Turkey’s Position in the Middle East: Regional Hegemon or Peripheral Bystander?

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Turkey’s Position in the Middle East:

Regional Hegemon or Peripheral Bystander?

Master Thesis

Rick Brouwer

Student nr.: s1454269

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Introduction

Turkey lies at the crossroads of diverse international arenas: the Middle East, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Thanks to this geo-strategic location and the bipolar rivalry, Turkey was constrained in the ability of defining a foreign policy of its own during the Cold War (Hale, 2000, 180). After the Cold War, Turkey adapted to a new and more complex international context, one in which it did not share a common adversary with the West. In the past two decades, foreign policy priorities have shifted in answer to diverse challenges on all levels: domestic, regionally and globally. The end of the Cold War was a turning point in Turkey‟s relations with adjacent regions. Even more so since the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Hereafter, regional relations intensified according to the idea of „zero problems with neighbors‟.

Turkey‟s relations with the countries in the Middle East were cool during the Cold War but they have warmed up since then, prompting Western concerns about whether they are „losing‟ Turkey as a committed ally in a volatile region (Larrabee 2010, 157; Oğuzlu 2008, 5; Danforth 2008, 91). From a Turkish perspective, the reorientation of its foreign policy expands its sphere of influence in the Middle East. Recent examples of Turkey‟s foreign policy activism towards the Middle East are Prime Minister Erdoğan‟s visit to Tehran in Oktober 2009, and the successful attempts of improving diplomatic relations with Syria since 2004 (The Economist, 29 October 2009; The Guardian, 1 October 2009).

One way to make sense of this activism is by using a theory of „regional hegemony‟ to analyze Turkey‟s position in the Middle East. While most literature on hegemonic theory focuses on the United States as a global hegemonic power, I will apply a theory of regional hegemony that is developed by Miriam Prys, who is a researcher at the Hamburg International Graduate School for the Study of Regional Powers. This framework is chosen because of its attention to different sources of power. From a realist point of view the Middle East is characterized as a multi-polar region in which no state is powerful enough to dominate the others (Beck 2008, 15). However, a different theoretical approach with attention to different power resources, is likely to have a different finding. That is why I will challenge the view that there is no Middle Eastern hegemon by applying a framework that derives its theoretical foundations from social constructivism.

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and the foreign policy strategy of the most preponderant state. However, besides these internal dynamics within a region, regional hegemony also depends on the hegemon‟s interaction at the global level. Interregional relations, global power endorsement or rejection and Turkey‟s ambitions at the global level are a few examples of variables that are at play at this level. This is well explained by Buzan and Wæver in their book Regions and Powers. They emphasize the importance of different levels of analysis in order obtain a more complete picture of the regional order (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).

The leading question is: To what extent can Turkey be characterized as a regional hegemon in the Middle East and to what extent is that position undermined or strengthened by interregional and global systemic factors? Chapter 1 deals with the question of how a theory of regional hegemony is to be constructed. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyze Turkey‟s position in the Middle East according to the three variables of the framework presented in Chapter 1. Chapter 5 answers the question how Turkey‟s hegemonic position in the Middle East is affected by interregional and global systemic factors.

The Middle East is not easily defined or delineated. Therefore, there is no consensus among scholars on where to place Turkey. Buzan and Wæver, for example, have defined the Middle East as stretching from Morocco to Iran (including Israel and Iran) while excluding Afghanistan and Turkey. Others define the region as the Muslim Middle East (with Turkey) or the Arab Middle East (without Turkey, Israel and Iran; Bilgin 2004). In this thesis, the term „Middle East‟ is used issue-specific and refers to the group of states that are of importance for a particular issue. Among these issue areas are security and stability in the immediate surroundings and economic interdependence: Kurdish insurgency, the Israel-Arab conflict and Iran‟s nuclear ambitions are issues that are of great importance for Turkey. For this reason, more attention is given to the Levant and Gulf regions than to the Maghreb.

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Chapter 1: Constructing a Theory of Regional Hegemony

Three elements in the title of this chapter are of special importance. First, in this chapter, a theory of regional hegemony is constructed with use of analytical building blocks stemming from the International Relations theories (neo-) realism and social constructivism. The aim of this chapter is to develop a social constructivist image of regional hegemony based on the typologies and analytical frameworks that are used in the literature on regional powers and hegemony. Second, this chapter‟s title asks for a theory of hegemony while the region of focus in this thesis, the Middle East, is usually seen as a multi-polar power constellation (Beck 2008, 6). In spite of this, this thesis focuses is on the degree of hierarchy in the relations among Middle Eastern states. Turkey‟s foreign policy activism towards its South-Eastern neighbors provides the rationale to do so. Attention is given to economic and social structures besides the traditional focus on power politics. Third, the concept of hegemony is constructed for a strictly regional use. This approach contrasts the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony that focuses on the development and transformation of the hegemonic nature of world order (Burchill et al., 2005, 127)1. It also contrasts those (realist) authors focusing on the United States as a global hegemon (Steans and Pettiford, 2005, 66).

Regional hegemony is conceptualized by Miriam Prys. According to Prys, regional hegemony is, in combination with material preponderance, constituted by three dimensions: the perceptions of all regional actors involved, the projection of power and values over the region and the provision of regional public goods. Prys applied this framework to analyze South Africa‟s role in Southern African and, in particular, its relations with Zimbabwe (Prys, 2008). The strength of this framework is that it can also be applied to other regions. This research intends to contribute to the knowledge of Turkey as an emerging regional power but, by application of Prys‟ framework, it also provides a greater theoretical insight of regional hegemonies.

The three dimensions formulated by Miriam Prys describe a set of strategies that are available for a regional power. They take into account the various sources of power (e.g. material and ideational power factors) and the inter-subjective relationships that construct the regional order. So, the framework contains evidence of a traditional approach to hegemony

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(based on material power) as well as an ideational approach, advocated by Critical School theorists and constructivists (Burchill and others, 2005, 196). Detlef Nolte, in a comment on regional powers, was quite apt: “the status of a regional power is a social category that depends on the recognition of this status and the corresponding power hierarchy by other states. Nevertheless, the inclusion in this social category also presupposes the corresponding material resources” (Nolte 2007, 12).

Below, a review of the background literature on regional hegemony is provided in order to be able to understand the various elements of Prys‟ framework and it helps to give the theory a place in the literature. Then, the three dimensions are explained in greater detail. The last part of this chapter is reserved for making the theory of regional hegemony applicable to Turkey and the Middle East.

