The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) - From Theory to Practice

(1)

- From Theory to Practice

University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Humanities

MA Thesis in European Studies

Main supervisor: Dr. Jamal Shahin Second supervisor: Dr. Sudha Rajagopalan

Presented by: Miranda Manyo Student number: 10181253 Date of completion: 01.07.2018

(2)

1. Introduction

The 2004 launched European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) depicts a never before seen step taken by the European Union (EU) towards influencing political and socioeconomic developments in the countries south to the Mediterranean, the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. The main focus laying on ensuring a certain degree of stability, prosperity but especially security on the borders of the Union (Delcour 2013). As stated in the ENP Strategy Paper “the European Neighbourhood Policy’s vision involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship” (European Commission 2004c, 5).

The steadily growing cooperation bond between the Union and especially its neighbours to the East mainly draws on the partner countries’ willingness to converge the political and economic norms of the European Union (Delcour 2013). Additionally, agreements like the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) or the Association Agreements (AAs) are to create “a strong political bond and promote further convergence by establishing a closer link to EU legislation and standards” (European Commission 2008a). Thus, through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the different regulations and agreements that come along with it, the EU essays to initiate wide-spreading reforms in its Eastern neighbourhood. Nevertheless, there are also scholarly voices that point out ostensible discrepancies of the policy (Kelley 2006). As the ENP is for example built around policy and norm diffusion, does it yet not include the seemingly most effective incentive for the willingness to domestically converge EU norms: membership (Delcour 2013).

As the conundrum of lack of membership raises the question of electiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy, this thesis seeks to find an answer on how the EU induces policy convergence in its Eastern vicinity nevertheless. Furthermore, it is also of importance to postulate to what extent the policy instruments chosen by the Union are in the end successful in achieving policy change in the target region. In order to systematically analyse the described matter, this thesis will scrutinise the ENP under the research question: “can the European Neighbourhood Policy effectively induce EU policy convergence without the promise of membership?”.

To start this analysis, in the following chapter first an overview of the historical and political background of the emergence of the ENP is given, its connection to EU enlargement

(4)

but also the methods and incentives available to the EU to ensure conditionality will be described. In the third chapter of this thesis, the theoretical framework of EU external governance will follow in order to provide ‘guidelines’ how to measure the effectiveness of the ENP. It will also show in more detail what kind of different roles the EU is epitomising in its external approach and which mechanisms are exactly at play when the EU is promoting its norms and values in the neighbourhood. In the fourth chapter, the theoretical framework will come to practical use by using the findings to postulate the effect the ENP is having in the participating countries. The chosen countries for this investigation are the Eastern partners Moldova and Ukraine, both Western Newly Independent States and both in their own way very apt cases to examine the impact the ENP is having in the domestic settings. Subsequently, a conclusion will provide an overall summary of the thesis and also an answer to its research question.

In terms of methodology the research conducted for this thesis is carried out by coding primary literature in form of various EU official documents regarding enlargement, foreign policy in general, the ENP in particular, documents stating EU values and standards but also secondary literature in order to assert the apt theoretical framework to describe the European Neighbourhood Policy.

2. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

2.1. Enlargement

Enlargement can be regarded as the corner stone of the European Union and its integration process. Integration without enlargement would be unthinkable and just simply unfeasible. The in the 1950s founded European Coal and Steel Community, which was then only consisting of six member states, eventually developed into the European Union as we know it now and is still counting 28 members today. Already in 1973, the founding members Italy, Germany, France and the three Benelux countries decided to herald the first round of enlargement by taking in Ireland Denmark and the UK and form the European Economic Community (EEC). Almost a decade later Greece followed in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986 and together formed the Mediterranean enlargement period. Austria, Finland and Sweden followed in 1995 as the fourth enlargement round (Schwarz 2016). However, 2004 marks the most controversial enlargement round to date and is described as the “big bang” by Börzel et al. (2017). From 2004 to 2007, ten new member states were welcomed into the European Union with a predominant

(5)

background from Central and Eastern Europe and bringing along a great increase of the Union’s population. After this massive Eastern enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania acceded in 2007 and finally the seventh and last enlargement period until now is marked by Croatia’s accession in 2013. Croatia was now already the second country after Slovenia, acceded during the big Eastern enlargement, that entered the EU with a past of heavy involvement in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s (Schwarz 2016).

Ever since the end of Yugoslavia a chain of unfortunate and violent events in the region caused several attempts of conflict resolution and state building by the EU to fail. However, the Kosovo crisis in 1999 initiated a much more coherent policy towards the Balkan states like the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe or the Stabilisation and Association Process. These developments made a future accession much more probable and therefore played a big role in the keeping of stability and peace (Renner and Trauner 2009). As a consequence, except of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, all countries of the Western Balkan have filed for EU membership since then (Schwarz 2016).

Keeping these historical developments in mind one could indeed agree with EU enlargement being called a “success story” (European Council 2007) and it is true that it is essential in the process of Europeanisation of especially the Eastern European nations (Schwarz 2016). However, especially the fifth round, the Eastern enlargement, is still a big challenge for the Union. Just the sheer number of newly acceded countries and the massive turnaround the war riddled ones amongst these countries needed to undergo in order to receive EU membership and fit the conditions and norm of the Union, called for a vast number of mobilised politicians, policy makers and of course citizens to see that through. But the mere wish to finally leave the Cold War division of Europe behind is not enough according to Börzel and her fellow colleagues. Before the Eastern enlargement period was even finalised however, criticism about the possible changes and unforeseeable impact the enlargement would have on the existing members and whether the new member states were ready and fit to be part of the Union, came to light. Various scholars and also policy makers were of the opinion that the EU had already passed the limit of new members it could successfully integrate (Börzel et al. 2017) and it found a proof in the fact that a certain sense of ‘enlargement fatigue’ sighed through the Union after the most recent and biggest enlargement period. The ENP therefore was also drawn-up as sort of alternative to additional enlargement and to try to address but much more appease this notion of fatigue (Smith 2005).

(6)

2.2. The Emergence of the ENP

The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy1_{got officially launched in 2004, right in the midst} of the fifth enlargement period of the Union. With the creation of this policy the EU once again had the opportunity to live up to their reputation of a “force for good” (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008, 81). Nevertheless, at this juncture it should be mentioned that the deepening of collaborations with adjoining nations was already a part of the EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy in which it is already clearly stated that the EU’s goal lies in the creation of “a world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone” (European Council 2003).

