An Intersectional Plea for Complexity:
The Inadequacy of Universal Basic Income as a Solution to the Oppression of Sex Workers
Name: Marieke van der Gaag
Student Number: 12060925
Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations
First Reader: Dr. A. Afsahi
Second Reader: Dr. P.E. Pallister-Wilkins
Place and Date: Amsterdam, June 2020
2 Abstract
This thesis challenges the increasingly common narrative that sees universal basic income as a solution to the oppression experienced by sex workers. Drawing upon Iris Marion Young’s idea about the various forms of oppression and applying these to the example of sex work, this thesis argues that oppression is complex and context-dependent. Because distributive solutions such as a universal basic income are unable to cater to the complexity of oppression due to their sole focus on economic disparities, they are insufficient solutions to societal oppression. Instead of distributive solutions, scholars interested in solutions to oppression should use an intersectional framework, since this allows them to understand the complexity of oppression and its multiple roots.
Keywords: Oppression; Distributive Justice; Universal Basic Income; Intersectionality; Sex Work
3 Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 4
2. Distributive Justice as a Solution to Prostitution ... 5
3. The Complexity of Oppression ... 9
3.1 Exploitation ... 12
3.2 Marginalization ... 15
3.3 Powerlessness ... 18
3.4 Cultural Imperialism ... 22
3.5 Violence... 24
4. Distributive Solutions vs. Intersectionality ... 27
5. Conclusion ... 36
4 1. Introduction
In both academic works as well as in mass media articles there is an increasingly common narrative that distributive measures, particularly a universal basic income (UBI), are a way to abolish prostitution (Brooks-Gordon, 2018, p. 197; Danaher, 2014; Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9; McLaughlin, 2020; Santens, 2016). The narrative assumes that prostitution is inherently oppressive, and that this oppression is rooted in economic inequality. Since a universal basic income aims to solve economic disparities, it would therefore also free sex workers from the oppression that comes with prostitution (or other forms of sex work), because they would no longer be forced to work in the sex industry.
This thesis challenges the narrative that distributive measures are a way to solve the oppression that sex workers face. I argue that oppression is complex and multi-faceted, and that solutions that only focus on eradicating economic disparities, such as universal basic income, are insufficient in targeting oppression as a whole, because they disregard types of oppression that are not rooted in economic disparities. By utilizing Iris Marion Young’s idea about the five different types of oppression, I analyze the types of oppression that sex workers face and demonstrate how these are the products of specific contexts and intersecting identities. Due to the complexity of oppression, I argue that an intersectional framework is necessary to create solutions that target all forms of oppression.
The relevance of this study is related to the fact that distributive solutions fail to acknowledge all possible forms of societal oppression. By only focusing on eradicating economic oppression, other types of oppression are disregarded or even concealed. In order to acknowledge different forms of oppression outside of the economic sphere, we need to understand oppression as complex and context-dependent. By holding on to distributive solutions such as universal basic income, this complexity cannot be brought to light.
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I start off in chapter 2 with a discussion of the narrative that suggests that a universal basic income could abolish prostitution, which I then embed into a larger discussion of distributive measures as a tool to deal with oppression.
In the next chapter, I dispute this narrative by relying on Iris Marion Young’s understanding of oppression, which sees oppression in five ways, namely as exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. I use these five types of oppression to demonstrate the complexity of oppression by applying them to the example of sex work. Because some of Young’s understandings of oppression are too focused on economic disparities, I expand on her analysis in order to highlight the different ways in which oppression can manifest itself in society, not all of which are economic in nature.
In the last chapter, I revisit the claims made by proponents of universal basic income as a tool to abolish prostitution, and demonstrate why the complexity of oppression makes these claims oversimplistic. By highlighting the multifaceted nature of oppression and analyzing this with an intersectional framework, I demonstrate the need for solutions that go beyond distributive justice.
2. Distributive Justice as a Solution to Prostitution
A large part of the recent literature on oppression focuses solely on forms of oppression that stem from economic disparities (see, for example: De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004; Harvey, 2006; Tondani, 2009; Van Parijs, 2013). Considering this focus, it is unsurprising that many of the solutions offered, for example a universal basic income, are purely focused on eliminating economic inequality. This focus is also at the root of a recent narrative about prostitution, with proponents of distributive measures arguing that a universal basic income could solve the economic vulnerability that forces women into sex work (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). In this chapter, I discuss the logic behind this narrative and the underlying theory of distributive justice
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that supports this line of thinking. After this discussion, I challenge the underlying assumption of distributive measures that promote economic solutions to problems of injustice and oppression.
Scholars Sarah M. Mah and Yuly Chan wrote a piece titled “Guaranteed Livable Income as the Way Forward to Abolishing Prostitution”, which inadvertently demonstrates why it is problematic to assume that a universal basic income, or any other type of distributive measure, is sufficient in countering societal oppression or injustice. Mah and Chan argue that prostitution is inherently oppressive to women, and write that “a strong social security system would allow a woman to avoid prostitution in the first place” (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). They argue that a universal basic income would protect women who are vulnerable to being recruited to work in the sex industry, as well as help current prostitutes leave their abusive situation (Mah & Chan, 2014, pp. 10, 13). The underlying assumption here is that prostitution is a societal issue that is rooted in economic inequality: economic disparities force vulnerable women into prostitution, which leads to their oppression. Mah and Chan argue in favor of a universal basic income that would fix these economic disparities, and, therefore, would be the only thing needed in order to abolish sex work.
The narrative constructed by Mah and Chan is becoming increasingly more common in both academic literature as well as mainstream media. Some of these contributions (see, for example: Brooks-Gordon, 2018; McLaughlin, 2020; Santens, 2016) take a similar approach as Mah and Chan, and discuss the oppressive nature of prostitution and the necessity to abolish it through UBI. There are also works that advocate for similar outcomes, namely abolishing prostitution through UBI, while using different justifications. An article by Danaher, for example, discusses the possibility that sex robots may displace sex workers, similar to how other forms of technological advancement have replaced human labor (Danaher, 2014, p. 115). A universal basic income would serve to protect those affected by technological unemployment,
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thereby avoiding economic vulnerability for sex workers and allowing them to change careers (Danaher, 2014, p. 123).
Regardless of the justifications for tying the concepts of the oppression of sex workers and UBI together, it is important to discuss the shortcomings of such a narrative, both in relation to the example of sex work, as well as in relation to oppression in general.
