Enabling Governance capabilities in a local security network

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E N A B L I N G G O V E R N A N C E

C A P A B I L I T I E S I N A L O C A L

S E C U R I T Y N E T W O R K

THE ‘WICKED’ PROBLEM OF MARIJUANA PLANTATIONS

09-January-2018 Master Thesis

Crisis & Security Management Supervisor: Dr. L. Block

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis the City Working Group of The Hague was assessed using a framework created by Candel et. al. (2016). The thesis asked if the network possessed the enabling conditions to deal with ‘wicked problems’. In order to measure this, the framework applies five governance capabilities that are required to enable handling ‘wicked problems’. A sixth measure, capability, was added to measure if these enabling conditions affected practice. The five capabilities used were reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness, revitalization and rescaling.

Previous research has indicated that the local integral approach has become a cornerstone in dealing with the wicked problem of marijuana plantations. However, the results of this research show that the situation has changed. Overall, the research found that the network has lost considerable capability since 2013. The network has problems being responsive. Information protocols and agreements are not adhered to in all cases. It also suffers from a decreased ability of dealing with scale discrepancies. In some cases it finds possibilities to deal with jurisdictional discrepancies, but this has not become common practice. It has not been able to deal with temporal discrepancies in the form of national policy. The research did find that outside of the police force, the network exhibited a sufficient amount of resources to merit some reflexivity. It also showed enabling conditions to be resilient. Organizations in the network are generally decentralized, and the network also exhibited an ability to self-govern.

Finally, this research tested if the theoretical framework could be applied to a different security subject on a local level. In general, the theory does lend itself to other application. However, it does not incorporate any facets regarding power relationships between actors, which proved to be an important aspect in this case. Furthermore, the framework does not incorporate influence between networks or the level on which they operate.

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ABBREVIATIONS & TRANSLATIONS

In this thesis, several abbreviations are used and several terms and legal jargon require translation. Please use the following scheme when reading the thesis.

NAM E ABBREVIAT ION TRANS LAT ION

Administrative Criminal Analyisis

B-CBA Bestuurlijke Criminaliteits

Beeld Analyse Bureau of Housing Inspection

Hemp Information Message

HPB HIB

Haagse Pandbrigade Hennep Informatie Bericht

City Planning Service DSO Dienst Stedelijke

Ontwikkeling

Public Prosecutor OM Openbaar Ministerie

Regional Information & Expertise Center

RIEC Regionaal Informatie &

Expertise Centrum Regional Cooperation Integral

Safety

RSIV Regionaal

Samenwerkingsverband Integrale Veiligheid

The Social Benefits Service DSV Dienst Sociale Voorzieningen

Act promotion of integrity assessment by the public administration

(act) BIBOB Wet bevordering

integriteitsbeoordelingen door het openbaar bestuur

Administrative Sanction Bestuurlijke Boete

Administrative Coercion Bestuursdwang

Housing Act Woningwet

Municipality Act Gemeentewet

Opium Act Opiumwet

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1. INTRODUCTION

The most recent report published by the Dutch Monitor of Organised Crime (MGC) in 2012 describes organized crime in the Netherlands as ‘transit crime’. The unique geographical position of the Netherlands, besides providing benefits to the Netherlands economically, also provides opportunities for organized crime to flourish. One of the crimes associated with organized crime in the Netherlands is growing marijuana. A large part of the marijuana produced in the Netherlands is exported to surrounding countries (WODC, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2012, p. 156). In 2015 almost 6000 plantations were found and destroyed by authorities in The Netherlands (Kuiper & Schravesande, 2016). Marijuana plantations are dangerous for two reasons. The first is that most plantations that are dismantled have owners involved in organized crime. A large network of criminals involved in a culture of violence and intimidation exists beyond the situation that is often found when police first enter a property (Boerman, Grapendaal, Nieuwenhuis, & Stoffers, 2017, p. 20). The second is that installations require high amounts of electricity, and are often set up by amateurs. This increases the risk of fire outbreak, endangering the growers, the neighbors and the properties. Marijuana plantations in residential areas also cause financial damage, due to the increased chance for water damage to property. Finally, the use of pesticides may irritate and damage the lungs of those in the vicinity (Boerman, Grapendaal, Nieuwenhuis, & Stoffers, 2017, p. 19).

Modern security problems of this nature can be described as a ‘wicked problem’. Wicked problems are problems that are hard or impossible to solve. Rittel and Webber first coined the term when they ran into problems in public planning (Rittel & Webber, 1973). They described 10 reasons for a problem to be considered ‘wicked’. To summarize, these ten reasons can be brought back to three inherent characteristics. The requirements to solve a ‘wicked’ problem are often incomplete, contradictory and are constantly developing, making it hard for policymakers to catch up to the problem.

Illegal marijuana plantations can be considered a wicked problem because of several reasons. The first reason is that the problem is constantly developing. The current political climate is divided on what to do about the problem. It is unclear what legislation is going to look like in the future. The current government - which was elected in March 2017 and formed recently in October 2017 - intends to run pilots on growing marijuana in a select amount of municipalities.

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(Sitanala, 2017). Whether these pilots will produce the intended results is still in question. The second reason is that there are a large amount of actors involved in solving the problem. Attempting to find and apply a solution may impede another’s’ interests. Finally, any obvious solution applied to the current legal framework surrounding marijuana will be incomplete by definition. Selling marijuana is currently legal, but growing it is not (Van Kempen & Fedorova, 2014). Criminalizing selling will put more pressure on police forces and move the problem into criminality. Legalizing growing may reduce criminality but cause a whole range of other problems, including a surge in export of a product that is illegal in surrounding countries, an increase in the use of marijuana among the population including youths, and a breach of European Union an United Nations treaties (Van Kempen & Fedorova, 2014).

The focus of this research is the city working group ‘hemp’ in The Hague. This network consists of several local actors, including the police, the municipality, housing corporations and the energy supplier. The choice for The Hague was made due to its geographical distance to national decision making, and the high population density. A high population density increases the consequences a plantation-related fire outbreak could have and should theoretically place the item higher on the agenda with its related actors.

1.1 Relevancy

This research is intended to test the theory of five governance related challenges that accompany or are caused by wicked problems. The model was first used by Candel, Breeman & Termeer (2016) to establish the capabilities of the European Commission in handling the ‘wicked problem’ of food security. It has not yet been attempted to apply this same model to other security-related issues, or to local networks. In order to test if this theory can also be applied to other fields, this research intends to look at the ‘wicked problem’ of illegal plantations in a different security setting. The second reason for academic relevancy is the application of this theory to a local network instead of to a supranational organzation on the level of the European Union. The framework of Candel et. al. (2016) used in this thesis incorporates elements taken from network theory and focuses for a large part on communication between an actor and its partners. In theory, evaluating a local network should be just as possible using the framework provided. As a secondary objective, this research aims to test to what extent this theory is also usable in a local network setting.

