Chinese Strategy in the South China Sea between 2000-2010

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Name: Simon van Mourik Studentnumber: s2158434

Subject: Chinese Strategy in the South China Sea between 2000-2010 Docent: Mr. Lindsay Black

Date: Juli 1st, 2019 Word count: 14.707

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In 2001, an American EP-3 surveillance plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet over the South China Sea. In 2009, five Chinese vessels harassed an American reconnaissance boat called the Impeccable. Both incidents greatly affected the bilateral relations between China and the United States. This thesis analyzes the statements made by Chinese citizen leadership and PLA commanders to find out whether China has been getting more assertive in the South China Sea in the first decade of this century. This thesis argues in the end that this is not the case. China has, looking at their statements, not adopted a new assertive strategy concerning the South China Sea between 2000-2010.

Introduction

'Not long before his death in 1997, iconic leader Deng Xiaoping wrote a 24 character long

guideline for foreign policy, in which he described how his successors were to behave in the international sphere. Its most well-known line is taoguang yanghui- ‘hide brightness and nourish obscurity’. […] The most broadly accepted explanation of this sentence is that China should adopt a modest approach on the international stage to prevent responses that could interrupt China’s return to the highest stage.’ 1

This quote, withdrawn from a foreign policy paper from February 2019 that appeared on the website of a Dutch academic diplomatic policy think tank called Clingendael, briefly mentions China’s presumed approach towards conflicts in international relations. One of the most important factors that ‘could interrupt China’s return to the highest stage’ is the United States. The possibility of great-power conflict between China and the United States has formed the basis for several academic books and research papers over the past few years. Economists, historians, international relations scholars, sociologists and lawyers have all studied the causes and probable outcomes of the clash that might be ahead.

The South China Sea

‘The conflict in the South China Sea is the biggest geopolitical risk of our time.’ 2

- Nuriel Roubini

Probably one of the most interesting subjects of conflict between China and the United States are disputes over the South China Sea. The South China Sea plays a vital role as one of the most important trade routes in the world, connecting East Asia to the Indian Ocean. This makes trade the first important subject of conflict concerning the South China Sea. Estimates are that more than a quarter of the world’s trade pass through the South China Sea. This makes the South China Sea the

Henk Schuldte Nordholt, ‘China on a Collision Course With the West’, Spectator Clingendael, 1

February 12th 2019 (https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/china-collision-course-west), version May 15th 2019.

Jos De Greef, ’Waarom worstelen de VS en China om de "Zuid-Chinese Zee”?’, VRT NWS, July 3 2

2017 (https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2017/07/03/waarom_worstelendevsenchinaomdezuid-chinesezee-1-3015386/), version 29 March 2019.

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world’s second busiest international shipping lane. It is therefore no surprise that surrounding 3 countries like Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. China and Taiwan are claiming almost the whole South China Sea, 4 based on the controversial ‘historical claim’. The map underneath shows that almost all the claims 5 made by surrounding countries are overlapping in some ways.

Source: https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/zuid-chinese-zee-arbitrage-verdient-europese-betrokkenheid# (version May 15th, 2019)

Joshua P. Rowan, ‘The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute’, 3

Asian Survey 45 (2005) 3, pp. 414-436, 416.

Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘Armed Clash in the South China Sea’, Council on Foreign Relations: Center 4

for Preventive Action (April 2014), pp. 1-9, 1.

Mingjiang Li, ‘Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? China’s Changing Approach to the 5

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Added to the global trade, it is important to note that almost all of the Chinese and Japanese oil imports are being brought in through the South China Sea. 6

Trade is however just one of the reasons behind the economic importance of the South China Sea. A second important aspect are the energy resources that the South China Sea possesses. China’s continuously growing economy is in constant need of oil and gas. The South China Sea has sometimes been compared to the Persian Gulf in terms of the oil and gas reserves it harbors. 7 Fishing is a third key interest for China and other surrounding countries. Several unilateral fishing bans imposed by China on other countries over the past decade show that it considers fishing as a vital interest in the South China Sea. As seems to be the case for China, all these interests have 8 contributed to high ranked government officials describing the South China Sea in 2010 in private meetings with American officials as ‘core interest’. To analysts of Chinese foreign policy making 9 this description is commonly regarded as a mark of top priority for Beijing. Core interests are non-negotiable viewing points for China and include other ‘red lines’ about for instance Taiwan and Tibet. China’s core interests are often related to territorial disputes. Although Chinese officials 10 later denied having used the term ‘core interest’, the affiliation with the term points to the

importance that China associates with the South China Sea. Miles Maochun Yu from the China 11

Leadership Monitor shortly explains how the South China Sea became so important to China. He

points out how deeply imbedded the feeling of mistreatment by other countries over the past centuries has been. China’s self-presumed greatness demands a much more respectful treatment by smaller countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. The South China Sea is for China an example 12 of how smaller countries should respect China and its claims.

A fourth substantial part of the importance of the South China Sea is strategic. After the Second World War, the United States took on the role of global hegemon, a role that it upholds until the current day. The military budget of the United States exceeds that of China by almost seven to one. Huge parts of this budget are used to maintain primacy in the Asia Pacific. China feels threatened

Alice D. Ba, ‘Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the 6

Waters?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33 (December 2011) 3, pp. 269-291, 270.

Li, M., ’Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? China’s Changing Approach to the South 7

China Sea Dispute’, 51.

Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Security 8

Challenges 6 (Winter 2010) 2, pp. 69-84, 79.

Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, Contemporary Southeast Asia. A Journal 9

of International and Strategic Affairs 33 (Januari 2011) 3, pp. 292-314, 296.

Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, ‘Can China Defend a ‘‘Core Interest’’ in the South China 10

Sea?’, The Washington Quarterly 34 (Spring 2011) 2, pp. 45-59, 45-47.

Alastair I. Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’, International 11

Security 37 (Spring 2013) 4, pp. 7-48, 17-18.

Miles Maochun Yu, ‘Understanding China’s Strategic Culture Through Its South China Sea 12

Gambit’, China Leadership Monitor, May 9, 2016 (https://www.hoover.org/research/understanding-chinas-strategic-culture-through-its-south-china-sea-gambit), version May 15, 2019.

