Chapter III Operational Preparations Prior to the War
2. Preparations in the Summer and Fall of 1941
area (i.e. the Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army or KANTOKUEN) was launched.
On 25 July, the forces to be stationed in southern French Indochina departed Hainan Island.
On the following 26th, the United States officially announced that it had frozen all of Japan’s assets in the United States. Britain and the Netherlands immediately followed suit. This sud-den turn of events caused the Army and Navy Departments of IGHQ to seriously tackle the planning of operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as well as an invasion of the southern areas. Before this opportunity arose, definite plans for an invasion of the southern areas had not yet been made, due to the developments mentioned above.(7, 10) The Yoshizawa delegation left Java for home on 27 June.(13)Col. Harada Yoshikazu re-turned home at the same time, while Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori remained in Batavia (Jakarta).(37, 42) He did not return home until one month prior to the opening of hostilities.(42)
which remained unchanged in this exercise. After handing over his charge of the Dutch East Indies to Staff Officer Kondō, Staff Officer Okamura was sent to inspect the 5th Division’s landing exercise in northern Kyūshū (March), the 48th Division’s invasion operation in Fuzhou (April) and the Twenty-fifth Army’s advance into southern French Indochina (July).(17) Against the Navy Department’s clockwise plan, the Army Department advocated a counter-clockwise plan, arguing that a swift advance via Malaya was imperative not only because it was sounder and would lead to an early overthrow of British authority as well as to the blocking of British reinforcements, but also because it might make a shortening of the schedule feasible.(10)
After the above-mentioned Navy map exercise, the Army Department carried out its own war game on 14 – 15 August, which resulted in the following tentative conclusions:(10)
1. The invasion of Malaya and the invasion of the Philippines are to be commenced at the same time. A slight delay in the invasion of Java on account of this will be all right.
2. The 48th Division is to be incorporated into the Philippines invasion army. After the capture of Manila, it is to be diverted to the Dutch East Indies invasion army and to land in Java.
3. After the capture of Hong Kong, the 38th Division is to land in southern Sumatra and oc-cupy Palembang.
4. The 2d Division shall be employed for Java in accordance with the plan that has been nursed for a while.
5. Based on the above, the Dutch East Indies invasion army shall be reorganized into a force with three divisions as its core.
6. A paratroop unit shall be dropped at Palembang.
As a result, the following changes were made to the previous deployment plan of the armies:
Malaya invasion army: was to consist of the Imperial Guard Division (stationed in French Indochina at the time), the 5th Division (in eastern China at the time), the 18th Division (in southern China at the time) and the 48th Division (also in southern China at the time) as in the original plan, but the 48th Division was removed.
Philippines invasion army: was originally to consist of the 7th Division (in Hokkaidō at the time) and the 16th Division (in the Kyōto divisional district at the time), but [in the new plan] it was to consist of the 16th and the 48th Division.
Dutch East Indies invasion army: was to be made up of two divisions in the original plan, that is, the 2d Division (in the Sendai divisional district at the time) and another division, but it was now provided with three divisions: the 2d Division, the 38th Division (in south-ern China at the time and to join after the capture of Hong Kong), and the 48th Division (to join after the capture of Manila).
The deployment of a paratroop unit at Palembang was an idea that had been proposed by Staff Officer [Prince] Takeda-no-miya when Staff Officer Okamura Masayuki had presented his report on the outcome of his research on the Dutch East Indies operation in September of the previous year (1940).(17)At that time, the Japanese forces did not have a paratroop unit, but three months later in December, a [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department was estab-lished for the first time within the Hamamatsu Army Flying School. The department had 22
Chapter III / Operational Preparations Prior to the War
only twelve members. These twelve had started their research by study-ing written information from the German military and by listenstudy-ing to the experiences of airmen who had to make jumps due to flight acci-dents. In April of the following year (1941), the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department became the Baichengzi Army Flying School [Para-troop] Raiding Training Department, and was transferred from Hama-matsu to Baichengzi in Manchuria, where it had started to train several hundred men as paratroop specialists.(93)
The 38th Division was stationed in a swampy area in southern China.
