The War on Terrorism: The European Union and the United States in a foreign and security policy divide?

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The War on Terrorism: The European Union and the

United States in a foreign and security policy divide?

An analysis of the influence of the War on Terror on the foreign and security policy of the European Union

Master of Arts in European Studies for European Policy

Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Maxime Groot

10597387

Supervisor: dr. L.K. Marácz

Second Examiner: dr. C. Vos

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Executive Summary

September 11 2001, the day that changed the world, as it is mostly referred to today, has marked a big change in the world’s international relations. Still in the mists of the end of the Cold War, the world was searching for its new global order and geopolitical position. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the following War on Terror influenced the Western world in many different ways, especially in the foreign and security area of the United States and the European Union. The following research question will be answered in this thesis: To what extent has the War on Terror had influence on the foreign and security policy of the

European Union? This question will be answered on the basis of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, the U.S. as a global actor on the world stage and the impact and responses of the War on Terror. The theoretical framework of International Relations, with the focus on realism and liberalism will be used. It will be argued that a supporting core concept that is intertwined with the European foreign and security policy and the transatlantic relationship is globalization. It will be illustrated that the CFSP could be

conceived as an observational process, which is always developing over time and is influenced by contemporary events, like the War on Terror. At the end of this research, it can be determined that the War on Terror has had a divisive effect on the European foreign and security policy cohesion, in the form of more supranationalization and providing a legal framework. Moreover, In the future the EU will continue to be affected by the United States, due to the special transatlantic relationship.

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List of Abbreviations

AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

COREPER Comité des représentants permanents

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

EAW European Arrest Warrant

ECHR European Court of Human Rights

ECJ European Court of Justice

EEAS European External Action Service

EEC European Economic Community

EDA European Defence Agency

EP European Parliament

EPC European Political Cooperation

EU European Union

Europol European Police Office

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDP Freie Demokratische Partei

HR High Representative

ICC International Criminal Court

IR International Relations

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SIS Schengen Information System

TEU Treaty of the European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UK The United Kingdom

UN The United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US The United States of America

War on Terror War on Terrorism

WEU Western European Union

WTO World Trade Organization

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1. Introduction

September 11 2001, the day that changed the world, as it is mostly referred to today, has marked a big change in the world’s international relations. Still in the mists of the end of the Cold War, the world was searching for its new global order and geopolitical position. The United States (U.S.), as a strong global

power, immediately felt attacked in its heart, and announced big changes in their security policy and in relations with any country at that point. Their foreign policy was from then on based on what former U.S. President George W. Bush

introduced as the War on Terror(ism). During the Cold War Europe found itself in a crucial geographical position between the American block in the west and the Soviet block in the east. Being in that position, the EU saw the chance of building itself up and was emerging more and more as a real power on the world stage. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 more countries, especially Eastern-European ones, joined the Eastern-European Union (EU) and strengthened the EU as a continental block. A process that is highly connected to these developments and the 9/11 attacks and asks for particular attention is globalization. Since the beginning of this century this phenomenon is emerging in a rapid speed all over the world and plays a very important role in the current foreign and security policies of both America and the EU and in their mutual relationship. Against this background and an uneven balance of power, Europe is currently dealing with some internal issues like Brexit and the migration crisis. The U.S., on their part, has to deal with mostly political changes because of the election of Donald Trump as their President. However, a challenge they both face is global terrorism,

where 9/11 was an eye-opener for how serious this problem was and a big incentive for taking action. The EU and the U.S. have a history of intensive cooperation through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and their security relationship remains a special one, but in handling external threat they do not always agree which road to take.

Therefore, it is interesting to distinguish the geopolitical foreign and security position of the European Union before and after 9/11. In what way has the policy and power of the United States been of influence? What is the

historical timeline of the foreign and security policy of the EU? and what measures did the EU take in the wake of the War on Terrorism?

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In first instance, it would probably assumed that the War on Terror is solely an American issue, because George W. Bush, president of the United States at that point in history started it after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. However, it will be interesting to investigate what influence the War on Terror has had on the EU and what the role of the European Union has been in the battle against

terrorism. Was the EU highly involved in the War on Terror or just for a small part? Were the EU and the U.S. working together in the wake of the attacks or were there disagreements? Does the War on Terror still have influence on policymaking and the EU as a society today? These are just some examples of questions that are relevant to examine in this research.

The relationship between the EU and the United States, regarding security, defence and foreign policy is partly safeguarded by NATO and is of great importance in the world’s politics. In the last seventy years, both sides of the Atlantic have co-operated to promote their shared values like freedom,

democracy, the rule of law and a free market based economy. Both economies are deeply integrated and there has not been a stronger pact in history.

However, the vice President of defence and foreign policy of NATO, Ted Carpenter, has called NATO a political fraternity and not so much a security alliance (Carpenter 2009, 12). This shows that there also exist some doubts and negative sentiments about the transatlantic relationship. Also, the complex

overlap of NATO and EU membership should be noted. The EU namely consists of NATO members and non-NATO members, while on the other hand NATO consists of EU members and non- EU members.

Robert Kagan, American analyst, believes that in the post 9/11 era the disparity in power between the EU and the U.S. has developed in such a disproportionate way that Americans and Europeans do not share a common view of the world anymore (Lansford and Tashev 2005, 282). As an extension, there are people who argue that the relationship between the EU and the U.S. has lost its central position and that the transatlantic highlight is far behind us. However, despite the differences between the two blocs, others still share the more popular thought of it being an important and indispensable body in world politics. At the end of the day, NATO embodies the values and norms that are at the heart of the transatlantic relationship and therefore it is a cornerstone of

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A process that has a big role to play in the War on Terror is globalization.

