University of Amsterdam
Graduate School of Social Sciences
Renewable energy development in the Netherlands
Why is the Netherlands lagging behind in light of the EU 2020 targets?
Erik Trompetter - 10160639
June 23, 2017
MSc Thesis Political Science
The Political Economy of Energy
American English
22,429 words (including in-text citations)
Dr. S. Krapohl
Supervisor
Prof. Dr. M.P. Amineh
Second reader
Table of contents
List of abbreviations...3
Chapter 1: Introduction...5
Chapter 2: Theoretical and conceptual framework...14
Chapter 3: Research methods...…...…...26
Chapter 4: Analysis...27
Chapter 5: Conclusions...52
List of abbreviations
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework
CBS Centraal Bureau Statistiek / Statistics Netherlands
CU ChristenUnie (Political party)
D66 Politieke Democraten ’66 (Political party)
EC European Commission
ECN Energy Research Center of the Netherlands
EIA Energy Investment Allowance
EP European Parliament
ERD Energy Research and Development
EU European Union
EZ Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IEA International Energy Agency
IenM Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment1
ISDE Sustainable Energy Investment Subsidy Scheme)
ISES International Solar Energy Society kWh Kilowatt per hour
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MEP Environmental Quality of Electricity
Mtoe Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt-hour (1 million watt-hours)
NIMBY Not In My Backyard Principle
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NMP4 Fourth National Environment Policy Plan
NREAP National Renewable Energy Action Plan
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PV Solar photovoltaic energy
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Political party)
R&D Research and Development
RE Renewable Energy
RES Renewable Energy Sources
RET Renewable Energy Technology
RETs Renewable Energy Technologies
SER Sociaal Economische Raad / Social and Economic Council
SDE Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie
SDE+ Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie +
SP Socialistische Partij
TPES Total Primary Energy Supply
VNO – NCW Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers VROM Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment2
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Political party)
Chapter 1
1.1. Introduction
In our contemporary world and society, one is facing new types of challenges that one has not experienced before. In a closed system such as the Earth, opportunities that are explored and exploited by previous generations can provoke challenges to later generations. One of the predominant challenges that this generation is facing is the challenge of production and consumption of energy. Fossil fuels have provided astonishing opportunities during especially the 20th century for the wealthy western countries (Armaroli & Balzani, 2007; Amineh & Houweling, 2007). However, currently, the human race is confronted with the pressing challenges that have emerged from fossil-fuel exploitation, which is due to two predominant reasons. Firstly, the proven fossil fuels reserves are gradually decreasing, and their continued use generates detrimental effects, such as an increased degree of greenhouse gases associated with global warming and pollution that endangers human health and possibly even existence (ibid.). On top of this problem, global energy demand is expected to increase drastically; the outlook is that global energy demand will increase by 30% between 2012 and 2040, whereas energy production will progressively face a depletion of conventional energy sources such as oil, coal, and gas (IEA, 2016). It is needless to say that both these problems and developments can be very detrimental for the world population, if not tackled appropriately.
In order to tackle both the global energy scarcity and the global warming crisis, in 2007 the EU has established an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. In this plan, the EC’s climate and energy package established legally binding objectives for 2020. These objectives are: 1) 20% of renewable energy sources in the total EU energy mix; 2) a reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions by 20%; 3) increasing energy efficiency with the objective of sustaining 20 per cent of the EU’s entire energy consumption, and; 4) 10% of bio-fuels in the transport mix (European Commission, 2007; Schubert, Pollak, & Kreutler, 2016).
This research thesis will specifically focus on the first target, related to the development of renewable energy. In 2014, renewable energy contributed to 16.0% of the overall final EU energy consumption, up from 8.5% in 2004. Throughout the same era, total electricity generated from renewables achieved 27.5%, compared to 14.4% in 2004 (Eurostat, 2016). Concluding, it can be said that generally, the EU has made great progress regarding these objectives. However, whereas a number of member states within the European Union have made considerable progress, and have even already surpassed their national target imposed by the EU, a number of other countries are relatively lagging behind. The Netherlands is one of these countries, being among the greatest laggards throughout recent year, together with Malta and Luxembourg, as can be seen from figure 1 and 2 below.
Figure 1: Share of renewables in gross final energy consumption, 2014 and the legally binding targets for 2020 (Source: Eurostat, 2016).
Figure 2: Proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources, 2014 (% of gross electricity consumption) (Source: Eurostat, 2016)
In this research thesis, it will be focused on the lack of development of renewable energy sources in the Netherlands. The central focus in this thesis will be on what the dominant reasons are that it relatively lags behind on other EU/European countries. Under the EU’s Action Plan of 2007, the EC imposed on the Netherlands that it should reach a RE percentage of 14 % by 2020 (IEA, 2014). However, in 2016, only 5.9% of energy production came from renewables,
compared to 5.8% in 2015 and 5.5 % in 2014. From these percentages, it can not only be concluded that the Netherlands is fairly lagging behind, but that progression has ostensibly still been very slow throughout more recent years (ECN, 2016; Eurostat, 2017). Therefore, reaching the objective of 14 % in 2020 seems to be very unrealistic.
1.2. Objectives
As such, in this thesis, it will be explained what the main driving forces are that hinder adequate and efficient implementation of RE policies in the Netherlands. Therefore, the energy transition process should be outlined. In doing so, the main objective of this thesis will be to study the interaction between the public and private sector in the Netherlands, and how this interaction and the interests of both sides have hindered RE deployment and development. As such, one of the major objectives of this thesis is to analyze the roles and influence that actors have in the energy and energy policy implementation, in which actors are dominant in this process. Regarding the public sector, these are obviously the governmental actors: politicians, ministers and ministries. It will be investigated which actors within the political system have a relatively high influence on energy and RE policymaking, which actors have a lower degree of influence, and how this has affected RE promotion and development throughout the last fifteen years. Regarding the private sector, these are actors that have a dominant position within the energy sector, such as and among others, Shell, Gasunie, Gasterra, Eneco, RWE, Essent, E.ON, and Vattenfall. It will be investigated in what ways these corporations are hindering renewable energy development in the Netherlands.
Moreover, a connection with these interactions will be made to a number of overall RE policy measures in the Netherlands, focusing on the objective why these policy measures have not been effective, what their contribution has been to the failure of RE development, and what role the main interests of the public and private sector have had in the draft of these sub-optimal policy measures.