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Illegal marijuana plantations cause damage to society. This research may identify certain issues in the enabling conditions of the actors involved in the network. If these issues are addressed, this could lead to an increased capability of the actors involved. Increased capabilities may have a positive effect on the general health of the population, and may limit financial implications for those involved. Second, the subject of this thesis is very topical. At the time of writing, the Dutch government is planning to perform a pilot on a local level to legalize marijuana plantations in a few chosen municipalities to test its effects on related crime (Sitanala, 2017). In order to properly compare the results of this pilot, it may be beneficial to already have some measure of capability before any changes are made on a local level.

1.2 Research question

The research question of this research is as follows:

To what extent does the current local security network dealing with the discovery and removal of illegal marijuana plantations in The Hague possess the enabling conditions to capably deal with wicked problems?

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1

WICKED PROBLEMS

The concept of wicked problems was first introduced by Rittel and Webber (1973). Although active in the area of social planning, the term ‘wicked problems’ was soon borrowed by other disciplines and proliferated in other sciences. According to Rittel and Webber, wicked problems had the following traits: (i) Wicked problems are hard to define. (ii) Wicked problems cannot be solved by one solution. (iii) Wicked problems do not have solutions that are simply correct or incorrect, but are on a spectrum between good or bad. (iv) After applying a solution, one cannot be sure of its effectiveness. (v) Applying solutions cannot be done on a test-basis, as every attempt to apply a solution will have (immediate) consequences, and may change the problem instead of solving it. (vi) There is no ceiling to the amount of solutions that may be applicable to a wicked problem. (vii) Wicked problems are unique. (viii) Wicked problems can be considered a symptom of another problem. (ix) A wicked problem can be described in many different ways,

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the choice for which also implies a different solution. And finally, (x) there is no room for mistakes when applying solutions to wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973, pp. 160-167).

2.2 GOVERNANCE RELATED CHALLENGES

Candel, Breeman, & Termeer (2016) have identified five governance related challenges that accompany or are caused by wicked problems. This framework has been developed using two previous studies involving both Termeer and Dewulf. (Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman, & Stiller, 2013) (Termeer & Dewulf, 2014). It should be noted that the framework finds its roots in the initial description of wicked problems bij Rittel and Webber (1973).

(i) Unstructuredness and frame diversity. There is no clear way to identify the problem,

nor is there any clear way to define it. “Formulating the problem is the problem” (Candel, Breeman, & Termeer, 2016, p. 790).

(ii) Frequent and uncertain changes. The problem seems to change from one moment to

the next due to more convoluted circumstances and settings. The problem itself is often linked to other problems, and may itself be a symptom. This makes finding a holistic solution complicated, perhaps impossible. This is due to the characteristic of wicked problems to change and the inherent ambiguity this enables.

(iii) Unlimited demands and concerns, demands and concerns differ when taking into

account all involved actors. Because the problem is framed differently by the different actors that are involved, more than one solution is usually being pushed by decision-makers. This applies pressure on the timeliness of the implementation of solutions.

(iv) Stagnating and unproductive interaction patterns. Candel, Breeman & Termeer

describe this as the “counter- productive blockades, stagnations and deadlocks that can occur when actors become frustrated about the absence of satisfying solutions and revert to more defensive positions and strategies” (2016, p. 790).

(v) Scale interactions. There are several different scales on which wicked problems exist.

Examples of these can be temporal, spatial and jurisdictional. Discrepancies can occur when attempting to deal with the problem on only one scale, and not taking into account the others.

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Termeer & Dewulf (2014, p. 683) argue that governance capability consists of two subcategories of ability. The first ability is for policymakers to observe and react to a wicked problem. The second is the ability of the governance system to enable this observation and reaction. This research focuses on the governance system as a local network and its enabling conditions. In order to operationalize the concepts that are used in this theory they should be further elaborated on. In accordance with these five challenges, Candel, Breeman & Termeer (2016) have created a framework of capabilities that correspond with the five challenges that have been described above.

(i) Reflexivity: the capacity to comprehend and handle the assortment of frames

encompassing a policy issue

- Enabling reflexivity: The first prerequisite to enable reflexivity is the ability of actors to go “beyond fighting things out in power networks, law suits, or elections.” (Termeer & Dewulf 2014, p. 688) By ‘beyond’ the author means that there is no struggle between nodes of the network that causes these actors to reach outside of the network in order to solve a problem. The secondary prerequisites to enable reflexivity are quite straight-forward. Reflexivity requires resources, skills and structures. Resources could for example be used in order to hire a communications officer, or to spend money in communication channels in the network itself. Second, for skills the authors list: organizational tolerance for ambiguity and the skill to look at situations using different perspectives. Both of these skills are aimed at the tolerance for a climate in which multiple organizations work together. If there is no tolerance for ambiguity, an organization might opt to take matters into its own hands. If an organization cannot understand the perspective of a different organization that it is working together with, a similar outcome might also come to pass. Finally, the authors write that “Reflexivity can also be enabled by structures that institutionalize a go-between or bridging position between organizations, policy sectors, or administrative levels.” (Termeer & Dewulf, 2014, p. 688).

(ii) Resilience: the ability to adjust to vulnerabilities and continually changing conditions

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- Enabling Resilience: In order to enable resilience, a network needs a culture that “… tolerates continuous processes of change in unpredictable directions” (Termeer & Dewulf, 2014, p. 690). Structure, as mentioned under reflexivity may help increase resilience by helping link actors together and creating a platform to spread knowledge quickly. Institutions will usually have to have adapted in order to mobilize and become more resilient. The authors list 3 possible adaptations. The first is flexible legislation, the second is decentralization of authority and the third is room for self-governance. The authors aim a change of institutions or actors to incorporate decentralized decision-making authority in order to make changes quickly and flexibly to adapt to a changing wicked problem. A high level of redundancy often helps to enable resilience.