Before discussing why distributive measures such as UBI are insufficient solutions to societal oppression, I briefly elaborate on what UBI means in practice. A universal basic income entails an unconditional payment that assures subsistence for every citizen (Goodhart, 2014, p. 139). The basic income is available to every individual, regardless of their current employment status, economic means, or willingness to work or look for work (Goodhart, 2014, p. 139). The debate around universal basic income largely revolves around considerations of social justice, and has been justified by scholars that uphold different distributive justice principles, such as strict egalitarians and libertarians (Goodhart, 2014, pp. 139–140).
It is clear that universal basic income is concerned with economic inequality as a form of oppression, since one of its main consequences is the reduction of poverty.1 In his 1979
lecture “Equality of What?”, political theorist Amartya Sen asks how equality and inequality should be measured (Sen, 1979). Many theorists and economists are concerned with this “currency of equality”, meaning the type of disparities that are measured on order to assess whether a society is unequal (Arneson, 2000, p. 498). Examples of this are the equality of primary goods, the equality of resources, the equality of basic capabilities, and the equality of opportunity, among other things (Rawls, 1999; Roemer, 1998, p. 276; Sen, 1979, p. 217; Tondani, 2009, p. 251).
1 It should be noted that not all proponents of UBI perceive poverty reduction as the main goal. Conservative
proponents may simply see it as a way to fix flaws in the labor market, for example (Clark & Kavanagh, 1996). However, regardless of the intentions behind promoting UBI, the outcome of implementing UBI is that it reduces poverty, thereby influencing societal economic (in)equality.
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A universal basic income aims to deliver at least some of these types of equality: a guaranteed income would diminish inequality of resources by ensuring that no one would be unable to sustain themselves, for example. Some scholars also believe a basic income could achieve equality of opportunity, since UBI would allow young people to fund projects such as starting a business, acquiring real estate, or investing in their education (Planel, 2018, p. 5). These projects would ensure that young people’s “initial chances in life” would not be unequal (Planel, 2018, p. 6; Rawls, 1999, p. 7).
In this analysis it is deemed irrelevant whether a universal basic income effectively influences the economic advancement of oppressed groups. Instead, it is relevant to note that distributive strategies such as UBI are based on a problematic assumption: the assumption that oppression in society can be eradicated through economic measures. Strategies that solely focus on fixing economic disparities wrongfully assume that if people are economically equal, they are equal in general.
The consequence of this assumption is that solutions based on distributive principles do not contribute to eradicating types of oppression that do not have economic roots. While I do not deny that distributive measures such as UBI may advance the economic situation of oppressed groups, I reject the idea that these measures would solve oppression in general, since oppression has more facets than just economic ones.
The next few chapters will illustrate why tackling oppression through distributive measures obscures the fact that other oppressions exist. By ignoring or dismissing other types of oppression and only focusing on oppression rooted in economic inequality, rather undemanding solutions to oppression are created.
9 3. The Complexity of Oppression
In the previous section I argued that the problem with distributive measures as a solution to the oppression of sex workers is the underlying assumption that economic circumstances are necessarily at the root of oppression. In the next few chapters, I demonstrate that this assumption is problematic because oppression can also manifest itself in ways that are at best only tangentially related to economic disparities.
I do so by exploring the nature of oppression, and analyzing how oppression manifests itself in ways that are not (fully) dependent on economic circumstances. Iris Marion Young’s idea of the “five faces of oppression” guides my analysis. Young identifies the five faces of oppression as exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (Young, 2012, p. 328). Each of the separate types of oppression that Young identifies will be explored, but I amend some of her definitions so that they more accurately reflect the multifaceted nature of oppression.
In order to demonstrate that oppression is not always economic in nature, I draw upon the example of sex workers as an oppressed social group. The narrative constructed by Mah and Chan, which believes UBI to be a solution to the oppression faced by sex workers, guided my decision to use sex workers as an example. Because Mah and Chan’s understanding of the oppression of sex workers is wrongfully one-sided, I use the same example to demonstrate why oppression is actually multifaceted.
Sex work is an umbrella term for a variety of labor practices that sell sexuality or sex as a commodity. Even though the terms “sex work” and prostitution” are often used interchangeably, sex work actually includes a variety of other labor practices (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxv). Sex workers are people employed in the sex industry, which can take the form of prostitution, stripping, phone sex, erotic webcam performances, erotic dancing, or pornography, among other things (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxi).
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This analysis focuses solely on female sex workers, leaving out male sex workers, and queer and non-binary sex workers. There is a variety of literature on the latter group, which takes into account additional hardships that queer and non-binary sex workers suffer due to their gender identities (see, for example: Laing, Pilcher and Smith, 2015; Rev and Geist, 2017; Fletcher, 2013). Analyzing the oppression of sex workers would naturally become more complex when one takes the additional oppression of queer and non-binary sex workers into account. However, I do not have to paint a complex picture of sex workers in order to establish that oppression is complex and that distributive measures are insufficient in dealing with oppression. Solely focusing on female sex workers already allows me to demonstrate that certain social groups face oppression rooted in more than economic inequality. A more complex example is therefore unnecessary.
Countries may approach sex work either through prohibition, abolition, or regulation (Barry, 1996, p. 220). Each of these strategies may contribute to different forms of oppression of sex workers, which I briefly touch upon here. Some of these strategies will be revisited in more detail in later chapters.
Prohibition can be considered the most inherently oppressive to sex workers, since it criminalizes the labor that sex workers engage in (Ditmore, 2006, p. 369). The criminalization of sex work makes those in the sex industry vulnerable, since their livelihood is something that society rejects and punishes. Sex workers are likely to end up with a criminal record, which is something that marginalizes them for the rest of their life (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxx). Additionally, when sex workers encounter dangerous situations in their line of work, they are unlikely to involve the police, since they are also engaging in criminal activity themselves (Sanders, 2005, p. 89). The societal effects of being assessed as a criminal are also an oppressive factor, which will be explored in chapters 3.2 and 3.4.
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Abolition laws intend to criminalize the people that engage with sex work or those who are perceived to profit from it, not those who provide the service (Ditmore, 2006, p. 5). However, abolitionist laws still tend to affect sex workers themselves, for example because they ban prostitutes from working together, or block sex workers’ attempts at forming unions (Ditmore, 2006, p. 5). While these laws intend to prevent pimping2 and the promotion of sex work, in reality they also prevent sex workers from ensuring safety by working together and from addressing their civil rights through unionizing. A short documentary by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union focuses on abolitionist laws in Sweden, in which a Swedish prostitute says the following:
If they [Swedes] suspect that a neighbor is selling sex, they will, like good citizens, just call the police and tell them about it. Which means that the woman will lose her apartment, because the landlord is obliged to throw her out, otherwise he will get charged with pimping. And also there are numbers of cases where sex workers – and I'm not even talking about, you know, people working in prostitution, but also women working in strip tease or in porn films, they lost their kids, because they are unfit mothers. Not because they are sex workers, but because they are sex workers that don’t understand the ‘need to stop.’ (HCLU, 2009)
This quote demonstrates some of the unintentional ways in which sex workers are targeted by abolitionist laws intending to punish those using or profiting from sex workers.
