Political and Professional? A snapshot of politicisation and the senior civil service in Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia

(1)

Political and Professional?

A snapshot of politicisation and the senior civil service in Germany,

the Netherlands and Slovakia

The Hague, January 25 , 2016 Master Thesis

International and European Governance Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Instituut Bestuurskunde

Universiteit Leiden

Supervisor: Dr. C.F. van den Berg Second Reader: Dr. J. Matthys

Student: Johannes Bogaards

Student number: 0918385 Word count: 30.250

(2)

1

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the people who have helped me in writing my thesis. First, many thanks to my supervisor Dr. Caspar van den Berg for providing me with literature, feedback and general positive support. Whenever I felt stuck he would put me right back on track. Second, I would like to thank my good friend Elmar van Holten for reviewing my thesis and providing feedback were necessary. Third, I want to show my appreciation to my good friends Matthijs van der Klugt, Niels Boer, Yavor Paunov and Dasha Kolesnyk for moral support and valuable input. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their support and patience.

Johannes Bogaards

(3)

2

Abstract

In both the academic and the politic -administrative realm politicisation and its influence on civil service staffing is a highly relevant yet elusive topic. A politically neutral civil service is theoretically considered to be necessary in order to create an effective public sector. However, several studies show that in practice politicisation, in various forms and sizes, occurs in most if not all states. Especially the staffing of senior civil servants has displays aspects of

politicisation. This raises the question what explains appointments of senior civil servants, their political affiliation or their professional background?

By analysing existing literature on the topic of politicisation, reports and interviews with senior civil servants this thesis follows a highly qualitative research method. The

research is of cross-national nature and tries to discern patterns in appointment procedures and practices across three EU-member state (Netherlands, Germany and Slovakia) and across the Ministries of Finance and the Ministries of Social Affairs. The theoretical aim of this thesis is to bring the theory closer to the practice, and to test which definitions, forms and models are most relevant.

This thesis argues that possible differences in politicisation stem from differences between the administrative tradition of states and the differences between sectors. First it is argued that differences in cross-temporal evolution of an administrative tradition; the internal consistency of ideas, structures and practices; and the independence of an administrative tradition from external, notably international, pressures lead to a certain pattern of civil service politicisation. Second it is argued that the nature of the policy sector and that the inherent differences between these types of ministries influence the pattern of civil service staffing. Third, it is argued that the types of merit in a specific policy sector (either fachwissen or ideology) leads to a certain pattern of civil service staffing. The findings of this research point out that the first assumption is correct and the second is partially correct. No conclusive evidence could be found for the third assumption and is therefore rejected.

This thesis concludes that administrative traditions have a profound impact on patterns of politicisation. A well-structured legal framework within a relatively longstanding

administrative tradition sets the boundaries of politicisation. Moreover, within these set boundaries there is an informal culture which tampers the effects of the legal framework. And lastly, even though traditional-merit criteria are still present and important in civil service, have become a part of a broader spectrum of merit.

(4)

3

List of Abbreviations

ABD Algemene Bestuurdienst AStS Administrative State Secretaries CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl

CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands CEEC Central and Eastern Europe Country

COFOG General Government Expenditure CSO Civil Service Office

CSU Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern

D66 Democraten ’66

DG Director-General

EU European Union

FDP Freie Demokratische Partei

FTE Full Time Equivalents

HZDS People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia NPG New Political Governance

NPM New Public Management

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PStS Parliamentary State Secretary

PvdA Partij van de Arbeid

SCS Senior Civil Service/Servants (used interchangeably)

SG Secretary-General

SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

(6)

5

Chapter 1: Introduction and research question

1.1 Introduction of the subject

‘Tradition is that whoever is appointed as a senior official, immediately loses his political colour to loyally serve each minister1‘

Researcher Roel Nieuwenkamp in NRC Handelsblad (2014) shows one of the commonly accepted ‘truths’ of the civil service in the Netherlands. It implies that civil servants are politically neutral and loyal to their political principal. However international academic literature shows that the time of a clear separation between tasks of politicians and their civil servants seems to be over. In some states politicians appoint senior civil servants, in other states they bring their own entourage, or as a DG said to Nieuwenkamp: ‘Previously it was limited to a political assistant, but now it is more a sort of entourage. The political primacy is capturing a piece of the civil service2‘

Another dimension on which there is a clash between politicians and civil servants is that of power and influence over a ministry. In 2012 VVD and CDA decided to reduce the number of ministers and state secretaries from 26 to 20 (12 ministers, 8 state secretaries) . Nieuwenkamp: ‘It was expected that this would lead to an increase of civil servants’ influence on important dossiers’, however 3 years later, reportedly, the opposite is closer to the truth: ‘because Ministers concentrate more on the broad outline they actually increase their grasp over matters3‘

The above shows that it is not easy to grasp the relationship between politicians and civil servants, still it is simply too important not to try. We should ask ourselves why is it important? First, because this concerns the political leadership of a state and whomever has direct access to his/her office, or in different words: anyone who can influence national policy should be scrutinised. This concerns anyone from a political aide to a top-ranking Secretary-General. We should know what their (political) background is, and how they got appointed on their position.

1_{Versteegh, K. (2014), ‘Schaduwpolitici en bontkragen rond het Binnenhof, NRC Handelsblad, Binnenland, 23}

January

January.

(7)

6

Second, we should know which criteria are important for selection and recruitment for top-positions, and whether these criteria indirectly influence the functioning of a ministry. In the extreme case of nepotism, criteria like political background and personal trust clearly

outweigh traditional-merit criteria, and could therefore seriously disrupt the functioning of a ministry. But it is still unclear exactly to what extent and how political influence can have a negative effect. For example even though political appointments are inherently political, they do not always lead to ‘bad’ appointments.

This thesis aims to further explore the topic of civil service politicisation, with a specific focus on appointments of senior civil servants. Perhaps the clearest, and most broadly applicable definition is formulated by Peters and Pierre (2004). They understand

politicisation as ‘the substitution of merit-based criteria for political criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining of members of the public service’ (Peters, 2013: p. 16).

Although there is much literature on the topic of politicisation, it remains a difficult subject. From a normative/theoretical point of view it could be argued that there is a strict seperation between politics and adminsitration. For example, the Weberian ideal where a civil servant is a loyal ‘instrument’ of the executive power. In practice however, a different pattern can be observed. The public administation in some states becomes more politicized. This proces has been studied byAucoin, Kopecký, Spirova (2011), Lewis (2012) and Peters (2013). These authors do not use the same definition of politicisation, and also describe different forms of politicisation.

