiers assault a Vietnamese fisherman and threaten crewmembers before expelling them from waters near the Paracel Islands.
Apr. 2012 A Philippine warship is involved in a standoff with two Chinese surveillance vessels at Scarborough Shoal. In reaction China imposes higher trade barriers toward the Philippines. Jan. 2014 China issues a “fishing permit” rule in the South China Sea despite protests by the
Philippines, Vietnam and the U.S. May
2014-Aug. 2014
A Chinese oil rig is moved into disputed waters near the Paracel Islands, causing large anti-China protests in Vietnam. anti-China and Vietnam engage in a standoff eventually resulting in the withdrawal of the oil rig by the Chinese.
Aug. 2014 A U.S. P-8 surveillance plane is harassed by a Chinese J-11 fighter jet.
Sept. 2015 China completes a runway on Fiery Cross Reef after large scale land reclamation. Oct. 2015 The USS Lassen passes through the disputed waters surrounding the Spratly Islands. Oct. 2015 The Permanent Court of Arbitration rules that it has jurisdiction in the case Philippines v.
China concerning the legality of China’s “nine-dashed line” claim.
Jan. 2016 USS Wilbur Curtis sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in the Paracel Islands. Feb. 2016 Satellite images suggest that China has stationed anti-air missiles on Woody Island in the
Paracel Islands.
May 2016 USS William P. Lawrence passes within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands.
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1.2 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
In December 1982 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Convention institutionalized customary international law principles such as the delimitation of a country’s territorial waters and established the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The treaty states that a country’s EEZ extends up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the low water mark. A state has the exclusive right to explore and extract marine resources within its EEZ. Other states have the freedom of unrestricted navigation and overflight within an EEZ (UNCLOS, 1982: Art. 58).
Moreover, the treaty lays out which territorial features give right to their own territorial waters. In the case of the South China Sea most of the territorial features consist of rocks, submerged islands and, since recently, artificial islands. According to the UNCLOS treaty submerged and artificial islands do not have the same status as islands and can therefore have no territorial waters of their own (UNCLOS, 1982: Art. 60.8).
The UNCLOS treaty appears to be the most suitable legal framework for resolving the dispute in a peaceful manner. But although all claimants in the South China Sea have ratified the Convention, its applicability remains limited. In the South China Sea the EEZs of multiple countries overlap. In case of a dispute arising from conflicting EEZ claims, the UNCLOS treaty calls for a peaceful, negotiated settlement between the parties involved. If initial negotiations fail, Part XV, Section 2 of the treaty states that compulsory procedures may come into effect. In this case any party involved in a dispute could submit a request to the appropriate court or tribunal to determine the interpretation or application of the Law of the Sea Convention in the dispute.
However, article 298 of the UNCLOS treaty offers states the option to opt-out of the compulsory procedures mentioned in Part XV, Section 2. In 2006 China, invoking article 298, declared that it does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention.
Despite China’s refusal to accept compulsory settlement procedures, the Philippines has called for international arbitration in the South China Sea dispute. In January 2013, the Philippines brought certain issues concerning China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (see Table 1). According to the Philippines, China violates certain provisions of the UNCLOS treaty. China refused to participate in arbitration, claiming that any issues regarding border disputes should be settled bilaterally.
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In October 2015 the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case, and will start hearing seven out of 15 submissions made to the court by the Philippines. In the case that the court rules in favour of the Philippines, it remains to be seen if China can be legally bound to decision of the court. Even so, the case may serve as an indicator of international opinion concerning Chinese conduct in the South China Sea. China has sought international support for its position that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction in the case. China claims that, as of June 2016, 60 countries have voiced public support for China’s position (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016).
Another issue complicating a legal settlement of the disputes, is the fact that not all territorial claims are derived from the UNCLOS treaty. China, Taiwan and Vietnam all claim to have historic rights to ownership of islands in the South China Sea. Historical claims, however, carry little weight in international law (Buszynski, 2012: 140). Besides, historical ‘evidence’ is often scarce and ambiguous, making it nearly impossible to vindicate historical claims.
All in all, the UNCLOS treaty provides no easy solution to the South China Sea dispute. Claims of historic settlement, the question whether reefs, shoals and artificial islands should be given the status of full islands, overlapping EEZ claims, and the refusal of China to accept compulsory settlement procedures, make the South China Sea a complex dispute with no clear legal solution in sight.
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2. Literature review
In recent years a substantial body of literature has been written about the causes of China’s presumed assertive posture in its territorial disputes in the South China Sea (e.g. Swaine, 2010; Yahuda, 2013; Zhang; 2014). China’s behaviour has, for example, been attributed to its growing economic power and military capabilities (Swaine, 2010, Yahuda, 2013), or to the need for a more assertive foreign policy to satisfy domestic nationalism (Zhang, 2014). The ‘assertiveness’ of China is posed as something new, distinguishing it from China’s earlier behaviour in international politics.
However, some authors have argued that this ‘assertiveness’ is either nothing new, or not present at all. Following the surge of articles discussing China’s assertiveness in foreign policy from 2009 onwards, some scholars have begun to ask the question whether China is truly assertive, and what purpose this narrative serves.