(iii) Responsiveness: the capacity to watch and react successfully and in an opportune

manner to issues that are important in politics and society

- Enabling responsiveness: In order to enable responsiveness of a network, three conditions must be met. The first is that the organizations are capable of “… monitoring attention and of filtering relevant information” (Termeer & Dewulf, 2014, p. 694). This means that decision-makers within the organization are fed the information that they need to know, when they need to know it. In the case of the public sector, it is also important to be aware of possible issues coming up on the policy agenda in the foreseen future. The second requirement is for political leaders – public, private or otherwise - to be on site on the area where the attention is coming from in order to engage with those who seek answers to their questions. Recent developments require political leaders to expand this scope from actual location to virtual locations, as social media is becoming more and more relevant every day to crisis communication (Sheehan & Quinn-Allan, 2015). Third, organizations should strategically engage situations, sometimes even not engaging at all. An indicator of this could be the amount of response strategies known and ready for use in case of an emerging issue.

(iv) Revitalizing: the capacity to remove and address issues that cloud or slow down the

governance process

- Enabling Revitalizing: in order to enable revitalization, actors have to understand that conflicts are an important part of the process of being a part of a network. This means tolerating some space in order to properly interpret the actions of other actors in the

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network. Termeer & Dewulf (2014, p.697) note that networks have a particular challenge in working together due to the “…ever-present question of whether stagnating interaction patterns are unintended by-products of familiar ways of acting or whether they reflect exertion of power or deliberative conflict avoidance.” These stagnant interaction patterns can be dealt with. For example, actors involved in the conflict could attract a third actor to mediate between them in order to solve any issues that may have arisen.

(v) Rescaling: the ability to notice and address scale discrepancies leading to scale

interaction problems.

- Enabling Rescaling: in order to enable rescaling within the network, there needs to be some form of sensitivity and ability to address spatial, jurisdictional and temporal scale discrepancies. This seems very abstract, but can be made somewhat more concrete by providing an example. Wicked problems often have long-term and short term effects. When drafting new policies, policies addressing the long term effects may conflict with policies created to deal with short term effects. This is what a temporal scale problem is; a discrepancy that leads to conflicting policies within a network due to a neglect of the problem as a whole, instead dealing with it on two separate temporal scales. Discrepancies may also cross scales. The same discrepancy could exist both on temporal and jurisdictional scales. One organization may deal with the long term effects, while another deals with a short term effect. As long as sensitivity to scale discrepancies is missing, both organizations will not communicate in order to rescale and attempt to solve the problem as a whole

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Reflexivity

External or internal struggle within a network Resources Skills Structures

Resilience

Structures Flexible legislation Decentralized authority Room for self-governance

Level of redundancy

Responsiveness

Monitoring and filtering information Positioning political leaders Communication strategies

Revitalizing

Methods or strategies to deal with stagnant interaction Tolerance for different perspectives and opinions patterns

Rescaling

Ability to deal with scale interactions that are: Spatial

Jurisdictional Temporal

Figure 1: Conceptual framework and indicators of enabling factors to improve the capability to deal with wicked problems.

2.3 NETWORK-BASED SOLUTIONS

When drafting their theoretical framework of governance related challenges, Candel et. al. (2016), drew upon Huxham’s work (2006), who emphasizes the importance of partnerships and its respective challenges. He describes some of the challenges which are incorporated into the framework of Candel et. al. (2016). These include scale problems, internal & external struggle and conflicting goals of organizations. Huxham notes that there is no clarity or agreement on what exactly collaboration should encompass. He notes that this ambiguity often leads to inefficiencies and takes a firm negative stance towards governance cooperation and with that, to the widespread use of networks in government. Although his insights are meaningful, Huxham does not take into account the nature of wicked problems. Opposing Huxham, Whelan (2012) argues that analysts generally take a positive stance towards networks when wicked problems are

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involved, because wicked problems “… cannot be divided into neat parts and allocated to individual organizations” (Whelan C. , 2012, p. 18). Whelan thus argues that networks are essential when combating a wicked problem as opposed to problems that have simple solutions, in which the network is beneficial to the individual organization. The incorporation of the network challenges described by Huxham into the framework used by Candel et. al. (2016) may enable increasingly clear evaluation of organizations in networks. Although not taking the nature of wicked problems into account, Huxham made several strong points regarding the problems that may arise when working in a network setting.

Another Author that Candel et. al (2016) draw upon in the creation of their framework are Weber & Khademian (2008) who note that networks will most likely remain one of the most prominent forms of governance structure due to the presence of wicked problems. The authors argue that the “… fundamental challenge to effectively managing any public problem in a networked setting is the transfer, receipt and integration of knowledge across participants” (Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 334). In conclusion, although the literature is adamant about network-based governance being flawed, it does seem to identify it to be the most applicable form of solution to ‘wicked problems’.

2.4 NETWORK-BASED CAPABILITY AND PERFORMANCE

The capability to deal with wicked problems is directly related to the performance of a network. If a network that targets a specific wicked problem has been performing well in reducing the presence of a certain wicked problem, ceteris paribus, that network possesses the required capabilities. Whelan (2015) argues that the performance or effectiveness of networks can be assessed on a multitude of levels. It can be assessed on the organizational level, the community level, and the network level. The appropriate unit of analysis depends on the type of research that is being performed (Whelan, 2015, p.540). In our case, the most relevant unit of analysis is that of the network. Whelan also discusses the difficulty of defining performance in the field of security. He notes that “…It is also clear that security networks are as varied as their organizational participants, meaning any conception of performance related to goal attainment, for example, would ultimately be limited to the narrowly defined objectives of each particular network” (Whelan, 2015, p. 541). Capability and performance in this context means to attain the

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goals that are set by the network itself. In order to counteract the variedness of networks and their goals, Whelan (2015) creates a generalizable performance measure. He proposes a system of assessment that is based upon what he understands to be the main capability that local security networks are in existence for, information sharing (Whelan C. , 2012, p. 39) (Whelan C. , 2015). In our research however, we do not seek to compare this network to others using a generalizable framework based on information sharing, but are instead interested in the goals set by one particular network; the removal of marijuana plantations by the The Hague city working group.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

This research uses the theoretical framework described above to provide an answer to the research question formulated in the introduction. This research attempts to identify to what extent the local security network in this case is capable of dealing with the wicked problem of illegal marijuana plantations. Second, this research attempts to measure the enabling factors of the five governance challenges as described by Candel et. al (2016). Third, this research discusses its findings and its implications on the application of the framework to other security subjects, and local networks.