The main aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy is to (re-)unify the European continent in integrating its adjacent partners to the East as well as to the South in the system of EU values. In pursuance of this goal the ENP contains so-called Action Plans. These Action Plans in turn rest upon the principle of ‘joint ownership’ and merge different policy fields in collaboration with the respective partner countries. The term joint ownership in the case of the ENP describes multilaterally and mutually carved out interests in finding solutions to commonly prioritised problems rather than norms and values determined by the Union alone (Eisele and Wiesbrock 2011). The mentioned Action Plans, serve to identify primary policy fields that are in need of both special action and special attention. Such fields are inter alia “political dialogue, trade, energy, transport, and justice and home affairs” (Eisele and Wiesbrock 2011, 128).

Other than the above-mentioned carved out policy fields the mobility of persons is another very import part of the ENP. The mobility of persons is included in the migration related regulations inside the framework of the respective foreign relationship. These norms and regulations contain provisions within the terrain of border control, visa regulations, asylum, readmission and especially legal and illegal migration. But at the same time the ENP’s Action Plans are in contrast to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement for example, not legally binding and hence according to Eisele and Wiesbrock, can be regarded as rather just a tool for political dialogue (Eisele and Wiesbrock 2011). Due to the fact that especially in regards to the rearrangement of EU borders after multiple enlargement rounds, the wish for keeping the neighbourhood surrounding the Union safe and stable was a very pressing issue since the fear of imbalance instability spilling over beyond the borders and inside the Union, certainly existed (Smith 2005). On that note Christopher Hill (2002, 97) argued that “the most important of all

1_{The ENP covers the following sixteen countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan,}

Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. However, Egypt and Palestine have not signed an enabling formal Protocol (FPP) yet and Belarus, Libya and Syria currently cannot participate (European External Action Service 2016).

(7)

the foreign policy implications of enlargement” is the extension of the EU external borders. The commission being apparently very aware of a possible notion of a (perceived) scenario of insiders and outsiders that could be created in the process, addressed this issue in order to forestall any potential consequences of this. It hence stated that:

Existing differences in living standards across the Union's borders with its neighbours may be accentuated as a result of faster growth in the new Member States than in their external neighbours; common challenges in fields such as the environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organised crime will have to be addressed; efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect our shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage (European Commission 2003b).

Even though certain scholars argue that the ENP exhibits an Eastern bias in the sense that the Eastern European countries are favourited for future accession negotiations (Korosteleva 2011; Gänzle 2009a; Börzel and van Hüllen 2014), the Eastern neighbourhood is certainly not the only region of target of the ENP. It collaborates also with the countries of the southern Mediterranean. And although the frontiers to the southern countries have been the same for a long time now they nevertheless have been a cause for concern for the EU just as long. The inclusion of the nations of the southern Mediterranean was conducted for the sake of keeping an equilibrium of the EU’s southern and eastern scopes. However, these two dimensions in the end do not balance each other out as well as may intentioned. Just as her fellow scholars, Karen E. Smith is namely also of the opinion that the partner countries to the East are regarded as possible future EU members much more than those to the South because the Mediterranean is not at all able to share the hope of future accession (Smith 2005).

After getting to know the basics of the European Neighbourhood Policy there is no way around the question, since especially the public opinion throughout the European nations is currently very much against migration from the southern and eastern hemispheres, of how issues and negotiations of migration law are to be handled under the circumstances. They most probably are bound to end in a tightening of security and border control matters, which in turn may have a lasting effect. So the deeper lying question of how a non-binding agreement with a central concern of migration control, can succeed under the scope of joint ownership and mutual interests persists (Eisele and Wiesbrock 2011). As will be discussed in more depth in the subsequent chapter, the theory of boundary-crossing from Bellamy and fellows shows that the free movement of people is very much tied to laws that need a legal framework, a framework that the ENP as a ‘simple’ agreement cannot provide.

(8)

Within the EU enlargement process, it has since its beginnings been always made clear that EU membership is perpetually tied to the compliance to a set of political and also economic criteria, which the EU has determined as being fundamental to its whole concept. This criteria are called the Copenhagen Criteria2_{, which were defined by The Copenhagen European Council in 1993} and are therefore also known under the term of accession criteria (Gänzle 2009a). Moreover, intensive research conducted by scholars Schimmelfennig and Scholtz has proven that conditionality towards EU norms and regulations works best when it is linked to a “consistent normative approach”, “it involves low domestic power costs in the target country” and most importantly if there is a “credible membership perspective” (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008, 1716). However, membership is nowhere mentioned in the make-up of the ENP. Therefore, another question regarding the ENP’s legal framework arises: is the EU still able to rely on “enlargement-tested” conditionality and if so, how? And correspondingly can it demand compliance from its neighbouring countries without providing them with the “golden carrot of membership” (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008, 1716)? The final question could hence be if the Union is capable with help of the ENP to induct a well working future in spite of the lack of membership, or is its goal to rather embody the role of a holding hand in order to lead the neighbouring nations down the road of future accession? (Gänzle 2009).

2.3. Conditionality and Socialisation under the ENP

In order to fulfil their role of a democracy promoting and value spreading force, the European Union in turn relies on their partner’s compliance in various policy fields and hence also in the ENP. As they have relied on it within their enlargement provisions now the big difference of enlargement in comparison to the ENP has already been made clear: there is no guaranteed membership included in the content of the European Neighbourhood policy. So as to understand how the EU exactly wants to achieve that, the following chapter will discuss the EU’s two strongest tools for compliance: Conditionality and Socialisation and will make visible how both parties can benefit from them, so compliance can actually be accomplished without the help of the ‘golden carrot’.

2_{The Copenhagen Criteria are:}

1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

2. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; 3. ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards

and policies that make up the body of EU law (the 'acquis'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Copenhagen European Council 1993).

(9)

2.3.1. The Conditionality Component

In their communication paper from March 2003 regarding the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative, hence before the latest enlargement period, the European Commission at this moment in time already made clear that just as in enlargement also within the ENP a certain notion of quid pro quo would predominate (Kelley 2006), stating that:

In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms […] the countries […] should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (European Commission 2003a).