This division had been formed following the China Incident, and its in-fantry regiments carried a regimental number in the two-hundreds. Nev-ertheless, the division was an elite division with abundant battle experience and highly valued by IGHQ, which was convinced that the division would be able to accomplish the capture of Palembang after capturing the Hong Kong stronghold. In order to capture Palembang, [the division] would have to travel up several rivers for about eighty to ninety kilometers as the crow flies, and carry out the operation on swampy ground.
As the 38th Division was well accustomed to rivers and swampy lands in southern China, it was, also in this respect considered to be the most suitable division.(18)The division’s troops had been recruited from the Nagoya divisional district.
The 48th Division was a division equipped with motor vehicles and organized in the pre-vious fall. Its core was made up of the Taiwan Mixed Brigade (consisting of two regiments;
known as the Hada Detachment, it had earned a reputation for bravery in the China Incident [1937]), and the 47th Infantry Regiment (originally based in Ōita City) of the 6th Division.
Almost all of its men were from Kyūshū. As previously explained, since the previous fall the division had held an exercise simulating traversing Malaya lengthwise all the way down to capture Singapore, and it had carried out a landing operation at Fuzhou in the spring [of 1941] as well. The division had assembled on Hainan Island.
IGHQ later (around October) gave the following nicknames to the three divisions that it had decided to assign to the Dutch East Indies invasion in this [new deployment plan]; it may be understood that each of the names reflected the division’s history as well as its task at hand:
2d Division: Isamu-heidan [the “Braves”]
38th Division: Numa-heidan [the “Swampers”]
48th Division: Umi-heidan [the “Mariners”]
On 12 August, [the Army Department of] IGHQ ordered the 48th Division to transfer from Hainan to Taiwan. Following that (on 23 August), it instructed the division to carry out train-ing on the assumption of capturtrain-ing Surabaya on Java straight after capturtrain-ing Manila.(1, 10)In addition, it ordered the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, which was training in Baichengzi, to transfer to Takanabe in Miyazaki Prefecture.(93)
In September, the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department of the Baichengzi Flying School was upgraded and strengthened into the Army [Paratroop] Raiding Training Depart-ment under the direct control of the inspector general of Army Aviation, and transferred to Takanabe. Its structure was reorganized into one training regiment (four companies) and one
IGHQ Staff Officer, Maj.
[Prince] Takeda-no-miya
training air unit (two squadrons).(39)At the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation, Lt. Col.
Itoda Isamu took charge of the department’s organization and training. Later he was ap-pointed staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion army and, as such, flew in over Palem-bang along with the raiding units and carried out a belly-landing while the troops parachuted.(39)
During that period (mid-August) the main concern of the Army Department of IGHQ was whether it was feasible at all to impose double duty on the 38th and the 48th Division and whether the preparation of the paratroop unit would be ready in time.(10)The department was not apprehensive about the operations after the landing on Java; it figured that the 48th Division would swiftly capture the Surabaya stronghold, and that the 2d Division, which had earned worldwide fame at Gongchangling, would conquer the Bandung stronghold right after the capture of Batavia.(17)
Afterwards, on 23 August, the Army Department conducted another war game on the southern operation. When it had contacted the Navy Department on the previous day, it had been informed that the Navy Department “estimated that there was a probability of one-in-two of having to face east halfway through the execution of the southern operation in order to deal with the U.S. Pacific Fleet; that the Navy estimated that the timing of when it could put the Java invasion army ashore could be set to about ninety days after the opening of hos-tilities; and that it was working on [the possibility of] conducting an air strike on Hawaii with the full force of its main aircraft carriers right at the opening of hostilities.”(10)
Several days before (in mid-August), the Navy Department had made a request to the Army Department for the Army’s cooperation in the cap-ture of Rabaul.(17)However, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Tsukada Osamu flatly refused, saying, “[the Army] does not have any manpower to waste on such an undertaking.”(10, 43)
The war game of 23 August was conducted with reinforced forces (in-creased from six to ten divisions), compared to the previous game. While the force for the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies remained the same, the 21st Division (stationed in China), the 55th Division (in Zentsūji), and the 56th Division (in Kurume) were also included for op-erations in the French Indochina area, along with the Imperial Guard Di-vision, as well as the 5th and the 18th Division.(10)
[The Situation] After the Decision on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy of Early September
(See Illustration No. 4)Report to the Emperor on the Prospects for the Southern Operation
After the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government on 2 September, an Impe-rial Conference was held on 6 September, and the Main Points for the Implementation of ImpeImpe-rial National Policy were decided upon; the most important point stated that “… resolved not to flinch from waging war against the United States (and Britain and the Netherlands), war preparations shall be completed approximately by late October.”(3)
At this time, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor that in [the Army’s] estimation, it was possible to complete the southern operation in about five months, including one month and a half for the Philippines, and about one hundred days 24
Chapter III / Operational Preparations Prior to the War
Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Lt. Gen.