One of the foremost China experts to call into question the ‘assertive China’ discourse that emerged in U.S. media from 2009 onwards is Alistair Ian Johnston. Johnston (2013) analysed seven events in Chinese diplomacy in the year 2010 in which China’s posture was described as assertive in U.S. media. Johnston argues that China’s behaviour in these events does not differ significantly from earlier Chinese behaviour. The year 2010 does not appear to be a watershed moment in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy as it is perceived to be by U.S. media. China’s posture in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the 2001 EP-3 spy plane incident and the anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005 was arguably more assertive than the events that transpired from 2009 onwards (Johnston, 2013: 13). He concludes that the claim of a ‘newly assertive’ China is largely unfounded and suggests that this claim mainly serves to develop a new policy affirming discourse in U.S. policymaking circles concerning China’s foreign policy (ibid: 46-47). Johnston does, however, note a more hard-line direction in China’s rhetoric towards its maritime disputes. But here too the claim of a ‘new assertiveness’ is unfounded. China’s interest and preferences remain unchanged despite more active diplomacy towards the issue (ibid: 19).
A similar analysis of foreign policy events was undertaken by Jerdén (2014). Focusing on an alleged foreign policy change of China in 2010, he examines the same cases that are presented in Johnston’s article alongside several additional cases. He comes to the conclusion that China’s actions in nearly all of those cases do not indicate a departure from China’s previous foreign policy
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behaviour. Although Jerdén does classify China’s behaviour since 2010 as ‘assertive’, he sees little change between this behaviour and the country’s behaviour pre-2010 (Jerdén, 2014: 74).
The ‘assertive’ China narrative thus does not seem to follow directly from China’s actions. China’s actions in the South China Sea are not conclusively more assertive than before. It therefore becomes necessary to shift focus to the question why Chinese actions were perceived to be assertive in U.S. media and what role U.S. officials had in constructing this discourse.
U.S. perceptions about China have always been intrinsically linked with U.S. perceptions of itself (Pan, 2004: 306). The way in which U.S. policymakers see their own country, shapes their perceptions of other countries. If, for example, the U.S. sees itself as an “indispensable, security-conscious nation”, this will affect the way in which other nations are perceived (idem). In light of such self-perception, China is seen as a mirror-image of American values and interests and, consequently, the country is seen as a threat. This China threat discourse is self-fulfilling in nature, and creates and perpetuates the social reality of a China threat.
In the context of the larger China threat narrative, the assertive China discourse appears to be a particular frame used to describe China’s behaviour as problematic or even potentially threatening. By situating the assertiveness discourse in the China threat literature, it becomes apparent that describing China’s actions as assertive is as much a political tool as it is an attempt at a genuine, objective description of foreign policy events. The China threat offers the U.S. a plausible justification for rebalancing its diplomatic and military resources towards the Asia-Pacific.
The narrative thus seems driven by U.S. domestic considerations in which the construction of a China threat can serve political purposes (Turner, 2012; Wick, 2014: 291). The construction of a China threat has a long history in U.S. society, and has been used as justification for U.S. policy toward China ever since the nineteenth century (Turner, 2012: 21). The particular threat that China supposedly poses has changed over time, with China’s foreign policy behaviour being framed differently throughout the past century.
Although some authors have made inquiries into the construction of the ‘new assertiveness’ discourse in the academic community and U.S. media, surprisingly little efforts have been made to examine the role of U.S. officials in framing China’s behaviour in its territorial disputes. If the assertiveness frame is used to present China as a threat that should be contained or countered in some way, the role of public officials in this process becomes an important subject to analyse.
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Active participation by U.S. officials in constructing an ‘assertive China’ narrative would greatly affect the way in which China’s foreign policy behaviour is perceived by Western audiences. This thesis will contribute to the existing literature by examining the role that U.S. officials played in the construction of a China threat by framing China’s foreign policy behaviour in specific ways.
3. Theoretical framework 3.1 The ‘China threat’
Power transition theory posits that power parity between a hegemon and a challenging state will inevitably lead to conflict as a challenging state will seize the opportunity to take on the hegemon (Organski, 1958). The hegemon will try to prevent this from happening by containing or balancing against the rise of a challenging state. To protect its hegemonic status, the hegemon has to foster support and justify such policies. Constructing a policy affirming discourse is thus in the best interest of the hegemon. In the case of the U.S. and China, such a discourse can possibly be found in the depiction of China as a potential threat to U.S. security.
This China threat, however, is not an observable fact. China’s capabilities may be growing, but they only become threatening if interpreted so (Pan, 2004: 306). The perception of China as a potential hostile country has implications for U.S. interpretations of China’s capabilities and intentions. A state will act differently to the capabilities of a threatening state than to those of an ally (Wendt, 1992: 397). A Chinese military build-up, for example, is often seen as evidence of revisionist intentions, while a stronger Japanese military is seen as a welcome development for security in the Asia-Pacific (Wick, 2014: 303). Hence the conclusion can be drawn that the China threat is a socially constructed ‘reality’ that stems from the perceptions of China’s behaviour by U.S. observers.
