Explaining environmental compliance: Study on the relationship between Member State and directive-specific factors and transposition delay.

Explaining environmental compliance:

Study on the relationship between Member

State and directive-specific factors and

transposition delay.

Master’s Thesis Comparative Politics, Administration

and Society (COMPASS)

Hidde Kamerman

July 2020

Master’s Thesis Comparative Politics, Administration and Society

Explaining environmental compliance: Study on the relationship

between Member State and directive-specific factors and transposition

delay.

Quantitative research on the relation between transposition delay of

environmental directives between 2007 and 2016 and factors on the

Member State and the directive level.

Author:

Hidde Kamerman

Student nr.: S4484436

E-mail: H.Kamerman@student.ru.nl

Master program:

Master Comparative Politics, Administration & Society

University:

Radboud University Nijmegen

Faculty of management sciences

Nijmegen, the Netherlands

Supervisors/readers:

First supervisor: MSc R.J. van Druenen

Second reader: Dr. P.J. Zwaan

Preface

This document is my master’s thesis on the topic of compliance with environmental directives in relation to factors identified at the Member State level and the directive level. This thesis is the final document for the master Comparative Politics, Administration and Society. In the past months, I have been working with passion on this topic as I am intrigued by

developments that occur in the field of environmental policy at the national, European Union and international level. During a course of prof. Dr. Ellen Mastenbroek, I got excited about the topic of compliance. The topic of my master’s thesis brings the environmental and compliance component together. I am proud of the result and realize that I could not have achieved this without the right guidance and help. I want to thank everybody that I have been in contact with regarding my thesis topic. Special thanks goes out to Ruud van Druenen for his guidance during the inquiry as thesis supervisor.

Hidde Kamerman June 2020, Nijmegen

Table of Contents

1.5 Preview theoretical framework...9

1.6 Preview methodological framework...10

1.7 Outline... 11

2. The development of European environmental directives...13

2.1 Deciding over directives... 13

2.2 Evolution of the EU environmental policy...16

2.3 Variation between directives... 17

3. Theoretical Framework... 19

3.1 The four waves of compliance... 19

3.2 Categorizing the explanatory factors...21

3.3 Enforcement school... 22

3.4 Management school... 25

3.5 Legitimacy approach... 28

3.6 Directive specific factors... 30

3.6.1 Ambiguity... 30

3.6.2 Conflict... 31

3.6.3 Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model...32

3.7 Conceptual model... 35

4. Methodological framework... 36

4.1 Data... 36

4.2 Operationalization... 37

4.2.1 Dependent variable: compliance... 37

4.2.2 Power of Member State... 39

4.2.3 Left-wing parties... 39

4.2.4 Constitutional autonomy... 40

4.2.5 Administrative capacity... 40

4.2.6 Corporatism... 41

4.2.8 Support for the EU... 42

4.2.9 Ambiguity... 43

4.2.10 Conflict... 44

4.2.11 Operationalization variables...47

4.3 Methods of analysis and checking assumptions...49

4.3.1 Missing values... 50

4.3.2 Assumptions... 50

4.4 Validity and reliability... 53

5. Analysis... 55 5.1 Descriptive results... 55 5.2 Explanatory results... 58 5.2.1. Model fits... 58 5.2.2. Statistical findings... 59 6. Conclusion... 65 6.1 Summary of results... 65 6.2 Limitations... 67

6.3 Recommendations for further research... 69

Reference list... 70

Appendix I: Case selection... 81

Appendix II: Scores independent variables...82

Appendix III: Operationalization ambiguity...83

Appendix IV: Operationalization conflict...90

1.

Introduction

The disturbance of the environment affects every country on every continent. However, some countries are more ambitious in tackling the treat of climate change than others. The European Union (EU) for example, makes considerable efforts at both the global and European level to improve the environment (Kilian & Elgström, 2010; Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013; Oberthür & Kelly, 2008). The EU is considered to be a global leader on protecting the environment. The EU has played an influential role in the negotiations of important climate agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and the Durban Conference (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013). During more recent climate conferences, like the Paris Conference, the EU has played an instrumental role in turning this deal into action and is seen as the most ambitious and proactive actor

(European Commission, 2018a).

Additionally, the EU has not only taken action at the international level, but also at the EU level to protect the environment. In 1973, the environment directorate general of the European Commission (DG Environment) was established. Its aim is to “protect, preserve and improve the environment and preserve the quality of life of EU citizens” (European

Commission, 2018b). The EU formulates its environmental objectives in a strategic

multiannual plan. Together with the seventh Environment Action Programme, a programme that documents the strategic policy orientation of contemporary environmental thinking (Hey, 2006), the Strategic Plan 2016-2020 guides European environment policy until 2020

(Environment Directorate General of the European Commission, 2018b). Environmental directives are incorporated into these programmes. In order to achieve the environmental aims of the EU, Member States must comply with environmental directives and adopt these into their domestic legislation.

Unfortunately, Member States do not always correctly implement the legislative acts that are passed at the EU level. The EU is facing deficits in terms of compliance in the environmental sector. Compliance is important in the environmental integration process of Member States in the EU (Falkner, 2013). If Member States do not transpose the obliged directives into domestic law, the EU loses its basic function of ‘integration through law’ (Falkner, 2013; Versluis, 2005). Thereby, large compliance deficits in the environmental policy field might endanger the EU’s legitimacy as the EU is considered as one of the most progressive actors in this field (Falkner, 2013). Compliance deficits with environmental

directives need to be minimized to keep the legitimacy of the EU intact. Additionally, if Member States do not transpose environmental directives, it will endanger the protection of the environment and risk the quality of life of EU citizens.

1.1 Research problem

The Member States are involved in the decision-making process of the environmental

directives. They can choose how to achieve the goals of the directives and how to incorporate these directives in their domestic legislation. The discretion given to Member States raises concerns about non-compliant behaviour of Member States (Angelova, Dannwolf & König, 2012). Discretionary leeway is an important feature of the EU. It is important to provide Member States discretionary leeway, deviation from this feature is not acceptable. However, providing EU Member States with discretionary leeway creates problems for the compliance side.

In practice, there is a substantial number of Member States that do not (fully) comply with the EU directives. This is illustrated by the most recent statistics of the European Commission. In 2018, there were a number of 333 open infringement cases regarding directives of the DG environment (European Commission, 2019a). Sectors with the largest amount of infringements are water and air (European Commission, 2019a). Comparing environmental policy with other policy areas, EU environmental policy has the second highest number of violations of EU law (Börzel & Buzogány, 2019).

