Hamas, Israel and the issue of state terrorism : An analysis of the violent acts committed by the state of Israel and the Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, or Hamas, and the subsequent implications for the definitiona

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University of Amsterdam

Master Political Science (International Relations) Thesis

Hamas, Israel and the Issue

of State Terrorism

An analysis of the violent acts committed by the state of Israel and the Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, or Hamas, and the subsequent implications for the definitional debate on terrorism.

Research Project: Researching the Middle East: Power, Politics and Change

Supervisor: Dr. E.A.V. Matthies-Boon Second Reader: Dr. B. Isleyen

Student: Matthijs van der Klugt Student number: 5884039

Word count: 18.891

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my appreciation for all the people who helped and supported me during the conduction of this research. Firstly, thank you to my supervisor Vivienne Matthies-Boon for her extensive feedback and useful suggestions. Secondly, I would like to thank Anne van Hasselt, Elmar van Holten and Emma Jansen for their corrections and valuable input. Finally, thanks to my fellow students, in particular Etienne and Marlies, for moral support during the process of writing.

Matthijs van der Klugt Amsterdam, June 2015

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Abstract

In the academic and political realms, terrorism is a highly elusive concept. With hundreds of definitions of terrorism in use, neither an academic nor a legal consensus exists with regard to a single, multi-applicable definition. This research sheds light on the concept of terrorism through an examination of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in particular the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. It addresses the desirability of a universalist definition of terrorism, the approaches leading to the wide variety of definitions of terrorism in use, the politicisation of the concept, and the issue state terrorism. Subsequently, this research analyses the attacks perpetrated by the state of Israel and Hamas during the 2014 Israeli-Gaza conflict.

It will be argued that state terrorism should be included in a universalist definition of terrorism, by stating that the terrorism label was inconsistently applied in the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. It will be reasoned that the only argument to apply the definition solely to the actions of Hamas and not to those of Israel, is the fact that Israel is a state actor whereas Hamas is not. Consequently, acts perpetrated by the non-state actor Hamas are used to legitimise acts of a similar nature that are committed by the state actor Israel. This case shows in a general sense that excluding state actors from the definition of terrorism, and therefore framing acts committed by state actors differently than acts committed by non-state actors, provides the state with means to legitimise otherwise illegitimate actions. By including states in a universalist definition of terrorism, the inconsistent labelling of the term can be reduced in order to decrease the occasions in which the term is used by political actors as a tool for delegitimisation.

As such, this research aims to contribute to the establishment of a universalist definition of terrorism. Such a definition is desirable because acts of a similar nature are currently conceptualised differently, only because some acts are perpetrated by a state, whereas others are committed by a state actor. Consequently, the acts committed by non-state actors are unjustifiably used to legitimate the acts committed by a non-state.

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List of Abbreviations

CIRT Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism CNI Council for the National Interest (United States)

CSTPV Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (St Andrews University)

CTS Critical Terrorism Studies

DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine e.g. Exempli gratia (for example)

et al. Et alii (and others)

EU European Union

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDF Israel Defence Forces

LAS League of Arab States

LN League of Nations

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center (United States)

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation PNA Palestinian National Authority

PTO Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Israel)

UN United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNHCR United Nations Human Rights Council UNSC United Nations Security Council UNTS United Nations Treaty Series

US United States

USA PATRIOT Act Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept Obstruct Terrorism Act

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1. Introduction

1.1 Topic and Problem Statement

The ‘war on terrorism’ that emerged after the attacks of September 11, 2001, has led to an increasing focus in the West on Islam, Muslim countries and terrorism. As a logical consequence, a vast amount of academic research emerged that analyses how these topics are being addressed. Those three concepts are often found to be inextricably linked to one another, many times also in relation to violence, religious extremism and radicalisation, or a combination of these features (e.g. Palmer, 2003; Saeed, 2007; Douai and Lauricella, 2014).

Terrorism itself, however, remains a highly elusive concept. With hundreds of definitions of terrorism in use, neither an academic nor a legal consensus exists with regard to a single, multi-applicable definition (Schmid, 2011a: 39; Jackson et al., 2009a: 217). Moreover, it is highly debatable to what analytical entities the definition should be applied. It is often found that this is influenced by the dominant political climate of the time and the place; for example, non-state Islamist groups have become the primary focus in the West after 2001 due to the attacks of September 11 (Ranstorp, 2009; Jackson et al., 2009a).

An important aspect of this discussion is the question whether the definition of terrorism should be applied to non-state actors only, or if state actors could engage in terrorism as well, as illustrated by the term ‘state terrorism’. In the academic field, state terrorism has been neglected for a long time, yet recently more and more scholars are emphasising the need to include the actions of states in terrorism studies and to examine the nature and causes of state terrorism (e.g. George, 1991; Blakeley, 2007; Jackson et al., 2009a). Schmid (2011a: 68) warns that by reserving the term terrorism solely for non-state actors, multiple uses of terrorism by governments are neglected and a double standard is created. However, it seems that most state and other legal actors, such as international organisations and intergovernmental institutions, believe that the concept should be applied to the actions of non-state actors only (Ibid.).

The debate on a definition of terrorism goes far beyond the academic realm. The political application of terrorism has influenced research agendas, and as such it has become a politicised concept as well. Moreover, the definitional debate is central to the prosecution of the global ‘war on terror’ and it affects the way in which terrorism is understood and dealt with as a criminal act in international, regional and local legislations (Jackson, 2008: 25). It therefore has substantial consequences for those groups and individuals that are labelled as

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terrorists, as this stigma allows them to become legally subject to torture, rendition and internment without trial (Ibid.).