The construction of a China threat is no new phenomenon. As Turner (2012) observes, China has been viewed as a threat by the U.S. in a variety of ways over multiple centuries. The China threat discourse created the ‘truth’ that a rising China endangers U.S. security. By emphasizing the differences between U.S. and Chinese identity, a discourse was created that made China an external threat that Americans needed protection from (Turner, 2012: 21).
China has been framed as a ‘threat’ in a variety of ways. Turner discusses how Chinese immigration in the 19th century U.S. was framed as ‘a danger to White society’ (Turner, 2012: 11). Chinese immigrants were seen as ‘inferior’ to people of European decent. The immigrants were
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blamed for the spread of various diseases, supposedly due to their lack of hygiene. Such stereotypes led to the emergence of an anti-Chinese movement and the call for immigration restrictions (ibid, 9). Later, in the context of the Cold War, China was a portrayed as a dangerous communist country: a ‘threatening Red China’, which values were seen as the complete opposite of the values that constituted American identity (Turner, 2012: 15).
By emphasizing the differences between U.S. and Chinese identity policymakers created the necessary conditions for targeted policies towards China. The representation of a China threat limits the number potential policy options. The existence of a supposed China threat supports certain policies, while alternatives are discarded (ibid: 6-7). As Turner (2012: 21) notes, these policies once again reaffirmed the discourse of clashing identities that underlie the China threat discourse.
Differences between U.S. and China can also be strengthened and even become self-fulfilling through the application of U.S. policy. As Wick (2014: 293) points out, China’s motives for its foreign policy behaviour are not conceived in isolation. Interaction between China and other states shapes China’s behaviour. U.S. policy may push China to adopt a certain posture in its foreign policy (Wick, 2014: 293). For example, when U.S. policymakers perceive China as a threat and formulate appropriate policy to protect the U.S. from this ‘threat’, for instance by establishing a larger military presence in Asia, Chinese policies might themselves see U.S. policy as a threat to China and act accordingly, for example by increasing the size of their armed forces, thereby perpetuating the belief in a China threat.
Another noteworthy dimension of the contemporary China threat, is the perception of China’s potential to become a future military power. Almost by default China is seen as a likely threat, not because of its capabilities today, but because of its potential to develop these capabilities in the future (Pan, 2004: 315).
The ‘assertive China’ narrative can thus be seen as the latest discursive strategy in a long tradition of portraying China as a threat to U.S. security. The question whether China has truly become more assertive is thus of less importance. Regardless of the ‘real’ assertiveness of China, a framing strategy could have been employed to perpetuate the belief in a China threat in order to justify specific policies towards China.
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3.2 Framing
The construction of the ‘assertive China discourse’ can be analysed by using a framing approach. A framing approach is useful to gain insight into the identity, interests and perceptions of an actor (Entman, 1993: 55).
Entman (1993: 52) describes framing as the process of selecting certain aspects of a perceived reality and increasing their salience in a text. By the use of rhetoric and highlighting selected information political leaders gain the ability to induce audiences (e.g. the general public, other bodies of government, the media, or foreign governments) to adopt a particular frame (Mintz & Redd, 2003: 194). Identifying such frames matters as discursive frames shape the attitude and behaviour of an actor. By describing China’s actions as ‘assertive’ it narrows the potential array of conceivable policy responses an actor can adopt. Effective framing can persuade the targeted actor to support or oppose certain policies (Mintz & Redd, 2003: 200). It should be noted that framing is not necessarily a conscious exercise. Actors are guided by their own belief systems which may unconsciously shape their own communication (Entman, 1993: 52).
Within a text framing can serve a variety of functions. A single statement can contain multiple frames. And a single frame may not necessarily include all functions (idem). Entman (1993: 52) names the following four functions of framing:
● Statement of problems: A frame can state that a particular issue should be perceived as a problem. Often this is the case when cultural values appear to clash.
● Identification of causes: The perceived causes of a certain problem can be identified and given increased salience within a text.
● Moral judgments: Often the behaviour of an actor is judged by the moral standards of the communicator.
● Suggestion of remedies: Solutions to a perceived problem can be offered and justified.
Within the context of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, it is thus to be expected that certain problems are attributed to the South China Sea dispute by U.S. officials. The supposed causes that will be identified by U.S. officials could indicate whether China is seen as the main culprit of increasing tensions, and whether this is due to a ‘new assertiveness’ on China’s part. Such provocative actions may in turn receive (negative) moral judgments by the U.S. government. Finally, it is expected that U.S. officials will offer potential solutions to the dispute, based on their
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own understanding of the dispute and the implications of these solutions for the furtherance of U.S. interests.
Framing China’s foreign policy in a particular manner, is an effective method to perpetuate the ‘China threat’ narrative and justify policy. From 2009 onwards China’s behaviour has been increasingly described as assertive in the media. This particular narrative may be new, but it seems to originate from the longstanding ‘China threat’ discourse. Just as earlier frames within the ‘China threat’ discourse justified U.S. policy toward China, it is expected that U.S. officials took part in the framing of China’s actions as ‘assertive’.
3.3 Assertiveness
The main concept addressed in this thesis is ‘assertiveness’. The study of International Relations, however, lacks a clear, widely acknowledged definition of ‘assertiveness’. Nonetheless it is possible to attribute certain forms of behaviour to this concept. A rather straightforward definition could describe ‘assertiveness’ as ‘confident, self-assured behaviour’. Such a definition provides a useful starting point for conceptualizing ‘assertiveness’ as it leaves open whether assertive behaviour is to be perceived positively or negatively.