1.1 Regional hegemony in International Relations literature

Since it is one of those contested concepts within the field of International Relations, regional hegemony is often randomly used to indicate a dominant-submissive relationship. But there is more to it. The nature of regional hegemony as well as the elements constituting it change according to the theoretical approach that is chosen by the researcher: neo-realists are concerned with hegemonic stability and focus on dominant states, while critical theorists point to „dominant states, social forces and ideas in consolidating hegemonic projects‟ (Steans and Pettiford, 2005, 113). The analytical framework developed by Miriam Prys is a compilation of commonalities in the academic literature on regional hegemonies. In this section, a discussion of the background literature on regional hegemony is provided in order to clarify the application of „regional hegemony‟ in this thesis.

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It is complementary because constructivists focus on how institutionalized norms shape the identities and interests of actors while rationalists focus on the processes and strategies through which these preferences are realized. Although not everybody agrees with this (Burchill and others, 2005, 203), it is a useful approach because social constructivism stresses the importance of interests (and their formation processes) and strategic considerations next to factors like the influence of ideas, identities and norms.

In the rationalist realm the workings of the regional hegemony have been explored mainly by neo-realists.2 However, it must be acknowledged that the neo-realist explanation of the concept is only one part of the more complete picture that social constructivism provides. For example, the balance-of-power mechanism that is considered law-like in neo-realism is important to constructivists only if states have socialized that balance-of-power mechanism and act as if it is reality (Steans and Pettiford, 2005, 189).

Another strength of social constructivism is that state-centrism is taken as an unproblematic category and that it is treated as the central actor in international relations (Steans and Pettiford, 2005, 201). The major rationale for this study is Turkey‟s foreign policy activism regarding the (individual states in) Middle East. This implies a focus on state-to-state relations. Still, the actors are not seen as unitary actors (as does Alexander Wendt in his systemic constructivist theory; Burchill and others, 2005, 199) and there is certainly attention to the construction of state identity and preferences.

The nature of regional hegemony

There are two ways of looking at the concept of regional hegemony. First, regional hegemony is a type of regional order. In the neo-realist sense, this regional order consists of one state that is dominant in a range of sectors, exerting influence over secondary states that are part of that order. It is a system of states characterized by hierarchy (in contrast to anarchy) because the units stand in a relationship of authority and subordination. Other types of regional asymmetrical orders are: leadership, an asymmetrical federation, a concert of states or an empire (Burchill and others, 2005, 35) A constructivist view of hegemony as a regional order is formulated by Burges (Burges 2008, 78) who developed the idea of consensual hegemony.

2_{There are two notable exceptions. First, Robert Keohane produced a liberal institutionalist critique of}

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Secondly, regional hegemony is a type of strategy that the hegemon applies in order to build the regional order to its own liking (Pederson 2002, 683). A particular pattern of relationships grows from the strategy that is chosen by the regional power. Whatever regional order is constructed is therefore dependent to a great extent on the strategy that is adopted by the preponderant state.

A distinction should also be made between preferences and strategies. An actor prefers some outcomes over others and it conducts a strategy to achieve the most preferred possible outcome (Hanif 2009, 12). The word „strategy‟ implies an unconstrained option to act, however, the options for one actor are affected by the behavior of others (from within the region and from outside the region). Actors need to take into account their own preferences but also their beliefs about future actions of other actors. These factors influence the margin to conduct a hegemonic strategy independently.

It is crucial to have clear the distinction between regional order and strategy because while each is affected by the other, it does not mean that a hegemonic strategy creates a hegemonic order per se. That is dependent on the strategy‟s success. The strategy of the preponderant state is appreciated as only one variable in the construction of a regional hegemonic order.

Realist approaches to regional hegemony

Regional hegemony is studied primarily by neo-realists who look at the mechanical reflection of the distribution of power among actors. The starting point for conceptualizing regional hegemony is the global balance-of-power game while the internal policies of a regime are of secondary interest. In this view, it is impossible to see a regional hegemony separately from the global structure because it derives its regional hegemonic status from its ability to impact on the global structure (Hurrel 2006, 5-6).

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the behavior of actors (and the outcomes of their interaction) varies according to the relative position within the global and regional structures (Mares, 1988 454) state preferences are exogenously determined and their behavior can be predicted by rational game-theory.

In another realist account of regional hegemony, David Myers theorizes about hegemon-centered regional state systems in his monograph Regional Hegemons: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Response. In his view regional hegemons are states who posses sufficient power to dominate the regional state system (Myers, 1991, 12). Two interesting points are up for discussion in this respect. First, domination (or coercion) is considered to characterize hegemony. Secondly, Myers regards the uneven distribution of material power of primary importance for constituting regional hegemony. These assumptions are disputed (see for example Destradi, Prys, Nolte and Pederson).

Within the rationalist realm, hegemony is often stated as an answer to why is there a degree of regulation and order in an anarchic world. Charles Kindleberger developed the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) for this reason. The theory holds that instability in the international order can be avoided if the dominant actor assumes a hegemonic role (Steans and Pettiford, 2005, 66). The theory was applied only to global hegemony at first, but, with the introduction of HST to the realm of security it was also applied to regional state-systems (Hanif 2009, 11). As in Waltz‟ structural realism, HST also looks at polarity as the key factor for stability. They differ on HST‟s assumption that unipolar systems are more stable then bipolar ones (Hanif 2009, 11). The idea is that the (regional) hegemon provides security and stability through unilateral actions.

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In sum, the neo-realist image of regional hegemony includes primacy of the global structure over individual states and regions and it also includes a material power-base and an emphasis on domination and coercion.

The limits of realism and the relevance of constructivism

The realist approach matters because the actors, who make up the region, are unlikely to ignore the role of power in their relationships, nor do they intend to. At the outset, hegemony is a power-political term because it assumes a degree of hierarchy in state-to-state relationships. The relevant question is how the actors perceive power and to what extent do they act as if the distribution of power determines their relationship. The above discussion of a neo-realist image of regional hegemony is useful to identify a couple of contradictions in the use of regional hegemony in IR literature.

First, hegemony is a point on the continuum between benevolence and coercion. For neo-realists, hegemony is synonymous for empire. Empires are characterized by the unilateral use of force (power from military capabilities) and an emphasis on furthering its own national interest at the expense of other states. An empire is dominant in terms of material power resources. In the modern sense of the word, an empire can also be informal, which means the control of one political society over another without annexing its territory (Destradi 2008, 8). Empires apply methods of coercion (making threats or engage in unilateral moves to have the weaker state acquiesce to its will) and imposition (in which case the target is so weak it has no other option than to comply (Destradi 2008, 9). In contrast to the realist view, empires are not hegemonies.