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by the American military presence in the region. From the Chinese point of view this is 13

understandable. The United States however have a different opinion on the matter. It has always stated that it would not meddle in the territorial claims that several states surrounding the South China Sea are making, but it does oppose what it sees as ‘Chinese threats to commercial interests’. 14 The importance of the South China Sea as a trade route also applies for the United States. Bonnie S. Glaser from the Council on Foreign Relations estimates that each year a total of 5.3 trillion dollars in trade passes through the South China Sea, and that the US accounts for more than one fifth of this total. In line with the trade interests of the United States are defending their allies in the 15 region, upholding global rules and norms and maintaining stability in the South China Sea. Next to that, the United States have been attempting for a while to integrate China further into the global economic system. 16

Literature Review

The paragraph above summarized the different interests that the United States and China have in the South China Sea, and shortly discussed its importance. It is therefore no surprise that several

incidents have occurred over the past decades. Because of the complexity and variety of the disputes in the South China Sea, solving them looks like something that will not be happening in the foreseeable future. But although solving the ongoing conflicts in the South China Sea does not look very plausible, the South China Sea does look like a very interesting subject from an academic point of view. The complexity of the disputes offer some very compelling causes for research. The different interests of China and the Unites States in the South China Sea have caused several clashes between the two countries. Some of the biggest clashes will constitute the basis for this thesis. This paper will try to find out whether the Chinese strategy in the South China Sea has changed in the first decade of this millennium. The existing literature shows that some observers argue that China is getting more assertive over the years because of its growing power status. 17 Others claim that China’s strategy remained largely the same. 18

To analyze the Chinese strategy, two major clashes between China and the United States will be studied. The selected case studies are the EP-3 incident from 2001 and the Impeccable incident from 2009. These clashes have been selected because they are the biggest clashes in the South China Sea between China and the United States in the first decennium of the current century. Therefore, they have triggered the biggest response by the Chinese administration. Next to that, they offer the best representation of the Chinese and American side of view, because of the impact that these incidents had. This should contribute to an indicative analysis of the development of the Chinese attitude in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In the past years, there have been several studies that are to some extent related to the study that this paper will be conducting. As for research papers that are closely related to the case studies that this thesis basis itself on, two specifically stand out. The first one is a thesis that has been conducted at

John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’, The 13

Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (December 2010) 4, pp. 381-396, 384-385.

Thayer, C.A., ‘The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, 79. 14

Glaser, B.S., ‘Armed Clash in the South China Sea’, 3. 15

Glaser, B.S., ‘Armed Clash in the South China Sea’, 3-4. 16

Fravel, T., ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, 313. 18

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the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California by Jon D. Harbaugh in June 2014. Harbaugh used the same case studies that this thesis aims to use to answer a somewhat different question. He tried to find out what could have been potential reasons behind the confrontations at sea between the People’s Liberation Army from China and several ships affiliated with the United States in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. The difference with this thesis can be found in the part of the research where Harbaugh looks to find potential drivers for the confrontations. This thesis will focus on potential change in the Chinese strategy towards the United States in the South China Sea. It is getting more assertive or less assertive? Harbaugh found that China was presumably trying to exploit what was perceived to be American vulnerability at the time. His conclusions will most 19 likely be taken into consideration when the Chinese strategy is being evaluated. The literature that has been published about this subject suggests that China is indeed getting more assertive in the South China Sea. A lot of the literature however, is published by Western based universities and think tanks. Analyzing the statements made by Chinese officials themselves should add a certain degree of objectivity to this thesis. After all, analyzing the statements themselves will prevent this thesis from adding the sometimes biased evaluations that can be attached to them.

Another study that based itself on roughly the same case studies has been conducted by Pete Pedrozo for the U.S. Naval War College. Pedrozo is a professor of international law and this background formed the basis for his paper. He writes about Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and the role that legal agreements like UNCLOS could and should play in this behavior. In the end he concludes that if China wants to be regarded as a responsible and stable state actor(that promotes global peace and security), it should abide international law on the sea. His article 20 therefore largely focusses on the legality of Chinese actions in its surrounding seas. The information he provides about the EP-3 incident and the Impeccable incident will certainly be used in this thesis. There is another subject within certain academic literature that is closely related with the research that this thesis will be conducting. This literature is based on a debate that has been going on about the ambiguity within Chinese policy making. As has been mentioned earlier on, it is probably not very academic to treat the Chinese state as one coherent entity with clearly formulated strategic priorities in the South China Sea. The most prominent debate about this subject has been discussed between Alice D. Ba from The National Bureau of Asian Research, Taylor Fravel from MIT and Lyle Goldstein for Naval War College. Fravel thinks that China does have a grand strategy and does not signal significant ambiguity within Chinese policy making. Lyle Goldstein however does 21 observe a certain amount of ambiguity which is according to him all part of the bigger strategy that China pursues in the South China Sea. Alice D. Ba also recognizes the ambiguity in Chinese 22 policy making, but she does not agree to the notion that this is consciously. Whether consciously 23 or unconsciously, this thesis will not treat the country ‘China’ as one coherent entity. The statements

Jon. D. Harbaugh, ‘Impeccable Timing: The Political Efficiency of PRC-U.S. Surveillance 19

Confrontations’, Naval Postgraduate School (June 2014), pp. 1-115, 1.

Pete Pedrozo, ‘The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster’, Journal of 20

National Security & Law Policy 6 (2012) 207, pp. 207-226, 226.

Lyle Goldstein, ‘Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: An Abundance of Noise and 22

Smoke, but Little Fire’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic

Affairs 33 (December 2011) 3, pp. 320-347, 321.

Ba, A.D., ‘Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the 23

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and policies that are being pursued by the Chinese civil leadership and Chinese military leaders will form the basis of the analysis of the selected case studies. In its own way, this thesis will try to contribute to the debate about Chinese ambiguity regarding the South China Sea. The study should certainly show if this ambiguity was apparent regarding the EP-3 and the Impeccable incident. The literature certainly suggests that an analysis of Chinese foreign policy that does not take said ambiguity into account is not very credible.

The most important literature related to the subject of this thesis is about the so called ‘grand strategy’ of China in the South China Sea. Some scholars like Alastair Iain Johnston, a political scientist from Harvard University, think that China is not definitively pursuing a more assertive policy towards the United States in the East Asia region. Mingjang Li from the Nangyang 24

Technological University in Singapore agrees to this conclusion and adds that Beijing realizes that

escalating the conflict in the South China Sea is very dangerous for all sides. Other scholars like 25 Carlyle A. Thayer, a professor on the University of New South Wales are convinced that China is growing more assertive in the South China Sea. Michael Yahuda from the Wilson Center goes 26 even further by not even discussing if China is getting more assertive in the South China Sea towards the United States, but why it is getting more assertive. The Chinese booming economy of 27 the past few decades would suggest that China is growing more confident, and that this growing confidence would be accompanied by increasing assertiveness. It should be interesting to measure with this thesis if the existence of growing assertiveness from China in the South China Sea is detectable in the selected case studies. The thesis should be able to add another dimension to the question whether China is pursuing a more assertive strategy towards the United States in the South China Sea. The part that each of these articles are missing is the analysis of the changing Chinese strategy over time by focussing on the statements made by officials. The driving factors behind the incidents, the presumed growing assertiveness, the Chinese legal viewing points in the South China Sea and the ambiguity within Chinese policy making have all been subject to research. Some of these researches have used the same case studies that this thesis will try to use. What could be added to the literature is the change in Chinese strategy over the years by studying some of the major incidents in the South China Sea. This will be the essence of this thesis: filling that gap. Literature suggests surprisengly that the Chinese strategy towards resolving incidents has largely stayed the same, when the start of the twenty-first century is compared to the end of the same decade.