While in the strategy paper of the ENP it is furthermore mentioned that “the ambition and the pace of development of the EU’s relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities” (European Commission 2004).

This notion does indeed hold a lot of resemblance with the conditionality worded in the earlier enlargement documents even though the EU has of course used conditionality in its other democracy policies before, too. However, the possible chances for succeeded conditionality were mainly linked to how people in power believed that compliance would influence them and their position (Kelley 2006). This means that even at a moment where the EU possessed of concrete leverage against a candidate country it still could not entirely depend only on political conditionality. Additionally, the various accession criteria and the already existing discrepancies amongst Member States on how to handle possible accession candidates discredited the instrument of conditionality even further (Kelley 2004). But since the institutions were very much aware of the experienced difficulties and did not want to repeat past mistakes but were nevertheless still eager to replicate the successful parts of the conditionality notion, the European Commission and the European Council went through multiple debates on how to possibly achieve this. According to Kelley (2006), these debates demonstrate very well how big and powerful institutions like the Council and the Commission themselves undergo learning processes as means to constructively overcome past mistakes.

But how does the EU want to ensure that her enlargement-tested conditionality is rectified but also still effective? It does so with the help of incentives or ‘silver carrots’ to stick to the pattern. These incentives actually make the essence of all conditionality (Kelley 2006). Without the biggest ‘golden carrot’ of membership however, Lavenex (2004a) argues that the ENP

(10)

countries may not be willing to integrate any domestic reforms. For this reason, the Union came up with eleven concrete incentives, from which the most relevant seven ones are the following: 1. Prospect of “moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration” (Kelley 2006, 37) with a stake in the Union’s internal market and an increasing chance at participation in EU policies and programmes

2. Increasement of the scope and intensity of political collaborations

3. New economic opportunity through the opening of economies and the decrease of trade barriers

4. Additional financial support

5. Guaranteed participation in EU programmes concerning cultural, educational, scientific, technical and environmental matters

6. Provided aid for legislative adaption of EU norms and standards 7. A deepening of general economic and trade relations (Kelley 2006).

In similarity to the preceding individual enlargement negotiations, the European Neighbourhood Policy also includes a possibility for extended contractual partnerships between the EU and its neighbours. And if these terms turn out to be alike those of the EEA agreement already in force, current ENP nations could benefit from this very greatly (Kelley 2006). Scholars Fantini and Dodini add that a deeper economic cooperation could have several additional advantages like possible ameliorated trade preferences or an expansion of a more energy and transport related interconnected infrastructure (2005).

Conclusively, one could hence argue that although membership is not a fixed component of the ENP and likewise only ‘Western Newly Independent States’ (WNIS)3_{seem to have a} realistic chance of becoming Member States in the near future, just as enlargement, the ENP is still equipped with several economic and political ‘carrots’, which should not be underappreciated (Kelley 2006). The president of the European Commission at the time Romano Prodi even argued that “the goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect?” (Prodi 2002). Thus, with this hope in the back of their minds, the EU did adapt conditionality to the ENP however, how firm the Union is supposed to observe the compliance without any legally binding reference still presents itself as a predicament (Kelley 2006).

(11)

2.3.2. The Socialisation Component

Next to conditionality, the Socialisation component is the second soft diplomacy instrument that the EU is equipped with in order to ensure compliance to the norms and regulations included in the ENP. In this case, socialisation takes place when actors try to induce behavioural changes in other targeted state actors by plying pressure on their reputation. This pressure can take the form of e.g. persuasion, public shaming or redistribution of power amongst the targeted actors (Johnston 2001). On the same token, various studies of democratic transitions have shown that the external actors can also turn to supporting domestic oppositions, help them strengthening their public voice and therefore the external actor’s bargaining power (Vachudova 2005; Burnell 2000). According to Manners (2002), it is very important to here state that the EU regards itself as a normative/soft power, which obtains its status of a global actor through norm promotion by engaging in domestic affairs.

During their several enlargement periods, the Union was already able to successfully use socialisation in combination with conditionality. Making their way to candidate countries at the time, EU officials achieved to negotiate the terms of future collaboration but also initiate and support domestic discussion on the core EU values. They were also successful in deepening relationships with NGOs and civil society organisations of various forms as means to have an even more profound effect on changing norms in the candidate countries. Benefiting from this successfully tested methods, the knowledge was used to structure the ENP in a similar way. As the ENP takes the role of an overarching policy under which several different projects and provisions are combined, the EU is continuously trying to socialise political elites and civil society alike through consistent cooperation with both of these parties (Kelley 2006).

The socialisation process under the ENP moreover resembles the one of enlargement in the way that the policy refers to the participating countries as ‘partners’, which shows the effort that is made to initiate and emphasize transnational dialogue instead of just imposing unilateral obligations (Kelley 2006). Moreover, the Commission looks to replicate the ‘social influence’ gained through submitted annual progress reports during the enlargement period, inside the structure of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The European Commission is also very hopeful that the publication of the annual progress reports and an additional implementation of further benefits will lead to a certain competitiveness amongst the ENP nations and motivate them to stay on the ‘right track’ (Johnston 2001; Kelley 2006).

After having gathered the background knowledge on how EU enlargement initiated the creation of the ENP, what it actually entails and which measures and structures the Union is equipped

(12)

with in order to ensure compliance to its demands but also to its standards, the subsequent chapter of this thesis will deliver a theoretical framework to understand how the European Union practices external governance. Furthermore, it will show how the EU in terms of different goals also makes use of different strategies in view of combining the multi-layered demands combined in the ENP.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Theoretical origins of External Governance

After the latest enlargement rounds of the European Union (2004, 2007 and 2013), the borders of the Union have changed dramatically. To the East, it now found neighbours still rattled by their Soviet past, and to the South, those who they share a long colonial past with. Both hemispheres bringing economically weaker and structurally very different countries in the mix. But of course, these nations also embody very important suppliers of various resources, emerging economies and a prospering much needed neighbouring market, crucial to the Union’s economy. All these criteria inter alia made the emergence of the European Neighbourhood Policy happen and in order to stop dividing lines from springing, the launch of the policy in 2004 came as a response to the big Eastern Enlargement (Petrakos, Tsiapa, and Kallioras 2016). Under those circumstances, in order to explain what these massive structural changes mean for the expanding Union and how the ENP could be examined most effectively, the following chapter will give a theoretical insight on this matter.