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The second contradiction concerns the nature of power. What kind of power resources are required for the exercise of regional hegemony? Alexander Wendt has acknowledged that international politics are considered to be shaped by power relations. However, Wendt argues that the effects of power are not constituted primarily by brute material forces, as realism claims (Burchill and others, 2005, 209). In this respect, and in spite of the importance of material preponderance as a part of hegemony, it does not have to be present in all issue areas (Prys 2008, 7). Realists assume that the hegemon provides material incentives (through the conversion of economic and military power into political power) to the weaker states in order to alter the costs and benefits of acquiescence with the regional hegemon (Destradi 2008, 13-14).

Thomas Pederson and Sean Burges are among those that have formulated a critique of neo-realism by incorporating ideational factors into the exercise of regional hegemony. Pre-existing principled beliefs and ideas about what is right or just influences a state‟s „strategic culture‟ (Pederson 2002, 685). This is important for the manner of interaction and the type of strategy that the hegemon adopts. For example, the idea of regional integration as a peace doctrine (Pederson 2002, 690).

Hegemony is based on the intersubjective internalization of ideas, norms and identities by the subordinate states (Destradi 2008, 14). Power is then exercised through the shaping of another states‟ understanding of the world. The use of ideational power resources is necessary for a hegemon to gain acceptance and legitimacy for its position within the region. To incorporate these features, Burges developed the concept of „consensual hegemony‟ in which “the process of dialogue and interaction causes subordinate parties to appropriate and absorb the substance and requisites of the hegemony as their own” (Burges 2008, 65). Still, relative power capabilities remain important for the launch of a hegemonic project (Burges 2008, 74) but its success is dependent on active willing and engagement of other states, which requires legitimacy. The realist assumption that hegemony is under constant threat is then rejected in this case.

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In sum, material power factors and ideational factors interact in the exercise of regional hegemony and are, in fact, mutually reinforcing methods. The hegemon is essentially egoistic but can certainly be benevolent; projecting its own goals as common goals through socialization and consensus building while minimizing coercion. Depending on the strategy, subordinate states comply with the construction of a regional hegemonic order because it is expensive not to (rationalist approach) or because their norms and values are redefined through the employment of hegemonic projects (constructivist approach).

Now, the theory of Miriam Prys will be explained in greater detail and it should become clear how the framework incorporates both materialist and ideational sources of power and is attentive to different hegemonic strategies (be they coercion or benevolence).

1.2 Perceptions, Projection, Provision Perceptions

The first variable of regional hegemony deals with how a regional power perceives its own role in the region and how other states in that region perceive that role.

There is no assurance that the most preponderant state will assume a hegemonic position automatically. It is likely that two equally powerful states do not have equal influence in the region if one perceives itself as a regional leader (and consequently acts like one) while the other does not. Political willingness to accept the burdens of hegemony (like the provision of regional public goods) is inherent to that self-perception. Political willingness means that a state with an ambition to become a regional hegemon makes conscious decisions to act as one (Prys 2008, 8). Political willingness is quite visibly stated in policy papers and declarations of intention by the regional power.

However, the notion of self-perception becomes tricky if the preponderant state has no ambition to become a hegemon but is, in practice, acting like one nonetheless. This may be due to a sense of exceptionalism (Prys 2008, 9). It means that the regional power is aware of its own power or influence in the region and is (more or less) willing to act upon it, even without explicit evidence of documented foreign policy papers. The best example of an perceived exceptional position within a region is India, which regards its regional predominance as a burden (Prys 2008, 8).

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pushed (by actors from within the region) or pulled (by those outside the region) to assume certain regional responsibilities (Prys 2009, 198). Less prominent states might wait for the regional power to act first, thereby enforcing a leader-follower relationship. It is also possible that the regional power sets an example (unconsciously) with its ideology, political or economic system, or set of values. The ability of a regional power to determine its own power/influence/position in a region is thus constrained by the perceptions and actions of other actors. This idea can be projected to the global level as well. Global power recognition may prompt the regional hegemon to speak or act on behalf of the entire region.

In sum, „political willingness‟ and the notion of „exceptionalism‟ are mere constructing factors but not necessary per se for the emergence of a regional hegemonic state system. Also, the perceptions and actions of the other states help to „construct‟ the regional order.

Projection

The second dimension of regional hegemony concerns the ways of exercising power over the region. Since power is a contested concept in International Relations theory it deserves some attention. Traditionally, discussions of power were the preserve of realists who treated power as an outflow of brute material forces. However, as Wendt argues, the translation of material advantage into sustained and intentional political influence is often problematic. That is because power is also constituted by non-material factors like legitimacy and norm socialization (Burchill and others, 2005, 209-210).

The dimension of projection deals with the outflow of power derived from material resources as well as from non-material sources. The projection of interests and values happens through consultative and consensual processes but also through manipulations of secondary state‟s interests (for example by providing political or economic incentives. More forceful actions such as sanctions and boycotts are also possible. A regional hegemon is able to conduct strategies anywhere on the spectrum between coercion (usually conducted by a unilateral hegemon or an imperial power) and the most subtle strategy of socialization (as in a consensual or discursive hegemony). Coercion is easier to identify as an hegemonic project than the process of socialization because the latter needs time to unfold and progresses only gradually over time. A complicating factor is that socialization and norm projection happen even without conscious efforts to that end.

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from underlying values, norms and interests of the regional power. This is for the purpose of assessing whether its values are in fact projected onto secondary states by specific activities. If you analyze the other way around (inferring norms and interests from hegemonic behavior) it is impossible to identify (intentional) projection.

Therefore, Prys‟ proposes two stages for assessment of projection. In stage one, the underlying norms and interests should be identified and inferred from official government documents, statements and declarations of intentions. After this, stage two determines whether and how specific attempts (through analyzing the hegemon‟s behavior) have been made to project the regional power‟s interests and norms onto its neighbors. These specific activities include agenda-setting in multilateral forums, state to state negotiations, (conditional) financial aid and the establishment of economic, political or social institutions (Prys 2009, 204).

The difficulty with measuring hegemonic projection can be made clear by an example. In the Middle East, where state-to-state relations were (and arguably still are) volatile, it is possible that the normalization of a relationship is to be mistaken for hegemonic projection. In that case, what is considered normal engagement by one analyst can be viewed as a hegemonic project by another. For example, A thin line exists between business opportunities exploited by private entrepreneurs on the one hand and the intentional hegemonic projection of a liberal economic system on the other. For this reason one needs to distinguish between an actor‟s behavior and its underlying interests and values.

