Demobilization of paramilitaries in Medellin : annihilation or restructuration?

(1)

i

Graduate School of Social Sciences MSc International Relations

Master Thesis

Demobilization of Paramilitaries in

Medellin: Annihilation or Restructuration?

Word count: 18.111

Supervisor: Abbey Steele Second reader: Jana Krause

Submission date: 23rd of June 2017

By Alexandre Marcou 11248262

(2)

(3)

iii

La paz es mucho más que el silencio de los fusiles1

(4)

iv

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank the people that I had the opportunity to interview, who opened up to me and shared their inspirational and breathtaking experiences. I could not have written this research without you and I am grateful for your openness and willingness to allow people to learn from your wisdom and knowledge. I am particularly thankful to Marina Jaramillo and Oscar Castaño who have generously dedicated time and energy to help me. Without them, I would not have had the opportunity to access people that opened my eyes and showed me the other side of reality. I would like to express my special gratitude to Búho for sharing his gripping stories that have inspired me throughout the research.

I am also grateful to my supervisor Dr. Abbey Steele for having encouraged me to go to Colombia and for having reassured me during the entire research process. Her guidance, support and understanding have been of great help to me. I express my gratitude to Dr. Jana Krause that has kindly agreed to be the second reader of the thesis.

I cannot leave without mentioning my parents, without whom I would not be where I am today. I greatly appreciate the freedom that they have always given to me, that has contributed to my personal fulfilment. Special thanks to Tariq Rami who had to bear with me during the stressful moments, and who always took time to provide me with emotional support. I would also like to say thanks to Luis Villafañe for his great patience and Lucy Lavirotte who has always been present when I needed her.

(5)

v

Abstract

How does a DDR process can lead to the restructuration of former armed structures? In post conflict settings around the world there has been a growing interest in the effects of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process, yet little is known about its impact on the restructuration of former armed structures. This research suggests that the demobilization of the United Self-Defence forces of Colombia (AUC) represented an exceptional process of criminal restructuration through which former combatants strengthened their criminal model. The present investigation contributes to the literature by providing a new theoretical framework that shows how a DDR process can trigger the criminal restructuration. Based on the findings from fieldwork in Medellín, the results show that the different components of the DDR process have enabled the armed structure to act less visibly, to renew its structure by getting rid of blocks and commanders and to adapt its strategy.

Keywords: Civil war; Medellín; DDR process; criminal restructuration; paramilitaries; criminality.

(6)

vi

Figures, Tables and Maps

Figure 1: Criminal Restructuration Model ... 25

Figure 2: Decomposition of the DDR process ... 26

Table 2: Mechanisms and sub-mechanisms of criminal restructuration ...28

(9)

ix

(10)

1

1. Introduction

On July 15, 2003, the Santa Fe de Ralito Accord launched negotiations between the Uribe government and the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). The accord provided for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the AUC, otherwise referred to as the paramilitaries. The accord envisioned the group’s demobilization by December 2005 in exchange for government efforts to reincorporate former paramilitaries into civilian life. In 2006, after 38 demobilization ceremonies, the government of Alvaro Uribe announces the end of the disarmament of 31.671 paramilitaries, the disarticulation of 37 paramilitary blocks and the dismantling of the armed structure (Daviaud, 2010).

Despite this apparent success, the emergence of armed groups in the areas that were once occupied by the paramilitaries started raising concerns. The persistence of drug trafficking, extortions, killings, disappearances and forced displacement were the first signs that alerted the public opinion and the authorities. It was quickly apparent that this criminal reorganization that emerged after the DDR process was not only composed by new armed actors. Most of the members were in fact paramilitaries, part of them mid-ranking officers that never demobilized, who took the control of the drug trade and re-established a territorial control.

The same phenomenon happened in Colombia’s second-largest city, Medellín, where demobilized paramilitaries were carrying out criminal activities. After the demobilization of the two urban blocks Cacique Nutibara and Heroes de Granada that demobilized respectively in 2003 and 2005, there was hope that the paramilitarism was going to come to an end. Not long after, however, specialists observed that former members of the two urban blocks started reorganizing the criminal model.

With a willingness to leave the past behind, the government avoided the use of the term “paramilitarism” and decided to name the new criminal groups “Emerging Criminal Gangs” (BACRIM). Several doubts have been raised about this new denomination since it was obvious that non-demobilized as well as demobilized paramilitaries were responsible for the escalation of violence. Yet, instead of replicating the same strategic model, paramilitaries underwent a process of restructuration. After the DDR process, in Medellín, criminals were acting more discreetly; they were renewing their structure by discarding blocks and members; and were changing their functioning mode through a different control over the population and a renewal of the relationship with the state (Amnistía Internacional, 2005; Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, 2008).

(11)

2

In light of this situation, it can be argued that the DDR process has failed in disarticulating the right-wing paramilitary group. While the goal of the process was to “reduce the chances of conflicts resuming and act as a platform for economic, political and social development” (Solomun & Ginifer, 2008, p.2), it became quickly apparent that there was still a long way to go before it could achieve this outcome. While there is information about how criminal groups have restructured after the DDR process, little is known about the factors that have provoked this restructuring.

In the academic world, critical voices have been raised, questioning the effectivity of the DDR processes (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Muggah, 2005). Studies on DDR processes have criticized the lack of special consideration towards cultural and contextual specificities (Bahamón, 2014), the weaknesses of the reintegration programs in re-socializing ex-combatants (Theidon, 2007) or the failure in ensuring a secure environment in the post-conflict period (Muggah, 2005).

The literature has also addressed the reasons explaining why ex-combatants of non-state armed groups have recurred to illegal and belligerent activities (Collier, 1994; Kaplan & Nussio, 2016). Scholars have identified poverty, unemployment, non-acceptance in their communities (Hill et al., 2008) or the dissatisfaction with the reintegration programs (Jennings, 2007) as the factors that have influenced in the ex-combatant’s decision to rearm.

Less is known about how these ex-combatants reorganize the criminal structure. The diversification of the economic activities (Dishman, 2001) or the shifts in military ranks (Daily, 2011) are examples of how the armed groups reorganize their structure and strategy after their demobilization. More data needs to be collected about the restructuration of criminal groups in order to better understand its mechanisms and dynamics.

Looking at the literature, it appears that scholars have studied DDR processes separately from the reconstitution of armed groups. It therefore seems that the existing literature has not considered the possibility that the DDR process itself could be responsible for the reconstitution and subsequent restructuration of the demobilized armed groups.

The present study aims at filling this gap, and examine whether there exists a correlation between the DDR process and the criminal restructuration.

