How does Terrorism End? A case study analysis of the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

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How does Terrorism End?

A case study analysis of the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Master thesis

Thijmen Robert Hamer s1610481

Crisis and Security Management Leiden University

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

This Master thesis describes the case of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and its struggle for independence. The conflict between the MILF and the government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) that stretched from ca 1980 to 2014 was used to answer the question “How does terrorism end through a political process?” This case was first placed into a historical context. Then, different lenses (State, group and context) were applied to the case that was divided into four distinctive phases. This relied on four important theoretical concepts derived from literature. These are: greed and grievance, spoiler roles, negotiation strategies and protracted social conflict. This led to the following main findings:

 The main reason why the MILF could continue the Moro struggle after the MNLF had agreed to peace, was the continuance of the Moro grievances.

 An acknowledgment by the government that the MILF was here to stay, opened up the possibility of negotiations.

 Militarization and internationalization of the conflict was detrimental to any peace, and served as a clear spoiler.

 Separating the radical terrorist elements from the more moderate rebels and international oversight was crucial for creating conditions for substantive and serious negotiations.

 Small steps in the negotiation process work better than comprehensive deals.

 A convergence or inclusive strategy works better than a divisive and exclusive strategy.

 A clear projection of the benefits of peace should be in place.

 A stalemate which was not satisfactory for both parties but which they believed could only be changed by politics.

 International involvement in the diplomatic process to create trust and mutual understanding between the parties.

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List of abbreviations

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines AHJAG Ad Hoc Joint Action Group

ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASG Abu Sayyaf Group

BBL Bangsamoro Basic Law

BDA Bangsamoro Development Agency

BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

BIMP-EAGA Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asia Growth Area

BJE Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

BMLO Bangsa Moro Liberation Front BPE Bangsamoro Political Entity

CAB Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro CAFGU Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit

CCCH Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities CPLA Cordillera People’s Liberation Army

CPP Communist Party of the Philippines CVO Civilian Voluntary Organization EDSA Epifanio de los Santos Avenue

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

FAB Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

FPA Final Peace Agreement

FTO Foreign Terrorist Organizations

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines ICFM Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

ICG International Crisis Group

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8 IPRA Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

IRA (section 2.4.2) Irish Republican Army

IRA Internal Revenue Allotment

ISF International Security Forces (from the MILF)

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

KM Kabataan Makabayan (Communist youth wing)

LMT Local Monitoring Team

MIM Muslim (later Mindanao) Independence Movement MIPT Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

MOA-AD Memorandum of Agreement – Ancestral Domain NATO North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDF National Democratic Front (part of Communist movement)

NGO Non-governmental organization

NISP National Internal Security Plan

NPA New People’s Army

NSBC Philippines Statistics Authority

OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference

OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process PDAF Priority Development Assistance Fund

PDI Philippine Daily Inquirer

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PNP Philippine National Police

PSC Protracted Social Conflict

RPM-P Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas (Communist)

RSM Rajah Solaiman Movement

SPCPD Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development SZOPAD Special Zone of Peace and Development

UN United Nations

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USA United States of America

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Terrorist groups are one the most pressing concerns for today’s society. Almost on a daily basis, attacks happen somewhere in the world. Although casualties are deeply distressing, it is the fear that these attacks cause that can disrupt society. The recent events in France 1and Belgium2 have shown that complete cities can come to a standstill because of an attack.

The study of terrorism3 aims at building a theoretical and scientific foundation to understand the rise and fall of terrorist groups. Since the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) started to collect and combine data about terrorist groups in 1968 until 2006, 648 groups have ended (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Scientists have devoted much time on explaining the rise of terrorism, employing both quantitative and qualitative studies (see chapter 1.2). However, on the ending of terrorism, information is scarce (Jones & Libicki, 2008),(Cronin, 2009). It is for this reason that the case of the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, is of particular interest.

The conflict between the separatist Muslim groups and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) is based on a fight for autonomy that has lasted for almost four decades (1969– 2014). If we broaden the scope to include all violent interactions throughout history, the conflict between the Christian Filipino’s and the Muslim Filipino’s (henceforth Moros4_{) population is already} ongoing for more than four centuries. The militant MILF movement was founded in 1984 by Hashim Salamat (Jubair, 1999; Gomez, 2000). The MILF came to replace the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as the most important Moro resistance movement after it had signed a peace with the government in 1996 (Jubair, 1999; Gomez, 2000).

Over the years, many violent clashes between the MILF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have occurred, many times disrupting the continued attempts that were made to resolve the conflict. On March 27, 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) peace deal between the Philippine government and the MILF was signed. Notwithstanding the frequent relapses into conflict after peace deals (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011)), we can

1 November 2015 2 22 March 2016 3

For a definition see chapter 1.2

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This term was introduced by the Spanish. It referred to their Muslim opponents which conquered large parts of present day Spain. The Muslim Filipino’s now use the term with pride, as it distinguishes them from the Christian Filipino’s and remembers of the struggle fought by their forefathers.

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11 view this as a terrorist conflict that has ended. In this respect, the MILF case could hold valuable lessons as to why conflicts are/fail to be resolved.

This thesis aims to answer the following research question:

“How did the MILF transition to a peaceful political process?”

1.2. General outline of this thesis

The thesis is structured as follows:

First, a general review is given of the literature concerning the onset and demise of terrorist/insurgency groups. This review presents the general theoretical framework that will be used in analyzing the specific case of MILF (section 1.3).

Second, the research design is presented, consisting of the methodology used and the lenses and framework applied to the case. Also, further motivation is provided for the selection of the MILF case (section 1.4).

Chapter 2 starts a historical background of the history of the Moro-Philippine conflict (section 2.1). By understanding the history of the conflict, a better analysis of present concerns will follow.

Then, the conflict is analyzed by dividing it into four phases between January 1997 and January 2014 (2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5). Each of these phases will be analyzed using the lenses and framework as described in chapter 1.4.

Chapter 3 provides a systematic analysis of the MILF case. Here, the different phases will be compared (section 3.3). Then the main observations and intermediate conclusions will be analyzed using the most important theoretical concepts (section 3.4). This will lead to the overall conclusions (section 3.5) and recommendations (section 3.6).