One should ask the question which factors contribute to a higher degree of

politicisation and in what way. However pointing out these factors is not enough, one should also analyse how these factors relate to each other. Much like a genuine puzzle it is an arduous task to figure out which piece fits at which place and which pieces are interlinked. The main focus of the thesis revolves around the circumstances under which top civil servants are appointed. It is expected that there are specific factors, which influence whether officials are appointed by political affiliation or professional background. For instance, such factors could be the administrative tradition of the respective country, and the specific nature of the concrete ministries. It is also expected that these factors, or the combination of them,

contribute to a specific form of politicisation. The research is of cross-national nature and tries to discern patterns in appointment procedures and practices across three EU-member states and across the Ministries of Finance and the Ministries of Social Affairs. The Netherlands ,

(8)

7

Germany and Slovakia will be analysed on a cross-national level. Also a more in depth analysis will be made on the Ministry of Finance and The Ministry of Social Affairs of the Netherlands and Germany. The theoretical aim of this thesis is to compare the models and expectations as stated in the literature, explore the current situation in three EU-member states and to contribute to the literature by adding new information stemming from primary data derived from interviews.

1.2 Research question

The main question of this thesis is: What are the current patterns of senior civil service recruitment and selection in Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia?

This question is broken down further in the following questions:

 To what extent are senior civil servants recruited and selected based on political or merit criteria in Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia?

 What are differences and similarities in the degree to which recruitment and selection based on political criteria across the three countries and across policy sectors?

 How can these differences across countries and policy sectors best be understood? Several concepts from these question have to be defined and explained. First, senior civil servants or the senior civil service, both abbreviated as SCS, are hard to define, and many states do not have an official and/or legal definition4. Poppelaars defines the senior civil service simply as the upper echelon of the civil service. These civil servants have the highest rank in terms of salary and function, and are often in a more-or-less similar management function Poppelaars, 2009: p. 62,63). While this definition is mostly true, and broadly

describes the subject, it lacks depth. Kuperus and Rode’s (2008) definition is more suitable: ‘Senior Civil Service (SCS) is a system of personnel for high and top level management positions in the national civil service, formally or informally recognised by an authority, or through a common understanding of the organisation of such a group. It is a framework of career-related development providing people to be competitively appointed to functions that cover policy advice, operational delivery or corporate service delivery.’ (Kuperus & Rode, 2008: p.4)

4

OECD (2009), Government at a Glance: Human Resource Management Practices: Senior civil service

http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264075061-

en/06/04/index.html?contentType=&itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fchapter%2F9789264061651-20-en&mimeType=text%2Fhtml&containerItemId=%2Fcontent%2Fserial%2F22214399&accessItemIds=%2Fconte nt%2Fbook%2F9789264075061-en (visited on 1 May 2015)

(9)

8

Second, merit criteria are understood as the essential criteria necessary for functioning in a certain position such as level of education, professional background, fachwissen and

managerial skills. However, these do not include political criteria such as party membership or personal closeness to the political principal.

The following sub-questions function as a guideline for this research:

 To what extent and how is there a relationship between various administrational traditions and various levels of politicisation?

 To what extent and how does the formal (legal) framework of a state facilitate/enable political appointments?

 To what extent is there an informal culture of politicization present in the public administration?

 Is there a change in the definition of merit, and to what extent does this influence appointments?

(10)

9

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework of Politicisation

2.1 Impact of Administrative Traditions

When comparing Western States and Central and Eastern European States it is argued that administrative traditions are resilient against reform. The historical background or legacy of a country and its administrative tradition have an impact on reforms in the administration (Painter & Peters, 2010 in: Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011 ). It appears that traditions give room for discursive convergence by the political and administrative elites across states. However, most scholars agree that administrative traditions ‘block, delay or filter the reform proposals of political and administrative reformers’ (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.311). Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit (2011) criticise this widely accepted assumption, as it would mean that both Western and Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) suffer from their own administrative legacy. In order to identify differential legacy effects for East and West, the scholars identify several key dimensions along which the administrative legacies of the Regions differ (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.312). Administrative traditions are usually seen as ‘an historically based set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate public administration within society’ (Peters, 2008, p.118 In: Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.315).The scholars argue that not only should one study ideas, structure and practices of an administration, but also focus on the temporal dimension. ‘Legacy effects’ are usually constrained to classifying countries along different types of traditions, such as the Napoleonic, Anglo-Saxon or

Germanic tradition. According to Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit (2001, p. 315) ‘legacy effects’ should be seen as effects on contemporary administrative reform outcomes that are traced to the structural and institutional level of analysis of a country’s administrative history. Therefore the scholars have developed three dimensions along which the West and the East differ: cross-temporal evolution of an administrative tradition, the internal consistency of ideas, structures and practices, and the independence of an administrative tradition from external, notably international, pressures.

One of the dimensions where Western states and CEECs differ is the stability of the administrative traditions and their underlying ideas, institutions and practices that were dominant at different points in time. In this regard CEECs went through many changes at several points in time. Before World War I many CEECs used to be a part of European Empires in the 19th century. This period stands in stark contrast with the Interbellum and subsequent communist period. For most Western states administrative traditions are

(11)

10

retraceable to the period of state- and nation-building of the 19th century. In the last one and a half century the CEECs went through many regime changes, with each regime bringing along its own administrative tradition. Some of these traditions are not relevant to the Western situation, for example the communist tradition. At the same time some overlap does occur, e.g. imperial tradition of 19th century, but this is not relevant for the present situation in CEEC’s. It is argued that the 19th

century period is mostly overlooked in the CEEC-context, due to the frequent changes in CEECs administrations. Western European administrative traditions are stable and feature a high amount of continuity, whereas Eastern European states display the opposite (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.316). Because of this critical difference between Western and Eastern states, the scholars formulate several expectations for contemporary administrative reforms. Western states display a deeper entrenchment of

traditional patterns of administration and inhibit reform, because of the continuity and long history of their administrative traditions. Therefore, reforms in Western states follow an incremental path and are piecemeal (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.316). CEECs are more susceptible to sudden change and radical reforms, because of the instability of ideas, institutions and practices associated with administrative traditions. Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit formulate three mechanisms that promote radical administrative reform. First, ‘punctuated equilibria’ occur and result in radical change when a dominant legacy is replaced or challenged by a new idea, legacy or paradigm. Second, regime changes are known to have the effect of ‘critical junctures’ which send a country in a radically different direction. Third, frequent regime changes usually result in a large turn-over of personnel in the administrative system, which hinders the continuity of ideas and practices. In Western countries long serving bureaucrats are seen as guardians of the system, therefore increasing the continuity of the system piecemeal (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.317).