The question that this thesis poses, is: How does a DDR process can lead to the

(12)

3

By taking the case of the DDR process of the AUC in Medellín, the aim of the thesis is to show how the process has influenced the restructuration of the paramilitaries. The underlying goal of the study is to demonstrate that part of the paramilitaries that never demobilized or that did it and reverted to criminal activities, found in the demobilization and reintegration process a unique opportunity to get rid of old leaders, succeed them seizing the drug business and other activities, and change their label and counterinsurgent discourse to act more discreetly.

In order to analyze whether the DDR process of the paramilitaries has led to a criminal restructuration, I make use of the findings of my fieldwork undertaken in April 2017 throughout several neighbourhoods of Medellín. Through the use of qualitative research methods, I have collected data from participant observations and 22 interviews with ex-paramilitaries from different blocks, local government officials, journalists, victims and members of NGOs. The combination of the findings from the fieldwork and the existent literature are used to develop a unique and comprehensive model that aims at conceptualizing my theory.

I propose to analyze the criminal restructuration by dividing it into three mechanisms: Invisibility/Purge/Adaptation. Invisibility refers to the opportunity created by the DDR process for the armed groups to act less visibly. Purge relates to the renewal of the criminal structure that has arisen after the beginning of the DDR process. Finally, Adaptation refers to the renewed strategy that new armed groups had to adopt after the demobilization process.

By decomposing the DDR process, the model explains how the different components of the process have triggered the mechanisms above mentioned.

The paper is organized into six sections. First, in the literature review, previous research on DDR processes and on the recurrence of armed conflict is presented. In a second part, a brief background of the paramilitary movement in Colombia and Medellín is provided. The background also describes the DDR process and its criticisms, followed by a presentation of the current criminal model in the city of Medellín. Subsequently, a description of the methodological approach and fieldwork follows. The part aims at describing the methods used for developing the theory and the data collected during the month-fieldwork. Afterwards, I proceed to the conceptualization of the theory through the creation of a model. This section, which represents the cornerstone of the research, intends to link the different components of the DDR process with the mechanisms of criminal restructuration. An additional part addresses the limits of the theory, as well as a discussion and recommendations about what sort of data would be needed to be collected to rigorously test the theory. Last but not least, the conclusion

(13)

4

provides a summary of the findings and personal recommendations about how the DDR process could have been improved to avoid the criminal restructuration.

(14)

5

2. Literature Review

This chapter reflects on the theoretical and methodological contributions to the topic of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. First, I will explore the academic debates about the functioning of the DDR processes with a particular focus on Colombia. In a second step I will examine what has been said about the reorganisation and restructuration of armed groups that have been part of a demobilization process.

After reviewing these two parts, my aim is to talk about a gap missing in the literature that will be then addressed throughout the rest of the investigation.

2.1 Does DDR work?

According to the United Nations, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has become an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation, featuring prominently in the mandates of peacekeeping operations over the last twenty years (United Nations, 2010). While disarmament refers to the laying down of arms from the combatants, demobilization is the process in which armed organizations decrease in size or are dismantled as one component of a broad transformation from a state of war to a state of peace (Theidon, 2006, p. 71). Finally, reintegration is a political, social and economic process that involves the strengthening of capacities of the ex-combatants and their re-socialization in society (Rolston, 2007).

Since 1989, international efforts to end protracted conflicts in Africa, Latin America, and Asia have included sustained investments in the DDR of combatants (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005). Nowadays, a lot of scholars see the DDR process as a necessary step to improve the prospects for peace and democracy in the aftermath of conflict (Walter, 1997; Sambanis & Wohl, 2010; Salomons, 2005). According to Salomons, DDR process “represents the touchstone, the moment of truth for any peace-building effort” (Salomons, 2005, p. 19). As attempts to support the transition from war to peace, DDR interventions have recorded some impressive achievements in terms of demobilization and disarmament in countries such as

Nicaragua2, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Sierra Leone where armed forces have been efficiently

reduced in size and weapons collected (Banholzer, 2014, p. 15). DDR programs have proved to be most successful when carried out as part of a larger reconstruction process. Overall

(15)

6

development is necessary for the accommodation of all ex-combatants in society (Rolston, 2007, p. 265).

However many scholars have questioned the efficiency of DDR processes (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005; Kigma, 2002; Bahamón, 2014; Muggah, 2005; Sambanis & Wohl, 2010). According to Wohl and Sambanis, the literature on DDR can be disconcerting in the repetitiveness of the “lessons learned”, but when we try to distill what we know about the effects of the programs on concrete outcomes, it becomes apparent that our knowledge about the impact of these programs is limited (2010, p. 43). Many studies start from the assumption that DDR helps build post-conflict peace, but the result is that “success” in terms of the substantive goals of the programs is often not defined (Sambanis & Wohl, 2010). Robert Muggah also criticizes the meaning of “success” by arguing that the objectives of various actors are widely divergent and even contradictory during the post-conflict period, with “seldom adequate reflection on their short, medium and long-term effects” (2005, p. 246). The lack of special consideration towards cultural and contextual specificities (Bahamón, 2014), the difficulty in discerning the individual contribution of the specific programs because of the multidimensional character of the interventions (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007), the weaknesses of the reintegration programs in re-socializing former combatants (Theidon, 2007), or the failure in ensuring a safe and secure environment in the post-conflict period (Muggah, 2005) are only a few examples of the controversies surrounding DDR processes.

In recent years, a large number of publications on DDR processes in Colombia has enriched the academic debate (Rozema, 2008; Nussio, 2012 a; Nussio, 2012b; Nussio, 2013; Restrepo & Bagley, 2011; Franco, 2014). The DDR processes in Colombia have been followed by vigorous public debate around their efficiency. Critics have questioned the unequal treatment of the ex-combatants and victims of the conflict, the limitations in the design of the transnational justice and the re-emergence of violence after the demobilization process (Nussio, 2013, p. 11). It is argued that DDR processes were difficult to implement in Colombia because of the persistence of the conflict (Stuij, 2009, p. 17). Two of the recommended preconditions for a successful DDR were absent: a secure environment in which the armed actors lay down their arms and the inclusion of all warring parties in the DDR program (Rozema, 2008, p. 428). According to Douglas Porch and María José Rasmussen, the DDR in Colombia has proven to be neither a smooth, nor a durable process that has merely transitioned, rather than terminated the violence (2008, p. 523).

(16)

7

The debate around the efficiency of DDR programs continues up till now, and it seems difficult to agree on their overall impact. What has happened in many cases is that former armed groups have re-emerged and rearmed after the demobilization process. How these armed groups reorganize and restructure?