1.3. Literature review

This chapter will provide an oversight of the academic literature in the field of terrorism/insurgency conflicts. These conflicts play an increasingly dominant role in policymakers’ security orientation. However, in contrast to interstate conflict, research into the causes, dynamics

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12 and solutions to terrorism/insurgency conflicts is relatively young (Jones & Libicki, 2008).When it is done, it frequently takes little notice of what research is already out there (Cronin, 2009). However, especially with regard to ending terrorism/insurgency, studies are scarce (Cronin, 2009; Jones & Libicki, 2008). The RAND study by Jones and Libicki (2008), has made a significant contribution because it has not focused upon one case, which is common in terrorist research (Cronin, 2009), but has researched 648 cases dating from 1968 until 2006. They have singled out the most successful methods for ending terrorism: political transition (43 %) and policing (40%). About 10 % of the groups ended because the group had achieved its goals and in only 7 % of the cases, there was a military victory for the government (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Concluding from this study, political transition gives the highest odds for ending a terrorist group. The purpose of this study is to further explore the correlative factors that Jones & Libicki have used, and to find out how political transitions come about.

This requires an exploration of the causal mechanisms which are at work in ending terrorism through political process. As of now, this is still a relatively uncharted part of terrorism research (Cronin, 2009). The study will contribute to filling this knowledge gap. However, this first requires a description of the academic field in which to maneuver. The literature review will go into differences over approach and definition (1.3.1), observed correlations (1.3.2) causes and dynamics (1.3.3) and non-violent endings (1.3.4).

1.3.1. Terrorism, a complex area of study

Scholars use a multitude of interpretations and/or orientations in defining terrorism or insurgency (Schmid, 2011). The terms are often used interchangeably. This complicates the systematic study of the literature. In his handbook on terrorism research, Schmid discusses several leading practical terrorist definitions, such as those used by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism (2001) and the United States Department of State (2006). He asked for input from dozens of terrorist scholars on the practical definitions formulated by the institutes mentioned above, and those definitions that were popular in academics works (Schmid, 2011). Schmid carefully analyzed the feedback received and attempted to capture the core dimension of terrorism as follows:

“terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special

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conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.” (Schmid 2011, 86)

The definition encompasses the thought process to commit an act of terrorism and the act itself. By his use of the words ‘effectiveness’ and ‘calculated’, we can assume that in his mind both are based upon a rational decision. It is a tactic that is presumed rational to pursue certain goals and requires calculated rational planning and execution.

In addition to this, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010) have brought more clarity on the difference between insurgency and terrorism. They argue that insurgency and terrorism are two distinct strategies of irregular warfare. Consequently: “it is not in tactics, targets,

causes or motivations that differences lie, but in political, relational and organizational features that are connected to the distinct strategy (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010).” Whereas an insurgency

strategy seeks to gain control of a territory and by using popular support and local resources, a terrorist strategy seeks to create fear, provoke a reaction or coerce a government into altering a certain policy. For both, this requires a completely different relation with the population (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010). They conclude that acts of terrorism are not exclusive to the strategy of terrorism. Such acts can be used in an insurgency strategy as well. However, within an insurgency strategy, the group must be extra careful to make sure that it has popular support (active or silent) to commit such acts (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010). This study will use both insights, the rational tactic explained by Schmid (Schmid, 2011), and the different strategies explained by Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2010) in which such tactics can be used.

Besides a range of definitions, scholars use different analytical lenses to look at the subject matter. Studies based upon assumptions of rationalism and self-interest have been contested by more interpretative, context-sensitive studies (Tarrow, 2007). This originates from different ontologies. Scholars in social science hold different views on whether the world consists of real things or merely of interpretations of that world. This affects the kind of questioning one does significantly. For example, is the human being able to think objectively? Or is he always influenced by his surroundings and ideas? Furthermore, scholars argue differently about how knowledge can be gained, their epistemological ground (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010). Can we learn from experience to explain phenomena? Or is it merely possible to interpret events and gain some shared understanding of what happened (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010)? This is the main difference between scholars that use a positivist epistemology and those that use an epistemology of interpretative understanding. The consequences of these different ways of looking and conducting research can be directly linked to

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14 the kind of questions scholars ask. A positivist research will want to distinguish factors and clearly define independent actor capabilities, such as state capabilities (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010). Positivist questions concerning terrorism will aim to discern the factors and actors which are relevant and add importance to them. However, this study should not be limited to attributing saliency to such factors and actors, but also include the dynamics of their interplay/interaction. Interpretative understandings are more suitable for the latter task. Here it becomes possible to ask: how do actors interact and do their relationships change over time? How should we perceive actors’ intentions, and what motivations drive their action? Interpretative understandings are less strict in how actors are presumed to interact (for example on the basis of rationality) and the importance of conflict factors and actor behavior, which can change over time. Sidney Tarrow argues that true understanding of relationships and motivations can only be derived from a more thick description (Tarrow, 2007). Because it is the aim of this study to find out how political transitions come about and not to test a model, an approach of interpretative understanding is applied. This has led to the following research question:

“How did the MILF transition to a peaceful political process?”

The study builds upon two assumptions that are by no way absolute, but guide the structure of the literature review. The first assumption relates to the correlations that were found in several quantitative studies into the demise of terrorist groups. The study assumes that correlations are valid and therefore does not seek to falsify them, merely to explore them in order to find causal mechanisms. The second assumption relates to the causes of terrorism. These are well studied (Cronin, 2009) and provide a useful frame of reference if we assume that removal of such causes is part of the cause for the demise of a terrorist group. Consequently, in the following paragraphs, we first explore correlations derived from quantitative research (1.2), and then causal factors (1.3).