Methodology

The study will be based on statements made by the Chinese government and the Chinese military leadership. This is based on a couple of arguments. First of all, China is the most populous country in the world. With almost 1.4 billion inhabitants, it has over four times as many inhabitants as America does. Of every person walking this earth, one in six is Chinese. The huge number of inhabitants, the geography of China, the nature of politics itself and the booming economy result in

Johnston, A.I. ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’, 7. 24

Li, M., ‘Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? China’s Changing Approach to the South 25

China Sea Dispute’, 67.

Michael Yahuda, ‘China’s new Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Contemporary 27

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complex policy making. As David Lampton states in The making of Chinese foreign and Security

Policy in the Era of Reform:

‘Policies are created not by the whole government, but by parts in the government. We often don’t know what the other side is doing.’ 28

This quote states the believe that (foreign) policy making by a state can often be inherently

ambiguous. This looks to be especially true for a government as big as the Chinese. Other scholars like Taylor Fravel, a Political Science professor for Massachusetts Institute for Technology and Lyle Goldstein, a research professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute have stated earlier on that the Chinese military has an important role in a lot of the positions that China takes concerning the South China Sea. The comparison between the sometimes ambiguous statements made by Chinese 29 officials should contribute to a nuanced analysis of the Chinese strategy. The awareness that other actors next to the army and the Chinese administration play a role in the Chinese strategy in the South China Sea is certainly taken into consideration when the studied actors were chosen. However, to keep this thesis within certain boundaries, the choice was made to keep the focus on what Michael D. Swaine of China Leadership Monitor calls ‘authoritative actors’ within the Chinese government. This approach takes into account that a government as big as the Chinese 30 sometimes produces ambiguous policies and at the same time tries to avoid being bogged down by citing an infinite amount of possible actors. ‘Non-authoritative actors’ like lower level officials, articles that appeared in small newspapers related to the Chinese governments and for example fisherman that conduct their business in the South China Sea are left out of this thesis.

Another important part of the structure of this thesis will be the comparison between the beginning of the 2000’s and the end of the decade. The incidents will each get their own chapter with

statements of the Chinese military and the Chinese government regarding the incidents. To provide a complete view of the circumstances in which these statements were made, this thesis will open each chapter with a recapitulation of the global and if necessary domestic developments that have influenced the statements. Examples of important events that could have played a role are the Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (with the South China Sea being an important international shipping lane) and the global financial crisis in 2008 (where China might have felt like it was catching up with the United States even quicker). These events and their implications will be taken into account at the start of each chapter.

The research itself will focus on statements made by Chinese high ranking officials. These will be extracted from academic papers, books, newspapers and official websites that publish these statements. The statements made by the military and the statements made by government officials will each get their own paragraph in the chapter. An effort will be made to find statements made by the highest ranking officials, because they are the most likely to represent the official Chinese strategy. At the end of each chapter, the coherencies and contradictions in Chinese policy making will be shortly highlighted. The conclusion will aim to answer the question whether the Chinese

David M. Lampton, ‘China's Foreign and National Policy Making Process: Is It Changing, and 28

Does It Matter?’, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform,

1978-2000, (Stanford University Press 2001), 1.

Ba, A.D., ‘Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the 29

Waters?’, 273.

Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot’, China 30

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South China Sea policy has been fundamentally changed in the first decade of this millennium with regard to the two case studies, or if it has largely remained the same.

But how does one determine ‘assertiveness’? Like Alastair Ian Johnston pointed out in International

Security, assertiveness is not a term that is included in the typology of any existing international

relations theory. The solution that he came up with however seems to suit this thesis perfectly. He stated:

‘(…)one can come up with a relatively simple and clearer definition than is implied in most of the

commentary, namely, a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before (e.g., “if you sell weapons to Taiwan, we will harm you in much more costly ways than before” or “if you let the Dalai Lama visit, the costs for you will be substantially greater than before”).’ 31

The concrete definition that Johnston has laid out in his article will serve as an example for the way in which the statements in this thesis will be analyzed. Threatening the opponent in a way that suggests that it will cost the opponent more than before will be deemed ‘assertive’. When this is not the case, statements will be judged as neutral or even de-escalating when threats are kept out of the statements. Because the specific subject of this thesis will be to find out whether Chinese

assertiveness is actually growing, a ‘base line’ needs to be laid out about how assertive China was before. Statements about the Belgrade bombing in 1999 will constitute this baseline. China reacted to this incident by laying down four demands to the United States:

‘(1) officially apologize to the Chinese government and people, including the families of those killed

and injured; (2) undertake a comprehensive investigation of the incident; (3) promptly publicize the findings of the investigation; (4) severely punish those responsible.’ 32

Next to that, the attack was denounced as a ‘barbaric act’ and China demanded that the US and NATO to bear ‘full responsibility’. When China does not threaten the United States in a way 33 compared to Johnston’s definition, the Chinese reaction to the Belgrade bombing from 1999 should form the basis on which Chinese assertiveness is determined.

From an academic point of view, it will be important for this thesis that the American side of the incident is being treated as well. To prevent a one sided story about for example the EP-3 incident because it is based on only Chinese statements, each chapter will contain a balanced American account of the incident. On occasion, academic papers about the incident will be used to paint a broader perspective.

In the end, the argument will be based on the compared statements from each incident that have been analyzed. When the statements made by Chinese officials get tougher in 2009 than they were in 2001 and in 1999, one can conclude that a tougher approach has been adopted. When the

statements have been getting less assertive, the conclusion will of course be that China has softened their approach. Because of the time gap between the case studies, this methodology should show some form of development in the Chinese policy in the South China Sea over the years.

Johnston, A.I.,’How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’, 10. 31

Kai He, ‘China’s Crisis Behavior. Political Survival and Foreign Policy After the Cold War’, 32

Cambridge University Press (2016), 73.

He, K., ’China’s Crisis Behavior’, 67. 33

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One issue this thesis could not overcome was sometimes finding the original Chinese sources that cited the statements made by Chinese officials. Official government websites had refreshed

themselves and the author does not speak Chinese. An effort will be made each time when Chinese sources were not available to find original statements by using quotations from related articles. In this way, this thesis will try to prevent an analysis that is biased.