In his critique of the ‘new assertiveness’ discourse Johnston (2013: 10) defines assertiveness as attempts to, either successfully or unsuccessfully, change the status quo by imposing higher costs on an actor than before. This definition is useful, as it makes it possible to identify speech acts that imply such attempts, but it does not fully differentiate between status quo and revisionist driven assertiveness.
When thinking of an ‘assertive China’ in the context of 21st century international relations, assertive behaviour by China quickly invokes the idea that China is asserting its influence to revise the international order. It appears to be common sense that China is using its newly found power to change the international order to its own liking. Such an understanding of China’s intentions follows basic Realist assumptions of hegemonic competition and balance of power.
However, as Wuthnow, Li & Qi (2012) rightly point out, assertiveness does not necessarily equal revisionism. They argue that assertiveness and revisionism are separate dimensions, i.e. there is no causal connection between revisionism and assertive behaviour. Assertiveness may indeed be revisionist if a state’s goal is to change the distribution of power through asserting itself in international politics, but it can also be status quo orientated if this assertiveness is embedded in a
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commonly shared understanding of the international order (Wuthnow, Li & Qi, 2012: 272). The authors offer four strategies for China’s involvement in multilateral politics that are useful for better understanding which options China has to engage in international politics (Wuthnow, Li & Qi, 2012: 270). These four strategies are:
● Watching: The watching strategy is non-assertive and status quo orientated. In this scenario China chooses to observe the international order without challenging the commonly agreed upon rules.
● Engaging: Engaging does entail a more assertive posture, but without challenging the status quo. In such a case China will, for instance, engage in multilateral institutions in order to achieve its goals within the boundaries of commonly agreed upon principles.
● Circumventing: In a circumventing scenario China will try to foster support for its own policies through existing institutions. In such a case China will not directly challenge the status quo, but it does pose an indirect challenge to the existing order.
● Shaping: Shaping is a more assertive and revisionist approach to international politics. Shaping entails changing existing institutions or setting up new ones to achieve China’s particular goals.
The four strategies identified by Wuthnow et al. open up new lines of inquiry about the use of assertiveness in the ‘status quo vs. revisionist China’ debate. It raises the question whether the ‘assertive China’ discourse is truly focused on the two possible uses of assertiveness, both status quo and revisionist, or if only revisionist behaviour is considered threatening.
For the purposes of the empirical analysis, it is important to note the differences between status quo and revisionist driven assertiveness. For example, an assertive statement by China within the context of the UN General Assembly about the legitimacy of its EEZ claims will be perceived differently than a large scale military exercise by Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea.
A narrative about China’s assertive behaviour can be identified by looking for text elements that, for example, state that China is ‘altering the status quo’ or attempting to ‘gain some benefit at the expense of another actor’, while remarks stating that China is ‘acting in accordance with international law’ or ‘behaving in a responsible manner’ might indicate more status quo oriented behaviour. Careful attention should be paid to the context in which these remarks are made, and,
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indeed, why these remarks were made in the first place. Finding evidence of an official narrative that explicitly states or strongly implies assertiveness by China would offer support for the claim that U.S. officials engaged in discursive acts to frame China’s behaviour. However, other possible interpretations of China’s behaviour should not be discarded. U.S. officials may use different frames to portray China’s behaviour.
4. Methodology 4.1 Method and data
Statements made by U.S. public officials about China’s involvement in territorial disputes in the South China Sea will serve as the main source of data for the empirical analysis. The expectation is that Chinese behaviour in these territorial disputes before 2009 was not framed as ‘assertive’, while it is expected that China’s actions from 2009 onwards were increasingly framed as ‘assertive’. Consequently, the time period 2008-2015 will be examined. The time period covers the period in which China supposedly became more assertive.
Official statements by the U.S. government will be examined as these can provide insight in the construction of an official political discourse as opposed to the discourse in Western news media. Statements have been collected from the online archives of the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). As executive bodies of state, the DoS and DoD are responsible for the direct implementation of U.S. foreign and military policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Both departments have the knowledge and expertise to formulate issue specific policy towards their respective policy areas and will therefore be the most well-informed source for discussing U.S. policy concerning the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Statements made by either one of these two departments should therefore reflect the official U.S. position on the South China Sea dispute.
A total of 71 documents, published between January 2008 and December 2015, have been collected from the online archives of the Department of State (40 statements) and the Department of Defense (31 statements). The documents consist out of transcripts of speeches, press briefings, and remarks made by senior officials that either explicitly mention the “South China Sea”, or one of the major island groups within the sea, i.e. the “Spratly Islands” or the “Paracel Islands”. An overview of all collected statements can be found in Appendix A.
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The increased attention for the South China Sea dispute in international media since 2009 is reflected in the amount of statements that mention the dispute. There is a sharp increase in statements about the South China Sea dispute over the years. As a result of this, the analysis relies on the collection of all available statements for the period 2008-2011 (22 documents) and a larger data sample for the period 2012-2015 (49 documents). Because the limited amount of statements available in the earlier years, all presented data is weighed by dividing the number of statements that mention a particular frame in a given year by the total amount of statements collected for that year. For the latter years, statements have been randomly selected from the online archives of the DoD and DoS.