Concluding, via this research, I will try to answer the question how the lack of progress in RE development in the Netherlands can be explained from investigating politically and economically powerful actors, and their interaction with each other. The time frame of this research will be about fifteen years. This is due to the fact that the EU 2020 targets have been
established in 2007, but also that it takes often more than ten years for some policies to be adequately changed or implemented (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
1.3. Research question
From the introduction and objectives presented and outlined above, one can derive and establish the following research question:
What are the driving forces that hinder RE policy and development in the
Netherlands, and how and to what extent has the powerful energy industry in the Netherlands contributed to this backlog of successful RE policy implementation and development?
1.4. Delineation of research
In order to adequately answer the research question, special attention will be given to three dimensions. The first element is the actors, coalitions, their power and influence. The power and influence of these actors and coalitions are mapped, including their development throughout time. The second dimension is the rules, which provide a structure for policies and political actions thatdetermine and establish which norms are legitimate. As has been touched upon previously in the theoretical framework, a distinction is made between formal and informal rules, the formal ones being the legally agreed upon ones, and the informal ones the rules that reflect the dominant political culture. The third dimension is the policy discourse. Namely, in order to give purpose to and help solving policy problems, actors use policy discourses. A policy discourse can be defined as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (van Rooijen & van Wees, 2006: 61). A policy discourse includes the content of policy regarding norms, values and the particular content of paper and measures (ibid.). The policy discourse is analyzed through aiming at the following: What have been the dominant practices and concepts, and what have been the starting points and assumptions? And especially, how have the analyzed actors
interpreted these concepts? The elements that hinder RE development within these dimensions will be analyzed and identified, and it will also be investigated whether certain changes in policies in the Netherlands have occurred throughout the last fifteen years, regarding these three dimensions, and which have contributed to the hindrance of RE development in the Netherlands.
1.5. Social relevance
There are a number of reasons that explain why investigating the achievements and developments of renewable energy in the Netherlands – or better said the lack thereof – is highly relevant. Firstly, one obvious reason is that developing renewables is of key importance in tackling climate change, within the EU but also globally (IEA, 2015: 1). Even when there is no complete global consensus about what exactly causes climate change, there is absolutely no longer any doubt that climate change is occurring and that it has a correlation with rising GHG-emissions in the atmosphere. Moreover, climate change is considered to be among the highest global threats in the 21st century (Carle, 2015), possibly able to provoke floods, famines, massive migration and even wars. Therefore, finding solutions to hamper and restrict CO2-emissions and other greenhouse gas emissions is of paramount importance, and renewable energy is one of the solutions to reduce CO2-emissions.
Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, the energy demand worldwide is increasing, and will increase even more. In 2015, world population accounted for 7.3 billion, and the United Nations (2015) have predicted that by 2030 and 2050, world population is expected to be 8.5 and 9.2 billion respectively. Energy demand will increase dramatically, mainly due to this population increase but also due to enhanced economic standards in especially the highly populated East and Southeast Asian region. The increased demand will result in a rise in
consumption for all types of fuels. As introduced previously, due to the fact that the supply fossil fuels will become scarcer and fossil fuels will eventually become depleted, the function that renewables will play in the future will be a lot higher and the world needs to anticipate on this change, and is already doing so. As such, the EU will increasingly face the challenge to secure its energy supply, and renewables can play an important solution for this problem, especially in terms of electricity generation. This is why they have imposed the 2020 objectives on member states.
Thirdly, as already explained: the Dutch are fairly lagging behind in terms of their 2020 binding targets imposed by the EU – both regarding their own national target, but also relative to how far other EU countries are currently standing regarding their specific national target. Namely, of all the EU member states, only Malta and Luxemburg had a lower share of renewable energy within the European Union in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). These binding targets are
objectives that display a fundamental part in the common European energy program (European Commission, 2007: 13). The increasing relevance lies in the fact that the year 2020 is becoming nearer, and at this moment, it actually seems to be extremely doubtful and difficult for the Dutch to achieve their RE targets imposed by the EU. The coming period will be highly important regarding the fact whether the Netherlands is going to achieve its goals or not, and this explains why investigating developments in the past and the public-private interaction in the
Netherlands is of high relevance. Pressure from the EU is rising, and if binding targets are not met, it could be quite likely that the country will have to pay certain penalties. Lastly, it would just be very bad for the country’s reputation: a country that has always been generally well known for being advanced and ahead of other countries in a high degree of areas, is now being among the laggards in Europe.
Regarding domestic developments, it should be mentioned that contemporary gas production in the province of Groningen has been gradually decreasing throughout the last years due to the dangers of earthquakes in that area. Namely, in 2016, gas detraction decreased with 25% compared to 2015 (CBS, 2016). If gas reserves decrease, this implies that energy supply needs to come from other directions. The Dutch Bureau of Statistics has shown that in 2015, the Netherlands became a net gas importer for the duration of several months. This is noteworthy due to the fact that since the exploration of natural gas in the Netherlands, the country had always been a net exporter, so this was the first time it occurred that the
Netherlands briefly became a net gas importer. Between 2010 and 2015, imports from Russia have doubled and imports from Norway have increased with 50% (ibid.). Concluding, increasing dependency on other actors implies that it is important to explore new means and methods to retrieve and generate energy and electricity, and renewables is one of the solutions. Moreover, the EU has the overall objective to become less dependent on other actors, such as Russia, regarding their energy supply, so it is needless to emphasize why it is relevant to investigate renewable energy development in the Netherlands.
For a long time, it has been economically unfeasible to prefer renewable electricity generation over fossil fuels, and RE was generally just not competitive compared to fossil fuels and it was more expensive to generate electricity from renewables than from fossil fuels.
However, renewable energy is subject to manufacturing economics, where all products decrease in cost the more is produced, whereas fossil fuels are resource oriented rather than
manufacturing oriented. Throughout the last years, these curves have been crossing, and right now the world is experiencing a tipping point where electricity generation from renewables – especially solar but also wind energy - is becoming more cost-efficient compared to fossil-fuel generation (Tegenlicht, 2016). As a consequence, in an increasing number of regions and
countries it has become cheaper to derive electricity from renewables than from fossil fuels. The documentaries made by Tegenlicht (2016) explains how the Dubai Electricity and Water
Authority (DEWA) has achieved to generate electricity from solar cells at a lower rate
($0.058/kWh; previously solar costs were about $0.015/kWh) than that it is able to generate electricity from gas; this was an unsubsidized project and therefore it has been shown that solar
energy production has become cost-competitive on its own.3 Concluding, it is possible for some countries to generate electricity from RE in a cheaper way than fossil fuel generated electricity. Also in Australia, Chili, Italy, Jordan and the U.S. state California, and recently even in India, it has become more efficient to generate electricity from solar cells than from fossil fuels at some places, and it is expected that more countries and regions will follow. Deutsche Bank (in
Tegenlicht: 2016) expects that solar energy will become cheaper than gas of coal in about 80% of the world within the next years. The example and trend explained above is used as an illustration that it is economically possible, lucrative, and efficient to generate electricity from RE as the cheapest option domestically; and that electricity generated from renewables will become more and more competitive in a high number of places globally; solar and wind costs have dropped by 80% and 50% respectively throughout the last five years (ibid.). From this development, it can therefore be argued that if the Netherland keeps ‘lagging behind’ in the development of renewable energy – focusing predominantly on fossil fuels – it could eventually result into a loss of competitiveness for the Dutch economy and industry, which might even risk becoming relatively inefficient.