2.2 The Restructuration of Armed Groups

Several studies have addressed the conflict recurrence and combatants’ involvement in crime after DDR processes (Collier, 1994; Kaplan & Nussio, 2016; Daily, 2011). At an individual-level, scholars have found different factors that influence the decision of ex-combatants to rearm. When asking under what conditions ex-ex-combatants will fight again in Liberia, Hill et al. (2008) have identified poverty, unemployment and non-acceptance in their families and communities as the most important factors. Bøas and Hatløy (2008) also surveyed Liberian ex-combatants and found instead that the main reason that makes them join armed groups and rearm after the demobilization are “security threats”. Moreover, another important factor is the dissatisfaction with the reintegration programs experienced by former combatants in countries such as South Africa (Mashike, 2004) or Liberia (Jennings, 2007). Enzo Nussio’s analysis on the recidivism of ex-combatants in Colombia shows that living in the midst of criminal bands can lure ex-combatants into crime and increase the likelihood of recidivism (Kaplan & Nussio, 2016, p. 23).

Although scholars have tried to explain the reasons why ex-combatants rearm, little is known about how an armed group restructures. According to Christina Steenkamp, besides surviving a peace process, armed groups are transformed: “They will mutate, yes. But disappear? No” (2009, p. 125). As noted by Dishman, armed groups that fought for political reasons change their strategy before negotiating with the government. This transformation that consists in undertaking profit-minded activities, has changed the way that guerrillas operate: “Guerrilla groups in Colombia and Burma appear disinterested in giving up their illicit activities in favour of a position at the bargaining table” (2001, p. 44).

Some studies have shown that there is a shift in the armed structure, in particular in the ranks of the former combatants (Daily, 2011; Daly, 2014; Themnér, 2011). Themnér (2011) finds in Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo that mid-ranking commanders have re-established relationships with former partners and have been responsible for the reconstitution of armed groups. In a similar vein, Sarah Zukerman Daily’s analysis on the power-sharing

(17)

8

agreement that took place between Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia during La

Violencia, has shown that ignoring mid-ranking officers prerogatives over the transition should

“provoke violence to resume” (2014, p. 347). It is necessary to acknowledge that the restructuration of armed groups has been very different from one context to another, and it is not very clear yet what its underlying causes are.

2.3 What is missing in the literature?

Although many scholars were interested in analyzing the efficiency of DDR processes, not much has been said about what happens next. The phenomenon of recidivism of ex-combatants has been studied, but there is less information about the restructuration of armed groups. It is not very clear how do armed groups that re-emerge after the demobilization process transform their mode of operation and adapt to a new environment. Moreover, the studies that have analyzed this phenomenon of restructuration have separated the DDR process from the transformation of the armed group happening in its aftermath.

Instead of examining DDR processes and the restructuration of armed groups separately, my study is aimed at linking them together. The way the programs of DDR are implemented may have a direct effect on the restructuration of armed groups. Thus, the goal of the study is to overcome the shortcomings above mentioned by theorizing that DDR processes can trigger the restructuration of armed groups.

To demonstrate the link between DDR process and criminal restructuration, I analyze the case of the demobilization process of the United Self-Force Defence of Colombia (AUC). But before showing in greater details the effects of the components of the DDR process on the restructuration of the armed group, I will present the background of my case in order to better understand the context and the actors involved.

(18)

9

3. Background

“To talk about Colombia is to talk about peace, but when one talks about peace, you have to talk

about war”

─ Luis Guillermo Pardo3

Before getting into the methodological and analytical part of my research, it appears necessary to provide background and context on the paramilitarism in Colombia, and more particularly Medellín. I will first provide an overview of the paramilitarism and introduce the peace negotiations that occurred during Uribe’s mandate. Second, I will explore the specificities of the DDR process of the paramilitaries by listing its constituent programs with a particular focus on the “Peace and Reconciliation Program” (PPR) founded in Medellín. As a final step, I will look at the current situation and examine whether the current criminal network is a continuation of the paramilitary model.

3.1 The Paramilitary Movement

In Colombia, right-wing paramilitary groups emerged as a widespread phenomenon in the 1980s in rural regions such as Cordoba and Magdalena (Cruz, 2007). According to Teresa Ronderos (2014), paramilitarism was born as a phenomenon of self-defence (autodefensa) that exerted violence with the aim of replacing the authority of the state in rural areas.

From the defensive and effective counterinsurgency of the beginnings, well rooted in the traditional, rural society, it turned to an offensive paramilitarism that defended private interests of landowners harmed by guerrillas (Nieto & García, 2007). The increasing relationships with drug traffickers lead to the penetration of crime and drug smuggling in paramilitary groups from the mid-1980s onward (Grajales, 2010). According to Palacios and Safford (Palacios & Safford, 2002, p. 661), the strong support from drug traffickers towards self-defence groups has allowed them to acquire more mobility and power, but on the other hand, has undermined their legitimate public image. This lack of legitimacy, however, did not stop them from becoming one of the most feared and bloodthirsty armed groups during the Colombian civil war.

Defined by Duncan (2006) as “Los señores de la Guerra” (warlords) paramilitary leaders started controlling whole regions, particularly during the 1990s, when paramilitary groups were

(19)

10

integrated under the umbrella of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). This organization, founded in 1997 by Carlos Castaño and his brothers Fidel and Vicente, has been recognized as “the most powerful paramilitary block the country had seen” (Steele, p. 152). Their power is undoubtedly linked to their strong ties with the State. For some, paramilitarism works as a policy of State terrorism, while for others it is a response to the abuses committed by the guerrilla against defenseless civilians in the absence of the state: Interestingly, in both cases, the State is responsible either for its actions or inaction (Jaramillo, 2005, p. 59).

Already in the early 80s, criminal gangs operating in Medellín served a dual purpose: they actively participated in the drug trade and worked as mercenaries to help the cartel and the government in the enforcement of security. Although these criminals shared similarities with the paramilitaries, it is in the 1990s when the paramilitarism officially entered in Medellin.

The increasing presence of urban militias linked to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC) or the National Liberation Army (ELN) in several communes of Medellín4

forced Carlos Castaño to announce AUC’s intention of taking control of Medellín in the mid-1990s. As mentioned by an interviewee, “the conflict was so strong that criminal gangs and

combos confronted with the militias begun to seek support from the paramilitaries”5. This is

the moment when the Bloque Metro (BM), led by Carlos Mauricio García, alias “Doble Cero” emerged as a strong military presence in Medellín. By 2000, the BM had co-opted many of Medellín’s criminal gangs and became the dominant paramilitary group in the city (Amnistía Internacional, 2005).