Related terms

Before the selected case studies will be evaluated, it is important to clarify some of the terms that are closely related to this subject. Earlier on in this paper the term ‘UNCLOS’ has briefly been mentioned. UNCLOS is an abbreviation for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and came into effect on the 16th of November 1994. China has in fact ratified the agreement, but the scope of China’s maritime claims is still subject to confusion. For instance, a lot of the claims that China 34 holds in the South China Sea do not align with the definition that has been laid out in article 121-3 of UNCLOS. A big part of the uncertainty can be explained by the ambiguity that the Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ provides. This EEZ is part of UNCLOS and states that a country has a couple of extra rights in terms of harvesting maritime resources from the coast line to 200 nautical miles from that same coast. China would without hesitation be able to claim a big part of the South China Sea, based on this law. The same article however, states that when these zones overlap for neighboring countries, they need to resolve disputes about twisted areas before they can claim sovereignty based on their EEZ. China did not resolve disputes with its neighbors, but still regards 35 twisted areas as its own EEZ. 36

Another argument that substantiates China’s claims but seems inherently ambiguous is the ‘historic rights’ argument. Based on article 14 of the EEZ, China claims that the South China Sea is theirs, referring to ‘historic rights’. This is, mildly put, a controversial standing point. Historic rights are 37 not known to from the basis for a strong argument in international law. The sometimes controversial claims of China are however not a subject of investigation for this paper. It is merely important to know about some of the Chinese claims in relation to international law.

Leszek Buszynski, ‘The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic 36

Rivalry’, The Washington Quarterly 35 (2012) 2, pp. 139-156, 140.

Buszynski, ‘The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry’, 140. 37

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Chapter 1: the EP-3 Incident

This chapter will focus on the EP-3 incident from 2001 that occurred over the South China Sea. Before the statements made by Chinese and American officials will be analyzed, it is important to establish the global and if necessary domestic context in which the incident took place. The events that will be described are expected to have influenced the responses to the incident and are therefore very relevant to this chapter.

1.1. Context - Global and Domestic Related Events

One of the most influential events that will have had some form of impact is the new administration that was installed in Washington in January 2001. This administration had started under George W. Bush on January 21st and it immediately began to draw up a new China policy. The major

policymakers in the administration disagreed with the soft approach of the previous Clinton

administration towards China and quickly labeled China as a ‘strategic competitor’. Although the 38 emphasis was still based on cooperation in this new so called ‘Bush doctrine’, the new doctrine also pointed out that confrontation was sometimes necessary. The Chinese view of this doctrine has been observed to be largely negative and even somewhat insulting. The shift in policy in the months 39 before the EP-3 incident did some damage to the bilateral relationship between China and the United States.

This relationship had already been damaged a couple of years before. Another related incident is likely to have had impact on the reactions towards the EP-3 Incident. This incident has been introduced shortly in the literature review section and forms the so called ‘base line’ for this paper on which Chinese assertiveness is determined. This is the Belgrade incident. On May 7th, 1999, a NATO coalition led by the United States bombed the People’s Republic of China’s embassy in Belgrade. Several Chinese citizens were killed. The incident caused outrage in China. The United States apologized for the incident, and the Central Intelligence Agency took responsibility by declaring that a different target should have been hit. Nevertheless, the incident sparked mass protests from Chinese all around the world. The home of the American consul in Chengzu was firebombed, and in Beijing protesters called for revenge. 40

Next to the Belgrade bombing and the new Bush administration, the American Taiwan policy had always been something that influenced the Sino-American relationship. By the turn of the century, the United States had shifted its policy from trying to ensure a peaceful resolution that satisfied both sides to reassuring Beijing and emphasizing on their terms while trying to convince Taiwan to actively find a solution. Instead of comforting China with this change of policy, the consequence 41 was that Taiwan began to defend its own priorities more assertively, thereby creating an even more difficult situation than before. The American policy shift created confusion and increased the risk 42 of the conflict escalating, something which Beijing blamed on Washington.

Tao Wenzao, ‘Sino–American Relations During the George W. Bush Administration’, American

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Foreign Policy Interests 26 (2004), pp. 409-413, 409.

Jing-dong Yuan, ‘The Bush Doctrine: Chinese Perspectives and Responses’, Asian Perspective 27

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(2003) 4, pp. 111-145, 112.

Peter Hays Gries, ‘Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy

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Bombing’, The Chinese Journal 46 (July 2001), pp. 25-43, 25.

Andrew J. Nathan, ‘What’s Wrong With American Taiwan Policy’, Washington Quarterly 23

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(2000) 2, pp. 91-106, 93.

Nathan, A.J., ’What’s Wrong With American Taiwan Policy’, 93.

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Added to these incidents and developments is the change of strategy in the South China Sea itself. Before 2000, the strategy of the United States was that of neutrality concerning disputes in the South China Sea. According to analysts, this changed from ‘active neutrality’ to ‘active concern’. 43 This change of strategy could end up in the willingness to intervene in conflicts taking place in the South China Sea. In practice, the change of strategy meant an increase of joint military exercises with Southeast Asian allies and an increase of surveillance flights. Many of those surveillance flights were deemed illegal by the Chinese because it violated their EEZ.

‘While the United States claimed that the main purposes for conducting this exercise were to help

maintain stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure the exercise of freedom of navigation in the SCS, other commentators believed that it was “gunboat diplomacy” targeting China.’ 44

The increased visible military presence of the United States in the South China Sea must have undoubtedly contributed to a growing sense of threat in China.

Furthermore, China’s application to become a member of the WTO has to be taken into account. China started negotiating about being admitted at the end of the 1990’s, but by the time the EP-3 incident occurred their admittance was not completed yet. As it turned out, the United States could have had the definitive vote in ensuring a waiver for China when WTO accession was not secured by June 2001. This waiver would be needed to keep the negotiations going. Interestingly, this is 45 one of the few arguments that has been mentioned until now that actually contributed to a softer approach by China considering the EP-3 incident. Accession to the WTO was very important for China. The economy was booming and trade relations were perceived as a vital factor to secure the growth of the economy in the following years. As one observer analyzed: 46

‘The Beijing government, after all, counts on a rising standard of living to limit dissent, and even a

brief loss of access to the American market could be damaging.’ 47

1.2. The Incident - What Happened?

So what happened exactly on April 1st in 2001? To provide an objective account, this thesis will try to find balance between the Chinese and American version of the incident. Both states agree on very few things concerning this incident. They do agree on the following:

Yann-heui Song, ‘The Overall Situation in the South China Sea in the New Millennium: Before

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and After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks’, Ocean Development and International Law 34 (2003), pp. 229-277, 236-237.

Song, Y., ‘The Overall Situation in the South China Sea in the New Millennium: Before and After

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the September 11 Terrorist Attacks’, 238.