1.6. Literature review & scientific relevance
Much literature has been written about the incentives of RE as well as RE policy implementation and the transition on the overall EU level, but also on the level of individual member states, among which the Netherlands. This research thesis will focus on RE policy and the stakeholders that influence policy and policy change in the Netherlands. Below, it will be explained why this research is useful within the wider scholarly debate and perspective of RE policy implementation, RE incentives and energy transition in general.
Rotmans et al. (2000) define a transition as a structural societal adjustment that is the result of interacting and reinforcing developments in the field of economics, technology, institutions, culture, nature and environment. This transition can be consciously directed and managed by different actors. Actors can determine certain outcomes by mobilizing resources, which can stimulate or hinder the transition. However, he argues that due to insufficient knowledge, support or embedding in the system, a substantially high degree of resistance can arise in the system, in such a way that the system innovation development pathway can be hindered or blocked. Even worse, a transition can even be reversed and ultimately collapse (Rotmans et al., 2005: 30).
This also implies that concerning an energy transition towards a higher share of renewable energy in the total energy mix, only with the right interaction between institutions, economy and technology, the transition can come into being and advance successfully.
Substantial literature on sustainability transitions has been developed in order to investigate the transformation of socio-technical systems – including institutions, industrial sectors,
infrastructures, technologies, and user behaviors – regarding environmental sustainability. The existing literature recognizes that governing and steering sustainability transitions is a political endeavor in which the directions and the means are frequently highly disputed (Walker & Shove, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2009; Kivimaa & Kern, 2016: 207).Different governments respond to and engage with the challenges of advancing sustainability transitions in a high variety of ways, which ultimately also leads to very different and sometimes unexpected outcomes (Kern, 2011). Moreover, not all policy measures are efficient and implementable in all countries and political contexts, due to their political, legislative, societal and geographic differences (Heiskanen et al., 2009 in Kivimaa & Kern, 2016: 206). Additionally, choices between several alternative technological pathways include struggles and clashes among competing commercial actors, and this spills over into conflicts regarding regulation (Meadowcraft, 2011: 71).
Governments and politicians are definitely preoccupied with anticipating on and managing the consequences of rising and declining industries, and their influence on the national economy. Therefore, the resulting policy mixes are usually political compromises. Obviously, the policy measures that derive as a result from these compromises are frequently not the most efficient and strongest policies regarding RE implementation, as will be argued in this thesis.
Additionally, Kern & Smith (2008: 4102) argue that steering system innovations in the field of energy can be politically difficult, and that scholars sometimes overestimate the role that a government can play in energy transition. Namely, they argue: “the transition debates so far have been overly optimistic about the role of governments in system innovations while
neglecting the realities of policy formulation and implementation which is essentially a political process, not a managerial task” (idem: 4101). They argue that from the Dutch energy transition endeavors and their transition projects, it can be derived that a legitimacy and power base for structural change is highly absent. Namely, the existing political coalitions and policy
arrangements do not easily give way to new institutional procedures and routine. They explain this by the fact that the dominance of market actors and the dominant objective of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to establish new energy business generated a focus on technological innovation on the supply side instead of a focus on institutional or social adjustments (idem: 4099). Moreover, the projects show that, even though ambitious goals and innovative policy approaches are established, existing socio-technical arrangements and organizational procedures can pose a large obstacle for sustainable system innovations. Therefore, these aspects of power and organizational routines seem to be of major importance in the hindrance of energy transition developments in Dutch policies and politics. This provokes the question to what extent public actors do really have the power to cause a policy change, and whether and to
what extent the dominant incumbents are able to exert pressure on the government to hinder policy change; especially if also institutional failures exist.
In fact, a high degree of literature exists regarding the specific types of RE sources – predominantly wind, solar, biomass – that has been developed throughout the past decades in the Netherlands. In other words, most of the literature does not look at the overall reasons of failures of RE development in the Netherlands. Additionally, most literature does not focus on the reasons why the Netherlands lags behind; what the exact political reason is why energy policies seem to be of moderate success, and why the country consequentially lags behind comparing to other EU countries.
Lastly it must be argued that literature on the last number of years and related to the topic of the research thesis is slightly scarcer, so this is where the research gap occurs and where this thesis can contribute to the existing knowledge and literature. Therefore, this thesis can be considered as an ‘updated’ explanation of the Dutch backlog. In light of the 2020
objectives becoming nearer, this research is therefore socially but also scientifically relevant. As has been mentioned previously, in this thesis, it will be especially focused on the actors, the coalitions, rules and policy discourses that have been developed and occurred throughout the years.
Chapter 2: Theoretical and conceptual framework
2.1. Introduction
In order to appropriately conduct research, the research question should be analyzed within a theoretical and conceptual framework, in such a way that these theories and concepts help contribute solving the puzzle of which political and market determinants cause the Dutch backlog in RE development. Due to the fact that the focus will be on the actors in power that are expect to hinder RE development in the Netherlands, it is chosen to apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework in this thesis. Moreover, in order to appropriately explain why RE development has been hindered in the Netherlands throughout the last ten till fifteen years, the concept of
innovation systems failures needs to be applied as well; this framework basically categorizes all systemic failures that can occur in innovation development and is therefore very relevant for a thesis that focuses on failures and a backlog in innovation.
2.2. Advocacy Coalition Framework
Persistent questions in public policy include problems of belief, learning, policy change, and the function of technical and scientific information in policymaking. Each of these problems operate in complicated, interdependent political environments in which hundreds of
shareholders interact with each other in the context of established institutional settings, unequal power relations, and ambiguous technical and scientific information about problems and
alternatives(Weible, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009: 121). In order to simplify the complexity of public policy, and to make sense of complicated policy-making systems, one policy process framework that has been developed is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). The ACF has been established bySabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1988) as a system-based model that incorporates most of the phases of the policy cycle, integrates aspects of both the bottom-up and top-down approaches to implementation studies, and puts technical and scientific information in a core position in a high number of its hypotheses.