In short, projection is about the changing of preferences of secondary states in the region in order to bring them to a path of actions that suits the interests and values of the hegemon (Prys 2009, 214). In this process a hegemonic regional state system is constructed.

Provision

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about the changing of preferences of secondary states while provision is about the realization of collective goods for the region as a whole. Ideally, no state could be excluded from these. (Prys 2009, 214).

Impure public goods (that only partially meet the criteria) make matters more complex, for example the provision of financial assistance to weaker states in the region is both rival and it excludes others (less weak states). However, financial assistance still counts as provision if the ultimate goal of the financial aid is, for example, the stabilization of the entire region. The provision of stability does meet both criteria. From this, it follows that public goods are often defined as goals. Peace and prosperity are good examples of such goals. However, according to Miriam Prys, these broadly defined goals are not suitable to be empirically studied. Instead, a „means definition‟ is applied which refers to the specific resources, processes, policies and institutions that are necessary for the achievement of specific regional public goods (defined as goals). These goals include the provision of regional security through enhanced military capacity and cooperation or the advancement of economic development.

In accordance with a constructivist approach, Prys does not formulate specific factors that are always needed for „provision‟ to be a constructing factor of regional hegemony. Instead of setting a quantifiable threshold (a set of factors or variables) for the provision of regional public goods, Prys argues for a contextualized approach that considers the regional circumstances. In section 3 where I will make the framework applicable to Turkey, these circumstances are considered.

Levels of analysis

The three aforementioned dimensions relate to the domestic and regional dynamics. However, the analysis is not complete without attention for the inter-regional and global levels. Turkey‟s growing economy and its geo-strategic location make it a player on both the world stage and in several regional arenas: the Middle East, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. To be able to say something about Turkey‟s position in the Middle East, one should be attentive towards global pressures on the region and Turkey‟s own ambitions on that level.

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question whether the regional hegemon is either constrained or, in fact, provided opportunities to establish a regional hegemonic order. In order to assess which one is the case, questions are considered such as whether Turkey‟s actions in global politics are compatible with its regional role. To what extent derives Turkey its global reputation from its power in and over the region? Does Turkey prioritize its global ambitions or its regional responsibilities? To what extent holds Turkey a common identity with the region and how does that show in its foreign policy at the inter-regional and global stage?

In line with the constructivist method, identity is given special attention because it is regarded to be an important determinant for foreign policy interests (Burchill and others, 2005, 196). It is also relevant because the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 sparked a debate on the changing identity of Turkey and the link towards closer ties with Turkey‟s neighbors to the East and South. In addition, self-perception should be researched not only at the regional level but also at the global level to see whether Turkey‟s regional position is a „stepping stone‟ towards global power status. The inter-regional and global level factors are discussed in chapter 5.

1.3 Theory application to Turkey and the Middle East

The three dimensions of the framework categorize and arrange a plethora of primary and secondary sources on the position and influence of Turkey in the Middle East. These include academic studies, official government policy papers or statements and media publications.

The issues

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Projection is about whether Turkey‟s actions and bequeaths in the Middle East are part of a hegemonic strategy. The underlying norms and interests are to be projected onto the region through specific actions. These norms include a commitment to democratic advancement in the Middle East, increasing economic interdependence, intercultural understanding and the building of harmony and tolerance among cultures. However, the single most important norm is the establishment of regional stability and security (Website Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The third dimension, provision, researches the extent and the kind of common goods or goals that Turkey provides to the Middle East. Regional security and economic development are the most important. Attempts to provide security must be seen in context to the multitude and complexity of security issues in the Middle East. It is quite harsh to conclude that Turkey is completely failing the Middle East because Kurdish insurgents still operate out of Iraq, or because a long-term solution for Iran is still lacking. It is relevant to take a look at the methods of conflict resolution and the (hegemonic) role of Turkey in these cases. Alongside aforementioned issues, Turkey is involved in a plethora of bilateral and multilateral security talks (e.g. the Israeli-Arab conflict, Lebanon and Iraq).

The region

The Middle East has many definitions, ranging from the „Muslim Middle East‟, the „Arab Middle East‟ and the „Mediterranean Middle East‟ (Bilgin 2004, 25-41). How should a region actually be defined and delineated? In Regions and Powers, Buzan and Wæver emphasize the importance of physical proximity for generating (security) interaction among the states that make up the region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 45). They do not accept regions as „pre-given‟ entities according to historical or cultural sources. Instead, they define regions specifically in the functional terms of security. This is a useful approach because it avoids the debate whether Turkey actually is a Middle Eastern state (in many cases, Turkey is considered a European country).

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clusters because they are greatly interlinked and cannot be analysed apart from each other (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 44). Thus the core of this constructivist method is: Who securitizes what issue?

RSCT is able to complement Prys‟ regional hegemony framework by its ability to construct a region and determine who is involved. Buzan and Wæver argue that there exists a large Middle Eastern Security Complex with three sub-complexes, namely the Gulf, the Levant and the Maghreb. Interstate wars over territorial disputes, ideological competitions, power distributions and status are the primary indicators for these labels (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 215-216). However, these regions are likely to look different when for example, hegemonic provision is used to define a region instead of a set of securitization processes. The question is then: Who provides what to whom? The idea that regions are constructed (issue-specific) and not simply exist ‟out there‟ is disregarded in Prys‟ theory.

Another interesting point that follows from integrating Prys‟ theory of regional hegemony with RSCT is what happens if the most preponderant state is the securitizing actor. Does that mean that the others must securitize the same issue? In principle, all actors decide for themselves what constitutes a threat, there is autonomy for these actors because securitization is a political act (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 72). However, not all actors are equal and therefore not all actors have the same capabilities to securitize issues on their terms. Therefore, Turkey, being a potential hegemon, may be able to influence the securitizing actions of secondary powers, for example by projection of its norms and values. On the other hand, Turkey is considered an „insulator‟ by Buzan and Wæver, meaning that the country is actually located between different regional security complexes; the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 394). Recent Turkish foreign policy activism in all three regions challenges the „insulator‟ characterization.

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Chapter 2: Perceptions

Although the distribution of material capabilities is not the sole determinant for the construction of regional hegemony, it is a useful starting point because material preponderance is often perceived as an important power source by the actors themselves. Also, it provides some insight in the states‟ relative capabilities and their representation. Traditionally, the three most popular power indices are military power, the size of the economy measured in Gross Domestic Product: GDP, and demography (Mearsheimer, 2001, 60-61). The numbers are from The Military Balance 2010.