Regulation entails that a state tries to control sex work by enforcing rules concerning the profession (Ditmore, 2006, p. 5). Examples of such rules are the obligatory registration of sex workers. In chapter 3.2, I explore how regulations such as these might oppress sex workers even further.
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It is possible that a combination of these strategies is implemented within a single country. For example, a country may regulate stripping while criminalizing street prostitution. In this analysis it is already sufficient to focus on liberal, rich countries where some forms of sex work are legalized in order to show that sex workers are subjected to different types of oppression in society. It has to be acknowledged, however, that clearly these oppressions are more severe when circumstances for sex workers are more dire, for example in the instance of human trafficking. This thesis will not explore these more severe manifestations of oppression, since my argument about the complex nature of oppression can already be made even when these complexities are not taken into account.
3.1 Exploitation
As the most well-known form of oppression, exploitation in the Marxist sense focuses on modes of production and the economic inequalities that are derived from the economic domination of one group over another (Young, 2012, p. 329). Marx used the concept of exploitation to explain how class structures are constructed and maintained in capitalist societies (Young, 2012, p. 329).
In her analysis, Young sees exploitation as a purely economic force that economically privileges some, while depriving others. I argue that Young’s understanding of exploitation is shortsighted and loses track of the fact that exploitation may also take place outside of the labor market, in ways that are unrelated to economic vulnerability. In this chapter, I first discuss Young’s economic understanding of exploitation. Afterwards, I discuss my own more complex understanding of exploitation as a form of oppression, and apply this to the example of sex work.
Young does not only look at the material consequences of economic exploitation, but also at the non-material consequences. She explains that when workers give up some of their power to capitalists, their power diminishes by more than the amount of the transfer (Young,
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2012, p. 330). Workers give up some of their freedom to the capitalist in order to be employed, but additionally also suffer material deprivation and a general loss of control, which deprives them of important elements of self-respect (Young, 2012, pp. 329–330). This dynamic is structural, according to Young, since it entails that the results of the labor of one social group (the workers) benefit another group (the capitalists).
While exploitation through profit-driven capitalist structures clearly exists, I argue that our understanding of exploitation should go beyond the focus on profit as the difference between the economic value of labor performed by the worker and the amount that the capitalist pays the worker in exchange for that labor. Young also understands this, as she gives the example of the systematic class exploitation of women by looking at domestic labor. Young explains that the only reason that men have the freedom, status, and self-realization to take part in the labor market is because of the domestic labor by women, which in turn prevents women from having that same freedom (Young, 2012, p. 330).
Young’s shortcoming, however, is that she still sees exploitation as a type of oppression that is fully rooted in economic circumstances. Young understands exploitation as the ability of one person to exploit another based on their economic status, which allows the privileged person to keep their advantage over the exploited person. This understanding completely dismisses the fact that exploitation may also happen in other areas.
An example of a different type of exploitation is sexual exploitation. When one looks at the sexual exploitation of children, for example, it becomes clear that exploitation happens through unequal power dynamics, which are not necessarily (only) based on economic vulnerability. The internet has proven to be a tool for online sexual exploitation, with offenders attempting to convince children to meet them offline to engage in sexual activities, or pressuring children to watch sexually explicit content or to send explicit images of themselves (Bryce, 2011, p. 321).
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In British governmental guidelines on the prevention of sexual exploitation of children it is stated that “in all cases, those exploiting the child/young person have power over them by virtue of their age, gender, intellect, physical strength and/or economic or other resources” (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009, p. 10). It is also mentioned that violence, coercion, and intimidation are tactics that are frequently used in the sexual exploitation of children. The guidelines also acknowledge that this manipulation is possible because of “the young person’s limited availability of choice resulting from their social economic and/or emotional vulnerability” (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009, p. 10).
The same argument about different types of vulnerabilities can be made about the exploitation of women through sex work. Even in legalized forms of sex work, women can be exploited through coercion, force, or deception (Sanders, 2005, p. 163; Sanders et al., 2009, p. 40). Women entering the sex industry involuntarily are found to be vulnerable in a number of ways, which allows them to be groomed, coerced, or abused by others, for example by a pimp or their partner (Grant, 1997, p. 244; Sanders et al., 2009, p. 40). Additionally, lack of regulations around sex work can lead to a disregard for the well-being of sex workers, with sex workers being forced to work in poor working conditions (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxx). In cases where women are forced to engage in sex work, we can detect two types of exploitation: economic and sexual exploitation. These women are exploited economically because they are forced to provide labor involuntarily, and are exploited sexually because they are forced to engage in sexual activity.
While this explanation of the exploitation of sex workers is valid, I am by no means arguing that all sex workers are necessarily exploited. Within sex work there are people who feel exploited and people who do not. Many contributions about sex work from sex workers themselves assert that they entered the sex industry voluntarily3, which makes it problematic to
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assess sex work as an inherently exploitative profession. The fact that exploitation is context-dependent simply demonstrates the complexity of the oppression that sex workers face.
In order to show the multifaceted nature of oppression, I follow Martha Nussbaum’s example by making a plea for difficulty. Nussbaum makes a plea for difficulty when it comes to multiculturalism, arguing that the relationship between religion and feminism is complex (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 112). The book Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? questions whether multiculturalism enables religious practices that are inherently oppressive to women. Nussbaum argues that suggesting that religion is inherently oppressive will alienate potential religious allies of feminism. She therefore argues that a more nuanced approach to religion should be taken.4
Since oppression manifests itself in different ways that are entirely context-dependent, I want to make a plea for complexity when it comes to oppression. The complex nature of oppression asks for nuance in analysis, which is lacking when one understands certain professions to be inherently exploitative.
3.2 Marginalization
After Young discusses her understanding of exploitation as an economically oppressive force, she surprisingly takes a similar route with her analysis of marginalization. Young understands marginalized people as those who “the system of labor cannot or will not use” (Young, 2012, p. 331). She believes marginalization to be the most dangerous form of oppression, since the exclusion from useful participation could have severe material consequences. While it is true
4 In the case of multiculturalism and feminism, Nussbaum (1999) theorizes about laws that ban certain religious
practices that are deemed oppressive to women. She argues that it should be questioned whether specific
proposed laws (such as laws banning child marriage) really impose burdens on people’s free exercise of religion. She thus argues that laws that are deemed oppressive to free exercise of religion should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in the same way that oppressive religious practices should be assessed on a case-by-case-by-case-by-case basis. Instead of viewing religion in its entirety as an oppressive force, only certain religious practices are assessed in that manner. By understanding the complexity of culture and religion, multiculturalism and feminism can coexist in a given society.