3.2 DESKTOP RESEARCH

The first method used is desktop research. Both documents from open sources and documents locked away from the public were used. Insight into these ‘closed’ documents was gained through negotiation. Examples of ‘closed’ documentation are the B-CBA (RIEC Den Haag, 2014), the hemp-monitor in the appendix, and a concept version of the RSIV’s evaluation on the ‘Action Program Hemp’ (RSIV, 2017), which is due to be released later in 2018. This method of the research is used throughout all phases of the research and is aimed both at helping design the questions for the questionnaire and interviews, and as a data collection method on its own. The documents that were found during the data collection phase have passed the four criteria of Scott as described in Bryman (2012, p. 544). These four criteria are:

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Page | 16 1. Authenticity 2. Credibility 3. Representativeness 4. Meaning 3.3 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The second method used is semi-structured interviews. This was the preferred method of data collection during the research. Using semi-structured interviews as a method compared to structured questionnaires and desktop research has the advantage of being able to respond to someone’s answers with an additional question. This has led to further clarification and a better exploration of the topic. The method has also provided interviews with flexibility, through this method, topics brought to light by a respondent could be further explored in the following interviews with other respondents. Interviews were essential to this research for several reasons. First, interviews provided invaluable insight into the practice of the individual actors of the networks and the relationship between them. Second, this method was essential because there was relatively little public documentation about the subject. Questions were structured per challenge as have been described by Head and Alford (2013); Rittel and Webber (1973) and Termeer et al. (2013). Interviews were conducted at the HPB/DSO, Vestia, WoonInvest, Staedion and Stedin. The interview guide can be viewed in the appendix of this thesis. In this version of the thesis, transcripts of the interviews will not be included in the appendix. Instead, they will be referenced to in the text according to their assigned letters. These are as follows:

Interview I DSO Interview 2 Staedion Interview 3 WoonInvest Interview 4 Stedin Interview 5 Vestia Interview 6 HPB

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This research has made use of two separate methods. These methods were combined in order to attempt to overcome the possible weakness and intrinsic biases that are inherent to single-method research. Triangulation was used to overcome weaknesses, but has proven to also be a method in itself as it cross-checks evidence in order to find patterns in data gathered through different means (O' Donoghue & Punch, 2003, p. 78). Triangulation is therefore also a method to increase internal validity of the research.

This research will not be completely externally valid and generalizable as security networks differ across the globe. However, it may be able to pinpoint more precisely why certain processes work well in this particular context. In the future, these results could be compared to those of other systems that deal with similar wicked problems. Not all indicators that have been described in our theoretical framework (Candel, Breeman, & Termeer, 2016) (Termeer & Dewulf, 2014) (Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman, & Stiller, 2013) will be used in this thesis. Due to temporal constraints a choice was made to use indicators that are most adequate to this case. Some indicators that suffer from ambiguity or are near duplicates of other indicators have been removed to create a workable operationalization scheme for this particular case. This further affects the validity of this research. The model is compromised somewhat, which could potentially have caused the researcher to miss some data that may have been relevant.

Finally, the amount of actors interviewed was also limited due to temporal constraints and due to disappointing rejections from some within the network. Ideally all members within the working group would be interviewed. Unfortunately, that wasn’t the case. This is due to several reasons. The first is the unwillingness to cooperate that was immediately declared by the police force. In their reply the police noted the research subject was too sensitive. In other cases the researcher was simply ignored, even after repeated requests through different communication methods. The public prosecutor, Van ‘t Hof Rijnlandt and Haagwonen were too busy before and during the holiday season, and could not find the time to plan in an interview. Finally, one interview was rejected because of special circumstances. The director of the city working group would not be available until the end of January. Nonetheless, six expert interviews from five separate organizations were conducted within the time frame.

Interviews were conducted at the Bureau of Housing inspection (HPB), Vestia, WoonInvest, Staedion and Stedin. The most important actor that was missed is the police. Fortunately, as

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Stedin works closely together with the police during the operational phase of dismantlement, they could fill in some blanks that would have remained if we were not to have any information disclosed from the police force at all. Disclosure of the RSIV report (RSIV, 2017) and the B-CBA (RIEC Den Haag, 2014) also helped fill in some blanks as to the operation of the police force and its separate districts.

Two respondents were interviewed from the HPB, one closer to the operational level, while the other was more policy oriented. This provided for a relatively detailed voice from the municipality and gave insight into its processes. Finally, the public prosecutor could not find the time to contribute to this thesis. Fortunately, its role within the working group is relatively small and mostly advisory (6, 1). However, this does further impact the validity of the research, as their organization within the network could not be properly assessed through the use of the framework presented by Candel et. al (2016). Especially its relationship to the police force and a clear description of the division of their tasks would have helped increase validity of this research. Having interviewed three separate housing corporations, a decent confidence in their role has been established. Interviewing more would have increased reliability as it could have enabled further cross referencing between the answers of the other partners, but would most likely not have produced much more information.

The documentation used in this research might trespass into the territory of other actors that are a part of the larger national security network. However, due to temporal constraints and the subject of local security networks this research has limited itself to performing interviews only with experts from the city working group.

4. OPERATIONALISATION

In the methodology it was mentioned that not all indicators described by Candel et. al (2016) will be used during this research. The following changes were made to accommodate the temporal restrictions of the research. Under reflexivity ‘skills’ was dropped. This indicator is ambiguous and hard to measure. Measuring the ‘skill’ for organizational tolerance is a thesis on its own, and is not so easily applicable within our framework. For responsiveness, ‘positioning of political leaders’ was dropped due to inapplicability. Although regularly in the news, there has not been a ‘crisis event’ associated with the removal of marijuana plantations in recent years.

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For Rescaling, ‘spatial scale interactions’ were dropped. Seeing as this research deals with a

local security network, geographical distance is not expected to have an impact large enough to

affect the capabilities of the network. Under resilience ‘flexible legislation’ has been dropped. One of the problems identified in literature is that national legislation regarding the subject has remained relatively untouched due to legal intertwinement with supranational entities such as the European Union and the United Nations (Van Kempen & Fedorova, 2014). On a more local level, the topic of flexible legislation may be further explored under the other two indicators of resilience (decentralized authority & room for self-governance). Under revitalization ‘Tolerance for different perspectives and opinions’ has been dropped. This indicator is very abstract and difficult to measure empirically. The methods deployed during this research do not allow exact measurement of this variable.

There are also some overlapping indicators of which some can be dropped, while the others can still provide some information about its underlying indication. One of these is ‘the level of redundancy’, which can also be measured through the ‘resources’ indicator. Another is ‘external or internal struggle within a network’ under Reflexivity. A practically identical indicator is ‘Methods or strategies to deal with stagnant interaction patterns’ which also focus on mechanisms to deal with internal and external conflicts within an organization. ‘Communication strategies’ was also dropped. Literature research shows that individual numbers regarding cash-flows or the amount of jobs within a certain department are not represented in most yearly reports or other publically available documents. It would seem unlikely then that any sort of indicator can be properly measured in practice. Second, policy regarding communication strategies will most likely rise to the fore when looking into ‘monitoring attention and filtering information’.