Population GDP Defense budget Military Personnel

Turkey 76,805,524 658bn 9.9bn ACTIVE 510,600 RESERVE 378,700

Saudi Arabia 28,686,633 410bn 41.2bn ACTIVE 233,500

Iran 66,429,284 359bn 9.59bn (2008) ACTIVE 523,000 RESERVE 350,000

Israel 7,233,701 198bn 9.78bn ACTIVE 176,500 RESERVE 565,000

Egypt 78,866,635 186bn 3.27bn (2008) ACTIVE 468,500 RESERVE 479,000

Iraq 28,945,569 76.0bn ACTIVE 578,269

Syria 21,762,978 53.3bn 1.87bn ACTIVE 325,000 RESERVE 314,000

Lebanon 4,017,095 30.7bn 911m ACTIVE 59,100

Jordan 6,269,285 21.0bn 2.31bn ACTIVE 100,500 RESERVE 65,000

All numbers are of 2009 unless stated otherwise. GDP and defense budgets are in United States Dollars. The countries are ranked according to GDP. Data compiled from The Military balance 2010 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies).

A few observations stand out. First, Turkey does well in all three categories: Turkey has by far the biggest economy and the second largest population after Egypt. On military power Turkey is roughly equal to Iran and Israel. Saudi Arabia stands out in this respect with a relatively small army but a defense budget that is equivalent to that of all others combined. Consequently, the Saudi army is one of the most technologically advanced in the region (The Military Balance, 241). Turkey has a material preponderance only in the size of its economy which, it must be noted, is far more diversified than the economies of Saudi Arabia and Iran who depend greatly on the exports of carbon fuels.

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enmity and amity in a region. That makes it is interesting to see how Turkey perceives its own position and role in the Middle East and how Turkey is regarded by the other states in the region.

2.1 Self-perception

Through the dimension of self-perception the concepts of „agency‟ and „structure‟ are linked together by „indicating that state behavior is purposeful and deliberate, while at the same time recognizing that it is shaped by the structural, historical or institutional contexts in the international and domestic milieus‟ (Prys 2010, 12). In the domestic realm, a dynamic Turkish identity provides the context for state behavior vis-à-vis the Middle East. It‟s dynamic nature is emphasized because changes in identity have caused profound changes in Turkish foreign policy orientation since the Cold War. This is attributable to the notions of „Kemalism‟ and „Neo-Ottomanism‟ which have polarized political elites and Turkish society alike. Turkey‟s self-conception as a Middle Eastern country is unmistakably tied to this dichotomy (see for example Yavuz, Onar and Taşpınar).

Kemalism, which became the official ideology in the 1920s, emphasizes the unitary and secular character of the Turkish nation-state with a strong commitment to the West (Onar 2009, 4). Turkey was unitary in the sense that that every citizen living within Turkish borders had to adopt a Turkish identity regardless of ethnicity and language. Until today, the role of the military is to safeguard this principle against separatism, especially against Kurdish rebellion. Secondly, Kemalism rejects the theocratic basis of authority in Turkish politics and Kemalists instigated a cultural revolution to displace Islam from public life (Onar 2009, 5). Up to the 1980s, Kemalism was largely unchallenged but since then Islamists and Kurds became vocal challengers to this official state-ideology and set up ad hoc coalitions which led to the emergence of the Islamist Welfare Party.

Neo-Ottomanism embraces Turkey‟s historical and imperial legacy and aims for a society in which Turkey‟s multiple identities can coexist, as was the case in the days of the multinational Ottoman empire. In the 1990s, when neo-Ottomanism started to receive a good deal of attention because it was perceived as a viable alternative for Kemalism, the Welfare Party saw Turkey as a „big brother‟ to the Arab-Muslim world (Onar 2009, 12). It is argued that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is its (more moderate) successor (Onar 2009, 6).

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heritage and multicultural identity. While Kemalists prefer to completely disregard the Middle East (seeing it as an impediment to modernity), proponents of neo-Ottomanism desire a „zero-problems‟ policy towards all of Turkey‟s neighbors. Multi-dimensional negotiations and engagement is a key foreign policy tactics of neo-Ottomanism and the AKP. Ömer Taşpınar describes Neo-Ottomanism as „more self-confident and embracing a grand, geostrategic vision of Turkey as an effective and engaged regional actor, trying to solve regional and global problems‟ (Taşpınar 2008, 3).

Turkey‟s self-positioning in the Middle East and its self-perception in relation to that region is schizophrenic along the lines of the acquired idea of neo-Ottomanism and the official state-ideology of Kemalism. What they have in common is a relatively strong nationalism. They differ on the role of Turkey‟s Islamic identity in politics. The AKP (founded by the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2001) is often viewed as yet another upsurge of political Islam since the 1990s. The AKP is particularly proud of Turkey demonstrating the compatibility of Islam, democracy and a moderate version of secularism (Taşpınar 2010, Turkey Institute, author‟s notes). AKP members view the Turkish democracy as an important source of soft power in the Middle East (Davutoğlu 2007, 84). Kemalists, however, are wary of exporting (or projecting) the Turkish model for democracy to the Islamic world because they fear it would come at the expense of secularism and Turkey‟s traditional Western orientation (Taşpınar 2008, 14). Kemalists prefer a non-involvement strategy in the Middle East.

Traditionally, Turkey‟s involvement in the Middle East was limited to trying to resolve (or deal with) the Kurdish issue which was a cross border problem for Turkey. In this light, the Kemalist focus on dealing with the Kurdish question (by suppression) is rejected by the AKP elites. By emphasizing Islam in the construction of a shared identity among Turks and Kurds the AKP tries to play down their differences. In the foreign policy realm, this leaves room to conduct a wider and multi-faceted Middle Eastern strategy, one that is less dominated by the Kurdish „threat to security‟. In social constructivist terms: The Kurdish problem is securitized primarily by Kemalists but much less by proponents of neo-Ottomanism. This leaves Turkey more room to maneuver in the Middle East, for example to economically engage the relative autonomous Iraqi Kurds.

