Prudent Precaution or Espionage Scandal? The Transatlantic Relationship and Surveillance Cooperation

Prudent Precaution or Espionage Scandal?

The Transatlantic Relationship and Surveillance Cooperation

MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Evelien van der Huizen

6035515

Main supervisor: Dhr. dr. J.B.M.M.Y. Shahin

Second supervisor: Dhr. dr. M.E. Spiering

Index

Page

Introduction 3

1. Interdependence or Independence: A short history of the transatlantic relationship

1.1 The United States of America and Europe before World War II 1.2 The Cold War and American national security

1.3 Postwar European security policy 1.4 German Reunification 1.5 Conclusion 5 6 10 12 14 17 2. Methodology 2.1 Theoretical framework 2.2 Newspaper analysis 2.3 Conclusion 19 19 21 24 3. Theoretical Framework: liberal democracy and national intelligence

surveillance

3.1 Liberal democracy and human rights 3.2 U.S. security policy from 1945 onwards

3.3 Government espionage and international politics 3.4 Conclusion 26 27 29 35 37 4. Case Study: Edwards Snowden and the classified NSA files

4.1 Edward Snowden

4.3 Security and individual rights 4.4 Domestic and foreign surveillance 4.5 European and American surveillance 4.6 Conclusion 38 38 40 41 44 45 50

General conclusions and discussion 52

Introduction

In 2012 Edward Snowden approached documentary film director and producer Laura Poitras about publishing classified documents from the National Security Agency he had in his possession. At the time 1

Poitras was already working on a documentary concerning government surveillance. Uncovering the truth 2

behind secret government activities had been one of the main focuses of her filming career because, as she declared herself, she believed these activities formed a serious threat to the fundamental freedom of America. Mid-2013 she and her colleagues Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill flew to Hong Kong to 3

meet Mr. Snowden for the first time. In Hong Kong they received NSA documents Snowden had procured during the time he worked for this agency. Poitras helped him approach several media outlets that were willing to disclose information about the NSA surveillance network. Shortly after this meeting the documents were made public. The British newspaper The Guardian and the American Washington Post were the first to publish the news, followed by the rest of the world press. However, Poitras and her team claim to be the only people who possess the entire archive of documents Snowden has stolen. 4

Although the first evidence was leaked in 2013, information about different aspects of the American and European surveillance activities are still being revealed today. The most recent scandal that involved the NSA an three French presidents did not come from Snowden directly. The American organization supposedly eavesdropped on private conversations of Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois Hollande. In 5

October 2013 the same allegations were made concerning private conversations of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The relationship between Germany and the US cooled for a while, but just like France, 6

Germany cannot permit itself to have a bad relationship with the only remaining superpower in the world. Initially, French officials strongly condemned the NSA’s action and the president called for an emergency meeting of the French defense council. A few days later however, the French government assured their citizens that the eavesdropping had stopped and moreover cooperation with the US on security policy would be intensified. 7

The ongoing nature of these NSA leaks is disquieting. Even after two years, new espionage revelations are published on almost a weekly basis. The files that have been published over the years have not only exposed the NSA but also British and other European surveillance agencies. In an interview Edward

Peter Maass, ‘How Laura Poitras Helped Snowden Spill His Secrets’, The New York Times, retrieved from: http://

1

www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/laura-poitras-snowden.html on June 28, 2015.

Micheal Morgenstern, ‘Citizenfour' Review: An Incredible Documentary About Edward Snowden’, The Huffington

2

Post, retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-morgenstern/citizenfour-review-an-inc_b_6025984.html

on June 28, 2015.

Glenn Greenwald, No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the U.S. surveillance state, New York: 3

Metropolitan Books, 2014, p. 11.

Peter Maass, ‘How Laura Poitras Helped Snowden Spill His Secrets’, The New York Times, retrieved from: http://

4

www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/laura-poitras-snowden.html on June 28, 2015.

Martin Untersinger and Damien Leloup, ‘Comment la NSA a-t-elle pu surveiller des conversations au plus haut niveau

5

de l'Etat ?’, Le Monde Magazine, retrieved from: http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2015/06/24/comment-la-nsa-a-t-elle-pu-surveiller-des-conversations-au-plus-haut-niveau-de-l-etat_4660318_4408996.html#2thYjrioeL31MTmm.99 on June 28, 2015.

Jacob Appelbaum, ‘Berlin Complains: Did US Tap Chancellor Merkel's Mobile Phone?’, Spiegel Online International,

6

retrieved from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/merkel-calls-obama-over-suspicions-us-tapped-her-mobile-phone-a-929642.html on June 28, 2015.

Alissa J. Rubin and Scott Shane, ‘Hollande Condemns Spying by U.S., but Not Too Harshly’, The New York Times, 7

Snowden said he hoped to spark a public debate about the level of surveillance activity conducted by western governments. According to him the current nature of government data surveillance on citizens has reached a 8

point of becoming dangerously undemocratic. The lack of transparency of the programs put in place by the American and European governments misleads the public and creates an inaccurate image of what the system really does. Governments are getting information wherever they can and by any means they can. Even though they believe that they are doing this for the good of the public and the protection of the state, their actions may actually be disrupting the very governmental system modern western states were built on, namely a liberal democratic structure.

The pages that follow will address the issue of government intelligence surveillance and its compatibleness with the democratic systems of the United States and Europe and will use the most recent whistleblower affaire regarding Edward Snowden as a study case. This will be done by answering the following research question: What is the effect of foreign and domestic intelligence surveillance of the United States of America and Europe on the concept of liberal democracy? First, the necessary background information on security concerns on both continents will be provided in chapter one. The chapter will start with an account of the colonial history of the US and Europe’s involvement in this history. Next the focus will primarily lie on the postwar and Cold War era. The last paragraph of the first chapter will discuss the period that followed 9/11. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York has had a profound effect on American foreign security policy and subsequently it also influenced the countries across the Atlantic in Europe. Therefore it is an important part of this research.

The second chapter will set up the methodology used for this thesis. First, the structure for the theoretical framework of this essay will be explained. Second, since this thesis will use a media analysis to put the theoretical framework into practice, the method used to conduct this media analysis will be explained in chapter two. Chapter three will lay out the theory on which this entire research is based. This will be done by first discussing the concept of liberal democracy and the part fundamental rights play in western society. Next, the actual foreign surveillance policy put into place in some of the western countries, especially America, will be looked at. Finally, in the context of the NSA scandal the media has played a major role, it was the medium through which the publication of the scandal was initiated. Snowden chose to approach two newspapers with the classified documents. As mentioned before, the theory set up in the first three chapters will be put to the test in the last chapter by analyzing some of the newspaper articles published on the subject of Edward Snowden during the first few months. The information made public by Snowden in these articles will help with shaping a constructive answer to the research question of this thesis.