Globalization, and as related to it neoliberalism, are emerging systems of global hegemony, and states actively foster the conditions for them by giving some level of power to big international organizations, like the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, there has been a notable change in the system of the economic features of structural adjustment, free trade and fiscal authority, because some scholars argue that it seems to be enlarged by military force (Roberts and Secor 2003, 63). Obviously, at one level, this

conjunction of war making and capitalism is not new or surprising, because many wars have been fought over fundamentally economic concerns. The modern world is marked by spaces of connection, which are dominated by global flows of information and images, transnational capital circuits and by military dispositions and geopolitical alignments (Gregory 2004, 318). These have their own unequal geographies, and do not produce a single, smooth surface, but the modern world is also marked by spaces of contradiction between the same and the other. These contradictions are fed by political, economic and cultural networks, but articulated by compensating imaginative geographies that give them different sanctions and force (Gregory 2004, 319).

Overall, the general standpoint is that the foreign and security policy of the EU and the U.S. have fundamentality changed after three historical turning points, being the (end of the) Cold War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and as a result of that, the war in Iraq. On the basis of this assumption the development of security, foreign and defence policies of the EU will be evaluated and it will be investigated to what extent these historical events have had an impact, with the War on Terror in the pivotal role. It will be illustrated that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has always been influenced by the position of the United States and that it will be that way in the future, because the EU- U.S. relationship is so deeply consolidated and integrated (McGrew 2014, 19). However, the events of 9/11 have been so dramatic and decisive that it left a mark on the EU and the U.S. in many different ways, but especially on their security measures. Moreover, it will be argued that the War on Terror definitely influenced the foreign and security policy of the EU.

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A number of arguments will be presented and the historical key periods will be identified to illustrate the development of the EU foreign and security policy. Moreover, the degree of influence by the U.S. and the 9/11 events will be determined. The following research question will be answered in this thesis: To what extent has the War on Terror had influence on the foreign and security policy of the European Union?

In order to answer this question we will need to look at the theories of International Relations (IR), which form the basis of the European foreign and security policy and the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, a core concept that is intertwined with the IR theories and the research subject is globalization, which will be covered as well. First, we will look at the theories of International Relations, where the focus will be on realism and liberalism as they are, to my opinion, most fitted for this research. Hereby, it should be noted that the European common foreign and security policy could be conceived as an observational process, which is developing over time and is influenced by contemporary events.

1.1 Theoretical framework of International Relations

The EU and the U.S. are both important and powerful actors on the world stage. In order to analyse and understand how and why world politics happen and what the underlying motives of the EU and U.S. are, it is needed to first look at the different theories of International Relations. In the following part the main

themes of the theories that have been most influential in explaining international relations and world politics will be focused on. The aim is to understand the various theories, to assess their strengths and weaknesses and to determine which theory can make the best predictions. Moreover, an overview of theories will be helpful to be able to assess the significance of globalization in this research and in the wider scope of IR. The main theoretical perspectives that exist in IR are realism, liberalism, social constructivism, Marxism and post structuralism. Of these, realism is considered as the most influential theory, but in modern times it has also received some criticism. A long-standing and well-developed debate in theories of IR is the one between realism and liberalism.

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Liberalism is a theory that is very popular in the Western world and is being pursued by both the EU and the U.S. For these reasons, the focus will be on both these theories in order to analyse the positions and actions in the European and American foreign and security policies.

1.1.1. Realism

Realism is a theory that already exists for a long time and is widely used in International Relations theories. In fact, realism is a family of theories, which include neorealism and structural realism, but can commonly all be traced back to classical realism (Pollack 2011, 3). The three core elements that are identified with realism are statism, self-help and survival. Since the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, realists consider sovereign states as the principal actor in international relations. State power is crucial and has traditionally been defined in particular in military terms. One of the most important mechanisms that realists have

considered essential throughout the ages is the balance of power. The most used definition for the balance of power holds that when the survival of a state is threatened by hegemonic or stronger state, they should join forces and seek to preserve their own independence (Dunne and Schmidt 2011, 101). In this form an equilibrium of power needs to be ensured, in order to exclude that one state can dominate the others. In the view of realist inspired scholars it is possible to view cooperation between states as balancing behaviour, for example as

Ikenberry states “powerful states emerge, secondary states will seek protection in countervailing coalitions of weaker states” (Ikenberry 2002, 8). The balance of power thesis begins with that as a result of the anarchical system, states

constantly seek security and that they see increased power as a tool towards increased security. One way towards increasing one’s power is cooperating with others. Shortly said according to Strömvik, it may be assumed that states seek political alliances “against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat” (Strömvik 2005, 121). As another scholar, Schweller puts it: when “a reasonable expectation of an external threat is absent, states need not, and usually do not, engage in balancing behaviour.” (Strömvik 2005, 123). So, in case the perceived threat rises, so should the interests to cooperate, and if the threat becomes less,

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so should the efforts to cooperate. One conception of power according to Jeffrey Hart is the ability to influence events. The balancing of power is assumed to be undertaken in relation to the most influential actor in the system (Strömvik 2005, 142). In this assumption, cooperation then only takes place if the

perceived benefits of doing so are greater than the costs and in the same context when the need for international influence seems to be relatively high. The

calculated gains from collective action should outweigh the autonomy losses. The balancing of power consists of different factors, but in sum we can say that

balancing is undertaken in relation to the influence of power of other states in the international system. Moreover, foreign and security cooperation should develop after times of disagreement with the most influential actor over how to cope with international events that are of importance to both parties (Strömvik 2005, 143).

However, among scholars there has also been some critique at the main ideas of realism, especially since the beginning of this century. Starting with statism, the key criticism is that it is flawed on empirical grounds, because of the challenges from ‘above’ and ‘below’. Moreover, statism is also flawed on

normative grounds because of the inability of sovereign states to respond to global collective issues, such as environmental degradation and global terrorism (Dunne and Schmidt 2011, 110). Secondly, within realism it is considered that the primary objective of national interest of all states is survival. Some critique that has been voiced is that, survival does not incorporate any limitations to what actions a state can take. The last core value of realism is self-help, which means that a state cannot rely on any other state or institution to guarantee survival. However, self-help is not an inevitable consequence of the absence of a world government or international organisations. States have preferred collective security systems to self-help in the past (Dunne and Schmidt, 110).

