Operational definitions

The first step towards achieving conceptual clarity on the central concept of the fear of crime was discussed in the previous chapter (see section 4.3.3, fig. 9). At the heart of the conceptualisation of the fear of crime are attitudinal aspects (Eagly &

Chaiken 1993; Cooper, Kelly & Weaver 2003), ranging from cognitive ‘assessments’, through ‘concerns’ to affective ‘emotions’. Cognitive assessments can be described in brief as ‘thinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58). Value-driven concerns relate to ‘(…) a concern one has about crime’ (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71). But the affective side of emotions is more complex.

Emotions are multi-dimensional events of affective phenomena that are highly correlated (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel &

Greve 2003). As Ben-Ze’ev (2000:4) puts it: ‘An emotional term usually refers to a highly complex and interactive cluster of emotions rather than to a single and isolated entity’. Besides ‘fear’, the concept of ‘the fear of crime’ is theoretically and empirically linked to the experience of a multitude of negative affective labels:

Alienation (Cops 2012), powerlessness (Cops 2012; Eve & Brown Eve 1984), rage (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012, Van den Herrewegen 2011), shame (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012, Pleysier 2010), grief (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012), unease (Van der Wurff 1992, Gray et al. 2008, Cops 2012), frustration (Cops 2012, Van den Herrewegen 2011),

vulnerability (Cops 2012), worry (Pleysier 2010, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009), irritation (Ditton et al. 1999; Pleysier 2010; Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009) and anger (Ditton et al. 1999; Pleysier 2010; Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

So, when we go on to discuss the affective element of a sub-concept of the fear of crime, we might explore isolated affective accents or tendencies, while knowing that these affective phenomena are actually connected in an ‘interactive cluster of emotions’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:4).

KEEPING TROUBLE AT A SAFE DISTANCE

When we add these insights to the sub-dimensions of fear of crime explored and defined earlier, a multi-layered conceptualisation of the fear of crime comes into view. This conceptualisation is outlined in the previous chapter (fig. 9, see section 4.3.3). Before presenting operational definitions for aspects of the fear of crime’s sub-concepts (A-L below), we will provide operational definitions for the additional theoretical elements of the concepts, since these are crucial to the main research question and thus our conceptualisation of the fear of crime. Here, then, are definitions for: (I) level of psychological reference, (II) level of psychological distance and (III) level of emotional intensity.

(I) Level of psychological reference:

…is about a theoretical distinction between ‘the private self’ and ‘the collective self’ (Trafimow, Triandis

& Goto 1991, Simon 1996, Turner et al. 1994, Brewer & Gardner 1996, Oyserman 2003, Sedikides &

Gaertner 2001). In which ‘(t)he private self includes cognitions that involve traits, states or behaviours (e.g., “I am honest”), while the collective self consists of cognitions about group membership (e.g., “I am a son”, this concerns membership in the family)’ (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto 1991:649).

The private self is the experiential home base of a person (Sedikes & Gaertner 2001) and ‘(…) contains those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate the person from other persons as a unique constellation of traits and characteristics that distinguishes the individual within his or her social context’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1). This person-based identity psychologically ‘(…) differentiates self from all others’ (Hogg 2001:137).

The collective self ‘(…) contains those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate in-group members from members of relevant out-groups’ and ‘(…) is based on impersonal bonds to others derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification with a group’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2). This collective identity psychologically ‘(…) differentiates “us” from “them”’(Hogg 2001:137).

(II) Psychological distance:

‘(…) refers to the perception of when an event occurs, where it occurs, to whom it occurs, and whether it occurs’ (Trope & Liberman 2010:442). The focus is on the following dimensions of psychological distance: ‘time, space, social distance and hypotheticality’ (Rim, Uleman & Trope 2009:1089). ‘Near events are represented at lower level construal, defined as concrete, specific and detailed. Distant events are represented at a higher level, which are more abstract, decontextualised and general’

(Bonner & Newell 2008:411). As Gouseti and Jackson (2016) point out, crime can be experienced both near (or proximate) and distant (or far). A ‘distant’ perception of crime represents it ‘(…) as a general, abstract category (…) social problem’, while a ‘near’ perception of crime makes it ‘(…) a more specific threat, differentiated and potentially tangible in the everyday’ (Gouseti & Jackson 2016:22-23).