Tsukada Osamu
for Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. The power of the allied forces, relevant to the southern operation, as estimated at that time by IGHQ, was as follows:(2)
Air Force
Area Current Increase by the end of October
Hong Kong 10 aircraft
Philippines 160 aircraft or more 100 aircraft
Malaya 200 aircraft or more 150 aircraft
Burma 50 aircraft 50 aircraft
Dutch East Indies 300 aircraft 150 aircraft
In total 720 aircraft or more 450 aircraft
Navy
Classification Aircraft Carriers Battleships Cruisers Destroyers Submarines
U.S. Asiatic Fleet 4 2 14 17
U.S. Pacific Fleet (Hawaii) 7 7 18 46 28
Dutch East Indies Fleet 5 8 19
British China Fleet and
East Indies Fleet 2 2 27 15 or 16 1
In total 13 9 52 83 or 84 65
(Note by the author: it seems that the “aircraft carriers” [in this chart] include seaplane tenders and flying boat tenders.)
Army
Hong Kong 19,200
Burma 35,000
Malaya 80,000 – 90,000 (of which 60,000 – 70,000 regular army)
British Borneo 3,500
Philippines 163,000 (of which 43,000 regular army)
Guam 1,800
Dutch East Indies 70,000 (of which 50,000 in the inner territory [i.e. Java])
Against this, the [Imperial Japanese] Army was considering to assign ten divisions, two num-bered air forces (about 600 aircraft, supplemented by 500 Navy aircraft), and 2.1 million tons of army vessels. More specifically, the plan envisioned one division for French Indochina, five divisions for Malaya (of which one was to have part [of its force] advance into south-eastern Burma while securing Thailand with its remaining force) and one numbered air force;
two divisions and one numbered air force for the Philippines, and three divisions for the Dutch East Indies (of which one division would have double duty within the southern area).(2) When Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama explained the [Army’s] expectation that it would be possible to complete the southern operation in about five months, His Majesty pointed out the erroneous estimate that Chief of Staff Sugiyama had made on the China In-cident as war minister, and strongly warned against [too much] optimism.(16)Later (in No-vember) when the headquarters of the Southern Army was organized, the staff of the
headquarters, hearing about the Emperor’s warning, made a resolve to
“pledge on the honor of the southern armies to firmly live up to His Majesty’s considerations by completing the southern operation within the term scheduled by IGHQ.”(24)
Report to the Emperor on the Mobilization of Forces Scheduled for the Southern Operation
On 8 September, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor about the following mobilization:(10)
First half of October: The 16th Division (Kyōto Division — to carry out the primary landing in the Philippines together with the 48th Division), the 55th
Division (Zentsūji Division — to secure Thailand and occupy the border area of Thailand and Burma), one-third of the 56th Division (Kurume Division), (Sakaguchi Detachment — to capture Guam).