A scholar, Kenneth Waltz, provides three fundamental tools of analysis in the theory of international relations, focussing on realism. In his landmark, the first level compromises the role of individuals as agents, where the second level is about the societal and national context. Lastly, the third level is focusing on the global structure of the international playing field (Waltz 1979, 109). In this case, the relationship between states and relevant international and

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In this research the focus will mostly be on Waltz’s third level, as many actors like states and international organizations are involved and the War on Terror is not an internal conflict. The most important actors are the United

States, Iraq, the UN and the EU. If we look at it from a global perspective, Iraq is isolated from international political and economic cooperation and thus belongs to the periphery, while the U.S. is a core centre of the world. When zooming in at the second level, national and subnational actors are important, for example the U.S. Government, who argued that the possible use of weapons of mass

destruction by Iraq asked for pre-emptive action. In this, the U.S. was supported by 30 states that formed the ‘coalition of the willing’. However, Waltz paid less attention to the EU. He attributed the uneven process of European integration to the fact that the U.S. had emerged as the guarantor of the West-European security, leading to the free persuasion of the integration of the EU Member States, without concerning about security threats from other European partners (Pollack 2011, 7). Closely following Waltz is Mearsheimer’s realist analysis of the EU, where he claims that with the departure of the U.S. from the defense of the EU, the transatlantic tensions would increase (Pollack 2011, 8). Indeed, given the hyper power of the U.S. after the Cold War, we could say that the EU was balancing against the U.S. in a unipolar world.

1.1.2. Liberalism

Although realism is seen as the dominant theory of international relations, liberalism makes a strong claim to being the best alternative. Liberalism is a theory of government within states and good governance between states and people worldwide. It seeks to promote values as liberty, order, justice and toleration into international relations. International institutions are required to nurture and protect these values. As a consequence these values and institutions have become deeply embedded in the EU and the U.S., but at the same time those same values lack legitimacy worldwide. Regarding power, liberals argue that power politics is a product of ideas and ideas can be changed. Therefore, the balance of power is not a given and subject to change over time (Dunne and Schmidt 2011, 114).

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After the Cold War in the 1990s, liberalism was highly influential in IR as Western states proclaimed a new world order and intellectuals provided

justifications for the supremacy of liberal ideas over other competing ideologies. However, since 9/11 realism seems to be more popular again, as the U.S. have engaged in costly wars against networks and states who were thought to be a threat. During this period the power and legitimacy of the domination of the Western order was called into question (Dunne and Schmidt 2011, 114).

A prominent analyst of the influence of liberalism on the world order is John Ikenberry who maps liberalism through phases, which he calls ‘liberal internationalism’. The first, liberal internationalism 1.0 starts in the interwar period and the failed attempt to replace the balance of power with the rule of law. Liberal internationalism 2.0 entails the U.S. led international world order, which is experiencing a crisis today. Ikenberry argues that when a liberal

hegemonic order comes under challenge, as was the case on 9/11, the response is uncompromising. In this sense, however, it is noticeable that former U.S. president George W. Bush still mobilized the liberal values against Al Qaeda and Iraq. Liberal internationalism 2.0 is in danger as the ability of the U.S. to steer world order is diminishing and new foreign and security challenges are opening up divisions among the major powers (Dunne and Schmidt 2011, 123).Some critique on the vulnerability of liberalism is that in the post war period, the practices of security, trade and development have not delivered on their promises. As a consequence however, liberal international orders remain favourable to the most powerful states in the world, as they also did not fail.

There are different views about the European Union’s liberal position in world politics and on its present and future influence and development. Over time the EU has tried to boost its position as global actor, which resulted in diverse ideas, whereby the optimists already see the EU a significant contributor to

international developments and believe that it will be a new superpower. On the other hand, there are the pessimists who argue that the EU foreign and security policy is ineffective and that the power of the EU is declining as new powers are emerging (Forsberg 2013).

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‘normative power’, ‘market power’, ‘structural power’ and many more kinds of power. The proliferation of all these related words is not surprising, because power is a central theme in political science. However, power is a contested and complex notion and there is no agreement on a single definition. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall have outlined a two dimensional definition of power in IR literature; power can operate through the interaction of power between actors or through social relations of construction (Barnett 2002, 8). Thereby they state that it can either be diffuse or direct. Moreover, the use and analysis of the concept of power exposed an important gap between IR theories and EU studies, where because of the pace of EU integration, there are mostly policy-oriented and descriptive approaches that have no connection with theoretical issues.

Another form of power, which is based on the ability to attract and persuade, and supported by liberals is soft power, or in EU context, normative power. Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power in the 1990s, and defined it as the ability to get what you want, not through the established instruments of hard power like coercion and payments, but through attraction (Nye 261, 2004).Normative power can be seen as a form of cultural power, as Manners states that the EU is mainly a normative power, because its power consists on the basis of the ability to shape discourses and persuasion. Kagan argued that the U.S. is more willing to coerce other nations, is less patient with diplomacy and quicker to use military force in order to get the desired result. If we compare this to the EU, there is greater emphasis on diplomacy, more faith in international cooperation and law and they take a longer view at history and problem solving (Tuomioja 2009). In his eyes this is a result of the fact that Europe can no longer use the same power as the U.S., being hard power with military force. Therefore the EU is required to make a virtue out of necessity, they believe in multilateralism because they have no choice. Moreover, he claims that the UN Security Council is a substitute for their lack of power and that the EU is hypocrite for reducing their own defence while enjoying and criticizing the American military power at the same time (Kagan 2003, 30).

As we can see, IR theories of realism and liberalism differ in their analysis of managing international relations and in my opinion especially in power politics. In conducting foreign and security policy the relevant theories and the world they

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apply to are constantly changing. Firstly, realism associates power with military force, where John Mearsheimer claims that a state’s effective power in

international politics, is ultimately a function of its military force (Pollack 2011, 8). Overall, realists claim that the relative power of the EU as well as its relative weakness is a result of its limited military resources. Liberals claim, in contrast, that in contemporary international politics, military power has lost in importance and the emphasis has shifted to economic power. Economic power can be used both in positive and negative ways in the form of sanctions and incentives. Where liberalism sees economic power as the primary instrument of power, realists see the importance of economic power only in supporting the military capabilities. We can say that we have reached a turning point in history where much of what was applicable and central has become irrelevant. For a long time the world politics have been analysed in the light of a Westphalia world order where sovereign actors were the only important actors (Tuomioja 2009). This concept of absolute sovereignty is becoming a theoretical construction in today’s globalizing world where interdependence is growing.