(III) Emotional intensity is defined as:

The relative magnitude and duration of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel &

Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze’ev 2000:4). High emotional intensity is a ‘(…) momentary magnitude (peak intensity) and long temporal structure (mainly, duration) (…)’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:117) experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena by a person. Low emotional intensity is more a vague and chronic mood (Pleysier 2010): a

multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:199, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze’ev 2000:4) ‘having no clear borderlines between them’, which seems to ‘(…) lack a particular object (…) directed at the world at large (…), in search of an object’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:86-87).

And here are operational definitions, indicated A-L, for aspects of the fear of crime’s sub-concepts (see fig. 9 in section 4.3.3 of the previous chapter).

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Situational fear of crime

A. Situational risk of personal victimisation (assessments)

‘A time and space-specific response to external stimuli (…)’ (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157;

Pleysier 2010175-179) of crime, crime signals or crime symbols (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72) from which one identifies the private self (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) as the acute potential victim of a - whether or not actually present - ‘dangerous other’, based on an assessment of vulnerability and a perceived lack of control (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

B. Concern about imminent crime threat to self (values)

‘A time and space-specific response to external stimuli (…)’ (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157;

Pleysier 2010:175-179) of crime, crime signals or crime symbols (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72) leading ‘to concern about crime’ (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) in the form of ‘(…) a sense of immediate threat to one’s security (…)’ (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:18&245).

C. Emotions about imminent crime threat to the self (emotions)

‘A time and space-specific response to external stimuli (…)’ (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:149-157;

Pleysier 2010175-179) in the form of the experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective

phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze’ev 2000:4) due to crime, crime signals or crime symbols (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), with a tendency of acute fear (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42): ‘(…) a response to existential threats (…)’ that leads into a strong ‘(…) aversion of a certain situation (…)’ and a strong hope ‘(…) that the undesired event will not materialise’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:479). This acute fear ‘(…) is typically brief, has a high peak of intensity, is provoked by tangible stimuli or situations and is easy to detect’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:479)

Personal fear of crime

D. Anticipated risk of personal victimisation (assessments)

‘(T)hinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), with ‘the private self’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) in mind as the potential victim of a - whether or not specific - ‘dangerous other’ (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

E. Concern about the anticipated personal crime risk (values)

‘Concern about crime’ (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) due to ‘thinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall &

Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), with ‘the private self’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) in mind as the potential victim of a - whether or not specific - ‘dangerous other’ (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

F. Emotions about the anticipated personal crime risk (emotions)

The experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze’ev 2000:4), due to ‘thinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), with ‘the private self’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:1) in mind as the potential victim of a - whether or not specific - ‘dangerous other’ (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42), with a tendency of anger: ‘(…) hostility toward someone’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:83) - whether or not specific (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42) - due to the perception that the anticipated – whether or not specific - offence against the personal self is ‘(…) intentional, malicious and unjustified’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:221).

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Neighbourhood fear of crime

G. General risk of crime in the neighbourhood (assessments)

‘(T)hinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to a group of people - which one has ‘(…) impersonal bonds with, from common identification (…)’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), due to ‘(…) proximity in current position (…)’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:341) of what one perceives to be one’s

neighbourhood (Kaal, Vanderveen & McConnell 2006) – in mind as the potential victim(s) of a - whether or not specific - ‘dangerous other’ (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

H. General concern about crime in the neighbourhood (values)

‘Concern about crime’ (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) due to ‘thinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall &

Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to a group of people - which one has ‘(…) impersonal bonds with, from common identification (…)’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), due to ‘(…) proximity in current position (…)’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:341) of what one perceives to be one’s neighbourhood (Kaal, Vanderveen & McConnell 2006) – in mind as the potential victim(s) of a - whether or not specific - ‘dangerous other’ (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42).

I. Emotions about crime in the neighbourhood (emotions)

The experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze’ev 2000:4), due to ‘thinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to a group of people - which one has ‘(…) impersonal bonds with, from common identification (…)’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2), due to ‘(…) proximity in current position (…)’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:341) of what one perceives to be one’s neighbourhood (Kaal, Vanderveen &

McConnell 2006) – in mind as the potential victim(s) of a - whether or not specific - ‘dangerous other’

(Van der Wurff 1992:38-42), with a tendency of disgust: ‘(…) a strong sense of aversion to something perceived as capable of (…) violating the boundaries of self’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:387). This object of disgust is held to be ‘harmful to our well-being’ (ibid:388), ‘(…) because it (…) may inflict personal harm upon us’

(ibid:389).