1.3.2. Observations from quantitative research

In order for a researcher to make a decision on which factors are important and how actors interact, it is imperative to conduct qualitative research. This can build upon correlations between factors that were found in quantitative studies. First, I wish to elaborate on a few caveats that come from those researches that have done large-N studies or meta-research. However useful it may seem to derive causes for ending groups from the removal of the sources that have created them,

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15 Audrey Cronin states that assuming that sources of conflict are logically connected to endings is too simple (Cronin, 2009). Factors for demise may just as likely be external as internal. Terrorism researchers have long focused on the psychology of individual leaders and organizational dynamics to explain endings. This does not match group dynamics anymore. Increasingly, terrorist groups are much more decentralized and rely less on interpersonal contacts (Cronin, 2009). Another caveat is made by Bart Schuurman (Schuurman, Eijkman, & Bakker, 2014). He contends that while conducting terrorism research, we should be aware of the bias upon counterterrorist efforts, both because a lack of reliable data on the group and due to government funding (Schuurman et al., 2014). This has caused researchers to assign the causes for the decline of groups to external factors, such as state policies (Crenshaw, 1999). Let us now examine concrete findings on correlative factors.

This study will focus on building upon correlations which were found in large-N studies such as the RAND study by Jones & Libicki (2008) and several few-N studies such as Audrey Cronin’s (2009) work or a study conducted by, among others, Martha Crenshaw for the United States Institute for Peace (USIP, 1999). Several correlations between factors and the demise of terrorist groups were found by Libicki & Jones: 1) the breadth of terrorist goals, 2) the size of terrorist groups, 3) their ideological orientation, 4) economic conditions and 5) regime type (2008). This has produced some interesting findings.

According to Libicki and Jones (2008), concerning the ideological orientation of groups, they found that religious groups take decidedly longer to end. However, religious groups also never truly achieve their objectives. Also, when religious groups have ended, this is in most cases accomplished by policing. Only one factor consistently holds up as a correlative factor to the duration of a group: size. Larger groups last longer and have a higher chance of achieving their goals (Libicki & Jones, 2008). They also found interesting correlations between the five factors listed above. Economic conditions seem to be related to a group’s ideological orientation and its size. In high income countries, groups are mostly either left-wing or nationalist. In addition, groups are small in high income countries. Terrorist groups more often end in high income countries than in low income countries. And lastly, policing is more effective in high income countries (Libicki & Jones, 2008). The breadth of goals is correlated to ideological orientation and the size of groups. Religious and left-wing groups hold the broadest goals of empire and social revolution. These groups are rarely ended by politics because their goals cannot be bargained over. Also, Libicki and Jones find that bigger groups often have broader and more ambitious goals. Such goals have more appeal which makes recruiting easier (Libicki & Jones, 2008). Regime type might have an impact on the size of groups, but this is highly contested. The argument that grievances are less in democracies, due to established political rights, is debatable. Moreover, because of privacy rights and other checks on power,

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16 democracies are less capable than authoritarian regimes in repression and the tracking down of terrorists, which could keep groups small. The last correlation is between ideological orientation and size. Libicki and Jones (2008) find that nationalist groups are often the biggest, with religious groups coming in second place.

All in all, one correlation was solidly produced between one of the five factors and ending the conflict: group size. An increasing size of the group meant that it would be harder to end. However, between factors, many also showed correlations with size. So despite not having found correlations between the other factors and duration, certain co-variations with other factors might produce interesting results.

Whereas Libicki & Jones focus more on group and state attributes, Audrey Cronin has distinguished the seven most important ways in which terrorist groups end:

- capture or killing of the leader,

- failure to transition to the next generation, - achievement of the group’s aims,

- transition to a legitimate political process, - undermining of popular support,

- repression,

- transition from terrorism to other forms of violence (Cronin, 2009)

Capture or killing only proved important in a few cases. Cronin concludes that capture is most likely more effective than killing a leader. If a leader is captured, this undermines his credibility and that of the group. Moreover, with a leader still alive, it may be harder for the group to regain new leadership (Cronin, 2009). Concerning a failure to transition to a next generation, right-wing terrorist groups stand out. Ethno-separatist and religious groups are more successful in this regard (Crenshaw, 1999). Groups rarely succeed in achieving their aims, but when they do, it is often through a transition to the political process. Cronin emphasizes that this is much more complex than merely pursuing a negotiated agreement (Cronin, 2009). There are many variables that determine the outcome of negotiations. Cronin lists a few: degree of hierarchy in the group, degree of centralized leadership, degree and nature of public support for the cause and if the group aims are negotiable (Cronin, 2009). Firstly, she concludes that a more hierarchical group structure and stronger leadership is advantageous for ensuring compliance with peace terms on local levels. Also, separatist groups often have aims that are more feasible and negotiable than other type of groups (Cronin, 2009). Potentially, additional pay-off in this respect may come if a terrorist organization struggles to perpetuate its own absolutist perspective in justifying the use of terrorist methods (Guelke, 1998).

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17 Secondly, centralized leadership is deemed important because the greatest risk of pursuing negotiations is that it often leads to the creation of splinter groups, frequently more violent and extreme than the original group (Cronin, 2009). Leadership that is centralized is more stable is this respect than a structure with decentralized independently operating cells. Thirdly, the loss of popular support can greatly influence the position of a group (Cronin, 2009). It can stop the flow of new recruits, diminish the amount of safe houses, cause a financial blow and potentially help the police get more information out of locals (Cronin, 2009). Support is lost through fear for government retaliation, an improvement in life conditions for the local populace, decreasing salience of the group’s ideology and resentment about the group’s level of violence (Cronin, 2009). Popular support is often linked to levels of repression. As levels of state violence and the profiling of certain ethnic or social-economic groups increase, resentment will grow. This may serve to legitimize terrorist attacks and as an effective tool for recruitment (Cronin, 2009). On the other hand, repression may deter the local population from supporting the terrorist group (Cronin, 2009). The last way to end a group, a transition to another modus operandi and away from terrorism, occurs when the focus of the group shifts to making profit, or when the group gains strength and transitions into insurgency (Cronin, 2009). However, as we have established in 1.1, this does not mean that such groups seize to use terrorist tactics.

In conclusion, a remark on the USIP study is warranted. They conclude that timing is also a crucial element. This fits within the interpretative approach, which sees conflict and its factors of importance as interrelated and changing over time. For example, the study states that peace overtures must be timed correctly. Preferably, they should come at a time that the government is strong and the group is undergoing of period of introspection (Crenshaw, 1999).