Finally, the choice was made to drop a second sub-indicator under structures intended to measure the presence of a liaison officer in organizations. However, as ‘communication strategies’ measures the amount of pre-existing formal communication strategies in place this indirectly also measures the amount of time that is spent on communication ex ante. Although the existence of a liaison officer is an indication that the organization commits to collaboration with its network, the work that a liaison officer would do is far more meaningful to this research. This work, in absence of a liaison officer, may be partially redirected to a different job function or title. It is

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thus more logical to measure this by using other indicators, rendering the need to distinguish the existence of liaison officers at least partially irrelevant.

The concepts that remain are further operationalized in the following scheme:

Concept Indicators Data Sources

Reflexivity Resources: the amount of funds made

available for multi-organizational operation per organization in Euros with regard to the removal of marijuana plantations.

Documentation, Yearly reports

Reflexivity/Resilience Structures: The total amount of

scheduled formal and informal

communication moments in the network per organization per year.

Documentation, interviews

Resilience Decentralized authority: The position

of the responsible actor in the hierarchy of the network during the removal of marijuana plantations by operational personnel.

Documentation, Interviews on operational level

Room for self-governance: The amount of nodes in the network that can change their own policy with regard to the objectives of the network without dependency on others within the network.

Documentation, Interviews

Responsiveness Monitoring attention and filtering

relevant information: the amount of existing communication strategies and information filtering mechanisms in place in the network.

Documentation, available manuals, interviews

Revitalizing Methods or strategies to deal with

stagnant interaction patterns: The existence of third party dispute mediation services used within the network over the last year.

Documentation, interviews

Rescaling Ability to deal with jurisdictional scale

interactions: Conflicts in policy of the Municipality of The Hague and national policy.

Documentation, interviews, Books describing law and policy such as Van Kempen & Fedorova. (2014).

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interactions: Conflicts in long- and short term policy on both municipal and national level.

Books describing law and policy such as Van Kempen & Fedorova. (2014).

Capability The total amount of successful

multi-organizational efforts in the form of operations that have led to the removal of an illegal marijuana plantation.

Documentation, Yearly reports, interviews.

Figure 2: Operationalization scheme

5. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Dutch legislation regarding soft drugs has been rewritten, amended and changed. In the following chapter we will describe the arguably complex past that the Netherlands has had with drugs and the policy it has used to govern it. Past legislation is relevant to our case because it contributes to the ideological background of future legislation. The direction that the Netherlands wants to take with regards to soft-drugs legislation is unclear and is part of the ‘wicked problem’ that has been described above. Understanding where the Netherlands’ unconventional soft-drug policy stems from is important to understand the state of current legislation, public opinion and ideological background.

5.1 THE OPIUM ACTS I & II

First drug legislation was introduced on the 23rd of January in 1912 in the form of the

International Opium Convention. According to De Kort (1994, p. 9) most countries with the exception of the United States had no real interest in new drug legislation. For some countries including the Netherlands drug related trade was a means of income. For this reason the Netherlands argued for a government monopoly on opium during the first International Opium Convention (De Kort, 1994, p. 11). For the Netherlands, domestic drug abuse was not yet high on the agenda. Nonetheless, feeling pressure from the United States, the convention was signed in The Hague by thirteen drug producing nations, and was meant to control the export of opium and cocaine products. Among those who signed the treaty were The Netherlands, Germany, the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Persia, Russia, Portugal and Siam. The Netherlands as well as several other European countries were not in a hurry to ratify any of the newly accepted legislation. It took two more conferences for the Netherlands to ratify the treaties. In February 1915 the ratification process was completed (De Kort, 1994, p. 10).

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China and the United States soon withdrew from the treaty as they were becoming more interested in a ‘dry’ prohibitionist approach which meant no cultivation of drug products from opium and coca-plants at all.

In the Netherlands this led to the Opium act of 1919, which regulated illegal distribution of drugs. The emphasis should be on the word ‘illegal’ in the last sentence as the nation itself still produced and sold drugs as a means of income up until the end of the World War II and the independence of Indonesia (De Kort, 1994, p. 8). The second version of the Opium act was based on the International Opium Convention of Geneva which was signed on February 19, 1925. It focused on controlling drugs internationally and included creating an institution for supervision and a certification system (League of Nations Treaties, 1925). Meanwhile, domestically, illegal drug trade had started to make an impression. According to de Korte (1996, p. 11) “… The majority opinion in the Netherlands was that the “war on drugs” (as we call it now) could not be won.” The effectiveness of the Opium act was called into question. Domestic press raised questions regarding the (lack of) measures that the act enabled. This led government to increase punishments for those who violated the law. Interesting to note is that smuggling was punished most severely. Possession was not punished at all (with exception of Chinese opium smokers, who were punished mildly), and illegal sales were not punished nearly as heavily. The reason that most users were exempt from prosecution was that they had obtained the drugs through legal means. Physicians were allowed to prescribe drugs such as cocaine and opiates for medicinal purposes. (De Kort, 1994, p. 13)..

5.2 AFTER WWII: CATEGORIZATION OF DRUGS AND THE REVISED OPIUM ACT

After the Second World War drug use was still not high on the agenda. Drug use seemed to be low, marijuana was not yet illegal and opium smoking by Chinese was not actively prosecuted. It wasn’t until 1953 that marijuana was made illegal under the Opium Act. (De Korte, 1996, p. 15-16). In the 60’s drug policy regained its place on the agenda. Authorities started hunting for drug possession and penalties were increased. However, these measures did nothing to reduce the proliferation of drug use throughout the Netherlands, especially amongst youth (De Kort, 1996, p. 16). The Single Convention of 1961 prohibited the legalization of Marijuana. However, a string of events led to the de facto decriminalization in the Netherlands in the 1970’s. De Kort

