A crisis of confidence: an assessment of REDD+ stakeholder experiences in
Indonesia
Abstract:
Identifying challenges and opportunities for REDD+ will help to inform future
policy and implementation of the program in Indonesia and other countries. The aim of
this research is to identify and elucidate challenges and opportunities for REDD+, and
other environmental governance initiatives, through perspectives of people working with
REDD+ in Indonesia. This paper presents the perceptions of stakeholders and
practitioners involved in REDD+ in Indonesia at multiple scales varying from global to
local. Our research demonstrates stakeholders are struggling with problems of corruption,
bureaucracy, and a lack of confidence in REDD+. Ultimately, our respondents and
supporting documents indicate the cultural and governance contexts in Indonesia are
particularly complex. Furthermore, there are problems surrounding funding, logistics of
implementation, corruption, stakeholder engagement and buy-in. Despite challenges,
REDD+ may have increased attention to these issues and acted as a catalyst for change.
Effectiveness for REDD+ in Indonesia will require both nuanced understanding of the
local and cultural context as well as long-term perspectives.
Keywords: REDD+; Forest Management; Payment for Ecosystem Services; Environmental Governance; Indonesia; Stakeholders; Ethnography
1 Introduction
While Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+)
has been introduced in over 65 countries (UN-REDD Programme 2018), yet there is still
uncertainty about its’ future. Indonesia provides an important example for understanding
challenges for REDD+. It is one of the most biodiverse places on the planet (Convention
on Biological Diversity n.d.), experiences significant deforestation and degradation
(Margono et al. 2014), leading to high levels of carbon emissions (Carlson et al. 2012).
Thus REDD+ presents widespread opportunities for Indonesia to benefit financially from
their forest reserves and minimize environmental and social consequences of large-scale
deforestation. Despite the promises REDD+ offers for Indonesia’s forests (Busch et al.
2015), its implementation has been complicated as a result of the political climate in
Indonesia (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; Brockhaus et al. 2012), high demand for forest land
for palm oil production (Abood et al. 2014) , and a history of questionable forest
management practices (Transparency International 2011; HRW 2013).
As REDD+ projects globally demonstrate varying levels of success, understanding challenges and opportunities for successful implementation will be crucial to help shape approaches and future policy. While implementation has been ongoing in Indonesia since 2007, long-term outcomes are unclear and more information about how projects are working on the ground is needed. This paper provides such insight by relating results of in-depth research with
2 Background: REDD+ & Indonesia’s forests
With the third largest extent of tropical forest, Indonesia had the highest rate of
deforestation on the planet in 2013 (Margono et al. 2014) and is known for its
complicated forest governance context (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005; Indrarto et al.
2012). Because of this combination of factors, REDD+ implementation in Indonesia has
received much attention – Indonesia’s government has publicly committed to REDD+,
created REDD+ agencies, and these efforts have been encouraged by funding pledges
from Norway, Germany and the UK (Government of Norway et al. 2015). Yet,
deforestation rates in Indonesia remain high (WRI 2016), and based on results from this
research the majority of REDD+ stakeholders feel it remains uncertain how successful
REDD+ has been, or will be.
Stakeholder groups in Indonesia are involved in REDD+ implementation at
national, provincial, and local levels with a diverse range of interests in program
outcomes. REDD+ demonstration sites in Indonesia display a wide variety of structures
and goals (Global Canopy Programme 2013; REDD Net 2013). No single established
source of funding exists for REDD+ projects: many report receiving funding from
international aid agencies or multilateral development banks, some projects are working
to secure funding from carbon markets, and other projects are funded and facilitated by
NGOs. Many projects are still searching for secure, long-term funding.
Projects can also vary in how they are implemented (see Table 1). Some have
obtained licenses from Indonesia’s government to operate Ecosystem Restoration
Concessions (ERC). Projects can also be established as official customary forest, also
known as hutan adat, a status that potentially gives forest communities legally
recognized tenure over their forest territories. Or, as in the case of the Carbon Fund, some
projects may approach REDD+ at a larger scale by engaging entire regions (kabupaten)
in REDD+ activities (World Bank Group 2013).
Table 1
Type of REDD+
Project
Locational basis
of Project
Funding source
Focal point for
conservation
activities
Examples
Ecosystem
Restoration
Concession
Ecosystem-based license in
production
forest
Private entity
holds the ERC –
donors, carbon
fund, NTFPs, etc.
Concession
based on
ecosystem and
restoration of
ecosystem
Harapan
Rainforest;
Rimba
Raya;
Rimba
Makmur
Community
Based Project
Centered
around hutan
adat
(community
forest)
Usually funded
by an NGO or
Development
organization
Empowering
forest
communities
and improving
tenure
WWF’s
Kutai
Barat;
GIZ’s
Kapuas
Hulu
National level
institution
Sponsored
Centered
around a
district or
region
National level
institution such
as the carbon
Fund or the
United Nations
Engaging region
or districts,
including local
governments,
NGOs and forest
communities in
forest
conservation
activities
Indonesia
District
Level
REDD+ ER
Program;
The
United
Nations
REDD+
Pilot
Project
Regardless of differences among manifestations of REDD+ projects in Indonesia, they all share Indonesia’s complex governance system of inherent tensions between devolution of authority to provinces and districts and an inherent tendency towards centralization and state control. Forest governance in Indonesia is particularly complex (Enrici and Hubacek 2016) and, as indicated by some of our respondents, requires a nuanced understanding and long-term perspective. While this paper addresses research specific to REDD+, the results are also broadly applicable to environmental governance challenges in Indonesia more broadly.
3 Methods and case study
Data collection was undertaken from 2012 to 2014 including participant observation, interviews, and a review of relevant forest policies. This ethnographic research was supplemented by a range of other sources including research publications, grey literature, newspapers and other media reports, as well as policy documents in order to understand the context of REDD+
stakeholder experiences and potential disconnects between the literature and what was happening on the ground. Triangulating data by including a full spectrum of sources from national to local scales – and combining multiple sources, such as literature and forest policy, with interviews among stakeholder groups, provides insight into how international and national initiatives manifest, increases validity of data and helps to bridge gaps between literature, policy and reality.
All participants were stakeholders of REDD+, and are defined as someone who is currently, or has previously been, involved directly in the REDD+ program, working on a project, collaborating on a project, or living in or adjacent to a project, as in the case of forest
communities. A chain referral and preferential sampling method was used, and interviews were conducted with key stakeholders with an effort to include REDD+ participants from a broad and representative range of stakeholder groups. Interviews were conducted with 71 stakeholders, including 45 Indonesian and 26 foreign respondents, from a variety of stakeholder groups:
donors, project managers, employees and heads of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government officials, policymakers, members of civil society organizations, academic researchers, and local forest communities. While some respondents work at multiple scales, others operate exclusively at the national, provincial or local scales.