Alan Rusbridger and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Edward Snowden interview - the edited transcript’, The Guardian, retrieved

8

from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview-transcript on June 28, 2015.

1. Interdependence or Independence: A Short History of the Transatlantic Relationship

The relationship between the countries of the European continent and the United States of America has not always been based on mutual respect. In the past cooperation between both countries has often been difficult or sometimes even impossible. An important factor in the transatlantic dynamic is the colonial history of the United States. Up until the late eighteenth century America was a part of the British Empire and earlier in the sixteenth and seventeenth century before the British got the upper hand, the territory was divided amongst the European colonial powers. Since the US went from being a European colony to an independent world power the relationship between both continents has not always been easy and the events that followed the attacks of 9/11 and George Bush’ War on Terror have certainly not made it easier since the US government and their European counterparts were not able to come to a mutual agreement about the American actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The relations between France - ironically enough the same country that helped the Americans defeat the British a few centuries earlier- and the United States became so difficult after the French refusal for support of a military intervention in Iraq that a Republican Chairman of the Committee of House Administration renamed several items on the menu in Congressional cafeterias. French fries became freedom fries and French toast became freedom toast. A disappointing yet somewhat comical low-point in 9

the relations between France and America.

Another side effect of the terrorist attacks was the controversial Patriot Act signed in October 2001. This document has been a “carte blanche” for government espionage which had great consequences 10

for the rest of the world and formed the bases for the Snowden leaks in 2013. Despite the controversy surrounding the revelations made by Edward Snowden, government surveillance is nothing new. You can go back as far as Ancient Rome and find examples of government surveillance networks, intercepted

communications and “official” eavesdropping. Unfortunately for Julius Caesar though, even his elaborate 11

spy network was not able to stop his enemies from plotting his death. The events of 9/11 however, had far more invasive effects than the espionage activities of a Roman emperor. The attacks reminded western countries of their vulnerability and made clear that even if the most important thing that we expect from our governments is to keep us free and safe, sometimes assuring our safety means impinging upon freedom. Both in Europe and in the United States governments have struggled with the solution to this dilemma and have dealt with it in their own ways.

This chapter will give an historic overview of the transatlantic relationship, with a specific focus on postwar security issues. In order to keep a structured view on the evolvement of these relations it will be divided into several distinct phases. We will start with a look at the relations prior to the world wars. Back then the United States had a smaller role on the political world stage, but in order to have a complete view of how the relationship developed to where it is today, we need to be aware of the past. Therefore, a look at the

Sean Loughin, ‘House cafeterias change names for ‘French’ fries and ‘French’ toast: Move reflects anger over France’s 9

stance on Iraq’, CNN International, retrieved from: http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/ on March 20, 2015.

‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism

10

(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001’, U.S. Government Printing Office, retrieved from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ PLAW-107publ56/html/PLAW-107publ56.htm on March 20, 2015.

Anthony Zurcher, ‘Roman Empire to the NSA: A world history of government spying’, BBC News Magazine,

11

colonial history of Europe and America will be included in this chapter. Next up is the post-war era, during which the Europeans became a partner in the alliance to maintain peace on their continent instead of just depending on their stronger ally, the United States. However, it was also during this period that the

polarization between Eastern and Western Europe took hold of the continent. It was the prelude to the Cold War, a time when distrust amongst nations was common and government surveillance prevailed. The last paragraph will discuss the period that followed the horrific events of September 11, 2001. The terrorist attack on American soil ensured that foreign policy would dominate American politics from that point onwards. The aim of this chapter it to supply sufficient background information on the cooperation between the United States of America and the European countries, which will enable the reader to better understand issues surrounding the relationship today.

1.1 The United States of America and Europe before World War II

The American Revolution started in 1765 and was aimed against British rule. Colonists of the Thirteen American Colonies had had enough of the British monarchy and rejected its authority by founding the independent United States of America. The conflict was however not just a British-American affair. A few years earlier in 1763, the Treaty of Paris ensured that Spain and France gave up their American territories to Britain, which meant that the British crown now ruled over most of North America. The attention of 12

Europe’s powerful countries was triggered by this fight for independence. Colonial rivalry made them eager to see Britain’s domination come to an end. France’s interest was especially high, next to the centuries-old French-British rivalry, the country also had some colonial interests in the region. Following the success of the liberal movement in American and the defeat of Britain, similar movements in Europe gained

momentum. Many of revolutionaries in Europe followed the principles of the American Revolution. The most famous example is maybe the French Revolution that took place almost a decade later. These historical ties to Europe made it a it very difficult for the US to disentangle itself from the old continent, even if the motto of nineteenth century America was to become „entangling alliances with none”. 13

The nineteenth and early twentieth century were a new period of territorial colonization in Asia and Africa. Great Britain had profited greatly from the demise of the Spanish Empire and the political 14

instability of the French Empire in the early nineteenth century. After the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Britain became the leading colonial power in the world. The battle had been a stark reminder of its naval 15

supremacy to the rest of Europe. However, this new era of colonialism was not just for the European powers, the US was also involved. Foreign territories such as Cuba and Hawaii were of great interest to the USA in order to compete with the already existing colonial powers. Commerce and the rise of nationalism were the driving forces behind this second round of imperialism and the US was not immune to their influences. Thus, expansionism was the mindset that dominated the US foreign policy even if some voices called for a more

‘Treaty of Paris 1763’, Yale Law School The Avalon Project: documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, retrieved

12

from: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris763.asp on June 22, 2015.

Thomas Jefferson, ‘First Inaugural Address’, Advocate of Peace through Justice, No. 4 (1920), p.121.

13

T.C.W. Blanning, Short Oxford History of Europe: the Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 14

11.