1.2 Research Question and Structure

This research will shed light on the concept of terrorism through an examination of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in particular the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. In July and August 2014 Israel launched a military operation in the Gaza Strip, known as Operation ‘Protective Edge’, following a period of increased tensions between both sides, which was sparked in June 2014 with the abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers by Palestinian men, who later turned out to be Hamas members (Mullen and Rahma, 2014; State of Israel, 2015: vii).1 Within a period of seven weeks, bombardments by the Israeli military, rocket attacks from Gaza by Palestinians, as well as clashes on the ground between both sides, led to the deaths of over 2.200 people, most of whom were Palestinian (Bannoura, 2014; OCHA, 2014: 4; Amnesty International, 2015: 6 – 14; State of Israel, 2015: 112 – 116).

In this research the events that occurred in this seven-week period of conflict will be explored to investigate whether the actions committed by both sides could be labelled as terrorism. Whereas Israel is commonly acknowledged as a state actor, Hamas is designated as a terrorist organisation by, among many others, the European Union (EU), Israel and the United States (US) (Council of the European Union, 2003; Aljamal, 2014: 42; US Department of State, 2015). As such, military launches of Hamas of any kind are often considered terrorist acts, whereas military launches by Israel are designated as military bombardments or counterterrorism measures, which has a wholly different connotation. Although multiple Palestinian actors were involved in the conflict, this research will focus on Hamas in regard to the Palestinian side of the conflict, due to its history in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since its establishment in 1987, and due to the fact that it has been de facto governing the Gaza Strip since the 2007 Battle of Gaza between Hamas and Fatah (Urquart et al., 2007).

A research of this kind is important because it addresses the possibility of a double standard in the debate on terrorism. By excluding state actors from the possible perpetrators of terrorism by definition, states are given carte blanche to commit acts that are then classified as ‘military operations’ or ‘counterterrorist measures’. Although the nature of the actions by both

1_{Israel almost immediately accused Hamas of the abduction (Ellis and Schwartz, 2014), but it was not before the end of}

August when Hamas officials admitted that the men who were responsible for the abduction, were Hamas members indeed, although it was stated that the Hamas leadership was neither aware of the action, nor did they approve it at the time (Mullen and Rahma, 2014).

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actors can essentially be the same, ‘counterterrorist measures’ are commonly regarded as a justification for ‘terrorism’. This inconsistent labelling of terrorism subsequently leads to using the term as a tool of delegitimisation by political actors (Jackson et al., 2009a: 217). Additionally, it is important that the amount of scholarship on state terrorism increases; as an important dimension of the phenomenon ‘terrorism’, state terrorism has been neglected by a large amount of scholars for a long period of time, which raises troubling questions about the ideological orientation and political objectivity of the field (Jackson, 2008: 26). By bringing states back on the table as a subject for analysis, they can be held accountable for actions that many recognise as terrorism, but which are rarely acknowledged as such (Ibid.: 30).

In this research it will be argued that state terrorism should be included in a universalist definition of terrorism, by stating that the terrorism label was inconsistently applied in the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. It will be reasoned that the only argument to apply the definition solely to the actions of Hamas and not to those of Israel, is the fact that Israel is a state actor whereas Hamas is not. Consequently, acts perpetrated by the non-state actor Hamas are used to legitimise acts of a similar nature that are committed by the state actor Israel. This case shows in a general sense that excluding state actors from the definition of terrorism, and therefore framing acts committed by state actors differently than acts committed by non-state actors, provides the state with means to legitimise otherwise illegitimate actions. By including states in a universalist definition of terrorism, the inconsistent labelling of the term can be reduced in order to decrease the occasions in which the term is used by political actors as a tool for delegitimisation.

As such, this research aims to contribute to the establishment of a single, multi-applicable definition of terrorism, yet it does not pretend to solve the definitional problem. Nevertheless, such a universalist definition of terrorism is still desirable; although Jackson et al. (2009a: 217) argue that the lack of a generally accepted definition does not have to be a serious issue in itself, Schmid and Jongman (1988: 3) had already stated that there can be no uniform data collection and no responsible theory building on terrorism, without some solution to the definitional problem. This research attempts to offer considerations in relation to the applications of the term ‘terrorism’ and the consequential legitimisation of counterterrorism efforts.

In order to come to the abovementioned conclusion, chapter two will firstly focus on definitions of terrorism in the academic debate. Attention will be paid to the desirability of a universalist definition, the various approaches to the concept, the politicisation of terrorism and the issue of state terrorism. The third chapter will focus on terrorism in supranational and

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national legislations. Subsequently, the focus will shift to Israel, Hamas and the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict in the fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter, Operation ‘Protective Edge’, the military operation carried out by Israel, and the attacks launched by Hamas will be analysed using the theoretical framework of the debate on a definition of terrorism. Finally, the implications of this analysis for the definitional debate will be addressed in the sixth chapter, while the seventh chapter will contain the conclusions of this research.

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2. The Academic Debate on Terrorism

In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism and counterterrorism have moved to the forefront of political, scholarly and public debates. This chapter provides an overview of the ongoing academic debates regarding terrorism, and in particular the desirability of a universalist definition of terrorism, the approaches leading to the wide variety of definitions of terrorism in use, the politicisation of the concept, and the question of whether state terrorism should be included in the definition or not.

2.1 A Universalist Definition?

In the scholarly debate on terrorism, a widely accepted general definition of terrorism does not exist; in fact, if there is one element of the debate upon which the majority of scholars agrees, it is the lack of such a universalist definition (e.g. Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 4; Jackson et al., 2009a: 216; Bueno de Mesquita, 2013: 635). Therefore, the conceptual delineations that distinguish it from other forms of political violence are hazy. Many academics have provided a definition of terrorism; some elements, like violence or the political nature of the act, appear in most, if not all, of them, whereas others remain highly controversial. One of these controversial elements, which is of high importance to this research, is state terrorism.