Interviews in Indonesia were conducted in English and Bahasa Indonesia, or with assistance from a local translator. Data collection took place in Jakarta and Bogor, as well as in a variety of locations in provinces and districts where REDD+ is being implemented. A small number of interviews were also conducted in Washington, DC where some REDD+ stakeholder groups have headquarters. Informal semi-structured interviews with informants from key
stakeholder groups were primary tools for data collection. Interviews consisted of approximately five to seven standardized questions developed based on relevant literature and preliminary scoping fieldwork. Interviews began with broad questions aimed at getting a general
understanding of respondent’s experiences with REDD+, and when topics relating to challenges, successes, or perceptions of REDD+ were mentioned those were explored in more depth. In addition, 18 meetings were attended in total, including nine at national and provincial levels relevant to REDD+ policy and strategy as well as nine local meetings relevant to REDD+ implementation and stakeholder engagement. Meetings selected for inclusion in the study included any meeting directly or indirectly related to REDD+ implementation at any scale, and open to the public, or to which an invitation was extended. At these meetings special attention was paid when stakeholders mentioned successes, opportunities, challenges, and perceptions of REDD+.
When possible interviews were recorded, with permission of respondents, and transcribed. Grounded theory and inductive methods were used for data analysis, for forming frameworks and research conclusions (Charmaz 2011). Interviews were transcribed and entered into a TAMS Analyzer database in order to apply this grounded theory approach to analyzing
data (Charmaz 2006). Following an inductive coding method interview transcripts, and meeting notes and transcripts, were reviewed at various stages of data collection to develop a list of coding categories based on recurring themes and issues mentioned by respondents. All interview transcripts were coded using these categories. Themes that emerged from interviews were used in conjunction with literature and policy review to identify major challenges and opportunities as discussed in following sections.
4.0Results and discussion
The themes presented by stakeholders can be grouped into five categories: (1) Complicated and often confusing governance, regulations and policy; (2) Securing sufficient funding; (3) Corruption and resulting inability to enforce project boundaries; (4) Cultural complexity (5) Stakeholder doubts and fatigue; and (6) REDD+ as a catalyst for change and new opportunities. All of these challenges can compound and create a situation in which it is often difficult for project organizers to move forward with a REDD+ project. Each of these topics is discussed in further detail below.
4.1 Complex and confusing regulations
Indonesian governance is known for being complex and characterized by sometimes
confusing laws (Bell 2003; Bakker and Moniaga 2010), something which extends to the forestry sector (Indrarto et al. 2012; Galudra et al. 2011). Sometimes regulations and tenure overlap and conflict with each other (Beckert et al 2014; Fauzi and Anna 2013), leading to a challenging context for REDD+ projects. Local stakeholders working from within Indonesian institutions as well as foreign stakeholders expressed frustration with complexities surrounding forest
governance. One national level foreign informant described it like this, “It’s an interesting sector to be in...you could spend 10 years here and still not understand...a lot of very experienced
colleagues, who’ve worked all over the world, have said to me they’ve never worked in a more complicated system than here.” –RespondentID-10369. Another national level foreign
stakeholder, said, “It just makes it really, hard…the whole regulatory process....at some point, they had three non-aligned, sometimes contradictory regulations on REDD1 and they were in the process of developing a 4th one…so then they try to start over and try and fit it together, and you wind up with this impossible framework.” – RespondentID-10371. All of this manifests in complexity of institutional arrangements (Fauzi and Anna 2013) and a multiplicity of
interpretations and perspectives regarding resource use and conservation (Galudra et al. 2011).
Many foreign stakeholders operating at national or international levels felt unable to find pathways to move forward with REDD+ projects as well as other aspects of the forestry sector, which in some cases have led to withdrawal from Indonesia or REDD+ projects. One stakeholder reported this kind of situation with a partner-organization,“…I was working with someone from [an international] Development Agency, and she was in Indonesia specifically for the purpose of closing down all of [their country’s] development activities. They are completely pulling out because they find it too difficult to work here and have any positive effect, and they think their dollars are much better used [elsewhere].”— RespondentID-10377. While the complicated forestry context creates a challenge for actual
implementation of forest conservation projects (Enrici and Hubacek 2018), it can also provide a daunting environment for stakeholder groups establishing and maintaining long-term working relationships. Furthermore, without sufficient understanding of Indonesia’s context, some foreign stakeholders may not be able or willing to persevere with projects -- another foreign informant said, “There’s no kind of clear information pathway on any of this…you can’t quite [go by] what’s written down. You’ve got to meet the right people and do the kind of social appraisal of asking something and then asking them to introduce you to other people and then try and collate your information and get back to the truth. So it’s a
1 In some quotes respondents use the term REDD interchangeably with REDD+. While sometimes the use of the term REDD is in reference to an earlier iteration of REDD+, for the purposes of this paper all references to REDD should be considered to be referring to REDD+.
completely labor intensive process. I think there’s a lot of donors that just won’t have time or resources to do that. They don’t want to have relationships that intensive.” – RespondentID-10376.
Stakeholders working within Indonesian institutions also expressed frustration with complex governance and regulations. Governance in Indonesia often overlaps between different scales, particularly in a conflict of interest and control between national and local governments (Stevens et al. 2014; Brockhaus et al. 2012). One Indonesian stakeholder working at the national level put it like this, “Now there are too many regulations, too many institutions...managing REDD+.”-- RespondentID-10395. Throughout Indonesia overlapping authority among different agencies, or various scales of government, can also contribute to confusion and challenges for those working in forestry (Indrarto et al. 2012; Bakker and Moniaga 2010; Resosudarmo 2004). Overlapping authority presents a challenge for forest governance in Indonesia, and can also generate doubt and confusion among those involved in REDD+, or similar conservation initiatives (Galudra et al. 2011; Fauzi and Anna 2013), something expressed by foreign and Indonesian informants alike.
There is a disconnect between what happens at national and local levels in Indonesia, highlighted in the following quote by a foreign NGO worker “Coming in, the Ministry of Forestry was the leader on REDD in Indonesia…but the problem is…if you talk to the Ministry of Forestry and look at regulations, it actually largely is under district control. So those gray areas people talk about today…that's how you know where you have a huge number of problems.” -- RespondentID-10380. At one meeting among Indonesian government officials and foreign researchers, an Indonesian representative said this, “The state wants to implement [this], but the district doesn't have the same awareness level"—RespondentID-10402. Another national level Indonesian stakeholder said, “And as you probably know already, in Indonesia it's the Bupati [district government head] that basically make decisions about land allocation. So they have a very important role in deforestation, they give the license.” --RespondentID-10404. Sometimes
those locally issued licenses contradict official land use categories designated by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry at the national level (Barr et al. 2006; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005). A recent law, ‘‘Law Number 23 about Local Government,’’ UU/23/2014, intended to rectify some problems resulting from extreme decentralization (Prasetyia 2012; Ewing-Chow and Losari 2015) attempts to shift authority from districts to provinces. While Indonesia has over 500 districts, it only has 34 provinces, so the new law has potential to strengthen connections between central and regional governments by shifting power from many district governments to provincial governments. However, this shift has not yet materialized.
Overlap in authority and confusing governance have been particularly problematic as they manifest with licensing and tenure in Indonesia, as parcels of land may have conflicting licenses for different uses (Resosudarmo et al. 2011; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005). Confusion or conflict over tenure can pose problems for REDD+ projects (Resosudarmo et al. 2014), or areas designated as protected forest by Indonesia’s government. Some members of forest communities involved in our fieldwork were not aware that palm oil concessions overlapped with their customary forest (hutan adat). Many community customary forests in Indonesia are vulnerable because of challenges associated with establishing community forest rights despite a 2012 court ruling that established rights of communities to have tenure rights to customary forests (Natahadibrata 2013), so far very few claims of community forest rights have been established, presumably because of complicated and challenging processes reported by our informants and supported by the literature (Sahide et al. 2016).
