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2. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF FRAMING: A LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptualizing the Notion of Framing as an Object

2.1.2 Types of framing

Druckman makes such distinctions to introduce the term framing effect (Druckman, 2001). A framing effect supposedly occurs when frames in communication shape frames in thought (Druckman 2001, p. 228). In other words, a framing effect is what happens when both objects

meet and initiate a process. From this framing effect there are subsequent distinctions. The diagram below is useful in understanding the distinction between different types of frames.

Figure 1: A visual representations of Druckman’s classifications of frames as found in the literature (Druckman, 2001).

Frames in Communication

Words, images, phrases, and

presentation style that a speaker uses.

Frames in Thought

An individual’s cognitive understanding of a given situation. Reveals what an individual sees as relevant to understanding a situation.

Equivalency Framing Effect Frames cast logically equivalent information in a positive or negative light, manipulating the individual’s preferences.

Emphasis Framing Effect

By emphasising a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker can lead individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions

Two distinct uses of the term frame and framing

Framing Effect

When frames in communication play an important role in shaping frames in thought.

2.1.2.1 Equivalency Framing Effects

The first framing effect identified by Druckman is the equivalency framing effect (2001, p.

228). The equivalency framing effect occurs when different, yet logically equivalent words or phrases are used to influence individual preferences. An example of this equivalency framing effect in practice is a widely cited experiment conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1987). Tversky and Kahneman asked a group to respond to the following problem:

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:

If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.

If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.

Which of the two programs would you favour? : Program A or Program B (Tverksy and Kahneman, 1981; 1987)

Looking closely at the possible programs offered to the respondents, one can conclude that both outcomes will result in an expected 200 lives saved. The outcomes are therefore logically equivalent to one another, despite being framed differently. Program A is framed as a risk-averse option whereas Program B is framed as risk-seeking option. The results of this experiment found that 72% of the respondents chose Program A. When comparing these results to the results of the second group in the experiment, the influence of equivalency framing effects become more apparent. The second group were given the same scenario and were posed the same question, the programs offered were however different. In the second group the outcomes were worded with respect to the number of people that would die. This differs to the first group where the respondents were given outcomes that were worded with respect to the number of people that would be saved. The experiment concluded that the respondents preferred a averse strategy when confronted with the number of people that could be saved, and a risk-seeking strategy when confronted with the number of people that could die. In this experiment, respondents were presented with logically equivalent information, and it was the different frames (risk-averse frame and a risk-seeking frame) that influenced peoples’ preferences.

Other scholars who have interpreted framing in a similar manner are Levin, Schneider and Gaeth who claim that frames cast “the same critical information in either a positive or a negative light”, which subsequently influences individual preferences (1998, p. 150). Such insights resemble the conclusions of Quattrone and Tversky (1988). Quattrone and Tversky demonstrate the effect of positive and negative light by quoting the example of a new economic program. In this hypothetical program, 98% percent of the population will be employed.

Quattrone and Tversky demonstrate that when the goal is to convince the audience of the merit of a new economic program, 98% employment is a better way to frame its success as opposed to quoting a 5% unemployment. The success of this framing influence is due to the positive evaluation generated from the 98% employment figure, as opposed to the 5% unemployment.

One can draw a similar conclusion from the work on the framing of survey questions (Bartels, 1998; Lacy, 1997; Zaller, 1992). It has been proven that survey questions are also susceptible to framing effects, particularly framing that makes use of the same logically equivalent wording in its survey questions. For instance, a survey published in the mid-1970s in the United Stated demonstrates the influence of logically equivalent frames. The survey found that Americans were more likely to ‘not allow’ a Communist to give a speech than they were to ‘forbid’ a Communist to give a speech (Druckman, 2001, p. 230). One would assume that ‘forbidding’ an action is more or less equivalent to ‘not allowing it’, therefore meeting the criteria of a logically equivalent frame. In this instance, ‘not allow’ was the preferred evaluation on behalf of the audience with respect to a Communist’s free speech. Thus, the results of the survey demonstrate how, yet again, a frame was able to influence the audience’s preference despite the presence of logically equivalent information.

The above interpretations and examples of equivalency frames are further demonstrations of consensus in the literature. While the scholars mentioned above may not use the same terminology, their conceptualizations of frames as a method of influence upon logically equivalent information exhibit a large degree of harmony and agreement.

2.1.2.2 Emphasis Framing Effects

Beyond equivalency framing, there exists another broad categorization of a framing effect that is emphasis framing effects (Druckman, 2001, p. 230). Emphasis framing effects do hold some similarities to equivalency framing, in that “they [cause] individuals to focus on certain aspects

or characterizations of an issue or problem instead of others” (Druckman, 2001, p. 230).