Sandra Lavenex, Professor of International Politics at the University of Lucerne, is of the opinion that the works of the European Neighbourhood Policy, thus its different influences and instruments, can be best scrutinised by looking at them through the lens of the governance perspective. The policy should be regarded more as an overarching structure, which seeks to facilitate regional integration in an individually conceptualised manner than a classic framework of conditionality or foreign policy that entails a strict form of rules, regulations or strategies. Divergent fields of policies require integration to move in a different fashion at a different pace. Through the application of the governance perspective it can be shown that a rather horizontal and flexible form of integration takes place in the ENP countries (Lavenex 2008), distancing itself from the past concentration on ENP’s macro-policies to focus more on

(13)

its individual meso-policies. Macro-policies in this case entail the end goal and needed instruments to achieve the goal, hence the overarching policy. Meso-policies in turn, describe the individual policies that lie in-between on the way to the final micro-policies, which involve the smaller more individually designed policies that in the end help to achieve the aspired objective (Sedelmeier 2007). All together these little pieces make the bigger puzzle.

Traditional angles on analysing the EU’s influence, always described it as ‘just’ a foreign policy actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; White 1999; Smith 2004). The governance approach however aims to take the position of a more intuitionalist observer and explains the current extension of the Union through enlargement and the interplay of its internal and external policy dimensions (Lavenex 2008). Furthermore the relations that the Union has with its neighbours and hence also its influence on them is described by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002, 502) as a “process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalisation”. Lavenex regards them as an expansion of EU borders and regulations apart from actual membership (2004b).

The initial understanding of governance therefore is especially fitting to examine the process around this expansion of borders and regulations (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). Scharpf (2000) further describes the term governance related to Schimmelfennig’s and Sedelmeier’s definition as a composition of institutionalised actions with the goal to produce not legally bot communally binding agreements. Even if the word governance, just like government, linguistically originates from the same word that is used for steering a boat (Peters 2011), there are two other origins that the governance notion is inspired by: International Relations (IR) and comparative politics.

The field of IR saw the emergence of governance introduced by a newly organised international political order, which arose without any workings of another global rule. However, the various actors involved in the governance process, such as intergovernmental, non-governmental, public or private actors, create policies that entail forms of socialisation and also legislation, which cannot simply be explained through the concept of anarchy that IR essentially relies on. Therefore, regarding external governance matters like e.g. the ENP, the governance approach allows an analysis through a very increased level of institutionalisation and a specifically created set of rules to be applied beyond EU borders and organisations (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). In his 1992 published article Governance, order and change in world politics James N. Rosenau describes anarchy however being not necessarily connoted good nor badly but is simply describing the absence of an all-encompassing international authority. Yet for the study of governance workings in the world, it is indeed very important to

(14)

keep in mind that governance primarily works without a centralised international institution (Rosenau 1992).

The beginnings of the governance notion in comparative politics on the other hand, originate from its opposing position to the government term. It is therefore depicted as a transition from a firstly interventionist state to a then cooperative one. Hence this very transition reveals itself through the diverging exertion modes of governance. It is for example organised in a horizontal manner rather than in a hierarchical one, the main goal is a sufficient and smooth process rather than pure results, voluntary mechanisms are favoured over legally binding conditions and the openly accessible nature allows for the inclusion of different sectors no matter if public or private (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). Indeed is according to Mayntz (2005) the fundamental trait of the governance approach that object and subject of political operations seem to become one.

Scholar R. A. W. Rhodes, further defines governance as a shift in the interpretation of government “referring to new processes of governing; or changed conditions of ordered rule; or new methods by which society is governed” (Rhodes 2012, 33). By talking about governance Rhodes refers to the transforming lines between the private, voluntary and public sector on the one hand and the transformation of the role the state on the other (Rhodes 2012). Moreover, Rhodes describes governance in four additional ways. Firstly, as an interdependence between different organisations and being a much wider concept by also including non-state actors into their cooperation. That lead to the eroding of the mentioned private, voluntary and public boundaries of the state. Secondly, the constant need to exchange obtained resources and to hold negotiations on common goals result in ongoing communication amid members of the network. As a third additional definition, Rhodes argues that governance is resembles “game-like interactions”, which are very much dependent on shared trust between the network participants and on agreed-upon rules of the game. Lastly, the fourth definition entails that governance networks are not able to be held responsible by the state, hence they are to a certain degree autonomous and self-organising. However, even though it is true that the state does not hold a sovereign function when it comes to these networks, it is able to indirectly navigate them (Rhodes 2007).

With the previous delineated shift away from a notion of anarchy in IR and a hierarchical government structure in comparative politics, the fundament for a detailed analysis of the institutionalisation component, inside but also beyond the borders of the European Union, is hence laid out in more detail. Still there are two additional dimensions regarding the invocation of the governance perspective, an internal and an external one. Has it internally been used to

(15)

serve as an alternative to the manifested theories of integration, externally it was and is still used to define the Union’s external relations and hence its policies towards third countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: Weber et al. 2007). As a result, these external modes of governance evolved from being of a solely hierarchical nature to an improved form of governance structures, which permit a much more horizontal and participative rule implication. In the beginning this wasn’t the case. Before and in the enlargement process hierarchical governance forms obliged non-EU members to follow unilaterally defined and legally binding sets of rules. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig describe this evolution as “rule expansion” (2009, 796). This rule expansion in turn shows two forms of development of EU boundaries, namely regulatory and organisational developments. Regulatory EU boundaries depict the expansion of the EU’s regulatory sphere of regulations and/or policies that are directed to third countries. Organisational boundaries on the other hand elucidate the deliberate incorporation of third countries in EU policy-making (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

This organisational boundary leads to the opportunity of including governance forms outside of the central big law-giving institutions like e.g. the Commission. The European Agency for the Security of the External Border (Frontex) is a very fitting example for how the introduction of new governance forms paved the way for the expansion of the organisational boundary (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). As a more general definition one could hence say that “external governance takes place when parts of the aquis communautaire are extended to non-member states” (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009).