There is no single authority or database for land-use permits, and different government agencies and sectors have different maps (Sills et al. 2014). The introduction of REDD+ and attention it has brought to forestry in Indonesia has increased awareness of these issues and as a result, one solution was proposed in which a single database would be established in order to sort out conflicting licenses and overlapping tenure. However, this project, called “One Map”, has not
yet been completed (WRI 2018), potentially as a result of the enormity of the task. One Indonesian stakeholder who had been involved in development of One Map said this, “We are engaging into an MoU with the governor of [the province]…so the governor requested
companies there provide them with all of the licensing...and administrative data...We gathered all of them…it was…a lot because we received like ten boxes of documents each day, and it keeps on going and going and going. And that’s only from [three districts], not the whole [province]” RespondentID-10394. Indonesia has over 500 districts which, in consideration of the
overwhelming documentation described here, may partially explain why One Map has not yet materialized. The stakeholder then goes on to describe problems with documentation, something indicative of tenure issues found throughout Indonesia (Sunderlin et al. 2014), …there are some licenses that are not there. It’s a really huge problem. We’ve asked the government, but they said they don’t have them but then they will [speak to] the company. But the company said they don’t have them.” RespondentID-10394. This scenario, while described by someone working for the central government, is indicative of what was reported by many stakeholders at both national and local levels from both Indonesian and foreign agencies. Confusion and a lack of transparency, as described above, are linked to higher levels of corruption (Kolstad and Wiig 2009). Complex and confusing governance thus not only frustrates efforts to implement REDD+ in Indonesia, but has the potential to directly fuel corruption, nepotism and collusion systemic throughout Indonesia’s forest governance system.
Setting up a REDD+ project as an Ecosystem Restoration Concession may come with even further complications. Stakeholders who have approached REDD+ as an ERC, have described difficulty in navigating processes for obtaining a license(Walsh et al. 2012). One project level foreign stakeholder described frustration working with Indonesia’s central government to establish an ERC and the impact it had on obtaining funding , “We kept getting money from investors...but then we couldn't get more because we never had any progress to
show, there was no good news.”RespondentID-10382. Some already established ERC based REDD+ projects have reported procedures for obtaining an ERC as long and daunting. Rimba Makmur and Rimba Raya, projects in Central Kalimantan, both report the licensing process years and even then they were also only granted partial licenses (Indriatmoko et al. 2014). As obtaining an ERC license will be essential for development of many REDD+ projects, difficulties in obtaining licenses has potential to greatly affect overall progress of REDD+ in Indonesia.
4.2 Issues with funding
Difficulty finding sufficient funding was frequently reported as another major challenge towards project implementation. While lack of funding has been discussed in the literature (Phelps et al. 2011; Dixon and Challies 2015), it is still important to discuss financing for REDD+ in Indonesia because of the contrast between perceptions of funding available, and the reality of a shortage of available funds at the local level. While some international stakeholders seemed to think there was plenty of funding for projects, local level stakeholders emphasized that securing funding was one of the greatest challenges to ensuring REDD+ long-term effectiveness and there is evidence to support this (Diana and Jong 2018; Enrici and Hubacek 2018; UN-REDD Programme 2013). When national and international level stakeholders are not in touch with challenges faced by those working on REDD+ projects at local levels it may contribute to logistical problems for project implementation. Results of this research suggest knowledge about lack of funding is prevalent among many stakeholders working on REDD+ at project and local levels, which undermines confidence and buy-in.
Despite widespread reports of substantial funding for REDD+, many projects are lacking basic funds to support on-the-ground efforts. Norway’s government reports approximately 8% of the USD1billion promised to Indonesia have either been released or “committed’ and distribution of funds will be results based (Royal Norwegian Embassy Jakarta 2016). While many REDD+
projects were initiated with assumptions that funding, or carbon markets would be easily accessible for project financing, that has not been the case for many REDD+ stakeholders. Lack of sufficient funding can also impact stakeholder perceptions of REDD+ and belief in
possibilities for achieving successful outcomes, especially given competing income opportunities from resource extraction: “One of our economists...saw the scale of the coal mining and scale of money coming in formally and informally to the local district government. And his feedback to me was REDD’s got a tough job to do here if it can even try and compete with the level of money flowing in. And he became a skeptic overnight.” -- RespondentID-10377. Such sentiments of doubt were prevalent across stakeholder groups, as discussed in greater detail in section 4.5 below.
From inception, REDD+ has been envisioned as a market based mechanism (Holloway and Giandomenico 2009). Though early pilot projects and readiness efforts have largely been funded by donor grants (Streck 2012), intentions were for a carbon trading mechanism to sustain long-term viability of projects and incentivize expansion. Despite these intentions, results from this research and evidence from available documentation demonstrate the carbon market has not provided a viable funding option. Many forest conservation activities including REDD+ are excluded from some carbon market mechanisms including the compliance market (Carbon Market Watch 2016; Butler, Koh, and Ghazoul 2009) and furthermore, carbon markets are still insufficiently developed to support climate change mitigation efforts (Johannsdottir and McInerney 2016).
Some at the local level reported that it did not seem they would be able to secure sufficient funding to maintain projects over the long-term. One such individual said, “We need more support, [people are] always thinking about the money. We need more cash from outside, from donors. There's not enough money to scale up.”-- RespondentID-10392. This speaks to the fact that REDD+ finances may not be sufficient to effectively compete with other land uses, such
as palm oil (Butler et al. 2009). Stakeholders are aware how this imbalance of economic
incentives may impact REDD+, and it may also create doubts for long-term success. One foreign NGO worker said, “The other issue is that REDD money is not unlimited. It's going to be a drop in the bucket compared to the revenue that palm oil brings in…So how do you address the real drivers of deforestation? How can you use REDD to really do that? I don't
know.”-RespondentID-10379. The inability of REDD+ to compete with mining and palm oil may continue to be problematic for a number of reasons. For example, globally REDD+ has created new opportunities for securing local tenure rights (Larson et al. 2013). However, while securing community rights can lead to more successful forest management in some situations (Stevens et al. 2014), it may not in cases where other activities can offer communities more financial compensation for their community forest (Resosudarmo et al. 2014). Ultimately, the lack of funding reported by some of our respondents is problematic as exemplified by the end of the UN REDD+ Pilot Project, which closed due to a lack of funding (UN-REDD Programme 2013) and is an issue which continues to threaten other REDD+ projects in Indonesia (Diana and Jong 2018) and elsewhere (Sunderlin et al. 2015).
4.3 Corruption and inability to enforce project boundaries
Both foreign and Indonesian stakeholders operating at all scales of REDD+ implementation expressed concerns about corruption and how it impacts REDD+ projects, an issue also
documented in the literature (Luttrell et al. 2014 Indrarto et al. 2012). At one time the Ministry of Forestry was ranked the lowest ministry in Indonesia on an integrity survey done by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and was furthermore found responsible for
inaccurately mapping forest cover, land use, concessions and unfairly allocating land rights ( HRW 2013). While such high level corruption is problematic for forest management, corruption in forestry also occurs at local levels (Prasetyia 2012; Kuncoro et al. 2013) and both can be problematic for REDD+ projects.