Shortly after, the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (CN), led by Fernando Murillo Bejerano alias “Don Berna” emerged and fought against the BM to control Medellin. Don Berna, who was

the leading figure of “La Oficina”6_{, joined Carlos Castaño and reinvented himself as a}

paramilitary. With the AUC’s approval, he declared war against “Doble Cero” and sought the control of Medellín. The fact that a drug lord was at the head of a paramilitary block showed the increasing power of drug-traffickers within the AUC, particularly in Medellín. According

4_{For instance, the case of the commune 13 is well-known because of the great presence of militias in the 1990s.}

See Aricapa, 2015 to understand the history of the commune 13 and the military operations led by the state and the paramilitaries to annihilate left-wing militias.

5_{Carvajal (Professor at the University of Antioquia), interview by author, Medellín, 29 April 2017.}

6_{“La Oficina de Envigado” (The Office of Envigado) is a drug cartel and criminal organization that has arisen}

(20)

11

to a Colombian journalist, criminality, drug traffic and paramilitarism went hand in hand: “Don

Berna mixed urban paramilitarism with gang members, mafias, drug dealers… everything.”7

Another paramilitary block, called “Heroes de Granada” also led by Don Berna was active in Medellín. This block had a similar structure to the block CN, but its command centre

was in rural areas in Eastern Antioquia8_.

With the intention to put an end to the violence, the newly elected Colombian President Alvaro Uribe initiated a negotiation process that resulted in the Santa Fe de Ralito agreement signed in July 2003. This committed the AUC to fully demobilize by December 2005 (Rozema, 2008, p. 430). Although the deadline was not feasible for all the paramilitary blocks, by June 2006, more than 30,000 paramilitaries were formally demobilized (OACP, 2005).

3.2 DDR Process and Criticisms

As mentioned by Enzo Nussio (2011, p. 88), the stated objective of demobilizing the paramilitaries amidst the conflict between Colombian government forces and guerrillas was to “re-establish the monopoly of force in the hands of state”. In order to open the negotiations with the paramilitaries, the government reformed the law to allow conversations with illegal armed groups without the need to grant them a political category.

The concentration, disarmament and demobilization of the military structures started on November 25, 2003, with the demobilization of the block CN and concluded on August 15, 2005, with the demobilization of the Block Élmer Cardenas. After 38 acts of demobilization, 31,671 men and women demobilized and 18,051 weapons were collected (Rendón et al. 2012, p. 306)9_.

The process of demobilization was guided by the Law 782. This law enabled amnesties and granted pardons to people that did not commit heinous crimes against humanity (Amnistía International, 2005). Due to the pressure exerted by the international community and NGOs for the laxity of the law, the government eventually withdrew the law and replaced it by the project 975 also called “Justice and Peace Law”, approved in 2005. The purpose of the new legal framework was to prosecute and sentence members of illegal armed groups which had benefited from the demobilization process. Ex-paramilitaries admitting to have committed

7_{Fernando Quijano (Journalist at Analisis Urbano), interview by author, Medellín, 17 April 2017.} 8_{Bhúo (Ex-paramilitary), interview by autor, Medellín, 21 April 2017.}

9_{The list of the demobilization processes presented by the High Commission of Peace (Alto Comisionado Para}

(21)

12

serious crimes before the demobilization, received sentences that ranged from 5 to 8 years. The Justice and Peace Law states that a postulate cannot access to the benefits granted by the law if he had been convicted of crimes after having handed his weapons (Verdad Abierta, 2014). The government decided to extradite 22 paramilitaries to the United States that were supposedly committing crimes from the prison (Verdad Abierta, 2010).

The body responsible for the reinsertion and reintegration of the demobilized paramilitaries that were under the law Justice and Peace was the Colombian Agency for

reintegration (ACR) founded in 201110. According to the numbers, 23,081 out of 31,551

demobilized paramilitaries have participated in reintegration programs, 1,658 have been

killed11 and 7,000 have not participated.

In Medellin, the Peace and Reconciliation Program (PPR), funded in 2004 under the initiative of the mayor Sergio Fajardo, has dealt with the reintegration of former combatants that were active in the department of Antioquia. Whereas at the beginning the emphasis was on the economic reintegration, the program realized that the attention had to be paid on other

aspects12. The program currently works with a multidimensional model that addresses the

reintegration of demobilized paramilitaries through the implementation of educational programs; psychosocial assistance; financial support; projects for the reinsertion in the communities and health provision.

Although the demobilization and reintegration processes have certainly had some

positive effects13, they have been harshly criticized because of its inconsistencies and

ambiguities14. As marked by a journalist, “We have to make a big difference between what has

been the theory of the DDR process and what has been the practice”15_{. Evidence suggests that}

the list provided by the block CN included a lot of common criminals or even ordinary civil,

10_{The ACR has replaced the Program for the return to civilian life (PRVC) and the High Counsellor for the}

Reintegration. The newly reformed ACR was created to fix the limitations of its predecessors.

11_{The killings were for the most part related to acts of revenge, or because demobilized people did not want to}

get back onto the new armed groups.

12_{Francisco Javier Cardona (Counsellor at ACR), interview by author, Medellín, 10 April, 2017.}

13_{As mentioned by a journalist, “Many new and old weapons were withdrawn from circulation, the idea that a}

negotiation was possible came true, and people that only knew how to use a weapon were starting to construct discourses and started talking with the community and the media” (Oscar Castaño, Interview by author, Medellín, 2 May, 2017).

14_{See also, Porch & Rasmussen; Rozema, 2008; Gómez, 2013; Wienand & Tremaria, 2017; Amnistía}

Internacional, 2005; Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2014.

(22)

13

and a lot of combatants were not demobilized (Amnistía International, 2005)16. This partial

demobilization was therefore considered as a masquerade. As a social leader puts it,

“The process was a paraphernalia because it became obvious that the demobilized were not paramilitaries, but rather people that were in the poor neighbourhoods of Medellin who were given a uniform and were offered money to buy food.”17

There were unwritten interests stemming from the decision of the government and the paramilitaries to find a common ground for agreement. One of the reasons that has certainly played a role is the relation between the government and the armed structure. The revelations from the paramilitaries have highlighted how important were the links between the

paramilitarism and the political network (Daviaud, 2010)18. When asking about the extradition

of the paramilitary chiefs, a professor said that “the government of Uribe had to extradite a lot

of people to hide the truth”19. Moreover, in addition to hiding the truth, the government wanted

to clear new ground and overshadow the paramilitarism: “The demobilization was made to take

the qualitative and quantitative leap and declare that Paramilitarism is dead”. 20The goal of the

demobilization was to show in Colombia and in the international stage that the government was making all possible efforts to declare the end of the right-wing movement. On the paramilitary side, the demobilization was seen as a way to legalize the money; gain immunity and to benefit from the programs.