Ibidem, p. 218. 15

distant approach. These voices thought that isolationism would bring with it more independence from 16

Europe and in particular from Britain. By alienating itself from European affairs the country could create its own success. American politician Bernard Fensterwald was a strong opponent of this line of reasoning, he was convinced that the United States could never practice isolationism in its „purest form”. According to 17

him American foreign policy could never amount to anything more than nationalism or pseudo-isolationism:

America never attempted the type of geographical, political, or economic isolationism which was put into effect by Japan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries […]. We never tried to promote [a] type of cultural isolationism practiced by the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. What we have practiced has been unbridled nationalism, especially in the political and economic spheres and particularly before World War II. 18

With nationalism on the rise in America, there was a strong support for loosening the ties with the Old World. Due to colonialism and mass migration, most Americans were of European origins back in the nineteenth century. Staying aloof from European affairs was a way of creating their own New World. The 19

Monroe Doctrine of 1823 is a good example of the self-protectiveness that grew from American nationalism. The 1823 Doctrine was initiated by President James Monroe and stated that any act of European colonialism on the American side of the globe would be considered as an act of aggression and would not be tolerated. According to J.A Field Jr., from this point onwards America was not interested in adding any more territory to their country, but was more set on spreading their liberal ideas across the world: „On the scales of civil liberty and representative democracy none could match the […] Americans.” . The fact that conquering a 20

country, be it geographically or ideologically, was incompatible with the philosophy of liberal democracy had not yet emerged: some saw imperialism as benevolent and a way of bringing freedom to the entire world. 21

Despite their intentions to disentangle themselves from Europe, America did indeed meddle several times in overseas affair. In 1883 United States officials started to attend international European conferences 22

that mainly dealt with trades issues. Moreover, the imperialistic turmoil that preceded the Great War and affected the European superpowers was also of great importance to the US, again, because of trade issues. Other examples of American interference are the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911, the Bosnian Crisis in 1908 and the Balkan Wars in 1913. The main objective of the US when dealing with European politics was 23

maintaining the precarious balance of power that existed on the continent during the onset of the First World

Bear F. Braumoeller, ‘The Myth of American Isolationism’, Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 6 (2010), p. 349.

16

Bernard Jr. Fensterwald, ‘The Anatomy of American Isolationism and Expansionism. Part I’, The Journal of Conflict

17 Resolution, No. 2 (1958), p. 111. Ibidem, pp. 111-12. 18 Ibidem, p. 135. 19

James A. Jr. Field, ‘American Imperialism:The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book’, The American Historical 20

Review, No. 3 (1978), p. 648.

Albert J. Beveridge, ‘In Support of an American Empire’, Teachingamericanhistory.org, retrieved from: http://

21

teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/in-support-of-an-american-empire/ on April 23, 2015.

Simone E. Baldwin, ‘The International Congresses and Conferences of the Last Century as Forces Working Toward 22

the Solidarity of the World: Appendix’, The American Journal of International Law, No. 3 (1907), pp.808-829. T.C.W. Blanning, Short Oxford History of Europe: the Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000,

23

War. Yet, the increasing presence of the United States on the world stage combined with the rise in power of the German Empire brought a lot of uncertainties for the old diplomatic order. After defeating the French in 1871, Germany had emerged as one of the major powers in Europe. Under Bismarck’s leadership the

German economic sector thrived and when Kaiser Wilhelm II came to power in 1888 he sought to model the German Empire on that of the British by expanding its naval power, thinking that a strong overseas empire would increase his country’s wealth and of course, his own prestige. This new military policy caused a 24

chain reaction across Europe that would eventually result in the mass mobilization of the entire continent. The Franco-German rivalry was rekindled once more and tensions with Great Britain rose due to the construction of a German navy designed to attack the British Empire. The strong Austro-German support made Russia look to France for a new ally despite the former alliance between Berlin and St. Petersburg. The strong focus on war industry, also referred to as a military-industrial complex, came to a head in the 1910s when one country’s armaments had become an excuse for another country’s army to expand. By 1914 25

relations amongst the European countries were so unstable that a single event in Sarajevo was able to unleash one of the most destructive wars in the history of Europe. 26

It is interesting to note that before the 1914-1918 war, the focus of American foreign policy had not been on European affairs but mostly on Southern America. President Woodrow Wilson may be well known for his leadership during World War I, however, his military activities in Latin America prior to the war in Europe are less famous. Wilson was convinced that by making these countries organize themselves along the same principles of democracy as the United States he would serve the interest of the people and help

maintain the peace in a part of the world that is so close to the US. His high-minded foreign policy was a sign of the American tendency of spreading the democratic principles that their own country was founded on to other parts of the world.

American involvement in the First World War brought around some changes on the transatlantic front. America’s economy developed in such a way that the country now had the economic power to become a true world power. For Europe the war had been a symbol of the decline of its own status in the world. 27

During peace treaty negotiations in 1919 and 1920 its demise became even more apparent as France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States of America set out to redraw the continent’s national frontiers. After the war, the empires that had determined the political landscape of the continent for centuries, started to disintegrate. The Russian Empire had ceased to exist after the 1917 revolutions. The treaty of Versailles 28

saw to the end of the German Empire and the Treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye and Trianon dismantled the Austro-Hungarian Empire and last but not least, the great Ottoman Empire was stripped of most of its territory and was only allowed to keep a small foothold in Europe. The collapse of these empires would 29

have left vast parts of Europe unstable were it not for Wilson’s insistence on national self-determination that allowed the treaties to create independent states for minority populations who were previously part of the

Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, London: Penguin UK, 2012, pp. 141-51.

24

Norman Stone, A Short WWI History, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 14. 25

Tony Judt, Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945, London: Vintage Books, 2005, p. 4.

26

Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers: Six months that changed the world, London: John Murray, 2002, p. 10.

27

Julian Jackson, Short Oxford History of Europe: Europe 1900-1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.192.

28

Idem, pp. 138-45. 29

fallen empires. It is ironic that the president who in other parts of the world had used military and almost 30

imperialistic methods to bring peace now argued in favor of the independence of small nation-states in Europe. Yet, new nation-states such as the Weimar Republic in Germany, were founded on parliamentary regimes based on universal suffrage. It seemed as if Wilson had once again succeeded in spreading the Anglo-Saxon ideals of liberal democracy and collective security to the rest of world, be it this time through diplomatic talks and international treaties. Despite the new found status of the US, Wilson was not able to convince the US Congress of the benefits of becoming a member of the new League of Nations, an intergovernmental organization whose main goal was to maintain world peace. Public opinion in America showed a strong desire for a return to normalcy, meaning a return to a more traditional form of foreign policy with less intervention in Europe. 31

The new territorial division in Europe was not successful in preventing the turbulent years that would follow. The new balance of power created by the treaties was in favor of the victors and the economic instability caused by the German refusal to pay for the damages of the Great War was used by the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) to gain popularity amongst the German public. After its leader, 32

Adolf Hitler, came to power during the 1930s he slowly started to dismantle Europe’s peace insurance and on the third of September 1939 both Britain and France declared war on Germany. The war quickly spread to a 33

large number of countries, first in Europe and later in de Asia-Pacific region. In matter of months the conflict escalated into a world war and the axis powers, Germany, Italy and Japan were victorious on all fronts. In July 1941 the Japanese army took control of French-Indochina, forcing the United States to increase its support for China with an oil embargo against Japan. Nevertheless, it was not until the attack of the Japanese Empire on Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941 that the Americans became militarily involved in the war. 34

With American interference the globalization of the war was now complete. In spite of the added military power to the Allied cause it was Russia that managed to stop the German war machine and

prevented it from expanding its territory any further. The success of the Normandy Campaign of June 1944 was the next sign that an Allied victory was at hand. In late April of 1945 German forces began to surrender and by the eighth of May the Allies declared victory in Europe. Japan surrendered in September of that 35

same year. It is from this point in history onwards that the relations between Europe and the United States 36

of America took a new direction as they began to resemble the structures we are familiar with today. It was also the start of closer cooperation between nations on security and defense strategy.