The second difference between Western and Eastern administrative traditions is the consistency between ideas and beliefs about public administration, the formal structure of administration and administrative practices (Bevir et al. 2003; Dyson 1980). ) Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit (2011: p. 318) expect that these differences affect the speed and level of change. For the West this means a slow adaption of administrative practices, which is later formalized into law. For CEECs this means frequent formal change aimed at changing the administrative practice, but a low degree of consistency between the formal rules and the actual practices. Furthermore, it is expected that CEECs display a higher degree of grand ideas of administrative governance and formal institutions than Western states. Western

(12)

11

states’ legal entrenchment of the administration leads to the adaption of new ideas within the legal framework (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.318). One of the major differences in this dimension is the ‘Rechtstaat’ tradition which is prevalent in continental Europe. The formalization of the public administration in public law makes it difficult to reform. Values, norms and practices do change slowly over time but within the legal framework. (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011: p.317). In CEECs the administrative traditions are less consistent, and suffer from to ‘institutional weaknesses’ and related frequent changes of formal institutions. In contrast, the informal patterns of behaviour, values and norms seem to have prevailed despite the frequent regime changes. In short, many post-communist

administrations are characterized by a general inconsistency between the legal/formalised goal and practices of and administration (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.318).

The third and final difference between Western states and CEECs is the dependence from external pressure. Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit (2011) expect that the differences in susceptibility to international pressure affects administrative reforms in East and West. According to the scholars, administrative reform cannot be explained by administrative tradition alone, but also by other factors. For CEECs an additional factor is the external pressure of political parties, economic determinants and the transformative power of the EU (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.318).. From a historical perspective it can be said that CEECs administrations are more susceptible to external pressures than those of Western countries. It could be argued that CEECs have been influenced, in a chronological order, by European empires, the Soviet bloc and now the European Union. A prime example of the latter is the adoption of the acquis communitarian in the pre-membership period. The

adoption of European law is a one-way system in which the candidate-states ‘download’ and the member states upload legislation. This process virtually leaves no possibilities to shape EU-policy for the candidate-states. In contrast, the old 15 member states (predominantly Western) have shaped EU-policy over time, and as a result have reduced its adaptive pressure (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.319).

(13)

12

2.2 The Normative Argument for a non-partisan public administration

According to the dominant view within Public Administration studies, a state is required to depoliticise its Public Administration and bureaucratic elite in order to create an effective public sector which complies with EU-norms: ‘Whereas in western democracies the historical trend has been a gradual move away from part-time, politically affiliated administrators to professional, career civil servants, developing countries experience a somewhat different change.’ (World Bank, UN DESA, 2003)These countries, for example those in Central and Eastern Europe, experience periods of ebbing and taning politicisation. Considering the big difference in political history this difference comes to no surprise: in most CEE countries communism and its one-party system have dominated both politics and administration, creating a public sector without a real dichotomy. After the fall of communism, and the subsequent creation of democratic states, different values concerning the Public Administration arose in the CEE-countries; Public Administration needs to be as efficient and effective as possible, hereby establishing the need for professionals and merit-based employment. In order to form such a public sector the following key-issues need to be ensured: depoliticisation seeks to uphold the merit principle in the human resource management of civil servants, hold them to a code of conduct with appropriate investigating and enforcement capacities, and guarantees them some form of tenure against political patronage. During the depoliticisation -process the gap between what is described as ‘politics’ and ‘administration’ increased in size (World Bank, UN DESA, 2003).

Three ‘classic’ authors on the dichotomy draw the same conclusion, albeit for different reasons. Wilson and Goodnow emphasize the need for a separation between the administration and politics in order to protect the first (politics out of administration); Max Weber on the other hand believes that this separation should establish a hierarchy where the politics are protected from the administration (Beamtenherrschaft). But even though the authors clash over the reasons why there should be a dichotomy between administration and politics, they all agree on one vital point: the political neutrality of the public service, essentially renouncing political partisanship within the Public Administration (Overeem, 2005, p. 316).

Wilson and Goodnow tried to eliminate the American Spoils-system, in which the administration was greatly influenced by politics, and wanted to replace it with a merit system. Weber expressed his support for the value in his work Politik als Beruf:

(14)

13

politics, but ‘ad Minister,’ above all impartially.. . . Hence, he shall precisely not do what the politician, the leader as well as his following, must always and necessarily do, namely, fight. For partisanship, fight, passion–ira et stadium–are the politician’s element.’ (Weber, 1919/1968, pp. 27-28)Thus according to Weber, public administrators should operate ‘above all impartially’ (unparteiisch), in their functional capacity remaining non-combatants in the passionate political controversies that surround them (Overeem, 2005, p. 317).

Overeem (2005: p. 316) accurately concludes that in its classical conceptualizations the dichotomy between politics and administration implied a deep concern about the political neutrality of administrators. In his paper, Overeem shows how a politically neutral public administration is still considered a valuable asset within public administration. He argues that even though the dichotomy between politics and administration is much debated, the principle that an administration needs to be politically neutral remains upright. As political neutrality is the most important principle for the dichotomy, the dichotomy itself is still important in modern public administration. Overeem concludes that the dichotomy between administration and politics is closely related to political neutrality of the administration. Furthermore, he accurately demonstrates that the value of political neutrality is preserved throughout the debate, and is endorsed by pro- and anti-dichotomy authors. He describes the point of view of dichotomy-critics as following: ‘Given the close relationship between the two notions, this is at least paradoxical. It is as if one hears principled omnivores defending vegetarianism.’ So even though the dichotomy itself is much debated and its position within the study of Public Administration is questioned, the main principle, that of a non-partisan Public Administration, remains stable (Overeem, 2005, p. 312).