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(1996, p. 17-19) argues that this is due to de-pillarization of Dutch society, the lack of an ideological or ethnical association with marijuana, and the lack of a moral entrepreneur such as the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the United States. He notes that countercultures (Hippies, Provo’s, and Beatniks) were not criminalized or stigmatized in the Netherlands which led to a common tolerance of the use of marijuana. It is argued that “… Perhaps because of this close identification with counter-cultural life-styles and values, the initial concept of drug-taking as a social problem in the Netherlands has been fundamentally ambivalent.” (Leuw, 1996, p. 25). The de facto decriminalization of marijuana didn’t just happen overnight. In the 1970’s the ‘Commission Baan’ and ‘Commission Hulsman’ were very influential in their recommendations regarding drug policy. It is argued that Commission Baan was influential because of their public background, compared to their counterpart who had no officially recognized political status. Commission Hulsman on the other hand was influential because they had finished their report earlier, and had incorporated two members who were also a part of the official commission (Leuw, 1996, p. 28). Both Commissions were asked to review Dutch drug legislation and provide advisement for future policy in 1968. Commission Hulsman was very liberal in their recommendation, recommending the full array of drugs to be legalized over a period of time. Commission Baan on the other hand presented a plan that was more in line with the status quo, but presented a new approach to dealing with drugs by separating drugs into two schedules in criminal law. These schedules or categories would later be known to be ‘soft-drugs’ and ‘hard-drugs’ (De Kort, 1994, p. 22). They argued that the difference between the categories of drugs were so large that common policy addressing both types of drugs together would lead to disproportionate penalties for those using ‘soft-drugs’. Their argument was based on the notion that “… the level of coerciveness and certainty of social reactions to using and trading drugs should be carefully linked to a risk-analysis of the kind of drugs and behaviors involved.” (Leuw, 1996, p. 32). They noted that cannabis does not belong in the same category of drugs that lead to unacceptable risks. Furthermore, criminalizing soft-drug use would separate users from non-users in society, creating subcultures of drug non-users that would no longer seek help as they would drift away from participatory society as criminals (Leuw, 1996, p. 33). Both the Commission Hulsman and the Commission Baan agreed on the categorization of drugs by risk category. They also agreed that the penal system should distinguish between use and trade of illegal substances.

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The advice from Commission Baan was almost completely copied into the Opium act with some slight changes. The act turned out somewhat less liberal than either commission had wanted. Possession of cannabis was to become a misdemeanor instead of a crime, amphetamines were to be more severely punished, and trade in cannabis and trade in drugs with higher risks was to be kept separate in the judicial system (Leuw, 1996, p. 33). In 1976 the third revised version of the Opium Act was sent to parliament and accepted.

5.3 A CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE: THE 90’S UNTIL NOW

In the 1990’s the political attitude towards drugs slowly changed. Both the soft-drug and hard-drug policies were producing complications. New hard-drugs such as MDMA were being produced in large quantities in the Netherlands, and the Dutch soft-drug policy was leading to nuisance problems, criticisms from abroad and a higher involvement of organized crime in the production of marijuana products (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, Drug Policy: The "Dutch Model", 2015, p. 177). Pressure to control these problems led to amendment of the Opium Act and changes in administrative and criminal law. The first impactful change to the Opium Act was made in 1999 when ‘professional cultivation’ of marijuana plantations was first included. It added higher penalties for those who grew marijuana in a professional fashion in order to produce wholesale results. Alongside this amendment, article 13b of the Opium Act was also added, which is known as the ‘law of Damocles’. This enables the mayor of a municipality to close down any housing or publicly accessible locations in which schedule I or II drugs are being sold (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, Drug Policy: The "Dutch Model", 2015, p. 178). This law is one of the main interventions a mayor can make use of when attempting to clear housing or other locations of marijuana plantations. In 2007 it was expanded to the law that we know now, which will be further discussed in the following chapter. In 2003 the ‘Bibob’ Act was introduced which enables governing bodies to withdraw or deny licenses to individuals and organizations that may lead to the exploitation of criminal activities. This act can be used to tackle the problem coffee shops that dabble in criminal activities. Finally, in 2014 the Opium Act was further supplemented by an Act that criminalized preparation and facilitation of marijuana cultivation in its entirety (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, Drug Policy: The "Dutch Model", 2015, p. 178).

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Alongside all of these judicial changes, policing of drug use and drug trade had also experienced an increase over this period of time. Organized crime had become a larger target for law enforcement to pursue in both schedule I and schedule II production business. A review of the actions taken during this period of time concluded in 2009 that there was still a drug problem in The Netherlands. Youth use of MDMA and cannabis was above average, and coffee shops were still causing nuisance problems, particularly related to tourism. The review concluded that the Netherlands had been a large contributor to drug related issues throughout the rest of Europe (Van Ooyen-Houben, Meijer, Kaal, & Galloway, 2009).

After verification, these conclusions were found to be true by an appointed commission. (Adviescommissie Drugsbeleid, 2009) This led to increasingly rigorous policy regarding drug use and trade. Drug use among youth was to be combated through prevention, for example through the use of informative programs deployed at schools. Further investments were made in addiction care facilities to enable youth to rid themselves of drug-related problems. A more rigorous approach pertaining law enforcement, organized crime and coffee shop sale restrictions was also made public in parliament (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, Drug Policy: The "Dutch Model", 2015, p. 179). In order to combat the tourism problem which bestowed the Netherlands with much international critique, the Netherlands dabbled for a while with the use of a registration system called the ‘wietpas’. A Dutch citizen wanting to buy from a local coffee shop would have to register in order to buy marijuana products for personal use. Although this was implemented for a while in May 2012 in southern provinces in the Netherlands, the measure was withdrawn in November. There were problems with privacy (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, 2012), and drug criminality and nuisance problems only increased in the municipalities that had made use of the system (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, Drug Policy: The "Dutch Model", 2015, p. 199).

5.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HAGUE

In 2012 Spoelstra (2012) researched the network involved in marijuana plantations at the time in The Hague. She noted that in 2006 the first marijuana-covenant was made, which enabled sharing information between partners in order to facilitate a more effective process in the removal of hemp plantations. The covenant was effective, and was redrawn into a larger version

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that included surrounding municipalities such as the municipality of Delft, Pijnacker and Leidschendam in 2012. Her research did not look into the new covenant, but focused instead on the effectiveness of the first. Spoelstra (2012) had also identified the problem to be a ‘wicked’ problem. Her conclusions about the network and the added value that it had created to combat the problem were positive. She noted that there was a lot of attention for the removal of marijuana-plantations from the start of the 2nd millennium onward up until 2012.