‘Transcript of President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918)’, retrieved from: http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?

30

doc=62&page=transcript on April 23, 2015.

Bernard Jr. Fensterwald, ’The Anatomy of American Isolationism and Expansionism. Part I’, The Journal of Conflict

31

Resolution, No. 2 (1958), p. 121.

Ibidem, p. vii.

32

‘The Transcript of Neville Chamberlain's Declaration of war’, BBC Archive 1939, retrieved from: http://

33

www.bbc.co.uk/archive/ww2outbreak/7957.shtml?page=txt on April 20, 2015.

Bear F. Braumoeller, ’The Myth of American Isolationism’, Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 6 (2010), pp. 253-4.

34

‘Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied Powers; June 5,

35

1945’, Yale Law School The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, retrieved from: http:// avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ger01.asp on April 20, 2015.

‘Formal surrender by the Senior Japanese Ground, Sea, Air and Auxiliary Forces Commands within Korea South of

36

38 North Latitude to the Commanding General, Unites States Army Forces in Korea, for and in behalf of the Commander in Chief United States Army Forces, Pacific’, Yale Law School The Avalon Project: Documents in Law,

1.2 The Cold War and American national security

During World War II it had already become apparent that there was a lot of distrust and also disagreement amongst the Allies themselves. A confrontation between Stalin’s Soviet ambitions and the contrasting liberal ideals of America seemed unavoidable. For the Soviets the war had been about defending their borders and restoring its power after the revolutionary period preceding the war, but what started as a campaign to secure the western frontiers of Russia quickly radicalized towards a policy of state control that spread to the nations of Eastern Europe. The countries that fell under its influence were those where the Red Army had pushed back the army of the Third Reich. These satellite states were under control of the Soviet government and their policies were determined by the Marxist ideals promoted by the government. 37

For the Unites States their participation on the European front had been a reaction to the spread of Nazism across Europe since there had never been an imminent threat to their own boarders. Yet, the US saw in Communism the same threat they had seen in National Socialism. Even though the Red Army and the United States Armed Forces fought side by side during the war, a rivalry between the USA and the USSR started to emerge. America was afraid that the USSR wanted to expand its sphere of influence by destroying democratic and capitalistic institutions, first in Europe and subsequently across the rest of the world. 38

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union fought against American capitalism because of its support of the bourgeoisie

class and its rejection of an almighty proletariat. The primary battleground of this ‘clash of civilizations’ 39

was the European continent - especially Germany which was divided into several parts - but during the 1950s the conflict reached a global level and divided the world in three sections:

1. The Western world and other parts of the world that embraced capitalism and a more or less democratic form of government.

2. The USSR and its satellite states.

3. Everyone else or the third world. This part of the world was initially not involved in the capitalism versus communism conflict, but could not always remain neutral. 40

Geopolitical power conflicts such as the Cold War were not an original concept. However, the technological advancements during this war on both sides of the Iron Curtain made the circumstances of this conflict somewhat different than the previous ones. Nuclear missiles had been developed during WWII and were used by the Allies to end the Japanese offensive. In August 1949 the Soviet Union had already conducted its own successful nuclear tests and the USSR became the second nation to have this power at their disposal. The major nuclear arms race between the United States and the USSR that followed made the stockpile of

Tony Judt, ‘The Past is another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe’, A Journal of Social and Political 37

Theory, No. 87 (1996), pp. 43-44.

John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy,

38

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 33.

Phil Gasper (ed.), The Communist Manifesto Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, a Road Map to History’s Most

39

Important Political Document, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005, pp. 43-48.

Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, No. 3 (1993), p. 23.

nuclear weapons at the disposal of both parties grow rapidly. The ability to annihilate each other with the 41

push of just one button was a very new phenomenon in world history.

Once it had become clear that Stalin was not the benign figure US propaganda had made him out to be during the wartime years, America entered a period of unprecedented military mobilization during peacetime. As early as 1947 President Truman announced to the United States Congress that he would 42

support - financially or militarily - any country threatened by the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine set a precedent for American governments still to come and would determine its foreign policy for the next fifty years. America’s aim was to enable its allies to rebuild their economies and shape them into a capitalistic 43

and democratic way to prevent their people from turning to communism.

In America itself the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime intelligence organization, had been dismantled in September 1945 in order to declassify its records. Four months after the disappearance of the OSS, the Central Intelligence Group was created, the forerunner of its more famous successor, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This was made possible by the National Security Act of 1947, which 44

rearranged the US military under the executive power of the Secretary of Defense and also created the National Security Council to assist the president on matters of national security and foreign policy.

On the European side, plans were made for a new security strategy which ultimately involved a lot of cooperation with the US. Security and intelligence agencies of the Allied countries had already enhanced their collaboration during the war, but with the stakes getting higher efforts for collaboration were doubled. One of them, the UKUSA Security Agreement or Five Eyes, was signed in 1949 and entailed an exchange in intelligence between the five parties involved meaning the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The existence of this treaty was shrouded in so much secrecy that it was not 45

made public until the twenty-first century. In 2001 the European Parliament published a report called

“Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications”. The report spoke the ECHELON program that came into being due to the collaboration between the five countries and was supposed to keep an eye on communications in the Soviet Union. According to the European Parliament the program had developed itself far beyond its original purpose after the Iron Curtain came down. 46

American presence on European soil gave the country the opportunity to expand its markets. Creating a “wall of capitalism to surround and isolate the communistic threat was part of the politics of

Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Toronto: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1969, p. 41

99-100.

‘U.S. - Soviet Alliance’, U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/

42

milestones/1937-1945/us-soviet on April 30, 2015.

Tony Judt, Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945, London: Vintage Books, 2005, p.127.