According to Schmid and Jongman (1988: 3), a universalist definition of terrorism remains highly desirable because there can be neither uniform data collection, nor any responsible theory building on terrorism, without some solution to the definitional problem and without isolating it from other forms of political violence. Jackson (2007: 244) calls the lack of such a definition one of the major methodological weaknesses of traditional terrorism studies to date. Because the field of terrorism studies has failed to produce a multi-applicable definition of terrorism, the terrorism label is applied in an inconsistent manner to a variety of different acts.

Many scholars refrain from contributing to the debate on a universalist definition. A study of Silke (2004a: 207) shows that out of 490 articles published in the leading terrorism journals between 1990 and 1999, only eight (1,6%) were conceptually-oriented. This suggests that the authors of the other articles have largely given up on the definitional debate on terrorism and thus simply use the term without defining it, on the misguided assumption that it is widely understood and accepted (Jackson, 2008: 225).

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As a supporter of such an approach, Hayward (2011: 70) argues that terrorism scholars should actively give up on trying to establish an agreed-upon definition of terrorism, as he calls the issue “irresolvable”. He is backed by Horgan and Boyle (2008: 55 – 56), who state that terrorism can be understood as a tactic, a strategy, a concept, or a social or political phenomenon. As such, they claim that attempting to establish such a definition would be an over-simplification of a complex phenomenon. These critics all argue that scholars are unlikely to ever agree upon a universalist definition of terrorism since there are so many conflicting opinions about the acceptability, justifiability and legitimacy of the methods and causes associated with those who conduct terrorist acts. Horgan and Boyle (Ibid.: 56) go as far as to argue that the absence of a universalist definition is not essential at all for conceptual development, but that the ongoing lack of such a definition may be a valid indicator of that very development. Although it might be true that the phenomenon terrorism is too complex to be defined in one single, multi-applicable definition, the following paragraphs will show why Schmid and Jongman are right in their view that at least some solution to the definitional problem is required.

Jackson et al. (2009a: 217) pose that the lack of a universalist definition of terrorism is not necessarily an issue in itself. They argue that the real problem in contemporary terrorism studies lies in the way in which many scholars tend to identify the groups they want to study first and subsequently apply the definition to them, instead of allowing the definition to determine which groups and events to study. Moreover, the dominant political culture of the day often determines what groups are considered terrorist groups and what groups are not. As Silke (2009: 41 – 43) shows, after 2001 the primary focus of terrorism research became non-state Islamist groups, and al-Qaeda in particular. Between 2002 and 2004, 57,3% of the research articles regarding terrorism focused on militant Islamist terrorist groups, while 13,2% of the total amount of articles addressed al-Qaeda. This suggests the existence of an ideological bias amongst Western scholars who tend to adopt the interests of their own governments (Jackson, 2008: 26).

However, this is no recent phenomenon; nearly two decades earlier, Chomsky (1991: 12) had already argued that the US government applied the terrorism label solely to actors considered antithetical to US interests, and that as such the activities of certain groups shaped the definition instead of letting the definition determine which groups should be seen as terrorist groups. George (1991: 1) also argues that “the term ‘terrorism’ has been virtually appropriated by the mainstream political discussion to signify atrocities targeting the West”. According to him, the US and its allies are the biggest supporters, sponsors and even

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perpetrators of terrorist acts in the world (Ibid.). However, by consistently applying the term to non-state actors targeting the Western populations, terrorism gets a connotation of Western victims and non-Western combatants.

This view is supported by Blakeley (2007: 230), who argues that this way of applying the terrorism label is related to the institutional affiliations of most orthodox terrorism scholars. She states that a database of international terrorism incidents between 1968 and 1997, established by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at St Andrews University and the RAND corporation, is widely recognised as the most authoritative source of data on international terrorism. RAND corporation is a non-profit-making research foundation with an estimated annual budget of $ 160 million, which makes it the largest private research centre in the world. As such, it maintains close ties to the US government and the Pentagon (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 8). This implies that the publications on terrorism by scholars affiliated with these institutions become highly politicised. After an examination of how the RAND – St Andrews data set defines terrorism and of the terrorist acts included in the database, Blakeley concludes that this database indeed follows the same pattern as the one that Chomsky accused the US government of using: terrorist groups are those non-state combatants that seek to target foreign or domestic interests and terrorist acts are defined as those acts perpetrated by such groups (Blakeley, 2007: 230).

This shows that the problem highlighted by Jackson et al. (2009a: 217) exists: the definition of terrorism does not determine what groups and what acts to study, but the groups are selected first, after which the definition is applied to them. In this sense, the dominant political culture of the day indeed determines what groups are considered terrorist groups. Moreover, the ‘terrorist’ label is used as a political tool to delegitimise certain groups (Blakeley, 2007: 230). These findings stress the importance of the argument made by Schmid and Jongman (1988: 3): without some sort of solution to the definitional problem of terrorism, there can be no uniform data collection or responsible theory building, since a continuation of the inconsistent labelling of terrorism will subsequently continue to lead to the usage of the term as a tool of delegitimisation by political actors.

2.2 Approaches to Terrorism

The following paragraphs will delineate several definitions of terrorism as provided by different scholars. As indicated before, the number of definitions of terrorism is endless, which means that this overview is far from complete. However, it entails definitions that emphasise different elements of terrorism in order to capture as much of the variety of

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definitions as possible. Importantly, this overview will capture the main approaches and practices towards the definition and conceptualisation of terrorism in the field.

The diversity of definitions of terrorism in use, has been illustrated well by Schmid and Jongman (1988: 5 – 6). They studied 109 academic definitions of terrorism and subsequently identified different word categories used in those definitions, of which the results are displayed in Table 1. These results show the dissension among scholars in regard to a definition of terrorism. The question whether the list displayed in Table 1 contains all elements necessary for a good definition, was already answered by Schmid and Jongman with “probably ‘no’ ” (Ibid.: 6). It might be the case that the most popular elements are not the most important ones, whereas other elements might be lacking. For example, the most frequently used element, violence/force, does in itself not inherently define terrorism. Depending on who is describing the act, intention, and circumstances, one and the same act of violence can be deemed terrorist or not (Ibid.: 101).