Shirley Kan, ‘China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assesments and Policy

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Implications’, Congressional Research Service (October 2010), pp. 1-37, 25.

Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘Mid-Air Collision Cripples Sino-US Relations’, Comparative Connections 3

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(2001) 2, pp. 1-13, 8.

Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on

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On April 1st 2001 a US Ep-3 electronic surveillance plane flew over the South China Sea at approximately 8:36 AM Beijing time.

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As a response, the Chinese navy sent two F-8 fighters to follow and monitor the plane.

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Around 9.15 AM, a collision between one of the F-8 fighters and the EP-3 surveillance plane took place, causing the F-8 fighter to crash into sea and the EP-3 surveillance plane to make an emergency landing at the Chinese Hainan Island. 48

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The US surveillance plane then entered Chinese airspace without approval. 49

On almost everything else both countries disagreed. Drawing conclusions of the differing sides of the incident is nearly impossible. The United States claimed that one of the F-8 fighters flew closer to the EP-3 plane three times. The third time the pilot, Wang Wei, made a misjudgment that caused the two planes to collide. The US side also stressed that Wang Wei was already known to be a ‘risk-taking pilot’. The Chinese side however, claimed that the US plane was flying parallel to the 50 Chinese F-8 fighters but suddenly veered to the left, ramming the tail of one of the Chinese

planes. Wang Wei was viewed as ‘fearless’ in facing perceived US aggressions to defend Chinese 51 sovereignty. 52

The crew of the American EP-3 plane was held captive on Hainan Island for eleven days after the incident, while China and the United States were negotiating about who was to blame and on what terms the crew would be released.

‘Although China initially demanded that the U.S. provide an official apology, bear full

responsibility for the incident, and agree to cease conducting aerial reconnaissance operations against China, Chinese leaders settled for less. They accepted a letter signed by then-Ambassador Joseph Prueher in which he conveyed the U.S. government’s “sincere regret” over the death of the Chinese pilot and also said we were “very sorry” that the crippled U.S. aircraft had entered Chinese airspace and landed in China without permission.’ 53

The fact that China ‘settled for less’, suggests that its strategy was more assertive when negotiations were started than when they were concluded. The following paragraphs will show whether this assertiveness can be found in official statements made by top officials of the Chinese government and later on by Chinese PLA officers.

1.3. Reactions of the Chinese Civil Leadership

The first official reaction on the incident was made later that day by a spokesmen of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Zhu Bangzao, who stated:

Erik Donnelly, ‘The United States-China EP-3 Incident: Legality and Realpolitik’, Journal of

48

Conflict & Security Law 9 (2004) 1, pp. 25-42, 28-29.

Donnelly, E., ‘The United States-China EP-3 Incident: Legality and Realpolitik’, 29.

49

David Ackerman, ‘China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy

50

Implications’, Congressional Research Service (October 10, 2001), pp. 1-37, 9.

Donnelly, E., ‘The United States-China EP-3 Incident: Legality and Realpolitik’, 29.

51

Kai He, 'The embassy bombing incident and the EP-3 midair collision’, in: China's' Crisis

52

Behavior Political Survival and Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Cambridge University Press

2016), pp. 76.

Glaser, B.S., ’Mid-Air Collision Cripples Sino-US Relations’, 2.

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‘By veering and ramming the Chinese jet at a wide angle, against flight rules, the U.S. surveillance

plane caused the crash of the Chinese jet.’54

Clearly, China’s first reaction was putting the blame on the United States. By doing this right away and without hesitation, one could state that the first stance that China took was an assertive one. The same assertive first reaction can be found in statements made by China’s assistant foreign minister Zhou Wenzhong on the evening of April 1st. Zhou made clear to US ambassador Prueher that the EP-3 plane caused the collision because it made an aggressive turn. This was followed by an 55 official statement by the Chinese ministry of Foreign Affairs stressing that 'the responsibility for the incident lay entirely with the U.S. side’. The next day, Zhang stated to Prueher that China 56

demanded an apology from the United States and that it would take full responsibility. The first 57 statements made by Zheng and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself all contribute to three major claims made by Chinese officials directly following the incident:

‘The United States (A) violated China's rights over its EEZ under the law of the sea, (B)

undermined an agreement between the United States and China on preventing dangerous maritime military activities, and (C) violated China's sovereignty.’58

On April 3, two days after the incident, Chinese president Jiang Zemin issued his own statement, stressing the American responsibility for the incident and calling for a stop of American surveillance flights close to China. This statement can be viewed as evidence of the rising tensions between 59 Beijing and Washington. President George W. Bush had issued his own statement the day before. The involvement of both country’s presidents made clear how important the incident was to both Beijing and Washington. When the United States refused to offer an apology, Jiang repeated the call for this and added that ‘the United States should do something to benefit the development of U.S.-China relations, rather than making statements that confused right with wrong’. Later that day(on 60 April 4), the Chinese minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan expressed concern that the situation could escalate further if the United States would keep arriving at incorrect judgements.61

From that moment on, the tone changed. President Jiang kept insisting that the United States should apologize to the Chinese people for the collusion, but added that the two countries should work

Dexin Tian and Chin-chung Chao, ‘The American Hegemonic Responses to the U.S.-China

Mid-54

Air Plane Collision’, International Journal of Communication 2 (2008), pp. 1-19, 2. Kai He, 'The embassy bombing incident and the EP-3 midair collision’, 76.

55

Jessica Chen Weiss, ‘Anti-American Protest and U.S.-China Crisis Diplomacy’ in: Powerful

56

Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations (Oxford 2014), pp. 67.

Weiss, J.C., ‘Anti-American Protests and U.S.-China Crisis Diplomacy’, 67.

57

Margaret K. Lewis, ‘An Analysis of State Responsibility for the Chinese-American Airplane

58

Collision Incident’, New York University Law Review 77 (November 2002), pp.1404-1441, 1412. Weiss, J.C., ‘Anti-American Protests and U.S.-China Crisis Diplomacy’, 67-68.

59

Weiss, J.C., ‘Anti-American Protests and U.S.-China Crisis Diplomacy’, 68.

60

Wu Xinbo, ‘Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States’, United

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together to solve the situation in a way that would enforce the bilateral relations. The same change 62 of tone could be heard in the statement made by Zhou on television. He stated the importance of the ‘good relationship’ with the United States and pointed out that it was in both countries’ interest to resolve the issue. 63

After these statements, a period of intense negotiations followed. These negotiations were largely about the way in which China wanted the United States to apologize and the way in which the United States was willing to apologize. China demanded an apology for the death of the pilot, Wang Wei, and for landing on Hainan Island without permission. The United States however, did not want to apologize for anything that happened as a consequence of the collision. In the end, the conflict was solved in a way which many diplomatic conflicts are settled: by constructing a text that was acceptable to both sides. In the end, the U.S. said it was ‘very sorry’ instead of expressing regret. 64 On April 11, ambassador Prueher published a letter he had sent to Chinese foreign minister Tang. In the letter, the United States stated it was very sorry for the loss of the missing pilot and it used the same verbal apology for entering Chinese airspace and landing without having permission. The 65 following day, on April 12, the American crew of the EP-3 surveillance plane was released, ending the crisis.