43

John L. Gaddis, ‘Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins’, Diplomatic History, No. 2 (1989), pp. 191-2.

44

Martin Rudner, ‘Canada’s Communication Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization’, in: Matthew M.

45

Aid and Cees Wiebes ed., Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and beyond, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005, p. 109.

‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications

46

(ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))’, European Parliament, retrieved from: http://

www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0// EN&language=EN on April 30, 2015, p. 13.

containment” conducted by the US. The flip side of his strategy was the support America gave to 47

administrations that had dictatorial aspirations and whose ambitions were thus indirectly funded by the world greatest advocate for democracy and freedom. Many of these endorsements lead to unstoppable situations. For one, the anti-communist forces in Afghanistan were backed by the US during the 1970s, but have produced some of the most fanatic member of the Taliban. Many dubious Latin-American governments 48

which later on turned into military dictatorships, were upheld through American support.

President Truman’s support for the rehabilitation of Western Europe was thus motivated by a fear of communism. A great amount of money was invested in the continent by means of the Marshall Plan starting April 1948: in four years seventeen billion dollars were spend to make Europe prosperous again. The North 49

Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the United Nations were also tools to stop the spread of the Soviet Union. 50

Despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, these intergovernmental diplomatic and military alliances still exist until this day and have contributed to the exchange of information regarding the national surveillance agencies of the member states. In 1952 a special NATO committee was set up especially for this purpose, making it one of the oldest and largest intelligence exchange mechanisms amongst the NATO allies. By the start of the 1960s the Cold War was over a decade old and its contours had been established. Neither the containment politics of the Truman administration, nor the more rigorous tactics of President Eisenhower, who called the struggle ‘A Crusade for Freedom’, had helped to end the power of the USSR and the

confrontation between capitalist freedom and communist totalitarianism continued. 51

1.3 Postwar European security policy

With the help of American money and cooperation, the European continent had started to rebuild itself. After two devastating wars Europe was finally seeking a permanent solution for peaceful coexistence. The

Marshall Recovery plan had provided the first step to closer cooperation by forcing the countries to set aside their differences and work together to divide the resources. However, the most crucial step towards change came from a French diplomat who went by the name of Jean Monnet. His plan called for an alliance between Western European countries, in particular France and West Germany. The alliance would be called the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was intended to unify Europe by neutralizing national competition over natural resources between nations through a common market. Two years after presenting 52

the plan, the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951, establishing the ECSC. The alliance between France and West Germany thus formed the basis for a lasting peace in Western Europe. The European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Eurotom) were both established by the

John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy,

47

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 4.

Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Afghanistan and the Crisis of American Foreign Policy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 48

No. 4 (1980), pp. 157-9.

Tony, Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, London: Vintage Books, 2010, pp. 91-3. 49

John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, 50

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 114-5.

Martin J. Medhurst, ‘Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom: The Rhetorical Origins of a Cold War Campaign’,

51

Presidential Studies Quarterly, No. 4 (1997), p. 647.

Desmon Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 52

signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. These three organizations would later on merge into the European Union (EU) and form one of the pillars created by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

Following the establishment of a more lasting European agreement for peace there were a number of key events that were of importance to the development of the transatlantic relations. First there was the crisis situation in Egypt concerning the Suez Canal in 1956 proving to the former imperial powers France and Britain that their time in the colonial spotlight was over. Without the aid of the military and financial might of America they would not be able to continue their dominion over the strategically important Egyptian canal. This crisis was followed by another in 1962 when the nuclear arms race lead to the Soviet Union installing missiles on Cuban territory which in turn lead to the US threatening with military action. The 53

Cold War which had remained quite frosty up until that point was now at risk of escalating into a full blown nuclear war. Once again the Europeans found themselves in the middle of this geopolitical power struggle and were worried about the repercussions of it. The next calamity was the Vietnam War. This conflict divided political and public opinion on the European side and created resentment in American politics for the lack of support from some of its closest allies. The decolonization process had been anything but smooth for all European countries involved and it had been the anti-colonial pressure from the US - combined with the economic hardship that followed the WWII- that had led to the disintegration of what remained from the European empires. Few countries were therefore willing to involve themselves in another conflict. 54

France fought a bitter war in Vietnam in an attempt to hold on to its former glory and by 1962 it had lost nearly its entire overseas empire. Therefore, French support for any American military undertaking was not likely to happen. As far as security surveillance policy goes, France had its own elaborate secret service 55

network that is able to assemble the necessary information of all the communications going in and out of France. The Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) is the agency that gathers foreign intelligence. It was run by military personal until the late 1990s and nowadays still operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense. As all other secret agencies its actions usually remain secret, nevertheless DGSE has been involved in several international scandals. In 1985 it was responsible for the sinking of a Greenpeace ship just off the coast of New Zealand. This of course, caused outrage in New Zealand for violating their territorial sovereignty. Furthermore, there were also rumors that the agency was 56

involved in a grand scale intelligence operation against American business people: “Along with the

champagne, the caviar and the chateaubriand on these flights, there may be microphones hidden in the seats and French government spies posing as passengers or flight attendants”. French governments might have 57

been reluctant to support some military actions of the US but both countries have helped each other in the field on surveillance intelligence exchange.

Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, London: Vintage Books, 2010, p. 254.

53

Tony Smith, ‘A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization’, Comparative studies in Society and

54

History, No. 1 (1978), pp. 70-71.

Wilfried Mausbach, ‘European Perspectives on the War in Vietnam’, GHI Bulletin, No. 30 (2002), p. 81. 55

Charles Bremner, ‘Mitterand ordered bombing of Rainbow Warrior, spy chief says’, The Times, retrieved from: http://

56

www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/article1980551.ece on April 30, 2015.

‘French have been spying on U.S. Businesses, NBC claims’, Deseret News, retrieved from: http://

57

www.deseretnews.com/article/182953/FRENCH-HAVE-BEEN-SPYING-ON-US-BUSINESSES-NBC-SAYS.html? pg=all on April 30, 2015.