Wilkinson (1992: 228 – 229) states that terrorism has five main characteristics. In order for a violent act to be categorised as ‘terrorist’, it must firstly be premeditated and aiming to create a climate of extreme fear or terror. Secondly, it should be directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the attack, and thirdly, it inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets. Fourthly, it must cause a sense of outrage in the

Table 1: Frequencies of Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism

Element Frequency

1. Violence, force

2. Political nature

3. Fear, terror emphasised

4. Threat

5. Psychological effects and (anticipated) reactions 6. Victim-target differentiation

7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organised action

8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic

9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints 10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance

11. Publicity aspect

12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination 13. Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims 14. Intimidation

15. Innocence of victims emphasised

16. Group, movement, organisation as perpetrator

17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others

18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence 19. Clandestine, covert nature

20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence

21. Criminal

22. Demands made on third parties

83,5 % 65 % 51% 47% 41,5% 37,5% 32% 30,5% 30% 28% 21,5% 21% 17,5% 17% 15,5% 14% 13,5% 9% 9% 7% 6% 4% Source: Schmid and Jongman (1988: 5 – 6)

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society in which it occurs due to its extraordinary nature, and finally it should be used to try to influence political behaviour in some way. Relating these characteristics to the table provided by Schmid and Jongman, one can see that these characteristics cover many of the elements listed, including the six most frequent ones. More remarkably, however, is the fact that Wilkinson does not make any reference to the possible perpetrator of terrorist acts. His definition can thus be applied to all actors who commit acts that suit the definitions, although he does not state this explicitly. Conceptually, the definition of Wilkinson can be seen as non-actor-based.

The opposite, actor-based definitions, are also a common practice in terrorism scholarship, however. Most of them define terrorism as a form of political violence committed by non-state actors who attack civilian targets (Jackson, 2008: 25). An example of this is the definition of Hoffman. Besides stressing the political aims and motives of terrorism, as well as the designation to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate targets or victims, Hoffman insists that terrorism is “perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity” (Hoffman, 2006: 40). This perspective acknowledges that states may engage in political violence that would be deemed terrorism if perpetrated by non-state actors, but it does not label it as such. Actor-based definitions of terrorism therefore primarily hinge on Weber’s principle that state actors have a sovereign right to the use of force (Weber, 1919: 1213)2.

Bueno de Mesquita provides another example of such an actor-based definition on terrorism. He argues that an act of violence could be labelled as terrorism when it meets three criteria: 1) it must be carried out by a non-state actor, although the actor could be sponsored by a state or states, 2) the purpose must be politically, economically or socially motivated, and 3) the intention must be to intimidate a population that is larger than the direct victims of the attack (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013: 635). Hence, he also explicitly excludes state actors from the area of terrorism. Although he acknowledges that violence by states does meet the other two criteria sometimes, he argues that violence by state actors and violence by non-state actors should remain analytically distinct because the incentives and constraints that shape state behaviour differ from those that shape the behaviour of non-state actors (Ibid.). However, this definition makes terrorism hardly distinguishable from concepts such as insurgency, guerrilla warfare and militancy and the definition itself comes to hinge on debatable concepts such as legitimacy and sovereignty, as well as on the nature of the actor who employs the violence (Jackson, 2008: 26).

2

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Another common conceptual practice is to define terrorism as an ideology or movement. Entire groups are then considered terrorist groups, and all their actions are deemed to be terrorist acts, no matter what other motives they might have or what other activities they might employ. In reality, this is highly problematic as most terrorism occurs in the context of a wider political conflict (Tilly, 2004: 6). The use of terror is then just one amongst many other strategies and routine forms of contentious action (Schmid, 2004: 1999). Tilly (2004: 5) states that terrorists range across a wide spectrum of organisations, beliefs and circumstances. Therefore he argues that “terror is a strategy, not a creed” (Ibid.).

2.3 The Issue of State Terrorism

The approaches and definitions in the previous section show that state terrorism is frequently absent in the academic definitions of terrorism, either because it is ignored completely or because the label ‘terrorism’ is applied solely to subnational or non-state entities. Blakeley (2007: 228 – 229) offers two main reasons for this notable absence of state terrorism, particularly the forms perpetrated by Western democracies. The first reason is related to the methods deployed by orthodox terrorism scholars, as she argues that most scholarship is grounded in problem-solving theory. Problem-solving theory, as defined by Robert Cox (1981: 128), “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action”. Blakeley then relates this to the work of orthodox terrorism scholars, as she states that the aim of their work is not to challenge those power relations and institutions, but to consider the problem of terrorism within their context (Blakeley, 2007: 229). As such, scholars assume that if states use force, this is in response to credible threats or as a means of protecting others.

The second reason relates to the institutional affiliations of orthodox terrorism scholars (Ibid.: 230). As indicated before, one of the most authoritative sources of data on international terrorismis the RAND – St Andrews data set, whose definition of terrorism is closely aligned with the ones handled by successive US administrations. These latter definitions explicitly exclude state terrorism from the definition. Blakeley found that multiple supposedly independent academics have close connections with either RAND or the CSTPV and besides that also retain key editorial positions in prominent journals in the field of terrorism and political violence, such as Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Ibid.). Although this does not necessarily mean that the entire system is corrupted, it might explain why state terrorism is absent in the dominant scholarship on terrorism. As Blakeley puts it: it simply does not fit in its established frame of reference (Ibid.: 231). This

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means that the definition of terrorism applied in the scholarly debate has become highly politicised and it strengthens the suggestion derived from Silke’s findings about an ideological bias amongst Western scholars (Silke, 2009: 41 – 43).

