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Institute of Governance and Global Affairs

M.Sc. Thesis Research

Al-Shabaab’s usage of transnationalism in its strategic

propaganda

BY:

MATTHIJS BRUGMAN

S1348736

SUPERVISOR: Dr. M.B.D. BENRAAD

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN CRISIS AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

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Table of Contents

Introduction ... 3

Chapter 1 Lite rature review ... 5

1.1 Propaganda ... 5

1.2 Al-Shabaab ... 8

1.3 Foreign Fighters ... 10

Chapter 2 Theoretical Frame work ... 13

2.1 Transnationalism ... 13

Chapter 3 Methodology ... 16

3.1 Research Design ... 16

3.1.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization ... 16

3.1.2 Data ... 17

3.1.3 Methods... 20

3.1.3.1 Content Analysis ... 20

3.1.3.2 Codebook and coding rules for content analysis ... 20

3.1.3.3 Discourse analysis ... 23

3.1.4 Research limitations, reliability and hypothesis ... 24

Chapter 4 Analysis... 26

Video 1: They are not welcome, they shall burn in the fire ... 26

Video 2: Under the Shade of the Shariah ... 29

Video 3: How many a small company has overcome a large company by permission of God ... 33

Video 4: And Inspire the Believers: Message to the Ummah and inspire the Believers ... 35

Video 5: The Burundian Bloodbath: Battle of Dayniile ... 39

Document 1: Gaidi Mtaani- second issue: The long road to Kismayo ... 43

Document 2: Gaidi Mtaani – fifth issue: Muslims of Bangui & Mombasa: a tale of tragedy ... 46

Document 3: Gaidi Mtaani – sixth issue: My journey of Hijrah & Jihad ... 49

Document 4: Gaidi Mtaani – seventh issue: May our mothers be bereaved of us... 52

Document 5: Gaidi Mtaani – eighth issue: Adebolajo Muslim of the year 2013 ... 55

Chapter 5 Conclusion... 58

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Introduction

Jerry has been living in an affluent neighborhood in Minnesota, U.S. since he was born. His parents have tried to make their son assimilate in the new country as well as they could. They are migrants from Somalia. Jerry goes to an American community college and plays football with his friends: the would-be example of successful assimilation, if there ever was one. One day Jerry tells his closest friends that Islamic culture and those who try to protect this sanctity fascinate him. A few weeks later Jerry is gone, never to be seen again. Later, the parents hear from a family friend that Jerry has decided to join Al-Shabaab, the radical terrorist group in Somalia. Jerry had been radicalized by online preachers and was now participating in the civil war.

This short anecdote is based on events that have happened in the past; the struggle for Somali families and foreign governments is real. This thesis will focus on the organization Al-Shabaab. This group has gained notoriety in the recent years when it comes to effectiveness of their attacks, while they are relatively small sized. Al-Shabaab however, has not seen the widespread media coverage that IS and Al-Qaeda have. A contributing factor may be that the targets of Al-Shabaab are not Western and that people tend to identify with and are more interested in news that directly

affects them (Clark, 2015). Research previously conducted has focused on Al-Shabaab becoming more internationally oriented and the dangers they possess to the immediate vicinity, but not on their international appeal. Therefore, more research into this group must be done.

The kind of radicalization process described in the anecdote would ordinarily be explained by well-established theories, which deal with socio-economic status or the degree to which one feels settled in the culture they live in (Schmid, 2013). Other factors such as a lack of a father figure or

uncertainty about one's place in life may also contribute to the probability some young individuals will fall prey to recruiters. These recruiters are actively seeking to use the aforementioned situations to their advantage when recruiting future foreign fighter. When it comes to Al-Shabaab recruits, as the anecdote exemplifies, it is known that they do not always fall into these categories. This poses a problem for the academic community, this problem lies at the core of this thesis project.

From a societal perspective, we can observe a multitude of reasons for in depth study. In the first place, the devastation that Al-Shabaab brings to the country it is based in – Somalia -, as well as the surrounding countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya give cause for concern. The prevention of human suffering is a priority in any liberal society and every day men, women and children are victims of

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this group. Secondly, based on the slowdown of media covering IS and Syria in the recent months, it would appear that terrorism is less of a threat than it was before. This is not the slightest case for Al-Shabaab, with multiple attacks striking the capital Mogadishu as of October 2018. Thirdly, some of the fighters that are responsible for these atrocities are Western citizens, recruited from

Scandinavia and North America. It is conceivable that these foreign fighters return home one day, traumatized by their experiences they could pose a critical security threat to others in such situation. If countries are to create, enact and execute effective countermeasures, knowledge about

radicalization is key.

From an academic perspective, David Malet has come up with the concept of transnational identity, which attempts to view the existence of foreign fighters in conflicts based on their identity (Malet, 2013). This transnational identity would be based on transnational themes which can be found in cultures and social groups. In prior research, the poor socioeconomic and political circumstances were posed as potential radicalization enablers. This does not seem to be the case for many fighters in Al-Shabaab, being well educated and from politically stable and economically thriving societies in Western Europe. As the foreign fighters in Somalia have not been looked at through the lens of transnationalism, this knowledge gap has to be explored. The objective of this research is to test the academic literature on transnationalism concerning the recruitment strategy of Al-Shabaab. The first part of the research will be assessing whether transnationalism is in fact present in Al-Shabaab’s propaganda. The second part will be looking at what kind of discourse the authors intended when writing their material. This explanatory research will answer the main research question: “How does Al-Shabaab use transnationalism in its strategic propaganda?”

The goal of the research is not to find out why foreign fighters have decided to travel, as the propaganda would give no indication regarding this. No interviews will be conducted; however, other research has shown a connection between transnationalism and pull-factors for foreign fighters. If transnational elements can be found in the propaganda, this will give a strong indication that they play a part in attracting new recruits.

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Chapter 1

Literature review

1.1 Propaganda

One way to define propaganda is a “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the

propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018, p. 6). Propaganda is used almost exclusively in a

pejorative manner, describing unwarranted and bad behavior. In the following section, the aspects in the abovementioned definition will be described individually.