–For example, stakeholders working at local or project levels reported instances where authorities expect bribes or payments in order to enforce project boundaries and stop
encroachment, a phenomena also documented elsewhere (Dermawan et al. 2011; Butt 2011). While some projects seem to have enjoyed support from local officials, other stakeholders reported that they often cannot get approval for projects, even after a project has been approved by the central government. A number of stakeholders reported a lack of enforcement of current regulations, something evidenced by encroachment onto protected areas (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; WWF 2013; Yuliani et al. 2010) and the lack of sufficient sanctions (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005; Faure and Wibisana 2013; Indrarto et al. 2012), and which can also lead to a sense of general frustration and fatigue with REDD+. One informant who works at both the international and project level, referring to a visit to one of the provinces where REDD+ is being implemented, said: “It was really staggering, the amount of...complete lack of enforcement of any rules or regulations about destruction of [the forest]…”. RespondentID-10375.
Corruption has been reported in the literature to lead to higher rates of deforestation in general (Galinato and Galinato 2013, 2012), and based on the results of this research, appears to facilitate encroachment into protected areas. This is evidenced by the same phenomena occurring across protected forest areas in Indonesia (Gaveau et al. 2013; Margono et al. 2012; Broich et al. 2011; Indonesia Ministry of Forestry 2014). Such corruption extends to REDD+ efforts, affects stakeholder authority over project areas and reduces their ability to enforce project boundaries. Without proper governance over REDD+ project territories, it makes it difficult to achieve goals for carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation. Other stakeholders also reported local authorities failed to respond to encroachment within project boundaries, something widely reported as a problem in Indonesia’s protected forest areas (Murdiyarso et al. 2011; Gaveau et al. 2013; Sloan et al. 2012). For some stakeholders, having to pay bribes in order to get local support was both expected and necessary. As a foreign stakeholder working at the local level stated, “…
to make it work we have to make tribute payments to local authorities…we’ve got to find ways to get support from local authorities.”- RespondentID-10387. Some stakeholders expressed concern about how local law enforcement failed to protect their rights. Some stakeholders described experiences with local police and authorities who were allegedly involved in encroachment activities, something which has also been documented elsewhere (Smith et al. 2003; Butt 2011).
Sometimes encroachment is done by other entities, such as agricultural companies or smallholders (WWF 2013; Krishna et al. 2014), but without local governmental support there is very little project organizers, or even local communities within those projects, can do about it. In other scenarios, sometimes outside entities encourage encroachment by local villagers, which can make it more difficult for project organizers to stop encroachment – without local government support it is nearly impossible. One stakeholder said, “We have villagers planting palm oil inside our concession. The [palm oil company] pays them to plant it there.” – RespondentID-10383. Project organizers turned to local authorities for support, but were expected to make payments, which their international-aid-agency-funded budget did not allow for. Complaints of this kind were common. One stakeholder involved in a REDD+ project working at local levels stated, “Illegal oil palm from [our REDD site] is sold to agents or a local mill, owned by the
government of Indonesia.“ – RespondentID-10422. Stakeholders’ experiences with corruption can make REDD+ project management challenging, as extensive encroachment can lead to forest cover and biodiversity loss. Corruption such as mentioned by our respondents can also lead to stakeholder fatigue and doubt, discussed further below.
4.4 Cultural barriers: Complexity and insufficient open discussion about REDD+
Many stakeholders, both foreign and Indonesian, expressed sentiments regarding a lack of clarity and openness surrounding REDD+ in Indonesia. Collaboration among stakeholdergroups has been identified as an important component of long-term successful ecosystem and natural resource management schemes (Vacik et al. 2014; Blumenthal and Jannink 2016). While inclusion and collaboration of stakeholders at multiple scales has been acknowledged in many REDD+ documents (CIF 2013; UN REDD Programme 2015), many of our respondents reported feelings of frustration at cultural disconnect and misunderstandings.
Indonesia has a complex and rich cultural context, reflected by the over 700 languages spoken there. This cultural diversity has contributed to a complicated context some describe as chaotic (Parry 2007; Forrester 1999) or confusing (Gallemore and Moeliono 2014; Ewing-Chow and Losari 2015; Galudra et al. 2011) and which may be challenging for foreign, or even local, stakeholders to navigate. One stakeholder from Indonesia working at the national level put it like this, “This issue is really challenging…the system in Indonesia is very complex.” 10404, another foreign stakeholder put it simply, “Operating here is difficult” RespondentID-10368. These perceptions of unnecessary institutional complexity are supported by evidence that sometimes the government’s priorities conflict (McFarland et al. 2015; Simamora 2011), laws are sometimes confusing and conflicting (Indrarto et al. 2012; Galudra et al. 2011; Gallemore and Moeliono 2014) and there is evidence of insufficient communication among governance actors at varying scales (Moeliono et al. 2014). Both foreign and Indonesian stakeholders reported feelings of frustration and sometimes even confusion when working on REDD+ efforts, particularly at national or international levels.
Many stakeholders seemed concerned about how the complexity of Indonesia’s context was impacting outcomes for REDD+. One Indonesian stakeholder working at the national level described frustrations in regard to overlapping authority (Ministry of Forestry 2009; Brockhaus et al. 2012) and lack of reference levels (Virah-Sawmy et al. 2015), “REDD cannot work here, we don't have the reference levels. And Indonesia is too diverse and vast. The national government cannot control the subnational, provincial or kabupaten [district].”—RespondentID-10367.
Confusion can happen when well-meaning foreign donors or project organizers approach situations with less knowledge about cultural context than may be necessary and some
stakeholders seemed to lack the understanding necessary to navigate Indonesia’s cultural context in a way that would allow them to be successful over the long term. Other foreign stakeholders expressed confusion and uncertainty about how to deal with problems in a culturally appropriate way. Some who had been working in the country for a long time had a better sense of how to approach issues, yet still expressed frustration at having to adapt to the cultural context. One stakeholder working at the national level for many years said, “It’s difficult because you can never say anything directly”- RespondentID-10381. And another working at national scales, emphasizing the frustration felt as a result of the cultural disconnect, and expressing concerns about how this has led to challenges for REDD+, “The Ministry of Forestry's definition of degradation and deforestation [differs] from [others]…And it's the same data, it's the definitions and what they're calling deforestation. So, getting those definitions in place like we agreed to is going to be a bit of a challenge”—RespondentID-10370. Such differing interpretations and definitions have in fact lead to conflicts over forest cover assessment (Romijn et al. 2013). Comments such as these were common and furthermore connect to lack of buy-in and stakeholder fatigue.
4.5 Stakeholder fatigue -- stakeholders doubt possibilities for success of REDD+
Sentiments of doubt, stakeholder fatigue, and lack of buy-in are representative of feelings of the majority of our respondent, and such doubts have also been expressed in the literature (Fletcher et al. 2016; Redford et al. 2013) . In 2015 President Jokowi disbanded the National REDD+ Agency (BP REDD+), an act which may both have reflected and added to doubts about the future of REDD+ (Jong 2015). Stakeholders from all groups and scales expressed some doubt and disenchantment with REDD+, and these were some of the most emphasized and salient
themes presented by respondents. Disappointment with achievements of REDD+ in Indonesia were also expressed publicly by government officials from Norway, one of the major donor countries (Parlina and Nicholas 2016). At the national level, this stakeholder fatigue is often expressed as a doubt REDD+ would endure and be able to achieve long-term success. This is how it was noted by one informant, “There are so many problems we are dealing with to overcome these REDD+ issues like local conflicts, either vertical conflict or horizontal conflict, or law enforcement, corruption, licensing, there’s [so much].”—RespondentID-10396. While many of these feelings about REDD+ were often specific to Indonesia’s context, but also extended to the global perspective, “This is all incredibly difficult work. So to not have made the progress anyone hopes, or even 10%, is not surprising…So, when I say we all have failed, it's not really a
criticism...it's just the way it is....it's certainly an issue globally too.”—RespondentID-10374. While globally successful forest management is a major challenge, some stakeholders seem to recognize that it is particularly so in Indonesia’s context, “It's been really painful to watch actually, I feel really bad for [Indonesia’s government]. You know, people underestimate how hard it is to do certain things well. It's a ridiculously hard problem. Especially in a country like Indonesia, where it's so resource dependent and corrupt.” RespondentID-10411.