The ACF conceptualizes policy change over time and suggests that governmental programs are unlikely to change as long as the dominating actors and coalitions, established in institutional programs, remain in power. Basically, the theory conceptualizes the obstructions for policy change in certain subsystems that are subjected to a market-focused system. For this thesis, it means that the framework can be used as a concept to investigate the power that dominant stakeholders within both the public and market sector have on Dutch policymaking, obstructing efficient policy change in favor of RE promotion and development. Below, the concept will be described and explained, and a specific focus will be given on the belief systems of the ACF.
Actors are institutions or organizations that function within a specific policy domain, for instance the energy sector. The definition ‘coalition’ is used in order to indicate the interaction between actors (van Rooijen & van Wees, 2006: 61). A coalition is perceived as a group of actors that approximately share the same policy programs and goals, and these common objectives shape the basis for their shared involvement in the policy process. The influence and power possessed by actors is defined by their relationship, specifically their mutual dependency and the distribution of resources among the various actors (ibid.). Resources can have the form in several ways, such as financial means, knowledge and expertise, media access, etc. Moreover, the distribution of these resources indicates the relative power of actors at several stages in the policy process.
According to Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1988), the ACF’s causal logic and resulting hypotheses build from a series of assumptions. These are: 1) a time prospect of ten years or more in order to understand policy change; 2) a key role of technical and scientific information in policy procedures; 3) policy subsystems as the major component of analysis; 4) a wide-ranging set of subsystem actors that include officials from all levels of government, market actors, consultants, scientists and members of the media; and 5) the viewpoint that public policies and programs are best perceived as translations of beliefs, and therefore can be conceptualized as belief systems (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 118-20).
Among the assumptions, the ACF specifically emphasizes beliefs as the causal driver for political behavior. Namely, the theory argues that policy change is generated via the coordinated action of a wide variety of actors within the same belief system. As a result, a three-tiered model of a belief system for its actors has been developed (Weible, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009: 122). The three structural categories in the ACF’s belief system are the deep core beliefs, the policy core
beliefs, and the secondary beliefs. The higher the level in the hierarchy, the more resistant the
beliefs are to change from learning and external influences. The several levels will be introduced and explained below.
At the top of the belief system, one can find the deep core beliefs. These are the deepest and most stable among the beliefs, and they are generally normative and even ontological. For example,liberal and conservative beliefs can be classified as such beliefs, and relative concern for the wellbeing of current versus future generations as well (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). Within this category, one has the tendency to seek for information that supports these beliefs, meanwhile also ignoring conflicting information. It is important to highlight that deep core beliefs span a high degree of policy domains and are the least receptive to change in light of empirical evidence: as Sabatier (1993: 31, 36) puts it: they are “akin to a religious conversion”. The strong conviction of liberalization and neo-liberal beliefs – i.e. energy should be fairly left to
the market – can also be considered to be among the deep core beliefs that are very resistant to change within a subsystem.
In the middle of the belief system hierarchy, one can find the policy core beliefs, which comprise the geographic and substantive breadth of a policy subsystem – in the case of this thesis the Netherlands and the energy sector respectively. Policy core beliefs display the normative preferences and causal perceptions throughoutthe policy subsystem and presenta framework to prioritize fundamental values. This is for example weighing the importance of sustainability standards against economic advancement in specific policy directions and supportingnumerous strategies for incorporating the deep core values at the top of the hierarchical policy subsystem – e.g. neoliberal beliefs(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Categories of policy core beliefs that the ACF identifies are, among others, orientation on fundamental value priorities directly linked to the policy subsystem, the efficiency of policy tools, and the appropriate distribution of authority between the government and the market, outlined by rules, laws and institutions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999).Moreover, the
subsystem specificity of policy core beliefs causes them to be perfect for establishing coalitions and coordinating activities among other actors of the same subsystem (Weible, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009: 122). Therefore, the policy core beliefs can be considered as the foundation for the formation of coalition. It must be argued that also policy core beliefs are quite resistant to change, however they are more likely than deep core beliefs to adjust in response to rebuttal and verification from new information and experiences. Namely, in addition to normative and
ontological elements, they also include empirical elements (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Weible et al., 2009).
Lastly, at the bottom of ACF’s belief system, one can find the secondary beliefs. When comparing secondary beliefs with policy core beliefs, the secondary beliefs are more
geographically and substantively narrow in scope, and also more empirically based. These are empirical beliefs and policy preferences that can be connected to a subcomponent of a policy subsystem – either substantively or geographically (Weible & Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). Moreover, within the beliefs system, these are most inclined to change over time when new information is gathered and processed, or when new events have occurred. Secondary beliefs contain policy participants’ preferences for particular government measures for attaining goals or their understandings of issues in specific areas. Examples of secondary beliefs are detailed rules and budgetary decisions. This can for example also be specific obligatory policy proposals regarding RE development, or policy proposals that are not obligatory at all as this could risk the prosperity of fossil-fuel favoring companies.
Figure 3: The 2007 Advocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram (Source: Sabatier & Weible, 2007)
In figure 3 above, one can see the 2007 Advocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram established by Sabatier & Weible (2007). Basically, the model provides a comprehensive overview of the ACF and characterizes how and in what ways the policy subsystem is located within the broader structure of socio-cultural values and institutional norms and rules. As already indicated, the ACF identifies subsystems as the main unit of analysis as political systems comprise of a high number of topics over large geographical areas that force actors to specialize in a topic and geographical setting in order to comprehend its complicatedness and in order to be persuasive in generating change. Subsystems are not unchangeable to external impacts, and figure 3 demonstrates that subsystems function within a wider political environment delineated by relatively stable parameters and external events, and restricted by long-term coalition opportunity structures, short-term constraints and resources of subsystem actors, and other policy subsystem circumstances and events (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009: 123).
So from the diagram, one can see that the policy making predominantly occurs on the right side of the ‘policy subsystem’. Within the policy subsystem, one can see that different coalitions behave in accordance with their policy beliefs. With their available resources and power, they can influence governmental decisions. The subsequent policy output and policy impacts will have an effect on the coalition’s policy beliefs and resources. As can also be seen
from the flow diagram, a number of other factors can also influence the policy subsystem and provoke policy change. These are ‘external (system) events’, ‘long-term coalition opportunity structures’, ‘relatively stable parameters’, and ‘long-term coalition opportunity structures’. The elements can all influence each other, which can either reinforce a policy belief and outcome, but it can also result in different policy outcomes. For this thesis, the ACF will be useful in order to identify the main coalition actors – and their resources and power - that have hindered RE development in the Netherlands and obstructed the development of a real RE sector.