A lot of research has been done to explain this environmental compliance deficit. A lot of potential explanatory factors have been brought forward (Collins & Earnshaw, 1992; Pridham, 1996; Jordan, 1999; Knill, 1998; Börzel, 2000; Haverland, 2000; Bailey, 2002). Because many explanatory factors are identified, it is hard to determine what the most important and overarching explanatory factors are in explaining environmental compliance patterns. Thereby, little attention is paid to the role of the directive level. There are

considerable differences between environmental directives. The large variation between directives depends, for example, on how ambitious the directives are (Council of the European Union, February 2008; Council of the European Union, 2005). Each directive is constructed in another way. Some directives set highly clear objectives and do not leave much room for countries to set their own objectives (European Parliament, 2014). Other directives are open to multiple interpretations and give Member States wide discretion (Council of the European Union, December 2013).

1.2 Research question

In order to reduce compliance deficits, it is important to analyze compliance patterns of Member States and uncover the reasons for non-compliance. The most important goal of this thesis is to determine which explanatory factors determine non-compliant behaviour of Member States. Non-compliance is measured in terms of transposition delay. Delay refers to the transposition stage of the compliance process (Thomson, Torenvlied & Arregui, 2007; Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied, 2009). More scholars, like Thomson, Torenvlied and Arregui (2007) and Zhelayazkova and Torenvlied (2009), measured compliance according to the transposition records of the Member States. Transposition delay allows me to compare what factors can explain non-compliance with environmental directives. To test which explanatory factors determine non-compliance patterns the following research question is formulated:

What factors at the Member State and Directive level explain non-compliance with environmental directives between 2007 and 2016?

The sub questions that will support the research question are:

1. What are the determinants for non-compliance with environmental directives in the literature?

2. Which directive-specific determinants for non-compliance with environmental directives can be identified?

3. Which determinants at the member state and directive-level explain transposition delay of environmental directives?

1.3 Scientific relevance

The literature to explain compliance behaviour of Member States regarding environmental policies is extensive. However, most scholars that are concerned with compliance of environmental directives, choose a qualitative approach. Consequently, most research is extremely case-specific (Treib, 2014). Case studies focus on a limited amount of

environmental directives (Bourblanc, Crabbé, Lieferink & Wieringa, 2013; Liefferink, Wieringa & Uitenboogaart, 2011; Uitenboogaart, van Kempen, Wieringa & van Rijswick, 2009; Buckley, 2012; Smith, Glegg, Parkinson & Richards, 2007) or a small number of Member States (Theesfeld & Schleyer, 2013; Kozuh, 2010; van der Heijden, ten Heuvelhof, Broekhans, van der Arend, van Bueren, Harteveld & van Ruijven, 2013; Benson, Fritsch, Cook & Schmid, 2014).

This research contributes to the literature in three respects. Firstly, it will focus on all Member States of the EU and on all environmental directives in force between 2007 and 2016. This study tries to identify the most important determinants that can explain diverging compliance patterns of Member States. This research includes all the Member States and a set of directives that represents the environmental directives that were in force between 2007 and 2016. Using quantitative data, this research creates a comprehensive view why some Member States perform more non-compliant behaviour than others. Extensive quantitative research on environmental compliance is rare. An exception constitutes a study by, Börzel and Buzogány (2019). They included a substantive amount of cases (2,341 infringements cases) and included all Member States that are part of the EU between 1978 and 2016. However, the aim of their research is to analyze whether compliance records of the Member States have fluctuated over time (Börzel & Buzogány, 2019). They assumed that because of a tripling of Member States and a four times larger acquis, non-compliance records would worsen over time. The goal of this thesis is not to analyze fluctuations of compliance records over time but to explain diverging compliance patterns of Member States and to determine which explanatory factors influence non-compliant behaviour of Member States.

Secondly, this research takes an additional level into account as possible explanation for non-compliance with environmental directives. Other scholars only focus on the level of Member States to determine possible explanations of non-compliance. This research takes besides the Member State level, the level of directives into account as possible explanation for non-compliance with environmental directives. The variation of directive-specific factors is used to determine which and when potential explanatory factors are in place to explain transposition delay with environmental directives. As this research explicitly focuses on the variation of the directive level to determine which and when factors are in place to explain transposition delay in combination with factors that are identified at the Member State level, it makes a contribution to the (environmental) compliance literature.

Thirdly, I constructed a new way of operationalizing ambiguity and conflict. Ambiguity and conflict represent the directive-level variables. These variables are

operationalized according to some self-constructed criteria. This new and innovative way of measuring ambiguity and conflict makes a contribution to the compliance literature as well.

1.4 Societal relevance

This research focuses on compliance of Member States related to environmental directives of the EU. Explaining compliance patterns might eventually lead to better compliance with

environmental directives. Improved compliance of the directives might, for example, result into higher quality of water and fiercer protection of species and areas which in turn can improve the quality of life of EU citizens. These directives are prepared by experts on environmental developments and risks. Transposing them increases the chance of improving the environment for present and future generations. This research provides insights which factors improve or deteriorate compliance of Member States. Once these factors have been identified, it could provide guidance for policies to improve compliance with environmental directives. It is important that every Member State complies with environmental directives as the consequence of a failing environment affects every country and continent on earth. Not complying with environmental directives affects other countries negatively. The deterioration of the environment is a cross-border problem, which is why EU environmental directives need to be transposed in a timely manner by every Member State to protect and preserve the quality of life of EU citizens.

Additionally, non-compliance of Member States can endanger the EU’s legitimacy (Falkner, 2013). Especially in policy areas where the EU is portrayed as an ambitious actor, the EU’s legitimacy can be harmed (Falkner, 2013). The EU is considered ambitious when it comes to environmental policies (Kilian & Elgström, 2010; Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013; Oberthür & Kelly, 2008). Arguably, one part of the problem is that the EU legitimacy might be at stake. This research breaks down compliance patterns to analyze compliance behaviour of Member States. An analysis of compliance patterns of Member States might lead to a better understanding why Member States perform non-compliant behaviour. This can in turn lead to new insights into how to ensure that Member States comply with environmental directives. When compliance deficits with environmental directives are reduced, the EU’s legitimacy can be restored or even improve.

1.5 Preview theoretical framework

The theoretical section aims to identify factors that can explain compliance of Member States with environmental directives. The so-called four waves of compliance research indicate that a lot of explanatory factors have been examined to explain non-compliance with

environmental directives (Collins & Earnshaw, 1992; Pridham, 1996; Knill, 1998; Jordan, 1999; Haverland, 2000; Börzel, 2000; Demmke, 2001; Versluis, 2003; Mastenbroek, 2005; Toshkov, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2008; Liefferink, Arts, Kamstra & Ooijevaar, 2009; Bourblanc, Crabbé, Lieferink & Wieringa, 2013; Spendzaharova & Versluis, 2013; Treib, 2014). The examined explanatory factors throughout the four waves are related to three dominant

compliance approaches; the enforcement, management and legitimacy approach. These dominant approaches are used to offer explanations for the poor compliance record of Member States (Tallberg, 2002).