1.3.3. Asymmetrical conflicts: causes and dynamics

In order to study the dynamics of terrorism, one must be aware of the context in which it is being used, the wider conflict. Therefore, it is important to give an insight into the academic literature concerning the causes of/and dynamics within an asymmetrical conflict. Asymmetrical conflicts are between parties that are inevitably unequally situated in capabilities and resources because of their relation, for example between a state and separatist group or an employee and employer (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Addressing the causes of a conflict may remove incentives to use terrorism. Understanding the dynamics within the conflict can serve to distinguish its main driving forces. Disrupting or transforming such drivers may produce the window of

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18 opportunity toward ending the conflict. In the following sections theory on causes and dynamics will be elaborated on in asymmetrical conflicts. The first part will have a general focus on civil conflict. Subsequently, this is extended to comprise the use of terrorist tactics.

1.3.3.1. Conflict resolution theory

Conflict resolution theory has produced many insights into the causes and dynamics of conflict. Most work builds upon the studies conducted by Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1969). Galtung came up with three triangles that were interconnected and described the dimensions of conflict and the forms of violence. Galtung viewed conflict as inherent to a society where human beings with different preferences live together. He did not see conflict as necessarily violent. The first dimension of conflict is contradiction, which refers to the underlying conflict situation, the perceived incompatibility of goals.

The second dimension is attitude. This is about the perceptions that actors have of themselves and their adversaries, often instilled by fear, anger or jealousy. Then there is actual behavior. Competing interests and negative attitudes can lead to different kind of behavior, often becoming more violent as the first two dimensions cut deeper. Galtung also translates these dimensions into forms of violence. He classifies contradiction as a sort of structural violence, attitudes as cultural violence and behavior as direct violence. To exemplify this division, structural violence can be poverty or disenfranchisement, direct violence can be killing or the act of rape, and cultural violence is everything that justifies this (Galtung, 1969). These dimensions of conflict and forms of violence can be connected to the drivers of peace. Addressing contraction requires peacebuilding, transforming attitudes is a matter of peacemaking and changing (violent) behavior is primarily done by peacekeeping (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). After Galtung had laid down the groundwork of conflict resolution by distinguishing the dimensions of conflict and related forms of violence, several scholars tried to concretize these dimensions and the dynamics within/ and between them. Edward Azar’s (1990) work on protracted social conflicts (PSC) is especially relevant to asymmetrical conflict and the case study in chapter three.

In the 1970s, Azar contested some of the dominant thinking within the academic community about conflicts. Until then, research focused mostly upon conflicts between states, and also clearly separated the international from the domestic domain. Azar concluded that such a distinction was purely artificial. According to Azar, there is one social environment in which conflicts arise and are resolved. Sources of such conflicts predominantly lie within and across states, not between them. His

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19 research emphasized the role of intercommunal relations. People may contest for material wealth, security, status and political rights. Such struggles are often played out at a communal level. Azar identifies four preconditions that can work to escalate conflicts: communal discontent, the deprivation of basic needs5, degree of state failure and the degree of international linkages. He adds that whether these preconditions will transform conflict into a violent struggle depends upon the process dynamics present, of which he lists three: communal actions/strategies, state action/strategies and built-in mechanisms. The former refers to identity group formation, organization and mobilization of such a group, the choice of goals, its leadership and tactics. The state will respond by choosing a policy somewhere between political accommodation and coercive repression. Political accommodation will be more difficult in weak states. The built-in mechanisms are the dynamics of conflict that always influence the choices conflict parties make. One can think of pre-existing beliefs and biases, the security dilemma or incentives based on a war economy (Azar, 1990). The four preconditions form an important part of the context in which the process dynamics take place.

After Azar, several post-Cold war theories have contributed to understanding the context and process dynamics even better. They can easily be integrated within protracted social conflict theory, and serve as a nice addition. These will be discussed in the next two sections.

1.3.3.2. Civil wars

Galtung’s idea of contradiction, based on the belief that the goals of each group are incompatible with that of the other as long as their current relationship is sustained, is a good starting position. Such contradiction can be grounded on greed when there is a scarcity of material wealth that both wish to possess, or on grievance, when cultural values and political rights of one group are denied/marginalized by the other. Many scholars in the pre-Cold War era mainly focused upon the grievances of civil war parties. This was understandable due to the strong ideological clash between communists and capitalists, which characterized much of these conflicts. Or the decolonization wave that empowered many disenfranchised populations to settle old scores. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) have conducted a large-N study which found no convincing correlates between grievances and the outbreak of civil war, but did so for economic variables and civil war. Based on previous research (Collier, 1999), they assume that conflict often pays off for rebel groups, independent of the outcome. They also state that grievances are frequently

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20 exaggerated, something which cannot be dispelled by conflict itself, but worsens this. Since grievances can easily be fabricated and misperceived, explanations of rebellions by referral to grievances should be extra cautious (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). By testing a data set of civil wars between 1960-1999 against indicators of grievance and indicators of opportunity, only the latter performed well.

The first factor that influences opportunity is the availability of finance. Especially in countries with large primary commodity exports, finance is easy and potentially lucrative. Also, the availability of finance through powerful diaspora networks is found to increase conflict risk. The second factor in opportunity is the cost of rebellion. If opportunity costs for starting a rebellion are higher, for example in countries with higher GDP growth rates, higher rates of male secondary education enrollment and higher per capita income, conflict risk is substantially reduced. A third factor is that of military advantage. Significant here is the degree of population dispersion. Concerning grievances, inequality, political rights and religious fractionalization all had insignificant outcomes. Only ethnic dominance is found to increase conflict risk (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Quantitative research carried out by James Fearon and David Laitin (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) endorsed these findings. These studies hint at the explanatory power of economic variables, and the dynamics of opportunistic greed to exploit them.

Jeremy Weinstein (Weinstein, 2006) elaborates more on the dynamics within what he calls – opportunistic and activist rebellions – those primarily based on greed and those that were caused by grievance. He argues that opportunistic rebellions organize on the basis of immediate rewards for their supporters, through the distribution of resource rents or external patronage. The leadership of the group is likely to have less control over its armed units when they do not share an ideological belief and identity (Weinstein, 2006). Especially in dispersed areas, opportunistic groups will use more violence to retain social control than activist rebellions (Weinstein, 2006). Insurgent groups can also thrive on significant amounts of external aid/rewards for their resistance against the government. Weinstein points out that such aid can fundamentally change the reality on the ground, risking members of behaving solely self-interested because money is flowing in from abroad (Weinstein, 2006).