So how can certain policies actually be changed? From the explanation given in the paragraphs above, it has become clear that to generate a certain transition in policy, a certain breakthrough has to be established in order to adjust the powerful advocacy coalition within the specific area of interest. Following the ACF, this adjustment can take place via two ways. The first way is that the ideas and beliefs of individual players within a coalition could be adjusted by means of policy-oriented learning. As has been touched upon previously, due to the fact that it is a very resistant process to change deep core and policy corebeliefs as a response to new
information, it could last ten years or maybe even more before policy-oriented learning takes place. Additionally, it is said that policy-oriented learning may have minimal outcome, according to Sabatier & Weible (2009). Secondly, if a substantial change comes into being, it is most probable that this will occur as a consequence of external shocks or disruptions, as has been shown in the picture. These external shocks can include, among others, changes in
socioeconomic conditions, public opinion about environmental concerns, impacts from other subsystems, or a specific disaster (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Frequently, a combination of elements can only provoke an external shock.
For example, one could argue that the so-called German Energiewende was partly the result of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, which compelled Chancellor Angela Merkel to totally abolish all nuclear plans and pursue an ambitious green development – the external effect caused a rapid change in public opinion, but it also gave the German Green Party a high degree of credibility; policy core beliefs and maybe even deep core beliefs were suddenly changed, and it can be argued that Angela Merkel was compelled to pursue this policy if she wanted to remain in power (Duyvenstein, 2011). In any case, one could conclude that an external event will generate a redistribution of resources and power that give the opportunity for the displacement or redistribution of power possessed by the dominant coalition to a less powerful coalition. However, it can also imply that the dominant coalition obtains changed deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs due to external events. Both developments would eventually lead to policy change.
Concluding, as has already been mentioned previously, the framework can be applied for investigating the power of dominant stakeholders within the market sector, and the interaction
they have with Dutch policymakers. It is expected that the Dutch market-oriented policy arrangement of the RE policy subsystem gives the dominant (pro-fossil fuel) stakeholders a strong position, which is expected to strongly influence the disappointing RE results in the Netherlands. Complementary to this framework, in the next section, it will be explained which characteristics influence the lack of success in RE developments and initiatives, by means of the innovation system failures framework. From this concept, it will be outlined in what ways dominant coalitions outlined in the ACF can have a negative influence on the success of RE development, in addition to a number of other failures that will later be identified as problems in the RE development of the Netherlands. Therefore, the ACF and the concept of innovation
system failures are complementary to each other and both contribute to answering the research question of this thesis.
2.3. Innovation system failures
2.3.1. Introduction
Technological innovation systems (TIS) theoryis a valuable heuristic framework that applies a high number of concepts for the analysis of the achievements and failure of a technology on the base of the performance of the surrounding technological system. It is constructed to investigate the emergence of new technologies and the establishment of technology-specific innovation systems around them, and specifically to identify “system weaknesses that should be tackled by public policy” (Jacobsson & Bergek in Kivimaa & Kern, 2016: 207). It identifies the most important structural elements of a technical innovation system (e.g. institutions, actors, infrastructures and interactions) and the most important functions of such a system (e.g. knowledge development and diffusion, entrepreneurial activity, the
formation of advocacy coalitions, market formation, resource mobilization, expectations and goal formation) (Twomey & Gaziulusoy, 2014: 1).
As a consequence, this concept outlines what drives, but also what hinders developments of RES and RETs. For this thesis, it is obviously relevant to conceptualize, categorize and explain which typical systemic problems and forces hamper the development and spread of RE as the focus is on the hindering elements of RE development. Negro, Alkemade & Hekkert (2012) and Klein Woolthuis, Lankhuizen & Gilsing (2005) introduced the innovation system failures framework based on technical innovation systems theory, and they emphasize that a high number of systemic failures could occur that restrict the development and diffusion of
innovations. From their viewpoint, the direction, pace and success of innovation processes are heavily affected by the environment in which innovations are developed, and if the
circumstances are not optimal, the pace and spread of innovation will be slowed down or halted. These circumstances are identified as different categories of problems.
In this section, the common theoretical categories of system failures in innovation systems – also labeled as systemic problems - will be introduced and linked to more particular problems experienced in the diffusion of RETs and the transformation of the energy system. Especially the market structure problems and the hard and soft institutional problems will later be identified as having been problematic in the Dutch energy system, however all categories will be explained in order to give a comprehensive overview of the framework.
2.3.2. Market structure problems
The first category that can be identified is market structure problems. Regarding market structure problems, a new technology or alternative could suffer from rivaling incumbent substitutes that have experienced a process of increasing returns (Artur in Negro et al., 2012: 3838). As a consequence, the new product is usually associated with a high price due to a lack of scale and experience economies. Moreover, the new product can be associated with a low degree of utility, such as weak performance, a lack of infrastructure and/or network externalities. In case the gap is very broad,it can occur that a new technology will never have the possibility to restore such initial disadvantages. Moreover, selection procedures within the market may not include a ‘free’ choice by purchasers, in case powerful incumbents control the market (Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000). Regarding renewable energy, RETs and their companies frequently
experience a hard time to break through in the energy market that is controlled by fossil fuel technologies, the latter one experiencing the advantages of economies of scale,
socio-institutional embedding and having experienced long times of technological learning. This has caused the incumbent substitutes to be efficient, cheap, produced in large sums and excellently aligned to customers, institutions and corporation preferences. When investigating the
suitability of alternative energy technologies, these technologies are mirrored to the
technological features of fossil fuels. In other words, the same heuristics are applied even though they are technologically very different. The powerful incumbent corporations play – whether it is intentional or not – a very problematic role in this as well. Later, it will be argued that this is sometimes definitely the case in the energy market dominated by fossil fuel technologies and incumbents, and it will be shown that this dominance has been a problematic occurrence for RE development in the Netherlands throughout the last ten till fifteen years.