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that a lack of access to the labor market can have severe consequences for social groups in capitalist societies, Young wrongfully assumes that access to the labor market necessarily leads to the absence of marginalization.
Because Young’s understanding of marginalization as a lack of access to the labor market is so one-sided, I amend the definition of marginalization by assessing the lack of social acceptance of certain labor as another type of marginalization. With the second type of marginalization, it is not a lack of access to economic opportunities, but instead the constructed meanings given to certain types of economic endeavors that marginalize a social group. Thus, this type of oppression is not necessarily rooted in economic inequality, but in social constructs. An example of a job that marginalizes an individual is one where a certain identity is associated with that job. An example of this is a nurse, which is a job that society traditionally associates with women (Simpson, 2009, p. 3). There is a stigma around men who work as nurses, which is already evident by the fact that they are specifically identified as “male nurses.” There is a necessity – albeit a socially constructed one – to emphasize that someone is a male nurse, since a nurse is traditionally considered to be a woman. Men working in jobs that are traditionally deemed “feminine” often have to deal with sacrifices in both pay and professional status, as well as disapproval from peers (Simpson, 2009, p. 4).
Even though this collective social understanding marginalizes the group of men that works as nurses, it should be noted that not all marginalization is similarly oppressive. For example, it can be argued that the marginalization stemming from sex work has more severe consequences than just salary sacrifices and peer disapproval.
Feminist writer and sex worker Cosi Fabian describes some of these consequences in The Holy Whore: A Woman’s Gateway to Power. She explains that her decision to become a prostitute gave her an “ominous sense of irrevocability”, which was based on the knowledge
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that becoming a prostitute might cost her her friends and future partners (Fabian, 1997, p. 49).5 Additionally, Fabian describes that she would have no protections under the law – criminal or civil, since any investigation into her life “could prove disastrous” (Fabian, 1997, p. 50).
Fabian’s concerns are not unfounded, as scholar Melissa Hope Ditmore, author of the Encyclopedia of Prostitution and Sex Work, notes that it is “nearly impossible” to transition into another line of work after having been publicly active in the sex industry (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxx). Ditmore explains that the repercussions of having worked in the sex industry can even be institutionalized, for example in countries where prostitutes are obligated to register themselves as a prostitute in order to work (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxx). This is the case in Austria, where prostitutes must remain unregistered for five years before being able to receive a letter of good conduct (Pheterson, 1989, pp. 62–63). This letter of good conduct is a necessity for employment in various other fields, such as nursing or driving a taxi, making it much harder to switch careers after being employed as a sex worker (Pheterson, 1989, pp. 62–63). Another type of institutional marginalization is an arrest record that may have originated during years of sex work, in cases where certain types of sex work (such as street prostitution) are not legalized (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxx).
The examples above make clear that marginalization is not necessarily rooted in economic disparities. While there are sex workers that struggle to get by economically, other sex workers actually consider their profession to be very lucrative. Regardless of the amount of money made through their profession, sex workers are still subject to marginalization because their profession is deemed undesirable by society (Primoratz, 1993, p. 159). Therefore, the assessment of marginalization as a type of oppression rooted in economic circumstances is incorrect, as it fails to take the complexity of marginalization into account.
5 It should be noted that this type of societal disapproval is incomparable to the peer disapproval that was
mentioned in the discussion of male nurses, since male nurses may simply be teased by their peers for working a in field that is considered to be feminine (Simpson, 2009). Unlike sex workers, they are unlikely to lose their friends due to the marginalized status of their job, simply because the level of marginalization is not that severe.
18 3.3 Powerlessness
Young’s understanding of powerlessness demonstrates another form of societal oppression that is not purely economic in nature. Young defines powerlessness as lacking the “authority, status, and sense of self that professionals tend to have” (Young, 2012, p. 332). Young has three different understandings of powerlessness: lack of work autonomy, lack of access to developing capabilities, and lack of respectability. I add a fourth understanding of powerlessness to this list, namely powerlessness related to authority figures.
Young’s first understanding of powerlessness, namely lack of work autonomy, is something that nonprofessionals suffer from in comparison to professionals. Young understands this type of powerlessness as an issue related to status, since a person’s “nonprofessional” status leads to a lack of autonomy over their working lives, in comparison with those who are considered professionals (Young, 2012, p. 333). While even professionals may not always be able to influence everything regarding their work, Young argues that they at least have considerable day-to-day work autonomy (Young, 2012, p. 333).
This type of powerlessness can be found in the sex industry, considering that sex workers sometimes have little influence over who they want to entertain in terms of clientele. In countries were prostitution is decriminalized, street solicitation is often still illegal. Street prostitutes experience a certain time pressure to attract a client and move to a location where the police cannot monitor them (Sanders, 2005, p. 52). This reduces the sex worker’s ability to elaborately screen her client, meaning that she is forced to accept clients without fully knowing if she is safe with them.
However, it should be noted that not all sex workers necessarily face powerlessness in terms of lack of autonomy over their working lives. Stacy Reed, a stripper from Texas, writes the following:
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Since strippers are the main attraction and have the freedom to work anywhere for considerable compensation, Texas managers and owners realize that their livelihood rests in the women’s control. Since more men want to watch strippers than there are women who will strip, a manager will usually side with the stripper before he bows to an abrasive client. In three years I had my ass pinched only once, and the offender got tossed. Moreover, given a stripper’s income, she can exercise the luxury to refuse to dance for any man who offends her. (Reed, 1997, pp. 180–181)
Reed not only describes autonomy over who to work with in terms of clients, but also highlights a certain flexibility and power that comes with her profession. Ditmore makes a similar argument, as she states that a lot of sex workers stay in the sex industry because the work offers autonomy and flexibility (Ditmore, 2006, p. xxviii). This once again demonstrates the complexity of oppression, since the type and level of oppression present is dependent on context.
Young also acknowledges that powerlessness takes place in the form of lacking development of capacities and knowledge (Young, 2012, p. 333). In many instances, acquiring a powerful position is preceded by an extensive education and the acquisition of various skills. A lack of access to this same development is powerlessness in itself, since nonprofessionals have little opportunity to gain better social standing or increase their chances on the labor market.