In his study on civil wars, Stathis Kalyvas (Kalyvas, 2009) has focused upon the use of violence within such wars. He expands upon Weinstein’s analysis that opportunistic rebellions are more violent. Kalyvas stresses that beside indiscriminate violence, often connected to a breakdown of authority as envisaged by Thomas Hobbes, groups use selective violence in order to produce local information (for example on government informants) needed to strengthen a group’s social control

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21 (Kalyvas, 2009). However, we can also think of this in a more delicate and nuanced game of rivalry. According to Claire Metelits (Metelits, 2009), insurgent groups are not excessively violent against local populations because of the presence of natural resources, but because they are in a state of active rivalry with one or more other groups. Resources only become a source for aggression when there is an impending threat of resource depletion, which is often the case when groups are in fierce competition/active rivalry (Metelits, 2009). Metelits even states that in the absence of such active rivalry, groups are even able to behave like a state, providing security, public goods and guarding indigenous institutions (Metelits, 2009). This kind of behavior could legitimize a group as a valid negotiating partner (1.5) (Zartman, 1995). Now that we have explored the most important explanations of conflict outbreak, grievances (1.3.1) and greed (1.3.2), and the dynamics associated with them, some final notes on other post-Cold War additions are heeded.

There is one influential theory that contributed to the preconditions described by Azar and the opportunity thesis put forward by Collier & Hoeffler. This is the work of Barry Buzan on re-conceptualizing security to catch all its complexities ((Buzan, 1991). Buzan stressed that during the Cold War the concept of security was interpreted too narrowly, strictly limited to the physical survival of the state or the nation. This centered around military and political dimensions of security. Buzan extended this by incorporating economic security, societal security, environmental security and regional security into the security concept. Economic security is about balancing risks, to ensure welfare stability. It is also the one dimension that reinforces all other dimensions of security. Societal security is about the harmony of cultures and identities that is present (lacking) in society. Concerning environment security, Buzan admits that this is hard to measure, but one can think of the exhaustion of farmlands or the extinction of other livelihoods, such as flora and fauna. Lastly, and in addition to Azar and Collier & Hoeffler the most important dimension, Buzan elaborates on regional security. This goes beyond mere conceptions of the balance of power, also comprising relationships of enmity/amity, based upon shared/opposing forms of identity and ethnicity or territorial claims and historical events (Buzan, 1991). Such relationships together form a security complex, which Buzan defines as:

“a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their

national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” (Buzan 1991, p190)

He saw security as a very omnipresent concept, which should be studied from the different levels (individual, nation state and the international system) and broken down into the dimensions set forth above (Buzan, 1991).

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22 Connected to this omnipresence was the introduction of a concept what Ole Waever called ‘securitization’ (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). Securitization is the construction of an issue as a threat that poses a security problem to the nation. This is often done by elites and accomplished once the audience accepts the frame (Buzan et al., 1998).

1.3.3.3. Specific dimensions of terrorism

Conflicts do not just emerge and hold the same shape, meaning and intensity over time. They are constantly evolving and changing. Such dynamics are important to understand the developments within conflicts and the road they take to violence, peace or a stand-off. This also includes a moment where terrorism becomes relevant or irrelevant again. For example when it is securitized by politicians. Buzan (Buzan et al., 1998) distinguishes three ways in which politicians can go about this: insulation, repression and equalizing. Insulation is based on decreasing vulnerabilities to terrorism. Repression is rather more active, aiming at eliminating the threat of terrorism. Equalizing refers to repairing inequalities in order to soften grievances (Buzan et al., 1998). Especially the difference between insulation and repression is an analytical distinction that is a useful addition to the more forceful policy responses that were put forward by Libicki & Jones (policing, military force) and Cronin (capture leaders, repression). Because our main topic of research, a policy based on political rapprochement, is rarely successful on its own (Libicki & Jones, 2008), I wish to elaborate further on forceful policy responses. Whereas repression relies on a pro-active and anticipatory justice system, insulation can entail different legal choices. Sara Fiorentini and Willem-Jan van der Wolf (Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015) explore some of these choices.

Because of diverging definitions of terrorism, governments claim that it is not possible to refer the crime of terrorism to an international court with universal jurisdiction (Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015). As to the approach governments may take to terrorism, Van der Wilt distinguishes between the objective and subjective approach (in: Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015). The former concentrates solely on the act that is performed. The latter also includes motive/intention. A subjective approach is needed to engage in anticipatory justice, such as punishing people for acts that are yet to be committed (for example a terrorist attack). However, according to Van der Wilt, because of the reactive nature of criminal law, it is not a suitable instrument for prevention (in: Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015). A subjective approach would entail a more farfetched curtailment of human rights, which has a risk of being counterproductive because it can contribute to terrorist recruitment grounds. This is an implication of a much tougher policy that influences the dynamics in

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23 various ways. Popular support may dwindle, in fear of arrest, or increase due to dissatisfaction with the government. Terrorist groups may be prepared to go until further lengths to achieve their goals because they know that a severe punishment awaits them once they are caught or the group is dissolved Abrahms (Abrahms, 2006).

Henar Criado (Criado, 2015) connects such hard policies directly to the terrorist behavior in his case study on the ETA in Spain. Because we assume that terrorists wish to maximize the saliency of their attacks, we should gain a better understanding of shifts in terrorist behavior by observing certain factors that explain such saliency. Criado points to three factors that explain terrorist saliency: number of victims, type of victim and the dynamics of political competition. The latter is directly connected to whether there is an exclusion of terrorism from party competition and if not, elections draw near (Criado, 2015). Clearly, governments and political parties could decrease the saliency of terrorism by unifying politically around the issue. A de-politicization of the issue is simply not realistic due to the electorate’s demand for action (Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015). This is particularly the case after a big attack or event.