One market structure related problem is the incompatible combination of RETs with the paradigm of centralized large-scale generation. For example, focusing too early on the
development of large-scale wind turbines has proven to generate unreliable technology, weak technological designs, and consequently a problematic spread of the specific technology (Negro, Alkemade & Hekkert, 2012: 3841). An additional classic problem for RETs in the market
suits the contemporary energy system best. By itself, this is not a problem,except for the fact that such technologies decrease the chance of success for more radical and long-term
alternatives (idem: 3842). In a high number of cases, near-market and incremental innovation technologies are favored and supported by policy by the incumbent actors and long-established energy utilities. An example of this is co-firing with biomass; a technique the Netherlands has increasingly pursued in order to reach their 2020 goals in time. The last market structure related problem is the negative stance and strategy of incumbent corporations towards
renewable energy. This strategy can be summed up as increasing expectations from the public and politicians concerning the significant role that incumbent firms can have in the sustainable energy transition, whereas in reality actually very little activities are pursued within this area.It is clear that within the energy sector, the incumbent actors, institutions and technologies are extremely powerful and also well organized (Polzin, 2015: 99). Incumbents exert their power by either being reluctant towards endorsing new technologies, or intentionally pursuing to hinder the advancement of new technologies (Bergek, Jacobsson & Sanden in Negro et al., 2012). For example, an incumbent could buy up independent developers, in such a way that the new
technology does not form a threat to their main businesses.The behavior of incumbent firms can rationally be explained, given the interests of incumbents in the modern energy system. Due to the fact that policy makers grant a large degree of influence to those incumbents when designing renewable energy policies, this can be very disadvantageous for the development of new
technologies. In any case, it can be concluded that especially market structure problems are an important element in explaining the Dutch backlog, as has been told before and will be analyzed with empirics later.
2.3.3. Institutional problems (hard and soft)
The second category of problems that can hinder the development of RE is the category of institutional problems. Institutions form an essential determinant in innovation systems theory, and institutional problems address the institutional mechanisms that might hamper innovation. Generally, these institutions can be conceptualized as the selection environment in which knowledge institutes, companies and also the government are embedded (Klein
Woolthuis, Lankhuizen & Gilsing: 2005). A distinction can be made between hard and soft institutions. These will be explained elaborately in the next paragraphs.
On the one hand, hard institutions include the formal, written, deliberately established institutions, such as technical guidelines, risk management standards, labor law, etc. One of the hard institutional problems relates to the so-called ‘Stop and go’-policies (Negro, Hekkert & Alkemade, 2012: 3842). These policies can be considered as very volatile and unstable
however the actual implementation is frequently postponed, or the implemented subsidy scheme has shorter time periods or lower tariffs than has been agreed upon beforehand (Negro et al., 2012: 3840). This obviously creates an uncertain and extremely inconsistent policy
environment, which makes possible investors and entrepreneurs risk averse to actually invest in RETs. As a result, this weakens the position of policy makers and the government regarding reliability, and it negatively affects both current and future RETs trajectories. Another hard institutional phenomenon that Negro et al. (2012) identify is the attention shift of politicians regarding a technology or its context of application. In other words, policy attention is
considered quite unstable due to changes in political priorities and societal problems. Changing priorities and focuses can lead to a decline of attention and support for certain RETs. Lastly,
misalignment between various levels of government can occur, which can hamper the diffusion
and development of a certain technology. For example, regional governments could be motivated to stimulate local activities and enterprises with subsidies and tax exemptions, whereas on the national level the government could actually hamper the advancement and diffusion of those technologies by halting certain national subsidy programs or publicly declaring to not support such technologies. The last hard institutional issue is the shortage of institutional help during the so-called ‘valley of death’. This is the period in the technology life cycle right before introduction to the market. During this period, high uncertainties regarding market achievements are linked to high investment costs for developing production capacity. Problems that could occur regarding this phenomenon are for example that extensive budgets of R&D are offered but that there are basically no instruments disposable for large-scale tests and premature market formation. As a consequence, a high number of RETs are stuck or even stranded during the R&D or premature demonstrationphase, incapable of proceeding to pre-commercial tests.For example, countries such as Austria, Germany and Denmark have been successful in these practices as they preserved a consistent feed-in system over a longer era which has led to large-scale implementation and developments of RETs such as wind energy, PV and biomass. In the Netherlands, this however appeared to be problematic for the same types of renewable energy, and the main Dutch problem has been consistency policy measures in the feed-in tariffs, which will be outlined more elaborately in the analysis (Lipp, 2007; Negro et al., 2012).
On the other hand, there are also the soft institutions. These include the informal, often developed spontaneously, and implicit ‘rules of the game’. These can be for example the legitimacy of a new technology, culture, social norms and values, the readiness to share resources with different actors, tendencies to trust, risk averseness and the entrepreneurial spirit within industries, organizations, regions and countries (Negro, Alkemade, & Hekkert, 2012: 3838). Especially legitimacy can be considered as a good and important example of soft
institutions. “Legitimacy is a matter of social acceptance and compliance with relevant institutions, and for new technologies gaining legitimacy is often a slow and tedious process” (Bergek, Jacobsson & Sanden in Negro et al., 2012: 3842). Due to the fact that frequently,
existing institutions are inclined to block the advancement of new technological alternatives, it is of paramount importance to gain legitimacy so that resources can be mobilized, and to gain political power to have an impact on the institutional environment. Obviously, politicians and dominant companies have a high degree of power to (de-) legitimize a technology according to their interests, however also inhabitants, environmental groups and the media can (de-)
legitimize a certain technology according to their interests. It must be argued that legitimacy as a soft institutional element can also be considered as one of the normative values outlined in the ACF, as a deep core belief and policy core belief. This will be outlined more elaborately in the analysis.
In the above two sections, the market structures and the institutional problems have been outlined under the innovation system framework. It is clear that, in a liberalized economy, state-market systems such as the energy system are entrenched in institutional settings. Even though institutions are predominantly established in order to facilitate and coordinate activities, they also approve and strengthen the power of the concerned laws, rules and actors. It is
expected that especially these two categories – institutions and market structures - are important elements in explaining the backlog of RE development in the Netherlands – in addition to the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Nevertheless, a number of other categories within the system failure framework should be described and explained as well, as they
comprise a substantial part of the framework itself, and a number of Dutch problems within RE development can also be identified under these categories – even though it might not be the main argument of this thesis.
2.3.4. Infrastructure problems
Another category of systemic problems in innovation systems is infrastructure problems. Obviously, for corporations to function effectively and efficiently, they need a reliable and solid infrastructure in order to enable daily activities and support their long-term advancements. A distinction can be made between physical and knowledge infrastructure. On the one hand, physical infrastructures involves the technical arrangements required for a society to operate such as natural gas grids, highway systems, electricity grids, and high-speed ICT infrastructure. Concerning RETs, different and specialized infrastructure is required compared to the current gas, gasoline and electricity infrastructure. Physical infrastructure failures can occur due to absence of the required infrastructure, or due to denied entry to the current infrastructure (Negro et al., 2012: 3844). The latter one mentioned has happened in the past with the
accessibility of biogas to the general gas infrastructure in the Netherlands, however throughout the recent decade this does not seem to be a high problem anymore (ibid.).