Many sex workers are unable to develop their capacities, since the work often does not allow for the developing of professional skills (Sanders, 2005, p. 164). Teela Sanders explains that many sex workers see their profession as a short-term endeavor, and do not show commitment to “developing skills, becoming self-employed, or making the transition to manager or owner” (Sanders, 2005, p. 164).
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However, it should be noted that once again, the presence or absence of this type of powerlessness is entirely context-dependent. There are also sex workers that develop their entrepreneurial skills and open their own sex clubs, thereby promoting themselves from performers to business owners (Dudash, 1997, p. 98). These individuals clearly do not experience powerlessness regarding the development of capacities. Fixing powerlessness therefore requires a solution that acknowledges the complexity of this type of oppression.
Finally, Young sees powerlessness as a lack of respectability. She describes respectability as being treated with respect, in terms of people being “prepared to listen to what they have to say, or to do what they request because they have some authority, expertise, or influence” (Young, 2012, p. 333). Young states that the construction of respectability is closely tied to the construction of professionalism: a professional way of speaking, dressing and engaging with others show who is respectable, and who is not. She adds to this that racism and sexism have a strong influence on who and what is considered respectable, meaning that norms of professionalism and respectability are established by those who are most privileged (Young, 2012, p. 333). Young gives the example of a Puerto Rican man gaining more respect when people discover he is a business executive, since his respectability had the be “gained” through his job, while a working-class white man tends to be treated with respect as long as he does not disclose his job status (Young, 2012, p. 333).
In the case of sex workers, a lack of respectability is evident too. Since sex workers are more often than not scantily clad or otherwise sexily dressed, they do not fit in with the constructed norms of respectability, since those revolve around professional dress and behavior (Pitcan et al., 2018, p. 175). Sexual and seductive behavior also does not fall under this category, making sex workers deviant from respectability norms (Pitcan et al., 2018, p. 164). This disadvantage leads, as Young also points out, to a lack of respect and a refusal to acknowledge an individual’s expertise or influence.
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In addition to the respectability associated with professional dress and behavior, I argue that respectability does not only encompass professionalism in terms of outward appearance and conduct. Respectability norms are also constructed in terms of whose work we see as healthy and morally correct, as opposed to deviant or even criminal (Primoratz, 1993, p. 159). In constructing sex work as “deviant”, the identities of sex workers become fixed too: what they do becomes who they are (M. O’Neill & Campbell, 2011, p. 165).
In addition to the three types of powerlessness offered by Young, I recognize powerlessness in relation to authority figures as a fourth type of powerlessness. The idea behind this type of oppression is that someone in a powerful and privileged position can rely on the idea that authority figures such as police officers have their best interest in mind, while people who lack this power cannot (McIntosh, 1998, p. 217). For example, people experiencing this type of powerlessness do not have the same advantage of being assessed as “innocent until proven guilty”, as police may disproportionately target them.
This type of powerlessness can be ascribed to sex workers as a social group, even if not all individual sex workers experience powerlessness related to authority figures. Norma Jean Almodovar, a former LAPD officer, recounts that “prostitutes were treated in an outrageously degrading manner by the very agents of the law who were supposed to protect them” (Almodovar, 1997, p. 211). Besides verbal and physical harassment from police, sex workers may also experience illegal arrests and “state pimping”, meaning that a sex worker is ordered by the court to pay high fines, which she can only afford by going back to her job in the sex industry (Roberts, 1994).
Considering that street prostitutes are the most visible type of sex workers, it is unsurprising that they are also targeted by the police most often (Barry, 1996, p. 220). In countries where street prostitution is criminalized and other forms of sex work are not, street
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prostitutes fulfil the position of scapegoat by taking the blame for sex work to satisfy the criminal justice system (Barry, 1996, pp. 220–221).
This scapegoat position is related to the previously mentioned respectability norms about “correct” types of employment. When society decides that sex work is something deviant and undesirable, the harassment of street prostitutes by police officers also becomes acceptable. Almodovar explains that fellow police officers truly believed that their abusive treatment of prostitutes was for the prostitutes’ own good, as it was meant to teach them that they were in a degrading profession (Almodovar, 1997, p. 212).
In section 3.2, I discussed marginalization in relation to someone’s choice of career. This type of marginalization is clearly at the root of the construction of some of these types of powerlessness: the fact that someone is employed in a type of job that is undesirable can lead to a lack of societal respect and to a lack of power in relation to authority figures.
3.4 Cultural Imperialism
Similar to powerlessness, cultural imperialism stems from the social construction of norms. Cultural imperialism entails that only the ideas and experiences of the dominant group in society are highlighted, which establishes only those dominant experiences as the universal norm (Young, 2012, p. 333). Young’s understanding of cultural imperialism can be tied to the concept of testimonial injustice, which is a term coined by scholar Miranda Fricker. Testimonial injustice means that prejudice deflates the credibility that is afforded to someone who is speaking (Fricker, 2007, p. 17). In this chapter, I demonstrate that testimonial injustice is structural in nature, and that cultural imperialism is at the root of this injustice.
Fricker argues that there are two forms of testimonial injustice: incidental and systemic testimonial injustice. I discuss only systemic testimonial injustice here, since incidental testimonial injustice is not a form of structural oppression and therefore unrelated to cultural imperialism. Systemic testimonial injustice is based on a specific part of someone’s identity,
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and is systemically connected to other actual or potential injustices, such as legal, economic, or political injustices (Fricker, 2007, p. 27). In practice, this means that if someone who is speaking experiences testimonial injustice, for example based on their racial identity, they are also vulnerable to other types of injustices, such as a disadvantageous position on the labor market. The problem with Fricker’s understanding of testimonial injustice is that while she understands that systemic testimonial injustices lead to other injustices, she still sees testimonial injustice as a phenomenon happening on the individual level. A certain individual is not taken seriously by another, because the hearer is prejudiced against the speaker in a way that disadvantages the speaker (Fricker, 2007, pp. 35–36). I challenge this understanding and argue that testimonial injustice does not happen on an individual level, but instead always on a structural level.
This structural nature becomes clear when one analyzes sex workers’ experiences with sexual assault and/or harassment, which is an example of testimonial injustice faced by sex workers. Cultural imperialism has established a certain understanding of sexual harassment in the workplace, namely as unwanted sexual advances by colleagues, supervisors or others with whom one works. Since this understanding is constructed by the dominant group in society, this definition of sexual harassment generally does not take into account experiences from minority groups, such as sex workers (Sanders, 2005, p. 89; Young, 2012, p. 281). The dominant group then projects their own interpretation as universally representative, leaving it up to other groups to challenge this universality (Young, 2012, p. 281).