Peter Aucoin’s study (2012) compares the political pressures on the governments of four Westminster-type systems, namely Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. The premises on which he writes his article stems from the normative argument for an impartial Public Adminsitration. According to Aucoin (2012), an impartial Public Adminstration has two important meanings:

‘First, citizens be treated impartially in the administration of public affairs, and second, public servants not act in ways that advantage or disadvantage the partisan-political interests of any political party, including the governing party or parties.’ (Aucoin, 2012, p. 179)

The second notion implies that there is a minimum standard the civil service should abide to: First, the civil service should not be subjected to staffing by means of partisan patronage or

(15)

14

cronyism. Second, the distribution of government projects, subsidies and contracts is free of patronage and pork-barrelling. Third, the content of public service communications to the media and the public are not politicized. Fourth, communication towards the public (or any other organisation) is judgement/opinion-free (both negative or positive). (Aucoin, 2012, p. 179). It is important to note that each country has its own interpretation of partisanship, and that current public service values and ethics are not always reflected in the political reality. However, Aucoin still sees a general trend in which the standard of what is publicly expected and acceptable has risen in the four Westminster systems. (Aucoin, 2012, p. 179)

2.3 Limitations of the Normative Argument

However, the question remains whether a true non-partisan public administration is viable in the real world. Several studies show that the Weberian ideal does not exist to the same extent in every country, and politicisation, in various forms and sizes, occurs in most if not all states.

Kopecký, Meir and Spirova’s book Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies (2011) provides a great deal of information on party patronage. Not only does it provide a good data set which can be used for further research, it also shows which indicators are best used for studying party patronage. The book is comprised of a broad analysis of the role that political parties have in appointments of civil servants in 15

European states. The basis of this book is an empirical study for which in-depth expert surveys were conducted in each of the 15 states. In this study the scholars define party-patronage as: ‘the power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life.’ (Kopecký et al.: 2011: p. 358) Whereas this definition is sufficient for party patronage, it is not for politicisation, as it is too narrow. Furthermore the authors describe how patterns of party patronage differ amongst the European states. For some states personal networks of individuals play a dominant role in appointments, whereas in others this is the political parties. (Kopecký et al.: 2011: p. 359)

Lewis’ chapter in Lodge’s and Wegrich’s book Executive Politics in Times of Crisis (2012) explains presidential politicisation of the executive branch in the United States (US). Despite the US having a completely different government structure and culture than the researched countries, the reasons for politicising the executive branch might be very similar. Lewis (2012, p. 41) explains the contradictory relation between the notions of democratic governance and effective public administration in a modern state. On one hand democratic

(16)

15

government calls for responsiveness to the elected officials, on the other hand, in order to be effective, bureaucracy has to be insulated from political intervention. The call for

responsiveness can be answered by, what Lewis calls, politicisation. In this process,

politicians who intervene, for example by appointing civil servants, in previously apolitical branches of the public administration. The insulation of the public administration can be achieved by for example implementing a career-system, creating independent agencies or creating legislation which protects civil servants against political intervention. (Lewis, 2012: p. 41.) Lewis presents several factors which could influence the president to politicise some agencies. One of those factors is the ideology of that agency, and whether it diverges from the presidents ideology. Because agencies themselves hold beliefs about policies, and these, in turn, could differ from the presidents view. A possible source for these differences could be the mission of the agency. Simply executing this mission, could put the agency and the president at odds. At the same time, a particular mission could attract employees from a certain political direction. (Lewis, 2012, p. 45.) Lewis sees evidence for this process of self-selection in some American agencies. Whereas liberals and Democrats are more likely to work in social affairs, Republicans are more likely to work in defence and fiscal agencies. (Lewis, 2012, p. 45) However, these assumptions are rather vague and should be specified further. Still, Lewis presents an interesting view, and it should be applied to other studies, in order to prove its validity. Besides ideology, other factors could also lead to an increase of politicisation. Theoretically, the Ministries can be divided in types: spending or

regulatory/administrative. The first tries to achieve its policy goals through spending, for example subsidies and other forms of financial interventions. A regulatory ministry on the other hand derives most of its power from the written law. By comparing the amount of employees, annual spending and the ratio between the two factors, it is possible to determine to which type a ministry belongs. A typical ‘spending’ Ministry would have low amount of employees relative to a high amount of expenditure. At the same time, a typical ‘regulative’ ministry would have a high amount of employees relative to a low amount of expenditure.

One of the most important authors on the subject of politicisation is Guy Peters. The relationship between civil servants and their political masters, which politicisation eventually boils down to, is the core theme of one of Peters’ articles. Peters (2013: p.12) notes, that from a democratic perspective political officials have a popular mandate trough elections and can claim to represent the will of the people. This makes politicians stronger than the civil

(17)

16

servants. Political theory on the other hand sheds a more nuanced view, where both groups of actors can claim a legitimate role in policymaking. (Peters, 2013: p. 12)

2.4 Three Conceptual Models of Politicisation

Dijkstra and Van den Berg (2015) separate politicisation in three conceptual types: The first, and least subtle conception, is appointments by patronage. Patronage means a political leader can appoint members of the civil service based on having personal, family or economic ties, therefore professional qualities and merit play a minor role. The loyalty of politicized civil servants is primarily aimed towards the political leader who appointed them. Patronage occurs because the political leader can share the ‘spoils’ with loyal followers. Essentially, the political leader’s power to appoint, fire and promote civil servants serves as an instrument to influence the civil service. This form of politicisation, increases control over the civil servant, and in turn makes the civil servant more loyal. Historically, this form of politicisation is observed mostly in pre-modern and early-modern Western countries, and nowadays in developing countries and autocracies.

The second, and more refined form is a party political approach to get a grip on policy and its implementation. Political leaders are able to appoint or promote politically likeminded people to influential positions in the public administration. Also, the behaviour of civil

servants can be changed, in the sense that they take party politics into account, or even engage in party political activities. The goal of this form of politicisation is to implement and

maintain a certain amount of vertical control within the government apparatus. This kind of politicisation does not exclude merit-based principles, but it does infringe on political neutrality of the civil service and the Weberian ideal, therefore it could jeopardize both the quality and continuity of the civil service. Civil servants are loyal to the ruling party and its policy agenda. This form of politicisation is described inter alia by Peters and Pierre, and Kopecky et al..

The third and most refined form of politicisation is known as ‘new political

governance’. According to this conceptualisation, politicisation occurs because the political leader deems it useful or necessary for his/her political survival and/or effectivity in a turbulent external environment. The loyalty of the civil servant is primarily aimed at the political leader and his/her policy agenda, and to a lesser extent towards the political party. Substantive expertise is important, however subordinate to politically-strategic skills. Political

(18)

17

leaders benefit from surrounding themselves with officials who, first, support their policy agenda and, second, are personally loyal. The officials must be ready and willing to give the correct ‘spin’ to the facts.