1.4. Reactions of the Chinese Army

Evaluations and literature that have done a certain amount of research on the EP-3 incident, often point to the important role of the People’s Liberation Army. Theories about the role of the PLA have had different arguments for their perceived interference. One of those theories is that the PLA tried to cover up their own mistakes, by blaming the EP-3 surveillance plane for the incident. This would also include covering up that Wang Wei was taking risks that were unnecessary. Another theory 66 suggests that the PLA was deliberately providing the civil leadership with false information about the EP-3 incident so that the threat that the United States posed would seem a lot bigger. This would then justify an increasing budget for the Chinese army. Gaining more resources would be more plausible when the Chinese leadership would feel threatened by the United States.67

An account of the statements made by the PLA provide a somewhat ambiguous view on the Chinese strategy. At first, they seemed very much in line with the statements made by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Jiang. On April 6, an article in Liberation Army Daily (the official military newspaper) appeared, stating:

‘Commanders and soldiers of the whole army and men of the People’s Armed Police resolutely

support Jiang Zemin’s statement and the Chinese government’s policies,” and further asserted that Jiang’s comments reflected the concern of the party and the government for the “people’s army.’ 68

Xinbo, W., ‘Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States’, 18.

62

Youtube, ‘US-China Narratives on 2001 EP-3 Incident’, https://www.youtube.com/watch? 63

v=qUcR8C6gRPw (Published on September 8, 2013), version May 21, 2019.

64

65

Ackerman, D., ‘China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy

66

Implications’, 10.

James Mulvenon, ’Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis’, China

67

Leadership Monitor 1 (2002), pp. 1-11, 8.

Mulvenon, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis’, 6.

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Later on, when the conflict looked to be resolved on April 11, another statement was made public: ‘Troops of all military units and armed police force resolutely support the Central Leadership's

correct policy decisions(…)’ 69

These statements have however been contradicted several times by statements of PLA officials. For example, when the situation looked to be calming down after April 5, the Chinese Defense minister Chi Haotian assertively stated on April 8 that the Chinese army and people would not accept U.S. government attempts to evade responsibility. In the afore mentioned Liberation Army Daily 70 appeared some contradicting statements as well:

‘Instead, military leaders like Chi Haotian employed explosive language, accusing America of operating from a “Cold War mentality” and pursuing “hegemonism and power politics,” and threatening that “the Chinese armed forces and people will not accept it if the U.S. government attempts to evade its responsibility.” Commentary ridiculed the United States as the “world

policeman” and threatened that “the Chinese people cannot be bullied and Chinese soldiers cannot be intimidated!” While asserting that “the army’s officers and men feel extremely indignant over the United States’ disgusting act of hegemonism.’ 71

To complicate observation of the stance of the Chinese military even further, General Zhang

Wannian, an important member of the Chinese Military Commission, had made statements on April 3 reassuring that the matter would be solved diplomatically.72

It is difficult to say what can be made of these contradicting statements. An interesting observation is that the EP-3 incident might have become the start of the modernization of the People’s

Liberation Army. The Chinese civil leadership came to see that the army needed an upgrade and as it turned out, the EP-3 incident might have just been the event that started that. An assertive strategy from the PLA can therefore be substantiated from this point of view. On the other hand observers 73 stress that, throughout the incident, civil leadership figures like president Jiang Zemin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were leading diplomatic talks and the solution of the issue. When they 74 decided to smoothen their tone a little bit after April 5, resolving the issue got a lot more likely. The sometimes harsh statements made by military leaders did not prevent this. This looks to be

insignificant, given the fact that the PLA got their desired increase in resources after the incident.

Mulvenon, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis’, 6.

69

Rebecca MacKinnon and Lisa Rose, ‘China's military takes hard line’, CNN, April 8, 2001 70

(http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/04/08/us.china.01/), version May 25, 2019. Mulvenon, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis’, 7.

71

72

Implications’, 12.

Minnie Chan, ‘How One Pilot’s Death Created the Modern Chinese Army’, Inkstone, April 3,

73

2019 (https://www.inkstonenews.com/china/chinese-pilot-wang-weis-death-hainan-incident-spurred-modernization-pla/article/3004433), version May 23, 2019.

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1.5. How did the Americans react?

To draw a complete picture, this paragraph will shortly discuss statements made by American officials about the collision. After all, statements made by government officials are often reacting to a statement made by the other side. The American statements will have influenced the Chinese statements.

The first reaction on April 1 from the American side was made by the commander-in-chief of the U.S. pacific fleet, Admiral Dennis Blair. Like the Chinese, he was quick to put the blame on the other side, stating that ‘increasingly unsafe behavior’ of the Chinese F-8 fighters caused the collision. His statement was later that day echoed by Senator John Warner, chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. When the conflict escalated, President George W. Bush started 75 interfering. On April 2, a day after the collision, he spoke to the press about how he was ‘troubled by the lack of a timely Chinese response’.76

‘He stated U.S. priorities as “prompt and safe return of the crew and return of the aircraft without

further damage or tampering.” First, however, China should grant embassy staff immediate access to the crew. Failure to do so, the President stressed, “is inconsistent with the standard diplomatic practice and with the expressed desire of both our countries for better relations.’77

In the days following these rigid statements, Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Bush started to express regret and sorrow for the death of the Chinese pilot. They were not contemplating about apologizing for the collision itself, but they did try to deescalate the situating to a certain degree. When serious negotiations started at April 5, both Powell and President Bush made one more statement to give the negotiations an extra push. Both statements expressed concerns about the future of bilateral relations between the two countries when reaching a solution would take to long. The emphasis the American President lied on keeping the future relationship from getting seriously damaged. An important reason for this was the fact that conservative members of the Congress and media were all increasing pressure on the administration to resolve the solution by taking hard harder stance towards china. A final solution was reached at April 12.78

1.6. Evaluation

When statements of both sides are reviewed, one can observe a short period after the collision of escalation, with assertive statements made by all parties involved. Within a few days this was followed by a period of de-escalation, in which both parties tried to reach a solution. But how can the statements made by Chinese officials be evaluated when Johnston’s definition of assertiveness serves as an example? Only a couple of the first statements made by the Chinese leadership suggest retaliation from the Chinese side that raise the stakes compared to the situation before the incident. The most obvious one is the statement that calls on the American side to stop surveillance flights over the South China Sea. Other statements did certainly not suggest the threat of 'imposing costs that are clearly higher than before’. When the statements are compared to the reactions after the

Joseph Y. S. Cheng and King-Lun Ngok, ‘The 2001 “Spy” Plane Revisited: the Chinese

75

Perspective’, Journal of Chinese Political Science 9 (Spring 2004) 1, pp. 63-83, 72.

Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Decisionmaking Under Stress: The Unintentional Bombing of China’s

76

Belgrade Embassy and the EP-3 Collision’, Chinese National Security Decision Making Under

Stress (2005), pp. 161-190, 176.

Godwin, P.H.B., ‘Decisionmaking Under Stress: The Unintentional Bombing of China’s Belgrade

77

Embassy and the EP-3 Collision’, 176.

Godwin, P.H.B., ‘Decisionmaking Under Stress: The Unintentional Bombing of China’s Belgrade

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Belgrade incident, one can hardly conclude that the tone became more assertive. In both incidents the Chinese officials claimed that the US (and NATO when the Belgrade incident occurred) should take full responsibility. However, when the Belgrade incident took place, China demanded ‘severe punishment’ for those responsible and used the terminology ‘barbaric act’. Looking at the

statements made after the EP-3 incident, then a much more diplomatic tone can be detected on the Chinese side. This suggests a more diplomatic and perhaps even less assertive approach.

Chapter 2: The Impeccable Incident

The second case study that this thesis analyzes took place at the end of the decade. The Impeccable incident took place in March 2009 and presented a new test for Sino-American relations.

2.1. Context - Global and Domestic Related Events

Overall, the tensions in the South China Sea had been rising in the years before the Impeccable incident in March 2009. A couple of factors can be indicated as having contributed to the rising tensions.

In March 2005, three countries (China, the Philippines and Vietnam) had signed an agreement to prevent further escalation concerning the oil reserves that the South China Sea harbors. The agreement was called Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in Certain Areas of the South China Sea (JSMU), but it turned out to be a short-lived agreement. In 2008 the agreement collapsed,

diminishing the small amount of regulations that were in place in the South China Sea. Disputes 79 over energy and later fisheries quickly became the focal point of new clashes. China imposed dubious fishing bans on other countries like Vietnam, and started to claim oil reserves in the South China Sea more assertively. Dr. Ian Storey of The Asian-Pacific Journal stressed that all this could 80 be observed as ‘increased Chinese assertiveness’ over the two years before the Impeccable incident: ‘This pattern of events includes pressure on British Petroleum and ExxonMobil in April 2007 and

June 2008, respectively, not to participate in offshore energy projects with Vietnam in waters claimed by China; increased naval patrols and military exercise off the Paracel Islands in the second half of 2007; the passage of legislation in December 2007 creating a county level city on Hainan Island called Sansha to administer Beijing’s claims in the South China and perceived attempts by China to dissuade Philippine legislators from including the Spratlys in the country’s baselines bill.’ 81

In the meantime, significant further militarization of the South China Sea by China itself had taken place. Satellite images from 2008 showed that China had built a new nuclear submarine base on

Christopher B. Roberts, ‘The ‘South Sea’ and ASEAN: Failing Unity amidst Beijing’s

79

Duplicitous Diplomacy’, International Affairs 33 (2013) 2, pp. 1-12, 3.

Buszynski, L., ‘The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry’,

80

143-144.

Ian Storey, ‘China, The Impeccable Affair and Renewed Rivalry in the South China Sea’, The

81

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Hainan island, called Yulin Naval base. A nuclear submarine and several other new military 82 installations were part of a bigger development of Chinese military naval capabilities in the South China Sea. With a stronger People’s Liberation Army, China seemed confident about reasserting 83 claims. American defense analysts recognized the growing Chinese naval capabilities. A Pentagon annual defense paper about the PLA noted that ‘these capabilities increase Beijing’s options for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, and resolve disputes in its favor’. 84

Another event that will have had significant impact on Chinese strategy is the 2008 global financial crisis. This crisis crippled the American economy, but left China relatively unharmed. Moreover, China seized its opportunity by enlarging its influence. It employed its huge financial reserves by supporting developing countries. The 2008 financial crisis seemed to strengthen the Chinese self-confidence. The consequence was that it was more willing to take a firm stand against that other 85 dominant power, the United States.

There is another related subject that observers point out to have been related to the Impeccable incident. Similar to the months before the EP-3 incident took place, a new administration had taken office in the White House in 2009. President Barack Obama was faced with his first serious foreign policy test when the Impeccable incident occurred. Analysts point to the similarities in timing of both incidents, suggesting that China was testing the new administration in a certain way. Whether 86 this is true remains open to speculation, but the timing of the Impeccable incident has been pointed out by several analysts and is certainly, as The Economist calls it ‘impeccable’.

2.2. The Incident - What Happened?

So what happened exactly on March 8, 2009 in the South China Sea? Because the Chinese and American account of what happened differ widely again, this paragraph will try to state only objective and agreed upon facts.

At the end of February 2009, the USNS Impeccable was dispatched by the United States to do research in the South China Sea. One of the main tasks that it was sent out with was gathering intelligence on capabilities of submarines based on Yulin Naval Base (briefly mentioned before in the context paragraph) on Hainan Island. On March 5, the USS Impeccable crossed a PLAN frigate at close range without radio contact at beforehand. Later that day, a Chinese military aircraft flew over the Impeccable several times at low altitude. The PLAN frigate crossed the bow of the

Thomas Harding, ‘Chinese nuclear submarine base’, The Telegraph, May 1, 2008 (https:// 82

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1917167/Chinese-nuclear-submarine-base.html), version May 24 2019.

George Friedman, ‘Chinese Military Installations in the South China Sea’, Geopolitical Futures, 83

March 27, 2017 (https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinese-military-installations-south-china-sea/), version May 24, 2019.

Storey, I., ‘China, The Impeccable Affair and Renewed Rivalry in the South China Sea’, 4. 84

Roberts, C.B., ‘The ‘South Sea’ and ASEAN: Failing Unity amidst Beijing’s Duplicitous 85

Diplomacy’, 4.

The Economist, ‘China and America spar at sea. Naked aggression: With an Impeccable sense of 86

timing’, March 12, 2009 (https://www.economist.com/asia/2009/03/12/naked-aggression), version May 27, 2019.