For Great Britain on the other hand the ‘special relationship’ with the United States had a great deal of influence on its security policy. Since the Second World War the United Kingdom has been America’s most loyal ally. Their collaboration regarding security surveillance has not limited itself to the Five Eyes

Agreement. Cooperation and information exchange with the American services has been an asset for both the

CIA and MI6. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) or MI6 supplies the British government with foreign 58

intelligence while its sister organization, MI5 takes care of internal intelligence. Both agencies are

responsible for national security and are aided in their endeavor to remain secret by the Official Secrets Act. The act states that “[…] it [is] a criminal offense to disclose any official information without lawful

authority”. MI6 played a crucial role in defeating Nazi Germany by feeding the enemy false information, 59

but before the war the agency did assist the Gestapo with gathering information regarding communism in Europe. It suffered further embarrassment during the Cold War when it was discovered that several 60

operations had been compromised by MI6 agents who had been recruited by the Soviet Union. In the post-61

Cold War era the agency gained different priorities and was determined to be more open and transparent towards the public about its activities. As a result the Intelligence Services Act was drawn up, binding the British intelligence agencies to the supervision of the Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee. 62

1.4 German reunification

When in 1963 German politician Egon Bahr proposed a rapprochement between East and West Germany it created great unease with the Americans. To them the division of Germany had created a buffer zone between the West and communism, without this zone the Soviets would have easier access to part of Europe not yet under their control. The first post-war chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Konrad Adenauer, had refused to recognize the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), thus holding off any cooperation. However, with the EEC leadership in disarray due to the empty chair crisis in 1965 and the US distracted by the war in Vietnam, the FRG started to look to East-Germany for a political alliance. 63

Much to the displeasure of the Americans, Chancellor Willy Brandt started to implement a so called Neue

Ostpolitik towards the GDR that would achieve a certain degree of cooperation and communication with the

Eastern part of Germany. The US was still unshakable in its politics of containment and isolation towards 64

everything that had to do with the Soviet Union or communism. In their eyes German reunification posed a possible threat to their own democratic freedom. Additionally, their European allies were starting to become

Martin Rudner, ‘Canada’s Communication Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization’, in: Matthew M.

58

Aid and Cees Wiebes ed., Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and beyond, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005, p. 109.

‘Nationality Instructions Procedural section The Official Secrets Act 1989’, retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/

59

government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/264795/officalsecretsact.pdf on May 10, 2015. Tony Rennel, ‘The Nazi monster recruited by MI6 to spy for Britain’, The Mail Online, retrieved from: http://

60

www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1202005/The-Nazi-monster-recruited-MI6.html on May 10, 2015.

‘Five of the most notable defections’, The Telegraph, retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

61

asia/china/7912237/Five-of-the-most-notable-defections.html on May 10, 2015.

‘Intelligence Services Act 1994 schedule 3’, UK Parliament, retrieved from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/

62

1994/13/pdfs/ukpga_19940013_en.pdf on May 10, 2015.

The empty chair crisis was a period of non participation from France in the institutions of the EEC. French President

63

de Gaulle did not agree with the attempts of the European Commission to create a shift towards supranationalism. The crisis was resolved in January 1966 when an agreement was reached which stated that an unanimity of vote was needed when major interests were at stake.

Judt, Tony, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, London: Vintage Books, 2010, p.p 496-7.

more and more economically independent which made it more difficult for America to exert influence over European politics. A new dynamic between Europe and the US started to take form.

The US realized that it had neglected their European alliance for too long due to the development in Vietnam when a decision was made to form a European Monetary Union. In an attempt to patch up the relationship a New Atlantic Charter was launched under US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and 1973 was declared the “Year of Europe”. The positive intentions quickly went South when Kissinger openly complained about the lack of leadership within the EC: “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?”. The 65

charter was disrupted even further when unrest in the Middle East broke out and America found little support from their NATO allies for an intervention given their dependence on Middle East oil. The Middle East 66

conflict started when an Arab coalition launched a surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur or Day of Atonement, a holy day for Judaism. The US showed a resolute support for Israel during this conflict, as did the Soviet Union to the Arabic coalition. Frustrations levels were high on both sides of the Atlantic and the 67

EU-US relations were brought to a breaking point as Europe was, once again, caught between a near-confrontation between two nuclear superpowers. The second oil-crisis in 1979 and the invasion of

Afghanistan by the USSR confirmed the divergent points of views Americans and Europeans held when it came to dealing with the Russians. America immediately opted for sanctions against the Soviets, while Europe was more hesitant and reluctant to make a decision. 68

The new decade brought a new American president and a new foreign policy. During the previous years of struggle Europe had learned to depend on itself and had adopted more inward-looking policies. The political leaders of the EC had started initiatives to deepen cooperation between the members. The European Monetary System was created and the first steps towards a Single Market were made, one of the most transformative initiates in the history of the EC. To say that the ties between the US and the EC were weakened at the start of the 1980s would be an understatement, but the arrival of a new Soviet leader would bring change. Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985 and showed a more favorable attitude towards America and Western-Europe. Under his leadership diplomatic relations improved and trade agreements were made between both sides. Yet, no one expected the events of November 1989. The destruction of the Berlin Wall accelerated history: within a few months the Eastern frontiers were opened, the Soviet Union dismantled and with it the Cold War came to an end. 69

The reunification of Germany was a momentous event in European history but it also highlighted once more the division between the EU and US. While the EU was afraid the unification could seriously disrupt the European integration process and once more make Germany the dominant party on the continent, the US saw it as an internal matter for Germany and saw no reason the get involved. Fortunately, Chancellor

Spiegel interview with Henry Kissinger, Spiegel, retrieved from:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-65

interview-with-henry-kissinger-europeans-hide-behind-the-unpopularity-of-president-bush-a-535964.html on April 24, 2015.

Maria G. Cowles and Michelle Egan, ’The Evolution of the Transatlantic Partnership’, Transworld, No. 3 (2012), p.

66

10.

William B. Quandt, ‘ Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War’, Office of Defense for National Security Affairs (ISA),

67

1976, pp. 13-31.

Maria G. Cowles and Michelle Egan, ‘The Evolution of the Transatlantic Partnership’, Transworld, No. 3 (2012), p.

68

11.