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Academics such as Taşpınar, Walker, Murinson and Onar simply equate the emergence of the AKP and its corresponding foreign policy strategy since 2002 to neo-Ottomanism. However, the idea of neo-Ottomanism was already existent in the 1990s, prior to the coming to power of the AKP (see for example Yavuz 1998). Therefore, an important question remains: To what extent did (and does) the AKP adopt neo-Ottomanism as its own ideology? To answer this question one needs to take a close look at „strategic depth‟, currently the most influential foreign policy doctrine in Turkey, developed and since 2009 executed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül have shown great willingness to adopt Davutoğlu‟s ideas and portray them as belonging to the AKP (Walker 2007, 2). Davutoğlu stayed clear of framing his foreign policy strategies in the context of neo-Ottomanism but despite this, Strategic Depth has some vital elements in common with neo-Ottomanism: First, Davutoğlu utilizes Turkey‟s Ottoman legacy in the conceptualization of „historical depth‟, meaning Turkey to be the „natural heir to the Ottoman empire that once unified the Muslim world and therefore has the potential to become a Muslim regional power‟ (Walker 2007, 2).

A focus on geography is another foreign policy determinant that „strategic depth‟ and Ottomanism have in common. However, it is the limited geographic reach of neo-Ottomanism that constitutes discrepancy between the two. Neo-neo-Ottomanism is criticized for promoting pro-active foreign policy only in the former Ottoman territories (Aras 2009, 3). Strategic depth, instead, transcends neo-Ottomanism because its policies and strategies stretch beyond the borders of the historic Ottoman empire indicating a strategy of self-positioning not only at the regional level but also at the global level of politics.

That becomes more clear if one examines Davutoğlu‟s arguments. According to Davutoğlu is Turkey is a central country, strategically located at the core of the Afro-Eurasian continent. Turkey‟s central position is different from peripheral island countries like Japan and the United Kingdom and continental countries such as the US and Australia. They are located away from the Afro-Eurasian heartland. It is this special position that gives Turkey „geographical depth‟ and a special country status (Davutoğlu 2007, 78). Consequently, Turkey‟s area of influence is significant; Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country and Davutoğlu argues that Turkey should make its role as a peripheral country (most clear during the Cold War) part of its past.

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International Crisis Group there exists currently a broad domestic support for Davutoglu‟s idea that Turkey should play a more prominent role in the region (ICG 2010, 22).

Most analysts of Turkish foreign policy (with the notable exception of Bülent Aras; Aras 2009) agree that the origins of Davutoğlu‟s strategic depth doctrine can be traced back to the neo-Ottomanism of the Ӧzal and Erbakan governments in the 1980s and 1990s. These features include a non-imperialist ideology with political and cultural tolerance for diversity (compare Davutoğlu 2007, 80 with Yavuz, 1998, 40). Secondly, there is the idea that the borders of the Turkish Republic do not correspond to the political, economic, and historical realities of Turkey. In this light, Neo-Ottomanism means becoming conscious of historic ties that transcend the confines of the current republic. It also aims to create a new sense of macro-identity among populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage (Yavuz 1998, 39). A third parallel is a multi-dimensional foreign policy and an innovative approach to geopolitics (Murinson 2006, 947), thereby utilizing Turkey‟s geographically central position.

From Davutoğlu‟s comments one recognizes a sense of exceptionalism for Turkey vis-à-vis the wider region. Although Turkey‟s exceptional position (as a former empire and central country) is definitely relevant for its hegemonic status in the Middle East, it is essential to note that Turkey is seen to have historic depth in all adjacent regions, not only the Middle East. Even more important, Turkey‟s geographic depth is as much constructed by its proximity to the Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Caucasus as it is to the Middle East. The „zero problems with all neighbors‟ policy of the AKP is evidence of Turkey claiming to appreciate good relations with the Middle East just as much as good relations with other adjacent regions.

Therefore, the relevant question is whether there exists a sense of Turkish exceptionalism that is particular for the Middle East.

Turkish exceptionalism vis-à-vis the Middle East

A Turkish sense of exceptionalism vis-à-vis the Middle East is particularly evident in attempts to export the „Turkish model‟. Democratization and Islam are its major features. Some examples make this exceptionalism clear.

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wars into a geography of peace” (Powell 2004). In this example Turkey acts as a catalyst and a channel through which the Middle Eastern countries relate to the US and EU.

Abdullah Gül also stresses the exceptional and alleviating role of Turkey in a world where there is a perceived threat of a clash of civilizations. His argument is that Turkey brings Europe to the Middle East and vice versa. Turkey‟s accession process is evidence of the fact that civilizations line up and cooperate in terms of a devotion to democracy, and not on the basis of religion. Turkey‟s accession process sends a message of reform, modernity, moderation and integration across the Middle East and the wider international community (Gül 2004, 2). Turkey thus sees itself as an essential link between cultures, fostering mutual understanding through closer relations.

Furthermore, a feeling of moral and humanitarian responsibility for the Middle East stems from Gül‟s essay. This goes beyond short-term economic and political interests as drivers of Turkey‟s foreign policy. Gül emphasizes the importance of better use of natural and human resources, good governance, transparency, accountability, respect for human rights and integration with the rest of the world. He goes on by saying: “We have sought to achieve democracy, civil rights and liberties, respect for the rule of law, civil society, transparency, and gender equality. Our experience proves that national and spiritual values can be in perfect harmony with contemporary standards” (Gül 2004, 6). Here, according to Gül, Turkey should be seen as a source of inspiration (Gül September 2010; Gül November 2010) and a model for Middle Eastern countries that seek to combine modernity with traditional Islamic values. Gül‟s emphasis on the opportunity for others to learn from the Turkish experience is a near perfect example of rhetoric like „god-given rights and duties‟ and Gül‟s perceived stature of Turkey as a „city on the hill‟.3

Ahmet Davutoğlu sees an important reason for further establishing Turkey‟s position in the Middle East in the need for defining a common international attitude towards issues in the Middle East. A primary example is the international attitude towards Iraq after the US invasion: It is in Turkey‟s interest to replace scenario‟s of Iraqi fragmentation with an emphasis on state-unity and sovereignty (this is especially vital considering Turkey‟s own risk of Kurdish separatism). Davutoğlu articulated a view concrete steps (or principles) through which the Turkey‟s position in the Middle East is enhanced or influence is carried out.

First, priority is to be given to the process of establishing common security through (secondly) mediation and dialogue as a means of resolving disputes. In this regard Turkey is

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able to assume the role of facilitator and mediator. Third, economic interdependence between Middle Eastern countries and Turkey should elevate all states out of isolation. The fourth principle is cultural coexistence and plurality (Davutoğlu 2007, 4-5). These principles are part and parcel of the broader (multiple level) strategy of strategic depth and are akin to neo-Ottomanism.

