rallies and demonstrations, public protest meetings or for instance distributing pamphlets in the street. Examples of violent phenomena include assault, vandalism and threats. In between is a grey area of activities and types of conduct that are harder to classify, such as flyposting, graffiti, verbal abuse or carrying insulting and punishable slogans or symbols. For the purpose of this report, we use clearly defined categories of violence: targeted graffiti, threats, bomb threats, confrontations, vandalism, arson, assaults, bombings and homi-cide. All right-wing extremist activities that cannot be classified under these categories are called ‘non-violent activities’.
Non-violent activities
The best-known type of non-violent political activity is the demonstration. In this section, we focus on this type of activity alone.
Compared to previous decades, right-wing extremist marches and rallies hardly ever face formal bans or other restrictions from the authorities. Once in a while they are confronted with anti-fascist counterdemonstrations, but even these are on the decrease. The same applies to the number of right- wing extremist demonstrations, for that matter. In 2012, only five demon-strations were staged, the lowest number since 2002.
It is noteworthy that the size of these demonstrations has become quite small.
Some right-wing extremist demonstrations in 2011 counted around hundred participants, but this number dropped to an average of twenty participants in 2012.
Table 22 Number of right-wing extremist demonstrations in the Netherlands (2007-2012)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
12 29 31 19 12 5
Groups of Dutch right-wing extremists participated in these demonstrations in the Netherlands, and attended right-wing extremist demonstrations abroad as well. In Germany, these were mostly national-socialist demonstrations.
German participation has been remarkably stable and remarkably high for years, especially in comparison to the Netherlands. Whenever Dutch right-wing extremists attend German demonstrations, they form but a small minority. It often involves demonstrations with hundreds to several thousands of protesters, among whom a mere handful of Dutch participants. Interviews with former right-wing extremists have taught us that participation in these demonstrations largely serves two purposes. On the one hand, it is a way to establish an international network. On the other, demonstrations in Germany are popular with Dutch protesters because of the large number of participants, and because of the often violent confrontations with the police and with their political adversaries. In 2012, Dutch groups again participated in a number of demonstrations in Germany (see Table 23).
Table 23 Number of German demonstrations visited by Dutch right-wing extremists (2006-2012)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
7 6 9 14 13 10 16
Right-wing extremist demonstrations are attended in other countries beside Germany. However, this happens less frequently and less consistently than with the demonstrations in Germany, which is why an annual comparison is less relevant. In 2012, Dutch right-wing extremists attended four demonstrati-ons in Flanders, and one in France, Hungary and Poland each.
6.4 Right-wing extremist violence
In chapter 2 of this report, readers will find information on the methods used to collect the data for this report. In this chapter, we want to look specifically into violence that is motivated by right-wing extremism. In compiling this overview, we used data from various sources. A major part of the data was retrieved from police databases. In addition, we used data from the Kafka research group and our own data, collected from public sources. Finally, we have searched publications from other institutions, such as the annual reports of the CIDI, MDI and LECD, and have used the relevant data. We then compared the data from all these sources and removed any duplications. We handled the process of selection, qualification and coding ourselves; this was not done by the data suppliers.
We define right-wing extremist violence as violence that is not only racially or politically motivated (because it is directed against foreigners or left-wing politicians, for instance), but that gives reason to suspect that the offender was (or offenders were) motivated by right-wing extremism. We have to add that in most cases, the offenders’ exact motivation remains unknown. This may either be because the offenders themselves are unknown, because they deny involvement or because they deny having a political motive. As a result, we will often have to infer from the context whether the incident was motivated by right-wing extremism. There are various methods to gauge the level of right-wing extremism of an incident. We focused on content-related clues. Whenever we were in doubt, we did not include the incident.
We ended up with thirteen violent incidents that were motivated by right-wing extremist ideas over 2012. In table 24, this number has been subdivi-ded into various categories of violence and compared to the data on previous years.
Table 24 Racist and right-wing extremist violence by category 2008-2012
Category 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Targeted graffiti* - - 1 3 1
Threats - - 10 8 8
Bomb scares - - 0 0 0
Confrontations - - 6 3 2
Vandalism - - 5 0 1
Arson - - 0 1 0
Assaults - - 9 3 2
Bombings - - 0 0 0
Homicides - - 0 0 0
Total (54) (34) 31 18 13
* In order to distinguish between the frequently occurring yet untargeted graffiti, and graffiti targeted at specific persons or objects, we only included the so-called targeted graffiti. This includes graffiti that was daubed in locations relevant to its message: a swastika on a synagogue, a racist slur on a mosque or the front door of a non-native family, for instance.
What strikes us most in reviewing this table, is that the decrease in the number of incidents, which has been apparent since 2008, continued in 2012.
We have not looked into the cause of this decrease. In previous years, we supposed that there might be a connection with the simultaneous decrease in the active following of right-wing extremist groups. As we have noticed that the active following of right-wing extremist groups has stabilised in 2012, this hypothesis can be rejected. We have, however, noticed that the same number of active followers of right-wing extremist organisations has been redistribu-ted over a larger number of organisations, which show increasing hostility towards each other. A possible explanation might be that this fragmentation has decreased the striking power of the movement as a whole. This could explain both the decrease in the number of violent incidents and in the number of demonstrations.
Another topic that stands out is that eight out of the thirteen incidents were threats. Half of these were threats made against critics of the PVV or of Geert Wilders. In the summer of 2012, one of the offenders was convicted. He had made threats against a Groen Links Member of Parliament on the internet, after this MP had criticised the PVV. The court sentenced him to 120 hours of community service.
6.5 Government response
Government action in response to right-wing extremism can be subdivided into three categories: administrative, criminal and corrective. For the purposes of this report, the term ‘administrative response’ is taken to mean a response by the authorities of a formal, restrictive or repressive nature.
Such a response might include preventative bans on right-wing extremist activities or the issuing of emergency orders. Criminal legal action is taken in the event of violation of particular articles regarding discrimination as set out in the Dutch Criminal Code, or in the event of an offence under general criminal law that was motivated by right-wing extremism. The corrective response pertains to those initiatives that are intended to counter right-wing extremism in non-repressive ways. This primarily involves educational projects and projects devised to prevent individual radicalisation or to
‘de-radicalise’ radicals.