Jackson (2009: 70) also recognises the absence of state terrorism in terrorism scholarship, although he identifies two different reasons for it. According to him, the depiction of terrorism as a form of violence perpetrated by non-state actors is sustained by two common conceptual practices. The first of those is the vast amount of scholars that adopt an actor-based definition of terrorism in which the nature of the violence determines the character of the violence (Ibid.). In these definitions, perpetrators of terrorism are explicitly regarded as non-state actors. Hoffman and Bueno de Mesquita, as they are quoted above are two examples of scholars who adopt such a conceptual practice.

The other reason is that many other scholars define terrorism as a strategy of violence that can be employed by any actor, including states, but they subsequently fail to examine the large amount of terrorism perpetrated by states in any systematic manner. Instead, they simply proceed to examine only the terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors (Ibid.). An example of this is Walter Laqueur, who acknowledges that state actors have practiced terrorism, which he calls “terrorism from above” as opposite to “terrorism from below”, which is this practices by non-state actors (Laqueur, 1977: 6). He even admits that state terrorism has caused much more destruction and loss of life than other forms of terrorism, but then he frankly states that it is not the form of terrorism he wishes to examine (Ibid.).

It should be noted, however, that state terrorism is not completely neglected in the field. Alexander George examines the forms of terrorism perpetrated by Western states and concludes that the US and its allies are the biggest supporters, sponsors and perpetrators of terrorist acts in the world (George, 1991: 1). Sluka (2000) brings together the findings of an international group of anthropologists who have done extensive research on forms of state terrorism from the perspective of victims and survivors in Spain, India, Argentina, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Indonesia and the Philippines. Nevertheless, these are among the few scholars to examine state terrorism and most of them tend to exist on the margins of or even outside of the main field (Jackson, 2008: 32). This view is supported by Silke’s study of 490 articles in the leading terrorism journals between 1990 and 1999: only twelve of them (2,4%) examined state terrorism (Silke, 2004: 206).

According to Schmid (2011a: 68), the exclusion of state terrorism from the definition leads to paradoxical outcomes. If the term terrorism only applies to non-state actors, multiple acts of terrorism by governments are then overlooked, which creates a double standard. The

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failure to provide sustained analyses of state terrorism raises troubling questions about the political objectivity and the ideological orientation of the field, as it is intellectually unsustainable to claim that states cannot engage in terrorism against each other or their own population (Jackson, 2008: 26). In this case, a car bomb detonated by state agents would not be deemed terrorism, whereas if the same bomb would had been placed by non-state actors, this would be labelled as ‘terrorism’. This line of reasoning is indicative for Schmid’s double standard: should the actions of the Nazis during the 1930s and 1940, when they arrested, deported and killed large parts of entire populations because of their ethnicity, sexuality or political affiliations, not be considered terrorist acts because the Nazis legally assumed power in 1933 and, as such, were a legal state actor?

If states can be viewed as terrorist actors, it can be argued that a few state actors have engaged in more terrorism that all non-state terrorist actors together. A conservative estimate of genocide against civilians, mass murder and forcible starvation perpetrated by states, would be that state actors have been responsible for 170 – 200 million casualties in the twentieth century alone (Goodin, 2006: 67). Whereas non-state terrorism has killed tens of thousands as well, even if just a small proportion of those casualties by state actors can be defined as state terrorism, the consequences of non-state terrorism pale beside the actions perpetrated by some state actors (Jackson, 2008: 27). As such, state terrorism is an extremely large and important dimension of the phenomenon ‘terrorism’ which should be examined extensively; by neglecting it in such a manner as has happened so far, a serious analytical breakdown occurs (Ibid.).

Grosscup (2006: 24) argues that strategic bombing can be considered a form of state terrorism. He notes that the original formulation of strategic bombing was “terror bombing”. This is regularly aimed at civilians and its intention is “to create such terror, destruction and misery as to undermine civilians morale and in swift order break their fragile will to resist” (Ibid.). The two most common justifications for these kinds of attacks are 1) that unlike non-state terrorism it does not deliberately target civilians, and 2) that in case of many casualties among civilians it is not intentional (Ibid.: 179). However, these justifications are often highly suspicious, because it is hard to control whether civilians were targeted deliberately or not.

Additionally, Grosscup (2006: 24) states that states are committing terrorist acts when they bomb civilian targets without military value for the sole purpose of terrorising a population into surrender. Similarly, counterterrorist measures can become terrorism when they fail to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, when it is highly disproportionate,

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and when it is co-opted to serve a political agenda (Goodin, 2006: 69 - 73). As such, state terrorism should be accepted as a form of terrorism, in order to avoid a double standard.

Partially based on the above, Jackson argues that terrorism should be described according to a set of four identifiable and unique characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of political violence (Jackson, 2008: 29 – 30). Firstly, terrorism should be considered an intentional act and a pre-determined strategy of political violence that can be perpetrated by any actor. Subsequently, the victims of the violence are not necessarily the sole targets of terrorist violence, but rather the audience to that violence. Related to that is the third characteristic, that terrorism is intended to cause fear and intimidation. Finally, terrorism is aimed primarily but not merely at civilians. These characteristics provide an approach to terrorism that brings states back on the table as a subject of analysis, since they can function to set the limits of legitimate state violence (Ibid.). By applying them, states can be held accountable for actions that many deem terrorism, but which are rarely acknowledged as such. Jackson et al. (2009a: 217) state that although the lack of a definition of terrorism does not have to be a serious issue in itself, a problem exists in the way definitions of terrorism are applied in an inconsistent manner by scholars in their research and in the subsequent way in which the terrorism label is frequently used by political actors as a tool of delegitimisation. They call this one of the major flaws of orthodox terrorism studies and offer a solution based on the approach of critical terrorism studies (CTS). As such, the nature of terrorism should not be seen as inherent to the violent act itself, but is dependent upon intention, context, circumstances, and social, cultural, political and legal processes of interpretation, categorisation and labelling (Ibid.: 222; Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101). Additionally, ‘terrorist’ should not be considered an identity like ‘Israeli’ or ‘Palestinian’, nor is one “once a terrorist, always a terrorist” (Schmid, 2004: 205; Jackson et al., 2009a: 222).