What is the level of Turkish involvement in the Middle East? It is clear that Turkey‟s self-conception in the Middle East does not include an imperialist agenda like in the days of the old Ottoman empire. Nor is Turkey completely indifferent to the developments and issues of the Middle East (as with Kemalism). Instead, the level of Turkish involvement in the region is determined by an unwillingness to become involved in the troubles and bickering of the region while, at the same time, it has a large stake in the resolution and outcomes of these disputes. The „zero problems with neighbors‟ policy has worked well for Turkey‟s relations with the Middle East because Turkey has not been a party to any of the conflicts (Davutoğlu 2009, Daily Star Newspaper).

This means that Turkey‟s relatively good relations with all actors in the Middle East gives it a unique position to actively contribute to the emergence of peace and stability. As we saw in chapter 1, a regional hegemony is characterized neither by domination (empire) nor by neglect or indifference towards the region. Obviously, Turkey consciously maneuvers somewhere on the spectrum between extreme involvement (empire) and extreme non-involvement (indifference), leaving ample room for regional hegemony.

Turkey’s insulator status

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However, Buzan and Wæver argue that foreign policy activism is still compatible with the concept of „insulator‟ because Turkey is unable to trigger strategic cooperation from neighboring states from the different regional security complexes. Clearly, the insulator label for Turkey is disputable. However, the Turkish rejection of such a label is relevant for Turkey‟s self-perception. It sees itself as a central country with an optimal geographic location that cannot define itself in a defensive manner. Ambitiously, Turkey aims to be a primary global actor in 2023, one hundred years after the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Davutoğlu 2007, 77).

2.2 Regional Perceptions

Turkey‟s neighbors in the Middle East, the Arab countries and Iran, did not sympathize much with Turkey during the 1990s despite their Islamic identity as a common denominator. That is because Turkey‟s most important partner in the Middle East was Israel (Veremis 2005, 4). In the Arab-Israeli contest, Turkey shifted from strict neutrality in the Cold War to closer relations with Israel during the 1990s, eventually culminating in a free trade agreement and extensive military cooperation (Hale, 2002, 296). Due to this shift, Turkey came to be perceived as distrustful in the Arab world. The distrust showed in the absence of many Arab states in the Developing-8, which was a multilateral initiative for economic cooperation among Muslim nations, initiated by the Turkish Erbakan government (Hale, 2002, 298). Still, it is argued by Hale that the Turkish governments prior to the AKP succeeded in continuing good relations with Israel while staying clear of extreme provocation of the Arab states which, in a worst case, could have resulted in united opposition towards Turkey (Hale, 2002, 299).

In 2002, the AKP inherited these perceptions of suspicion and distrust. However, the Islamist roots of the AKP were a major asset to break free from the cycle of negativity. Turkey started a new approach of engagement with the Middle East, often referred to as neo-Ottomanism (Taşpınar, Walker, Murinson). The Middle Eastern states have proven to be quite receptive to this approach despite the paternalistic tone that is inherent to neo-Ottomanism and the Kemalist cultural revolution whereby Islam was banned from the public life. These legacies from the Ottoman empire impact the „good relations‟ policy of neo-Ottomanism which is therefore regarded with ambivalence (Onar 2009, 11-12).

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resentment that the Arabs stabbed the empire in the back during the First World War”. At the other side, Arabs see the Ottoman empire as “imperious, repressive and unenlightened” (Taşpınar 2008, 13-14). Turkey‟s aim for global actor status through strengthening its regional role should be assessed in light of this Arab suspicion and fear of losing freedom of choice and individual responsibility.

A few (relatively recent) events catalyzed closer relations and positive perceptions. First and foremost, Turkey‟s decision not to allow US troops through Turkish territory during the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was a major boost for trust (Ӧnis and Yılmaz 2009, 10). Many Arab states saw in Turkey a US foreign policy outpost in the region (Walker 2007, 5). Therefore, considerable weight and interest was given to the decision to stand up against the superpower with whom Turkey traditionally sought good relations.

Second, Turkey‟s participation and leadership role in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (Ӧnis and Yılmaz 2009, 10) helped change Turkey‟s image. Since 2004 Turkey provides the Secretary General of the OIC.

Third, Turkey‟s EU membership drive has generated considerable interest in the Arab world (Ӧnis and Yılmaz 2009, 10; Taşpınar 2008, 13). That is because the Turkish economy is, for some in the Middle East, the gateway to the Europe by eluding political and economic isolation.

A fourth important determinant for the changing perceptions of Turkey is its „zero problems with neighbors‟ policy. The vacuum that was left by the US invasion in Iraq and by the intensification of intra-Arab disputes (Altunışık 2010, 151) constructed a regional dynamic in which Turkey saw a chance to upgrade its regional status by taking up a role as a credible third party to conflicts and crises in the region. Unlike Iran, Turkey was in a position to talk to all parties which contributed to the perception of Turkey as a fair mediator (Idem).

TESEV Survey

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Middle East. An analysis of the survey is provided by Prof. Meliha Benli Altunışık in a different publication.

Feeling of goodwill

In her study on South Africa‟ status as a regional hegemon, Miriam Prys concludes that “a feeling of goodwill prevails over sentiments of anti-South Africanism, which conforms to what we would expect from a regional hegemon” (Prys 2009, 203-204). Following this argument it is interesting to see whether the Arab countries harbor feelings of goodwill regarding Turkey.4

In the seven countries in which the survey was conducted, people were asked how they thought about eight countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. There were four choices ranging from „very favorable‟ to „very unfavorable‟. Turkey was the second most highly regarded country (with 75%) after Saudi Arabia (78%). This is remarkable since Turkey is not an Arab country. Turkey enjoys a very good image in all seven Arab countries. In Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, Turkey was the most supported country (Akgün and others, 2009, 11).

A second question in the TESEV survey was who defends the most the rights of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The results show that Palestinians trust Turkey and Egypt the most, both received a 7% score. In the overall results, Turkey ranks equal to Egypt and Syria (Akgün and others, 2009, 14). The „Davos incident‟ in January 2009, where Prime Minister Erdoğan engaged in a public confrontation with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos, is likely to have had a huge impact on how Turkey is perceived in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This may also helped the perception of Turkey being a legitimate and acceptable third party to the conflict. Turkey is seen fit for a mediation role, receiving a support as high as 79% in the seven countries (Akgün and others, 2009, 17).