Table 1: Politicisation types5

Type

politicisation Loyalty to?

Which type of merit

matters?

Motivation of Political

Leader Instruments Appears in: Authors:

I. Patronage Primarily to the individual political leader Of secondary importance Sharing the ‘spoils’ and creating personal loyalty Appoint, Promote& Fire Mostly pre- and early modern Western and developing states Grindle (2012); Van den Berg et al. (2015) II. Party Political Grip Primarily to the government party and its policy agendar 1.Fachwissen 2.:Politico-strategic skills Vertical control on civil service apparatus 1.Appoint, Promote& Fire 2.Circumventing, side-lining, marginalizing Western and developing states Peters & Pierre (2004); Kopecky et al. (2012) III. New political governance Primarily to the individual political leader and his/her policy agenda 1.Politico-strategic skills 2.:Fachwissen Political survival and political effectivity in turbulent external environment 1. Circumventing, side-lining, marginalizing 2. Appoint, Promote& Fire Prosperous Western states Van den Berg (2011); Aucoin (2012)

(19)

18 *(Dijkstra & Van den Berg, 2015, p. 252)

2.4.1 Patronage

In her book Jobs for the Boys, Grindle describes how Patronage was replaced by Weberian civil service systems in six countries, and how it is still being replaced in four contemporary Latin-American countries. According to Grindle (2012), Patronage is a system ‘where discretionary appointment for personal and/or political purposes is a principal route to a nonelected position in government for a large portion of those enjoying such positions’ (Grindle, 2012: p. 18). The patronage-system stands in stark contrast to the (Weberian) civil service system. In a civil service system individuals are appointed on the basis of meritorious credentials and through a competitive selection process.

Both of these conceptions are mostly theoretically relevant, and are not always

supported by empirical facts, as patronage occurs in all public administrations in top echelons. In a patronage-system, patronage has institutionalized, and bureaucrats are loyal to the

individuals, or patrons, who have brought them into public service rather than the state. This is one of the primary reasons for many scholars to associate patronage with corruption and incompetence. Grindle challenges this assumption, by pointing out that discretionary appointments can improve the flexibility of the PA, making it more capable to reach certain goals. According to Grindle, a patronage-system does not necessarily lead to the appointment of ‘incompetent’ officials - as some of these patronage-systems are successful at selecting capable individuals. The real weakness of a patronage system, is the relation between the employer and the official, or as Grindle describes: ‘its vulnerability to the caprice of those who manage such systems’ (Grindle, 2012: pp. 22-23).

2.4.2 Party Political Grip

Peters and Piere use the following definition for politicisation: ‘ the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining of members of the public service’ (Peters and Piere in Peters, 2013: p. 16). The definition suggests that politically based decision-making occurs in several areas of public service personnel policy. This is in contrast to the definition of patronage, which also refers to decision making based on political criteria, but only in the area of appointments; according to Kopecký, Mair and Spirova (2012) patronage is ‘the power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life’ (p.358). Patronage can hence be understood as a

(20)

19

subcategory of politicisation. When looking at politicisation in the area of recruitment, the two terms are essentially interchangeable.

The power of the bureaucracy can be described as a combination of several factors inherent to politics and the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy itself has a lot of expertise, civil servants usually work in a specific policy sector for several years, and therefore are experts in their field. However, Ministers and State Secretaries do not always have sufficient knowledge and experience within that sector. This skewed distribution of expertise, could give civil servants the power to influence the Minister on policy decision. Another factor which is important is time. A Minister, usually, does not stay in the same position for a long time, whereas civil servants are more or less permanently appointed. The organisational memory of the department, therefore, is in the hands of the civil servants. They can inform their Minister on successes and failures of the past. (Peters, 2013: p. 12)

Since civil servants are a permeant factor of the public administration, unlike political leaders, the neutrality of the civil service is considered to be important. From a normative perspective, civil servants are required to be impartial and professional. However, Peters mentions that, this is more the case for street-level bureaucrats than top-level civil servants. Therefore, although a politically neutral civil service is an important value, all systems display a certain degree of political appointments at the top of the administrative hierarchy. To be more precise, the relationship between politicians and administrative officials is affected by the administrative tradition. Subsequently, the degree and amount of political appointments differ per administrative tradition. (Peters, 2013: p. 13)

Peters notes that scholars of public administration generally assume that the civil service should retain autonomy and capacity to use their neutral competence within the policy

process. At the same time, for democratic purposes politicians should control the same policy process. This process of shared influence involves a so called ‘Shafferian bargain’. This term, coined by Hood and Lodge (2006), describes the bargain between civil servants and their political masters in which the civil servants accept anonymity and an apparent loss of power for a both a tenure in office and a considerable influence on policy.

Even though most scholars agree that the civil service should remain autonomous and neutral, the daily practice is rather different. Over the last previous decades, the civil service in most industrial countries has experienced an increasing amount of politicisation. Peters (2013) describes three stages or acts, through which politicisation has increased.

(21)

20

The first stage in which politics manifested itself in the civil service occurred during the period of domination by neo-liberals. (Peters, 2013: p. 14) In many Westminster

democracies and in the United States, politicians essentially ‘de-privileged’ the existing civil service, as the latter was seen as unresponsive and entrenched. The new civil service now included political appointees, which were appointed with the purpose of restoring political control within the public sector (Peters, 2013: p. 15).

This Neo-Liberal sweep, characterized by New Public Management ideas, sought to decrease the influence of the civil service and increase its efficiency. Somewhat

paradoxically, the reforms increased the autonomy of public managers and agencies, thus leaving political leaders with the task of drawing out the general lines of policy (Peters, 2013: p. 15).

The third stage is a more broad approach of political leaders to increase their control over public policy. This demand for more influence has several reasons. First, according to democratic values, elected presidents and Prime-Ministers should have the power to implement public policy. Second, the decentralizing effect triggered by an increase of agencies and other independent public organisations, have created the need for more centralization. Third, the need to fulfil the task of a political leader to set broad patterns of policy, has tended to shift power more upward and centralized (Peters, 2013: p. 15)..

According to Peters (2013), this shift of policy control should be seen within the context of presidentialisation. This means that parliaments, and even cabinets, lose power to Prime-Ministers. A possible reason for this process, is that increasingly Prime-Ministers are seen as being personally responsible for policy implementation. However, as Peters notes, this is more a shift of political power than policy power. And despite the public perception,

political leaders could be relatively powerless over a public sector. This is apparent, especially in light of the previously mentioned disaggregated public sector (Peters, 2013: p. 15).