2.3.5. Interaction problems (strong and weak)
Another identified category is the category of interaction problems. Interactions include relationships with firms, but it also includes the interaction with for example public knowledge institutes, the government, and several third parties, among which specialized consultants. By connecting various actors and facilitating flows of knowledge and expertise, progression and acceleration of the technical development occurs, as well as reduction of uncertainty and
enhancement of understanding among actors. However, too weak or too strong interactions can be problematic for the diffusion of RETs, and they can both generate a lock-in. Specific problems will be outline briefly now.
Strong interaction problems exist within a structure when individual actors are led in the wrong direction by network actors and as a consequence fail to provide each other with the appropriate and necessary knowledge. Moreover, strong interaction problems occur when the network is too exclusive and when actors become unwilling to leave the group or to grant access to new participants. Moreover, actors could be ‘locked into’ their relationship because of
switching costs, resource specificity, or because of no availability of alternative partners. Weak network failures or weak interaction problems exist when the connectivity among
complementary actors and technologies is weak. As a consequence, productive phases of learning, adjustment to novel technological advancements and innovations are hindered. Additionally, in case certain institutions in a system cooperate insufficiently, this could generate a lack of joint vision of future technology advancements, which in turn may impede the
coordination of research endeavors and investment (ibid.).
2.3.6. Capability problems
The last category of failure in the innovation systems theory is capability problems. Namely, corporations can simply miss the capabilities or resources to be able to make the transition from and old to a modern technology or paradigm (Klein Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 2005: 614). Concerning search processes, companies both rely on and build upon their existing knowledge base and other resources when they seek new opportunities. As a
consequence, they might be ignorant of certain opportunities at a further distance. In other words, their viewpoint could be limited (Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000). Lack of capabilities occurs among all players within an innovation system, and it can generally manifest itself in a variety of ways. These can be, for instance, a lack of capacity of entrepreneurs to collectively work out a realistic and coherent message and to efficiently lobby to the government; the lack of
technological expertise of both engineers and policymakers; lack of skillful personnel; and a lack of ability by consumers for formulating demand.
2.3.7. Conclusion innovation system failures
After having outlined and categorized all the various problems that generally occur in a (technical) innovation system, it has been clear that a wide variety of problems can occur that restrict the development of renewable energy. As explained earlier, even though my argument is that the dominant energy incumbents plus the market-centered setting of the energy market in the Netherlands are the most important reasons for why the Netherlands is lagging behind in its development of RE, there are a number of other issues identified in the primary and secondary data that I consider to be of influence as well, and that can be connected to the ACF to a certain extent as well – especially the market structured and institutional problems. The innovation system failures framework that I outlined above will therefore be complementary in adequately answering the research question of this thesis. Lastly, it has to be mentioned that the various systemic problems outlined above are not (always) independent problems from each other. Obviously, it can occur that malfunctioning parts of the system generate and reinforce other parts of the socio-technical innovation system. For instance, institutional problems can be reinforced by problematic knowledge infrastructures and too strong and too weak interactions among the different actors group within a socio-technical innovation system.In the thesis, it will be attempted to identify and connect these problems with each other, in order to adequately and accurately explain the Dutch backlog in RE development.
2.4. Connecting theories and concepts and derived hypothesis
Connecting both the ACF and the TIS-failure framework with each other, one overall observation has been that that both frameworks emphasize the importance of dominant actors and coalitions within the policy subsystems that they find themselves in; these actors and coalitions have the power to obstruct policy change according to their interests, and
consequentially also innovation if this is against their core interests and beliefs. Therefore, in this research, the power of actors and coalitions can be considered as the independent variables of this research, and the dependent variable the degree of RE development and achievements in the Netherlands. As such, the following hypothesis has been derived that will be attempted to answer in this research thesis:
The power of the pro fossil-fuel economic actors in Dutch policymaking has
contributed to the backlog and slowness of RE development in the
3. Research methods
In order to answer the research question and the hypothesis, data will be obtained via desk-research, in which both primary and secondary sources will be analyzed. This research can be classified as a single-case study based on qualitative analysis. Namely, qualitative data need to be used in order to assess and evaluate the policies toward renewable energy, and in order to assess the orientation of the Dutch government and to assess the force that the economic components exert on national politics and policies.
In order to guarantee validity of the research, the sources and literature used will derive from a diversity of sources, such as books, journals, institutions, and sources from the
government. Articles in the following peer-reviewed journals will be useful for this research thesis: Energy Policy, Energy Research & Social Science, Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews,
Energy, Technical Forecasting & Social Change. Moreover, publications by IEA, CBS, ECN, Eurostat,
the European Commission and the Government of the Netherlands will be used.
It has been chosen for a single-case study, due to the fact that the main focus is really specifically on the slow development of RE production in the Netherlands. As already stated in the literature review, every country has a different political, legislative, societal and
geographical makeup. In case I would have attempted to answer this question through a comparative case study, the research would risk to become too extensive of scope, digressive, and most importantly, a higher degree of factors would have to be included as I would also have to explain the success of the country/countries of comparison. This would maybe even force me to investigate factors that are irrelevant in explaining the Dutch backlog. Nevertheless, it should be argued that a comparative-case study could definitely add value compared to a single-case study, however the scope and extent of this research thesis is too limited to conduct such research adequately.
Lastly, as already stated, the time frame under study will be roughly the past fifteen years. The predominant reason for this is that the ACF focuses on development/change over “a decade or more” to allow for an entire policy course (Cairney & Sabatier, 2014: 485). Namely, coalitions interact with each other; decisions are taken; institutions are established, reinforced or changed; the effects of policy outputs are assessed and evaluated; and the information is understood differently by each coalition that learned from earlier decisions.An additional reason for having decided to study approximately the last fifteen years, is the fact that the liberalization of the Dutch energy market was put into place at the beginning of this century, and it will be argued that this development has been one of the overall dominant explanations for the Dutch backlog in RE development.
4. Analysis
4.1. Structure of the analysis part
In the first part of the analysis section, the current energy situation of the Netherlands will be explained, in order to give a comprehensive overview that can serve as background information for later sections. Afterwards, the importance of liberalization in the Dutch energy sector will be outlined. Subsequently, it will be zoomed in on the specific actors that have an influence on the energy in the Netherlands; both the public and private sector will be
introduced, and it will be explained how these actors have contributed to the hindrance of RE development in the Netherlands throughout the past fifteen years. Moreover, the importance of the energy sector for the Dutch industry will be outlined throughout the analysis. Both from the public sector and the private sector side, by help of some examples, the actors’ and coalition’s power on energy policymaking will be outlined, and by these means their interaction with each other will also be made clear. Lastly, the general policy measures that the Dutch government has taken throughout the years will be explained, with a specific focus on their inconsistency.
Throughout the analysis, connections will be made with the descriptions outlined in the theoretical framework, and these connections and references will be repeated in the overall conclusions.