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3. Terrorism in Politics

3.1 Terrorism at the Global Level

The use of the term ‘terrorism’ in modern political discourse is commonly traced to the 18th century, when the designation terrorisme, which is derived from the Latin terreo (‘to frighten’), was used to characterise the terror used by the French revolutionary government against its political opponents (Byrnes, 2002: 9). This period between September 1793 and July 1794, during which an estimated 20.000 persons were killed and some 300.000 arrested, is known as ‘La Terreur’, or the ‘Reign of Terror’ (Sidhu, 2013: 86). Initially, ‘terrorism’ thus referred specifically to acts of state terrorism, as committed by the French government.

Subsequently, in the 19th and early 20th century, ‘terrorism’ became a common concept to refer to acts and campaigns of anarchists and nationalist, directed at state actors (Byrnes, 2002: 10). In the same period, the terrorism label was also increasingly applied to the frequent use of violence against colonial regimes, as part of the struggle for independence from colonial rule (Ibid.). During these years, the use of the term terrorism thus shifted from the actions committed by a state actor to its political opponents to the actions of (political) opponents to a state actor.

International responses to terrorism started in 1937, when the League of Nations (LN) undertook the first significant early modern attempt to define terrorism as an international crime, following the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia by Croatian separatists while on a state visit to France in 1934 (Walters, 1969: 599). While the memories of the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dofuss and of an assassination attempt on Romanian Minister Duca three months earlier were still fresh, the League faced immediate political pressure to respond (Saul, 2006: 79). This led to the establishment of an expert Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism (CIRT), which eventually culminated in the adoption of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism by 24 member states in 1937, the first comprehensive counter-terrorism treaty (Ibid.: 80).

Although the Convention was only ratified by one state (India) and never entered into force, the provided definition of terrorism, which was adopted by the League, has proved durable in the decades that followed, as it influenced other approaches to a definition as well as issues regarding the international community’s response to terrorism in a variety of legal contexts (Ibid.: 79). In Article 1.2 of the Convention, ‘acts of terrorism’ are defined as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in

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the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public” (League of Nations, 1937).

Hence, according to this definition, whether a violent act can be regarded as terrorism depends on the target(s) or victim(s) of the violence, rather than that it depends on the perpetrator; as such, this is an example of a non-actor-based definition. Important to note is that in the first part of the definition, terrorism is criminalised along with the victimisation of the state. This implies that Weber was right in his assertion that states have a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919: 1213). As noted in the previous chapter, this is the assertion on which actor-based definitions of terrorism hinge conceptually, but the non-actor-based definition of the League is also grounded in it. Nevertheless, states could also engage in terrorist activities following the rules of this definition, if their intention is to create a state of terror in the minds of the population of another state or designated area. However, the fact that this definition was established by state actors makes it highly unlikely that the Convention intended to include state terrorism in its definition.

Article 2 of the Convention narrows down this broad definition of terrorism by labelling several particular acts as ‘terrorist’, provided that those acts constitute acts of terrorism within the meaning of the first Article (League of Nations, 1937). Included are wilful acts causing loss of liberty, bodily harm or death to head of states, their family and entourage, or to other persons charged with public functions or holding public positions, wilful damage to, or destruction of, public property, and any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public.

In this Article, the definition focuses very much on states as victims of terrorism, rather than perpetrators of it, which would legitimise the use of counterterrorism measures to a large extent. These measures could constitute the very same acts that are deemed to be terroristic according to the Convention, but under the guise of anti-terrorism legislation and military force. This is important to bear in mind, as this would be a morally suspicious act. Goodin (2006: 56) is right when he notes that “if what they [states] do is otherwise indistinguishable from what is done by non-state actors that we would deem to be terroristic, then the acts of the state officials doing the same thing would be morally wrong for just the same reasons”.

Attention was diverted from the Convention by the Second World War and with the demise of the League after the war, interest in it never revived (Saul, 2006: 82). Nevertheless, the Convention did mark the starting point of the criminalisation of terrorism. Firstly by

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distinguishing it from ordinary crime by stigmatising it as a special moral crime, and secondly by emphasising the possible threats posed by terrorism to international relations, peace and security (Ibid.: 82 – 83), yet particularly to state actors rather than to non-state actors and the general public.

International interest in and response to terrorism rose again in the 1960s and 1970s, following a series of aircraft hijackings and other attacks on a variety of targets using different methods (Byrnes, 2002: 10 – 11). The international community responded to these events within the framework of the United Nations (UN), the successor to the LN, by adopting a series of conventions, each addressing a particular kind of terrorist attack, like the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), 1969), and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (UNTS, 1987). Important to note is that all of these acts to which these conventions were addressed, were committed by non-state actors. In the political realm, none of the acts that led to the deaths of 170 – 200 million people, as mentioned in the previous chapter, have ever been addressed in the context of terrorism.

According to Byrnes (2002: 11), these conventions all shared several characteristics. Most relevant to this research is that they all adopted an operational definition of a specific type of terrorist attack with no single reference to the underlying political or ideological purpose or motivation of the perpetrator, and that they all focused on acts committed by non-state actors whereas the question whether non-states could engage in terrorist activities was left largely aside (Ibid.). Thus, some acts were perceived as such a serious threat to all that no single motive could be justifiable, yet only if these acts were committed by non-state actors. As such, it seems that politicians, and states in particular, have entered into a mutual-protection pact not to prosecute each other as ‘terrorists’ (Goodin, 2006: 56). This is in fact highly problematic, as this functions as a safeguard for states to engage in terrorism while labelling it otherwise, like counterterrorism or military force, which has a completely different connotation. Additionally, this is also in line with the problem highlighted by Jackson et al. (2009a: 2017), that groups are selected first after which a definition of terrorism is applied to them. As such, these conventions served as a political tool to delegitimise the actions of a variety of non-state actors.