At the community level stakeholder fatigue manifests as doubts promises would be met. Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) was developed as a way to make sure communities were fairly and ethically being involved in the process (Colchester 2010). In some cases well-meaning stakeholders, some of whom may have been doing their best to offer communities FPIC, may have approached communities years ago. However, when licenses take many years to obtain, or financing turned out to be difficult to find, communities may feel they have been made false promises and lose faith – a sentiment expressed by several of the communities included in our research. One village head said this, “I do not believe the benefits from [this project] will happen…How can I turn down the benefits offered by [the palm oil company] even if I know
they’re bad? I think this [REDD+ project] will just be like every other group that’s come here with promises that have not been met.” RespondentID-10414.
Some stakeholders were even starting to suggest that their organizations were moving away from REDD+ even if they were still interested in achieving outcomes. This can be described as doubt in REDD+’s label, and in some cases stakeholders disassociated their forest governance projects with the REDD+ label (William D. Sunderlin, Ekaputri, et al. 2014; Enrici and Hubacek 2018). One respondent operating within the Indonesian government directly stated that individuals from the former Ministry of Forestry were not interested in being involved in REDD+, “REDD now is forestry, but then the Ministry of Forestry says we don't want REDD. Because REDD is now being managed by [other agencies]. For a long time I've always been saying...we still have to have REDD. But, they don't want to use the term REDD.”-RespondentID-10393. Other stakeholders had doubted REDD+ would be successful because similar programs had not achieved what they set out to do, something that has also been expressed in the literature (Redford et al. 2013).
Some stakeholders felt although there was much attention given to REDD+ nationally, this was not the case on the ground, “There's projects...but really if you look at what's happening on the ground, it's not that much…some of them are also making more noise than anything. -- RespondentID-10367. And another said, “REDD+ isn’t happening yet…”—RespondentID-10405. Other stakeholders felt attention to REDD+ at National and provincial levels, combined with a lack of action at project levels was part of what caused stakeholder fatigue, “I get a lot of impressions from people and it seems like Central Kalimantan has had so much focus on it...there is a bit of, a kind of REDD fatigue there,...and frustration with all the things...happening.” — RespondentID-10370.
will be effective, and subsequent lack of interest in supporting projects and other efforts. Analysis of Indonesia’s political context demonstrates REDD+ lacks support at national and local
government levels as well as among the public (Luttrell et al. 2014). Respondents from our research expressed frustration at lack of buy-in by government agencies at both national and local levels, but also many other stakeholders expressed a lack of buy-in. Buy-in was discussed by respondents in two different capacities – first their own lack of buy-in, and second their
perception of a lack of buy-in from other stakeholder groups. While these two aspects of buy-in were often mentioned separately, there is a relationship between the two. Often informants would explain their own doubts about REDD+ as being influenced by seeing a lack of buy-in from other stakeholder groups. This is characterized in the following quote, by a stakeholder working at both national and project levels,“ On one hand, [Indonesia’s Government] make[s] all these public announcements about climate change, and they support this and they support that. And then over here, it’s one concession after another for conversion to oil, and then they don’t do anything about all the small-scale conversion….”.RespondentID-10419.
Frequently, comments such as above, about buy-in and concerns about how much buy-in other stakeholder groups had were directed towards Indonesia’s Government at both national and local scales. Concern about a lack of buy-in was voiced frequently regarding local governments, as one stakeholder stated rather bluntly, “…buy-in from the government [in that district] is still pretty weak.”RespondentID-10407. Other accounts support these sentiments, include reports of a lack of enforcement experienced in national parks and by some REDD+ projects at the local level (Yuliani et al. 2010; WWF 2013). A variety of stakeholders expressed concern that plans for REDD+ in Indonesia had not included ways to create buy-in or incentives for local governments, which ultimately impacts how much local governments support REDD+. One national-level government official explained it like this, ”There is no reason for these subnational governments to buy-in, there is no buy-in at all. Why should they be interested in REDD? What is it doing for
them? Bupati [district heads] are only around for 5 years, they want some kind of reward that'll happen when they're there.” – RespondentID-10413
Some stakeholders involved in running REDD+ projects were not even certain their own projects would be successful. Such doubt has potential to undermine longevity and commitment to achieving REDD+ outcomes. As one stakeholder stated, “ Not that there's any success stories. You know, I think the stuff we're doing [at our REDD+ project], you know we really don't have it figured out there.”—RespondentID-10380. Members of forest communities, extensively involved in some REDD+ projects also expressed doubts about REDD+’s ultimate utility, “All I think we can really hope for is ownership over our forest. These projects are only helping us a little.” – RespondentID-10416. Other stakeholders felt challenges discussed above compounded the fact many stakeholders failed to see, or believe, how REDD+ could benefit them, “There are so many issues going on here…we have to find what the source of issues is first.”–RespondentID-10385. Getting support and buy-in for REDD+ at all scales will be necessary if REDD+ is to have any hope for success in the long run.
4.6 Hope for the future: REDD+ as a catalyst for change
While many REDD+ sentiments expressed by stakeholders were negative, there were also positive reflections expressed by respondents. While many stakeholders have doubts about the future of REDD+, many at least acknowledge some good has come about as a result of REDD+ activities. Despite evidence REDD+ has not yet achieved the ambitious goals of reducing Indonesia’s deforestation rate (WRI GFW 2016), some actions towards forest governance reform have resulted from REDD+’s introduction and the international attention it has drawn to Indonesia’s forests. These actions include the presidential moratorium on new licenses (Busch et al. 2015), intensified discourse regarding Indonesia’s sometimes problematic forest classifications (Enrici and Hubacek 2016), as well as continued international support for
REDD+ efforts (Government of Norway, Government of the United Kingdom, and Government of Germany 2015).
One Indonesian stakeholder working at the national level framed the positive side of REDD+ as increased interaction among the Indonesian government and other stakeholder groups, “But in terms of the REDD process itself…I think a lot of good things [are] happening when they engage various stakeholders. And I think that never happened before”—RespondentID-10396. Another similar perspective is REDD+, although different than its original design, is acting as a catalyst which will drive change and help encourage policy reform and better forest management, shared by an Indonesian stakeholder working at national and local levels, “ I really like the perspective, the idea REDD is going to drive change.” – RespondentID-10499. Other
stakeholders felt by entering into projects for the long-term, there was a possibility for positive change. As has been mentioned by many of the stakeholders interviewed for this study, working in the Indonesian context requires perseverance and understanding. One foreign stakeholder working at the national scale said, “ It’s almost a kind of a test of stamina here. A lot of donors have decided to withdraw because they’ve just had enough…and for some reason, we’ve stayed. So it’s almost like we have a good relationship because we’ve been around the longest.”— RespondentID-10376. If REDD+ is to succeed it will be important for NGOs and stakeholders to recognize both positive outcomes as well as shortcomings, and for stakeholders to remain committed and work towards their goals in REDD+, even in the face of challenges.