Note: As mentioned previously, in the operation plan for war against the United States., two di-visions were assigned to [the operations in] the Philippines and three battalions to [the opera-tions in] Guam. That is to say, the 16th and the 48th Divisions were charged with the Philippines, and the Sakaguchi Detachment with Guam. However, as explained hereinafter, the Army, ad-vocating a counter-clockwise plan, and the Navy, adhering to a clockwise approach, later came to a compromise, in which the Sakaguchi Detachment was directed to the Makassar Strait front and an element of the 55th Division, the Horii Detachment (or South Seas Detachment), was formed for [the operation in] Guam.
Latter half of October: The 2d Division (Sendai Division — to be brought under the Dutch East Indies invasion army and head for west Java), the 65th Brigade ([from] Fukuyama — scheduled for the secondary landing in the Philippines as a reserve for the 48th Division’s redeployment).
During his report to the Emperor, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama explained that there was a possibility that by the end of the year, [allied] reinforcements of 50,000 to 60,000 troops from Australia and New Zealand, 100,000 from India, and 10,000 to 20,000 troops from China would be sent to Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies.(2)
Continuing Disagreement Between the Army and Navy on the Operation
On the same day (8 September), the Navy Department was still in favor of a clockwise plan.(9, 10) The Army Department, however, had proceeded with its research and considered the counter-clockwise plan a must. Staff Officer Imoto Kumao of Section 2 of the Army Depart-ment wrote a memo on that day that “for ‘Java,’ synchronized landings from the east and the west are more appropriate.”
On 10 September, the Navy Department again asked for “support to seize Rabaul,” which was flatly turned down as before by Vice Chief of Army General Staff Tsukada. Even when the Navy Department explained that [Rabaul] would “be nothing but an advance position of the Truk Islands,” and that it would “have naval guard units take over to return [the Army troops] after the capture,” the request was in vain.(9, 10)
26
Chapter III / Operational Preparations Prior to the War
Chief of the Army Gen-eral Staff GenGen-eral
Sugiyama Gen
Map Exercise at the Naval College
From the following day, the 11th until the 20th [of the month], the Combined Fleet conducted a map exercise at the Naval College.(105, 106, 111, 113)In the first half, this exercise dealt with general operations, while in the second half the air strike on Hawaii was investigated by only a lim-ited number of staff in the utmost secrecy. The exercise showed that a surprise attack on Hawaii with the full force of all aircraft carriers right at the outset of the war was preferable.
On the other hand, concerning the Philippines, the Navy Department wanted to have land-ings carried out right at the opening of hostilities at Davao as well as in Luzon Island, thereby separating the Philippines from the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, it also wanted a speedy launch of the Dutch East Indies operation. At the time, the main force of the Philippine Army Air Corps covered the area from the vicinity of Manila to the north. However, as a matter of fact, the flying ranges of the Japanese Navy fighter planes at that time did not allow an attack from Taiwan to Manila and the vicinity, nor did they allow an attack from Palau to Davao and the vicinity (even though their flying range was considerably longer than those of the Army fighter planes). Therefore, if a full-force surprise attack on Hawaii were to be executed with carrier aircraft, then the idea of a landing at Davao right at the opening of hostilities had to be abandoned. So, this war game led to a course of first occupying northern Luzon and after advancing the air bases, occupying the southern Philippines (Davao and Jolo), followed by capturing the Dutch East Indies.(105, 106, 111, 113)The dates for capturing these areas were roughly as follows: northern Luzon on or immediately after the day of the opening of hostilities (day x), Davao and Jolo approximately between day x + 20 and day x + 30, Tarakan and Menado approximately on day x + 50, Java approximately between day x + 80 and day x + 90.
Completion of the First Draft of the Southern Operation Plan and Issue of Summons to Prospective Staff Members
On 17 September, while the Navy was conducting its map exercise at the Naval College, the Army Department completed its first draft of the southern operation plan.(10)
After that, the Army Department summoned the prospective staff officers of the armies for the South and held separate study sessions with the prospective staff officers of each army in the following order: on 25 September with the staff of the Southern Army, on the 26th with the staff of the Philippines invasion army, on the 27th with the staff of the Malaya invasion army, and on the 28th with the staff of the Dutch East Indies invasion army.(23)
The officers summoned as prospective staff for the Dutch East Indies invasion army were the following:(23, 36)
Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō (chief of the General Affairs Department of the Inspectorate General of Military Training; as prospective chief of staff of the army).