Overall, my preference in theories will be liberalism, as I think it will be most relevant and suitable for answering the research question. Applying

liberalism to the War on Terror will prove its value and strengthen its position as the theory that needs to be pursued. Moreover, it will be a logical basis for the motives taken by the EU in their CFSP.

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1.2 The concept of globalization

Today we live in the age of globalization. The world has relatively become a smaller place, and almost every part of it is connected to another. Since the beginning of this century, globalization is a concept that plays a very important role in modern society. However, globalization exists way longer already because it embodies social structures and processes and has a wide range and meaning in time and space (Marácz and Róka 2011, 12). At the core of the concept are

social processes that transform human life into a tight economic, social, cultural and political world (Marácz 2011, 14). It is a channel through which positive and negative ideas are being transmitted, the positive being the spread of advanced Western forms of social life and the negative being the call for extremism and conflict (Marácz and Róka 2011, 7). With globalization, processes as social media and migration have skyrocketed, while at the same time it has put the traditional form of monolingual communication in the past. In answering the research

question it is important to pay attention to globalization, because it is the source and channel through which the War on Terror is deployed and foreign and

security policy can be promoted. Moreover, its significance in IR can be determined on the basis of the theories of realism and liberalism.

Put simply, we can say that globalization is deepening, widening and speeding up the interconnectedness worldwide. Therefore is it important to address this

contentious issue in the analysis of world politics. Since there exists consensus about the overused and ‘slippery’ concept of globalization, it is not surprising that it engenders controversy (McGrew 19, 2014). However, globalization is strongly associated with the emergence of a new global politics, where the traditional distinction between national and international affairs is no longer that meaningful. There are circulating several definitions of globalization within the intellectual world, because there is no general consensus about one definition. Giddens for example defines it as follows: ‘The intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (Giddens 1990, 21). Gilpin shortly puts is as ‘the integration of the world-economy’ (Gilpin 2001, 364) and Scholte as the ‘de-territorialisation- or the growth of supra-territorial

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relations between people (Scholte 2000, 46). To distinguish globalization from internationalization and regionalization, it can be defined as ‘a historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of

power relations across regions an continents’ (McGrew 2004, 20). Globalization is narrated as the force that will elevate the whole world out of poverty as more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy (Roberts and Secor 2003, 65). However, when there is globalization there are winners and losers. Or as Thomas Friedman defines it:

“globalization is the interweaving of markets, information systems, technology and telecommunication systems in a way that is shrinking the world from a size medium, to a size small, and enabling each of us to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and enabling the world to reach into each of us farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before” (Friedman 2000, 33).

Over the last two decades the sheer scope, scale and acceleration of global interconnectedness has become evident in every sphere, from cultural to economic. It designates a tendency towards the growing intensity, extensity, velocity and deepening impact of worldwide interconnectedness. Globalization is associated with a shift in social organization, where the emergence of the world as a shared space, the relative denationalization of power and the

reterritorialization of economic, social and political activity are important aspects. It can be conceptualized as a fundamental shift in the spatial scale of human social organization that expands the reach of power across continents and links distant communities. Moreover, globalization is not burying the Westphalian ideal of sovereign statehood, but rather transforming it by producing a disaggregated state. There are different views about globalization, there are the so-called hyper globalists, who believe that it brings about the demise of the sovereign nation-state, because global forces undermine governments to control their own societies and economies (Scholte 2000, 48). By contrast, sceptics argue that states remain the principal forces and agents in shaping world politics (Gilpin 2001, 365).

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Globalization is associated with actors that have a playing field in the whole world and the vehicles that drive globalization processes are virtual spaces (Marácz and Róka 2011, 12). Globalization is a concept through which every human being can build up its own global network; each of us can have an opinion that can be felt on the other side of the world. In the process of

globalization entities are able to be active and passive. To give an example, the EU is an active player when it is expanding and integrating new Member States, but on the other hand the EU also suffered from the banking crisis in the U.S (Marácz and Róka 2011, 13). The globalization of international society has grown over the last decades. During the 1990s there was closely universal agreement that the global system was dominated by the U.S. and its allies, including the institutions that the U.S. dominated. The U.S. has rarely been a status quo power, but has often tried to form the system in its own way. Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has strongly been a revisionist power, which means that for example in the 1990s they pressed for new norms on intervention,

embedding of what it saw as liberal norms in international institutions and the opening of markets (Hurrell 2004, 83). The international society after the Cold War was the first period when sovereign equality was the prime central norm for the whole world. At the start of the new century, all 192 UN Members had

formally agreed to a global covenant, where core values as non-intervention and independence were enshrined (Armstrong 2004, 44). In this same period, the U.S. was fully engaged in international affairs and a new world order was unfolding, one wherein the U.S. would hold a special dominant position.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 the globalization’s ‘ozone hole’ is been in everyone’s sight and mind. The new security paradigm, which is one of the most important aspects of today’s world order, means that disconnectedness defines danger. This is one of the reasons why the Americans went to war in the Persian Gulf, because, for example, Saddam Hussein’s outlaw regime was

dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world (Barnett 2003, 2).

Globalization is often treated with a binary outcome: it is great and sweeping the planet, or it is horrible and failing humanity everywhere, but neither view really fits. Globalization is a historical process, and is simply too complex and too big to make such judgements. Barnett makes a distinction between, what he calls the ‘Core’, where globalization is thick with network connectivity, collective security,

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liberal media and financial transactions, and where there are rising living standards, stable governments, and more deaths by suicide than by murder (Barnett 2003, 2). Other regions where globalization is thin or just absent are places plagued by widespread poverty, disease, politically repressive regimes and routine mass murder, and he refers to those regions as the ‘Gap’ (Barnett 2003, 2). The phenomenon of terrorism could rise under the concept of

globalization. Terrorism is not a term that stands on its own or is self-evident. It is presented as a horizontal security issue, which is interlinked with defence matters and foreign security (Den Boer en Goudappel 2011, 20). The reason to support the decision of the U.S. to go to war in Iraq, is that the resulting long-term military commitment will force the U.S. to deal with the entire ‘Gap’ as a strategic threat environment. This of course alongside the fact that Saddam Hussein’s regime supported terrorist networks and was willing to kill anyone to stay in power. Another analyst, Friedman argues that globalization is not a phase or a trend, but that it is an international system, which replaced the Cold War system. The difference is that division defined the Cold War system, while globalization is characterized by integration (Friedman 2000, 36).