A third question was concerned with the credibility of Turkey regarding religious issues. Respondents were asked how competent the governments of the eight countries were in „speaking out for Muslims‟ (Akgün and others, 2009, 16). Saudi Arabia was viewed as the most credible to speak out for Muslims on religious issues. Turkey scored well despite its

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secular political system: The respondents in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan viewed Turkey as equally adept to speak for Muslims as Egypt and Syria. Turkey appears to be “a major actor who is listened to, is seen as a legitimate actor on religious issues and thus has the capacity to be influential” (Akgün and others, 2009, 16). To the question if Turkey should play a bigger role in the Arab world a total of 77% of the respondents said yes (Akgün and others, 2009, 18). Similarly, 76% thinks Turkey can have a positive impact on peace in the Arab world (Akgün and others, 2009, 20). From these numbers follows that Turkey‟s activism in the Middle East earns a great support in the region.

Fourth, 61% of the respondents think Turkey can be a model for Arab countries. Especially Lebanon, Syria and Palestine answered positively. Egypt and Saudi Arabia pull the average down but still more than half of the respondents in these countries (58% and 55% respectively) see Turkey as an inspiring model despite Turkey‟s secular political system. Similar numbers result for the question whether Turkey is a successful example combining Islam and democracy (Akgün and others, 2009, 22). The last relevant question is whether Turkey has become more influential on Arab politics in recent years. Apparently, Turkey‟s activism in the Middle East has not gone unnoticed since 71% percent answered that they increasingly felt Turkey‟s influence (Akgün and others, 2009, 23).

In sum, according to the survey, Turkey is well thought of in the Arab Middle East, partly because of its ability to contribute to peace and stability in the region and partly because Turkey earns credibility for its democratic advancement. There is a demand on Turkey to take on more responsibility for finding solutions to regional problems like the Arab-Israeli conflict and neutralizing instability caused by Iran. However, Turkey‟s Middle East policy in the 1990s tells us that Arab perceptions of Turkey depend much on Turkey´s Israel policy. Relations between these two countries are strained since the 2009 „Davos incident‟, bringing about a higher level of public acceptance of Turkish influence in the Middle East. Turkey‟s political elites are well aware of this as Erdoğan often resorts to populist rhetoric (Daloğlu, 2010).

Regional hegemony

Because this thesis is concerned with regional hegemony it makes sense to discuss the references to regional hegemony in the survey and its analysis by Altunışık‟s. There are three references.

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(Altunışık 2010, 21). There exist some fears and suspicion towards possible coercive and imperialist features of Turkey‟s Middle Eastern policy. This anxiety is a construct from past experiences emanating from the Ottoman empire. It is a historic and realist account of hegemony defined by domination and imposition. Chapter 1 of this thesis explained a different and broader interpretation of regional hegemony that includes perceptions, projections, and provision. Thus the respondents and researchers use a different and less comprehensive definition of regional hegemony.

Secondly, in the research, regional hegemony is understood as a state posing threats to regional stability and security (Akgün and others, 2009, 26). We have seen that Turkey is not perceived as a hegemon in this sense because Turkey‟s role in the Middle East is perceived as constructive and contributing to stability.

Thirdly, in contrast to Turkey, Iran is seen as a regional hegemon in this sense because of its potential to destabilize the region, its ambitions to change the balance-of-power (Iran‟s nuclear power project) but also because Iran poses an ideological threat (furthering a Shiite ideology “from Beirut to the Gulf”, Altunışık 2010, 13). In this respect, from a strategic point of view, some Arabs see Turkey as a crucial balancing actor, a regional “Sunni power” (Idem). Therefore, Turkey‟s interest and activism in the Middle East is considered highly welcome, especially by Saudi Arabia.

Both Iran and Turkey have gained importance in the Arab world: Turkey is perceived to contribute to security through its roles in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria while Iran is often perceived as a destabilizing factor triggering balancing acts. In this light, it can be argued that Iran and Turkey both adopt a hegemonic strategy, but with very different power-bases. Turkey uses a more subtle and legitimate strategy and is therefore less perceived as a threat. But that does not preclude Turkey‟s hegemonicness. The researches and the respondents equate hegemony with threats to stability and the potential loss of free will which is why Iran sometimes receives the label „regional hegemon‟. However, according to a social constructivist understanding of regional hegemony both acceptance and legitimacy are crucial elements of regional hegemony. The survey shows that Turkey is better endowed with the latter than Iran.

Power

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even without strategic partnerships. Turkey may be part of the interstate regional system but is not able to dominate it by deploying or threatening with military action in case of non-compliance. But the essence is that Turkey does not have such intentions. Neither neo-Ottomanism nor Strategic Depth call for Ottoman-style domination of the Middle East (Taşpınar 2008, 15).

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Chapter 3: Projection of Values and Interests

The second dimension of regional hegemony is concerned with exercising power through projection rather than imposition of the hegemon‟s values and underlying interests (Prys 2008, 10). The theory in chapter 1 holds that Turkey‟s Middle East policy is dependent on domestic, regional and global pressures. In this light, one should differentiate between Turkey‟s own vision for the region and the vision and interests of other regional or external actors who try to influence Turkey to take a particular course of action. In this section the focus is on Turkish interests and the corresponding endeavors of their realization. After a discussion of the „Turkish model‟ there is attention for the highly valued principle of territorial integrity and political unity. Finally, because Iran is the main challenger of Turkish hegemony in the Middle East their relation and competition deserve some attention.

3.1 The Turkish Model

‘Over the next 15 years, Turkey’s most likely course involves a blending of Islamic and nationalist strains, which could serve as a model for other rapidly modernizing countries in the Middle East’ (National Intelligence Council 2008, 36).

After the Cold War, the Clinton administration came to see Turkey as a democratic model to follow for the Islamist authoritarian states in the Middle East. A decennium later, the Bush administration reiterated the potential of a Turkish example for political reform in Iraq. (Altunışık 2005, 45). To some extent, the US vision of Turkey as an example for the Middle East is shared by AKP members who possess a feeling of exceptionalism vis-à-vis the Middle East (see previous chapter).5

There are, however, two methodological problems concerning the research of „projecting the Turkish model‟. In chapter 1, projection was defined as a furthering of national interests or underlying values through conducting specific actions. This strategy is very „hands on‟, meaning that pro-active policy is conducted to meet particular foreign policy goals. This must be seen in contrast to a „hands off‟ approach, meaning that Turkey „only sets an example‟ with its secular and democratic principles without conducting specific actions to export the Turkish model. Both strategies are part of the concept of hegemony and they are

5_{Ibrahim Kalın argues that Turkey does not want to be a model for anyone else, especially when Turkey is}

Turkey’s Position in the Middle East: Regional Hegemon or Peripheral Bystander?