The programs of reintegration implemented in Colombia, and more particularly Medellín were also criticized. Whereas the government talks about a “reincorporation into civilian life”, the different programs do not tackle issues such as the political participation of the demobilized, the institutional reforms or the economic reforms. Demobilized people constantly complain about the unlikely chances they have to find a job (MAPP-OEA, 2008). Last but not least, the fact that the programs are exclusively addressed to the ex-combatants has raised awareness in various sectors of society that push for victims’ reparation.

16_{According to Amnesty International (2005), there were more than 2000 combatants fighting in the ranks of}

the CN, but only 868 demobilized.

17_{Jorge Carmona (Social leader), interview by author, Medellín, 2 May 2017.}

18_{The investigations conducted by the Supreme Court of Justice in 2006 have reported that 34 out of 102}

elected senators (33%) and 25 out of 168 deputies had connections with paramilitaries.

19_{Gabriel Carvajal (Professor at the University of Antioquia), interview by author, Medellín, 29 April 2017.} 20_{Fernando Quijano (Journalist at Analisis Urbano), interview by author, Medellín, 17 April 2017.}

(23)

14

3.3 The New Criminal Model

Just when the government proclaimed the end of the paramilitary era, the country faced a new cycle of violence that shared many characteristics with the paramilitarism. Since the beginning of 2006, international organizations and national NGOs started to be concerned

about the emergence of new groups called “Emergent Criminal Gangs” (BACRIM)21_{such as}

“Los Águilas Negras”, “Los Rastrojos” or “Nueva Generación” (Daviaud, 2010, p. 150). According to the report from the NGO “Nuevo Arco Iris” (2008), there is a presence of “criminal gangs” in 27 departments of the country. According to the same report, the number of members of the groups varies from 3000 to 10,000. Interestingly, these groups were located in paramilitary zones of influence.

Diverse sectors of the society started wondering what this new wave of violence was. The government, for its part, declared that paramilitarism was a thing of the past, and asserted that the emergent groups were only criminal groups at the service of the drug trade. On the other hand, many analysts considered these groups as a continuation of the paramilitarism as their existence obey to three main factors: the maintenance of the criminal activity exerted by alleged demobilized paramilitaries; permanence of non-demobilized paramilitaries and the formation of new paramilitary groups related to the drug trade and other criminal activities

(Daviaud, 2010). As mentioned by a professor from the University of Antioquia, “This is

paramilitarism in a concrete analysis of the reality. When they continue to threaten and kill

social leaders, we realize that the paramilitary policy remains alive”22

Other analysts prefer to say that these groups preserve the characteristics of the paramilitaries but have new interests. According to the Peace Mediator of Antioquia, “they have a paramilitary mentality in the sense that they still see the guerrilleros as their biggest

enemies, but they do not have the same structure as before”23_.

All in all, these criminal gangs that have emerged after the partial demobilization process look very much alike their predecessors. Contrary to the view put forward by the government, their activities are not just geared towards drugs trade and organized crime; they also persecute civilians and social organizations. Moreover, the downward trend in the homicides that took place after the DDR process is starting to be reversed in the departments where these groups are concentrated. The reasons are the disputes between the armed groups that fight for the

21_{In reference to “Bandas Criminales emergentes”.}

22_{Gabriel Carvajal (Professor at the University of Antioquia), interview by author, Medellin, 29 April 2017.} 23_{Luis Guillermo Pardo (Peace Mediator of Antioquia), interview by author, Medellín, 1 May 2017.}

(24)

15

territorial control. It is still the case in the communes 5 and 8 of Medellín where “Los

Urabeños”24_{and the “Rastrojos” fight over territorial access}25_.

The presence of these illegal armed structures has a direct impact on the civilian population: these actors restrict their mobility, exert a social control and put in place an illegal economy based on the extortion. By adapting to a new environment “freed from the paramilitarism”, these armed factions continue to disrupt the normal functioning of the institutions (Daviaud, 2010, p. 153). The current public policies and reintegration programs have proved to be insufficient and incapable of containing the rearmament phenomenon. As the programs treat all the ex-combatants in the same way, regardless of their ranks, a part of the disillusioned mid-ranking combatants have decided to retake the weapons.

In light of the foregoing, several questions arise. It seems that the DDR process has played a role in the emergence of these criminal gangs. The restructuration of these illegal armed groups are probably linked with the DDR process implemented by the government. Each component of the process has certainly had an impact on the way new groups have emerged. That leads to the following question:

How the DDR process of the AUC has led to the restructuration of the paramilitarism?

In order to answer to this question, I have conducted fieldwork in Medellín to obtain first-hand information. The next section describes the methods of investigation used during the research and will explain how I proceed to the elaboration of a new model that conceptualize the theory.

24_{Also called “Clan del Golfo”, “Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia” or “Clan Úsuga”.} 25_{Oscar Castaño (Journalist at Oriéntese), interview by author, Medellín, 2 May 2017.}

(25)

16

4. Fieldwork and Methods

The following section introduces the research methods adopted throughout the design of the thesis. My aim is not just to list the methods used, but more to explain why such methods were employed and how the process unfolded. I describe my methodological framework in order to explain the process that led me to the conception of the theory and the theoretical model. This part is thus aimed at exploring why I ended up analyzing the relationship between the DDR process and the criminal restructuration, and how I intend to study this phenomenon. First, I will describe the methodological approach I have used and explain the selection of my case. In a second step, I will discuss the methods employed by giving a particular emphasis on the fieldwork conducted in Medellin.

4.1 Methodological approach

4.1.1 My approach

I have conducted qualitative research during the whole process. This method that focuses on one or a small number of cases has allowed me to make use of intensive interviews, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a comprehensive account of an event (King et al., 1994, p. 4).

I have decided to use a case study as it allows the researcher “to retain the holistic characteristics of real-life events while investigating empirical events” (Yin, 1984, p. 23). The use of qualitative methods in case study research combined with the conduction of fieldwork were very useful to gain flexibility and to understand the perceptions of my interviewees. If I had used another approach such as a quantitative analysis or if I had not gone into the field, I would certainly have had limited results. In fact, talking with my interviewees has enabled me to better grasp the subject, have a better perception of reality and widen my scope.