The enforcement school assumes that Member States comply with directives based on a rational consideration of benefits and costs (Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996; Tallberg, 2002). Explanatory factors that can explain non-compliance extracted from the enforcement approach are the power of Member States and the share of left-wing parties in national parliaments. Another general approach is called the management approach. According to the arguments of the management school, non-compliance is a matter of a state capacity (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Tallberg, 2002). There a two types of capacity constraints that influence compliance with environmental directives. The first form of capacity limitations concerns a state’s constitutional capacity, the second type concerns the administrative capacity of a Member State. Another factor that influences the state capacity is the degree of corporatism in a society (Scruggs, 1999). The legitimacy theory is the third school of compliance theory. This school draws on the proposition of the logic of appropriateness and argues that

compliance is ensured when Member States perceive a directive as normatively right. Factors that are derived from this theory are the level of support for the rule of law and the level of public support for the EU.

The three compliance schools provide different determinants for non-compliance with environmental directives. The influence of these determinants can differ because of the characteristics of the directive. These specific characteristics need to be determined to explain non-compliant behaviour. A distinction is made between directives that are ambiguous or not and the degree of conflict experienced during the decision-making process while developing a directive is determined (Matland, 1995). As this research focuses on the influence of the directive level, it makes a contribution to the compliance literature.

1.6 Preview methodological framework

The methodological section is primarily concerned with the case selection, the

operationalization of the variables and the methods of analysis. The case selection consists of environmental directives that are currently in force and have been introduced between 2007 and 2016. Consequently, 28 directives are selected. The whole dataset consists of 782 cases, as 28 countries are included.

Non-compliance is conceptualized as “the incorporation of directives into national law in good time, on an appropriate scale and in a correct manner” (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005, p.4). In order to measure this dependent variable, the transposition delays of the selected environmental directives are determined for every Member State. Transposition delay is a sufficient indicator for compliance because delays can be determined over a relatively large number of cases enabling generalizations to be tested in different time periods (Thomson et al., 2007). Thereby, previous studies have linked factors like a member-state willingness and capacity to the length of transposition delay (König & Luetgert, 2008).

Data on transposition of environmental directives are found on the EURLEX database. Before the actual analysis can be performed, all the variables need to be operationalized. In order to identify a causal relation between compliance and multiple independent variables, a linear regression analysis is executed (Lewis-Beck, 1995). A linear regression analysis can determine the causal relationship between compliance and the independent variables (Lewis-Beck, 1995). As this research is concerned with the effects of variables measured at different levels, the Member State level and the directive level, it uses the fixed effects approach to control for differences between groups (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002).

1.7 Outline

The first step in answering the research question is to provide a chronological description of the evolution of environmental directives. Such a chronological description gives a view of how the environmental acquis has developed. In the next step, theories about potential determinants for (environmental) compliance are presented. Theories of different approaches are used to select a variety of factors that influence compliance behaviour of Member States with EU-environmental directives. In the fourth section, the methodological considerations are elaborated on. This section provides a justification for the selected directives.

Furthermore, it gives an operationalization of the dependent and independent variables. Thereby, the statistical approaches that are chosen to analyze compliance patterns of Member States are explained and justified. The fifth section reports on the results of the statistical analyses. The drafted hypotheses in the theoretical section are tested here. In the sixth section, a comprehensive conclusion of this research is given. The last section elaborates on the meaning, importance and relevance of the results in this research. The implications and limitations of this research are also outlined. Finally, recommendations to improve future research are provided in order to overcome the limitations and implications encountered in this research.

2. The development of European environmental

directives

This section provides a chronological and historical description of the development of EU environmental policies. Before considering the evolution of the Environmental Action Programmes (EAPs), the decision making process of directives is discussed. For a better understanding of this thesis, the steps of the co-decision procedure are outlined. The variables identified for the directive-level apply to this type of decision-making procedure. It portrays especially how the degree of conflict can fluctuate between directives. Consequently, the historical description of environmental policies displays which issues were of importance over time. The EAPs show how the environmental goals and policies have changed over the last 45 years. By illustrating these changes it becomes clear that there is a great variation between directives.

2.1 Deciding over directives

Nowadays Article 288 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides the legal basis for the enactment of directives. Directives have a binding nature and can be addressed to a limited number of actors (Prechal, 1995). This type of legal act provides countries room to choose the form and methods to achieve a result (Art 288 TFEU; European Commission, 2019). The types of measures implemented by the EU countries are

communicated with the European Commission. Usually, directives need to be transposed into national law within 2 years (European Commission, 2019). Article 288 of the TFEU stresses that apart from directives, two other types of legal acts have a binding force: regulations and decisions. Regulations apply uniformly to all EU countries and they do not need to be transposed into national law (European Commission, 2019). Decisions are binding to a definite number of addressees like a Member State or private parties (Prechal, 1995).

With the adaption of the Lisbon Treaty, the co-decision or ordinary legislative procedure became the main decision-making procedure to adapt EU legislation (Council of the European Union, 2019). The ordinary legislative procedure starts with a legislative proposal sent by the European Commission, who is empowered with the right of initiative, to the Council and the European Parliament (Council of the European Union, 2019). After the submission of the proposal of a directive, measures can be taken to speed up the decision-making process. Examples of measures speeding up the legislative procedure are the

adaptation of a general approach by the Council and the organization of informal meetings between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission, named trilogues (Council of the European Union, 2019).

Consequently, the European Parliament and the Council scrutinize the proposal of a directive and can adapt it or introduce amendments to it (see figure 1). A substantive number of proposals are sent back for a second reading (Council of the European Union, 2019). As figure 1 shows, the Parliament has three options at the second reading. It may: 1) approve the amended proposal for a directive, it is then adopted, 2) reject it, the proposal will not enter into force or 3) amend it, the proposal will be returned to the Council (Council of the European Union, 2019; EU Monitor, 2019). The Council decides whether it approves the reviewed proposal or not. If the Council still rejects the proposal, the conciliation committee is summoned automatically (EU Monitor, 2019). A conciliation committee consist of a delegation of an equal number of members of the Parliament, Council and Commission who have to agree on a joint text (Council of the European Union, 2019; EU Monitor, 2019). The procedure will end when no agreement is reached between the three institutions. At the third reading, the Parliament and Council both need to accept the text to adopt the legislative act (see figure 1). Throughout the decision-making process, the Parliament votes under majority vote while the Council makes its decision by qualified majority vote (Council of the European Union, 2019; EU Monitor, 2019). This means that at least 376 MEPs have to vote in favour of a proposal and 55% of the Member States, representing at least 65% of the EU population to approve the proposal for a directive (Council of the European Union, 2019).