Jacques Delors, ‘Speech at opening of the academic year of the College of Europe’, Bruges, retrieved from: http://

69

Helmut Kohl was able to calm the Europeans by stating that “the future architecture of Germany must be fitted into the future architecture of Europe as a whole” and Franco-German cooperation must be

encouraged. The integration of the European community went even further with the creation of the 70

European Union in 1992 after the singing of the Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced a common Foreign and Security Policy, a European Monetary Union and a Justice and Home Affairs department. Included in 71

the Common Foreign and Security Policy was the creation of Europol, an organization that would ensure European cooperation on the exchange of criminal intelligence. In 2001 after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., the collaboration would be extended with a Counter Terrorism Task Force. Yet again this deepening of European cooperation made America uncomfortable: if the Europeans would be able to agree on a defense policy of their own, the role of NATO would become less important and with that the position of the US would be less powerful. America’s fear soon became irrelevant when the war in

Yugoslavia started and the Western European Union was unable to come up with a swift common response and proofed incompetent in dealing with the conflict. After the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, where almost 8000 boys and men were killed, the US was forced to step in to prevent any further killings. The 72

failure of the EU brought on an incentive for renewing the transatlantic commitment. On the peacekeeping front the Partnership For Peace (PFP) was created to strengthen the position of NATO and with that American influence on EU security policy was assured. 73

After the attacks of 9/11 previous feuds between European powers and the new Bush administration seemed to fade away for a brief period as article five of the NATO treaty was invoked for the first time in its history: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all […]”. In America the attacks had brought the country 74

together, people wanted to show that even if they were traumatized they were not defeated. George Bush’s popularity soured because of his resolve to bring those who had attacked the US to justice. According to him terrorists had attacked America “because [they] loved freedom and [the terrorists] hated freedom”. He created a new guideline for American foreign policy, the Bush Doctrine, which made no distinction between the terroristic groups and the nations harboring them. The ultimate goal of the Doctrine was to make the world a safer place - especially for the US - and spread freedom. 75

Support in Europe quickly diminished after it became clear that Bush would not limit his so called

War on Terror to the territory of Afghanistan but also planned on invading Iraq under the false pretense of the

country possessing weapons of mass destruction. According to American officials Iraq was part of the so

Maria G. Cowles and Michelle Egan, ’The Evolution of the Transatlantic Partnership’, Transworld, No. 3 (2012), p.

70

13.

Desmon Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

71

2005, pp. 118-23.

Helge Brunborg, Torkild Hovde and Lyngstad Henrik Urdal, ‘Accounting for genocide: How many were killed in

72

Srebrenica?’, European Journal of Population, no. 19 (2003). pp. 244-245.

John Borawski, ‘Partnership for Peace and beyond’, International Affairs, No. 2 (1995), p. 233.

73

Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty (1949), retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-ECAE8DB0-F591EC88/

74

natolive/official_texts_17120.htm on April 4th, 2015.

George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington: The White House,

75

called “Axis of Evil”, together with Iran and North Korea. France and Germany decided against an attack 76

on Iraq and the US found itself supported by only a small amount of allies, Britain and the Netherlands being amongst them. In retrospect it is easy to say that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake, since we now know 77

there were no weapons of mass destruction of any kind to be found and that the country descended into sectarian chaos after the American and coalition forces invaded. At the time the invasion was justified by the all-embracing umbrella of national security.

The candidacy of Barack Obama in 2008 was highly anticipated in Europe and was expected to bring change to the international stage of politics. Prior to his election Obama spoke of respect for human rights, tackling global warming and a foreign policy based on diplomacy, things George W. Bush had neglected during most of his presidency. Regardless of the great anticipations, Obama’s words had been more theory than action since he continued in the same line as Bush. Even though he promoted a more multilateral approach, his actions showed that he would only follow this line if it was necessary and would benefit America. Transatlantic relations were strengthen when Obama decided to stop referring to a “war on terrorism” and captured Osama bin Laden, the brain behind the 9/11 attacks. He also succeeded in pulling 78

American troops out of Iraq. He did however, not succeed in closing down Guantanamo Bay or change America’s climate policy in any significant way. His renewed focus on Asia has also raised some eyebrows amongst European leaders, even though American officials have repeatedly stated that this commitment is not in any way meant to diminish their relationship with Europe. 79

1.5 Conclusion

The relationship between the United States and Europe has been one of continued cooperation with mixed feelings on both sides. The postwar period saw the creation of an alliance between a new power and the old European powers. Europe was depending on America for its economy and security and gladly accepted economic aid with after the Second World War. Yet, at the beginning of the fifties the relationship already started to show some cracks. The Suez crisis had made it painfully clear to Britain and France that they were no longer world powers who could act on their own terms. The anti-colonial stance of the Americans made resentment grow quickly amongst Europeans who wanted to hold on to their empires. However, due to the power of the USSR and the spread of communism across Eastern-Europe there was also a reason for cooperation. To America, Western Europe was a buffer zone against the threat of communist totalitarianism. The Truman Doctrine implemented from the fifties onwards deepened the Euro-US collaboration even further. With the financial support of the US, Europe slowly started to recover from its wartime damages and subsequently opted for more independency from America. This worried the US as the status quo was

working just fine for them. On the other hand, collaboration between the Europeans was also to be encouraged as the continent had the unfortunate tendency to wage suicidal wars against each other. The

George W. Bush, ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address’, retrieved from:

http://georgewbush-76

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html on April 30, 2015.

Jiri Sedivy and Marcin Zaborowski, ’Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Relations’, European Security,

77

No. 3 (2010), pp.190-1.

Zaki Laïdi, Limited Achievements: Obama’s Foreign Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 66.

78

Maria G. Cowles and Michelle Egan, ‘The Evolution of the Transatlantic Partnership’, Transworld, No. 3 (2012), p.

79

creation of the ECSC and its successors ensured that European states were connected in such a way that starting a new war was made almost impossible. Cooperation and integration were the two new key features of European diplomacy.

During the years of the Cold War the link between both continents was constant and of great necessity, but the lack of agreement amongst Europe’s leader has often been a source of frustration for the US. Henry Kissinger was not the first and will certainly not be the last to complain about the lack of leadership and commons purpose in the European community. The reluctance of Europeans to get militarily involved in non-European conflicts has remained a breaking point in the relationship. European hesitance towards involvement in any kind of intervention stems from a difference in cultural background and historical experiences as was made clear by the background discussed in this chapter. Previous experiences regarding military action have never ended well for Europe, but especially World War I and II have

influenced Europe’s attitude toward military action, on their own territory and beyond. Nevertheless, it remains clear that commons threats have always been able to strengthen the alliance between Europe and the US and bring both parties together.

The history of EU-US relations demonstrates that on numerous occasions Europe has been disappointed by the actions of American presidents even when they had promised a more Europe friendly foreign policy. The relationship has been one that has often been fueled by fear: fear for Nazism, fear for communism or a fear for the creation of a common European market that is impenetrable for American investments. There has never been a golden age of transatlantic relations and I am confident in saying that there will never be one. However, this partnership has lasted for more than sixty years and that makes it impossible to say that the transatlantic relationship has lost its significance. It has simply evolved and adapted itself to the changes of national and international politics and diplomacy. Yes, Americans and Europeans have different ways of looking at the world and this has often been the cause of diplomatic conflicts, but in a world where national affairs are more and more affected by what happens on the international stage, both parties have become increasingly dependent on each other which will ensure the continuation of their transatlantic relationship.