However, beyond this, the two notions differ quite drastically. Emphasis framing effects are a type of framing that is based on a presumption of passive accessibility process. This is the notion that people “automatically and subconsciously base their political judgements on whichever considerations happen to be accessible in memory” (Druckman, 2001, p. 235). As a result, this interpretation of framing is frequently used in communication studies in the political domain. A useful example of an emphasis framing effect is when a presidential candidate talks primarily about security issues. It can then be said the candidate has framed their campaign as a matter of security. As a result, this emphasis frame may influence voters to judge other candidates solely based on their security issues.

In addition, is possible to make a third distinction between two different types of emphasis framing. The first type refers to frames that “lead individuals to base their opinions on different considerations with little attention to overall opinions” (Druckman, 20021, p. 230).

For instance, when “an undeserved advantage frame leads Caucasian individuals to oppose affirmative action”, it can be said the frame has influenced their actions by drawing attention to their personal interests. In other words, by framing affirmative action as an underserved advantage, Caucasians are likely to evaluate the concept on that singular consideration, as opposed to developing an opinion that is formulated from the multitude of factors involved (Kinder and Sanders 1990, cited in Druckman 2001, p. 230). Conversely, the second type of emphasis framing refers to frames that “alter overall opinions with less attention to the underlying considerations” (Druckman, 2001, p. 230). For instance, it was found that support for government spending for the poor increased when it was framed as an overall advantage for everyone involved (Sniderman and Theriault 1999, cited in Druckman 2001, p. 230). In contrast, when it is framed as an initiative that will increase taxes, i.e drawing attention to underlying considerations, the support decreased (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001, cited in Druckman 2001, p. 231). The distinction between these two types of emphasis frame is sometimes difficult to grasp. It is also difficult to judge whether these distinctions are necessary. A relevant question is then, are these distinctions and categorizations helpful or do they add more confusion?

Interestingly, despite the general consensus that has been identified between the various types of frames that exist, there does exist some contention. For instance, Scheufelle takes a different view to framing and explicitly disagrees with the assumptions that have been made with regards to emphasis framing. For Scheufelle (2000), the process of passive accessibility is something that pertains to agenda-setting. Agenda-setting refers to the way in which the

media control news coverage by controlling the amount of coverage they give to news stories.

For Scheufelle, this process relies on a passive accessibility process, whereby salience is increased for particular news stories. In contrast, for Scheufelle, framing is based on prospect theory, whereby “subtle changes in the description of a situation invoke interpretive schemas that influence the interpretation of incoming information rather than making certain aspects of the issue more salient” (Scheufelle, 2000, cited from Druckman, 2001, p. 145). This interpretation of framing differs from other interpretations in that Scheufelle appears to explicitly deny the connection between framing and emphasis. In addition, the question could be asked, to what extent does Scheufelle’s definition of framing equate to equivalency framing?

The “subtle changes in the description of incoming information” could very well refer to the changes made in an equivalency frame when the incoming information is logically equivalent.

Such questions are interesting and demonstrate that despite a relative consensus, there nevertheless exists confusion and ambiguity when we compare interpretations of framing.

2.1.2.3 Goal-Framing

A third type of framing that can be identified in the literature is goal-framing. Goal-framing has been identified as a specific kind of Goal-framing, awarding it a place alongside equivalency framing and emphasis framing, otherwise named risky choice framing and attribute framing (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998). Goal-framing is supposedly quite successful at increasing the persuasiveness of messages by strategically choosing whether to advance argumentation that demonstrates positive consequences or negative consequences.

This type of framing is particularly popular in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation.

Specifically, goal-framing finds popularity amongst scholars who study pragmatic argumentation (van Poppel, 2012, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman 1981; Block & Keller 1995;

Rothman & Salovey 1997; Meyerowitz & Chaiken 1987). When studying pragmatic argumentation, scholars tend to focus on gain and loss frames (van Poppel, 2012, 2013).1 A gain-frame works by advancing argumentation that exhibits the positive consequences of an action. For instance, ‘you should stop smoking because it will improve your lung capacity’.

This sentence is framed as an advantageous action. In contrast, a loss-frame works by

1 Pragmatic argumentation is defined by van Eemeren and Henkemans as a subtype of argumentation based on a causal relation. Pragmatic argumentation occurs “when the standpoint recommends a certain course of action and the argumentation consists of summing up the favourable consequences of adopting that course of action” (van Eemeren & Henkemans, 2016, p. 89).

advancing argumentation that exhibits the negative consequences of an action, this is effective when demonstrating what will happen if the individual were not to pursue the advised action.

For instance ‘you should stop smoking because it is harmful to those around you’. This sentence is now framed as a loss-frame because it is demonstrating the disadvantages of not doing the proposed action. This concludes the types of frames that exist in the literature:

equivalency frames, emphasis frames, and goal-frames.