3.2. Effectiveness of EU External governance

Another very important aspect to consider is the effectiveness within the EU’s external governance. Especially in regards to the European Neighbourhood Policy, the question to what extent third countries outside of the guarantee of full membership really adopt to and implement EU norms, has yet to be investigated more intensively. Even though of course, reliance on the EU aquis is standard procedure within association and accession agreements and the creation of multiple institutionalised forms of promotion of these associations. Hence, effectiveness means to which degree EU regulations and norms are factually implemented in third countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). Additionally, EU regulations are mostly part of other encompassing more international rule (Jachtenfuchs 2001). Therefore, the promotion of these international rules, referred to as ‘joint rules’, are equally important to the analysis of EU external governance. In the following analysis these joint rules are compared to outcomes that

(16)

entail compliance of third countries to their domestic regulations and the influence of internationally powerful states (e.g. the US and Russia) but also of internationally valid rules and organisations occupied with them. An additional method of measuring effectiveness is by the different levels of rule selection within international agreements, rule adoption into local legislation and finally rule application in the concerning local policies and administrative settings (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

Rule selection is especially of relevance for international negotiations between the EU and non-Member States. Through rule selection the possibility of measuring if and to what degree given EU regulations represent the official standard of EU-non-member relations is given. Hence, it is examined if third countries accord to EU rules being the essence of their agreements and negotiations or if they respond better to joint rules, which only represent EU rules that are part of internationally agreed upon norms. If both scenarios do not apply, oppositely the EU and the partner states are able to choose rules that do not refer to the EU aquis but who are instead set by external international organisations like the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). But also, the selection of domestic rules or rules set by external countries is theoretically possible. Rule selection is insofar relevant for the assessment of effectiveness that in opposition to enlargement negotiations, where membership is part of the package, in EU-third country negotiations the EU cannot simply on its aquis to be a central condition and point of departure for every following negotiation subjects (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

Rule adoption as the second step of the assessment of effectiveness in EU external governance, proceeds by finding out if after the accord on which rules to be selected for EU-non-member agreements, these rules are effectively implemented in the concerning domestic laws. This step is the most important one of them all, because even if third countries agree on EU regulations or joint rules as their central negotiation point it is still unclear if they actually adopt the regulations on a domestic level afterwards. If and to what degree EU regulations find their way into domestic legislation of the partner countries is therefore empirically highly important. In any event, rule adoption takes place when it can be verified through ratification of the signed agreements with the Union or through the actual adoption of overarching laws including EU or joint rules (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

Thirdly, rule application is not as one might assume the natural step after rule adoption. One should think of it more as a circle than a linear process. If, and to what degree, joint or EU rules are conclusively integrated into third country laws is only the first level of the process, because still the question arises if and to what extend EU partners really follow and applicate

(17)

adopted rules. Hence, rule application can be considered the most profound level of external governance (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

To summarize, the three depicted stages of effectiveness assessment are deeply intertwined. Rule adoption depends on rule selection and rule application in turn depends on rule adoption. Even though this incorporates a form of a circle, the effectiveness can however be interrupted at any stage (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

3.3. Central dimensions to EU external governance

Another aspect of the governance approach to the ENP is certainly the focus on the significance of the institutional environment responsible for policy results just like the EU’s neighbourhood policy (Jachtenfuchs 2001). According to Lavenex (2004, 685) this institutional environment enables people to look at ‘wider Europe’ as a form of continuant internal institutionalisation and it furthermore “underlines the legacy of previous rules and procedures developed towards accession countries, and explains rules expansion as an attempt to manage the external interdependence of the EU as a nascent political system”. As a result, Lavenex identifies two separate dimensions central to the external governance of the EU, which are “perceptions of interdependence and institutional roles and capacities” (Lavenex 2004, 685).

As it comes to perceptions of interdependence and potential thread, they both are equally important to legitimatising political order. With this in mind, concerns about the European identity expanding along with its physical expansion and its sensitivity towards activities in its adjoining neighbourhood could be seen as driving forces behind all concerning initiatives of the near past like certainly the European Neighbourhood Policy. The mentioned concerns are directly linked to the self-given role of the Union being a security community and honour the responsibilities this entails. This view is omnipresent in the recent EU initiatives regarding its neighbouring states and derives from an extensive overhaul of the definition of European security. Moreover interdependence, shouldn’t be perceived in a rigid form but rather as a flexible entity that changes with the circumstances around it (Lavenex 2004). The scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were very active in the field of political interdependence and stated that:

“in common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence most simply defined means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world Interdependence in world politics refers to

(18)

situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane and Nye 1977, 8).

With the ENP the Union has indeed extended its scope of governance to areas whose political vulnerability directly derives from the challenges the third countries in question face. Hence, its unstable neighbourhood. According to this reasoning, it makes not only sense why certain aspects of domestic politics are prioritised in regards to non-member countries but also that these priorities change with time and conversion of circumstances. However, securitisation is not simply the product of external dangers but much more the results of framing processes taking place in a constantly developing institutional arena (Lavenex 2004).

The institutional setting forms the second dimension of the EU’s external governance. Institutional capacities and roles are evidently incorporated here. The institutional roles of the EU are its own creates missions and duties, connected to the power of the civilian society. The structures of these roles primarily depend on experiences made earlier on. Enlargement is a very fitting example for these made experiences (Lavenex 2004). Being aware of the role conceptions as a development initiated by established foreign policy patterns opens the door to a view on external governance that allows it to look at it being shaped by correlating structures of befitting behaviour inspired by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989).

Institutional capacities in turn, describes the distinct competences within the multi-layered system of the EU and also form the backdrop of the Union’s obligation to act on governance related undertakings. Hence, whether any security issues such as e.g. organized crime or migration influx become European issues, thus call for Union or domestic political action, is at all times decided to the backdrop of the growth of the EU’s aquis communautaire and the jurisdiction of its institutions. One of the above-mentioned issues can become a European one, more precisely one of EU external governance if the EU has been allocated competences in this field and is equipped with the appropriate institutional tools (Lavenex 2004).

3.4. Scopes of functionalist extension

If we examine external relations in general we find that besides traditional frameworks, institutions like the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) also define external relations in a territorial and politically inclusive way. This territorial and political centred definition is referred to as Type I. The Type II logic on the other hand, involves EU influence in different sectorial geographies apart from each other and how these in turn relate to “patterns of

(19)

functional interdependence” (Lavenex 2014, 892). However, studies show that the EU has been reluctant to develop Type I foreign policies in the past and that the both types of external relations possess a very complex way of interaction. Nevertheless, they are examples where the EU acted on Type external relations like the Common Foreign and Security Policy or the European Security and Defence Police, which are not largely dependent on the aquis communautaire (Lavenex 2014).