2. Methodology

This chapter will explain the methodology used for this research. First, a short explanation of the process that was followed to get to the theoretical framework for this essay will be given. Second, the method used to conduct the media analysis of chapter four will be laid out.

2.1 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework that will support the media analysis is discussed in chapter three. Following the conclusion of this chapter the collected newspaper articles or passages of the newspaper articles have been divided into several subcategories:

1. Security and individual human rights

2. American domestic and foreign surveillance policy 3. European surveillance and American surveillance

The different categories will make sure the content of the next chapters is well-ordered and easy to keep track of. In chapter three the various aspects of the subsections have been analyzed such as human rights and domestic versus foreign surveillance policy in the US. While in chapter four the subsections have been used to divide the chapter into three parts. All articles were read with a special focus on passages that touch on security legislation and the implications for fundamental rights, the differences between domestic and foreign surveillance strategy and last but not least, the analysis put a spotlight on the American surveillance legislation and their European counterparts.

The subsections were put together with the help of the work of Daniele Glaser, Marci Milanovic and Jack Balkin. All have a special focus on human rights and the threat secret services pose to these rights. In

The CIA in Western Europe and the Abuse of Human Rights, Daniele Glaser examines the activities of the

CIA in Europe during the Cold War and gives a good perspective on the history of American surveillance in Europe. Glaser is especially interested in the covert operations of the CIA in Europe after the Second World 80

War. According to the author it is extremely challenging for academics and journalists to uncover what really took place in Europe during the Cold War since access to information is limited:

Research into CIA covert action and human rights violations in Europe remains a challenging task for academics, as the evidence available is limited, morally sensitive and at times contradictory. […] When the stay-behind networks were discovered in 1990 the press observed that the ‘story seems straight from the pages of a political thriller’ and argued that this large international covert action program represented ‘the best-kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II’. Beyond such sensational journalism the hard facts were, however, much more difficult to come by. Also 15 years later it remains unclear when or whether the full story on the CIA stay-behind operations in Western Europe will be available for a larger public.

Daniele Glaser, ‘The CIA in Western Europe and the Abuse of Human Rights’, Intelligence and National Security,

80

If it is difficult for academics or journalists to uncover the actions of the CIA during the Cold War, a period that took place almost three decades ago, one can imagine that it is almost impossible to investigate the present activities of secret services without the help of whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden. Jack Balkin on the other hand focuses more on the future and the possible existence of a national surveillance state that is authorized to invade citizen’s privacy at all cost in order to protect national security:

In the National Surveillance State, the government uses surveillance, data collection, collation, and analysis to identify problems, to head off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social services. The National Surveil- lance State is a special case of the Information State-a state that tries to identify and solve problems of governance through the collection, collation, analysis, and production of information. 81

Balkin also provides an insight on the effects of the involvement of the private sector in government surveillance. Furthermore, Marko Milanovic provides a more legal approach to the development of security 82

policy in western countries. In his essay Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance, Milanovic 83

focuses on the legality of the surveillance programs put into place by primarily the US and Great Britain. Although the main issue of Milanovic’s paper is foreign surveillance, he starts by taking a look at the different domestic laws that are in place to protect privacy and then graduates to international law and their effect on national surveillance policy:

The primary purpose of this article is to advance this conversation by looking at one specific, threshold issue: whether human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and the ECHR even apply to foreign surveillance. […] The article will show that while there is much uncertainty in how the existing case law on the jurisdictional threshold issues might apply to foreign surveillance, this uncertainty should not be overestimated – even if it can and is being exploited.[…] The only truly coherent approach to the threshold question of applicability, I will argue, is that human rights treaties should apply to virtually all foreign surveillance activities. That the treaties apply to such activities, however, does not mean that they are necessarily unlawful. Rather, the lawfulness of a given foreign surveillance program is subject to a fact-specific examination on the merits of its compliance with the right to privacy, and in that, I submit, foreign surveillance activities are no different from purely domestic ones. 84

Since the term surveillance can have a very broad meaning it is best to clearly define the meaning of the concept that will be used as a guideline in this thesis. Marco Milanovic has provided the following definition:

[A]n umbrella term encompassing a wide range of activities conducted for the purpose of gathering intelligence, ranging from audio-visual observation or surveillance in a narrower sense, the interception of

Jack M. Balkin, ‘The Constitution in the National Surveillance State’, Minnesota Law Review, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-25.

81

Ibidem, pp. 4-5.

82

Marko Milanovic, ‘Human Rights and the Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age’, Harvard International

83

Law Journal, (2014), pp. 1-77.

Ibidem, pp. 7-9.

communications, electronic and otherwise, to the collection, storage, processing, and transfer of personal data to third parties. 85

Keeping in the same line as the Milanovic approach to surveillance policy, different levels of legislation were analyzed to form a theoretical framework. The different levels that have been used are national and international law. The right to privacy is a human right and therefore in most cases it is protected by either constitutional law or an international treaty. One of the main principles liberal democracies exist by is the rule of law and thus the respect of their own constitutional frameworks. Once it is clear how fundamental rights are protected, it also becomes clear under which circumstances they can be violated or restricted. Many of the laws have a passage mentioning national security as a justification for infringing upon privacy rights. Just as most of the surveillance legislation has a passage that mentions that they have been established for the sake of counterterrorism and are measures to ensure national security. In some cases their was no national legislation to provide the necessary protection against the implementation of surveillance activities. The United States for example have no constitutional law that explicitly protects privacy and are not bound to any international treaty regarding the protection of privacy. For EU countries this is different since EU legislation stands above national law of member states, as can be concluded from the rules of the European Court of Justice in the case Costa v. ENEL:

It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question. 86

Since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights has become a legal binding document for all EU members since article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty states: “The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of […] which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. This article makes the Charter a binding document that has the same legal status as primary European Union law. Therefore, even if a European member state does not provide freedom of privacy in its own national laws, it will still be protected through European law. This entire frame of reference needs to be taken into account when analyzing cases of surveillance policy.

2.2 Newspaper analysis

The documents leaked by Edward Snowden mid-2013 have been discussed extensively in both American and European media. This essay is focusing on international surveillance cooperation and its influence on the democratic principles in western society. Since Europe has been on the receiving end of the consequences of American surveillance laws this analysis of the Edward Snowden affair will be done by researching the reaction in Europe through media analysis. The kind of media outlet that is going to be used in this case was quite obvious, since Snowden selected newspapers as the media outlet to make the NSA documents public, it

Ibidem, p.7

85

‘Costa v. ENEL Case 6/64’, Judgement of the European Court of Justice, retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/

86