Maj. Gen. [Col.] Manaki Takanobu (attached to the Military Affairs Bu-reau of the Ministry of War; as prospective vice chief of staff).
Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu (he had been made staff of the Northern District Army since July for the KANTOKUEN[Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army] after serving as instructor at the War College; as prospective staff officer in charge of operations).
Sixteenth Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen.
Okazaki Seizaburō
Maj. Yamashita Yutaka (Appointments and Assignment Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective assistant staff officer of operations).
Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke (he had been transferred to the Information Department of the Ministry of War after serving as head of the Southern Group of Department 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ; as prospective staff officer of intelligence).
Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu (Inspectorate General of Army Aviation; as prospective staff officer for air operations and the [paratroop] raiding group).
Lt. Col. Saiki Ikuzō (Signal Communications Section of the Office of the Army General Staff;
as prospective staff officer for signal communications).
Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto (War College; as prospective senior staff officer of Section 2 of the army).
Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō (Transport Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective staff officer for shipping).
Maj. Takahashi Mitsuzō (War Preparations Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective staff officer for the lines of communication).
At that time, the Army and the Navy Departments [of IGHQ] were in serious conflict over the counter-clockwise plan versus the clockwise plan.(9, 10)
The primary causes of the conflict between the counter-clockwise and clockwise plans were: (1)Whereas the Army, considering the state of affairs with the Soviets in the next spring, wanted to ensure the swift capture of the Singapore stronghold, which fell under its respon-sibility, the Navy, on the contrary, wanted to quickly capture the Philippines and Java, and be ready for the U.S. main fleet to come to the attack; (2) The Army attached more importance to the naval and air forces of the allies around Singapore and their reinforcements coming across the Indian Ocean and from India, while the Navy put a high priority on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii; (3) The Army was interested in the oil produced in Palembang, while the Navy was much attracted by the heavy oil produced in Borneo.
The Army had requested the Navy to station part of its air units in the Malaya area, but the Navy, which was strongly focusing on the Philippines, would not comply with the Army’s request.(9, 10)On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the Navy had repeatedly asked for the Army’s support for the capture of Rabaul, but the Army had refused this.(9, 10)
Because of this polarity, both were suffering from the following issues:(9, 10)There were no major problems with [the operations in] the Philippines and Guam, as they had been pre-arranged in the operation plan for the [current] administrative year. [However, this was not the case with the following:]
The Navy wanted to occupy the oil fields of Miri on its own account right at the opening of hostilities. Moreover, it also strongly desired to capture Ambon and Kupang at an early point, but was short of the necessary strength [to do so].
The Army had found that the Malaya Operation might be slowed down substantially due to an overland journey of one thousand kilometers and because of the naval and air forces of the allies in Singapore, and that it might end up in a situation where attacks on Java and Sumatra were to be made [only] from the east.