Firstly, ‘deliberate’ implies that the actions by the propagator are done on purpose. The creator of the message must be aware of his own intentions when spreading the propaganda. (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018). This implication is debated among academics with those such as Ellul (1973) opposing it while others able to directly connect intent of messages to the identity of the group promoting it, reinforcing the concept of a transnational identity (Malet 2013). In other words, Malet’s theory implies that the propagandist is deliberate in emitting propaganda, and that Islamists i.e. those who advocate the full implementation of Islamic laws in society, have done this since the 1980’s. The authors next describe “systematic” as an organized effort, which is to say carry out methodically and with organized regularity (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018, p.7). This means that the purveyor of information must have a structure or organization that does not spread material only once, but multiple times.

‘Attempt’ refers to the intention of the propagandist to achieve a certain goal. The goals are varied but according to theory they can be part of three main missions. Firstly, to shape perceptions: the perceptions of the target audience prior to the emission of propaganda are not favorable towards the propagandist. If a villager living in the outskirts of Mogadishu looks at all the destruction

Al-Shabaab has caused, he will look unfavorably upon the group. If, however, Al-Al-Shabaab manages to spread messages stating that they are financing religious education and saving Muslims from the “crusader’s”, the perception changes. Besides this, symbols and catchphrases can help to frame a topic in a certain manner.

The previously mentioned shaping of perceptions may consequently lead to a manipulation of cognitions (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018, p.10). People are able to create images for themselves, based on their senses. A son being told every day to respect women, while at the same time seeing that his father treats his mother with dignity, will most likely treat others with respect in the future.

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The perception of others is influenced by his experiences and upbringing when he was young. Similarly, if a Somali child hears about the atrocities committed by Kenyan and Ethiopian armed forces, he may be less inclined to listen to their official narrative once another battle occurs. His cognitions have effectively been manipulated.

A final and easier to assess goal of propaganda is to make the target complicit, directly or indirectly. This is described in the article as “achieving a response from the audience that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018, p.12). In the context of terrorist groups, this could mean that the audience is to come to the battlegrounds, to join the radical group or to start opposing alternative narratives and armed forces. The need to recruit foreigners to join in a fight stems from the position of insurgents in domestic struggles. In the current climate of powerful national governments, in a fight between insurgents and government (factions), the insurgents are often at a disadvantage in terms of legitimacy and military power (U.S. Government, 2012, p. 23).

An example of the alternative narrative could be the following: on the one hand, terrorist

organizations do not have access to conventional media stations, while governments on the other hand, do. With an attack like the one at the West Gate Mall in Kenya, which was carried out by Shabaab, the Kenyan government will portray women and children as victims of the attack. If Al-Shabaab has no alternative narrative for its followers, they will be influenced by pro-Kenya propaganda and will be less supportive of the Al-Shabaab message. However, if Al-Shabaab can show the attack as a successful strike in the fight to save Muslims in Kenya and the surrounding countries, they will garner more support along their followers.

Belonging to a large social group can have an impact on the receptiveness too. The Ummah, which is the global monolith of Muslims is such a group. The Ummah Consciousness which will be discussed in chapter 2.1 is a manifestation of how religious identity could theoretically enhance the propaganda. By emphasizing the shared identity, a shared political identity is created. As soon as the target audience accepts the concept of Ummah, their perceptions shift. The purpose of the

propagandist was to shape the perceptions of the audience, by becoming part of the Ummah: the recipient of the message is now more open to new propaganda. Furthermore, the cognitions of these individuals are potentially manipulated as well, leading to a reluctance in accepting the official narrative from governments. The manipulated individual will start thinking along the lines of “any attack on the Ummah must necessarily be an attack on my people, and the only thing I can do about it is joining the arms and fight”..

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The interaction between propaganda and identity is a dynamic process. One could argue that the Ummah as political entity has always existed and that propaganda has simply made people aware of its existence. However, this idea has only emerged in the 1980’s, while Muslims as an ideological group have been around for more than a thousand years. This seems to suggest that in fact the political entity did not exist until influential Islamists started using it in their propaganda. In other words, the propaganda shaped their membership of the Ummah. Now that this membership forms part of the person’s identity and evolves on its own, it starts to enhance the propaganda’s ability to either shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions or to make the target audience ‘act’.

The distribution of propaganda can have an impact on its efficacy (Winter, 2015). Many terrorist organizations have used traditional forms of communication, such as print media and video tapes. Every individual that wishes to have his voice heard, has benefited from the emergence of large social networks. The ability to distribute information quickly, anonymously and on a large scale has helped terrorist organizations to reach a larger audience. People sympathetic to the cause would in the past perhaps not have had to ability to read a forbidden newspaper or listen to Osama-Bin Laden’s speeches. However, with the growth of the internet, Western governments’ ability to prevent their citizens from accessing the propaganda has diminished.

Once the audience has been deemed susceptible, there are varieties of means the creator can use to add “value” to the message he is trying to convey. Framing is usually used to selectively portray the situation in the favour of whomever is trying to frame it (Manzaria & Bruck, nd). This practice is not exclusively used by terrorist organizations. A contemporary example of the usage of framing is the death of the three-year-old Alan Kurdi, known to most as the child who laid dead on the beach after an attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea illegally into Greece. Even though it could be argued that the responsibility lay with the parents who brought the child in this situation, the event was framed as a failure of the EU to effectively process refugees.

Apart from picking a specific narrative, the wording can also be enhanced: music or color use are methods that generate or increase the emotions invoked when applied. Examples of this method are the usage of dramatic music with scenes of despair. Dead soldiers on the battlegrounds with

uplifting music, however, may express joy and implies that the death of these individua ls was just.

On top of the enhancements mentioned above, the usage of imagery is probable. Adding specific imagery to the dialogue can inspire the audience even more than words could. A study done in 2003

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looked at the different impacts of words versus imagery and found that pictures are more effective at conveying a message than words and lead to higher electro-myographic activity, meaning they result in bodily responses (Larsen et al., 2003). This study was reaffirmed in 2018 (Winkielman & Gogolushko, 2018). When applying this knowledge to propaganda, one would expect the

propagandists to make use of imagery to enhance their message.

1.2 Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab is a terrorist organization that is still active in the horn of Africa as of October 2018. The organization has been labelled “terrorist” by the European Union and the United States, as well as by other states since at least the year 2008. Certain individuals within Al-Shabaab have been designated as foreign terrorist actors too. The organization focuses on the creation of an Islamic state, or caliphate, within the territory of Somalia, with the goal to form a caliphate spanning the whole horn of Africa (Counter Extremism Project, n.d), this includes Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. As a result, these countries have felt military style attacks and (suicide) bombs (Burke, 2018).