Since sex workers (often) engage in sexual contact with their clients, their experiences of sexual abuse are frequently disregarded as being “part of the job” (Sanders, 2005, p. 89). If a prostitute is raped by a client, how can she convey the fact that she was sexually assaulted if many people would dismiss her claims because of the nature of her work? In a study by Sanders involving fifty sex workers, one prostitute explains that being raped is a sex worker’s worst
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nightmare (Sanders, 2005, p. 89). She states that: “if you go to the police, they are going to go ‘well you fuck for a living anyway, so what’s wrong with one more dick up ya?’” (Sanders, 2005, p. 89). This type of testimonial injustice is what prevents the majority of sex workers from reporting sexual harassment or assault to the police (Sanders, 2005, p. 89; Surratt et al., 2004, p. 46).
The testimonial injustice evident in the study by Sanders is not the product of an isolated social interaction between a particular police offer and a particular prostitute; it is based on structural prejudices related to social identities. These structural prejudices are a product of cultural imperialism: the prejudices about the abuse of sex workers express “the dominant group’s perspective on and interpretation of events and elements in society” (Young, 2012, p. 281). Testimonial injustice is shaped by norms produced through cultural imperialism, for example ideas about what is considered morally acceptable labor. The problem of dismissing sex workers when they account experiences of sexual abuse is therefore a structural issue. It should be noted that once again, this type of oppression is unrelated to sex workers’ economic circumstances.
3.5 Violence
After briefly touching upon the issue of violence in the form of sexual assault in the previous chapter, this chapter explores violence as a type of oppression in more detail. Young points out that violent attacks are often random and unprovoked, and have no motive except “to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person” (Young, 2012, p. 334). Violence against groups should be regarded as systemic injustice, according to Young, since the violence is directed at certain people solely because they belong to a certain group (Young, 2012, p. 334). While Young describes violence against oppressed groups as random, this paper understands violence as a tool that oppressors use to maintain their privileges over oppressed groups (Cudd, 2006, p. 85). Violent attacks against oppressed people should therefore not be perceived as random, although
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they may very well feel like that to the people who experience them. Rape is an example of this type of oppressive violence, as it can be used as a tool to structurally oppress women.
The fact that violence should be viewed separately from class issues is already evident in Young’s analysis. She argues that a Black man may always be subject to the threat of violence, regardless of whether he may face oppression in the form of exploitation or powerlessness (Young, 2012, p. 334). He might be wealthy and successful in business, but may still be threatened with violence randomly when walking the street. Police brutality would be a prime example of the often-unprovoked expression of violence against certain groups (Dottolo & Stewart, 2008, p. 360).
The same applies to sex workers: the most economically successful sex workers may still be subject to violence from their clients. Various works of research have shown that sex workers disproportionately face violence (Sanders, 2005, p. 73). A case study of drug-using sex workers in Miami showed that 41.5% of respondents had some violent encounter during their work in the past year (Surratt et al., 2004, p. 52). Examples of violence by clients included “being ripped off” (money that was paid for sex being forcibly taken back), being beaten, being threatened with a weapon, and being raped (Surratt et al., 2004, p. 52). Scholar Hilary Kinnell explains that violence against sex workers should not only be understood as criminal violence, but also as legalized, institutional and societal violence (Kinnell, 2013, p. xxi). This statement is meant to demonstrate that violence against sex workers is not exclusively committed by clients, but also by others, for example by pimps, partners, ex-partners, or the police (Kinnell, 2013, p. 49). The chapter on powerlessness already highlighted abusive treatment of sex workers by police officers. The fact that violence is part of this abuse demonstrates the complexity of violence against sex workers, since those who are meant to protect them against violence may turn out to be perpetrators as well.
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The Miami case study found that while the majority of women recalled occasions where their clients had assaulted or raped them, almost none of them sought help or counselling (Surratt et al., 2004, p. 46). Some sex workers feared that seeking help would not lead to anything because they would be “blamed because of what we do” (Surratt et al., 2004, p. 46). This relates to my previous discussion on cultural imperialism: because sexual assault or violence is defined by dominant voices in society as something that does not happen to sex workers, sex workers believe that reporting this type of violence will do nothing to help them.
It should be noted that these sex workers’ fears are not unfounded: intersectional scholar Kimberle Crenshaw reports that when it came to rape, the Oakland Police Department dismissed over twenty percent of rape claims as unfounded in 1990, sometimes even without interviewing the women involved (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1281). The police explained that the cases were “hopelessly tainted” by women who would not be credible as witnesses in court (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1281). Prostitutes were included in the group of people unlikely to get a conviction (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1281).6
What becomes clear from these examples is the fact that violence is used to structurally oppress social groups, and that the use of violence is at best only tangentially related to the victim’s economic situation. What also becomes clear is that different types of oppression can work in tandem with each other. In this case, violence is used to oppress a marginalized and possibly exploited social group, while cultural imperialism prevents this type of violence from being addressed, because the victim is afraid the police will not believe her. This demonstrates the complexity of oppression and the need for solutions that address the multifaceted nature of oppression.
6 Besides prostitutes, people of color were also assessed as “unlikely to get a conviction.” Sex workers of color
can therefore be oppressed both on the basis of their profession as well as on their race. The intersection of these two identities will be discussed in chapter 4.
27 4. Distributive Solutions vs. Intersectionality
The previous section demonstrated the complexity of oppression applied to the example of sex workers. This chapter revisits the claims made by proponents of universal basic income as a solution to the oppression that comes with sex work, and demonstrates that these claims are oversimplistic in light of the complexity of oppression. I introduce the concept of intersectionality to demonstrate that an intersectional understanding of how oppression operates is necessary in order to come up with solutions that recognize the complexity of oppression.
While this thesis analyzes sex workers as a social group, it should be acknowledged that within that group, there are individuals with many different identities, some of which contribute to a more severe type of oppression. Intersectionality entails that one approaches oppression with regards to the various identity layers that intersect with one another. Examples of such identity layers are race, class, gender, ability, sexual orientation, nationality, etc. Intersectionality can be used to understand the different experiences of members of the same social group, for example the social group “women.” Even though white women and Black women may both experience oppression because of their gender, their oppression is still very different due to the fact that Black women’s racial identity is another identity layer that leads to their oppression. If a Black woman is also poor, her oppression is created at the intersection of her gender, race, and class (see: Crenshaw, 1991). The intersectional framework therefore allows us to understand that not every member of a certain social group is oppressed equally. By using an intersectional lens, we are able to see oppression in all its complexity, which also allows us to come up with solutions that cater to this complexity.