In the examined briefings, the majority of speech acts is directed towards reporters who were present during these briefings. It is to be expected that most press briefings on U.S. soil were intended for the U.S. media, while press briefings in foreign countries were attended by both U.S. media and foreign journalists. This means that the official U.S. press releases inform the media, who in turn inform the general public and may apply their own framing to this information as well. Official press briefings are an important source of data for journalists covering foreign policy. If U.S. officials framed China’s behaviour in any way, there is a distinct possibility that this will be reflected in news media.
The statements have been analysed by following the four functions of framing, as identified by Entman (1993), as a general guideline. Following these specific functions of framing, it becomes possible to identify discursive elements that serve one or more of these functions. This has been done by assigning codes that correspond with Entman’s functions of framing to relevant text elements with the use of the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti. Codes with similar functions were then grouped together in ‘code families’ (see Appendix B). Based on the codes and code families the statements could then be interpreted. The major, dominant frames that have been identified throughout the DoS and DoD statements will be presented in the analysis.
4.2 Limitations
Before applying a framing approach on the collected data, it is important to take note of certain limitations of such an approach.
First of all, attention should be paid to the audience of these speech acts. The statements that have been examined are intended for a variety of audiences. The statements provide a domestic
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audience with information about the government’s foreign and military policy. Additionally, the statements are directed at foreign audiences. Foreign audiences include, among others, the citizens of Asian nations, allied governments in the region and the Chinese leadership. A single statement may be intended for multiple audiences. For example, a hypothetical statement saying that China’s actions in the South China Sea will not be tolerated, could satisfy a domestic audience demanding a tougher attitude towards China, reassure U.S. allies threatened by China’s actions, and intimidate the Chinese leadership fearing U.S. retaliation.
Secondly, it is to be expected that statements made by the DoD will differ in language and context to those of the DoS. Although the South China Sea is of concern to both departments, their specific policy instruments, priorities and recommendations may differ. This can affect the way in which the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are framed by these departments. The DoD might seek to underscore the role of the U.S. military in providing peace and stability in the region, while the DoS might point towards diplomatic efforts as the preferred solution to the conflict.
Moreover, although all statements are given by top officials within the DoS and DoD, their specific positions differ. For example, remarks made by the Secretary of State may convey a different message than a statement made by the commander of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific. Different levels of seniority and expertise within the department may guide the narrative of the communicator. These differences in departmental characteristics and between officials within these departments, may cause U.S. discourse about the South China Sea issue to be less unified and/or consistent than initially thought.
Lastly, the South China Sea dispute is a rather specific topic. Sino-U.S. relations span a wide range of policy areas and topics. Certain frames that are invoked in discussing one specific issue may not be indicative of wider U.S. engagement with China. For one, the U.S. and China have highly interdependent economies. Tensions in the South China Sea, might not preclude the U.S. and China to maintain good economic relations. The results of the framing approach will therefore not be transferable to other cases.
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5. Analysis
By examining the official narrative concerning the South China dispute throughout the period 2008-2015, this chapter will identify when and how U.S. officials applied certain frames to China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. The chapter is divided according to the four functions of framing as identified by Entman.
5.1 The U.S. and the South China Sea dispute
Before setting out to find instances of framing in the context of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the question needs to be asked whether implicit assumptions are made by U.S. officials when discussing the dispute. Simply referring to the disputes in a particular manner might indicate an implicit bias on the part of the communicator.
The U.S. government’s choice to devote attention to the disputes is guided by U.S. perceptions of the world and the place of the United States within that world. The U.S. believes it is in its national interest to promote law and order across the globe. The South China Sea dispute has the potential to threaten certain aspects of that order. The choice to comment on the situation in the South China Sea is therefore not without bias. Even though the U.S. claims no territory in the South China Sea, it has chosen to take a position on the issue.
Although the U.S. is presumably guided by its own national interests, China’s involvement has increased the salience of the dispute even more. China is the most likely challenger of U.S. power in the region. Looking away from China’s territorial ambitions in the South China Sea would in all likeliness severely damage the image of the U.S. as guarantor of regional peace and stability. Without China’s involvement the South China Sea dispute would have been of less concern to U.S. policymakers as the costs of inaction would have been significantly lower.
On a bilateral level, the U.S. is committed to the region through the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. In order to substantiate its commitment to the Philippines’ defence, the U.S. finds itself in a position that necessitates to comment on the dispute, in which the Philippines is one of the principal claimants.
All in all, the U.S.’s involvement in the issue is not unbiased. The U.S. has clear reasons for commenting on the disputes. The U.S. is guided by its own perception that law and order should be promoted worldwide, while even more importantly, the U.S. needs to uphold its identity as a credible guarantor of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.
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5.2 Problem statement: Regional stability and freedom of navigation
U.S. officials attributed a variety of specific problems to the issue of competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. The two main problems that have been identified are (i) regional instability in case of escalation of the dispute and (ii) restrictions to the freedom of navigation (see Figure 1). Throughout the period 2008-2015 both problems remain the two most important issues addressed in U.S. discourse about the South China Sea dispute.