Within the framework of globalization, European foreign and security policy could be established and develop over time. It embodies all the international activities of the European Union, not just those in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It cannot be denied that this multitude of activity is mostly incoherent, but the aim of the persons in charge is to avoid major inconsistency and to pull the threads together (Hill 2004, 145). There is a common aspiration to achieve a European foreign policy involving bilateral and multilateral relations with organizations and states in the international system (Hill 2004, 145). Although Member States also have their own national policy regarding foreign affairs, the European foreign policy exists alongside them and acts as a centripetal force.

If we want to interpret globalization, the cataclysmic attacks of 11 September 2001 introduced a new epoch in world politics, as Naím stated: ‘the era of

globalization is over’ (Naím 2003, 32). Governments sought to seal their borders, in response to the perceived threat of globalized terrorism. The events of 9/11

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and the financial crisis are for many a indicative of how globalized the world has become in the twentieth-first century.

The way in which the Bush administration responded to terrorism was highly controversial and costly too. However, the huge impact the 9/11 events had on the U.S. and its relations with the wider world could not be denied. In the short term, it led to U.S. intervening in Afghanistan and the Iraq War, and more generally the foreign policy of the U.S. became more militarized. Between 2001 and 2009 U.S. military spending doubled (Cox 2004, 75). If we apply the

theories of IR to this, realism seems to be more fitted to the American approach, using hard power and acting as a sovereign state. However, the U.S. was still promoting liberal ideas, like democracy and the rule of law, which are associated with the Western world. Overall, I think the concept of globalization fits better in the liberal view of the world.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks underscored the darker side of globalization. The experience of fighting a battle on global terrorism and using coercive hard power to dominate weaker states, like Iraq, brought to light that there are limits to achieving political goals with military power (Hurrell 2004, 83). It appeared that there was a mismatch between the rhetoric of human rights and democracy of the U.S. and their systematic willingness to defend its national security by

violating human rights. This undercut Western claims to moral superiority and for many the unilateralism of the U.S. was undercutting the acceptability and

legitimacy of U.S. leadership (Hurrell 2004, 83). However, I do not think, as Naim said earlier, that the era of globalization is over, rather 9/11 and the War on Terror highlighted the seriousness of globalization and how it enabled actors to act internationally.

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1.3 Thesis structure

In the following part the structure of this thesis will be set out and the main insights for each chapter will be touched upon. The first chapter ‘The history of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU’ will describe the

founding and shaping of the CFSP, from the early years of the European Union as an international organization to influential events as the Cold War 9/11 and the War on Terrorism. In order to do this, the timeline of the establishment of the important European treaties will be followed, starting with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which officially created the EU. After that, the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997, will be discussed in light of the deepening of the EU

Common Foreign and Security Policy. Then, lastly the 2007 Lisbon Treaty will illustrate the changes it made to the former EU treaties and its impact on the CFSP. This chapter provides a basis for understanding the CFSP and will demonstrate the impact of world politics and events on the CFSP.

The second chapter ‘The War on Terror and the positions of the EU and the U.S.’ will cover the reaction of the EU concerning the 9/11 attacks and its

aftermath. This devastating event caused a lot of changes in the international system and in the foreign and security policy of the EU. The position and response of the EU to the U.S. will be set out and after that the position of the U.S. as a global power will be analysed. Furthermore, 9/11 was the starting point of the War on Terror. Subsequently, the war in Iraq and the differences in

approaching it between the U.S. and the EU will be discussed. Further, the chapter will comment on some policy challenges the War on Terrorism brought for the CFSP of the EU. In the last part, some important main EU instruments in the fight against terrorism will be identified.

The third chapter ‘Main EU instruments in the battle against terrorism’ will firstly introduce some EU measures and instruments that have been introduced in the wake of the War on Terror. Further, the chapter will compare the European and American foreign and security policies and their motives. This will

demonstrate a few similarities and differences between the EU and U.S.

approach in dealing with the War on Terrorism. Thereby some oscillations on the European side will be explained. In the last part of that chapter the current state of being of the CFSP will be analysed and in which way it is heading. There will also be discussed which sentiments prevail in the European society.

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All the above will lead to the concluding remarks about the extent to which the War on Terrorism has influenced the foreign and security policy of the EU, and whether the U.S. was a leading factor for Europe in this. A careful

examination of the history and development of the CFSP, of the European reaction of 9/11 and the following war in Iraq, and the existing challenges it should be possible to draw conclusions. In this last part of the thesis it should be clear that the development of the European foreign and security policy and the War on Terror are intertwined by the concept of globalization. Moreover, the theories of international relations will have showed their strengths and

weaknesses in application to the War on Terror and the overall relationship of the EU and the U.S.

1.4 Research design

This thesis will provide an international analysis of the development of the foreign and security policy of the EU and the influence of the decisive event of the 9/11 attacks had on the transatlantic relationship in this field. A historical framework will be used to come to a coherent answer to the research question. In order to do this we will need to define the most suitable research method that will be used. Because the discussed issue is international, political, economic and security based, the research design and method will be through document and text analysis. Scholar and researcher Bowen, explained that document analysis is particularly applicable as a research method for qualitative studies, which are intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single event, phenomenon, program or organisation (Bowen 2009, 29). This applies perfectly to the study of the foreign and security policy as a program within the organisation of the EU, and 9/11 leading to the War on Terror as a single event.