Within the EU neighbourhood approach and in a more softened way also in the former African colonies, sectorial external relations, hence Type II relations are entrenched in Type I policy initiatives. In contrast to that in the EEA, forms of functionalist outreach are mixed with legal authority (Lavenex 2014). This entails that the EU’s aquis is represented in third countries through commonly owned institutions and that therefore it can be acted upon CJEU jurisprudence, or in the case of the EEA, EFTA Court jurisprudence (Lavenex 2011). The Energy Community Treaty or the Transport Community Treaty between the Union and nine eastern European nations, are both examples for sectorial governed external relations and thus fall in the functionalist Type II category. Although this may be true, the mentioned Type II treaties are all part of the territorial aspect of the ENP and EU jurisprudence are chore characteristics of Type I hierarchical relations (Lavenex 2014).

The extensive framework of the ENP and the EU-ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) relations are executing a policy-mix of soft conditionality in Association Agreements with the promotion of the aquis. This combination is indeed an imitation of successfully achieved conditionality within the Union’s enlargement model (Lavenex 2014).

Although, outside of the EU’s direct neighbourhood, the EU still has other methods of making the conclusion of a contract with non-member states conditional on their adherence to e.g. market, environmental or human rights standards. Nonetheless, external governance success, especially the hierarchical Type I kind, is in all phases dependent on functionalist dynamics encouraging any bottom-up adaption of it. Rooted are these functionalist structures in both socio-economic constructs of interdependence existing in the different sectorial areas and the decentralised structures of transgovernmental cooperation. Very important here is that a differentiation must be made between market regulations that profit from the majority of countries’ dependence on the single market and between matters beyond the market where the EU in turn is dependent on the other countries (Lavenex 2014).

(20)

3.5. Europeanisation and integration of EU policies

Other than scholars Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, who mainly focus on the theoretical application of EU rules, Markus Jachtenfuchs describes in his 2001 published article “the governance Approach to European Integration”, how the Europeanisation of policies and politics through the EU, the Euro-polity, is the fundament to all enlargement and hence ENP strategies. According to him political or policy-making processes of any sort occurring in a Member State, cannot be understood without taking into account the major influence the EU has on these processes. In other words, Europeanisation in this context signifies to what extent Member States alone, Member States together with the EU or the EU itself, carry out public policies (Jachtenfuchs 2011). On a scale from 1 to 5 initially invented by scholars Lindberg und Scheingold (1970), where 1 stands for ‘exclusive Member State domain’ and 5 for ‘exclusive EU competence’, this cooperation can be actually measured. Jachtenfuchs explains that at a certain point of time and always after motivational instructions from the EU, most policy fields rediscover themselves somewhere between 3 and 4 but never higher. There are just a very few exceptions where the EU has been able to gain exclusive competence (i.e. stage 5 on the scale), like in its foreign trade policy for example. However, one should not equate the rarely reached fifth stage with failed integration but rather take this as a sign for its positive evolution. Striving for perfection is not the goal here. Having all the policies reaching 5 or an almost 5 average would consequently lead to a centralist state position, which is not at all the purpose (Jachtenfuchs 2001).

What should also be taken in consideration in this context, is that the degree of Europeanisation varies massively from one policy sector to another. A uniform trend towards a total Europeanisation of politics and policy-making as it was implied in the early stages of neofunctionalism is thus not occurring. In fact, collective policy-making today is found in nearly all policy fields and is not at all temporary phenomenon but has become a general and adequately stable pattern (Jachtenfuchs 2001).

Stefan Gänzle is underpinning Jachtenfuchs’ stance of common integration and goes as far to state that the governance perspective has in itself been created to analyse phenomena of integration, no matter if regional or global. He interprets governance occupies itself with how political actors outside the government scope regulate, interact, and cooperate with national and international societies (Gänzle 2009b). In sharp contrast to the government notion, that is mostly linked to a “central authority that has the absolute ability to impose its policies” (Kirchner 2006, 949). Hence, very much opposite to the domestic governments and their limited

(21)

room of manoeuvre, governance does not have these sectorial limitations. Its main focus is namely political settings creates through i.e. international cooperation. Furthermore, Gänzle claims that arising challenges and outside of the state realm and its capacities must be attended in a collective manner. In fact, it also entails that any sort of state-like activities should not be limited through state borders but can also be implied beyond it, in form of a multi-layered cooperation applicable to various political ‘playing fields’ (Gänzle 2009).

One could therefore say that the governance approach serves to depict the “multi-level and multi-actor constellations within the EU’s fragmented political system”, to underline “relational aspects of power and has been extended to the EU’s external relations broadly conceived” (Gänzle 2009, 1718). With attention to this, Gänzle proceeds by stating that the externalisation of EU governance conduces how the European Union factually accomplishes the integration of external actors by building a bond between domestic and external affairs. One could therefore conclude that the governance perspective lays the focus on the intrinsic dynamics at play in the new European political arena and additionally clarifies the intersection of exclusion and inclusion within EU policies (Gänzle 2009). Gänzle is therefore very much on the same page as Lavenex and Rhodes, putting joint work first but also emphasising that one should always keep in mind that there is indeed an “in” and “out” in the realm of the European Union and that only the governance lens reveals the various facets and layers of the work comprised in the ENP.

The close look at the different analyses of the governance structures of the EU and the theoretical workings around it, made clear that that the Union embodies three different main roles: value spreading, rule seeking and boundary setting. Thereupon, the following chapter deals with these diverse and challenging roles the EU has to fulfil and seeks to depict how the understanding of these different “jobs” is crucial to assess how the European Neighbourhood Policy is applied.