Because of these circumstances, in the joint study sessions on the 28th by the Army De-partment staff of IGHQ and the prospective staff officers of the Dutch East Indies invasion army, a new plan was conceived to have the detachment, charged with the capture of Guam, 28
Chapter III / Operational Preparations Prior to the War
storm Palembang from the Java Sea after completing the capture of Guam.(10, 36)Assessments of the situation of the paratroop unit around that time indicated that 1,500 troops would be ready to be put [into action] at the end of October.(10)The [newly conceived] plan was to have one detachment land in Palembang from the Java Sea and the main force of the army in east-ern Java, without [first] destroying the allied air and naval forces in Singapore, Sumatra and western Java.(36)However, it involved great risks. In this study they came to the conclusion that the loss of [Army] vessels at sea by the time that the invasion units were to arrive at the shores of Java and southern Sumatra would amount to 85 out of a total of 500 [Army] vessels (note: this number also includes the transport ships for the Malaya and Philippine invasion units), that is, one sixth [of the total number].(10)The Army Department of IGHQ decided that
“[the plan] should be reconsidered as there existed a certain amount of concern about the cover provided by the Navy for the attack on the Dutch East Indies by the Dutch East Indies invasion army,” and that “the landing points of the main force of the Malaya invasion army should be changed in a positive way, and that [the date to attack] the Dutch East Indies should be advanced.” (Note by the author: this means that by moving the landing points in the Gulf of Thailand as far as possible to the south and, following the development of the operation, by also carrying out landings on the east coast of Malaya, the period [necessary]
for the invasion of Malaya should be shortened, so that the landings in southern Sumatra and western Java could be made in a much shorter time frame).(10)
As explained above, as of 28 September [1941] the Navy desired: (1)to carry out a surprise attack on Hawaii with its main force of aircraft carriers right at the outset of the war, and also to enable [its unit(s)] to carry out a landing at Davao right at the opening of hostilities as well; and (2)to capture Rabaul, for which operation it absolutely wanted to have the Army’s support. The Army, on its part, wanted: (1)to absolutely have the support of Navy air units in order to speed up the Malaya operation as well as to reduce the loss of vessels;
(2)to enable the 38th Division to land in Palembang via the South China Sea, as well as to re-alize the parachute drops [of the paratroop unit]; and (3)to carry out simultaneous landings on Java both from the east and the west.
The Situation in October
The Army Department [of IGHQ] tried to iron out the differences with the Navy Department.
It decided to have the Guam invasion unit, after the capture of the island, proceed all the way down to Rabaul and capture it, which was fervently desired by the Navy, and once Rabaul was captured, have the unit turn round and head all the way back to take part in the Dutch East Indies invasion. In addition, the Army Department also decided to take on the capture of Miri, Kuching, Ambon and Kupang, which the Navy had been at pains [to find a way to capture].
The Army Department performed a war game at the War College from 1 to 5 October. On this occasion, the prospective staff officers of the Dutch East Indies invasion army were com-pletely taken aback to hear that the detachment which was scheduled to head for Palembang after the capture of Guam was also to capture Rabaul after seizing Guam, and that Ambon and Kupang were newly added [to the targets] to capture.(43)
War Game at the War College
The outline of the war game held at the War College was as follows:(10)
1. Accommodating the request of the Navy, the Army decided to provide units to invade Rabaul, Ambon, Kupang, Miri and Kuching, to receive in return support from an element of the Navy’s land-based air [unit] in the Malaya area in an effort to speed up the pace of the Malaya opera-tion.
2. A surprise attack on Palembang was set to be carried out ten days before the invasion of Singa-pore, so that the landing on western Java would take place on the same day as the invasion of Singapore. The landing in western Java was set to be executed on day x + 95. [This date of] land-ing in Java might be about two weeks later than that of the Navy, which estimated its arrival at eastern Java between day x + 80 and day x + 90. However, if the U.S. Pacific Fleet were to launch an offensive [against our forces], the Navy would have to extract and deploy [some of] its air and sea strength [against it]. In such a case, [the Army] would be able to arrive in Java [before the Navy].
3. The strength to be employed was set at ten divisions (Imperial Guard, 5th, 18th, 55th, 56th, 21st, 16th, 48th, 38th and 2d Divisions).
4. The operation was divided into three stages: The first stage would feature a practically simul-taneous start of operations in the Philippines, Hong Kong and Malaya, after which Borneo, Celebes and Timor would be promptly captured. As the Malaya operation made progress, key locations in southern Sumatra would be seized. In the second stage Java and northern Sumatra would be captured, and in the third stage key areas would be secured.
5. Regarding the Dutch East Indies territory of Borneo and eastward, the Navy would capture Menado, Tarakan and Kendari on its own account. About Balikpapan, Ambon, Makassar, Ban-jarmasin and Kupang, a tentative plan to capture them through joint actions by the Army and the Navy had been made. However, the problem of how to share responsibilities with the Navy for the capture of the east coast line of Borneo and the Celebes front still remained unsolved.
6. The [army] troops would be deployed as follows:
The 38th Division would [first] capture Hong Kong, after which its main force would go to cen-tral and south Sumatra, while an element of its force (referred to as Detachment B) would [be sent to] capture Ambon and Timor.