Gordon Clubb (Clubb, 2014) refers to these big events as triggers. These events can produce higher levels of violence, more geographical spread, re-entry of disengaged militants and offer more important opportunities for spoilers (Clubb, 2014). A reservation to this is made by Adam Roberts (2015), who has done meta-research into the field of terrorism. According to Roberts, history teaches us that is mostly not a few trigger acts of great violence that transform the conflict (Roberts, 2015).

1.3.4. Ending conflict non-violently

In order to find a political solution for an asymmetrical conflict, the parties can choose to negotiate. The positions from which the parties can negotiate are determined by the conflict, which is constantly evolving. To capture this, one should assess its features, actors’ capabilities and history. Such features and capabilities were discussed in the previous paragraph. This paragraph explores literature on the way they can interact when they choose to negotiate instead of fight. The literature points us in the direction of four factors of importance: tactics, leadership, third parties, trust and the role of spoilers. In order to review these factors, a clear understanding of negotiation practice is needed. In the literature, elements of time and momentum are attached to certain practice. Also, I will shortly give a general indication of important elements in successful peace agreements so we can start reviewing tactics and results.

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1.3.4.1 Negotiation practices within the longer peace process

Most authors that write on conflict resolution agree that just as with other phases of conflict, such as the emergence of a clear contradiction between parties and possibly armed conflict (Cronin, 2009), negotiating a peace, takes time. Setbacks can cause severe delay or even deterioration, whereas breakthroughs can accelerate the road to peace. Conflicts evolve, they can spin around, take another shape or get a different meaning over time. Negotiations, if they come about, can take different forms depending on the conflict situation. For example, if a conflict is from its onset mainly about political injustices but grows to become a struggle for territory and resources, negotiations may have to take another form.

The first difference that academics have stressed is that between official and unofficial diplomatic contacts. For asymmetrical conflicts, this is especially important. Governments are not easily inclined to recognize the legitimacy of a rebel group, since this implies an erosion of their own authority. However, for negotiations to work, an equal power balance is favorable. This requires mutual recognition of the other as a legitimate actor (Zartman, 1995). Official contacts usually signify such recognition, which would explain why some governments attempt to avoid this. Legitimacy may preclude a government from criminalizing rebel group members, which could undermine its strategy. In this stage of the conflict, contacts are rather made unofficial or through back-channels.

So what negotiation options do the parties have and at what stage of the conflict is an option likely to be on the table? Besides being official or unofficial, the main differences between options can be categorized in three tracks of diplomacy. Frequently, this involves a third party. Within track one, top-level government representatives are involved, usually under the guidance of an international governmental organization or another state. This involves more muscle and pressure to come an agreement. Track one diplomacy often comes in the form of official negotiations, summitry, or an arbitration procedure. Third parties may act as an arbiter or forceful mediator (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011).

For track two diplomacy, no top-officials are needed and the pressure to come to an agreement is less. Such contacts can serve to create trust, exchange views, brainstorm to reconcile interests and needs or work out low-level issues for implementation. This can take the form of mediation, work-group meetings or informal conciliatory meetings. According to Ramsbotham et al (2011), a third party mediator has to provide for three basic elements in second track , diplomacy: improve communications, exchange relevant information and befriend both parties. Second track

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25 diplomacy has gained more adherents and appreciation over the last decades. In these meetings, it is easier to implement a principled negotiation approach, as advocated by Herb Kelman (Kelman, 1996). Central to this approach is to bridge the difference between positions and interests. This is easier done in low-level meetings, where statements and promises can be made in a more exploratory and non-binding way. Also, it is easier to explore true basic needs. According to Burton, interests can be differentiated from needs in that they are negotiable, whereas needs are not. Burton lists four basic needs: security, political access, development and identity. However, basic needs can often be fulfilled by different positions, whereas interests are concrete and have a limited range of negotiation positions that achieve them. According to Burton, focusing on needs instead of interests presents a chance to creatively find solutions (Burton, 1990).

Finally, third track diplomacy is about including grassroots movements. This might concern meetings between community leaders, academics or any other initiative that is organized by citizens that seeks to bridge differences, build social cohesion and find common ground. A third party might be an authoritative figure from a neighboring village who can fulfill the same roles as third parties in first and second track diplomacy (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). The question that remains is: do we need each option and if yes, when?

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2011) conclude that track one and track two diplomacy are often most effective when they are undertaken in conjunction. Track three is needed throughout the process, but especially when party positions are completely opposed. Grassroots movements may demand internal change of their own party position. Also, they may explore and accomplish things on a local scale that may serve as an example for national politicians/leaders. The question remains to what ends should the different diplomacy methods be used?

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1.3.4.2. Successful elements of peace agreements

In order to know what method one should use, an idea of what constitutes a good settlement is needed. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2011) list several elements of successful settlements:

- The inclusion of all affected parties

- Agreements need to be well crafted and precise

- A well-struck balance must exist between clear commitments and more flexible terms - The parties need incentives to sustain the process, for example through power-sharing - Provide for a dispute settlement mechanism, and a way for renegotiation in matters of

disagreement about the implementation

- Deal with the core issues, bring about transformation

- Preferable: respect for human rights, justice and group rights

However, to reach such an outcome, many variables should be taken into account. Cronin lists a few: degree of hierarchy in the group, degree of centralized leadership, degree and nature of public support for the cause and if the group aims are negotiable (Cronin, 2009). She concludes that a more hierarchical group structure and stronger leadership is advantageous for ensuring compliance with peace terms on local levels. Also, separatist groups often have aims that are more feasible and negotiable than other type of groups (Cronin, 2009). The greatest risk of pursuing negotiations is that it often leads to the creation of splinter groups, frequently more violent and extreme than the original group (Cronin, 2009).