5 Conclusions
One of the most prominent themes of this research is that REDD+ is undergoing a crisis of confidence in Indonesia. Few stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels have much faith REDD+ will be successfully realized in Indonesia in the near future. This lack of confidence is likely compounded by the rest of our findings that regulations are complex and
sometimes confusing; there is a lack of funding; corruption and enforcement are problematic; and a complicated cultural situation is exacerbated by a need for more nuanced understanding by foreign stakeholders. Many respondents working directly on REDD+ felt a serious lack of pathways for moving forward and project implementation, something which likely added to delays in REDD+ development and may have exacerbated feelings of doubt.
At all levels, frustrations exist with corruption, governance, land tenure, slow progress and bureaucracy. Furthermore, this research shows a widespread loss of faith in REDD+’s central mission. Most stakeholders no longer believe the REDD+ mechanism can compete with
alternative land uses and that REDD+ can be a successful mechanism using carbon markets to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation. While some actors are turning their backs on the REDD+ altogether, many actors are content to use REDD+, and the recognition and funds it makes available, to achieve other long-term goals such as biodiversity conservation and community rights.
However, despite all these challenges, there are some positive outcomes from REDD+ and opportunities for the future. The introduction of REDD+ has arguably increased attention to forestry challenges in Indonesia, and the program is potentially acting as a catalyst for change. Furthermore, stakeholders who are able and willing to persevere for the long-term may have better opportunities for future action. Despite all of the challenges, two major conclusions can be drawn that would warrant future research and may help efforts towards REDD+ and other conservation initiatives throughout Indonesia: 1) Environmental governance work in Indonesia will require a long-term perspective, stakeholders must adjust their expectations for how long implementation will take and when they will see results; and (2) working on REDD+, and any kind of environmental initiative, in Indonesia is going to require nuanced approaches within Indonesia’s diverse contexts.
Compliance with Ethical Standards:
Funding: This study was funded by the Fulbright Commission and a Dean’s Dissertation Fellowship from the University of Maryland. The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
References
Abood, Sinan A., Janice Ser Huay Lee, Zuzana Burivalova, John Garcia-Ulloa, and Lian Pin Koh. 2014. “Relative Contributions of the Logging, Fiber, Oil Palm, and Mining Industries to Forest Loss in Indonesia.” Conservation Letters.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.12103/full.
Bakker, Laurens, and Sandra Moniaga. 2010. “The Space between: Land Claims and the Law in Indonesia.” Asian Journal of Social Science 38 (2): 187–203.
Barkmann, Jan, Günter Burkard, Heiko Faust, Michael Fremerey, Sebastian Koch, and Agus Lanini. 2010. “Land Tenure Rights, Village Institutions, and Rainforest Conversion in Central Sulawesi (Indonesia).” In Tropical Rainforests and Agroforests under Global Change, 141– 160. Springer. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-00493-3_6.
Barr, Christopher M., I. A. P. Resosudarmo, A. Dermawan, John McCarthy, Moira Moeliono, and Bambang Setiono, eds. 2006. Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic Development, and Community Livelihoods. CIFOR.
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-bh1QmnPD_cC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=forest+concessions+sanctions+indonesia&ots=RnJ sm167lp&sig=FnoVU9WCjYyrMZKqMGvlZATj7Eg.
of Multi-Layered Conflicts in Jambi Province, Sumatra, Indonesia.” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 7 (1): 75–92.
Bell, Gary F. 2003. “Indonesia: The New Regional Autonomy Laws, Two Years Later.” Southeast Asian Affairs, 117–131.
Blumenthal, Dana, and Jean-Luc Jannink. 2016. “A Classification of Collaborative Management Methods.” https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/handle/10919/66233.
Brockhaus, Maria, Krystof Obidzinski, Ahmad Dermawan, Yves Laumonier, and Cecilia Luttrell. 2012. “An Overview of Forest and Land Allocation Policies in Indonesia: Is the Current Framework Sufficient to Meet the Needs of REDD+?” Forest Policy and Economics 18 (May): 30–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.09.004.
Broich, Mark, Matthew Hansen, Fred Stolle, Peter Potapov, Belinda Arunarwati Margono, and Bernard Adusei. 2011. “Remotely Sensed Forest Cover Loss Shows High Spatial and Temporal Variation across Sumatera and Kalimantan, Indonesia 2000–2008.” Environmental Research Letters 6 (1): 014010.
Busch, Jonah, Kalifi Ferretti-Gallon, Jens Engelmann, Max Wright, Kemen G. Austin, Fred Stolle, Svetlana Turubanova, et al. 2015. “Reductions in Emissions from Deforestation from Indonesia’s Moratorium on New Oil Palm, Timber, and Logging Concessions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (5): 1328–33.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1412514112.
Butler, Rhett A., Lian Pin Koh, and Jaboury Ghazoul. 2009. “REDD in the Red: Palm Oil Could Undermine Carbon Payment Schemes.” Conservation Letters 2 (2): 67–73.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-263X.2009.00047.x.
Butt, Simon. 2011. “Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia: An Obituary?” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 47 (3): 381–394.
Carbon Market Watch. 2016. “REDD Archive - Carbon Market Watch.” 2016. http://carbonmarketwatch.org/category/redd/.
Carlson, K. M., L. M. Curran, D. Ratnasari, A. M. Pittman, B. S. Soares-Filho, G. P. Asner, S. N. Trigg, D. A. Gaveau, D. Lawrence, and H. O. Rodrigues. 2012. “Committed Carbon Emissions, Deforestation, and Community Land Conversion from Oil Palm Plantation Expansion in West Kalimantan, Indonesia.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (19): 7559–7564.
Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis. Sage Publications Limited. http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=w2sDdv-S7PgC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=charmaz+grounded+theory&ots=p_qn0SGJav&sig=pcji1Thv K9n979FiCal9QhdS7kE.
———. 2011. “Grounded Theory Methods in Social Justice Research.” The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 4: 359–380.
Charmaz, Kathy, and Liska Belgrave. 2002. “Qualitative Interviewing and Grounded Theory Analysis.” The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the Craf 2: 2002.
https://www-
cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/default/files/knowledge-documents/fip_learning_product_redd_stakeholder_collaboration_0.pdf.
Colchester, Marcus. 2010. “Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Making FPIC Work for Forests and Peoples.” Research Paper 11.
Contreras-Hermosilla, Arnoldo, Chip Fay, Elfian Effendi, and Forest Trends. 2005. Strengthening Forest Management in Indonesia through Land Tenure Reform: Issues and Framework for Action. Forest Trends Washington, DC.
http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/WCA2009/regions/southeast_asia/publication s?do=view_pub_detail&pub_no=BK0092-05.
Convention on Biological Diversity. n.d. “Indonesia - Country Profile.” Convention on Biodiversity Country Profiles. Accessed December 2, 2018.
https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/default.shtml?country=id.