2.2 Evolution of the EU environmental policy

The previous subsection outlined how directives become part of the environmental acquis of the EU. This subsection is concerned with the policies that have been into place since 1972. The historical description is based on seven Environmental Action Programmes (EAPs).

The first five-year EAP (1972-1976) was adopted by the European Community after the first United Nations Conference on the environment in Stockholm (Hey, 2006). It defined environmental quality objectives, with the primary focus on water protection, waste

management and nature protection. The second EAP (1977-1981) is a continuation of the first, with a greater range of issues to be dealt with. These two EAPs were enthusiastically received by the public, but the success declined during periods of economic recession (Hey, 2006). The third EAP (1982-1987) is characterized by its concern regarding the completion of the Internal Market (Hey, 2006). It pointed to the potential risks and benefits of environmental policies in relation to the internal market (Halmaghi, 2016). In order to overcome distortions in industry competitiveness, the third EAP advocated harmonized emission standards

(Halmaghi, 2016). Quality objectives were replaced by emission-oriented objectives (Hey, 2006). Great emphasis was placed on air, noise and industrial pollution control policies. The fourth programme proposed an integrated approach rather than emission-oriented and quality objectives approaches (Hey, 2006). Environmental policy became less an additive policy and more an important and integrating part of economic decision making (Hey, 2006). The ambitious fifth programme (1992-1999) was attacked by the Member States because the environmental policies were not in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. As response, more consensus-oriented instruments were used to leave more discretionary room and flexibility to Member States (Hey, 2006).

During the sixth EAP (2002-2012), new Member States joined the EU. Because of these new Member States, a wave of deregulation is linked with this EAP. The goals of the sixth EAP are not as ambitious as the fifth EAP (Hey, 2006). This is illustrated by the INSPIRE directive; during the negotiations no political agreement could be reached as the proposal was regarded as unambitious (Council of the European Union, June 2005). As result, the INSPIRE directive has clear and modest objectives about how Member States are required to share geographic information to support policies that influence the environment (Council of the European Union, June 2005). Living well within the limits of our planet is the name of the programme in force from 2013 to 2020. The seventh Action Programme complements and supports the sixth EAP. Its main focus is on natural capital, efficient use of natural resources

and the health of EU citizens (European Commission, 2015a). Additionally, the EAP

promotes and expands initiatives to ensure that cities within the EU become more sustainable. According to the European Commission, more action is required in these areas. To encourage more action four ‘enablers’ are identified to help the EU deliver on these goals (European Commission, 2019b). Firstly, according to the EAP there should be more focus on whether existing legislation is implemented in a correct manner (European Commission, 2019b). Secondly, knowledge about environmental developments needs to be more accessible for citizens (European Commission, 2019b). Thirdly, adequate and efficient investments in products and services to benefit the environment will be needed (European Commission, 2019b). Lastly, environmental policies should be better integrated into other policies and vice versa (European Commission, 2019b).

2.3 Variation between directives

When analyzing the development of EU environmental policies, one can distinguish policies in different environmental sectors. The first two EAPs were primarily concerned with water protection, waste management and nature protection. While air quality, industrial pollution control and noise were important objectives in making policies during the third EAP. During the more recent EAPs environmental legislation about these topics has been modernized.

Not only do EAPs differ from one another, the directives introduced and adopted within every EAP vary. The large variation between directives depends, for example, on how ambitious the directives are. Some directives are perceived as too ambitious while other directives lack a degree of ambition (Council of the European Union, February 2008; Council of the European Union, 2005). Ambition is often related to political importance and

controversy (Thomson & Torenvlied, 2010). Directives with a higher degree of political importance usually face a higher degree of conflict during the negotiation processes (König & Luetgert, 2008). Controversial directives have been shown to lead to transposition delay by exhausting national administrative resources (König & Luetgert, 2008). As a result, Member States may bank on other Member States postponing notification of compliance (König & Luetgert, 2008). National implementing actors rather observe the transposition process of other Member States before they decide which implementation instruments they will use (König & Luetgert, 2008). The way directives are formulated and constructed plays a role as well. Some directives are formulated in a concise and clear manner (e.g. assessment public and private projects directive) while others contain an extensive and complex text (e.g.

maritime spatial planning directive and the alternative fuel directive) (European Parliament, 2014; Council of the European Union, December 2013).

In the next section it becomes clear that there are many factors that influence compliance results of Member States. Apart from member state specific characteristics, the degree of conflict during the negotiation process and whether directives are ambiguous or not provide explanations when and which determinants influence the timely transposition of environmental directives by Member States. The next section elaborates on this line of argumentation.

3. Theoretical Framework

This theoretical sections starts with a historical description of the EU compliance literature in relation with environmental policy. Thereafter, three schools of thought are used to categorize the most relevant potential explanatory factors at the member state level to analyze non-compliance concerned with environmental directives. Additionally, factors related specifically to the environmental policy are grouped into one of these schools. These factors are derived from the specific environmental compliance literature. Consequently, directive-specific factors are presented. Characteristics of a directive can influence the explanatory power of the factors identified by the three compliance schools. At the end of this chapter, a conceptual model is presented to give a clear overview of the variables that will be examined in this research.

3.1 The four waves of compliance

Compliance within the EU has been a central issue in analysing European integration. From the 1980s onwards, various scholars drew attention to compliance deficits within the EU (Mastenbroek, 2005). Over time, EU compliance research has evolved and four waves of research can be distinguished. Throughout the four waves of compliance scholarship a lot of relevant factors have been examined in order to explain non-compliance with environmental directives. A substantive part of the explanatory factors examined throughout the four waves are related to three major theoretical approaches that dominate the compliance literature (Tallberg, 2002; Börzel, 2003). The dominant perspectives are the enforcement approach, the management approach and the legitimacy approach (Tallberg, 2002).

The first wave of scholars pointed primarily to the legal and administrative reasons not to comply with EU policy demands (Mastenbroek, 2005). During this wave, little attention was paid to the environmental policy area (Demmke, 2001). According to scholars of this wave, non-compliance with environmental directives exists because of structural,

administrative problems and the complexity of directives (Demmke, 2001; Mastenbroek, 2005; Treib, 2014). An important factor in explaining the poor implementation record throughout the 1970s and 190s was political symbolism (Jordan, 1999). EU environmental policy was known by its high amount of legislation that had to be adopted by Member States rather than its effectiveness of solving environmental issues (Jordan, 1999). The domestic administrative bureaucracies of Member States were not sufficient enough to deal with this

amount of legislation (Jordan, 1999). Pridham (1996), in his turn, pointed to the construction of state structures, like federalism and a lack of effective inter-ministerial coordination are mentioned as important explanatory factors for non-compliance with environmental directives (Pridham, 1996). Other important explanatory factors hampering compliance concern the complexity and the range of the environmental directives (Collins & Earnshaw, 1992; Jordan, 1999). The directives tended to be rather vague because agreement was reached by a complex and time-consuming bargaining process in the Council of Ministers.