The main problem attributed to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea according to U.S. public officials is regional instability. Both before and after 2009 more than 57% of the collected statements point to the disputes leading to increased regional instability (see Figure 1).
Secretary Clinton, for instance, states that “The United States is concerned that recent incidents in the South China Sea threaten the peace and stability on which the remarkable progress of the Asia-Pacific region has been built” (Clinton, 2011b).
Regional instability would be detrimental to the economic development of the region. With the economic balance slowly shifting from the West towards the Asia-Pacific region, stability in this part of the world becomes ever more important for the global economy. Conflict between some of the region’s most promising economies would damage the progress made. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the South China Sea is one of the world’s most important waterways. If tensions escalate global commerce could be seriously affected.
The fear of regional instability due to assertive behaviour by any of the claimants is acknowledged in the literature about Sino-U.S. competition in the South China Sea. Hosssain (2013: 112-113) argues that the U.S. has a vested interest in safeguarding peace and stability in the South China Sea. Besides the economic importance of the region, he notes that in the event of armed conflict between the Philippines and China, the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty would force the U.S. in a precarious position which might incite other claimants to take offensive actions in the South China Sea (Hossain, 2013: 112-113).
Besides regional instability, U.S. officials address a closely related problem, namely a hindrance of the freedom of navigation due to irresponsible activities by any of the claimants. The U.S. maintains the position that free movement through international waters should not be hindered by the actions of a particular state. In 41% of examined statements it is explicitly mentioned that restrictions to the freedom of navigation as a result of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea would be considered highly worrisome. The freedom of navigation, in particular, is directly
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linked to U.S. interests. Freedom of navigation is described as a distinct national interest. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stresses that “as a Pacific nation and resident power we [i.e. the United States] have a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, and respect for international law in the South China Sea” (Clinton, 2011b).
The U.S. commitment to the freedom of navigation is unsurprising as it warrants the presence of the U.S. navy in the South China Sea, and is solidly grounded in international law. Unrestricted movement of U.S. commerce and military assets is paramount to the U.S. economy and the country’s military commitments around the world.
Although the U.S. is a strong supporter of the freedom of navigation principle as found in the 1982 UNCLOS treaty, the U.S. has not ratified the treaty due to concerns, mainly by Republicans, that the treaty would impinge upon U.S. sovereignty. This does not exclude the U.S. from the freedom of navigation as the U.S. accepts freedom of navigation as customary international law and has ratified the earlier 1958 Convention of the High Seas that also established the freedom of navigation through international waters.
In face of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, however, the U.S. government pressed Congress to ratify the treaty. According to a DoS spokesperson ratification of UNCLOS would serve “as a very good underpinning to help in mutual understanding and some rules of the road on these kinds of issues” (Nuland, 2012a). If the UNCLOS treaty is ratified by the U.S., this will add credibility to the U.S.’s commitment to a rule-based international order in general, and the freedom of navigation in particular.
Whereas reiterating the U.S. commitment to regional stability will in the first place appease allies in the region, the freedom of navigation argument is more likely to be acknowledged by domestic audiences. Regional allies such as the Philippines and Japan welcome the U.S.’s commitment to the region as a balancing force to China. Freedom of navigation is especially important for the U.S. itself. In order to maintain a global presence, unrestricted access to the world’s major waterways is of crucial importance.
The problems addressed by U.S. officials indicate a discrepancy between the Chinese and the American world view. China’s ambition to claim sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea clashes with the rule-based international order envisioned by U.S. political elites. The U.S. posits itself as a responsible global power, committed to international law. By doing so, any
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country that fails to recognize the presumed importance of regional stability and freedom of navigation, is seen as a threat to the supposedly responsible interests of the United States.
Figure 1: Problems attributed to the South China Sea dispute, percentage of documents mentioning a specific problem within a given year
Source: DoD and DoS (2008-2015)
5.3 Causes: Identifying China as the troublemaker
Having established which problems are associated with the territorial tensions, the focus shifts to identifying the forces that caused these problems to become apparent.
Initially, the territorial disputes were seen by the U.S. as a regional matter in which the U.S. could only offer support for a negotiated, multilateral solution. Consequently, U.S officials refrained from naming any wrongdoers. The official position was that the U.S. takes no sides in the territorial dispute and urges the claimants to come to a peaceful solution in accordance with international law (e.g. Marciel, 2009).
This position gradually begins to change from 2009 onwards when U.S. statements begin to point to China’s actions as detrimental to regional peace and stability. A key turning point in the discourse towards the situation in the South China Sea, is the March 2009 incident involving the U.S. surveillance ship USNS Impeccable (see Table 1).
On 8 March 2009 the USNS Impeccable, while operating in the Chinese EEZ off the coast of Hainan, was harassed by multiple Chinese vessels. Chinese ships shadowed the U.S. ship and
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
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performed dangerous manoeuvres force the Impeccable’s out of the Chinese EEZ (U.S Department of Defense, 2009a). The incident was one of the most serious confrontations between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea since the EP-3 incident in 2001 (see Table 1). The initial reaction by U.S. officials was non-confrontational towards China. The DoD assured reporters that the incident was no reason for a change in U.S. conduct in international waters and that confidence building mechanisms with China were still in place (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a). The event was portrayed as an unfortunate incident that was unlikely to happen again.