Politicisation is not a one-way-channel, and this is best illustrated by Peters (2013). He defines six forms of politicisation. Direct politicisation concerns the direct attempts to appoint political allies on certain positions. (Peters, 2013: p. 17) Professionals politicisation relates to public officials who have made a career through the system, yet are political loyalists. (Peters, 2013: p. 17) Redundant politicisation concerns the structures put in place by politicians that monitor the actions of career employees. (Peters, 2013: p. 18) For example Ministerial Cabinets and special advisors (the cabinets refers to the personal entourage of a Minister).

(22)

21

Anticipatory politicisation relates to a situation whereby professional civil servants

themselves choose to leave office after a change of government (Peters, 2013: p. 17,18). Dual politicisation concerns a situation where besides the political executive, other political entities (President/Parliament) try to appoint their own nominees on certain positions, in order to influence the policy. (Peters, 2013: p. 19) Social politicisation refers to the (indirect) influence of social (non-state) actors over the career path of civil servants (Peters, 2013: p. 19) .

2.4.3 New Political Governance

The third conceptual model comes from Peter Aucoin, who has coined the term New Political Governance . The paradox of NPM-reform as described by Peters(2013) is also observed by Aucoin . The reforms were aimed at improving the management performance by freeing departmental managers from centralized controls. At the same time, Ministerial direction and control became a task for Ministers, government and executive heads of departments. The paradox stems from the fact that on the one hand managers are empowered, but political control is increased on the other hand (Aucoin, 2012: p. 178).

The theory behind the reforms is that managers need greater management authority to reach certain goals, as defined in set policies by the Ministers(Aucoin and Heintzman 2000 in Aucoin 2012).In turn, the Ministers hold managers accountable for meeting these goals. Advocates of this theory have argued, that, according to democratic values, the elected government should control policy and programs, and that partisan-political interference and staffing posed no threat towards the impartiality of the civil service. Aucoin is critical of this second notion, and states that exactly the opposite has occurred. It has taken the shape of politicisation, and infringes on the values of an impartial and non-partisan public service (Aucoin, 2012, p. 178)

Aucoin calls this type of politicisation New Political Governance (NPG), as it is different from the initial NPM efforts of political executives to control the public service and to protect the politicians against an unresponsive or non-cooperative civil service. Aucoin makes clear that NPG is a tool which gives political leaders legitimate democratic control over the public service. According to him, NPG is politicisation at its worst: ‘governments seek to use and misuse, even abuse, the public service in the administration of public resources and the conduct of public business to better secure their partisan advantage over their competitors.’ (Aucoin, 2012, p. 178)This type of politicisation has negative effects on the public adminstration, or as Aucoin puts it:

(23)

22

‘At best, this politicisation constitutes sleazy governance; at worst, it is a form of political corruption that cannot but undermine impartiality and, thereby, also management performance to the extent that it assumes management based on nonpartisan criteria.’ (Aucoin, 2012, p. 178)

NPG has four characteristics: Governance and the continuous campaign are integrated, the partisan-political staff is a third force in governance and public administration, personal politicisation of appointments to the senior public service, and public service loyalty to the government is understood as being partisan towards the current government. (Aucoin, 2012, p. 179) The extent to which these four characteristics are present changes over time and depends on: ‘the party in power, the prime Minister, the state of competition between parties in the legislature and in the electorate and, among other factors, the institutional and statutory constraints that provide checks against politicisation.’(Aucoin, 2012, p. 179)

2.5 Blind Spots/Research Gap

Existing research has focussed on several aspects of civil service politicisation: the scope of people involved, motivations for politicisation, methods of politicisation and in which (type of) country what kind of politicisation occurs. Simply said, almost all factors which influence politicisation seem to be determined. However the literature still has a few blind spots which need to be properly researched and tested.

First, whether the differences in Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit (2011) three

dimensions explain a certain outcome in the model by Dijkstra and Van den Berg (2015). In other words, would a difference in cross-temporal evolution of an administrative tradition; internal consistency of ideas, structures and practice; and independence of an administrative tradition from external, pressures explain different patterns of politicisation.

Second, if ministries can be identified as driven by either Fachwissen/Professional Knowledge or by Ideology, could the differences between these types of ministries influence the pattern of recruitment and selection. If ministries are drawn towards a certain ideology then this could be reflected in the political affiliation of their staff. It could lead to an increase of politicisation, if the political principal holds beliefs which are in stark contrast to those held by the ministry. Lewis sees evidence for this process of self-selection in some American agencies. In the United States, liberals and Democrats are more likely to work in social affairs, Republicans are more likely to work in defence and fiscal agencies. (Lewis,

(24)

23

2012, p. 45) It would be interesting to see if this framework can also be applied on a European context in order to see whether Europe displays a similar trend.

Third, considering that ministries can be identified as either ‘spending’ or

‘regulatory/administrative’, it is still unclear whether the differences between these types of ministries influence the pattern of recruitment and selection. It could be argued that a ‘spending’ ministry draws staff of a different political beliefs than a

‘regulatory/administrative’ ministry. Lewis (2012, p. 45.) states that the ideology of an agency could lead to an increase of civil service politicisation. If an organisation holds specific views about policies, and if these are in conflict with those held by the President, the President may choose to appoint persons who share his political agenda.

Last, ministries are active in certain professional fields and thus draw from a specific pool of experts on that field. It could be argued that in order to run a ministry some classical merit-criteria such as policy specific expertise should be retained. This means that a certain degree of expertise is necessary and that this limits the pool of people who can be appointed. In this case both political affiliation and expertise play a role in the appointment process.

(25)

24

Chapter 3: Hypotheses and Operationalisation of Variables

3.1 Expectations

The literature review leads to several expectations. The dependent variable is the degree of civil service politicisation in a state and/or ministry. It is expected that the state/ministries will differ significantly in six independent variables (I.V.) , and that these variables influence the dependent variable (D.V.): Degree of Civil Service Politicisation .

First, the countries’ Administrative Traditions on a system level. First I.V. 1 represents administrative traditions and what characterizes and distinguishes them from other

administrative traditions. Specifically the separate administrative traditions are compared on the issue of senior civil service staffing.