During the second wave, scholars paid disproportionate attention to environmental policy. They were primarily concerned with the different impact of the EU on Member States (Mastenbroek, 2005). The main focus of scholars within this wave was based on the

‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis. The underlying assumption of this hypothesis is that successful compliance depends on the fit between European policy requirements and existing institutions at the national level (Mastenbroek, 2005). According to second wave scholars, the degree of misfit between European rules and domestic traditions and domestic institutional features can determine the success of compliance (Treib, 2014; Börzel, 2003). A lot of scholars during this wave draw on the mismatch between national administrative arrangements and European requirements (Knill, 1998; Börzel, 2000; Haverland, 2000; Bailey, 2002). Problematically, only few environmental cases could be explained by the ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis.

Furthermore, during this wave the so-called “leaders and laggards” discussion in the European Union on environmental policies was tested (Börzel, 2000; Liefferink, Arts, Kamstra & Ooijevaar, 2009). It was believed that non-compliance with environmental law was a matter of a ‘Southern problem’. Arguable, Southern European countries have types of political systems that are rendered as incapable in effectively implementing EU environmental policies (Börzel, 2000). Other factors mentioned during this wave are the degree of domestication and Europeanisation (Bugdahn, 2005).

The third wave of compliance research brings back national politics focusing on stronger theorization along the lines of neo-institutionalism (Mastenbroek, 2005). A broad variety of factors that influence compliance are used by different scholars. Scholars included issue salience as possible determinant for compliance (Versluis, 2003; Spendzharova & Versluis, 2013). Another factor that was examined during this wave relating to compliance with environmental directives, is the role of institutional veto points (Haverland, 2000). Additionally, scholars of the third wave examined whether membership enlargement has affected the EU environmental compliance record (Andonova, Mansfield & Milner, 2007;

Toshkov, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2008). Finally, studies tried to assess the impact of green or pro-environment political parties (Jensen & Spoon, 2011).

Arguably, another wave of environmental compliance literature can be identified (Treib, 2014). This contemporary wave is in progress and elaborates on the third wave, examining the influence of the accession of new Member States. Notably, during this wave disproportionate attention is paid to the most influential environmental EU-directive, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) (Bourblanc et al., 2013; Liefferink et al., 2011;

Uitenboogaart et al., 2009). Qualitative studies tried to present the practical implementation of this well-known directive.

3.2 Categorizing the explanatory factors

The four waves address a number of potential explanatory factors for environmental

compliance. In the contemporary debate of which factors influence compliance, three major theoretical approaches dominate the compliance literature (Tallberg, 2002; Börzel, 2003; Börzel, Hofmann, Panke & Sprungk, 2010). The dominant perspectives are the enforcement approach, the management approach and the legitimacy approach. These dominating

approaches offer explanations for the poor compliance record of Member States and present arguments what the sources of non-compliance are (Tallberg, 2002). In short, the enforcement approach points to the willingness of Member States to comply with directives or not, the management approach to the incapability of Member States and the legitimacy approach to the normative obligation of Member States (Checkel, 2001; Tallberg, 2002; Börzel, 2003).

As mentioned before, a substantive part of the explanatory factors examined throughout the four waves are related to these dominant approaches. As illustrated, a first wave explanatory factor is political symbolism (Jordan, 1999). Adopting legislation without having the goal of solving environmental issues in an effective manner is in a way compatible with having a normative obligation to comply with environmental directives. Symbolic compliance behaviour of Member States is not a case of unwillingness or capacity limitations but seems the right thing to do towards the EU as authority. More straightforwardly are factors derived from the second wave like the political structure of a country, administrative capacities, degree of federalism and the lack of effective inter-ministerial coordination (Pridham, 1996). These already researched factors are in line with the argumentation of the management approach. Determinants for non-compliance relating to the goodness of fit hypothesis lack explanatory power as illustrated by Knill (1998), Haverland (2000) and other authors. While possible determinants for compliance like issue salience and the role of

institutional veto points can be allocated to the core principles of the enforcement approach. Most of the potential explanatory factors for non-compliance in the environmental policy, identified by the historical description can be allocated or categorized by the three most influential approaches of compliance research. The influential role of these approaches in compliance research cannot be ignored. Their scientific dominance serves as justification to rely on these compliance theories and is used to get a grasp of the most important and overarching factors of non-compliance. Problematically, the enforcement, management and legitimacy approach do not specifically point to environmental non-compliance but to compliance in general. To account for this, the most important environmental policy factors are allocated under these approaches. The most important environmental policy area related factors are corporatism and left-wing party strength (Scruggs, 1999; Neumayer, 2003). These factors are indisputably related to the enforcement approach and the management approach. The next subsections elaborate on the main propositions of the three compliance schools.

3.3 Enforcement school

The first general compliance approach is the enforcement approach (Downs, Rocke &

Barsoom, 1996). The enforcement school assumes that states are rational actors, weighing the costs and benefits before they decide to comply with a decision (Tallberg, 2002). States make a rational choice to comply or not in a cooperative situation depending on whether the

benefits exceed the costs of detection (Tallberg, 2002). The decision to transpose directives on time or not depends on priorities and the distances between the policy preferences of a state and the policies they have to comply with (Tallberg, 2002; Börzel & Buzogány, 2019). The larger the distance between the policy preferences and the policy a state has to comply with, the larger the compliance costs and the more incentives a state has to defect (Börzel &

Buzogány, 2019). This approach is referred to as voluntary non-compliance, because costs of defiance and domestic costs determine whether states are willing to comply (Treib, 2014).

Enforcement scholars, on the one hand, offer explanations that weaker states violate European law more often than powerful states (Fearon, 1998; Giuliani, 2003). Powerful Member States have the ability to construct legal acts based on their preferences. The costs of compliance are determined by the efforts of Member States to attain its goals during the negotiations (Fearon, 1998). Powerful Member States can impose their own policy preferences while shaping the environmental directives and will comply with their own propositions (Börzel et al., 2010). Member States that are less influential are more likely to violate the guidelines of the directives since they do not have the power to shape the

directives based on their own preferences, that is, the policy preferences of a weaker Member State are less likely to be reflected in the policy a state has to comply with (Fearon, 1998; Giuliani, 2003). From this point of view, powerful Member States are more likely to be compliant with environmental directives than less powerful Member States (Börzel et al., 2010).