4.2. Energy situation of the Netherlands
4.2.1. Introduction
The Netherlands has an open, liberalized and advanced market economy, and currently the country has a population of 17.127 million people, which makes it comprise 3.3 % of the total European population (CBS, 2017; IEA, 2017). Moreover, its country size is 34,000 km2, and its population density was 504 inhabitants per square kilometer in 2016 (CBS, 2017), which is considerably high. Within Europe, only Malta, Monaco and the Vatican are more densely
populated. Additionally, even though overall population growth in the Netherlands is decreasing – from 1.5% in 1990 to 0.6% in 2016 – the amount of households and single-person houses is actually increasing (IEA, 2014: 17; CBS, 2017). The high density of the Netherlands heavily impacts the spatial planning and land use in the Netherlands, among which its energy infrastructure.
4.2.2. Energy production & consumption in the Netherlands
In 2012, total primary energy consumption in the Netherlands accounted for 78.6 Mtoe (idem: 17).4 Natural gas accounted for 41.7% of energy in 2012, oil 39.4% and coal 10.4%. In the same year, renewables accounted for less than 6% of total supply, made up of biofuels and waste
4Unfortunately, not all data sites update a report with statistics every year – the latest report from the IEA on the Netherlands is from 2014, with outlining data from 2012. It is attempted to complement these data with more recent developments.
(4.7 of TPES), wind (0.5%) and solar (0.1%) (ibid). Moreover, nuclear energy made up 1.3% of TPES. Due to the country’s very low height differences, the significance of hydropower is extremely marginal and contributes to nothing more than 0.01% of total energy. Regarding national production, more than 80% of the supplied energy in the Netherlands is produced domestically, with overall energy production reaching 64.7 Mtoe in 2012. Of this locally produced energy, natural gas accounts for 88.8%, biofuels and waste about 6.1% and oil 2.8%. On the other hand, nuclear, solar, wind and geothermal energy combined account for
approximately 2% (IEA, 2014: 19). Furthermore, the country still exports a large amount of natural gas. Lastly, large amounts of oil are imported due to the fact that the country has only a very limited amount of oil production.
The Dutch energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, which represented over 90% of TPES in 2012 (IEA, 2014: 19). Therefore, the energy sector in the Netherlands, accounting for 10.9% of Dutch GDP, strongly defines the domestic emission profile (IEA, 2014). Despite the substantial improvements in decoupling emissions from economic prosperity and industrial energy
efficiency, the Netherlands continues to be one of the most CO2- and fossil fuel-intensive economies among the IEA member states, as can be seen in figure 4 below. The percentage of fossil fuels in the total energy mix is higher than 90%, connected to its use in industry (iron and steel, petrochemical, agriculture and horticulture) and in transport (IEA, 2014: 10). Moreover, there is a tendency in industry to use oil and oil products, in such a way also increasing CO2 emissions.
Furthermore, due to the fact that the Netherlands has a strategic geographic position in Europe, the country is a very important trade and transit hub for natural gas, oil, coal and electricity (IEA, 2014: 18). By means of the Gasrotonde, the country even attempts to increase its importance within the gas infrastructure in Western Europe (Heilbronn et al., 2013a). Moreover, the Dutch state is involved with the production of natural gas and its exports; it earns 11 billion euros a year from natural gas (Heilbronn et al., 2013a). Additionally, Dutch corporations play a significant role in oil refineries. Namely, the country has competitive oil refining, and
petrochemical industries, and has leveraged investment in energy infrastructure amenities, such as ports, efficient industrial processes and modern power plants, and is a large producer of natural gas (idem: 9). Combined with its advantageous geographic location, these characteristics cause the Netherlands to be one of Europe’s biggest and most important hubs regarding energy trade. This will be outlined more elaborately.
It can be concluded that the Netherlands is relatively self-reliant, as it has its own natural gas – even though diminishing due to earthquakes in Groningen - it has its coal-fired power plants, it imports its resources predominantly from reliable partners, and it even exports part of its resources. Therefore, the country has a relatively easy stance on guaranteeing the security of its energy supply. From the explanation given above, one would say that the availability of conventional energy and the function of conventional energy in the Netherlands restrict the impetus of adequately developing renewables. This is due to the fact that renewables do not seem to be of an urgent contribution to the security of supply of the Netherlands, and given the importance of conventional energy sources for the Dutch industry, this does not positively contribute either to the impetus of RE. Indeed, frequently, no majority can be reached in parliament to give priority to the ambition of more renewable energy, putting the interests of the industry and the natural gas sector on a second place; in case interests of the industry can be damaged, there is usually no interest in pursuing more RE (Heilbronn, 2013a). In addition, the Dutch economy/industry does not play an important function as a manufacturing industry for RE materials, such as is the case in Germany, where solar panel constructers have been sponsored by import levies (Oteman et al., 2014; Van Kann, 2015). In sum, from this general perspective of the Dutch energy situation, one could already argue that a factor of necessity and urgency to develop RE appears to be absent in the Netherlands and the Dutch economy.
4.2.3. Contemporary developments of energy use in the Netherlands
In 2014/15, the final energy demand was the lowest since 2000, which is partly due to increased energy efficiency but also due to the economic crisis. In 2014, the share of sectors in gross final energy consumption included the following: 33% for built environment; 28% for
industry; 23% for transport; 6% for agriculture; and 9% for other end use (ECN, 2016: 70). It is expected that energy demand will still decrease but to a lower pace, due to an improving economy (ibid.). From table 1 below, it can be observed that especially coal consumption has substantially risen throughout the past years, due to both the low price of coal and the
commissioning of three new coal-fired power plants; 15% of the energy mix in 2015 compared to 9.1 % in 2010 (ECN, 2016; CBS, 2016). The remarkable development of these coal-fired power plants will be explained later. Nevertheless, ECN (2016: 9) expects by 2020 the consumption of coal will have been reduced by more than a third relative to 2015 levels, due to increasing co-firing of biomass, the closure of old coal-fired power plants. Furthermore, one can see that the use of natural gas has been diminishing due to increased energy efficiency in the heating and construction sector, and the use of renewables is expected to become increasingly significant. Lastly, it is expected that the Netherlands will become a net electricity exporter in the future: a development and objective that will be mentioned later in the thesis as well. In any case,
predictions about developments in the future are hard to make and it is beyond the scope of this research thesis to further focus on such developments. In the next section, the overall
developments of renewables in the Netherlands will be outlined, before focusing on the actors involved regarding energy policy in the Netherlands, and their hindrance on RE promotion and development.
Table 1: Primary energy consumption according to energy source