Originally, document and text analysis is a social research method, and in the past it has mostly been used as a complementary method, but as Bowen states as of today it developed to a method on its own (Bowen 2009, 29). This illustrates that the methodology of document analysis is emerging, as sociologist Altheide refers to it, and that it is a process of description and interpretation.

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This fits well within the structure, method and goal of this thesis. Institutional and organisational documents have been an important part of qualitative

research, and as in this thesis, those are the most viable source for historical and organisational research. They will provide historical insight and deeper

background information. According to the document and text analysis methodology, articles, books, journals, newspapers, letters, minutes of

meetings, press releases, background papers and institutional or organisational reports can be used for analysis as part of the research. They can be found in newspaper archives, libraries, institutional files, and mostly in the current society they can be accessed online. As is clear, there is a plethora of documents that can be used for research, yet written text is by far the most popular used method (O’Leary 2004, 11). In this thesis the historical context is based on the use of books, articles, press releases and journals. Moreover, also institutional documents, such as EU treaties will form the basis for the international and political analysis in this research. For example the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) which was implemented by the Treaty of Maastricht and foresaw, among other things, in the rules on external, foreign and security policy. These data will give an insight in the functioning of the EU as an international organisation and the developments it went through. Bowen emphasizes that by carrying out the document and text analysis, the focus should be on the quality instead of the quantity of each document. Taken that into account, the documents used for this research thesis were comprehensively reviewed.

Considering the process of the text and document analysis, a detailed planning by the researcher is required. Therefore the following outline was prepared and carried out prior to writing the thesis: first, a list of texts and documents was created to explore and decide its value, relevancy and

accessibility. Secondly, the relevant documents were gathered, analysed and stored to develop a table of contents and to organise them. Lastly, a

comprehensive review was carried out to assess the credibility and authenticity of the gathered information. Important in this phase of the research is the demonstration of objectivity and the thoroughly evaluation of the documents. Therefore, the possible subjectivity and biases of the scholars are taken into consideration and the own objectivity has been safeguarded in the pursuit of delivering a credible and academic research.

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To make such a comprehensive review of the used literature, the

limitations and advantages of the text and document analysis method need to be mentioned. The methodology of text and document analysis is widely used in different fields of research and is a primary method. However, there are some disadvantages of the text and document analysis. Bowen refers to them as being concerns, which can easily be avoided (Bowen 2009, 31). These potential flaws will not apply if the researcher follows the outlined process above and has an organised and clear planning. A limitation that is always part of the process of writing a thesis is the time consuming element, where the gathering and analysing of the literature takes up most of the time. Moreover, another limitation might be that as a researcher, you never know if you are being complete, due to the fact that there is just too much information available, and you can never read and assess everything. Also, not all data the researcher selects is useful, therefore it is important to limit it to the specific research goal. However, these limitations are manageable, taking into account that the

researcher has foreknowledge and can thus resolve the limitations (O’Leary 2004, 183).

The advantages of using text and document analysis are that they track political and historical change and development and that they provide data that can no longer be witnessed or observed. The coverage it gives is very broad and moreover, they are accessible in the public domain, mostly in online databases (Bowen 2009, 31).

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2. The history of the European Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP)

Europe has been building itself up and investing in itself during the period of the Cold War and its aftermath. The end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, left a lot of ‘buffer states’ of the Soviet Union alone and conflicted, and Europe made use of this in integrating them in their ‘project’. Democracy, rule of law, security and neoliberalism are main features of the European Union and their society, but where does it leave them on the present global stage? We will analyse the history of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its shaping from the early years of the European Union as an international organization to the events of the Cold War and the War on Terrorism. In order to do this, the timeline of the European treaties will be followed, starting with the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, which officially created the European Union. After that the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty will be discussed. This chapter will aim to provide a basis for the understanding of the CFSP and will show how the EU developed the CFSP, in responding to some major turning points.

The aim of the foreign and security policy is to enable the 28 EU Member States to strengthen their position on the world stage, more than if they were to act alone. Moreover, bolstering international security and preserving peace, the policy seeks to promote the rule of law, democracy and human rights around the world. Research on the CFSP is said to be notoriously undertheorized, where the first wave of theorising literature tends to refer to documents about institutional development and to politically loaded motivational factors (Kurowska 2012, 1). The present field, which we can label as the second wave of theorising, is located is a somewhat uncomfortable position between international relations, security studies and European studies. Scholars are having their concerns about the routine activities of generating knowledge about the CFSP, and are longing for theoretical pluralism and more reflexivity (Kurowska 2012, 2). Another factor that goes hand in hand with this development is the speedy growth of the policy itself. For scholars and theorisation of the subject this brings along advantages and disadvantages. First, the advantage is that the relative closeness of the policy and academic community has given scholars of the CFSP a solid grounding

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in practice and partially avoids the risk of a ‘flight from reality’. However, a

disadvantage is that the underlying political order can be endorsed with a system of values which are inherent to it. Moreover, it implies a certain

underrepresentation of critical voices in the field of foreign and security policy, whereas most of the criticism is about the discrepancy between the rhetoric and the implementation, also referred to as the gap between expectation and reality.

2.1 The establishment of the European Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP)

The CFSP has always been the odd one out. It emerged in the beginning of the 1970s in an incremental and pragmatic fashion when it became clear that coordination of the different foreign policies of the Member States was helpful and needed for the EU to pursue its goals. These days, the objectives of the CFSP are an integral part of the EU and the Member States have increasingly accepted the new modes of institutionalisation (Wessel 2016, 394). The clear ambition of the Member States of the EU is to act cohesively in international relations. As article J.I (4) TEU states: “Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action, which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (TEU, Art. J.1.4.)1_{(Strömvik 2005, 107). Within the}

framework of the CFSP the European Union today responds to international

affairs by joint foreign policy statements, whereby the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acts as the spokesperson of EU’s foreign policy and the Presidency represents the EU in international organizations (Jakobsson 2009, 531). To investigate the foreign and security policy of the EU we have to start at its roots, and look how this phenomenon developed in international politics. We will start with a short outline of the history and the development of the CFSP over the years. We will then go on with the

1_{In the Amsterdam Treaty the numbering of the articles changed. The reference given in this}

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establishment of the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.