The offensive and defensive jihad that Al-Shabaab are engaging in has been justified through their new hardline interpretation of Salafism and Wahhabism. This interpretatio n differs from the group that preceded it: al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI). AIAI initially sought to create Shariah rule in Greater Somalia through an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). When U.S.-backed Ethiopian forces blocked this effort, the group converted from a rebel group to a guerrilla movement and resorted to violent measures to achieve its goal, this includes attacks on the surrounding countries. After the Kenyan intervention in 2011, which sought to bring Al-Shabaab members to justice for allegedly kidnapping Ethiopian citizens, Al-Shabaab shifted its attacks towards Kenya as part of a new offensive strategy.

Al-Shabaab has slowly lost territory in its active regions over the last ten years. This has had an impact on the methods they use for gaining notoriety and enforcing their goals. Initially control of town centers and even larger cities was the modus operandi, but after the seemingly endless streak of losses they have had to endure thanks to the presence of American and African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, the tactic has moved to political assassinations, car bombs and military offensives (Menkhaus, n.d.). In recent months, they have also resorted to pillaging villages, taking both money and young boys as future recruits (Burke, 2018).

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Al-Shabaab is a strict hierarchical organization with top down leadership. It consists of a single top leader; the Emir, to whom several regional commanders are answerable. The Shura Council is the body that formulates policy regarding Islamic rules and practices. The Council, consisting of ten members, who have been chosen by the emir (Counter Extremism Project, n.d), oversees these regional commanders. Junior leaders that aid the Shura council enact the policy and they oversee the different executive branches: military, media and law enforcement (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). The branch relevant to this research is the Media Branch, called Al-Kataaib.

Al-Kataaib is responsible for spreading Al-Shabaab's message in the local region and worldwide through Jihadi-fora, but also for internet archives and video websites. The style is elaborate and modern, with catchy lines such as: “If you can’t afford to get hold of one of these (pointing to his AK47), then certainly a simple knife from your local B&Q will do the job.” (Osman, 2013). Their media style can also be seen in the material they put out on the internet. All of the video files that will be analyzed for the purposes of this research were created using modern software, with video effects and music playing in the background. Any message that is submitted through one of the many channels is signed by Al-Kataaib and verified with Al-Shabaab leadership beforehand.

Al-Kataaib, moreover, is specifically aiming at foreign audiences, with all material emitted through its channels in either Arabic, English or both. The purpose of reaching Muslims worldwide has been discussed by the United States government, with the State Department noting that this is in contrast with the usage of the Somali language at the Radio Andalus station, which also belongs to Al-Shabaab. The United States government also notes that Al-Shabaab has been effective at recruiting U.S. citizens from the Somali diaspora living in states such as Minnesota. This is done either through interpersonal contact, e.g. a recruiter in mosques, or through (social) digital media (United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia, 2017, p.14).

The usage of propaganda by Al-Shabaab is done for various reasons, all of which have been

discussed in chapter 1.1. The propaganda has several purposes specific to Al-Shabaab: one of these is to weaken the resolve of the enemy, in this case the Kenyan government. A specific medium is being used for this purpose: the Gaidi Mtaani magazine. This magazine is distributed in Swahili and English yet not in the native language Somali (Ondieki & Zenn, 2012).

The efficacy of this method has been demonstrated in the past, when Al-Shabaab showed Kenyan civilians that their government was lying about the success of their military offensives in Somalia

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(Ondieki & Zenn, 2012), this consequently damaged the reputation of the Kenyan government and their armed forces.

The bilingualism of Gaidi Mtaani shows a specific focus on Kenyan civilians from all

socioeconomic strata; the English appeals more to well-educated Kenyans, but also foreigners in Europe and North-America (Ondieki & Zenn, 2012), while Swahili can be read by lower-educated citizens. Some of the propaganda used in this research also found that some Kenyans have decided to join the Al-Shabaab forces, despite the fact that they will fight against their own country and countrymen. Moreover, academics (Bunker & Bunker, 2018) have previously noted that the authors of Gaidi Mtaani demonstrate a remarkable knowledge of Kenya and the relationship it has with Somalia, as well as the historical intricacies of Kenya. Oppression of Muslims is often tied to Kenya’s long time marginalization of Muslims. This shows that the authors are aware of Kenya’s history which is relevant to Al-Shabaab’s cause.

Another purpose of the propaganda is to attract more fighters to the region. Al-Shabaab finds itself in a disadvantaged position, as the Somali government is supported by other nations and armies. Meanwhile Al-Shabaab itself has to recruit untrained individuals and prepare them for battle. The Arabic word for this is the hijrah, meaning “to migrate from one place to another for the communal defense or betterment of Islam” (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, & Sheehan, 2012, p.1)

Another critical reason for using propaganda can be found in the group’s desire to shape their own narrative. Western media will depict the terrorist organization as evil, vile and hostile to innocent civilians. Al-Shabaab must provide an alternative frame in order to keep the territories they rule over under control (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018, p.175): a frame of victories, depicting the allied forces as the enemy, while portraying the caliphate as an inviting place to live. For example, some videos are testimonials of current fighters who are enjoying their time fighting the unbelievers and drinking tea with friends.

1.3 Foreign Fighters

The concept of foreign fighters in insurgencies has been a regular occurrence in the past fifty years and shows no sign of dying down. Hegghammer describes the phenomenon of foreign fighters as: “unpaid combatants with no apparent link to the conflict other than religious affinity with the Muslim side” (Hegghammer, 2010, p. 53). In the past however, these fighters had affiliations with

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paid (government) groups and were organized, structured and sent by these governments. The emergence of the phenomenon of individuals traveling to fight in other countries by themselves can, be dated back to as recent as the 1980's. Back then, existing organizations such as the Muslim

Brotherhood in the Arab states and immigrant organizations in the West would start coordinating the availability of foreign fighters for any conflict pertaining Muslims, or Muslim territories (Malet, 2013, p. 193).