Even though certain sex workers do not experience a particular type of oppression, this does not mean they do not understand the oppression of sex workers in general. Intersectional scholar Patricia Hill Collins explains this idea in relation to Black women, and argues that not all Black women need to have the exact same experiences in order to understand the struggle
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of being a Black woman (Hill Collins, 2009, p. 25). The same applies to sex workers: while a certain sex worker may not experience a specific type of oppression, she will most likely understand that sex workers generally face at least some form of oppression. In the remainder of this chapter, I go over the five forms of oppression that I have previously identified and explain why distributive measures are insufficient in solving these oppressions. Additionally, I demonstrate why an intersectional analysis is a better tool to understand these oppressions.
In section 3.1, I demonstrated that exploitation may take other forms than simply the exploitation of labor. The example of the sexual exploitation of children shows that the vulnerability at the root of exploitation does not need to be economic, it can also be based on for example age or physical strength. The idea that a universal basic income would fix this type of exploitation can therefore also be questioned. If exploitation can also be rooted in different types of vulnerability, how can a solution that is simply focused on reducing poverty fix this? The answer is: it cannot.
The fact that exploitation can take different forms also proves that the narrative around prostitution being a solely economically exploitative job is problematic. Mah and Chan understand the exploitation of sex workers as a type of coercion to work in the sex industry based on economic vulnerability (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). I believe that this understanding is too narrow: even if sex workers are not forced into sex work because of economic reasons, they can still be exploited in different ways. Sex workers may be exploited sexually by clients, for example through rape or other forms of assault, which is at best only tangentially related to economic exploitation. A universal basic income therefore targets only one aspect of the oppression that sex workers face. Other aspects of sex workers’ identity, mainly their gender or race, intersect with their economic status in a way that assures their vulnerability to exploitation (Anitha, 2019, p. 15). Solutions that focus on only one root cause of exploitation, namely the economic aspect, are therefore insufficient.
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Chapter 3.2 demonstrated that marginalization is not only related to a lack of access to the labor market, it is also dependent on negative perceptions of certain types of labor. In the case of sex workers, this marginalization may even have consequences that have institutional roots, such as a sex worker’s inability to switch careers due to certain laws.
The narrative about universal basic income as a way to “solve” sex work conveys the belief that distributive policies, in this case universal basic income, would give people who are employed in marginalized jobs the freedom to participate in another line of work (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). If a certain standard of living would be provided through distributive policies, then no one would be forced to engage in marginalized labor. However, this line of thinking is problematic in a number of ways.
First, the assumption that sex workers only engage in sex work because they are forced, either by someone or out of economic necessity, greatly undervalues the agency of sex workers. People may choose to become sex workers purely because they are skilled at it, or because of the high monetary gains that can be made through the work (Pheterson, 1993, p. 59). Many writings on sex work created by sex workers themselves underscore that they voluntarily made the decision to become a sex worker, and many assert that the majority of their “sex worker sisters” did the same (see: Hartley, 1997; Fabian, 1997; Chapkis, 1997; Reed, 1997).
I am not making the argument here that all sex workers have agency in their choice of profession, I am merely pointing out that the oppression of sex workers is complex. Similar to my plea for complexity when it came it exploitation, I argue that some sex workers have agency over their involvement in their profession, although not all sex workers do. Even if not all sex workers become involved in the industry through their own free will, it should not be disregarded that some do.
Second, Mah and Chan provide an oversimplistic account of the resources needed to leave the sex industry. By arguing that a universal basic income would help sex workers leave
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their “abusive situation”, Mah and Chan assert that UBI is the only necessity for a woman to successfully leave the sex industry (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 13). I argue that a universal basic income is not the only tool needed when one considers switching careers: job training is usually a necessity in order to change careers, for example. While arguably sex workers have marketable skills such as risk assessment (in the case of potentially dangerous clients) communication skills, and customer service skills, these skills are not recognized as valuable as long as sex work is not considered real work (Highleyman, 1997, p. 155). Mah and Chan fail to acknowledge the fact that this type of marginalization is deeply rooted, and that UBI by itself is therefore insufficient in helping women effectively change their livelihoods.
Third, this line of thinking assumes that there is something inherently marginalizing about sex work, since it implicitly argues that the solution to the negative assessment of sex workers is for sex workers to change careers. This puts the responsibility on those who are the victims of oppression, instead of on the oppressor. Mah and Chan make the argument that a universal basic income would provide women who are forced into the sex industry the economic freedom to leave the industry (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). However, they do not acknowledge that sex workers that chose their profession voluntarily may choose to remain sex workers even if they would receive a universal basic income. The inherently oppressive thinking patterns that assess sex work as something negative, immoral, unethical or undesirable would still oppress those women (Primoratz, 1993, p. 159).
Fourth, as long as there is a demand for sex work, there will be people working in the sex industry to supply these demands. Thus, the problematic aspect of sex work is not the fact that sex workers provide sex as a commodity on the labor market, or that there is a demand for this labor. Instead, the problem is the fact that sex work is continuously marginalized, even though there clearly is a demand for this labor.
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Distributive measures are unhelpful in fixing marginalization, since the negative perceptions of sex work are not based on the economic position of sex workers. Instead, they are rooted in socially constructed beliefs about what kind of job is ethical, moral, or good. Jobs that fall outside of this spectrum are scrutinized, and people practicing this type of labor become marginalized (Primoratz, 1993, p. 159). The fact that this oppression often happens on the intersections of various identity layers, such as one’s race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and choice of career, is no coincidence (Cho et al., 2013, p. 786). Because of this, solutions that take a more intersectional approach need to be considered.
It should be noted that Mah and Chan seem to take an intersectional approach in the beginning of their plea for UBI as a tool to abolish prostitution. The authors acknowledge that women’s exclusion from social policy is exacerbated by poverty and racism, which shows an understanding of the intersecting identity layers of gender, class, and race (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 5). However, this intersectional understanding is discarded when it comes to their solution to this oppression, which is solely focused on fixing economic disparities. The exclusion that is rooted in gendered and racial constructs is not discussed any further, which makes it seem like these issues would be fixed simultaneously with economic disparities. I argue that this belief is naïve, and that these gendered and racial roots need to be addressed in order to solve the oppression they contribute to.
Section 3.3 showed that powerlessness may take many forms. Besides Young’s economic understanding of powerlessness in terms of work autonomy, development of skills, and professionality, I argued that powerlessness may take the form of a lack of power against authority figures.