The EU was established as a mainly political cooperation project, where for a long time military and security policies were no main points of attention. In order to distinguish the roots of the foreign and security policy we must start at the end of the 1940s, when the Second World War came to an end. The sentiments felt in the European society at that time asked for a mutual treaty that would foresee in a common defence system and sustainable peace. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established between Europe and the United States as a military security coalition to promote political and military stability and peace in the West. It was set up to protect Western Europe against further Soviet expansion. Not much later, in the 1950s the concept ‘civilian power Europe’ came up, which entails that Europe should remain civilian, so without a defence dimension. This could be for ideological reasons or because a Union with military strength would undermine NATO (Smith 2005). Furthermore, an attempt to establish a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 by the then the six EU countries2_{turned out fruitless (Smith 2003, 559). Due to this, an}

alternative had to be created for the desire to integrate Germany in the Western defence architecture, and in 1954 the Western European Union (WEU) was established. However, these developments led to the intensification of NATO as the most important institution in the field of foreign and security policies of all its Member States (Smith 2003, 559). The dominant issue in the debate about European security remained the relationship between the EU Member States and the U.S. The central element in framing European foreign policy was that of ‘civilian power Europe’, which for some contradicted the demands of international life (Smith 2003, 559).

In the early 1960s, containment seemed to dominate the field in reaching greater foreign policy cooperation within the European Economic Community (EEC), but in fact this was an important time because the foundations for further foreign cooperation in more than only the economic sphere were laid out. In this time of history the developments concerning European foreign policy were

mostly a reaction to and a dependence of exogenous forces (Smith 2003, 660).

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In the fall of 1970, six foreign ministers from the ECC discussed the topic of foreign affairs within the framework of European cooperation for the first time (Strömvik 2005, 1). Although it was a very informal and limited meeting without a treaty base or any form of tools, it illustrated the fact that the Member States wanted some form of cooperation in this field and it laid the foundations for the development of European foreign policy. This idea of European Political

Cooperation (EPC)3_{and what a common foreign policy should look like raised}

questions about diplomacy, sovereignty, prestige and international status (Strömvik 2005, 1). In fact the idea was so sensitive that the framework was more notable for what could not be done than for what could be done. The question that came up as a result of that is, why would European states increasingly choose to forgo individual status and prestige in the international scene and want to act collectively towards the rest of the world? This is a very intriguing question, considering that this kind of cooperation is a rare occurrence in international politics, and that it is not imposed on the others by one

specifically powerful state (Strömvik 2005, 3). This question is partly answered by the explanation of the concept of cooperation. It is a logical thought that when a group of states have made a pact to cooperate on international security level, that during periods when security seems to be threatened by events or actors in the outside environment, they should intensify their efforts (Strömvik 2005, 119). Their will to cooperate should change, if there is a change in a

perceived threat. This is based on the assumption that cooperation in foreign and security affairs is established as a result of a common identified threat. So in this period of time we see a group of democratic, sovereign and sometimes even reluctant states, which more and more act as a collective Union.

The 1970s are marked as a period with an atmosphere of suspicions and

recriminations between the EU Member States and the U.S., because there were several transatlantic disagreements about how to handle international security matters (Strömvik 2005, 153). Although, the EPC framework was just recently established, there were no major changes made, and surprisingly it did produce quite an amount of unity even though the treaty eventually never entered into force. In the years that followed, the relationship between the EU and the U.S. improved slowly. For example, regular and formal consultations between the

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President of the United States and the head of government of the European Commission Presidency were introduced twice a year in 1976 (Strömvik 2005, 154). In the late 1970s, developments were mostly a reaction to external forces again, when there was a heightening of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the Reagan administration declared a ‘second cold war’, which drove the Europeans back into their ‘containment’ (Smith 2003, 660). Already in 1978, Hill argued that the growing accordance for the need of some European foreign policy confirmed the desire to play an important role in international affairs, not only as individual states but also as a collectivity (Hill 2004, 145).

In the beginning of the 1980s the transatlantic relationship was strained a bit again, because of the plans the Americans had for a Strategic Defence

Initiative (SDI). This was an endeavour of then U.S. President Ronald Reagan to create a space missile field in which ballistic missiles of the Soviets could be destroyed outside the atmosphere (Strömvik 2005, 161). It thus seemed an unfavourable time for European foreign policy to flourish, but the European countries were reframing the institutional consequences and debate, and by doing that new forms of European cooperation were evolving. European political cooperation was consolidated in 1986 in the Single European Act, and diplomatic coordination was gradually growing after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when all ruling ideas about European security were brought into question (Smith 2003, 661). Further, there were no serious or openly security related problems in the rest of the 1980s, although there was some distrust of U.S. foreign policy in the rest of the world.

Moreover, there were doubts on the European side about the American commitment to EU security, which increased at the beginning of the 1990s

(Strömvik 2005, 167). Scholar Robert Kagan, said that during this period in time both sides of the Atlantic obviously relied on their pooled military power to deter any possible attack from the Soviets, no matter how remote the chances of such an attack might seem (Kagan 2003, 29). The second half of that period coincided with one of the most drastic changes in the international world order since the Second World War, namely the end of the Cold War. With this major event happening, the tensions about another conflict in Bosnia began to rise and the EU and the U.S. opinions about foreign and security strategies started to deviate. Between 1993 and 1995 a series of disagreements about policies regarding

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the summer of 1996, there were some serious differences between the EU and the U.S. again, this time about how to cope with states that sponsored terrorism and U.S. extraterritorial legislation. How to deal with states that caused

international concern, especially in the light of international terrorism further increased the disunity between the U.S. and the EU. Those transatlantic tensions did not appease until 1998, when a deal was reached, which included a promise from the U.S. not to enforce law regarding European companies (Strömvik 2005, 175).