3.5.1. The EU as value spreader

With EU-scepticism on the rise, one Member State almost out the door and a general discontent of EU citizens with the Union, the upholding and promoting of the EU core values is of ever more importance. During the term of office of the former Commission President José Manuel Barroso in 2013, EU foreign Ministers drew up a letter to him stating that “at this critical stage in European history, it is crucially important that the fundamental values enshrined in the European treaties be vigorously protected” and that “the EU must be extremely watchful” at

(22)

every point that these values wouldn’t be contested within the borders of the Union (Foreign Ministers 2013, 2). These values that the Foreign Ministers want to be protected this passionately and which the EU seeks to promote within its neighbourhood, have its beginnings way before even the European Community (EC) was created. The question of democracy, legitimacy and other common values all come together in one all-encompassing pursuit of how to define Europe and certain ideas about how shared cultural, religious and historical values can form the cornerstone of European integration. Hence, in the course of time the EC soon strived to become a community of values and this especially towards possible new member states (De Angelis and Karamouzi 2016).

As the EC and later the EU grew bigger and bigger and countries with a history of oppression and dictatorship sought for accession, a fixed set of EU values needed to be defined. For that purpose, the Copenhagen European Council came together in 1993 and created the Copenhagen Criteria as conditions for accession. The respect of human rights, the rule of law and democracy but also a functioning economy build the essence of these criteria (Copenhagen European Council 1993) and serve to eventually create a common European identity. To make sure that these set values are accordingly promoted, EU policies have been declared to that (European Commission 2001). To bring this theory into practice, the Union’s values are actively being endorsed by several EU institutions though written (treaties and declarations) and practiced form (sanctions and policies) and are held high not only within the borders of the community but also towards third countries (Oshri, Sheafer, and Shenhav 2016). The role as an overseeing and leading power goes to the European Commission, which monitors the implementation of human rights and democracy-promoting policies and the realisation of EU law (Youngs 2004). But also, the other wings of the EU play their part in field of value promotion. The European Council for example is the one to set up the EU’s democratic agendas and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) when the cherished human rights of the European citizens are violated (Oshri, Sheafer, and Shenhav 2016).

Of course, these important and upheld values are themselves also recorded in various European treaties and according to them, EU membership is open “to any European state which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them” (European Union 2012, Article 49). Also in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty it is declared that the values of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, freedom and equality all belong to Europe’s religious, cultural but especially humanist heritage (European Union 2007).

But the question remains on how these cherished values actually get respected and adopted by the citizens. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010) declare that in order to socialise member

(23)

states inhabitants to follow and adopt their values, the EU is sure to emphasise their importance in various ways by e.g. promote power sharing or sending messages of the importance of political inclusiveness. This in effect leads to citizens being more likely to participate in the political process. However, the EU can also oblige its member states to ratify corresponding laws that through the course of time get accepted by the people and are seen as normative in the end. Interesting hereby is that citizens of older member states seem to be far more likely to show support for the defined values and also engage more in the political process than residents of newer member states or third countries. And this because residents of older member states have simply been more deeply socialised into the norms and values. Hence, the older the EU membership the more its residents support its values. This means in turn that it is surely the task of the EU to promote, disseminate and uphold its norms but how profoundly the citizens of the different member states really adopt them is in the end the function of the nation state (Oshri, Sheafer, and Shenhav 2016).

This socialisation that takes place by the Union both directly and indirectly. Directly, as e.g. the outcome of immediate contact and interaction with EU institutions and policy instruments. Indirectly, by simply getting in contact with it as a third entity, through the mediation of the nation state. It can however also derive from the repercussions initiated by norm violations of for example the Copenhagen Criteria or in contrast from the “rewards” gained by adhering to the norms (Oshri, Sheafer, and Shenhav 2016). According to Schmidt (2008), different ways in which the EU is able to foster socialisation accordingly, are how the its institutions proceed their socialisation through mechanism according to the logic of appropriateness and the logic of calculation of their measures. And since human beings still respond and follow basic patterns of behaviour the socialisation process can benefit from that knowledge, relying on the fact that all people share the desire of belonging to a group and hence will behave appropriately (Kennedy 2013).

Democracy, political engagement and a common identity are all known to be on the forefront of the EU’s goals and guidelines. Articulating these values and making them a condition of joining the “club” and to live a prosperous life as a European citizen are just as much important for the Union. Doing that by means of socialisation is an effective and proven way to do so. If the Union is however able to proceed in the same manner in its neighbourhood with its role of a rule builder will be assessed in the next part of this chapter.

(24)

3.5.2. The EU as a rule builder

The European Neighbourhood Policy is just one part of the of the bigger picture of how the EU is aiming to bring its neighbouring countries “closer to the European Union in a number of priority fields” (European Commission 2004b) and “at strengthening the prosperity, stability and security, creating a ring of friends” around its geopolitical borders (Petrakos, Tsiapa, and Kallioras 2016). An indeed very ambitious and high bar to set. In order to find out if and how the adoption of EU rules under the roof of this ambitious object really work in terms of harmonisation and rule selection, the following part is depicting how policy convergence in the realm of the EU is performed.

As Barbé et al. (2009) claim, the usual way of describing the adopting of EU rules by third countries the Union maintains relationships with, is through harmonisation of these rules. However, even though the EU does in general want the partner countries to harmonise its rules, the convergence of EU policies can be achieved also by rules other than EU ones. Just as Lavenex and Schimmelfennig already made clear. For example, can rules of international or bilateral nature also find their way to the centre of policy harmonisation. To find out which rules these are and how these are selected, the patterns of rule selection must be examined more closely. Hence, understood what process lies underneath the wish to enhance the “similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy” (Knill 2005, 768) within in the EU and its partner countries.

Important to note is that firstly, for Barbé and her fellow scholars it is significant to realise that the ongoing policy exchange is indeed referred to as convergence instead of just transfer for example. And this I have to agree with because as they elaborate further, the meaning behind a transfer conveys a notion of a one-way interaction, where the notion of convergence of policies allows to also reveal the fact that the enhancing of the approximation of policies between multiple actors is based on a rather complex and interlaced process. Rule selection in this case is thus the result of the interaction of the EU and its partners. If this interaction takes place by specific agreements of both parties (EU and third country) or by an anticipatory part on the side of the EU is not of importance. Fact is, the Union can achieve a continuous interaction through both means. This in turn sustains the Union with inside knowledge on how third countries see the possibility of applying different processes of achieving policy convergence. Consequently, if directly or indirectly the EU’s partner countries occupy a crucial role in which EU promoted rules are adopted in the end and also in which way (Barbé et al. 2009).