Corbin, Juliet, and Anselm Strauss. 2007. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Sage Publications, Incorporated. http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=0TI8Ugvy2Z4C&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=strauss+corbin+qualitative+methods &ots=bkSihjTULw&sig=P2HtpL5q9P2Z7Tvd71pSguK7Ouw.
Dermawan, Ahmad, Elena Petkova, A. C. Sinaga, Mumu Muhajir, and Yayan Indriatmoko. 2011. Preventing the Risks of Corruption in REDD+ in Indonesia. CIFOR.
http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=K2czHGS_iIcC&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=Preventing+the+risks+of+corruption+ in+REDD%2B+in+Indonesia&ots=1Sjq_KqXFo&sig=CG1dah9GI11-bOXRT_p2A-2cFsI.
Diana, Elyiza, and Hans Nicholas Jong. 2018. “End of Funding Dims Hopes for a Sumatran Forest Targeted by Palm Oil Growers.” Mongabay Environmental News, November 9, 2018. https://news.mongabay.com/2018/11/end-of-funding-dims-hopes-for-a-sumatran-forest-targeted-by-palm-oil-growers/.
Dixon, Rowan, and Edward Challies. 2015. “Making REDD+ Pay: Shifting Rationales and Tactics of Private Finance and the Governance of Avoided Deforestation in Indonesia.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 56 (1): 6–20.
Enrici, Ashley, and Klaus Hubacek. 2016. “Business as Usual in Indonesia: Governance Factors Effecting the Acceleration of the Deforestation Rate after the Introduction of REDD+.” Energy, Ecology and Environment 1 (4): 183–196.
———. 2018. “Challenges for REDD+ in Indonesia: A Case Study of Three Project Sites.” Ecology and Society 23 (2).
Ewing-Chow, Michael, and Junianto James Losari. 2015. “Multiple Authorisation: The Legal Complexity of Desentralisasi in Indonesia and the Potential Contribution of IIAs in Reducing Confusion.” Indonesia Law Review 5 (3): 241–256.
Faure, Michael, and Andri Wibisana. 2013. Regulating Disasters, Climate Change and Environmental Harm. Edward Elgar Publishing. http://books.google.com/books? hl=en&lr=&id=xQsCAQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&dq=Regulating+Disasters,
+Climate+Change+and+Environmental+Harm&ots=0lIxr2YL9v&sig=Z4HACb6BaUE_Qp11 0icsXmu49KU.
Environmental Services: A Case Study of Two Indonesian PES Schemes.” Ecosystem Services 6: 54–63.
Fletcher, Robert, Wolfram Dressler, Bram Büscher, and Zachary R. Anderson. 2016. “Questioning REDD+ and the Future of Market-Based Conservation.” Conservation Biology 30 (3): 673– 675.
Forrester, Geoff. 1999. Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? St. Martin’s Press.
Galinato, Gregmar I., and Suzette P. Galinato. 2012. “The Effects of Corruption Control, Political Stability and Economic Growth on Deforestation-Induced Carbon Dioxide Emissions.” Environment and Development Economics 17 (01): 67–90.
———. 2013. “The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Corruption Control and Political Stability on Forest Cover.” Ecological Economics 89: 153–161.
Gallemore, Caleb T., and Moira Moeliono. 2014. “Discursive Barriers and Cross-Scale Forest Governance in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.” Ecology and Society 19 (2).
Galudra, Gamma, M. Van Noordwijk, Sardi Suyanto, I. Sardi, U. Pradhan, and D. Catacutan. 2011. “Hot Spots of Confusion: Contested Policies and Competing Carbon Claims in the Peatlands of Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.” International Forestry Review 13 (4): 431– 441.
Gaveau, David LA, Mrigesh Kshatriya, Douglas Sheil, Sean Sloan, Elis Molidena, Arief Wijaya, Serge Wich, et al. 2013. “Reconciling Forest Conservation and Logging in Indonesian Borneo.” PloS One 8 (8): e69887.
Readiness.” 2013. http://www.theredddesk.org/.
Government of Norway, Government of the United Kingdom, and Government of Germany. 2015. “Joint Statement by Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Unlocking the Potential of Forests and Land Use.” In .
http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/joint_st atement_redd_cop21_en_bf.pdf.
Holloway, Vivienne, and Esteban Giandomenico. 2009. “The History of REDD Policy.” Carbon Planet White Paper, Adelaide, Australia.
Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2013. “The Dark Side of Green Growth The Human Rights Impacts of Weak Governance in Indonesia’s Forestry Sector.” Human Rights Watch.
Indonesia Ministry of Forestry. 2014. “Forest Area Statistics 2013.” Jakarta: Indonesia Ministry of Forestry.
http://www.dephut.go.id/uploads/files/2fba7c7da8536e31671e3bb84f141195.pdf.
Indrarto, Giorgio Budi, Prayekti Murharjanti, Josi Khatarina, Irvan Pulungan, Feby Ivalerina, Rahman Justitia, Nala Prana Muhar, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, and Efrian Muharrom. 2012. “The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, Agents and Institutions.”
http://forestclimatecenter.org/files/2012-08-09%20The%20Context%20of%20REDD+ %20in%20Indonesia.pdf.
Indriatmoko, Yayan, S. Atmadja, Andini Desita Ekaputri, and Mella Komalasari. 2014. “Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve Project, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.” In REDD+ on the Ground: A Case Book of Subnational Initiatives across the Globe. Center for International
Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia. http://www.cifor.org/library/5280/rimba-raya-biodiversity-reserve-project-central-kalimantan-indonesia/.
Johannsdottir, Lara, and Celine McInerney. 2016. “Calls for Carbon Markets at COP21: A Conference Report.” Journal of Cleaner Production 124: 405–407.
Jong, Hans Nicholas. 2015. “BP REDD+ Officially Disbanded - National - The Jakarta Post.” The Jakarta Post, January 29, 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/29/bp-redd-officially-disbanded.html.
Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. 2009. “Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?” World Development 37 (3): 521–532.
Krishna, Vijesh V., Unai Pascual, and Matin Qaim. 2014. “Do Emerging Land Markets Promote Forestland Appropriation? Evidence from Indonesia.” EFForTS Discussion Paper Series.
Kuncoro, Ari, Vid Adrison, Ifa Isfandiarni, and others. 2013. “Varieties of Governance of Public Goods Delivery in Indonesia: The Case of Roads after Decentralization and Local Democratization.” Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia.
http://econ.feb.ui.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/201301.pdf.
Larson, Anne M., Maria Brockhaus, William D. Sunderlin, Amy Duchelle, Andrea Babon, Therese Dokken, Thu Thuy Pham, et al. 2013. “Land Tenure and REDD+: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.” Global Environmental Change, April.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.02.014.
Luttrell, Cecilia, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Efrian Muharrom, Maria Brockhaus, and Frances Seymour. 2014. “The Political Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Constituencies for
Change.” Environmental Science & Policy 35: 67–75.
Margono, Belinda Arunarwati, Peter V. Potapov, Svetlana Turubanova, Fred Stolle, and Matthew C. Hansen. 2014. “Primary Forest Cover Loss in Indonesia over 2000-2012.” Nature Climate Change.
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2277.html?
utm_source=Daily+Carbon+Briefing&utm_campaign=1f7e4f67b5- DAILY_BRIEFING&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_876aab4fd7-1f7e4f67b5-303421281.