The academic views on why people would be susceptible to radicalization in general have been numerous. A non-exhaustive list of all radicalization risks would include, among others: socio-economic status, political goals, sense of belonging, a sense of purpose and potential monetary and financial gain. (Bakker & Bont, 2016; Christmann, 2012). These reasons might explain how youngsters living on the street in a dysfunctional society could join a radical organization in their own country (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012). However, they are not able to explain the recruitment successes that these terror organizations have had to the same extent in some Western countries. Immigrants living in Western Europe are not expected to improve their financial situation by simply moving to a war area. In fact, for example, the stipend they would receive from their group in crime is considerably less than what they would receive living in Sweden as an immigrant (Mukinda, 2016; Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.). Some fighters received a one-time payment of $30, others were paid a monthly stipend of $100. Meanwhile, in Sweden a single adult who stays in an

accommodation without food would receive $240. On top of that, thanks to international sanctions and embargoes, many products are simply not available in the affected areas (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2016). Political instability as a reason for radicalization does not apply either. History has shown that societies, which are unable to get their political affairs in order, are prone to groups radicalizing and trying to sway political decision-making in their favor. Current Western societies would typically not be characterized as such, and thus radicalization of their inhabitants is unlikely.

A method found to equal the parties in the conflict is to recruit new soldiers, convinced of a terrorist group’s cause. Obviously, the target community needs to be susceptible to the message. This has to do with their own subjective situation. In order to understand the reasons why successful,

financially stable immigrants in Europe would travel to another country, sometimes a country in which they have never even been, some academics have looked at another reason why one might do so. This is the theory of transnationalism, to be discussed in the theoretical framework (see page 13, chapter 2.1).

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Somalia has seen much conflict in the last fifteen years and the influx of foreign fighters from European countries, the U.S. and Canada over this period has been surprising, considering the fact that these countries are not actively involved in the conflict (Lister, 2013). The conflict was instigated by Ethiopia's interference in Somalia's internal affairs, resulting in Al-Shabaab developing a strategy to regain control of the country. Now, however, the focus has shifted to offensive jihad; Al-Shabaab is currently bombing Ethiopia and Kenya while having attempted to hit Turkish NATO soldiers.

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Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

2.1 Transnationalism

To start understanding the transnational aspect of traveling religious foreign fighters, first the concept of transnationalism will be discussed briefly.

Vertovec describes transnationalism as “enhanced transnational connections between social groups, as a result of globalization” (Vertovec, 2009, p.2). This can lead to the creation of social groups. When these groups begin to disperse around the globe it is referred to as a diaspora. This diaspora is:

a social form with a ‘triadic relationship’ between globally dispersed yet collectively self- identified ethnic groups, the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside and the homeland states and contexts whence they or their forebears came. This group has a collective identity based on a variety of historical and contemporary conditions, characteristics,

trajectories and experiences. (Vertovec, 2009, p.5)

The membership of such a diaspora can lead to multiple types of consciousness, here mentioned under the term “diaspora consciousness”. This self-identification is present on top of, or side by side with, the ‘traditional’ consciousness of being a member of the state you reside in. This awareness of being part of multiple groups or ‘multi-locality’ stimulates the desire to connect oneself with others. Obviously, in a time of technological connectivity this diaspora can be held together -or even created- through a shared imagination (Vertovec, 2009, p.7). In practice, this means that one does not have to visit the country one’s grandparents have lived their lives in to connect to the culture and its people.

Elements of a culture that can help form the diaspora identity are, for example: language spoken at home or even in the professional environment for first-generation immigrants “the consumption and use of cultural products and commodities associated with the country of origin”, “Food, clothes, various objects used on an everyday basis (…)” and also “artistic products (…) (Gsir & Mescoli, 2015, p.15). These “contribute to defining their specific image and to displaying it, an identity which is designed both for the self and for the others” (Gsir & Mescoli, 2015, p.16).

A second element of the membership of diasporas is the “diaspora literacy”, coined by Clark. Here, similarly to the diaspora consciousness, the common heritage of the people affects the way they can

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perceive language. Language used by the community can have meanings, unknown to non-members of the community. Only by having experienced the same history, or having been raised with the same customs, albeit in another country, are you able to fully understand the intricacies of language. This means that if language is used with a specific connotation to Somali or Muslim culture, it will carry meaning beyond the words. Being surrounded by people who do not belong to the diaspora, who are not able to understand language the way you do, can create a feeling of distance between you and them, and a feeling of belonging between yourself, the creator of the message and other people who understand it. This forged sense of belonging helps to strengthen propaganda initiatives. (Clark, 2009).

The theory of transnational identity as defined by Malet looks at the cultural connection between a potential foreign fighter and the cultural characteristics of the people currently fighting their own righteous cause. It aims to explain how a common heritage may be enough incentive for individuals to travel to a war zone. Malet claims that: “Insurgencies try to recruit foreign fighters by framing distant civil conflicts as posing a dire threat to all members of a transnational community of which both the foreign recruits and local insurgents are members” (Malet, 2013, p. 3).

With the emergence of the internet, international recruitment through the modern types of

communication has been facilitated tremendously (Rowl, 2017). While it is easy to skype a loved one on the other side of the world, a recruiter will be able to use the same technology to approach diaspora members on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

A transnational identity can be used as an indicator for social membership to another group, i.e. the country of origin (Byng, 2017). This membership based on religion brings with it a strong set of morals, values and a view of what society ideally should look like. Once somebody has become part of this social group and identifies as such, he or she is more willing to confront problems facing that group. A real concern in the eyes of policymakers is that the religious convictions might supersede the western values when conflicting, even if this conflict only exists in the view of the individual (Bowen, 2004, p. 882 (Kelly, 1993). Research has shown that moving to a country often cements and strengthens the religious convictions of the immigrant, which could contribute to the feeling of belonging to the transnational faith, as opposed to the state he resides in. This appears to confirm the concerns of the policymakers.

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A sense of belonging to a group brings with it interesting dynamics between the different participants once the group itself suffers from collective disadvantage or attacks. The sense of belonging as discussed in the article by Kelly has consequences for the way the group deals with said collective disadvantage. Depending on the situation a group can either be more effective at coping with the disadvantage and when necessary it is increasingly able to fight the injustice (Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010), e.g. “Muslims are being attacked in Somalia, I am a Muslim, and therefore I must fight to protect the Ummah”. In “Rebels without Borders” Salehyan makes the connection between ethnical or kinship links with the insurgents and the willingness to mobilize (Salehyan, 2009, p. 20), underscoring the potential of radical groups that are based on religious or ethnical links to become violent.

The transnational identity crafted by Islamists creates what is called in literature, an Ummah consciousness. This is a “transnational political identity for Muslims, believing that identity and allegiance are determined through the fraternity of faith rather than geography” (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, & Sheehan, 2012, p.25). On top of that, not only must one identify with this concept to become part of the Ummah, one must experience the oppression first hand, by traveling to the lands under attack.