Essentially she describes how the local integral approach became a cornerstone in combating the crime by making use of a mix between a local and a national security network. She describes several events that contribute to this change. The first is the ‘cannabisbrief’ of 2004, which was a letter from central government that called upon municipalities to work towards a local, integral approach (Spoelstra, 2012, p. 35).The letter intended to reduce the attractiveness of the crime by doing two things. On the one hand municipalities should prioritize catching growers, and on the other hand they needed to scare new growers off by showing the repercussions of committing the crime of growing marijuana. In the letter the central government emphasizes the role of local actors, mentioning both housing corporations and electricity suppliers. A secondary event that led to the use of local security networks to combat the problem was the addition of an administrative approach to the already existent criminal approach. Municipalities were given the option of applying ‘spoedeisende bestuursdwang’, which loosely translated would mean to apply ‘urgent administrative coercion’. This effectively enables a municipality to recover and repair a property and recover costs incurred from the owner (Spoelstra, 2012, p. 36). During the introduction of a policy program in 2008 by the government, the role of local networks was once again emphasized as a tool to combat the marijuana plantation problem. During the same year, RIECs (Regional Information and Expertise Centers) were erected to facilitate communication between municipalities and local actors (Spoelstra, 2012, p. 35).

After the redraft of the covenant in 2012, there have been several changes that should be noted as impactful to this particular case. First, although focusing on the period between 2006 and 2012, Spoelstra failed to notice an impactful change that was already on the way while she was writing her thesis. The Dutch police started a reorganization bout on the first of January 2013 when the Police Act of 2012 was entered into force. The reorganization was meant to centralize the police force, which up until then was decentralized into 25 regional police corps and one central corps.

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In the following years this centralization bout would be criticized in the media quite heavily (Paternotte, 2017) (ANP, 2017) (ANP, 2017) (RTL Nieuws, 2017). The effect that the reorganization may have had on this particular case will be further explored in the analysis chapters.

Second, municipalities have further expanded their influence and toolbox by gaining the ability to use the administrative sanction to punish those who are responsible for withdrawing a property meant for housing from the housing supply. An addition to the Housing act (art. 92a) (wetten.nl, 2018) has given municipalities the possibility of sanctioning owners of property, besides those who are renting it. This means that the municipality can, since 2015, also fine housing corporations if they feel they have played a role in the existence of a marijuana plantation, as a result of not providing enough supervision.

In November 2014, through the introduction of article 11a in the Opium Act, grow shops were made illegal (Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 2014). Grow shops sell material required to facilitate marijuana plantations and were known to give advice regarding their setup. In short, the law criminalizes facilitation of marijuana plantations, thereby making grow shops illegal.

6. WICKED PROBLEMS

Rittel and Webber describe 10 prerequisites for a problem before it can truly be considered ‘wicked’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973, pp. 160-167). The following is an attempt to define the wicked problem according to the ten prerequisites formulated.

The first prerequisite is that wicked problems are hard to define. The problem of marijuana plantations can be defined in many ways. Marijuana plantations are illegal, they create dangerous- situations, and they are a financing tool for organized crime which in turn creates an atmosphere of intimidation and violence. They also cause damage to housing property and the electricity network. They cause strain on the administrative and criminal justice system. They are a cause of drug-related problems in society. There are many ways in which the problem can be described, which ties into the second prerequisite, which is that wicked problems can be described in many different ways, the choice for which also implies a different solution. There

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are reasons why the national discourse is so divided on what to do about the problem. If marijuana was legalized altogether, this could increase youth drug problems and increase export into neighboring countries in which marijuana is not legalized. This in turn could strain international relations. Further criminalization on the other hand could lead to more strain on the police force, and may require additional funding to properly combat. This also ties into the third and fourth prerequisite, which are that wicked problems cannot be solved by one solution and that wicked problems do not have solutions that are simply correct or incorrect, but are on a spectrum between good and bad.

The fourth prerequisite is that after applying a solution, one cannot be sure of its effectiveness. Let’s say we were to legalize in order to decrease organized crime activity in The Netherlands, what exactly would happen to the organized crime that is currently active in the Netherlands? Would it be likely that it would simply disappear, or would problems in another crime-related area become more prevalent? This ties in to the fifth prerequisite which states that applying solutions cannot be done on a test-basis, as every attempt to apply a solution will have immediate consequences. Although the Dutch government is currently planning a pilot to test what the outcome will be for semi-legalization in a local setting, which is basically a solution on a test-basis, it will be highly unlikely that this pilot will not have any consequences. What will happen if ‘municipality-marijuana’ pushes ‘illegal’ marijuana out of the market?

The sixth prerequisite is that there is no ceiling to the amount of solutions that may be applicable to a wicked problem. Some already named solutions are legalization and further criminalization. A solution on a more local level could be to implement the use of regular information campaigns to inform the public of the risks of having a marijuana plantation. Another example of a solution that has already been applied in the past is the criminalization of grow shops. The seventh prerequisite is that wicked problems are unique. There is no other problem like marijuana plantations. It shares some similarities with drug laboratories in that it is illegal and that attempts are made to hide it. Legislation and public opinion regarding hard drugs is different to that surrounding marijuana, which gives it its own unique depth over similar problems. The eighth prerequisite is that wicked problems can be considered a symptom of another problem. Some easy problems that marijuana plantations and marijuana use can be considered a symptom of are drug abuse and criminal activity. Finally, there is no room for mistakes when applying solutions

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to wicked problems. This prerequisite is closely related to the fifth prerequisite that states that solutions cannot be applied on a test-basis. This is because of immediate consequences that may not be immediately foreseen. An example is an increased crime rate in a different areas after a reduction in crime rate surrounding marijuana, the so called ‘waterbed effect’.

7. CASE DESCRIPTION: THE CITY WORKING GROUP

7.1 THE CITY WORKING GROUP

Figure 3: Stacked Venn diagram of het network dealing with marijuana plantations in The Hague.

In this thesis the emphasis is on the city working group. The actors involved in the city working group are those who are first confronted with the problem. Although the covenant has expanded to incorporate surrounding municipalities in the region, the city working group remains

Dutch Tax Service Social Benefits Service

Mayor Police Housing Inspection Bureau Stedin Housing Corporations Public Prosecutor City W or ki ng G ro up Co m plet e n et w or k

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operational in the The Hague area only. The covenant is thus a legal tool under which the working group shares its information, and under which, if information has not been shared, partners can attempt to force other partners to cooperate. The actors involved in the covenant have several shared responsibilities (Convenant, 2011). They are listed hereunder:

1. A proactive and consequent participation of marijuana-plantation prevention and prosecution.

2. All covenant partners agree to share the appropriate information that is listed in the covenant of 2012.

3. There is a duty of confidentiality regarding the information that is shared under the covenant.

4. All partners agree to spread the knowledge of all agreements in the covenant throughout their respective organizations.