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Impeccable again later that day. These first move turned out to be making threats, when on March 87 7 an intelligence collection ship of the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy made contact with the Impeccable. The captain of the Impeccable was told through the board radio that he was illegally gathering intelligence in the Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone and that ‘it should leave the area or ‘suffer the consequences.’’ 88

The next day, on March 8:

‘ (…) three PRC government vessels - a PLA Navy intelligence ship, a State Oceanographic

Administration (SOA) patrol vessel, and a Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) patrol vessel - and two commercial cargo ships interfered with a U.S. oceanographic surveillance ship, USNS Impeccable, engaged in lawful military activities in the PRC EEZ. The two cargo ships, acting under the direction of the PRC government vessels, made several close passes behind the U.S. ship in an attempt to snag the towed-array cable protruding from the stem of the ship. When those efforts were unsuccessful, the cargo ships intentionally stopped in front of the Impeccable, forcing it to make an emergency all-stop to avoid a collision.’ 89

This all happened approximately 75 miles south of Hainan Island. When the Impeccable left the area, the crew of one of the Chinese cargo ships attempted to pull the sonar array of the Impeccable, using a grappling hook. Both the American and the Chinese government were furious. America 90 accused China of being reckless, illegal and unprofessional. China accused America of illegal presence in its proclaimed EEZ, stating that the Impeccable was in violation of Chinese domestic and international law. It is important to note that settling the Impeccable incident was not 91

necessary in the way that the EP-3 incident needed to be settled. The situation in which China held the crew of the EP-3 surveillance plane captive on Hainan Island called for a more active settlement policy from both China and the United States. The crew needed to be able to go back to America, which gave China leverage. This was not the case regarding the Impeccable incident.

2.3. Statements made by Chinese civil leadership

Quite remarkably, the Chinese leadership and Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not issue an official statement regarding the Impeccable incident on March 8. The first official reaction was made by a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Ma Zhaoxu, two days later. Interesting about that statement is that it is in fact a reaction on questions asked by the media on a regularly scheduled press conference on March 10. This points to a somewhat more careful attitude compared to the EP-3 incident. The reaction itself was, however, based on accusing the United States. Ma stated that

Thayer, C.A., ‘The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, 74-75. 87

Pedrozo, P., ’The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster’, 212. 89

Raul Pedrozo, ‘Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident’, Naval War College 91

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‘the accusations made by the U.S. are flatly inaccurate and unacceptable to China’. Ma later 92 expanded the official statement:

‘U.S. Navy surveillance ship Impeccable violated the provisions of relevant international law as

well as Chinese laws and regulations, conducting activities in China’s exclusive economic zone without Chinese permission. China has made solemn representations with the United States regarding this. We demand that the United States immediately stop related activities and adopt effective measures to avoid a repeat of similar incidents.’ 93

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs waited two days before it reacted to the Impeccable incident. When it did, it accused the United States of lying, illegally entering the Chinese EEZ and demanded a stop of similar surveillance missions by U.S. related vehicles in the South China Sea. Other additional statements made by Ma stressed that China itself was in constant compliance with international law. Chinese commentators concluded hopefully out of the statements made by Ma 94 that:

‘(…)that it [the United States] should show fundamental respect for the sovereignty of other

countries in state-to-state relations and that ‘nobody can encroach upon [China’s] maritime rights and interests.’ 95

Later statements made by Chinese officials mocked America, stating that it was not used to being challenged because of its longstanding superiority. The hypocrisy of American ships in China’s EEZ was pointed out and compared to American reactions if China were to enter the EEZ of the United States with surveillance ships. So on the one hand the hypocrisy of the United States was 96

highlighted, on the other hand it was stressed how reasonable and thoughtful the Chinese reaction was. China attempted to take the moral high-ground.

The situation seemed to escalate. It was therefore to the surprise of many analysts that the air was cleared all of a sudden on March 20. Chinese news channels reported that diplomatic efforts had reduced tensions between the two countries and that the Chinese military was prepared to end the stand-off in the South China Sea. In the days before, Beijing had declared that it would increase the

Jonathan G. Odom, ‘The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who 92

Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should be Concerned’,

Michigan State Journal of International Law 18 (2010) 3, pp. 1-42, 7-8.

Harbaugh, J.D., ’Impeccable Timing: The Political Efficiency of PRC-U.S. Surveillance 93

Confrontations’, 48-50.

Harbaugh, J.D., ’Impeccable Timing: The Political Efficiency of PRC-U.S. Surveillance 94

Confrontations’, 50.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security 95

Strategy: A Closer Look at the Impeccable Incident’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34 (April 2011) 2, pp.219-244, 230-231.

Mastro, O.S.,’Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security Strategy: A Closer 96

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military presence to show America its strength. The top leadership in Beijing eventually decided that a standoff over this issue in the South China Sea was not worth the trouble. 97

That this was by no means a definitive resolution became clear a couple of days later. When mr. Qin Gang, another spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was asked about a factual account of what happened exactly a couple of weeks before, he labeled the American account ‘sheer lies’. 98

The reactions of the Chinese civil leadership show and evolution from initial anger and afterwards pragmatism. When the Impeccable incident occurred, the Chinese civil leadership did not want to show weakness, but in the end solving the issue after taking a firm stand was a strategy that could be observed very clearly in resolving this incident. This looks a lot like the strategy after the EP-3 incident.

2.4. Reactions of the Chinese Army

It is important to start this paragraph by pointing out that, especially concerning the Impeccable incident, many observers argued that the view of the PLA differed from the view of the Chinese civil leadership. Two theories are being brought up to substantiate the claim that the Chinese civil leadership has a different opinion than the PLA does. Both theories are associated with the

Impeccable incident. The first theory claims that the Impeccable incident occurred because

relatively low level officers were fed up with the U.S. surveillance expeditions in their proclaimed territory. This theory also points out that the bilateral relations between China and the United 99 States were being improved by the civil leadership at the time of the Impeccable incident. Next to that, some evidence points to the fact that the incident was resolved quickly when the civil

leadership started to exert influence. Besides this, some observers have analyzed that an assertive 100 form of nationalism is driving certain Chinese military representatives to adopt a more assertive stance against the United States in the South China Sea. This has been contradicted by the Chinese equivalent of a national security advisor, Dai Bingguo, who stated that:

‘China has never thought of vying for leading position [sic] in the world’, that China has

cooperated with the United States over various trouble spots and is a “partner the United States can count on.’ 101

It will be interesting to analyze if the statements made by the Chinese army support the suspected difference of opinion between the two groups of officials.

The first official statements made by PLA officers supported the statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Admiral Wang Dengping stated the importance of sovereignty of China in its own EEZ. Admiral Zhang Deshun added to this statement that the United States were violating

Eric A. McVadon, ‘The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea’, China 97

Security 5 (Spring 2009) 2, pp. 1-29, 9-10.

Odom, J.G., ’The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who 98

Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should be Concerned’, 10.

McVadon, E.A., ‘The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea’, 4. 99

McVadon, E.A., ‘The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea’, 4. 100

Buszynski, L., ‘The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry’, 101

Chinese Strategy in the South China Sea between 2000-2010

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