On the other hand, other scholars supporting the enforcement approach argue that powerful states can permit not to transpose directive on a timely manner (Martin, 1992; Thomson, Stokman, König & Achen, 2006; Börzel et al., 2010). They can afford to pay for immaterial (reputational) and material (financial) damages (Börzel et al., 2010). Weaker states are less resistant because they rely more on goodwill and cooperation (Börzel et al., 2010). The power of state functions as a safeguard, reputation losses are absorbed by the political and economic influence in the EU (Martin, 1992). Powerful Member States can, in contrast to their smaller and less powerful partners, rely on their share of votes in the EU-decision-making procedures (Thomson, Stokman, König & Achen, 2006). Less powerful states cannot rely on their powers in the EU decision-making procedures and are dependent on their

reputation as reliable partners (Thomson, Stokman, König & Achen, 2006). This thesis follows this line of argumentation and expects that more powerful states are more likely to violate the guidelines of directive than less powerful Member States. Consequently, the next hypothesis is formulated:

H1: The more powerful a Member State is, the longer the transposition delay is for

environmental directives.

Another factor related to the willingness of Member States to transpose environmental directives into their domestic legislation is the role of left-wing parties. Jensen and Spoon (2011) point to the ‘Parties Matter’ Thesis. Even if parties are not in office, their role in the legislature and in the executive is still important (Jensen & Spoon, 2011). The willingness of Member States to transpose the directives before the deadline is passed, depends on the ideological stance of the political representatives within a country. A large share of left-wing parties in national parliaments ensures timely transposition of environmental directives. Left-wing parties are perceived as more open towards demands of environmental activists and consumers compared to right-wing parties (Neumayer, 2003). This openness has often lead to

a quicker incorporation of environmental demands into the party programmes of parties located on the left side of the political spectrum (Neumayer, 2003). Left-wing parties are more interventionistic than right-wing parties. Interventionist policies are used to correct market failures (King & Borchardt, 1994). This makes that left-wing parties are more eligible to install provisions of environmental directives to correct for market failures. Thereby, incorporating environmental demands has the strategic objective of having the electoral support for competing left-libertarian or green parties (Neumayer, 2003). Another point of concern is which class are hit the hardest by climate change and environmental disasters. The poor and the working cannot shield themselves from the damaging effects of the environment, while the rich can isolate themselves (Benton, 1997). Left-wing parties are known to be more concerned about the welfare of the working classes than right-wing parties (Neumayer, 2003).

Studies concerned with the relationship between left-wing party strength and compliance with environmental rules present different results. King and Borchardt (1994, p.225) tested the belief that left-wing party strength results into higher environmental quality than normal. Even though left party power is tested with six measures, “the general

conclusion is that there is a moderate and inverse relationship between left party power and air pollution per capita in OECD countries (King & Borchardt, 1994, p.233). Scruggs (1999) in his turn found a moderate association between good environmental performance and left governments and a weak correlation for support of green and left-libertarian parties and lower pollution levels.

Consistently, evidence can be found that present a relationship of Green or Left-libertarian party strength with good environmental performance (Neumayer, 2003; Scruggs, 1999). An example of good environmental performance is lower pollution levels. Whereas ambiguous effects are related to the ‘traditional’ left-wing party strength (Neumayer, 2003). There is inconsistency among the results of relevant studies about the relation between a small share of traditional left-wing party legislative seats and compliance with the legal

environmental guidelines. Jahn (1998, p.121), for example, finds different results for Liberal, Social Democratic and Green parties. Here, Liberal and Social Democratic parties are

considered as traditional left-wing parties. The analysis of Jahn (1998, p.122) shows that only the strength of Social Democratic parties improves the environmental performance of

countries.

Even though the evidence is contradictory, I assume that a bigger share of left-wing parties in parliament would ensure timely transposition of environmental directives since they

are more interventionistic and concerned with the well-being of the lower social classes. As a result, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H2: The higher the share of left-wing party seats in national parliaments, the shorter the

transposition delay for environmental directives.

3.4 Management school

The second general approach of compliance is the management school. The management approach assumes that non-compliance with international rules is a result of capacity limitations and rule ambiguity (Tallberg, 2002). Chayes and Chayes (1993) were one of the first scholars to point to the lack of capacity as a reason to perform non-compliant behaviour.

Chayes and Chayes (1993) aimed to improve the prospects for compliance with treaties and found that non-compliance can be best understand through the lack of capacity of countries rather than the willingness to manage compliance costs. The management approach can be seen as reaction to the enforcement approach. According to the management approach, implementing provisions rely on a government’s capacity. The capacity of government can be considered in terms of political and economic features (Tallberg, 2002). According to

Tallberg (2002), political capacity relates to the extent a government can ensure that public and private actors meet international commitments. When governments are inadequate to secure ratification, command compliance of the regional and/or local or gather important and necessary administrative capacity, it can be argued that there is a level of political capacity limitation (Tallberg, 2002). Economic capacity limitations arise when a government lacks financial resources to fulfil the obligations of a treaty. Insufficient economic resources may hamper compliance efforts (Tallberg, 2002). Furthermore, managerial theorists argue that misinterpretation by the states, because of unclear and imprecise treaty language, causes non-compliance (Tallberg, 2002). The management approach considers ambiguous norms as one of the main sources of non-compliance (Treib, 2014).

The management school, as described above, focuses on international treaties and is concerned with compliance in general. This research is primarily interested in whether Member States adopt environmental directives in national legislation in a timely manner. Following the argument of the management school relating to the timely transposition of

environmental directives, two types of capacity limitations causing non-compliance come forward.

One refers to the constitutional autonomy and the other to the administrative capacities (Tallberg, 2002; Börzel et al., 2010; Treib, 2014). The first form of capacity limitations is characterized by the executive inability to adopt directives in national law because of a state’s constitutional characteristics (Tallberg, 2012; Börzel et al., 2010). Constitutional

arrangements can hamper the timely transposition of environmental directives. In some states, constitutional arrangements are shared with decentralized authorities who grant subnational governmental legislative authority (Tallberg, 2002). Federal states, for example, have partial legislative authority in some policy domains (Mbaye, 2001). Another example is coalition governments and bicameral parliaments (Falkner & Treib, 2008). There are more independent veto players in coalition governments or bicameral parliament systems than in a single party government or unicameral parliaments (Falkner & Treib, 2008). The process of the decision making within a coalition government or bicameral system is usually more time-consuming compared to the process of a one-party government or unicameral parliament (Falkner & Treib, 2008). Consensus between multiple parties needs to be reached in order to make a decision. Just as federalism, coalition governments and bicameral parliaments increase the amount of veto-players. As Börzel et al. (2010) argue: “A large number of veto players reduces the capacity of a state to make the necessary changes to the status quo for the implementation of costly rules”. In other words, constitutional characteristics determine the number of veto players of a state. The more actors or veto players have to agree to directives, the more likely a directive is blocked or delayed (Tallberg, 2002; Börzel et al., 2010; Treib, 2014). This assumption lead to the second hypothesis:

H3: The larger the constitutional autonomy of Member States, the shorter the transposition

delay for environmental directives.