However, on 12 March a destroyer escort was assigned to the surveillance ship to deter any further Chinese harassment, signalling an increased uneasiness with recent Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea (Tyson, 2009).
The incident with the USNS Impeccable in March 2009 showed the U.S. government that China was increasingly willing to assert its territorial and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. This was confirmed by a DoD senior official who acknowledged that:
“China's very sensitive about what it perceives to be as its territorial claims. And […] that [this] is consistent with the PLA's overall mission that it's been given to protect and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009b).
It appears that China has become more confident in protecting its territorial integrity. This is an important observation, as it hints towards the acknowledgement of a growing assertiveness in territorial disputes. China considers the majority of the South China Sea as territorial waters, which means that actions intended to protect China’s supposed territorial integrity, could easily be perceived as aggressive attempts to assert its sovereignty over a highly disputed area. By arguing that China is more willing to back up its territorial claims, the U.S. government is strongly implying that China is becoming more assertive, and, vice versa, that this increased assertiveness stems from a desire by China to protect its alleged sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea against foreign intrusion.
However, it is not clear whether or not China’s desire to protect its territorial integrity is constituting a challenge to the status quo. While the U.S., following article 58 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has the right to sail through a foreign country’s EEZ, China’s reaction to a U.S. surveillance ship near its territorial waters is unsurprising. The presence of foreign military assets near a country’s borders often raises suspicion of a foreign military’s intentions. For instance, the U.S. has scrambled fighter jets on numerous occasions when foreign
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military aircraft skirted U.S. airspace without notifying U.S. authorities beforehand (e.g. New York Times, 2007). From the perspective of national defence, it thus appears to be common practice for a state to investigate an unannounced foreign military’s presence near its borders. However, this does not absolve China from unprofessional or aggressive conduct when intercepting foreign ships or aircraft.
Besides remarks about China’s harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009, increased assertiveness by China is barely explicitly mentioned as a cause for increased tensions in the region up until 2012 (see Figure 2). From 2012 onwards, China’s actions are more consistently described as assertive.
When China moved an oil rig into disputed waters off the coast of Vietnam in May 2014, a DoS official remarked that “this is a unilateral action that appears to be part of a broader pattern, quite frankly, of Chinese behaviour to advance its claims over disputed areas in a manner that really undermines peace and stability in the region” (Harf, 2014).
The U.S. government, thus, begins to actively identify China’s activities as structural attempts to advance its territorial ambitions. China’s activities in the South China Sea between 2012 and 2015, especially the build-up of military installations and land reclamation, are perceived to be more confrontational and in direct violation of the 2002 ASEAN Code of Conduct.
In November 2015, during a visit to the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter blamed increased tensions in the region on Chinese land reclamation activities in the South China Sea by stating that: “[...] this year, this past year, the one that's done it [land reclamation] more than anyone else is China. And that’s why it's gotten a lot of attention and that's why there's so much tension around this part of the world right now.” (Carter, 2015b).
Although China is not the only country engaged in land reclamation, Carter directly accuses China of increasing tensions in the region. The underlying assumption seems to be that Chinese behaviour in the conflict is inherently more threatening than the actions of any other country. Even as China is arguably the strongest actor in the region, this has little bearing on the matter whether China's claims, and subsequent actions to substantiate those claims, are any more legitimate than those of other countries involved.
Although the U.S. officially takes no sides regarding the legality of the territorial claims, China’s claims are increasingly scrutinized. China’s territorial claims are called “inconsistent with international law” (Russel, 2014). If these claims are indeed in violation of international law
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China’s efforts to substantiate its claims could be perceived as both revisionist and assertive. China would break the status quo and fail to participate in the rule-based international order if it were to advance its claims. However, China’s opposition to the applicability of international agreements is not completely unwarranted. China has invoked its right to waive any compulsory settlement procedures in the UNCLOS treaty. The Philippines vs. China arbitration case will have to prove whether China’s refusal to accept arbitration in its maritime disputes is actually justified.
Regardless of China’s acceptance or refusal of international law, the legality of China’s claims does not change. But refusal of such procedures, does limit the enforcement mechanisms to hold China accountable to international agreements. China’s unwillingness to participate in international negotiations is thus not necessarily indicative of revisionist tendencies, but might be seen as circumventing behaviour (Wuthnow, Li & Qi, 2012: 272). Not engaging in negotiations gives China the possibility to secure support for its own views, conclude bilateral talks with other claimants, and build military installations on occupied islands to strengthen its strategic position.
Another point that highlights the disproportionate attention for China’s supposed unlawful conduct, is the fact that China is not the only claimant that acts inconsistent with the UNCLOS treaty or the ASEAN Code of Conduct. Vietnam and Taiwan, for example, have both occupied islands in the South China Sea outside of their respective EEZs. In none of the examined statements any country besides China is called out explicitly for activities that violate international law.