Societal fear of crime

J. General risk of crime in society (assessments)

‘(T)hinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to other members of society – being ‘(…) strangers about whom we hardly know anything (…) (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:341) but we have ‘(…) impersonal bonds to (…) derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2) due to a shared nationality or geographical location.

K. General concern about crime in society (values)

‘Concern about crime’ (Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:71) due to ‘thinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall &

Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to other members of society – being ‘(…) strangers about whom we hardly know anything (…) (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:341) but we have ‘(…) impersonal bonds to (…) derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2) due to a shared nationality or

geographical location.

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L. Emotions about crime in society (emotions)

The experience of a multi-dimensional event of affective phenomena (Hartnagel & Templeton 2012:466-467, Vanderveen 2006:1999, Gabriel & Greve 2003, Ben-Ze’ev 2000:4), due to ‘thinking or being aware of crime’ (Farrall & Ditton 1999:58) or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro 1995:4, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987:72), as an anticipated risk (Van der Wurff 1992:38-42, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:245, Fisher 1978, Garofalo 1981), to other members of society – being ‘(…) strangers about whom we hardly know anything (…) (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:341) but we have ‘(…) impersonal bonds to (…) derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification’ (Sedikes & Brewer 2001:2) due to a shared nationality or geographical location, with a tendency of pity: a ‘(…) sympathetic sorrow for someone’s substantial misfortune (…)’ (Ben-Ze’ev 2000:327), due to ‘(…) the belief that the object does not deserve such substantial misfortune (…)’ (ibid:329), while we ‘(…) perceive ourselves as being unable (…)’

(ibid:328) to solve the basic problem, as it is beyond ‘(…) our control of the eliciting event or to the control of others’ (ibid: 344).

5.2.4 Conceptual framework

Several theoretical concepts discussed in the previous theoretical chapter are logically of influence (Waege 2001:88) to our four explored sub-concepts of the fear of crime. We will provide indicators of these concepts, also with operational definitions, following the structure of the conceptual framework on the next page (fig. 10). Given the problematic nature of the research tradition (see section 3.6.2), causal assumptions are omitted.

KEEPING TROUBLE AT A SAFE DISTANCE

Fig. 10 – Conceptual framework for ‘the fear of crime’.

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Risk sensitivity

Risk sensitivity is a reasonably stable characteristic of sensitivity to threats and risks (Wildavsky & Dake 1990:167): ‘(…) some persons are very upset and worried about virtually all hazards, whereas others are quite indifferent and tranquil’ (Sjöberg 2000:8). This characteristic acts as a filter for an individual’s general ‘(…) knowledge construction, information judgement and processing’ (Jackson 2015:222).

1. Fear threshold

A relatively low ‘minimum level of perceived risk necessary to produce fear’ (Warr 1987:30).

2. Perceived likelihood

‘(T)he feeling that one and one’s social group are especially likely to be targeted by criminals’ (Jackson 2009:367).

3. Perceived consequences

A lowered ‘capacity to cope with the consequences of victimisation’ (Doran & Burgess 2012:30) resulting in a judgment of a high impact of criminal victimisation (Jackson 2009).

4. Perceived control

An individual’s perception to have ‘especially low levels of control’ over the incidence of crime (Jackson 2011:513), due to one’s general, personal assessment of one’s capacity to win (or at least not lose) a confrontation with a - whether or not specific - member of a comparison group’ (Van der Wurff 1992:40).

5. Contemporaneous offences

A high estimation of the likelihood of falling victim of an offence, as a result of this offence being associated with other offences that one perceives one is likely to fall victim of (Warr 1985:245).

6. Dispositional fear

A natural tendency to respond generally more fearfully to situations than others do (Oppelaar &

Wittebrood 2006; Gabriel & Greve 2003; Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010).

7. Specific crime fear

A distorted perception of crime risks, due to an over-sensitiveness to crime (Sjöberg 2000).