The fieldwork process made me realize that it was better to follow an inductive approach. I have therefore decided to engage in a theory-building model that has allowed me to be very flexible and open for the conception of my theory. As argued by Eisenhardt, theory developed from case study research is likely to have important strengths like novelty, testability, and empirical validity, which arise from the intimate linkage with empirical evidence (1989, p. 547). This theory-building approach and its independence from prior literature or past empirical observation can be particularly well-suited to new research areas or research areas for which

(26)

17

existing theory seems inadequate (Ibid, p. 549). However, it must be noted that building theories can have weaknesses. In fact, the research can result in idiosyncratic theory. As I will clarify in the discussion part, my case study theory that has been built through a bottom-up approach is not easy to generalize. In fact, “grand” theory requires multiple studies and an accumulation of both theory-building and theory-testing empirical studies (Ibid, p. 547).

Throughout the paper, I will try to show that my theory is plausible based on the results of my fieldwork. For further research, the results should be tested in order to see if they are generalizable to other cases.

4.1.2 Case study selection

I have decided to take Colombia as the starting point of the research. I believe Colombia is an appropriate case for scholars and practitioners that wish to analyze Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes. As a matter of fact, DDR processes have been repeatedly implemented throughout the conflict since the ten-year civil war La Violencia (1948–1958). As an illustration, the communist 19th of April Movement (M-19) formalized peace negotiations in September as early as 1989, when the group’s leadership signed an agreement with the government that outlined the stipulations of DDR and the formation of the M-19 Democratic Alliance political party.

The Colombian case is very special in the sense that DDR programs have been implemented while the war was still raging. The United Nations clearly states that DDR processes are an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation (UNDDR, 2005). Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the challenge to bring the DDR programmes to a sustainable peace is greater in Colombia. If the war still brings opportunities, the ex-combatants will be tempted or forced to take up arms again.

My aim was to focus on a specific demobilization process that has taken place in Colombia. When doing my research before the fieldwork, I was surprised to discover that more than half of the 52,000 individuals certified as demobilized between August 2002 and January 2010, belonged to the right-wing paramilitary group united self-defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) (Guáqueta, 2009, p. 21). The critics, controversies and unresolved problems related to the demobilization of the AUC made me want to delve further into the subject

Moreover, for a matter of time and practical limitations, I have decided to focus the research on Medellín. The city was not chosen randomly. In fact, the department of Antioquia where Medellín is located was one of the departments with the highest presence of

(27)

18

paramilitaries. Moreover, Medellin has played a major role in the reintegration process of former paramilitaries, in particular through the launch of the Peace and Reconciliation Program (PPR) that constitutes a unique framework, supposedly more effective than other reintegration programs across the country (Ramírez, 2010).

Therefore the research draws on the DDR process of the paramilitaries implemented in Medellín. By looking at the criminal model that has emerged after the process, the goal of the research is to see whether the restructuration is caused by the case under study.

In addition, some practical reasons have been taken into account when selecting my case. Firstly, I had the chance to be guided and supervised by Dr. Abbey Steele, who has extensively written and researched on the Colombian Civil war. And second, I knew my fluency in Spanish was going to be of valuable help to conduct the research.

4.1.3 Initial plan and the turnover of the research

Before doing my fieldwork in Medellin, I had a very different plan. The aim of the research was to test a specific hypothesis conceived before collecting the data. However, I discovered while doing fieldwork that it was very complicated to test it.

My original plan was to analyze the reintegration of the members of two paramilitary blocks (Cacique Nutibara and Héroes de Granada). My case studies were the two ex-paramilitary blocks and my goal was to conduct a within-case analysis in which I would have analyzed the ex-combatants at an individual level, in order to evaluate their reintegration into society. I first wanted to explore the differences between the two blocks, see if former combatants of these two groups have reintegrated differently and finally explain why they had or had not reintegrated in the same way. Starting from the point that most former members of the block CN came from urban areas and most former members of the block HG came from rural areas, I posited the following hypothesis: “Ex-combatants coming from urban areas reintegrate more easily into society.”

However, while digging deeper into the subject, I understood that the outcome “reintegration” was going to be difficult to analyze. As stated by Carlos Vélez, specialized in the Colombian civil war:

(28)

19

“There is a disarmament but there is neither reinsertion nor reintegration. To what they reintegrate if they were not integrated? RE-integrate to what? They were born in the logic of war, and they continue doing the same thing”26_.

In fact, according to most of the respondents, too few people have actually reintegrated into society. The DDR process in Colombia and Medellín has been highly criticized and despite the effort of the government to cover up the reality, most of the former combatants have

reoffended27. As I will explain in my theory, most of the individuals that benefited from the

programs were surprisingly civilians that never took part in the armed conflict.

To illustrate this point, I want to refer to my experience. With the help of a journalist, I had contacted several paramilitaries located in the communes 5 (Castilla) and 8 (Villa Hermosa), known for their dangerousness. Before meeting them I received two calls warning me that they could not guarantee my security. If inhabitants of the communes would have seen me talking with a “reintegrated” paramilitary, my life and his life would have been compromised. How can we talk of reintegration if former paramilitaries cannot even talk about their experiences? Moreover, after interviewing a former mid-ranking officer that told me he was fully reintegrated, I was surprised to see him talking with a friend about the members of the criminal groups with great detail. He then recognized that he was still in contact with the commanders of the criminal gangs and that he almost accepted “very interesting” offers to join the group. I do not think that someone that is still aware of all the criminal dynamics and who almost accepted their offers can be considered as “reintegrated”. These findings have raised my awareness about the complexity of the demobilization process of paramilitaries in Medellin.

After talking with several specialists, I arrived to the conclusion that the DDR process was in part responsible for the current situation. My analysis then focused on the restructuration of the criminal model and on the mechanisms that were accountants for such mutation. I then started asking questions related to the controversies of the demobilization process, the ties between the paramilitarism and the current criminal movement and other issues which struck me as relevant for the investigation.

26_{Gabriel Carvajal (Professor at the University of Antioquia), interview by author, Medellín, 29 May 2017.} 27_{Interviews with Fernando Quijano, Oscar Castaño, Carlos Vélez, Gabriel Carvajal, Luis Guillermo Pardo, and}

(29)

20

4.2 Fieldwork

I have collected most of the data during the fieldwork, through interviews and participant observations. In my view, the fieldwork was necessary in order to get a better sense of reality and find information that was not only based on the official version. The participant observations enabled me to learn about the activities of the people under study in the natural setting through observing and participating in their activities. This process has provided me the context for development of sampling guidelines and interview guides.