Parties will have to make tactical choices on how to deal with these variables and which of the above listed elements they wish to make a priority. However, during conflict, it will not always be possible to address all elements, including a rational way of dealing with them. For example, the first element, the inclusion of all parties, will perhaps first require a confrontational tactic from a smaller party, presenting itself as an important player in the conflict, whereas later its tactics might shift to more conciliatory to retain a seat at the table. Bigger parties will have to engage in third and second track diplomacy to make sure smaller factions are in agreement with the process. Another example is on the second element, whether to get a comprehensive deal, precise and well-crafted, or to seize momentum and make a deal on certain issues, while forestalling agreement on other topics. It may be tempting for an incumbent leader to get a quick deal, in order to boost his standing and political clout. However, certain studies argue that small steps are easier to sustain, and therefore preferable to an instant all-encompassing solution (Osgood, 1962). Notwithstanding that strong incentives to

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27 continue working on all other issues must be in place, with clear procedures, timetables and public commitments to see them through (Sisk, 1997). On the latter, strong leadership is needed (Weinstein, 2006). Small-steps are best made in the second and third track, which attract less attention and do not have to produce policy results (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Clearly, choices must be made which are often ambiguous. They may involve choices for a location, a third party mediator, the agenda and all other political/military decisions that shape the context of the negotiations.

In conclusion, different negotiation tactics can exist in a group or government strategy. The difference between strategy and tactic is not always clear-cut. The strategy is the grand scheme of how a party wants to accomplish his end goals. It can also refer to part of the scheme, for example the military or diplomatic parts. Tactics refer to certain methods of- or maneuvers in within such broader set-ups. These may change over time and is dependent upon the state of the conflict. Tactics may consist of different methods of diplomacy, or tracks of diplomacy. Certain factors of importance, such as the strength of leadership, degree of hierarchy, type of group, strength of spoilers and mutual trust are best engaged with a certain tactic and using one or several of the diplomacy tracks. Strategy and tactics are essential for understanding the conflict and actor’s behavior. For example, a group strategy may be to mobilize broad resistance with popular support and to seize control of certain territories in order to gain government concessions on autonomy and self-rule. If it does not have the military might to seize control, it might move from insurgency to terrorist tactics in order to gain a better bargaining position. However, this could undermine its popular support and therefore its grand strategy. This game is continuously played out by the conflict parties. The following will elaborate on how players can approach this game and what options they have.

1.3.4.3. Strategy and tactical choices

Clausewitz famously states that “war is a continuation of political activity by other means” (Von Clausewitz, 1873). The same can be argued the other way: “negotiations are just another means of fighting a war” (Jubair, 1999). These are the first two options that parties have: fight or negotiate. For the area of fighting, which is connected to negotiations because it always looms in the background or happens simultaneously, we have explored several tactics in section 1.3. Now, this will be extended with academic views on tactics which are concerned with negotiation processes. This does not mean that both are deeply interrelated, as it is important for parties to keep the war option on the table to exert pressure. Both war and negotiation tactics can be part of a grand strategy.

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28 First, there is a strand of scholars which argues that both fighting and negotiating are based upon rational decisions. According to these scholars, a conflict party’s tactical choices should therefore also be based upon rational calculations. Such calculations are made by weighing the utility of negotiations against the utility of fighting, for example to gain a better bargaining position. These scholars adhere to bargaining theory, which comes from international relations. However, the strategic logic holds the same for asymmetrical conflict as for interstate conflict. Terrorist groups also incur costs upon themselves by escalating to more violence (sunk cost human/financial, audience costs) and gain credibility of threats by using violence (Abrahms, 2011). Because of the costs incurred, the challenger shows resolve. Scholars subsequently presume that an escalation of violence by the challenger will have a positive effect on coercing compliance by its adversary (Abrahms, 2011). In conclusion, according to these scholars, a tactic based on gaining negotiation concessions by forceful coercion is logical and sound.

Despite the logic reasoning behind bargaining theory, Abrahms (2011) shows that empirical studies have not endorsed the theoretically expected outcomes. Several large-N studies indicate that governments are less likely to concede to political demands when they are confronted with an escalation of terrorist violence (Crenshaw & Peller, 1998),(Abrahms, 2006). If groups actually achieved success of their strategic goals, it was in hybrid cases where terrorism was only used as a secondary tactic (Abrahms, 2006). Also, violence was directed at military targets and not at civilian targets (Abrahms, 2006). All authors contend that groups rather achieved success despite the use of terrorist tactics than because of it (Jones & Libicki, 2008; Cronin, 2009; Abrahms, 2006). So why is this?

Abrahms points to a sense of moral outrage, the election of conservative hardline politicians, the prevention of incentivizing potential terrorists or a perceived correspondence between extreme terrorist means and extreme ends (Abrahms, 2011; Abrahms, 2006). However, he contends that more research to assess the reasons behind the inability of bargaining theory to explain negotiations between governments and terrorist groups is needed. Clearly tactics should extend mere rational bargaining, based on coercive and exchange power (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Further proof of this can be found by applying the ‘dollar auction’ game to conflict bargaining. In this game both parties will exceed the value of the ‘thing for auction’, here one dollar, in order to incur greater costs upon their adversary than upon themselves. The focus is upon relative gains, which might entail: my losses are less than that of my adversary. The logic is that due to such a focus, the efforts/costs or resolve to gain something, for example an oil field, may not be in proportion to the potential gain (Shubik, 1971).

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29 A strategy such as the ‘departing train’ rely on ideas of seizing a unique opportunity while the momentum is there. This might offer chances for integrative solutions, but could also be used as a tactic by a dominant party to press through its own agenda. The idea behind it is that there is a unique opportunity to obtain peace, a ‘departing train’, but if a party does not align with the peace process, or get on the train, it will fall short of its benefits (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). The role of spoilers is also important in this.

Stedman (Stedman, 1997) distinguishes between internal and external spoilers (Stedman, 1997). Spoilers exist only in the context of a peace process, which they want to undermine. Stedman divides spoilers in three types: limited, greedy and total. The limited spoiler seeks tangible and smaller objectives. The greedy spoiler makes a cost/benefit analysis whether there is a possibility to profit from spoiling behavior. The total spoiler has all-or –nothing terms and refuses any compromise (Stedman, 1997). With regards to the ‘departing train’ tactic, it is especially effective for limiting the influence of spoilers by limiting their time to break up the peace process. A potential danger is that inside greedy spoilers, those actors that are indispensable for a successful outcome may attain high profits by exploiting their bargaining position (Stedman, 1997). A departing train tactic could be especially effective when it consist of an amnesty proclamation. When the government can convince the warring factions that this is a one-time offer, it works as a strong incentive (Ramsbotham et al., 2011).