Lastly, it is important to underscore the difference in viewpoints existing regarding the concept of transnationalism. Transnationalism as a theory needs the concept of borders to be accepted as generally understood. Only if borders – nation state borders- are present, can national identities form and, more relevant to this research, can transnationalism supersede this. The connection one has with fellow diaspora members or people from the home country of their (grand)parents can supersede the connection with the country they are born in: thus a link between individuals or groups is made, based on this transnational element alone. Propaganda masters in Somalia may however have a different view to this. Potentially they see borders as a construct made by (secular) countries, something that is not in accordance with the goals of an Islamic caliphate.

Nevertheless, borders are accepted as a general concept by the jihadi. References to the holy lands of Islam are always made to make a distinction between the lands that are under the control of Islamic rulers and those that are not. Short term there is a difference because of the distinction between believers and non-believers. If Al-Shabaab or other Islamist organizations manage to achieve their goals, then borders will be gone forever, as the caliphate will span the entire earth.

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Chapter 3

Methodology

The research question stated at the beginning of this thesis was ‘How can Transnationalism explain Al-Shabaab’s recruitment propaganda?’. In order to answer this question, a methodological framework, which will be described below, is necessary. The concept

transnationalism is conceptualized and operationalized through the usage of six different themes, this will be followed up by the chosen data. Sampled primary Al-Shabaab documents will be the core of the analysis. The steps through which this data will be analyzed are elaborated on in the methods paragraph. As part of the content analysis, a codebook will be used to show the presence of the different themes that indicate transnationalism. The research design will be concluded with a research hypothesis based on the theoretical framework.

The type of research that shall be conducted is a single case study. The purpose of this study is to test whether a specific theory (transnationalism) is applicable to the terrorist organization (Al-Shabaab). In-depth knowledge about the case is necessary to properly answer the research question. The single case study brings with it a lower generalizability than would be the case when comparing different terrorist organizations. As the theory has already been found applicable in other cases, generalizability can be assumed to a certain level. If the theory is found to be not applicable, it does bring with it wider repercussions for other applications of the theory.

3.1 Research Design

3.1.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization

Based on the literature surveyed in the theoretical framework, a conceptualization of these terms can made. Transnationalism is to be defined as the belief that the individual’s identity is based on the membership of something other than nationality. Following the method of content analysis, several themes will be ascribed to the concept. These categories are 1) Somali heritage and/or culture, 2) Muslim culture, 3) aggression against Somali’s, 4) the Ummah, 5) diaspora life and 6) borders. These categories reflect the different dimensions within the concept of Transnationalism. In the methodology chapter, the various indicators for these themes will be mentioned.

Al-Shabaab for the purposes of this research will be the terrorist group active in the horn of Africa, and those members identifying as being part of this group. The material analyzed will be deemed originating from Al-Shabaab if it is distributed by Al-Kataaib (See chapter 1.1.3). As Al-Shabaab is

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a strictly hierarchical organization and has a sophisticated media operation, it can be assumed that no material will be disseminated under the name of Al-Kataaib or Al-Shabaab if leadership has not previously approved it.

Finally, propaganda is defined as the material distributed by Al-Shabaab with the purpose of shifting the perception of locals and to recruit Western and non-Western civilians. The types of propaganda that will be looked at are edited videos and print media.

3.1.2 Data

The universe of data available is surprisingly large. Online databases are attempting to gather and store jihadi terrorism material before this is removed by government entities. The material that can be found and downloaded is of high quality and is easily searchable through search tools. Data is archived and categorized based on ideological affiliation, terrorist group, leaders, countries involved, goals, dates and more. Jihadi fora are not always taken offline, but part of this media is not accessible for the purposes of this thesis, as the author of thesis does not command neither Arabic, nor Somali. The material picked is available in English.

The goal of the research is to see if transnationalism is present in Al-Shabaab propaganda, and to find out how this is used to enhance the propaganda. As described in the literature review, all

propaganda emitted by Al-Shabaab is created by the Al-Kataaib Foundation. All data sourced in this research is created by them. To get a more general idea of the Al-Shabaab media, two types of propaganda will be looked at.

The first type of content to be analyzed is videos, submitted by Al-Shabaab to Jihadi forums. In total five different videos have been selected. All these video have been either English spoken, thanks to English-native recruits, or are available with English subtitles. All the subtitles have been added by Al-Kataaib themselves. This choice reflects the attempt to create international appeal for the material (Ondieki & Zenn, 2012). The videos selected for this research have been selected based on their English language version primarily. From the large database on jihadology.net, five videos were picked using a random number generator: the selection of videos is as varied as possible, with media focusing among other things on battles (“Burundian Bloodbath”), life under Al-Shabaab rule (“Under the shade of the Islamic Shariah”) and religious aspects (“How many a small company has overcome a large company by permission of God”).

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This is to ensure that a general understanding of their propaganda can be achieved, in turn leading to better generalizability.

Figure 1: Videos analyzed

The videos will be transcribed fully and timestamped. After, they will be analyzed on the theme level. In the next chapter, these methods will be discussed.

The second type of content is five editions of the online Gaidi Mtaani magazine. This magazine is primarily aimed at Kenyan civilians. After the 2011 invasion by Kenya in Somalia, the main

purpose of the magazine has been to undermine the authority of the Kenyan government, to weaken the resolve of Kenyan military troops and finally to be able to provide an alternative dialogue for the Al-Shabaab troops and those civilians that are under their command (Ondieki & Zenn, 2012). Gaidi Mtaani means ‘Terrorism Street’ and has been released on average twice a year. In 2014 and 2016, no magazines were released. The frequency of new issues does not appear to be based on any rule, however, almost every single issue is based on the events of the time of issuing, such as attacks, deaths and the urgent need for new recruits. The first edition came available online in 2012 and the latest edition was released September 2017. In total, nine magazines have been released as of January 2019.

Gaidi Mtaani is suitable for analysis with regards to this research, because the propaganda has been systematic, has been released multiple times and has a specific purpose, as can be understood

Document type 1: Edited videos

Name, languages and duration Description/Context “They are not welcome; they shall burn in the

fire” (Arabic, English, Somali and Swahili) (55 minutes)

This video shows the alleged destruction caused by AMISOM and the other foreign forces. “Under the shade of the Islamic Shariah”

(English and Somali) (43 minutes) This is a documentary-style video that describes the life under Al-Shabaab governance.