As two of the six principal organs of the UN, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – the latter with as its primary responsibility the maintenance of peace and security – both have adopted dozens of

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resolutions in regard to terrorism and counterterrorism, besides these series of conventions.3 Nevertheless, a clear-cut definition of terrorism is often absent in these resolutions. The first UNGA resolution referring to measures to prevent international terrorism, adopted in December 1972, states that “acts of international terrorism (…) are occurring with increasing frequency and (…) [they] take a toll of innocent human life” (UNGA, 1972). However, it is not determined what acts are to be categorised as ‘international terrorism’, except for the notion that such acts endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardise fundamental freedoms. How ‘innocence’ can be measured and what those ‘fundamental freedoms’ are remains unspecified, while these concepts are in fact highly contested, subject to competing claims and dependent on political and cultural context and circumstances. This means that this definition can also be applied in a highly subjective manner in a way that is advantageous to certain state actors. This would lead to paradoxical outcomes regarding a definition of terrorism, which is indicative for Schmid’s assertion that a double standard is created.

However, it is interesting to point out Article 4 of this resolution, in which the UNGA “condemns the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien régimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and other human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Ibid.). This passage, together with the UNGA’s reaffirmation of people’s right to self-determination elsewhere in the resolution, suggests that acts of terrorism are conducted by state actors, in contrast to the second characteristic that was shared by the aforementioned conventions.

A confirmation of this viewpoint can be found in resolution 46/51, adopted in December 1991, in which the UNGA expresses its concerns at “the world-wide persistence of acts of international terrorism in all its forms, including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved” (UNGA, 1991). Hence, in this resolution the UNGA explicitly poses that state actors are among the perpetrators of terrorist acts, both directly and indirectly, provided that they are involved in acts that deny people their rights to independence, self-determination and other human rights related issues. Yet, although the UNGA “condemns” these acts and actors, it does not address the question of what measures should be taken in reaction to them.

The reaffirmation of the inalienable right to self-determination, as well as the condemnation of terrorist acts as quoted from Article 4 of the 1972 resolution, return in many subsequent UNGA resolutions (e.g. UNGA, 1976; UNGA, 1977; UNGA, 1985), but it is not until 1994 that terrorism is described more specifically in one of the resolutions. Resolution

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The UN provides a complete overview of all UNGA and UNSC resolutions regarding (counter)terrorism online, which can be found at http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/resolutions.shtml (UNGA resolutions) and at http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/sc-res.shtml (UNSC resolutions).

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48/122, adopted in February 1994, defines methods and practices of terrorism as “activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and security of States, destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, undermining pluralistic civil society and having adverse consequences on the economic and social development of States” (UNGA, 1994). Although still very broad, this definition gives a better indication of what kind of acts could be labelled as terrorism. It resembles to a large extent the definition established by the League in the 1930s: wilful and calculated acts to endanger the lives of members of the public in order to create a state of terror in the minds of this general public. Yet, the ambiguity of this definition should be noted: whereas the first part related to human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy could be directed at both state and non-state actors, the latter part again privileges the state as the victim of terrorist acts and, as such, this definition is again aimed at protecting the interests of states.

In resolution 49/60, adopted one year later, the UNGA added to this definition that such acts are unjustifiable in any circumstance, “whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (UNGA, 1995). This addition results in the fact that the definition can be applied even more broadly. Besides, yet again the UNGA fails to establish a set of measures to be taken against the perpetrators of these acts.

In their resolution 635 (1989) regarding terrorism, the UNSC states that it is “conscious of the implications of acts of terrorism for international security” (UNSC, 1989), but again a more in-depth explanation of what kind of acts fall into this category is lacking. Subsequent resolutions were often adopted in relation to specific events that were considered to be terrorist attacks, equal to the conventions adopted since the late 1960s. Examples are resolution 731 (1992), urging the Libyan government to cooperate in finding those who were responsible for the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 (UNSC, 1992), resolution 1189 (1998), calling upon the international community to cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the ongoing investigations regarding the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (UNSC, 1998), and resolution 1368 (2001), condemning the attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania (UNSC, 2001).

In addition, resolutions have been adopted in relation to bombings in Indonesia (2002), Colombia (2003), Spain (2004) and Great Britain (2005), so by examining these resolutions one can see what particular acts are regarded as terrorist attacks by the UNSC. Again, with the possible exception of the destruction of Pan Am flight 103, all resolutions are related to

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violent acts committed by non-state actors. Nevertheless, in more general resolutions, the boundaries that distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence remain fuzzy and the UNSC does not get any closer to a proper definition than the UNGA does in its resolutions.

In resolution 1269 (1999), for example, the UNSC expresses its deep concerns regarding “the increase in acts of international terrorism which endangers the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as well as the peace and security of all States” (UNSC, 1999), which means that basically any violent act can be included, as long as individual lives are endangered. However, not many people will refer to, for example, an armed robbery of a gas station, during which an employee gets shot, as an act of terrorism, although this would meet the criteria of the abovementioned definition. Obviously, the connotations of the terms ‘robbery’ and ‘terrorist attack’ are completely different, as both acts require and legitimate different sets of counter measures. Therefore, a definition remains partial and as a matter of fact also highly subjective.