(25)

As a second important statement we come back to other agreed upon rules for adoption than EU ones. Barbé et al. are here building upon the examination of rule selection given by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig in the chapter above. But other than them, Barbé and fellows do not want to only depict the effectiveness of rule selection but want to reveal the pattern that leads to polices being adopted and what mechanism are exactly at play when the EU makes use of bilateral or international rules outside of its own tool box. Because as already established at this point, at a lot of occasions the EU promotes and exports the rules created by it (Björkdahl 2005), but at others the policies have another origin. To build upon Lavenex and Schimmelfennig explanation but go more into detail, there are three ways policy convergence can be pursued. In the first scenario EU rule convergence is reached by the third party adopting the rules of the aquis communautaire fully or partly, just certain aspects of the aquis politique or specifically through the EU formalised rules, which are essentially related to human, social or economic rights defined by the Union. Secondly, when both parties decide to converge towards rules set internationally, the EU will support and facilitate the adoption of internationally acknowledged rules for the third country. As a third option, both parties can settle on defining rules bilaterally (Barbé et al. 2009).

To now assess what the pattern behind reaching policy convergence through selecting EU, international or bilateral rules is, we need to gain an understanding of the intersubjective and relational character behind the agency of neighbouring countries. It demands to consider the domestic variable of the partner state as an essential piece of the legitimacy of the efforts made by the EU to promote their rules and of the rules themselves. For this reason, two different variables are defined in order to see how this domestic factor influences the selection of rules in the target state. The first of the two variables, mutable perceptions of legitimacy, combines aspects of both legitimacy and legalisation. The greater significance for the convergence of EU rules however, lies here in the legalisation part of the variable. The chances of the rules being converged successfully, depend on the degree to which they are included in the legal end form within the concerning state (Barbé et al. 2009). As Lavenex and Schimmelfennig already noted in their joint article, the further EU rules are legalised, “the more likely they will be selected, adopted, and implemented beyond EU borders” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 802). Additionally, this variable also presupposes that actors will more likely turn to adopting rules when they believe they are appropriate. This finding makes clear that the intersubjective character has a massive influence on the legitimacy variable. Hence, the relation between the rules that lead to possible policy convergence and the normative aspect of the response in the neighbouring country is crucial to the matter. Ultimately, the last essential aspect of how

(26)

legitimacy is perceived, is to what extent the third country can identify with the promoter of the external rules and how much legitimacy the partner country confers to the actual convergence process (Barbé et al. 2009).

Nevertheless, in the end the degree of legitimacy is rather hard to measure. Policy- and decision makers in neighbouring countries usually refrain from articulating this publicly. But to resort to simply observing the policy-makers’ preferences would be too easy and dependent and independent factors would mistakenly be combined. If the degree of legitimacy is to be measured the most effectively, the third country’s political behaviour outside of EU interaction must be regarded. To be more precise, the behaviour of the political actors before EU influence should be concerned. Looking at behaviour in similar topics/situation or contrary settings is also much more likely to give reliable insights (Barbé et al. 2009).

Regarding the second variable, which is defined by Barbé et al. (2009) as bargaining power, involves two main straightforward arguments. Firstly, neighbouring states decide to affiliate external rules or not by simply weighing up the costs and benefits of it in comparison to other options they might have. The second argument entails the fact that the EU on its end, falls back on possibly rearranging the cost and benefit condition through allaying either incentives or disincentives. All depending on how much bargaining power the EU might possess in regards to the respective country. However, cost and benefits of adopting external rules, for a third country depend partly on how well equipped their administrative capacities are. Important to add here is the fact that third countries do not only weigh costs and benefits before their decision but also take into account what the chosen path could mean for their relationship with the EU (Barbé et al. 2009).

Having examined the two variables underlying rule selection it now time to transfer that knowledge and understand how the end result of policy convergence is reached. Barbé et al. (2009) on this note specify that actually the change in the two presented variables is how policy convergence can be explained. Convergence of EU rules is always the most demanding alternative since EU rules are much more complex and detailed than international bilateral ones are. As a result, the costs of adopting them and the risk of the neighbouring country regrading them as intrusive or even condescending are a lot higher. Thus, convergence of EU rules is only then expected when the both the mutable perceptions of legitimacy and the bargaining power variable have a positive value, in other words only when the EU can offer appropriate incentives and when the respective rules are regarded as legitimate by the neighbouring country. However, if just one of the variables is insufficient, third countries are most likely to decide for the convergence of non-EU rules. Hence, when the legitimacy variable is insufficient, this is the

(27)

case when EU rules are seen as either not legitimate at all or gravely less legitimate than the international alternative, the internationally based rules are chosen to be converged. If the bargaining power variable is insufficient, this happens when the neighbouring state is uninterested in adopting foreign rules and is also powerful enough to counteract the pressure exerted on the part of the EU, policy convergence is expected to be based on bilaterally negotiated rules (Barbé et al. 2009).

Given these points the reasons and patterns behind the EU’s role as rule builder are much clearer and all depends on how the communication between neighbouring country and Union, or rather their relation and common ground is constructed. There is no general scheme to define how the same input leads to the same outcome, since not one case of negotiations resembles the other. Of significance here is to grasp the extent to how transnational cooperation is crucial to the Union’s ability to establish and impose its rules outside of its territory, hence under the threshold of membership and that policy convergence ultimately depends on how far both parties are ready to come out of their comfort zone.

In the subsequent part of this analysis, the light now gets shined on the EU’s function as a creator and setter of internal and external boundaries, comprehending what boundaries and borders actually entail and what very different forms of creating boundaries in the realm of the EU exist.

3.5.3. The EU as boundary setter

The concepts of borders, territory and also frontiers do all have in common that they have been determined historically. At different stages in our history they carried different meanings for the people defining them, deploying them for the historical purpose present at the moment in time (Zielonka 2002). When the rule of the nation state was at its peak borders of any kind represented hard divisions between these centrally-governed nation-states. In addition these hard lines were seen as a guarantee for the encounter of administrative frontiers and cultural traits but also military borders and markets (Maier 2002). In the course of time and the beginnings of the European Union however, the function of these borders and frontiers has become more and more indistinct. Even though the hard physical borders might have vanished the territorial concept of the state still exists. Then again supranational integration and the course of globalisation have taken their toll on the significance of borders and the above-mentioned encounter of different types of frontiers have blurred. And especially within the EU the individual states carry a variation of different cultures, multiple levels of government