However, not all U.S. officials shared the same concern with China’s ambitions in the South China Sea. The DoD in particular showed little concern with the increase in China’s naval capabilities in the South China Sea. Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific Samuel Locklear remarked that: “[…] generally, we have more encounters at sea [with the Chinese navy] these days because the PLA navy is more active. It's larger, and it's more active. So, just by mathematics, you're going to see them out and about in different areas more. And that doesn't bother me” (Locklear, 2014). China’s growing ambitions in the South China Sea are met with little surprise by the U.S. military. A larger Chinese naval presence is seen as an expected consequence of China’s rise in the past decades.
Secretary Carter (2015c) makes a similar observation, but adds that China’s rise also brings greater responsibilities: “As a rising power, it’s to be expected that China will have growing ambitions and a modernizing military. But how China behaves will be the true test of its
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commitment to peace and security. This is why nations across the region are watching China’s actions in areas like the maritime domain and cyberspace”.
Carter shifts the responsibility of peace and security in Asia to China, implying that it is China’s choice whether or not it wants conflict to occur. This uncertainty about China’s intentions is a common theme in the China threat literature (Wick, 2014: 292). Such an understanding of China’s intentions assumes that China’s motives are independent of the actions of others in the international system, and can ultimately be known and understood by U.S. policymakers. But this assumption leaves out the possibility that China’s behaviour is constructed through interactions with other countries. U.S. perceptions of either a status quo or a revisionist oriented China will influence China’s behaviour. China’s choice for status quo or revisionist behaviour can partly be ascribed to China’s interpretations of U.S. foreign policy (Wick, 2014: 293). By portraying China as a threat to U.S. interests in the region, especially if U.S. foreign policy is guided by such a perception, China will be put in a position where it has to choose between appeasing or opposing U.S. foreign policy.
As shown, U.S. officials were careful to accuse China for the increase in tensions in the South China Sea. Aside from the 2009 Impeccable incident, U.S. officials refrained from directly accusing China. This changed from 2012 onwards, China’s activities, land reclamation and militarization in particular, were a cause for concern for U.S. policymakers. From that moment on China is explicitly mentioned as the cause of heightened tensions throughout both DoD and DoS statements.
26 Figure 2: China as the cause of increased tensions, percentage of documents within a given year that
identify China as the cause of increased tensions
Source: DoD and DoS (2008-2015)
5.4 Moral judgments: From neutrality to confrontation
Closely related with the identification of China as the main force behind the heightened tensions, are the moral judgments that are ascribed to the troublesome activities of the claimants. Due to the official nature of the examined statements, explicit moral judgments remain sparse. U.S. officials phrase their statements as careful as possible not to unnecessarily anger other governments. Nonetheless some (implicit) moral judgments can be discerned from the statements.
The initial statements, between 2008 and 2011, contain barely any explicit moral judgments of any of the claimants in the South China Sea dispute. U.S. officials go no further than expressing the concern that provocative actions by any of the claimants could escalate tensions in the region.
Furthermore, the U.S. stresses that it takes no sides in the legality of the territorial claims. Concern is expressed towards those countries that try to solve their disputes by “intimidation, coercion, [or] resort to non-peaceful means” (Burns, 2012). Although it seems likely that China is the intended target of such judgments, such statements could, in theory, be directed towards any of the claimants.
From 2012 onwards, China is from time to time judged for its actions. The timing corresponds with the earlier discussed identification of China as the main cause for tensions in the region. China’s land reclamation efforts and the militarization of islands in the South China Sea, in particular, are condemned by U.S. officials. On 20 August 2015 Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
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commented on China’s land reclamation and militarization activities: “[…] we have called for all countries – not just China, because there’re others, but China is by far and away the one that has done the most, especially in the last year, to stop dredging, stop any further militarization, not just stop temporarily, but stop permanently that” (Carter, 2015a).
Although Carter calls for all claimants to stop land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea, only China is mentioned explicitly. From Carter’s statement it remains unclear which other claimants besides China have engaged in such activities. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (2016) Vietnam has undertaken similar activities, albeit on a significantly smaller scale than China. By not naming other actors that have engaged in provocative activities, the sole focus is placed on China. This perpetuates the belief that an irresponsible China is creating problems for the responsible U.S. and its partners in Southeast Asia.
In sum, the supposed neutral stance toward the territorial disputes seems to disappear throughout the period 2008-2015. Although U.S. officials refrain from actually supporting the territorial claims of any of the claimants, they begin to actively voice opposition to China’s territorial claims. Other claimants are not explicitly called out for provocative behaviour, thereby strengthening the perception that China is at fault, while the U.S. and its partners in the region act responsibly.
5.5 Remedies: Negotiations, rebalancing and alliances
Over the years the U.S. has become more actively involved in trying to resolve the perceived problems of regional instability and hindrance to the freedom of navigation by a growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. The proposed remedy to the growing Chinese assertion in the South China Sea has evolved from the U.S. expressing its commitment to a peaceful multilateral solution to stressing the importance of the continuing U.S. military presence and U.S. support for its allies in the Asia-Pacific to deter China from escalating the dispute.
Throughout the period 2008-2015, the U.S. keeps reiterating its commitment to a peaceful, multilateral solution in accordance with international law. In 47% of the statements it is stressed that the U.S. takes no position on the legality of these claims and encourages all parties to work together to find a negotiated, multilateral solution.