“How many a small company has overcome a large company by permission of God” (English and Somali (21 minutes)

This video is part of the religious scripts series, presented by the leader Ubaidah. It discusses a verse from the Qur’an.

“Message to the Ummah and inspire the believers” (Arabic and English) (35 minutes)

This is an inspirational video, meant to

encourage Muslims to travel to Somalia to fight. “Burundian Bloodbath” (English) (32 minutes This video describes a battle allegedly won by

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through the interpretation of the theoretical framework (see chapter 1.1.2). As the magazine is being distributed in English and Swahili, and more important, not in Somali, the outward purpose of the material is evident. By analyzing five editions, the research can also show if there has been any change in the past six years of online propaganda. Context will always be described.

A potential reason why Al-Shabaab might focus specifically on Kenya, apart from the current battles with Kenyan forces, is that a large province in Kenya is home to Somali speaking

individuals: this is Ogaden, or Somali Region. Historically there have been political and militar y battles over this contested land: the primary language spoken is Somali, as opposed to Swahili and this area borders Somalia on all but one side.

The choice for the five magazines has been based on the presence of English articles within the magazines. Some editions only contained a handful of English statements, others did not contain any English, therefore those have not been selected.

Figure 2: Documents analyzed

If transnationalism is present in different types of media, this is a strong indicator for widespread usage of this recruitment method.

Document type 2: Gaidi Mtaani magazine

Issue and title Description/Context

2. The long road to Kismayu This edition focuses on the Kenyan’s army claimed inability to fight Al-Shabaab forces 5. Muslims of Bangui & Mombasa: A tale of

tragedy This edition talks about the ‘crusader’s’ attempts to “commit genocide against the Muslims in the Central African Republic and the crusade

against the Muslims in Kenya”(bron blad zelf) 6. Risala kwa askari muislamu’wa Kenya

(Message from the Muslim Soldiers of Kenya) The cover story of soldiers involved in the conflict in Kenya. These are Al-Shabaab soldiers.

7. “May our mothers be bereaved of us should

we fail to avenge our Prophet” This quote was used by the Charlie Hebdo attackers. This magazine covers life in Somalia under Al-Shabaab rule.

8. Adebolajo Muslim of the year 2013 Michael Adebolajo was the Woolwich attacker who killed a British off-duty soldier.

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3.1.3 Methods

The research will be conducted using mixed methods: content analysis and discourse analysis. The first step in the process of finding out what the enhancing effect of transnationalism on propaganda is, is to establish that Al-Shabaab is in fact using this dialogue. The method for this will be the content analysis. Content analysis will be applied to the material listed in figures 1 and 2. Based on the prevalence of the themes as defined in the codebook section, the themes will be discussed. These most common themes per document and video are then looked at further through discourse analysis. This second part will look at the writing styles and the usage of framing techniques by the propaganda creators. These two methods combined in the mixed methods approach will strengthen each other’s findings and are together ultimately more suited to answer the research question.

3.1.3.1 Content Analysis

The method used for the research is content analysis, as alluded to in the introduction of this chapter. The six categories described in the introduction of this chapter will be used for five video fragments (classified as document type 1). The video fragments have been downloaded to hard drive to avoid government interference rendering them unusable, i.e. removed from the internet. The next step is to transcribe the video fragments, including timestamps, notable scenes and music next to the uttered dialogues. The transcripts will be added to this research in the annexes. The transcribed documents will be marked using Microsoft Word “comments” following the A01-A06 category system.

The five magazine issues by Gaidi Mtaani (classified as document type 2) have been acquired in digital pdf format and will be marked using the same six categories. The methodological

explanation for these categories is addressed in the following chapter.

3.1.3.2 Codebook and coding rules for content analysis

The codebook listed below will be used to quantify the presence of categories of transnationalism within the materials analyzed. The six categories listed are based on the literature review and the theoretical framework. A short explanation per category will be given in this chapter.

A01: Somali Heritage and A02: Muslim Culture are based on the literature by Gsir & Mescoli. The elements that define a culture are often the elements that unite those within the culture. Food and art

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are given as examples. The distinction between Somali Heritage and Muslim Culture is made to reflect a potential nationalistic element, given that Al-Shabaab is primarily active in Somalia and aims to recruit people from the Somali diaspora. Some elements can be part of both, such as religious practice. Diaspora literacy can help individuals, part of the diaspora, to identify with the group based on their cultural background knowledge.

A03: Aggression against Somali’s is the category that draws on the collective disadvantage argument by Zomeren, Spears, & Leach. If part of the group is under attack, the group as a whole can feel threatened, especially if propaganda masters frame it as an attack on the group itself.

A04: Ummah is based on the Ummah consciousness (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, & Sheehan, 2012), an extension of the diaspora consciousness as described by Vertovec and the “creation of identity based on faith, as opposed to geography”. Diaspora literacy is applicable here too, but to a wider extent, being that of a group of Muslims. The Ummah is also interpreted by some to be a “nation” itself (Saunders, 2008).

A05: Diaspora life appears similar to Somali Heritage, with the distinguishing factor being that all Diaspora members are Somali, but not all Somali have had the experience of living abroad while being of Somali descent. Experiences such as not being able to fit into a new culture because of your heritage could be an indicator. The presence of fighters from certain countries also creates the impression of a transnational element.

A06: The existence or absence of borders can determine what is part of the religious caliphate and what is not, by creating geographical boundaries and subsequently excluding areas that are not within those borders. Lands of jihad or holy lands theoretically have geographical borders around them, transnationalism supersedes this however. Any reference objecting to the western concept of borders can point in the direction of transnationalism.

The unit of analysis will be ‘theme’. This distinguishes multiple categories within a single sentence or paragraph. This is logical because the purpose of the propaganda message is to recruit. If two themes are present in a single sentence, they both aid the propagandist in moving the target audience to the previously stipulated goal.

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Coding rule #1: If multiple themes can be distinguished within a single sentence or paragraph, they will both be counted

Coding rule #2: If multiple paragraphs speak about the same topic in a row, this will be counted as a single theme only

Coding rule #3: If the propaganda speaks of hypothetical scenarios, this does not mean that that specific category is applicable. See A03 in table below.

Coding rule #4: Analogous application of Islamic verses will be counted as A02. The same applies for general Islamic statements that are not contested.

Coding rule #5: The codified themes will be accompanied by a page number, this page number refers to the page in annex B where the full quote can be found.