During all the periods of transatlantic tensions described above we may conclude one recurrent trend; the foreign policy cooperation between the EU Member States intensified, especially in times when the EU and the U.S. disagreed about the desirable approach to the foreign and security issues in the world. Some scholars have pointed out that the EU Member States have stepped up their cooperation on foreign policy with each other at times when the U.S. was rapidly changing its strategies on international issues or when the country showed little interest in employing its great influence over issues that mattered for the EU (Strömvik 2005, 145). During the post-war period, the relationship between the EU and the United States has been a paradoxical one. On the one hand, the relationship is based on a wide set of shared values and goals, which made the overall relationship interdependent and complex (Strömvik 2005, 144). On the other hand, in the mutual relationship there has always been a sense of

competition, crisis and disagreement, both about policies towards others in the world and over the nature of the mutual relationship itself. The line of internal European security cooperation is since the establishment of policy in this field always been up, once new levels of cooperation had been established they stayed. This can be demonstrated if we continue to look more closely into the evolution and the development of the EPC, which later became the CFSP.

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2.2 The Treaty of Maastricht

The years after the end of the Cold War marked a decisive period for the EU. The Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 was a milestone, firstly because it was the official establishment of the political European Union and secondly because the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was brought to life. However, the post-Cold War crises of the 1990s also marked the shortcomings of the EU; it was not only still dependent on the U.S. and its allies in NATO, the EU was also ‘handicapped’ by the intergovernmentalism4_{of the CFSP (Smith 2003, 661).}

The successor of the European Political Cooperation would, with the Maastricht treaty, thus be the CFSP. Within that policy the EU foreign ministers meet mostly in Brussels once a month and discuss all areas of common foreign policy, including the framing of a common defence policy (Strömvik 2005, 2). The substance, principles and procedures of the cooperation were all expanded or altered through the Treaty of Maastricht, and the TEU stated that the CFSP was brought to life to reinforce “the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world” (TEU Article 2). The objectives of the CFSP were further specified and safeguarded fundamental interests, common values, the independence of the Union and the strengthening of international security and the preservation of peace. The dimension changed and the collective foreign policy was then said to cover “all areas of foreign and security policy”, and according to the TEU this also included the eventual framing of a common defence policy (Strömvik 2005, 7). From the end of the 1990s onwards the development of the CFSP started to take real shape and became a field of European action. An example was the Helsinki European Council meeting of 1999 when there was a new determination among the Member States to move forward (Smith 2003, 662). There it was decided that EU military capabilities could be deployed collectively up to 60.000 troops (European Parliament 1999). Moreover, another main component of the CFSP is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of 1999, whose development was stimulated by a growing set of defence and security institutions.

Surrounding the CSDP there were emerging some problems, for example that

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the process remained essentially intergovernmental, that the instruments used for European collective actions were not guaranteed and that there was no well-defined European interest (Smith 2003, 565). The CFSP as a purely

intergovernmental form of international cooperation is not fully supported in EU Treaty provisions, but the non-exclusive competences of the CFSP are

paramount. The obligations of the Member States, the competences of the institutions and the decision-making procedures prove that the Member States were willing to cooperate in a common policy that would not replace the national obligations, but that would only emerge when and where possible. First, we will have a look at the obligations the Member States have under the CFSP. The grounds and obligations for the systematic cooperation are grounded it article 25 and 32 TEU, which contain that Member States are obliged to consult and inform each other on any matter of foreign and security policy. However, the Treaty does not further define this obligation, which is rather unfortunate. The flipside of this, is that in particular the bigger Member States tend to ignore the information and consultation obligations when sensitive policy issues are at stake. In these cases they take diplomatic initiatives and individual positions or are pointing at cooperation in another international organisation.

The CFSP also foresees some instruments, which are defined in article 25 TEU, which prescribes that “The Union shall conduct the common and foreign and security policy by: (a) defining the general guidelines, (b) adopting decisions defining: (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union, (ii) positions to be taken by the Union, (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii), and by (c) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy” (TEU Article 25).

Over the years the Member States showed their willingness to cooperate, but remained reluctant in actually transferring competences to the EU in the field of security. This makes it difficult to distinguish the type of competence the EU has under the CFSP, as it is not mentioned in Article 3-6 in the TFEU. Probably, it would come closest to the shared competences, because both the EU and the Member States have a role to play (Wessel, 394). Practice reveals that within the scope of the CFSP decisions, Member States still have the possibility to lay

emphasis on certain national preferences (Wessel, 412). Considering the fact that the Member States are holding back their competences, shows that they still

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consider their sovereign power and statism as important values. This shows that within an liberal project, realist concepts also peak to the surface.

By the end of the 1990s there was an institutional framework surrounding the CFSP with a definition of procedures and budgetary allocations (Smith, 564). Of course there were still doubts about costs and how such force should be deployed in a framework, but the slow evolution of CFSP was more important, because the outcomes, being the generation of trust and shared ideas, were essential. However, the CFSP remained an intergovernmental treaty based on cooperation and therefore binding in the same sense as any other international law. Regarding the societal ideas about the CFSP, there were some suggestions that the CFSP was primarily established to and continued to balance the

American influence in international affairs, but these ideas are rarely found in academic literature (Strömvik 2005, 144).

Another change the Treaty of Maastricht made, was that also the Comité des représentantes permanents (COREPER) was from then on formally able to participate in the preparation of European foreign and security policy issues before the Council meetings (Strömvik 2005, 110). COREPER exists of

permanent representatives who monitor the interests of their Member State in Brussels, they prepare meetings of the different formations of the Council of the Ministers and establish the agenda’s (De Groot 2011). A last EU body that was established by the Maastricht Treaty was the European Police Office (Europol). Europol is a multinational investigation organization and an alliance between the EU police forces who organize the exchange of information between the 28 Member States. However, for the actual establishment of the organization a separate treaty between the Member States was signed and made Europol fully operational in 1999.

All together it could be demonstrated that the Maastricht Treaty expanded the scope and motivations for cooperation and widened the principles guiding the CFSP. With the empirical and theoretical propositions we can assume that the possibility exists that for the development of the CFSP, changes in big threats that have faced the Member States over time are of great influence. The CFSP was originally established as an integrating and cooperative project, but it

The War on Terrorism: The European Union and the United States in a foreign and security policy divide?