8. Level of tolerance

The extent to which one tolerates crime and anti-social behaviour (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009).

9. Authoritarianism

Sentiments of authoritarianism accentuate ‘(…) a desire to reestablish rules and behaviour that underpin social organisation, and censure those who violate the rules (…)’ (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:117).

10. Conservatism

A need to consolidate the current state of society (Sztompka 2000:275), because of the perception that the world has changed and is still changing in an unwelcome direction (Pleysier 2010:158), and due to negative thoughts about the speed and profundity of social change (Sztompka 1993:xvi, Hale 1996:120).

11. Passivism

The sense that decisions might be regretted later on (Pleysier 2010:160-161), based on a general nostalgic appreciation of the past (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33).

12. Need for closure

‘(A) desire for definite knowledge on some issue and the eschewal of confusion and ambiguity (…) need for closure is presumed to exert its effects via two general tendencies: the urgency tendency, reflecting the inclination to attain closure as quickly as possible, and the permanence tendency, reflecting the tendency to maintain it for as long as possible’ (Kruglanski & Webster 1996:278, as quoted by Jackson 2015).

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Sense of vulnerability

Vulnerability is an individual’s sense of exposure to risk, the expectance of serious consequences, a loss of control over a situation or an inadequate ability to manage the direct and indirect consequences of a threatening situation (Killias 1990:98, Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:87, Cops 2012:94, Pleysier 2010:106).

1. Physical vulnerability

The extent to which people estimate their own capability to physically defend themselves in threatening situations (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006).

2. Psychological vulnerability

The extent to which people estimate their own capability to psychologically defend themselves in threatening situations (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006).

3. Ecological vulnerability

A complex mixture of a heightened physical vulnerability due to biological differences in overall strength and a heightened social vulnerability as a product of the more sensitive socialisation process of women (Pleysier 2010: 106).

4. Socio-economic vulnerability

A sense of vulnerability due to having fewer resources to prevent crime than people from higher economical classes (Oppelaar & Wittebrood 2006, Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010).

5. Minority vulnerability

A general sense of powerlessness and negative future perspectives (Covington & Taylor 1991) among racial minorities, religious minorities and minorities on the grounds of sexual orientation (Van den Herrewegen 2011:44).

General attention to crime

General attention to crime is a societal source for a discourse that people turn to when they discuss issues related to crime (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009). It feeds the discourse on crime with arguments about ‘the worsening nature of the crime problem’ (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:33), strongly relating to anti-social behaviour: ‘behaviour or uses that are outside the normative values of the majority’ (Millie 2011:1).

1. Cultural attention

A general preoccupation with negative messages, which makes individuals more alert to crime threats in their environments and turns ambiguous events into a perception of threat (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:114).

2. Political attention

A political attention to crime and anti-social behaviour with a focus on risk control (Ericson 2007).

3. Media attention

Media attention to crime and anti-social behaviour, which is influenced by political attention to crime and provides the public with information about the magnitude and prevalence of crime (Beunders 2008:40), reminding them also about the continuous threat of crime (Svendsen 2008:12).

4. Crime aversion

Strong emotional reactions to crime, such as ‘anger, indignation, and a passionate desire for vengeance’

(Van Marle 2010:42, also see Ericson 2007:20), due to an unequivocal rejection of crime (Boutellier 1993:11-32, Spithoven 2012, Spithoven, De Graaf & Boutellier 2012, Van der Wurff 1992) and of other types of rough behaviour that threaten societal solidarity (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010).

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Coping strategies

Coping strategies are active deeds (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2010), mostly appearing in the form of physical reactions (Cramer 2006:3), to ‘(…) intentionally engage in activity that will address the problem (…)’ in the form of ‘(…) conscious, purposeful attempts to reduce anxiety with the intent of managing or solving a problem situation’ (Cramer 2006:8), leading to change in reality (ibid:20).

1. Avoidance behaviour

Behavioural ‘(…) avoidance tactics (…) primarily taken to decrease one’s exposure by trying to avoid situations that are related to a highly perceived risk of criminal behaviour’ (Vanderveen 2006:158).

2. Preventive measures

Measures taken ‘(…) to protect oneself and thus to lessen the seriousness of victimisation’ (ibid:159).

Defense mechanisms

Defense mechanisms are a collection of cognitive operations ‘(…) that occur at an unconscious level, the function of which is to modify the conscious experience of thought or affect’ (Cramer 2006:9). These are

‘(…) mental maneuvers in which we all engage to maintain our psychological equilibrium and protect our self-esteem’ (Ibid:4), but ultimately do not change reality (ibid:20). So, more specifically, their function is to ‘(…) protect the individual from painful emotions, ideas and drives’ (Valliant 1992:3). Defenses ultimately enable the individual to avoid the experience of negative affective states, such as ‘(…) pain, anxiety and displeasure’ (ibid:22). Although these manoeuvres are unconscious, they are reflected in narrative material, in which researchers can track ‘disjunction, disruption, or nonsequitur in the flow of discourse – something that hovers on the edge of illogicality or disbelief’ (Cramer 2006:13) and these events can be coded (ibid:14).

1. Denial

‘(T)he failure to see, recognise, or understand the existence of the meaning of an internal or external stimulus, so as to avoid the anxiety that would occur if the stimulus were recognised’ (Cramer 2006:23).

2. Projection

‘(A)ttributing one’s own unacceptable thoughts, feelings, or intentions to others, so as to avoid the anxiety associated with harboring them’ (Cramer 2006:23).

3. Displacement

‘(A) mechanism in which the person generalises or redirects a feeling about an object or a response to another object’ to feel ‘less endangered’ (Valliant 1992:237).

4. Suppressing

‘(A) mechanism in which the person intentionally avoids thinking about disturbing problems, desires, feelings or experiences’ (Valliant 1992:238).

5. Rationalising

‘(A) mechanism in which the person devises reassuring explanations’ (Valliant 1992:238).

Environmental orientation

People have a general focus on characteristics of environments because ‘delinquency tends to occur in characteristic types of area’ (Shaw & McKay 1929 as cited by Van den Herrewegen 2011:51). ‘Every citizen has a mental topography of the relative safety and danger of various locations (…) which he develops through his own experience, information from friends and relatives, and his response to visual characteristics of the buildings and their layouts’ (Merry 1981:413, as quoted by Wilcox-Roundtree et al.

2003:325). This is a constant, mostly unconscious awareness, which leads individuals to constantly scan their environment for ‘fear cues’, ‘fear triggers’, ‘fear spots’ and possible escape routes. It is a watchful modus, ultimately to prevent potential victimisation (Pleysier 2010).

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1. Mental maps

Interpersonally and media-exchanged networks of characteristic elements of situations or locations that people are motivated to avoid, due to the perceived high risk of falling victim of crime themselves, and information about how to manage these situations (Hale 1996, Pleysier 2010). The function of these mental maps is to ‘(…) both represent and avoid (…)’ these situations (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:108).

2. Social incivilities

Based on the separation of social and physical incivilities posited by LaGrange et al. (1992), Farrall, Jackson & Gray (2009:91-92) list the following social crime cues: disorderly or disreputable behaviour, the presence of empty or abandoned streets, the number of people present in the area, the perception of the people in the area and noise pollution. These social cues act as a signal for ‘the community to be suffering from deteriorating standards of behaviour, diminishing power of informal social control, increasing diversification of norms and values, and decreasing levels of trust, reciprocity and respect’

(Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009:90 based on Jackson 2008) and thus a heightened risk of criminal behaviour.

3. Physical incivilities

Based on the separation of social and physical incivilities posited by LaGrange et al. (1992), Farrall, Jackson & Gray (2009:91-92) list the following physical crime cues found in earlier research: poor lighting, graffiti, litter, vandalism, dog dirt, hiding places for criminals, a dilapidated state of buildings and areas adjoining vacant areas such as car parks, parks or factories. These physical cues act as a signal for ‘the community to be suffering from deteriorating standards of behaviour, diminishing power of informal social control, increasing diversification of norms and values, and decreasing levels of trust, reciprocity and respect (Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009: 90 based on Jackson 2008) and thus a heightened risk of criminal behaviour.

4. Limitation of sight

The inability to see other individuals who may be present (Pleysier 2010:152), due to limited sight as the

The inability to see other individuals who may be present (Pleysier 2010:152), due to limited sight as the

In document Keeping trouble at a safe distance (pagina 89-101)