Then there is a strategy of inclusion. This is based on seeking integrative solutions that presumes all parties agree that a continuation of hostilities only produces mutual suffering. Integrative solutions are those that brainstorm for a common position that works to transform the conflict by challenging dominant assumptions (Boulding, 1962). For example, to transform the idea that once your adversary feels stronger and more secure, this will not worsen but improve your own security. Changing this assumption will open up opportunities for creative joint solutions, like wealth-sharing (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). According to Zartman, such momentum can come about with a ‘hurting stalemate’. The idea is that if there’s enough cost to a conflict, parties will overcome their differences (Zartman, 1995). This is in direct opposition to the idea of the dollar auction, where parties will continue their struggle despite the large costs. A very real disadvantage of the ‘hurting stalemate’ is that contrary to expectations, it does not give a guarantee for peace, and might take years to overcome (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Even when it might seem logical on the basis of absolute gains to stop fighting, a deep mistrust may prevent this from ever materializing. So how do we overcome this and create trust?

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30 Strong leadership may create trust, for example by showing a clear dedication to attain peace. Leaders may create a strong symbolic frame of unity and opportunity. According to Kaufman, the strength of such a frame is dependent upon how much do constituents actually care about it, the credibility of a leader, the issues or values that are bridged or connected by the frame and the fidelity of the narrative compared to earlier beliefs/actions. Just as frames might be abused to create fear and mobilize people for violence, they can be used to construct peace (Kaufman, 2011). Leaders can also, as an ultimate sign of dedication, tie their own fate to the peace process. A disadvantage of this is that opponents of the incumbent leader may use the peace process as a way to get rid of an incumbent. Therefore, a strong leadership structure which strengthens the legitimacy and powers of the leader is important to ensure his commitments are carried out (Weinstein, 2006). Another way to create trust is to chop up the peace process in many steps, which can be checked and serve to build confidence. Important here is to have agreement on procedures and timetables (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Finally, a third party mediator or arbiter may bridge mistrust by creating trustful relations with both parties. Lederach (Lederach, 1995) argues that parties rather choose a partial-insider than an impartial-outsider. It is easier to trust an insider than an outsider. And trust is deemed more important than neutrality (Lederach, 1995). But trust is easily lost and hard to build.

1.3.4.4 Using negotiations for other ends than peace

It may be that negotiations merely serve to stall for time and reinforce military positions. A state strategy may be based on military domination and denial, for example by enforcing a naval blockade. A tactical choice at a certain time within such a strategy may be to avoid fighting and choose to negotiate. This will allow the government to attain relative gains in the meantime. Stalling for time may also be used to pacify third parties and make them lose interest. Similarly, a government may choose to negotiate in order to divide its opponent between those that support negotiations and more militant wings (Duyvesteyn & Schuurman, 2011). Moreover, a government may have to deal with several groups, choosing to negotiate with one so it can fight the other. For the government, this might prove an effective tactic in order to prevent your opponents from joining forces. However, this comes with a risk. Once a negotiation has failed because one party broke the peace or disregarded an agreement that was made, it is much harder to begin afresh.

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1.4. Research Design

1.4.1. Main theoretical considerations and strategies relevant to this case.

In this study the following theories from the literature review will take an important position:

- The protracted social conflict theory (Azar, 1991) - Peace spoiler theory (Stedman, 1999)

- Negotiation strategies (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011) - Greed and grievance theory (Collier & Hoeffler, 2003)

The protracted social conflict theory is of particular relevance as it allows capturing the social economic dimension of the conflict. As will be shown later in the case (chapter 2.1) this dimension can be regarded as an essential causal element of the grievances underlying the conflict.

The Peace spoiler theory is used as it will become clear from the case description that the peace process is a bumpy road with many different obstacles (= differing interests of participants).

Negotiation strategies are of relevance as different presidents have taken different strategies in order to deal with the conflict.

The relevance of the Greed and grievance theory is clear, as –historically- the loss of land, the inferior social status of the Moros has caused many grievances. Besides this, the ability to generate economic resources and external support are crucial for sustaining the conflict. Both aspects are relevant to this particular case.

1.4.2. Framework of analysis

In order to analyze the different phases of the conflict in a structured way, they are viewed through different lenses: the context, the state and the group. To gain a full picture of the context in which the parties interact, we can use three different levels of analysis: international, national and local. On the international level, this will provide insight into the world economy and regional stability. The national level can take into account factors such as the state of the national economy, regional differences and the dynamics of the political system. Lastly, the local level is suited to explain the situation in Mindanao and the conflict areas. For the state and the group lens, it is important to discern their specific positions, interests and needs at a certain moment in time. We can

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32 also call this their perspective. These are constructed through internal and external (with the context) dynamics. This gives us the following framework:

Context : local, national and international events/developments. State : perspective based upon internal and external dynamics. Group : perspective based upon internal and external dynamics.

Four phases are selected. 1). January 1997 – February 2001, 2). March 2001 – July 2005, 3). August 2005 – May 2010, 4) June 2010 – March 2014.

Phase one will consist of the start of the peace negotiations under President Ramos and end with the impeachment trial and subsequent stepping down of President Estrada. The second phase starts with the presidency of Arroyo and is mostly dominated by the war on terrorism. It ends when the talks about ancestral domain start. Phase three is focused upon the theme of ancestral domain and the disruption of the peace process through the Supreme Court suspension order. It ends with the elections for a new president. Phase four starts with the presidency of Benigno Aquino and focuses upon a revived peace process, culminating in a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

By using this framework consistently for all phases of the conflict, the study captures the time and context-specific factors that shape actors’ positions and relations.

1.4.3 Method

This study will focus on a single case. The existing gap of knowledge on how terrorist groups end is best improved by deeper exploration of the detailed processes that led to an end of the conflict with a terrorist groups. So what are the exact merits of the single case study method and how will this method be applied in the study?

The main contribution of a case study is its in-depth analysis. However, it is also important that case studies rely on a reference framework of a larger population of cases, to assess the particular situation of the case within a population of cases (Gerring, 2006). Most case-study designs rely on the representativeness of the case in relation to the larger population of cases concerning its

How does Terrorism End? A case study analysis of the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front