In 1996, the UNGA decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorism, in order to further develop a comprehensive legal framework dealing with international terrorism (UNGA, 1997). In contrast to the conventions of the 1960s and 1970s, this convention would not be limited to one specific type of terrorist act, but it should rather establish a comprehensive counterterrorism treaty comprising all forms of terrorism. The previous chapter, as well as the content of this section so far, have made clear that ‘all forms of terrorism’ is a highly subjective term. It lacks any consensus, so the main aim of establishing this treaty was to provide a workable general definition of terrorism through national criminal legislation and transnational law enforcement cooperation, thereby also addressing measures to be taken against perpetrators of terrorism (Byrnes, 2002: 12). As such, this treaty would be the succeeding treaty to the 1937 Convention of the League. It should be noted that by addressing terrorism through a framework of national and international criminal law, the nature of these undertakings would be likely to emphasise the state as a victim of non-state combatants, given the fact that these legislations are primarily designed and implemented within and between states.

Previous legislative efforts to a general definition of terrorism had run into several difficulties, which are listed by Byrnes (Ibid.: 13). The first of these was the question whether or not to include state terrorism in the definition of terrorism. Secondly, the question whether to define terrorism solely by reference to the nature of the act, or whether to take into account the (political) objective or motivation of the perpetrator. The third difficulty was the

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relationship between those acts defined as terrorism and the right of non-state actors to use violence against state actors in situations of armed conflict. The Ad Hoc Committee was charged with the task to overcome these difficulties; however, in the first draft comprehensive convention, the Committee proposed the following definition of terrorism in Article 2 (UNGA, 2002: 6):

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or

(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,

when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.

Although this definition was quite clear on what acts are to be perceived as terrorist acts, the question whether or not to include state terrorism remained unanswered. Yet again, the state was indeed portrayed as a victim of terrorism, by explicitly including “State of government facility” in the definition. Furthermore, the second and third difficulties mentioned by Byrnes were neither addressed in this article of the convention, nor in the subsequent articles. Those three issues were mentioned, though, in Annex IV of the convention (Ibid.: 17), which contains texts circulated by the Coordinator for discussion and texts proposed by the Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. By considering the proposals of these two different actors, it becomes abundantly clear why these questions remained unanswered in the convention: an agreement on the answers was still far away.

The Coordinator proposed to include as an amendment that “the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention” (Ibid.). The Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference proposed a slightly different amendment, by replacing ‘armed forces’ with ‘the parties’ and by adding ‘including in situations of foreign occupation’ to the situation of armed conflict. Although textually small, this means a major difference in significance. Whereas the Coordinator’s proposal meant that the activities of armed forces of state actors, as understood under international law, would be excluded from the definition of terrorism, the second proposal was meant that the actions of all actors, state or non-state, would be excluded from the definition in case of an

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armed conflict, including in case of a foreign occupation. The second proposal thus suggested that non-state actors should have the right to use violence against state actors in situations of armed conflict, while the first proposal reserved this right for state actors.

A second proposal by the Coordinator was to include the amendment that “the activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention” (Ibid.). Again, the Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference proposed a textually small alteration with big significance: “inasmuch as they are in conformity with international law”, instead of ‘governed by other rules of international law’. In the first amendment, states would be excluded completely from the definition of terrorism; they could engage in unlawful activities, but these would be treated by other laws and other institutions. The second version of the amendment means that state actors could engage in terrorist activities, whenever they commit an offence as set forth in Article 2 of the convention, assuming that none of these acts is in conformity with international law.

Up until today, an agreement has not been reached and the member states continue their struggle to define terrorism. Although the Ad Hoc Committee did negotiate several texts resulting in the adoption of three other treaties, which are the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (UNGA, 1998), the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (UNGA, 2000) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (UNGA, 2005), the negotiations on the Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism remain deadlocked. Hence, a convention containing a unilateral definition of terrorism is yet to be adopted. As Deen (2005) noted, the main sticking points still revolve around the basic definition of terrorism, and more specifically around the question on whether or not the activities of national armed forces are to be included. Given the fact that member states have to define terrorism and most of them are willing to exclude state terrorism from the definition, Goodin (2006: 56) seems right in his claim that states have entered into a mutual-protection pact not to prosecute each other as terrorists.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the members of the League of Arab States (LAS) did manage to adopt a convention regarding terrorism. The members of the LAS all belong to the Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. As a result, the definition in their convention resembles the alterations they proposed to include in the UNGA convention.. In Article 1 of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, the adopted definition of terrorism reads (LAS, 1998):

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Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, causing terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupy or to seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource.

This definition is very broad and does not restrict terrorism to political motives, as it is explicitly stated “whatever its motives or purposes”. The definition does not define ‘terrorist groups’ either, nor does it refer to potential perpetrators in any other meaning, which means that this definition can be applied to all sorts of actors, including states, whenever the committed act suits the definition above. However, the definition does state that those acts deemed to be terrorist should advance a “criminal agenda”. Since state law usually defines criminality, this leaves the interpretation once more to state actors.

It is interesting to highlight Article 2 of this Convention as well, in which cases of struggle – including armed struggle – against foreign aggression and occupation for liberation and self-determination, are excluded from the definition posed in Article 1 (Ibid.). Whereas most aforementioned UN resolutions recognised people’s right to self-determination as well, they did not explicitly exclude acts with such a purpose from a definition of terrorism. This Convention does, even with the addition “by whatever means” to the cases of struggle. The rest of the Convention contains measures the contracting states should take for the prevention and suppression of terrorist offences, as well as mechanisms for implementation.

3.2 Terrorism in National Legislations

While turning to definitions of terrorism in national legislations, it is interesting to start with the US, because of the arguments made by Chomsky (1991), George (1991 and Blakeley (2007), which were presented in the previous chapter: they argued that the US government uses the ‘terrorist’ label as a political tool to delegitimise certain groups. Within US legislation, multiple definitions of terrorism are in use. The US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which was established by President Bush in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the US State Department handle a definition posed in the United States Code, as it is established by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the United States House of Representatives. This definition states that “the term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (‘United States Code’ (B); Administration of George W. Bush, 2004).

Hamas, Israel and the issue of state terrorism : An analysis of the violent acts committed by the state of Israel and the Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, or Hamas, and the subsequent implications for the definitiona