Figure 1: Causal Mechanism on a System level

Second, the nature of the policy sector. It is expected that Ministries can be identified as either ‘spending’ or ‘regulatory/administrative’, and that the inherent differences between these types of ministries influence the degree of Civil Service recruitment and selection. Lewis sees evidence for this process of self-selection in some American agencies. In the United States, liberals and Democrats are more likely to work in social affairs, Republicans are more likely to work in defence and fiscal agencies. (Lewis, 2012, p. 45) This framework is applied on the European context to see whether this is also the case in Europe. Theoretically, the Ministries can be divided in types: spending or regulatory/administrative. The first tries to achieve its

DV:

Degree of Civil Service Politicisation I.V.1: Administrative

traditions ( Netherlands, Germany and Slovakia)

Governmental and

administrative organisation Civil Service Structure Political Culture (coalition, single party majority, etc.) Legal Tradition

Relationship between state and society

(26)

25

policy goals through spending, for example subsidies and other forms of financial

interventions. A regulatory ministry on the other hand derives most of its power from the written law. It is argued that a certain type of ministry is more likely to attract civil servants with a certain political direction.

Figure 2: Causal Mechanism on a Sector Level : Spending vs. Administrative

Third, the types of merit in the policy sector. It is expected that Ministries can be identified as either driven by Fachwissen/Professional Knowledge or by Ideology, and that staffing of the Senior Civil Service corresponds with these differences. Lewis (2012, p. 45.) states that the ideology of an agency could lead to an increase of civil service politicisation. If an organisation holds specific views about policies, and if these are in conflict with those held by the political principal, the political principal may choose to appoint persons who share his political agenda. Therefore it needs to be established whether traditional merit criteria such as fachwissen are more important than ideological/ political criteria such as politico-strategic skills and political affiliation.

Figure 3: Causal Mechanism on a Sector Level :Fachwissen vs. Ideology

Degree of Civil Service Politicisation I.V. 2: Nature of the

Policy Sector

Degree of Civil Service Politicisation I.V. 3: Types of Merit in

Policy Sector

Fachwissen/ Ideology Spending vs. Administrative

(27)

26 3.2 Hypotheses

From the literature-review and the expectations the following hypotheses are drawn: Hypothesis1: Patterns of politicization are more similar within groups of countries of the same administrative tradition than across them.

Hypothesis 2: Patterns of appointing civil service professionals (experts) are more similar within groups of countries of the same administrative tradition than across them.

Hypothesis 3: Lower degrees of politicisation are more likely in sectors that are more strongly driven by Fachwissen than by ideology.

Hypothesis 4: Lower degrees of politicisation are more likely in sectors that feature a strong regulatory/administrative domain

Hypothesis 5: Higher degrees of appointing civil service professionals (experts) are more likely in sectors that are more strongly driven by Fachwissen than by ideology

Hypothesis 6: Higher degrees of appointing civil service professionals (experts) are more likely in sectors that feature a strong regulatory/administrative domain

(28)

27 3.3 Operationalisation of the variables

The theoretic argument of this thesis is that administrative traditions, the specific nature of a ministry and the types of merit in a ministry lead to politicisation of top-civil servants. Politicisation is seen as a product of the above mentioned factors. The dependent variable ‘Civil Service Politicisation’ is operationalised in table 2. The indicators are partially derived from Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012 ).

Table 2: Operationalisation of dependent variable

Concept Definition Indicators Data sources

Civil Service Politicisation

the degree in which politics manifest itself in the professional policy in the civil service

∙ Size of Ministerial entourage

∙ Turnover among senior officials after elections; ∙ Scope of senior positions that are subject to political appointments; ∙ Experience of senior officials in politics, e.g. as party functionaries, elected representatives; ∙Extent to which SCSs’ pol party preferences are common knowledge among their colleagues ∙ Degree of influence by the core executive over policy decisions; ∙ Extent to which ideology rather than evidence determines policy decisions; Importance of political contacts, including party-membership, for career progression.

The professional experience of senior officials

The experience of senior officials within the specific branch/ department they were appointed for Whether Senior Civil Servants are specialists or generalists

∙ Civil Service Law ∙ Official Reports from global NGOs

∙ Relevant Scholaric Literature

∙ CVs of top-Civil Servants

∙ Interviews with top-Civil servants

(29)

28

IV1 ‘Administrative Traditions’ and its operationalisation are displayed in table 3. Peters (2008) definition of administrative tradition is used together with the selected indicators to give a broad and in-depth view of the researched administrative traditions. The primary sources for IV1 are relevant scientific literature, national law (civil service laws, constitution etc.) and official reports. Interviews are mainly used to assess the culture of the administration and to validate the findings of the other sources.

IV2 ‘Nature of the Policy Sector’ and its operationalisation is displayed in table 4.The nature of the Policy Sector is understood as whether a Ministry can be classified as “spending” or “regulative”. The three indicators are a good basis for comparison, as they are derived from national data and COFOG data. The interviews are mainly used to establish the goals and means of the ministry.

6

Peters, 2008, p.118 In: Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011, p.315

Table 3: Operationalisation of independent variable 1‘ Administrative traditions’

Administrative traditions

An historically based set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate public administration within society 6 ∙ Governmental and administrative organization

∙ Civil Service Structure ∙ Political Culture (coalition, single party majority, etc.)

∙ Legal Tradition ∙ Relationship between state and society

∙ Relevant Scholaric Literature

∙ National Law ∙ Official Reports from global NGOs

Table 4: Operationalisation of independent variable 2 ‘Nature of the Policy Sector’

Nature of the Policy Sector

Whether a Ministry can be classified as “spending” or “regulative”

∙Relative size of Ministry ∙Budget and Spending per Ministry

∙Goals and tasks of Ministry

∙ COFOG Data ∙ National budgets ∙ Interviews with top-Civil servants

(30)

29

IV3 ‘Types of Merit in Policy Sector’ and its operationalisation is displayed in table 5. Merit is understood as the essential criteria necessary for functioning in a certain position. Literature and national laws give a good basis for comparison, but interviews are necessary to properly assess whether a ministry is driven by ideology.

Ideally all senior civil servants of the 4 ministries (26 SCSs) are interviewed to properly asses civil service politicisation, the administrative traditions, the nature of the policy sector, and the types of merit in the policy sector. However given the size of this thesis and the fact that such a response-rate is unlikely, the acceptable minimal response rate is set at 2 respondents per ministry.