Margono, Belinda Arunarwati, Svetlana Turubanova, Ilona Zhuravleva, Peter Potapov, Alexandra Tyukavina, Alessandro Baccini, Scott Goetz, and Matthew C. Hansen. 2012. “Mapping and Monitoring Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Sumatra (Indonesia) Using Landsat Time Series Data Sets from 1990 to 2010.” Environmental Research Letters 7 (3): 034010.
McCarthy, John, and Moira Moeliono. 2012. “16 The PostAuthoritarian PoliticsofAgrarian and Forest Reform in Indonesia.” Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=N-rGBQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT427&dq=regulations+contradict+indonesia&ots=cfA2ulBtp G&sig=0nwdI48bWzxUlStTFylO_a-AeqM.
McFarland, Will, Shelagh Whitley, and Gabrielle Kissinger. 2015. “Subsidies to Key Commodities Driving Forest Loss: Implications for Private Climate Finance.” Overseas Development Institute.
2014. “Information Networks and Power: Confronting the" Wicked Problem" of REDD+ in Indonesia.” Ecology and Society: A Journal of Integrative Science for Resilience and Sustainability 19 (2). http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/79135/.
(MoF) Ministry of Forestry Center for Forestry Planning and Statistics. 2009. “Indonesia Forestry Outlook Study.” APFSOS II/WP/2009/13. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.
Murdiyarso, Daniel, Sonya Dewi, Deborah Lawrence, and Frances Seymour. 2011. Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium: A Stepping Stone to Better Forest Governance? CIFOR.
http://www.google.com/books?
hl=id&lr=&id=tK4i9uUZz10C&oi=fnd&pg=PP5&dq=daemeter+moratorium&ots=zmxP6F q_tR&sig=1SpYHsMAFRpw1YMuSs--dWt2854.
Natahadibrata, Nadya. 2013. “Government Recognizes Customary Forests.” The Jakarta Post, May 18, 2013. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/18/government-recognizes-customary-forests.html.
Parlina, Ina, and Hans Nicholas. 2016. “Norway Slams Slow REDD+ Project Progress.” The Jakarta Post, February 4, 2016. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/04/norway-slams-slow-redd-project-progress.html.
Parry, Richard Lloyd. 2007. In the Time of Madness: Indonesia on the Edge of Chaos. Grove Press. https://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=8imo5gPToE8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=chaos+indonesia&ots=mKW483MA ZE&sig=CuM4p1l6lt8kjIlJJZq4ConEt1E.
Phelps, Jacob, Edward L. Webb, and Lian P. Koh. 2011. “Risky Business: An Uncertain Future for Biodiversity Conservation Finance through REDD+.” Conservation Letters 4 (2): 88–94.
Prasetyia, Ferry. 2012. “Corruption and Decentralisation: Some Evidence in Indonesia.” Journal of Indonesian Applied Economics 4 (1).
http://jiae.ub.ac.id/index.php/jiae/article/view/121.
REDD Net. 2013. “REDD-Net: Networking for Equity in Forest Climate Policy.” REDD Net: Networking for Equity in Forest Climate Policy. 2013. http://www.redd-net.org/.
Redford, Kent H., Christine Padoch, and Terry Sunderland. 2013. “Fads, Funding, and Forgetting in Three Decades of Conservation.” Conservation Biology 27 (3): 437–438.
Resosudarmo, I. A. P., S. Mardiah, and N. Utomo. 2011. “Extractive Land Use, Spatial Planning and Their Implications for REDD+ in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis.” 3rd IRSA International Institute, Padang, 19–21.
Resosudarmo, Ida Aju Pradnja. 2004. “Closer to People and Trees: Will Decentralisation Work for the People and the Forests of Indonesia?” The European Journal of Development
Research 16 (1): 110–132.
Resosudarmo, Ida Aju Pradnja, Stibniati Atmadja, Andini Desita Ekaputri, Dian Y. Intarini, Yayan Indriatmoko, and Pangestuti Astri. 2014. “Does Tenure Security Lead to REDD+ Project Effectiveness? Reflections from Five Emerging Sites in Indonesia.” World Development, Land Tenure and Forest Carbon Management, 55 (March): 68–83.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.015.
Verchot, and Daniel Murdiyarso. 2013. “Exploring Different Forest Definitions and Their Impact on Developing REDD+ Reference Emission Levels: A Case Study for Indonesia.” Environmental Science & Policy 33: 246–259.
Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta. 2016. “Norway-Indonesia REDD+ Partnership - Frequently Asked Questions.” Norway - the Official Site in Indonesia. July 20, 2016.
http://www.norway.or.id/Norway_in_Indonesia/Environment/Questions--answers/#.V48A8I40rPc.
Sahide, M. A. K., S. Supratman, A. Maryudi, Y.-S. Kim, and L. Giessen. 2016. “Decentralisation Policy as Recentralisation Strategy: Forest Management Units and Community Forestry in Indonesia.” International Forestry Review 18 (1): 78–95.
Sills, Erin O., Stibniati S. Atmadja, Claudio de Sassi, Amy E. Duchelle, Demetrius L. Kweka, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, and William D. Sunderlin. 2014. REDD+ on the Ground: A Case Book of Subnational Initiatives across the Globe. CIFOR.
https://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=co4UBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=REDD%2B+on+the+ground:
+A+case+book+of+subnational+initiatives+across+the+globe&ots=KiZfg-8Ynm&sig=yPSBYceSHSiorExOIPwIs1xo8sI.
Simamora, Adianto P. 2011. “SBY Vows to Protect Palm Oil Interests.” The Jakarta Post, March 26, 2011. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/26/sby-vows-protect-palm-oil-interests.html.
Sloan, Sean, David P. Edwards, and William F. Laurance. 2012. “Does Indonesia’s REDD+
Letters 5 (3): 222–231.
Smith, J., K. Obidzinski, S. Subarudi, and I. Suramenggala. 2003. “Illegal Logging, Collusive Corruption and Fragmented Governments in Kalimantan, Indonesia.” International Forestry Review 5 (3): 293–302.
Stevens, Caleb, Robert Winterbottom, Jenny Springer, and Katie Reytar. 2014. “Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change: How Strengthening Community Forest Rights Mitigates Climate Change.” World Resources Institute.
Streck, Charlotte. 2012. “Financing REDD+: Matching Needs and Ends.” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 4/6 Climate systems, 4 (6): 628–37.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2012.10.001.
Sunderlin, W. D., E. O. Sills, A. E. Duchelle, A. D. Ekaputri, D. Kweka, M. A. Toniolo, S. Ball, N. Doggart, C. D. Pratama, and J. T. Padilla. 2015. “REDD+ at a Critical Juncture: Assessing the Limits of Polycentric Governance for Achieving Climate Change Mitigation.” International Forestry Review 17 (4): 400–413.
Sunderlin, William D., Andini Desita Ekaputri, Erin O. Sills, Amy E. Duchelle, Demetrius Kweka, Rachael Diprose, Nike Doggart, et al. 2014. The Challenge of Establishing REDD+ on the Ground: Insights from 23 Subnational Initiatives in Six Countries. Vol. 104. CIFOR. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5Ze2AwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq= %22redd+on+the+ground%22&ots=5kyGEple-V&sig=285Ej7DHfI_A-v1cb7iTPFX-YNI.
Sunderlin, William D., Anne M. Larson, Amy E. Duchelle, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Thu Ba Huynh, Abdon Awono, and Therese Dokken. 2014. “How Are REDD+ Proponents