Code Category/Theme Definition Indicators

A01 Somali Heritage That what it means to be from Somalia. Beneficial elements of Jihadi interventions for the country or the cities within can also create attraction.

References to music/art/culture/ traditions, cities and religion. Specific qualities pertaining to Somali people

A02 Muslim Culture That what it means to be a Muslim, but also religious scripture when used to justify action.

Faith or habits, specifically attributed to Muslim faith A03 Aggression against

Somali's

Death as result of battle with the unbelievers/’crusaders’ Actual events, not hypothetical. Civil Casualties, responsibility at the hands of Somalian government or 'infidel forces'

A04 The Ummah The concept of Ummah, a global monolith of Muslims. Protecting the Ummah is a job of any Muslim

“Your fellow Muslims”, our brothers/sisters. A05 Diaspora life Experiences lived by people who

have been raised by parents from the Somali diaspora. People from

countries other than Somalia joining the fight.

Not being able to fit in with your ‘new culture’

A06 Borders Barriers created by nation states. In jihadi propaganda, this is only a temporary phenomenon as the end-goal ‘the caliphate’ spans the earth and has no borders.

Borders, lands of jihad, the country you live in

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3.1.3.3 Discourse analysis

To increase the external validity of the research, a qualitative aspect will be added in the form of discourse analysis. The documents selected will be the same that are being used for the content analysis. This is done so that either a confirmation or a weakening of the content analysis midterm conclusion can be made. The additional value of the discourse analysis will only benefit the research if the data used is identical.

Using the Foucaldian method of discourse analysis, the first step is to recognize that “discourse is a corpus of statements whose organization is regular and systematic (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 42). Without this specific order, the phrase takes on a different meaning, or is not able to express as precisely what the author had in mind. With propaganda, this applies too. It could be argued that this is more applicable with propaganda still, as propaganda masters will pick their words more carefully to achieve their goal fully, as opposed to regular conversations.

The discourse analysis will not follow a strict coding scheme as the content analysis section does. The analysis will be based on methods used in two strands of research disciplines; the Foucaldian analysis to understand the relationship between the terrorist group and the party it fights against, i.e. power relationships, as well as framing analysis to understand what feelings the author allegedly is trying to evoke. For the purposes of this research, the following seven questions will be used:

1. Would alternative wording of the same information have resulted in a different discourse being privileged?

2. How are the events presented?

3. How are the people in the article characterized?

4. What message does the author intend you to get from the article?

5. Why was this particular picture chosen to accompany the article (if applicable)?

6. What repetition exists within articles and/or between different articles on the same topic 7. What professional media practices assist with the presentation of dominant discourse (e.g.

editorial constraints, journalistic standards

These questions have been formulated by an individual, whose identity could not be attained. A reference in the bibliography will be made with the webpage where the questions were found under the name “questions discourse analysis”.

The qualitative element of discourse analysis aims to deal with some of the weaknesses inherent in the content analysis. Once the content analysis has led to an overview of all the themes present in

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the analysis material, discourse analysis will attempt to find out how these themes are portrayed in the material. As described in the literature review, propaganda creators attempt to evoke emotional responses to the material spread.

3.1.4 Research limitations, reliability and hypothesis

This research will only be using English language sources, since the author does not speak Swahili or Arabic. This also means that parts of the videos selected and the Gaidi-Mtaani magazines will not be analyzed. This should not have a notable effect on the results, as propaganda masters, in theory, attempt to pursue their goals in all material released. If transnationalism is not present in the English sections used, then the implication is that the material meant for non-Somali speaking individuals does not emphasize a common identity, this would be counterproductive to the propagandist’s goal.

The amount of propaganda is limited to the amount chosen in chapter 3.1.2, for reasons of

feasibility. It takes considerable work to transcribe English language material and some of the video sources are almost one hour long. As all work is disseminated under the name of Al-Kataaib, it has all been approved by Al-Shabaab leadership through the Shura council.

Lastly, the potential validity and reliability issues and how to mitigate them will be discussed. Actually, measuring what has to be measure is obviously essential to any research project. The theory of transnationalism is clear on what drives radicalization and foreign fighting. To assess whether the terrorist propaganda follows this theory, looking at what has been published so far is likely to be an accurate depiction, even more so than interviews with recruiters could be, as they have an incentive to lie. One of the ways to assess intentions is studying behavior and focusing on published material.

The external validity in this research is low, as it is a single case study focusing on one group: Al-Shabaab. Based on this research, it is not possible to make statements about other similar groups. However, this case has the potential to strengthen the theory on transnationalism. In that sense, the external validity stretches to the potential applicability of the theory on other cases. The reliability of content analysis in a single case study is high. There is little researcher effect and the propaganda selected should lead to the same conclusions in repeated studies by others. Only in situations where the researcher would selectively pick specific propaganda, could he reach another conclusion.

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based can be interpreted in multiple ways. Phrases and texts as a whole can only be assumed to mean certain things, based on general theory of propaganda and stylistic usage of adjectives and similar methods of ‘enhancing’ language. This potentially is an example of reliability issues.

External validity within discourse analysis is limited too, however this can be mitigated to an extent by the mixed methods approach, as undertaken in this research. The content analysis will be able to obviate the limited external validity, by introducing consistency in data.

The final element of this chapter is the formulation of a hypothesis. Based on the theoretical framework and other studies, it is likely that the propaganda that will be analyzed contains some form of transnationalism. Similar results have been found in the material of ISIL and of Al-Qaida where in- and out-group identity was used to create: “value-, dichotomy-, and crisis-reinforcing narrative” (Ingram, 2017, p.385). Since Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in particular have many similar views and methods, it makes sense that the recruitment methods of both groups are potentially also similar. Therefore, the hypothesis is that transnationalism is present in Al-Shabaab recruitment propaganda and enhances the ability of Al-Shabaab to recruit new people, shift perceptions and potentially cause the target audience to ‘act’.

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Chapter 4

Analysis

In the following chapter, all the individual video files and magazine issues will be analyzed using both methods cited in chapter 3.1.3. The analysis will start by describing a short context and date of submission, as this can help to explain why material was released in the first place.

Video 1: They are not welcome, they shall burn in the fire

This video was posted online on a Jihadi forum on May 30, 2017, after a recent successful attack on Kenyan forces. The purpose has mainly been to discourage foreign interference in domestic matters.