Table 5: Operationalisation of independent variable 3 ‘Types of Merit in Policy Sector’

Types of Merit in Policy Sector

The essential criteria necessary for functioning in a certain position ∙Politico-strategic skills ∙Fachwissen ∙ Laws ∙ Relevant Scholaric Literature ∙ CVs of top-Civil Servants

(31)

30

Chapter 4: Research Design

4.1 Case selection

The Netherlands, Germany and Slovakia were chosen for comparison because of several factors. First, despite the fact, that all three states are members of the European Union, some differences in civil service recruitment and selection amongst the three are expected. A reason for that could be found in the limited effect the EU has on the national public administrations and the general differences which stem from national administrational legacies. Even though it is suggested that general EU-wide norms have emerged as part of the process of

Europeanisation, common EU norms on structuring the administration could be particularly difficult to specify. Dimitrova (2002: pp. 171, 172) points out that whilst some common principles (such as democratic norms) can be explicitly prescribed in European legislation, others, such as transparency, are defined differently between EU-member states. Another problem that can arise after accession is that the states are free to (re) structure the

administration as they please; this can result in reforms being contested after accession, thus challenging their longevity. (Dimitrova, 2002Because of this ‘gap’ in EU-regulations, the EU cannot issue sanctions on a member state for not having an administration structured by EU-norms. This means that only when a state is still in the pre-accession the EU can influence a candidate state’ public administration. In order to comply with the laws and regulations of the acquis communautaire, candidate-states must restructure their Public Administration to ensure their effective functioning after accession. Dimitrova points out that the adopted laws, as stated above, are based on the Weberian model of Public Administration. According to her this is evident, in the sense that they are based on the classical model of the dichotomy, in which politics and administration are clearly separated. By aiming to secure the independence of civil servants from political dismissal and focusing on continuity of the Public

Administration, they try to counter the heavily politicised characteristics which were prominently featured during post-communist times (Dimitrova, 2002: 182). Therefore it is interesting to analyse whether EU-membership has led to convergence of the three states’ norms, ideas and laws concerning civil service recruitment and selection.

Second, the Netherlands and Germany share a common border, have excellent political relations, and have numerous close cultural ties7 Also both states have a longstanding administrational legacy and are continental western states, therefore some similarities are

7_{Government of the Netherlands (2015), Relations between the Netherlands and Germany, Den Haag}

(32)

31

expected concerning civil service recruitment and selection.. Yet, some key differences are to be found in the state-structure. For instance, the Netherlands is a decentralised unitary state, while Germany is a Federation of several Länder. Due to the above-mentioned factors, a comparison between these states seems justified in an effort to establish whether the countries display similar norms, ideas, and laws, concerning civil service recruitment and selection.

Third, Slovakia’s dual status of a ‘new’ EU-member and a post-communist state makes it an interesting case for analysis. It is argued that the differences between Slovakia, Germany, and the Netherlands are not limited to the administrative traditions. It is also expected that major differences can be observed in the cross-temporal evolution of the administrative tradition; the internal consistency of ideas, structures and practices, and the independence of an administrative tradition from external, notably international, pressures (Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit, 2011).

This thesis also analyses the Ministries of Finance and the Ministries of Social Affairs of respectively the Netherlands and Germany. It is argued that they can be classified as respectively regulatory-type and spending-type ministries. This is in line with Lewis (2012) conceptualisation that the goal of a ministry could be a reason for politicisation. Hereby, the focus is on expenditure per ministry/sector, the number of employees and the means to achieve their respective policy goals.

Cross-sectoral, and especially cross-national, comparisons can be problematic, due to the different definitions for the relevant variables. A number of problems like these were encountered during this research. First, official German data gives the exact number of employees per Ministry, whereas in the Dutch case this is expressed in fte’s

(full-time-equivalents). Second, the Dutch Ministry of Finance does not separate between the employees in the Ministry itself and the employees of the Dutch Tax-Authority, counting all into its workforce. This Dutch Tax Authority has a work-force of 28.249 fte’s, but no exact number is given on the employees on the Ministry itself. Third, not all countries have the same (legal) definition for a civil servant and his/her status. Before comparing the appointment of senior civil servants’, one should properly establish what the notion of ‘civil servant’ means for each country.

Besides the national datasets information is also drawn from Eurostat’s dataset. This dataset concentrates on General Government Expenditure by Fucntion (COFOG) and supplies cross-national data which can be compared. The function ‘General Public Services’ is

(33)

32

financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs foreign economic aid, basic research, R&D related to general public services, public debt services, transfers of a general character between different levels of government.8 The function ‘Social Protection’ is most closely related to the Ministry of Social Affairs, as it incorporates Sickness and disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, housing, R&D, social exclusion.9

Table 6: General Government Expenditure by Function (COFOG) in Percentage of GDP 10

Country General Public

Services

Social Protection Executive and Legislative organs, fiscal and financial affairs, external affairs

Germany (2012) 6,1% 19,4% 1,7 %

Netherlands (2012) 5,4% 17,6% 2,2%

The German Ministry of Social Affairs has 2630 employees, and the Ministry of Finance 1850 employees, making the first about 42% larger (see figure 3) . In terms of spending the difference is even larger, the Ministry of Social Affairs takes up about 40% of the national expenditure. The Ministry of Finance’s expenditure is only 1,5% of the national budget. This difference in expenditure is also affirmed by the Eurostat COFOG data. Social protection is 19,4% of the German national GDP, and General Public Services 6,1%,. (see figure 2)

The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs has 2254 FTE, and the Ministry of Finance 31.598 FTE. For the latter it has to be made clear that at least 28.249 FTE are tax-agency employees which formally fall under the Finance Ministry (see figure 4). In terms of expenditure the Ministry of Social Affairs takes up 14% of the national budget, the Ministry

8_{Eurostat (2015) Glossary: Classification of the functions of government ,}

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Classification_of_the_functions_of_government_(COFOG) (visited on 10 October 2015).

9_{Eurostat (2015) Glossary: Classification of the functions of government ,}

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Classification_of_the_functions_of_government_(COFOG) (visited on 10 October 2015).

10_{Eurostat (2015b) Government expenditure by function,}

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-

explained/index.php/Government_expenditure_by_function_%E2%80%93_COFOG#EU-28_general_government_expenditure_at_48.1_.25_of_EU_GDP_in_2014_and_at_48.3_.25_of_GDP_in_2013 (visited on 10 October 2015).

Political and Professional? A snapshot of politicisation and the senior civil service in Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia