In this paper, we have explored how focal actors influence the dynamics within innovation ecosystems by means of governance mechanisms. By doing so, we augmented existing innovation ecosystem literature in a number of ways. First we augmented existing work on innovation ecosystem literature by the implementation of trust and control by focal actors in innovation ecosystems. Until now, the importance of governance mechanisms and its implementation by the focal actor was only mentioned in innovation ecosystem literature and no empirical research was done yet. This research was among one of the first that used empirical research to have a first grasp of how the focal actor uses governance mechanisms in innovation ecosystems. Second, we extended previous work on the impact of governance mechanisms on partners within innovation ecosystem literature. Scholars had focused on the focal actor as a research object and on what types of governance mechanisms were used. To understand the impact that governance mechanisms have on partners, this research looked beyond the focal actor and integrated the opinion of all partners. As a result, we created an initial understanding of the impact of governance mechanisms on partners. Third, we extended previous work on innovation ecosystem literature regarding the use partner alignment stimulators. In alliance literature, alliance management capabilities were found that mediate the relation between governance structures and alliance performance.
Innovation ecosystems are a subset of alliances, and as in line with alliance literature, a number of partner alignment stimulators were found that influence the relation between governance structures and innovation ecosystem performance. A number of partner alignment stimulators match with alliance management capabilities, but still some important differences are found. As a result, we created an initial understanding on the use of stimulators in the context of innovation ecosystems. Last, we extended previous work in innovation ecosystems by understanding the relation between governance mechanisms, focal actors, partners and partner alignment. Until now, no empirical research was done yet on this unique combination of constructs. This research explored the applicability of constructs out of alliance literature in an innovation ecosystem context. We found that findings out of alliance literature can be applied to innovation ecosystems. Some concepts can be directly applied to innovation ecosystems, whereas some constructs function slightly different in innovation ecosystems. In an innovation ecosystem context, partner alignment stimulators are used, whereas in an alliance context, alliance management capabilities are used. By thoroughly researching the use of governance mechanisms by focal actors, we were able to have a first grasp on how its use influences dynamics within innovation ecosystems.
Also the interaction between trust and control-based governance mechanisms was better understood. In alliance literature it was found that trust and control only complement each other in case of high relational and performance risk (De Man and Roijakkers, 2008; Hagedoorn et al., 2008). In line with alliance literature, trust and control were used as complements within innovation ecosystems. When innovation ecosystems started, both relational and performance risk were high as partner alignment was not found yet and uncertainties existed on whether innovations would be found. Social and behavioural control were used from the start to create a feeling of cohesion and consensus, to prevent opportunistic behaviour and to have a clear division of tasks and responsibilities. Goodwill trust and competence trust complemented to the use of control by creating a feeling of trust, one of the partner alignment stimulators, that in turn stimulated partner alignment. The use of trust-based governance mechanisms stimulated the effectiveness of social control.
One governance mechanism described in alliance literature, output control, was not used in innovation ecosystems. In alliances, output is used to define what the preferred output will be at the end of an alliance. Often, alliances work with shorter time frames than innovation ecosystems and the final output is often discussed upfront (Roijakkers and Maes, 2017). Then output control is used to make sure that at the end of the alliance, the desired output is indeed obtained. Innovation ecosystems often focus on disruptive innovation or have a rather broad focus. Also within innovation ecosystems, it is often not
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known upfront how long the collaboration will last. As a result, it can be questioned whether these types of ecosystems will ever be able to use output control as they are very dynamic.
This research was an important step in further bridging the fields of alliance and ecosystem literature.
As illustrated by table 8, characteristics of different governance mechanisms as used within innovation ecosystems are comparable with definitions from alliance literature. The list of partner alignment stimulators matched only partly with alliance management capabilities, though they both aim at increasing performance. Three alliance management capabilities were in line with partner alignment stimulators that we found. Still it is not know yet whether partner alignment stimulators have a moderating or mediating effect, and whether the differences between alliances and ecosystems are a result of specificities of innovation ecosystems or the specific cases. Based on the findings of this research, we do not understand yet why three out of six alliance management capabilities (Interorganizational learning, sensing and transformation) were not present in innovation ecosystems.
There is a probability that these three alliance management capabilities were not present in the four specific cases that we used for this study. It is also possible that they exist, but that we were not able to identify them. Last, it also could be that these three alliance management capabilities are higher-order stimulators that are not present in emerging innovation ecosystems, and only are revealed in more mature innovation ecosystems. In the four specific cases of this study, the focal actors of the four case studies were still struggling with their communication structures, were still bonding and governance structures were not complete yet. Therefore we assume that they were not ready yet to for example be alert to the environment (sensing), to move beyond routines (transformation) or to build new thinking (interorganizational learning).
The generalizability of this research has a number of limitations, which also imposes avenues for further research. First, this study was based on an in-depth case study of four innovation ecosystems. Therefore we expect that theoretical insights from this study may only be applicable in an innovation ecosystem context. Next to innovation ecosystems, a number of other ecosystem types have been identified in literature (e.g., business ecosystem, knowledge-based ecosystem, service ecosystem, etc.). Future research could explore how governance mechanisms are used by focal actors within other ecosystem types and how the differences between these ecosystems influence the use of governance mechanisms.
Some ecosystem types (e.g. service ecosystems) do not have a focal leader as present in innovation ecosystems. It could be interesting for future research to understand how governance mechanisms are used when no focal leader is present.
Second, the four innovation ecosystems were active in four specific fields; artificial intelligence, blockchain, sustainability and climate change. Therefore we expect that the theoretical insights from this study may only be applicable in innovation ecosystems with a comparable focus area, as each different focus are probably has its own specific implications that can influence the use of partner alignment stimulators. Also it is not known yet whether the mismatch between a number of partner alignment stimulators and alliance management capabilities is a result of the specificities of alliances and innovation ecosystems, or whether it is related to the nature of the four cases. Future research could explore whether governance mechanisms are influenced by comparable partner alignment stimulators in case of innovation ecosystems with a different focus area. Also it could be assessed whether in different focus areas, comparable partner alignment stimulators are found. Last, future research could focus on understanding the differences between partner alignment stimulators and alliance management capabilities is a result of specificities of ecosystems compared to alliances, or that partner alignment stimulators are case-specific.
Third, the four cases represented relatively young innovation ecosystems that were still in the development phase. We had to choose for these kind of innovation ecosystems since only in starting innovation ecosystems, alignments structures are still being developed (Adner, 2017). As a result, the findings are only applicable to emerging innovation ecosystems. Future research could focus on more mature innovation ecosystems to understand whether the role of governance mechanisms changes over
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time and whether partner alignment stimulators still are still important in later stages. Its understanding can continue the stimulation of partner alignment also in later stages of development in innovation ecosystems. Therefore we recommend future researchers to use longitudinal studies to understand how governance mechanisms and partner alignment stimulators develop over time. Also, in more mature innovation ecosystems the role of output control could be investigated, due to the possibility that the output is more predictable in these stages, it should be researched whether output control can be used in innovation ecosystems.
Fourth, the generalizability of the findings can be discussed as out of three out of four cases belonged to the same program, whereas the fourth ecosystem was completely independent from the program. As a result, quite some resemblance was found between three of the cases, in terms of for example behavioural and social control. Still, all three cases were different in for example the amount of actors, used technology and the focal actor. The fourth case differed substantially from the other three in for example the institutional environment and location. To increase generalizability, future research could focus on cases that are more comparable.
Fifth, the findings of this research are based on constructs from alliance literature. Though innovation ecosystems are a subset of alliances, it is discussable whether these constructs can be applied directly to an innovation ecosystem context. We found that governance mechanisms out of alliance literature could be applied to innovation ecosystems, when partner alignment stimulators were added. In case of the alliance management capabilities however, only three out of six capabilities were recognized in innovation ecosystems, though we assumed that the other three would also be present. Future research could focus on understanding the use of partner alignment stimulators in innovation ecosystems that are more mature, to understand whether the three management capabilities are either not present in innovation ecosystems or that they are only revealed in later stages of development.
Last, the findings in this research are solely based on an explorative, in-depth case study. To increase the understanding of partner alignment stimulators and to test how strong their influence is on the effectiveness of governance mechanisms, future research could focus on the use of quantitative research methods. Several scholars made an attempt to define how alliance management capabilities can be measured (Schreiner et al., 2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010).
We discovered a list of relevant partner alignment stimulators that enhance the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. It is important for managers to consider these stimulators when starting an innovation ecosystem.
First, we recommend managers to consider the importance of leadership as it turned out to be one of the most important partner alignment stimulators. A manager should understand that innovation ecosystems require different management capabilities compared to existing management practices; a manager should be a natural connector, listener, visionary, decision-maker and expert. Also a good manager should be able to make decisions regarding the future of the ecosystem (top-down), but also at the same time he should be able to implement the vision of its partners (bottom-up). A manager has to be able to have different roles, depending on what a situation needs. To increase the success of innovation ecosystems, we recommend managers to already consider the characteristics as described above regarding the perfect leader for innovation ecosystems when hiring future managers. Also we recommend focal actors to consider important leadership characteristics when managing an innovation ecosystem.
Second, and related to the first implication, we recommend managers to consider the importance of communication and management structures. A manager has to understand that every partner has its own specific uncertainties and ways to deal with them as well as his or her personal expectations. Only when a partner feels that a manager or focal actor understands him, he will try the best he can to perform. To understand their partners, a manager should be transparent, open, thorough and a listener. These
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characteristics will contribute to a feeling of transparency and openness between the focal actor and partners. Also structures can be designed to effectively manage the expectations of partners. We would like advise to managers to be a transparent and open to ensure that partners feel that they can share their feelings and expectations. To increase the success of innovation ecosystems, we recommend managers to have open and transparent communication and to design an expectation management structure.
Last of all, we recommend managers to consider the importance of resource allocation. Only when every partner contributes resources and knowledge to the innovation ecosystem, it will be possible to create synergies and to innovate collaboratively. For some partners it is difficult to find support within their own organizations to allocate resources, whereas some partners simply do not have the knowledge and resources. Another group of partners simply does not prioritize resource allocation specifically to the ecosystem. Managers should understand why partners are not allocating resources to the organization.
When for example the required resources or knowledge are simply not available, managers could discuss with a partner whether they can contribute by allocating resources that they do have. To increase resource allocation, we recommend managers to investigate why partners are not allocating resources to the ecosystem, and then they can take appropriate actions.
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