One-third of the 55th Division (referred to as the South Seas Detachment or Detachment I) would seize Guam, followed by the capture of Rabaul, after which the detachment would reverse its course and head for the Dutch East Indies.
Note: this detachment was to be organized to replace Detachment A for capturing Guam and other [purposes].
One-third of the 56th Division (referred to as the Sakaguchi Detachment a.k.a. Detachment A) would carry out attacks along the east coastline of Borneo and the Celebes front southward (ex-cept for the locations which the Navy would attack on its own account).
Note: The detachment was relieved of the duty to capture Guam.
The 48th Division would have Detachment C carry out advance landings at Aparri, Vigan and Laoag, while the division’s main force would land at Lingayen and seize Manila. Afterwards, the division would [be directed to] eastern Java.
The 16th Division would detail Detachment D and Detachment E respectively to head in ad-vance to Davao and Legaspi, while its main force would land in Lamon Bay and head for Manila.
An element of the 18th Division (Detachment F) and another element of the same division (De-tachment G), and an element of the 55th Division (De(De-tachment H) would be detailed (sent in 30
Chapter III / Operational Preparations Prior to the War
advance) [respectively] to Miri (followed by Kuching), and the southern and western coasts of the Gulf of Thailand.
The main force of the 5th Division would land in northern Malaya and go southward along its west coast.
The Imperial Guard Division would stabilize Thailand and then head southward along the west coast of Malaya.
The main force of the 55th Division would stabilize Thailand as well as carry out operations in southeastern Burma along with the advance parties, after taking over from the Imperial Guard Division.
The main force of the 18th Division would land on the southwestern coast of the Gulf of Thai-land and first head for the Penang stronghold.
The 56th Division (minus Detachment A) would land on the southeastern coast of Malaya.
The 21st Division would secure French Indochina.
7. The schedule of operations was planned as follows:(10)
day x landing of the advance parties along the Gulf of Thailand day x + 2 landings of Detachment C at Aparri, Vigan, Laoag day x + 3 landing of Detachment D at Davao
day x + 5 landing of Detachment E at Legaspi day x + 10 landing of the Detachment I at Guam
day x + 25 occupation of Hong Kong by the 38th Division landing of the main force of the Malaya invasion army
day x + 35 Malaya invasion army’s [possible] battle [with the enemy] at the border [of Malaya], capture of Manila
day x + 45 start of concentration of the main force of the Dutch East Indies invasion army day x + 70 occupation of key locations in Dutch Borneo and Celebes by Detachment A day x + 85 occupation of key locations in the southern Sumatra by the 38th Division day x + 95 occupation of Singapore
landing of the main force of the Dutch East Indies invasion army (consisting of the 2d Division) in western Java
day x + 120 preparations for landing in northern Sumatra
During the war game, the participants became acutely aware of the fact that the Burma area was a cause for worry. Therefore it was decided to newly add the 33d Division (stationed in China) to the Burma area and to establish a new army with this division and the 55th Divi-sion, which would allow the Malaya invasion army to devote itself entirely to the Malay Peninsula.(10)As a result, Maj. Gen. Isayama Haruki, who until now had been considered as prospective chief of staff for the Malaya invasion army, was made the prospective chief of staff of this newly established army, which in turn resulted in the putting forward of Maj.
Gen. [Col.] Manaki Takanobu, who had been considered until now the prospective vice chief of staff for the Dutch East Indies invasion army, as prospective vice chief of staff for the Malaya invasion army.(36)[Manaki was promoted to major general on 15 October.]
In this war game, the [role of] commander of the Dutch East Indies army was [played by]
Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke, the role of commander in chief of the allied naval forces by Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto, and Maj. Kondō Dempachi played the role of the assistant to the leadership of the Dutch East Indies invasion army.(23)
Immediately after the war game, the persons concerned in the Office of the Army General Staff, the Ministry of War, and the Army Aviation Department made plans to visit Taka nabe in Miyazaki Prefecture. The [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, which had been