Contrary to what Mah and Chan assume in their call for UBI as a tool to fix prostitution, not all sex workers experience powerlessness in the same way. Mah and Chan clearly have one vision of who a sex worker is, namely a powerless woman that is forced into sex work.
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Therefore, their solution to fix sex workers’ oppression also only targets this one type of sex worker. In reality, sex workers may experience a great variety in severity of powerlessness. Solutions should therefore also reflect this variety.
For example, it is obvious that a highly paid private escort experiences less powerlessness regarding work autonomy compared to a street prostitute that is solely trying to survive economically. The private escort makes enough money to be able to decide which clients she wants to entertain, while the barely surviving street prostitute has less autonomy in choosing her clients in comparison (Sanders, 2005, p. 71). The street prostitute may be forced to entertain clients that she feels uncomfortable with, because she does not have the privilege to turn down any paid job.
I do not deny that in this case, the powerlessness experienced by the street prostitute is related to economic circumstances. A universal basic income could clearly contribute to a reduction of powerlessness here: this particular sex worker now would not be forced to accept every single client that approaches her, because she would have a basic income to sustain herself. If she entertains less clients per night because she now only selects clients that she feels safe with, she will not get into financial trouble.
However, the fact remains that powerlessness is not solely caused by economic disparities. Both the private escort and the street prostitute may still suffer from powerlessness in the sense that their profession deviates from common respectability norms. The nature of the work and the way of dressing that fits with the work is regarded by many as unethical or even criminal. I therefore reinforce my belief that while a universal basic income can be helpful, it still only targets the oppression that stems from class differences, making it insufficient in targeting oppression as a whole.
When it comes to powerlessness with regard to authority figures, I once again argue that an intersectional approach is crucial in understanding this type of powerlessness. White
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privilege is a concept that refers to the idea that white people experience privilege compared to people of color in many, if not all, aspects of their lives (McIntosh, 1998, p. 207). Examples of this are the fact that white people do not need to teach their children about how systemic racism influences their interactions with the police, or the fact that white people can be certain that if they are pulled over by the police, it is not because of their race (McIntosh, 1998, p. 209).
Taking into account white privilege, we need to acknowledge that sex workers of color are even more likely to experience unfair treatment by police in comparison to white sex workers (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1281). On top of that, the perceived immorality of the sex worker’s chosen career plays a part in the oppressed position that allows police officers to harass her. Lastly, one can argue that this powerlessness has gendered aspects: the descriptions of patronizing statements made by police officers towards prostitutes discussed in chapter 3.3 all follow the narrative that women need to be saved from prostitution (Almodovar, 1997, p. 212). Clearly, a variety of identity layers contribute to powerlessness in relation to authority figures, which is why the economic focus of UBI is unable to dismantle this type of oppression.
In section 3.4, I discussed cultural imperialism and argued that this type of oppression is not rooted in economic inequality at all. I showed that cultural imperialism can lead to testimonial injustice in a structural way. The increasingly common narrative about UBI as a tool to abolish prostitution is a good example of this type of cultural imperialism. The assertion that sex workers are necessarily economically oppressed and that women are always “forced” to partake in such labor reinforces the negative stereotyping of sex workers and leaves little room for these women’s agency.
I do not argue that it is wrong to study the exploitation of sex workers, as I have done so myself in this thesis. However, it becomes problematic when such an analysis does not leave room for nuance when it comes to the oppression of sex workers. The assumption that abolishing sex work is helpful to sex workers because it “frees them”, relies on the dominant
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narrative around sex work, which sees sex workers as helpless victims that need saving (Goodson, 1997, p. 249; Marlowe, 1997, p. 143).
Throughout this thesis, I have cited various testimonies of sex workers that underscore that they are not victims, and that they do not need saving. Those who see UBI as an effective tool to abolish prostitution do not take testimonies such as these into account, which is a clear example of testimonial injustice: the voices of sex workers are ignored based on their identities, in order to construct the narrative that sex workers are necessarily victims.
The testimonial injustice that proponents of this narrative are guilty of can also be studied intersectionally. While this thesis chooses to focus on female sex workers, it is interesting to briefly note that male sex workers are almost never perceived to be victims of exploitation when they engage in commercial sex work (Marlowe, 1997, p. 143). It is clear that the mere profession of sex work is not necessarily subject to cultural imperialism, only when it intersects with a sex worker’s gender.
The chapter on violence demonstrated that violence is a strategy that is used to structurally oppress people, and that economic circumstances may be completely unrelated to this oppression. I briefly discussed rape and police brutality, both of which are examples of often-unprovoked violence that usually target a specific social group. The question then remains: if violence is caused by factors other than class-based disparities, how can a distributive solution such as UBI contribute to reducing this type of oppression?
Mah and Chan take violence into account in their analysis, but not in a way that aims to solve violence structurally. They argue that prostitutes are forced to take safety measures such as hiring a bodyguard or installing a panic button because they can no longer rely on public law enforcement for their safety (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). Mah and Chan propose to solve this threat of violence by making sure women can “avoid prostitution in the first place” due to the strong social security system that UBI would create (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). This statement
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reflects that the authors assume that this threat of violence only exists due to the economic vulnerability of these women, which seems very shortsighted. The fact that sex workers cannot rely on public law enforcement does not only have to do with the fact that they are poor, because the authors make no such statement about poor people in general. It seems more plausible that this threat of violence exists due to a vulnerable position created at the intersection of the sex worker’s identity as a “deviant” worker, their gender, their class, and/or their race (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1281). The violence that sex workers experience should therefore also be assessed as such, and not as something that is only rooted in economic vulnerability.
Additionally, Mah and Chan point at the shortcomings of public law enforcement when it comes to the protection of sex workers without proposing any solutions that would improve the security of sex workers. Instead, the authors argue that sex work should be abolished altogether, so that these women would not need protection in the first place (Mah & Chan, 2014, p. 9). This argument once again does not get to the root of the problem: instead of seeing the lack of protection of sex workers as an issue, the authors simply point at the possible economic vulnerability of sex workers as the sole problem.
Even if one would assume that all sex workers are economically vulnerable, this still demonstrates the enormous shortcoming of seeing violence as a problem solely rooted in economic inequality: any other circumstances that may work together with economic vulnerability in creating oppression are completely disregarded. Examples of other potential circumstances are in this case gender-based violence, racial violence, and a dehumanization of people employed in certain industries.
While poor economic circumstances may exacerbate oppression through violence, only targeting economic inequalities will not fix the problem of oppression in its entirety. Policies intended to fight oppression can only be successful it they acknowledge the underlying