The dialogue in this video starts with an introduction portraying victims, who presumably have been hurt by Western/’Crusader’ forces. There are three main themes visible in the video: Muslim culture, aggression against Somali’s and the Ummah, with a four theme less visible.The connection to Islamic verses is made almost immediately in quotes such as:

As for defensive jihad, then it is from the most difficult forms of repelling the aggressor from the religion and sacred matters. As such, it is obligatory by the consensus of the scholars, since there is nothing more compulsory after Eeman, than fighting the enemy that seeks to corrupt the religion and worldly affairs. (page 3, annex B)

The active presence of Islamic clerks and the usage of scripture serve to appeal to the diaspora’s sense of Islamic duty and respect for the holy book. Even if the Muslims watching the propaganda do not agree with Al-Shabaab’s methods directly, they may be swayed by the supposed religious support provided in the Qur’an. Often ‘the scholars are in agreement’ is added, to take away a possibility of doubt. As described in the theoretical framework, in migrant communities, religious beliefs tend to intensify, while religious practice decrease (see page 13, chapter 2.1). This makes the diaspora community more susceptible to being misled due to the selective quotation of Islamic verses out of their original/intended context.

Acts of violence against Somali citizens such as rape and killing are described graphically and interviews with citizens can lead to strong feelings of enmity by those that see the propaganda. Naming the victim and showing the family, which has importance in Somali life, adds to the feeling of sympathy and empathy by the audience:

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The death of my sister Aisha Ahmad Anshur was extremely distressing and a tragic incident which her children and I will never forget. Even though death is inevitable, her killing was completely unjustified. (page 3, Annex B)

On top of members of the diaspora community identifying with the victims, the propaganda creator alludes to the direct attack on the Ummah itself, saying: “It is because of our ideology. This is the reality of the war waged by the Jews and Christians against the Muslim community throughout the world.” (page 5, annex B). This shows an attempt to use transnationalism to unite the group of Muslims. In this part of the propaganda, the content is in fact assuming that the transnationalism exists but is also making it seem much more important than others may have perceived it

previously.

A fourth element also present, though not to the same extent as the other three, are borders. The area that is being fought in is often described as the ‘lands of Jihad’ or ‘lands of Islam’. These terms imply that their religious convictions show through a type of territorialisation. Religion becomes a type of state, one that individuals can go to and visit. The propaganda shows how that is feasible: “Our brothers over there do not want the cross to enter their land, and by Allah, we support them in their fight to expel the crusaders from Muslim lands” (page 10 annex B). The cross here refers to the Christian faith.

The content analysis shows proof for the presence of the themes that have been associated with transnationalism in recruitment propaganda. Four elements of the theoretical framework have been found to be present. The next paragraph analyses how the found elements are being deployed in the quest of mobilizing new recruits.

Though the presence of certain themes in the text may be benefic ial to the goal of the propagandist, the word construction and word choice are instrumental. The propagandist employs three dialogue styles.

In a majority of the (international) material emitted by Al-Kataaib there is one English presenter, who either translates Arabic and Somali into English, or simply presents in English. His command of the language appears almost infinite. The spoken language is not unlike literary material and is characterized by the usage of many adjectives. Positive and negative nouns, verbs and adverbs are widely present in this fragment. Each action by the foreign armies is preceded by adjectives or

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adverbs such as: “forcefully taken, gushing rivers of blood, the cheapest of blood, a systematic campaign of sexual violence” and the ‘rule of three’: “oppression, violence and occupation” (pages 1-7, annex B). The rule of three is a rule of thumb that states that summations of three words are most effective at keeping the audience’s attention and will be remembered more easily.

A second theme visible in this video is the usage of images to strengthen the dialogue. When

victims are mentioned, they are shown in the worst state imaginable by human rights standards. The video starts almost immediately with footage of airstrikes perpetrated by the foreign armies (page 1, annex B). The woman being interviewed is devastated due to the recent death of her sister from the attack.

A final method the propagandists are using to enhance the transnational concepts used, is through the implementation of a false dilemma: one must necessarily agree with Al-Shabaab, because the only alternative is Western hypocrisy, enmity and a culture lacking virtue. This is partly achieved by describing the Western side as fundamentally incompatible with Islamic teachings, and partly by stating that the society Al-Shabaab strives for is completely in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah. This raises the question: how can one not agree with Al-Shabaab? As a good Muslim, one will want to associate himself with the group that is aligned with the holy teachings, thus his membership of the transnational community growths in subjective value, and his perception of nationality will decrease.

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June 30th, 2012, recently recaptured Baidoa is an alleged example of what an Al-Shabaab run

country would look like. The purpose of this video is to inspire those that fight and those that wish to join the fights. It also serves to provide an alternative narrative to the one presented by the authorities and AMISOM, one of the core goals of propaganda (see page 6, chapter 1.1.)

This second video has a different purpose from the first video, and therefore the themes visible have changed quite significantly. Transnationalism is present throughout, however. The three main

themes visible this time are the Somali heritage, Muslim culture and aggression against Somali’s to a lesser extent. The video is filmed in the style of a documentary, portrayed to be objective.

Firstly, many references are made to the history of Baidoa, a strategic Somalian city in the district of Bay. Fundamental aspects regarding the Somalian and Baidoan culture are described by the English presenter, among which are the Nomadic culture, tribal clans and trading practices. An example of this is:

The city has a distinct cultural history, and is renowned for its madrassas, and distinguished recitations of the holy Qur’an. (…) More so, the population of these regions are farmers, and the wheat harvested here alone is enough to feed the entire population of Bay and Bakool. They are also experienced nomads, and camels are a highly cherished possession” (page 14, annex B).

These dialogues help strengthen the bond of those in the diaspora living abroad with their home country. Not only are the traditional cultural characteristics addressed in the video, the fragment also shows how well the city is doing under Al-Shabaab leadership. Even the traditional conflicts between tribal clans appear to be resolving since the 2009 power shift.

A second element present is the Muslim culture in general. The positives changes that have happened during the reign of Al-Shabaab in Baidoa are all attributed to the implementation of the Shariah. The villagers, on top of being able to go and visit the mosque whenever they wish, are also shown to be more pious. Religious education is flourishing, with Al-Shabaab themselves stating: “Islamic institutes and madrassas have quadrupled since the Mujahideen took control of Baidoa in 2009” (page 18, annex B). The citizens seem to have embraced the new way of life and safety and security have come because of it. In the video, people are seen praying and shops close promptly

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