The fieldwork was conducted during a month stay in Medellin from mid-April to early May 2017. Field research consisted of a combination of 22 extensive interviews (see Annex 1), and participant observations conducted in a workshop organized by the Colombian

Reintegration Agency, in the National Congress of Peace that took place on the 28th of April,

and during my meetings with ex-paramilitaries. My first emphasis was on former paramilitaries, as their experiences were the core of my research, but I started to doubt whether all the information was honest and started focusing on journalists, researchers and other specialists that could provide me more information about the subject matter.

4.2.1 Interviews

I decided to conduct semi-structured interviews based on a predetermined set of open questions in order to have the freedom to explore different subjects. I adapted my questionnaire throughout the research and ended up with a more structured design as the research topic became more precise. The questionnaire was adapted according to the position of the interviewee.

The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR), which is the official body in charge of coordinating, advising, and implementing the Route to Reintegration for demobilized combatants from illegal armed groups, did not accept my request for interviewing former

paramilitaries28_{. I therefore decided to start interviewing employees of the agency in their}

offices in Medellin. I interviewed some officials and they gave me access to two demobilized paramilitaries that were working in the agency and were the examples of a successful reintegration. As I wanted to see the other end of the spectrum, I managed to contact a

28_{They did not specify the reasons, but I suspect that the fact that I come from another country played a role in}

their decision. There is probably confidential information that they do not want to share with foreign students. Otherwise, maybe the ACR did not give me the permission for security matters, or because it was afraid of showing that the demobilization process was not as successful as they stated.

(30)

21

known journalist that had extensive knowledge about the paramilitarism. He put me in contact with ex-paramilitaries from different military ranks, other journalists that were critical of the demobilization process, and most importantly with Luis Guillermo Pardo. The interview with the latter, who is the Peace Mediator of Antioquia has been of great help as his important position and immense knowledge provides greater validity to my theory. I was also in contact with two NGOs of victims in order to see the victim points of view.

The interviews have been consistently improving throughout the research. As I had to interview people from different positions and with different points of view, I reconfigured my interview guide an adapted it to ask relevant questions related to the theory.

I recorded most of my interviews, and most of the time, I found quiet places where we could talk without risk. After transcribing the interviews I have translated the relevant parts and proceeded to a manual coding. I created tables containing each important aspect of the research and inserted the corresponding quotations.

4.2.2 Participant Observations

It was very interesting to attend a workshop organized by the ACR in the city of Itaguï, located at the gateway of Medellin in the Metropolitan Area of the Aburrá Valley. The workshop was an awareness campaign designed for officials working for the city hall. The goal was to raise their awareness about the presence of former paramilitaries in the city in order to help them to reintegrate. It shocked me to see how little knowledge officials had about the DDR process of former paramilitaries in their city. Moreover, attending the National Congress of peace was very useful. Although the subject was the negotiations between the government and the FARC, It allowed me to make up my own mind about the possible solutions and create parallels between the current demobilization with the FARC and the one with the paramilitaries.

Finally, I kept my ears open when spending time with the former paramilitaries. It allowed me to discover things that I could not have found by only interviewing them. As mentioned earlier I found out that various ex-paramilitaries were still involved in a criminal network while they were telling me that they had nothing to do with the criminality anymore. I must note that the findings from the participant observations are not explicitly used in the paper. However, they have been of great help as they have served as an inspiration and have supported my findings.

(31)

22

4.2.3 Challenges and ethical considerations

The biggest challenge I experienced was to talk with former paramilitaries. I struggled to find a good contact that could help me to meet these people, as the ACR did not accept my request. The ex-combatants only accepted to talk to me when they knew I was sent by a reliable source.

A second challenge was related to security. Many people warned me to be careful with the questions I asked and warned me not to ask names as I could put them at risk. In practice, I felt fairly free to ask my questions and did not experience any troubles. I was also surprised to see the high protection and number of bodyguards that some of my interviewees had. It was important for my research to see how social leaders, NGO members and journalists put their lives at risk when practicing their profession. It helped me to understand that the criminality in Medellín is not over.

Regarding the ethical considerations, I was aware that my research required me to interact with human subjects and I made sure to request the consent of the research participants before I conducted the interviews. The social head of the community in the neighbourhood of “Aranjuez”, located in the popular commune 1 asked me to change the names of the former combatants. Therefore, some of the names used in the research have been changed for ethical purposes.

In the next section I will conceptualize my theory that is aimed at linking the DDR process of the paramilitaries with the criminal restructuration that took place after the process. I will decompose the DDR process in order to see how its components have played a role in the criminal restructuration.

(32)

23

5. Theory

As a first step, I will introduce my theory, whose purpose is to relate the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process of the paramilitaries with the criminal restructuration. Secondly, I will explain the modelling of my theory in which I will define the components of the DDR and the mechanisms of the criminal restructuration followed by an explanation of the model’s design. Finally, the rest of the section will be devoted to the conceptualization of the theory.

5.1 DDR process and criminal restructuration

Through a process of theory-building, my aim is to answer the following question:

How does the DDR process lead to the restructuration of former armed structures?

I propose that a DDR process can favour the evolution of a criminal model. In this sense, we can understand the implementation of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration as an exceptional process of criminal restructuration through which former armed structures become less visible, adapt and strengthen their criminal model.

In Colombia, the process of DDR of the United Self-Defence of Colombia (AUC) brought about a profound transformation of the dynamics of the conflict. In this specific case, the DDR cannot be considered as the annihilation of a paramilitary model but more as a mechanism of criminal evolution that has led to the restructuration of the paramilitary movement. Overall, what transcended with the paramilitaries was not only a partial demobilization: it became a real evolution.

I believe that the DDR process of the AUC has triggered the perfect conditions for the incubation of new groups that have taken advantage of this situation to undertake a process of criminal restructuration. The DDR has been seen as an exceptional opportunity for a paramilitary reinvention in which a new actor—successor of the paramilitarism—has emerged refined, and freed from their old heritage that prevented it from being more agile and pragmatic.

(33)

24

5.2 Model: Invisibility/Purge/Adaptation

My aim is to design a model that shows how the transit from former paramilitaries to a new criminal structure has been triggered by the DDR process. In order to do so, I propose that the DDR process has led to a process of criminal restructuration through three mechanisms:  Invisibility: This mechanism is linked to the opportunity created by the DDR process for the armed groups to act less visibly. In this sense, the DDR process generated the emergence of groups that were not obligated to use the “paramilitary” label, and that had to change their counterinsurgent discourse rendering them more discrete. Moreover, the apparent “success” of the DDR process applauded by the government, has allowed the new criminality to operate out of sight.