Further responsibilities are described in the ‘Action-program Hemp’, which is based on recommendations from the B-CBA of 2014 (RIEC Den Haag, 2014). The tasks described herein are not meant to cover the whole network, but instead are aimed at police districts and municipalities. They will be further explored under the following headers in this chapter.

The police

The police attempt to catch perpetrators, dismantle the plantations, and are responsible for starting the criminal procedure. If a plantation is found or if any of the partners suspect the existence of a plantation at any location, they are to inform the police as agreed under the covenant. The police gather evidence and build a case against the perpetrators. In the current covenant of 2012 the police are the only actor whose individual responsibilities are extensively recorded in the covenant (Convenant, 2011). These tasks are the following:

1. The police have operational control regarding the dismantling of marijuana plantations. 2. After the police are informed of the location of a possible marijuana plantation, the police

decide if there is enough evidence to initiate a criminal investigation.

3. After dismantling a marijuana plantation the police will notify the relevant covenant partners immediately so they can take appropriate measures.

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a. Personal information of the suspect(s). b. Location of the plantation.

c. Date of dismantling.

d. Amount of found marijuana plants or the amount of marijuana found in kilograms. e. The state of the marijuana plantation, including the way it was built and the manner in

which it makes use of its electricity supply. f. Date of earlier dismantling in case of recidivism. g. Indication of the amount of previous harvests. h. Potential risk for surrounding residents. i. Dossier number.

j. Imagery of the situation.

k. Any and all information that could further help the effective operation of the covenant.

In the ‘Action Program Hemp’ further instructions to the police regarding their approach were described. The police are given one guideline and one task. The guideline is to prioritize dismantling small plantations because of dangerous settings. The document also notes that the police should focus on organized crime during the criminal process. The task is that the police immediately send a so called HIB (Hennep Information Message) to the municipality after dismantling a plantation in order to facilitate better information sharing within the network (RSIV, 2017, p. 8). The action program also takes note of a pilot regarding information communication in the Area of Delft-Westland. Results were reported in the evaluation by the RSIV (RSIV, 2017, p. 11). These results have not yet led to any change in policy, but indicate that the use of a specialized hemp-team may improve results.

The Hague Housing Inspection bureau

The The Hague Housing Inspection Bureau (HPB) is a part of the The Hague municipality and is the operational part of the City Planning Service (DSO). They are tasked with detecting residential fraud, nuisance, illegal residency, overdue maintenance and the wrongful use of social benefits systems (Denhaag.nl, 2017). Within our case, the HPB is responsible for starting the administrative procedure against the owners of illegal marijuana plantations. The administrative procedure is separate from the criminal procedure that the police initiate. Within their operational

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process, the HPB determines to what extent a property is used for any other activity other than for its intention. This means that when a house meant for habitation is used to home a plantation, the perpetrator is liable to be given an administrative sanction, as the house is not used for its initial intent (1, 6). The tasks are further defined in the Housing Act (wetten.nl, 2018) and the Territorial Planning Act (wetten.nl, 2006).

The HPB has three instruments which they can use to follow up on their tasks. The first is the administrative sanction which has been explained above. The second is the Act of Victor/Victoria (art.174a, Municipality Act) (Wetten.nl, 2018). This act effectively gives the inspection bureau the ability to close down any building that they deem is dangerous. This happens in quite often in practice. This is usually applied when an attempt was made to fraudulently use electricity, when the foundation of a building has been altered, or when water supply has been tinkered with (Interview 1, 6). The third is the Opium Act clause 13.b. Although a part of the housing inspection bureau’s toolbox (officially the toolkit of the mayor), this is generally not used in the case of marijuana plantations, unless hard drugs or weapons are involved (Interview 1, 6). The fourth tool to the bureau’s disposal is the administrative coercion, which has been touched upon lightly in the historical overview. Applying administrative coercion in this case means that if a property is not back in circulation within a pre-determined period, the administration will do it themselves, but will recover costs at the owner’s expense (Interview 6) (Wetten.nl, 2018).

The action-program prompts municipalities to make use of these instruments to combat the problem of marijuana plantations. It also adds that there needs to be one central communication point within the municipality, and that municipalities train their personnel to recognize undermining (RSIV, 2017, p. 9). The municipality of The Hague meets these requirements with the HPB.

Stedin

Stedin manages the electricity net within the The Hague area. They are responsible for providing and maintaining power access to all areas in The Hague. Stedin is considered a semi-public organization. A complete array of tasks has been defined by law (Wetten.nl, 2016). During the operational phase, Stedin shuts down the power and determines the monetary value of electricity that may have been fraudulently obtained. Stedin works closely together with the police. During

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the dismantlement of marijuana plantations, Stedin employees will accompany police officers. According to Stedin, they do this to provide safe entry for the police, and in order to obtain information regarding the amount of stolen electricity. Stedin keeps some workers on night shifts in order to accompany incidental plantation finds during off-hours (Interview 5). Stedin is operational in the entire The Hague area.

Housing Corporations

The housing corporations are a social safety net that provides housing for people with a low to median income. Their housing is generally considered cheap, and is often eligible for subsidy. Housing provided by housing corporations are often a prime target for those seeking to set up marijuana plantations because of these reasons. A story that is often cited (Interview 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) is that individuals with an unsound financial situation may become prey to criminal organizations looking to set up a plantation. They are offered financial compensation when they cooperate, but are left with most of the risks. Once they have become a part of the crime, it is unusual for them to get rid of these organizations (Interview 6). This scenario is backed up by research done by the RIEC (RIEC Den Haag, 2014, p. 33). The financial background of the individuals involved in marijuana most likely contributes to the amount of plantations in social housing arrangements.

Housing corporation’s tasks have been defined in the Housing Act (wetten.nl, 2018) They are foundations, which means they cannot turn a profit. Any profit made has to be put back into the organization (Interview 2). Housing corporations are often the victims of illegal hemp plantations when property is damaged or even destroyed. Some respondents note the average cost of repairing a home is between €15.000 and €20.000 (Interview 1, 5). When a marijuana plantation is found, it is standard protocol for housing corporations to immediately ask for rescission of the rental agreement (Interview 2, 3, 5) Housing corporations also sometimes have clauses related to the use of the property in their rental agreement. Some incorporate specific clauses for marijuana (Interview 3), while others use more general terms to force rescission (Interview 2, 5).

The Public Prosecutor

The public prosecutor uses the information gathered by the police in order to penalize perpetrators through criminal law. Even though they are not a part of the detection of marijuana

Enabling Governance capabilities in a local security network