The second type of capacity limitations that may delay the transposition of

environmental directives, is administrative capacity. Administrative capacity refers to the deficiencies in a state’s administrative bureaucracy (Tallberg, 2002). Inefficient government structures can pose a major cause of non-compliance (Tallberg, 2002). Poor bureaucratic features hamper the adaptation of legal acts (Börzel et al., 2010). A sufficient administrative

system ensures clear procedures and rules for transposing directives and solves administrative problems. The following hypothesis is based on these considerations:

H4: The higher the administrative capacities of Member States, the shorter the transposition

delay for environmental directives.

As described before, a government capacity refers to political capacity or economic capacity according to the management approach (Tallberg, 2002). The level of political capacity improves when a Member State is subject to a corporatist society. Corporatism ensures flexibility and co-operation between governments and the company level which automatically results into better regulation of environmental policies (Scruggs, 1999). Corporatism can be seen as a social system that aggregates and represents large parts of the population as result of a high level of policy concertation and deliberation (Scruggs, 1999; Neumayer, 2003). In the literature, the most dominant corporatist actors are employers, interest groups and unions. In contrast to corporatism stands pluralism. Pluralism is much more competitive and is

characterized by a low level of policy concertation (Scruggs, 1999). A pluralistic structure consists of a large number of interest groups who strive in a competitive way for access in the legislative process (Neumayer, 2003).

The corporatist nature of societies may improve compliance with environmental directives. Three reasons to support this argument are derived from the literature. The role of corporatist institutions towards the EU is doubtful, but corporatists’ institutions can play a significant role at the producer or company level (Scruggs, 1999). It changes the interests of private sector. The interests of producer groups are in turn important for compliance with environmental directives. The influence of corporatism at the producer level may seep

through to the EU level, where directives are prepared (Scruggs, 1999; Neumayer, 2003). The first reason encompasses ‘the shadow of strict regulation’. The government of a Member State retains the position to threat to use direct or strict regulation (Scruggs, 1999). Corporatists’ institutions are characterized by a negotiated policy regime, which is perceived more flexible and co-operative than direct regulation (Scruggs, 1999). This flexibility and co-operation achieves greater environmental regulation (Neumayer, 2003). The second way corporatism influences support for environmental directives at the Member State level is through long-term policy commitment. Corporatist societies are balanced in long-terms of old and new interests

(Neumayer, 2003). New interests such as environmental protection are easy and soon

accommodated (Neumayer, 2003). Environmental compliance will be more acceptable when there is a history of trust between producers and governments. Corporatist institutions

function as link between these two and provide a context for effective learning and adaptation. Thirdly, corporatism can overcome collective action problems for environmental areas and discourage free-riding (Scruggs, 1999). Because of its ability to compensate losers via unemployment benefits or subsidies it reduces the risk that companies undermine the collective interest (Neumayer, 2003).

Scruggs (1999; 2001) finds convincing evidence that corporatist institutions positively influence environmental outcomes. He concludes that effect of pluralism is more detrimental to the environmental than corporatist institutions (Scruggs, 1999, p. 30). Contrary, Neumayer (2003) does not find strong evidence that corporatism is beneficial for the environment. In order to assess this connection, Neumayer (2003) tested the effect of corporatism on different pollution levels. In most of the cases the relationship between environmental performance and corporatism is insignificant (Neumayer, 2003). Crepaz (1995) findings are even more contrary in relation to Scruggs (1999, 2001). According to his statistically significant results,

corporatism has a negative effect on pollution levels.

Despite the mixed results, this research expects that corporatism has a positive effect on the timely transposition of environmental directives. Corporatist features ensure

cooperative arrangements between interest groups and Member States (Mbaye, 2001). As a result, corporatism reduces the number of veto players and boosts a government’s autonomy to act (Mbaye, 2001). Following the reasoning of the veto-player hypothesis, government autonomy will eventually result into better compliance with environmental directives (Börzel et al., 2010). The following hypothesis is formulated for the relationship between corporatism and compliance:

H5: The higher the rate of corporatism in Member States, the shorter the transposition delay

for environmental directives.

3.5 Legitimacy approach

The legitimacy approach is primarily based on the logic of appropriateness (Börzel et al., 2010). The logic of appropriateness draws on what social norms believe is right rather than

weighing the costs and benefits before deciding to comply with a decision (Checkel, 2001). According to constructivist scholars, socialization ensures domestic compliance (Checkel, 2001; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). Internalizing norms is the goal of socialization (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). Socialization is referred to as “the process where principled ideas become norms in collective understandings about appropriate behaviour” (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p.11). When social norms are perceived as right, the socialization process of norms is completed. States have a moral obligation to comply with directives of the EU, because it corresponds with their normative self-interests.

Consequently, as legal studies demonstrate, there exists a relation between national legal cultures and states’ tendency to comply with directives (Gibson & Caldeira, 1996; Jacob, Blankenburg, Kritzer, Provine & Sanders, 1996). According to Börzel et al (2010, p.1370) the degree of compliance correlates with the extent of acceptance with the rule of law and “compliance with legal norms is considered as demanded by a domestic logic of

appropriateness”. The diffuse support for law-making as legitimate mean makes that Member States are willing to comply, even if the costs exceeds the benefits of transposing a directive (Börzel et al., 2010). The rule of law is socialized into the norms and rules of the European Union; Member States comply out of a normative belief that rule of law is a legitimate way to ensure political order in community (Börzel et al., 2010). As a result, the next hypothesis is defined:

H6: The higher the level of support for the rule of law in Member States, the shorter the

transposition delay for environmental directives.

Thereby, when institutions who set the rules enjoy high degrees of support, Member States are willing to accept a directive (Gibson & Caldeira, 1995). Public support makes that a Member States feels a greater obligation to comply with EU directives (Gibson & Caldeira, 1995). Related to this argument, another hypothesis for the enforcement school is formulated:

H7: The lower the level of public Euroscepticism in Member States, the shorter the

3.6 Directive specific factors

The three compliance schools explain whether Member States do or do not comply with directives based on determinants at the Member State level. I selected seven determinants for (non-)compliance derived from three major theoretical approaches that are dominant the compliance literature (Tallberg, 2002). However, the influence of these determinants can differ because of the characteristics of the directive. For example, one could assume that the most simple and undisputed directives can be more easily implemented than complex and controversial directives, besides the fact that Member State features may hamper the transposition process. Factors relating to the directive level may provide additional

explanations. Matland (1995) offers explanations how the influence of Member State features can differ because of the characteristics of a directive. To determine the characteristics of the directives, a distinction is made whether a directive is ambiguous and the degree of conflict experienced during the decision making process while developing a directive (Matland, 1995). The direct influence of ambiguity and conflict at the directive level is stressed in section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.

3.6.1 Ambiguity

It is hard to obtain common indicators for ambiguity. Ambiguity occurs when there is a lack of clarity or uncertainty how to apply a term (van Leeuwen, van Hoof & van Tatenhove, 2012). Therefore, ambiguity plays a role in the interpretation of a law. Linguistic

constructions make that a law is interpreted wrongly (van Leeuwen, van Hoof & van Tatenhove, 2012). However, ambiguity can lead to discretionary leeway which in turn can lead to more compliant behaviour (Héritier, Knill & Mingers, 1996; Knill, 1998).

In order to assess whether a directive is ambiguous, one should focus on the content of the directive. This is for example done by van Leeuwen, van Hoof and van Tatenhove (2011) for the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and by Versluis (2003) for the Seveso II and the safety data sheets Directives. Versluis (2003) determined the degree of ambiguity according to four requirements. One of these requirements encompasses the level of detail in a directive is verified. Versluis (2003) makes a distinction between framework directives and specified or detailed directives.

Framework directives are perceived as more ambiguous than ordinary directives (van Leeuwen, van Hoof & van Tatenhoven, 2012). After a directive is adopted, directives are shaped by Member States. Member States have an even stronger role in shaping and

Leeuwen, van Hoof & van Tatenhoven, 2012). A framework directive does not set specific environmental target and measures. The directive simply provides a framework which requires further formulation of objectives by the Member States (van Leeuwen, van Hoof & van Tatenhove, 2012). Framework directives provide room for Member States to create and construct measures that takes the national context into consideration (van Leeuwen, van Hoof & van Tatenhoven, 2012). In order words, framework directives can be considered as

ambiguous. The following hypothesis is formulated:

H8: Ambiguous environmental directives are related to a shorter transposition delay than non-ambiguous environmental directives.

3.6.2 Conflict

Directives subject to conflict are regarded as more controversial directives. Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied (2009) focused on conflict as potential factor to influence transposition in a positive way. They argue that conflict speeds up the transposition of EU directives. In their line of argumentation, they refer to the study of König and Luetgert (2009). This study finds a positive effect for conflict on the timeliness of transposition (König & Luetgert, 2009). However, they measured conflict according to the number of EU institutional actors involved and the use of qualified majority voting (König & Luetgert, 2009). The case selection of this research consist only of directives subject to the involvement of the Commission, European Parliament and Commission and qualified majority voting (see 2.1 on decision-making process of directives).

Contrary, implementation theory predicts that legislative conflict has a negative effect on environmental compliance (Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied, 2009). From their point of view, conflict means that there is little agreement among legislators. Conflict reflects compromise, since the outcomes are a result of a bargaining process between highly diverging positions (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Compromises are characterized by incoherent and unclear agreements, which will hamper the efficiency of implementers (Hill & Hupe, 2012). Consequently, this influence compliance negatively. Thereby, when countries deviate from the guidelines of the directives reached under conflict, there will probably no consequences. Deviations will be tacitly approved by legislators to avoid reputational loss (Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied, 2009). This research follows the line of argumentation formulated by implementation theorists,

stressing that conflict has a negative effect on the extent of the transposition delay. Therefore, the next hypothesis is formulated:

H9: Environmental directives established without conflict are related to a shorter transposition delay than environmental established with conflict.

3.6.3 Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model

Besides the direct effect ambiguity and conflict have on the compliance with environmental directives, these directive specific factors may colour the other independent variables. The identified determinants and the associated hypotheses illustrate that a lot of factors at the Member States level can hamper implementation. However, it is unclear under what circumstances the Member State factors play a role. Implementation scholars have tried to explain under which circumstances implementation is successful. The most important

implementation scholar for this research is Matland (1995). Matland (1995) combines features of top-down and bottom-up models to find indicators of successful implementation. In his search for indicators explaining successful implementation, he developed the ambiguity-conflict model to explain successful implementation, like the timely transposition of environmental directives.

The ambiguity-conflict model takes the underlying characteristics of a policy into account (Matland, 1995). In respect of this research, the model can help to analyze the underlying characteristics of the directive level, consisting of ambiguity and conflict. It identifies the degree of ambiguity and conflict to determine when policies will be effective or successful (Matland, 1995). That is, the conflict-ambiguity matrix present a matrix to sort out under what circumstances successful implementation can occur. The four perspectives of policy implementation process are: administrative implementation, political implementation,

experimental implementation and symbolic implementation (Matland, 1995). The first two

perspectives will be highlighted, in contrast to experimental and symbolic processes. Experimental and symbolic implementation process are perceived as less releveant in this regard. Symbolic implementation occurs when a degree of policy ambiguity and policy conflict is apparent (Matland, 1995). This combination seems implausible as high ambiguity diminish conflict (Matland, 1995; O’Toole, 2004). Experimental implemental implementation is not primarily concerned with successful outcomes. It is rather concerned with policy learning (Matland, 1995). This cannot be explained in the case of timeliness transposition of environmental directives.

A perspective of policy implementation process that can be related to successful or timely transposition of environmental directives is political implementation. This type of implementation is characterized by low levels of ambiguity and high levels of conflict (Matland, 1995). In this perspective, power is the most important determinant in explaining outcomes. Although the goals are clear, they are subject to conflict. Conflict arises because actors oppose a proposed policy. The chance of successful implementation increases when a powerful actor can force its will on other actors (Matland, 1995). In order to force their will, sufficient power mechanisms need to be in place or resources attributed to an authoritative actor provide a strong negotiating position to come to an agreement (Matland, 1995). The larger the power of the implementer, the more likely an implementation effort will be successful (Matland, 1995). Coercive mechanisms are shown to be most effective in this respect. The enforcement school addresses two political power-related indicators for

environmental compliance: the power of Member States in the decision-making process of the EU and the strength of left-wing parties at the Member State level. Placing these indicators in relation to the ambiguity-conflict model it appears that power plays a larger role when

directives are subject to a low degree of ambiguity and a high degree of conflict (Matland, 1995). It can be argued that under low ambiguity and high conflict circumstances, the

variables extracted from the enforcement play a substantive role. The relation of enforcement variables with the political implementation perspective is portrayed by the following

interaction hypotheses below:

H10: The positive impact of Member State power on transposition delay for environmental directives is larger for directives characterized with a high level of conflict than for directives with a low level of conflict.

H11: The negative impact of left-wing party strength on transposition delay for

environmental directives is larger for directives characterized by a high level of conflict than for directives with a low level of conflict.

Another perspective that is incorporated into this research is administrative

implementation (Matland, 1995). Administrative implementation occurs when there is low policy ambiguity and low policy conflict (Matland, 1995). In case where a directive is