 Purge: This mechanism is linked to the new structure adopted by the criminal network since the beginning of the DDR process. Purge is understood here as the process of abandonment, discard and renewal of the armed structure that has arisen during and after the DDR process. The DDR process has operated as a sieve by enabling the new group to get rid of blocks and commanders. By removing some of the military leaders, the DDR process enabled mid-ranking officers to take on the power and reorganize the internal structure.

 Adaptation: This mechanism is linked to the behaviour that the new armed groups had to adopt after the DDR process. Adaptation is understood as the reorientation of the criminal network that had to operate in a different way, renew its social control and change its relations with the state in the aftermath of the DDR process.

(34)

25

Criminal

Restructuration

Figure 1: Criminal Restructuration Model

As mentioned in the methodological section, the theory builds on the DDR process that took place in Medellín. Most of the ex-combatants that I have interviewed come from the two rural blocks: Cacique Nutibara (CN) and Héroes de Granada (HG). Therefore, many of the new criminal structures that have emerged after the DDR process in Medellín are composed by

former members from these two blocks29_.

As my theory is based on the DDR process that was implemented with the paramilitaries that were active in Medellín or paramilitaries that were active in other areas but reintegrated in Medellín, it seems important to explore how each component of this specific process has affected the mechanisms of criminal restructuration above mentioned. The different components of the process have not affected each mechanism in the same way. I have decided to disassociate the DDR process in four components in order to take a closer look at the specific effects that each component had on the mechanisms of criminal restructuration.

I propose to dissemble the DDR process of the paramilitaries in four parts: disarmament and concentration; disbandment of paramilitaries; legal framework and the reintegration program “Peace and Reconciliation Program” (PPR) (Figure 2). I have decided to divide the

29_{However, some combatants that fought with rural blocks (Bloque Mineros, Bloque Elmer Cárdenas, Bloque}

Calima…) have joined the ranks of the new criminal structures that operate in Medellín. It is the case with the members of the “Urabeños” that come from rural areas but have decided to make alliances with criminal bands in Medellín. DDR Invisibility (Opportunity) Purge (Structure) Adaptation (Behaviour)

(35)

26

process in this way because I believe those are the four most important components of the DDR process of paramilitaries in Medellín.

Figure 2: Decomposition of the DDR process

-Disarmament and concentration: This component of the process is the starting point of the DDR process. During this stage, the combatants from a paramilitary block lay down their arms in an official ceremony and are then collectively transferred to what is called “concentration

zones”30_{. In these zones, ex-combatants enter into a process of “re-education” for peaceful}

coexistence. This process usually lasts between 2 and 3 months. Disarmament can be achieved individually, but in this case ex-combatants do not undergo the concentration phase.

—Disbandment of paramilitaries: This component of the process is the disarticulation of the armed structure. I define this stage as the willingness of the Colombian government to dissolve the paramilitarism. This process is not only linked to the demobilization of the ex-combatants themselves but also represents the elimination of the “paramilitary” label. The aim of this process is to mark a break from the past and declare the extinction of the AUC.

—Legal Framework: This component addresses the criminal law jurisdictions that regulate the demobilization of ex-combatants. Although several laws have been issued and modified

throughout the demobilization process, I will focus on the “Justice and Peace” law31_{. This law}

has been at the heart of the DDR process and still regulates the situation of the ex-paramilitaries to the present day.

—Reintegration program (PPR): This component constitutes the most complex and sensitive phase of the DDR process. The reintegration of former paramilitaries takes place on a long-term basis, and it is complicated to assess the program’s success. The “Peace and

30_{Cacique Nutibara (CN) gathered in a recreational centre in the municipality of La Ceja; HG concentrated in}

the small town of Cristales, in the municipality of San Roque.

31_{Also called law 975.}

DDR Disarmament and Concentration Disbandment of paramilitaries Legal framework Reintegration program (PPR)

(36)

27

Reconciliation Program” (PPR) is different from other programs implemented in other parts of

Colombia in terms of its policies and monitoring system32.

Last but not least, it is important to briefly define what I mean by “restructured armed groups”. As mentioned in the context, there is a vigorous debate in Colombia regarding the naming of the new phenomenon of violence. In my view, what has arisen after the demobilization process is a group of actors with a strong paramilitary ideology. In the same vein as Restrepo et al. (2008), I consider that the new phenomenon can be described as

Neoparamilitarism. The new armed structures that were born after the DDR process have

changed their strategies of territorial and population control with regard to the methods used by its predecessors. Yet they have the same sources of financing such as the sale of drugs, illegal transport, micro traffic, illegal mining, extortions or money laundering, and still have an offensive discourse against leftists and social leaders. They are not paramilitaries in the traditional sense but their ideology and functioning mode is closely linked to their predecessors.

In the next part I will show that this model is plausible based on the findings from my fieldwork in Medellín. I will divide the section in three parts corresponding to each mechanism and examine how the components of the DDR process have enabled their blooming.

5.3 Conceptualizing the model

In order to conceptualize my model, I have chosen to subdivide the three mechanisms in several sub-mechanisms (Table 2).

32_{For practical matters, I was not able to compare the PPR with other reintegration programs implemented in}

(37)

28

Restructuration of the criminal model

a) Invisibility -Apparent success

-Change of label & discourse

b) Purge -Renewed Structure

-Liberation from the commanders

c) Adaptation -New operating mode

-New social control

-Renewed relation with the state

Table 1: Mechanisms and sub-mechanisms of criminal restructuration

For the sake of concision, I will only connect one component of the DDR process to each sub-mechanism. Although I believe that other components have also played a role, I will focus on the component that had the greatest effect on each sub-mechanism.

a) Invisibility

The government considers that the paramilitarism has died after the implementation of the DDR process. It is in this context that the armed structures have had the opportunity to reconstitute by getting rid of their label and counterinsurgent discourse. The new criminality has transformed in a more discrete and imperceptible phenomenon.

Apparent success:

In Medellín, the reintegration program (PPR) and its innovative multidimensional model was perceived as a well-designed tool for reintegrating demobilized combatants into society. As mentioned by a counsellor working at the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR),

“When the block Cacique Nutibara demobilized, Medellín started to become a benchmark in the country. The monitoring and accompanying programs designed by the PPR towards the ex-combatants are the most efficient in the world.”33

After meeting with ex-combatants that were working in the ACR, it seemed that the reintegration program was in fact a success. One of them said that: “I have benefited a lot from

33_{Francisco Javier Cardona (Counsellor at the ACR), interview by author, Medellín, 10 April 2017.}