Socialization or Strategy?

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Socialization or Strategy?

China’s Voting Behaviour in the United

Nations Security Council

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Introduction

In 1971 the People’s Republic of China, lead by Mao, gained control of China’s United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-‐seat, after is was held for over 20-‐years by the government in exile on Taiwan (Republic of China). 1971, therefore, constituted a new era in the UNSC. China was both non-‐western and communist and there was much anxiety about how China would influence the functioning of the UNSC, and what its impact would be on world order. Alongside the

discussion of how China would change the UNSC there has also been scholarly discussion on change in the opposite direction; how the UNSC changed China. American Professor of international relations Alastair Iain Johnston has contributed to this debate by publishing his book ‘Social States’, which studies China’s behaviour in international institutions from 1980 to 2000. To address change Johnston specifies and applies socialization theory to the Chinese situation in international organisations. In trying to uncover the workings of socialization theory in the Chinese situation, Johnston strategically chose ‘hard cases’. These are cases in which rationalist scholars would expect socialization processes to have little actual effect. Socialization theory is often identified with a constructivist strand of international relations theory, as opposed to a more rationalist approach, which tends to deem material aspects to be more important than ideational aspects. Johnston tries to beat the rationalists at their own game, so to say, by studying fields of national security and arms limitation. These are areas that rationalists see as most likely to be dominated by strategic motives rather than normative ones.

This thesis builds on socialization theory and adapts the same strategy as Johnston but takes it a step further. It uses statistical analysis rather than

qualitative analysis. Statistical analysis from a rationalist/naturalist point of view is considered as a more reliable method than studying cases.1

But first let us elaborate on socialization theory in the field of

International Relations and constitute this research’ relevance to that field.

1_{J.W.
Moses
&
T.L.
Knutsen
ways
of
knowing,competing
methodologies
in
social
and
political}

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Relevance

Socialization theory is well elaborated in the discipline of psychology and pedagogics. It is referred to as the process of the adaption of behaviour of a person or child as a response to its social context. It is also well accepted that socialization is an actual phenomenon in the development of behaviour.

Socialization has become the conceptual umbrella for what is often more trivially described as group pressure or social control and it has hence provided

psychological explanations for the phenomenon that people act against their own instincts in favour of behaviour preferred by others.

Socialization theory is based on the ontological assumption that

behaviour and social context are related and that there is a positive correlation between the amount of interaction with a certain social context and the level of adaption of norms, values and actions to the norms values and actions, which dominate in that certain social context. It has thus provided an explanatory framework for social processes, group dynamics and influence of social institutions such as the family, the church etc.

In his famous book ‘Social States’ Alistair Iain Johnson elaborates on the value and impact theorizing of socialization has offered to the social sciences. At the same time he wonders why despite the commonly accepted value of

socialization theory it has not been lifted to the international level. At which the actor and the social context do not consist of individuals but of states.

International Relations research of socialization theory is still

underdeveloped in comparison to its impact on psychology and pedagogics. This thesis adds to the body of research on socialization theory in an international context. Two other additions to what is currently available on socialization theory in IR are the research design as well as the subject of research.

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Although a statistical research design is hardly a novelty anymore in the social sciences, there is still little statistical research about more constructivist

concepts or theories, such as socialization theory. This thesis tries to bridge that gap by, as mentioned, proving a hard case for socialization theory by using a more naturalistic/rationalistic research design to prove a constructivist concept.

Research Approach

This thesis combines the work of Professor Johnson and my earlier paper

‘China’s foreign policy development’ -‐ a study on China’s voting behaviour in the United Nations Security Council. This paper provided some insights in China’s

UNSC voting behaviour patterns. However, its data was still very general and provided little insight in the substance of the UNSC resolutions and could

therefore not conclude undeniably on China’s international policy development. The thesis at hand tries to bridge that gap.

As mentioned this thesis provides a critical reflection in addition to Alistair I. Johnson’s study ‘Social States’. It follows its case selection but focuses on another area of empirical information. Following the introduction and the former paragraph the main research question of this thesis is; To what extent can socialization theory be empirically substantiated by China’s voting behaviour in the UNSC from 1980-‐2000?

Structure

The three research chapters each provide analysis of China’s international behaviour between 1980 and 2000. It consists of two important steps that

should generate the hypotheses, which are to be tested by the statistical analysis. The first chapter links the socialization concept to the UNSC. If we hold the assumptions of socialization theory to be true, how would we, from a theoretical point of view, expect an actor’s behaviour to evolve in time? This chapter tries to come up with a number of hypotheses, which will be tested by the actual empirical data. This data will be obtained in a later phase of research. The sub-‐question for this chapter is: What hypotheses can be drawn from socialization theory with regard to China in the UNSC from 1980-‐2000?

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measurement. This zero-‐measurement is needed to observe change in the positions of the actor in the course of the period that is researched. The second chapter therefore tries to provide an assessment of the characteristics of both the actor and the structure at the beginning of the research period, 1972 (t). Chapter 3, the actual body of research, is statistical in nature. It focuses on how China’s voting behaviour in the UNSC from 1972-‐2000 can be described. This chapter contains a statistical assessment of China’s voting records in the UNSC. It will focus on China’s willingness to cooperate internationally, trough the years. In order to do so, patterns of China’s abstentions will be assessed.

Whereas China’s foreign policy development’ -‐ a study on China’s voting behaviour

in the United Nations Security Council failed to make a distinction in the

substance of the respective resolutions, we will now make a distinct order in the nature of UNSC resolutions. Surely one resolution touches a more fundamental level of international action than another. Therefore a distinction will be made between procedural/formal resolutions, ones that aim at extending or ratifying an earlier resolution, superficial resolutions and resolutions that touch the fundaments of a nation’s principles of international cooperation.

The underlying assumption is that socialization will be most apparent when we can observe change in voting behaviour on these more fundamental issues. This chapter also builds on the conclusions of the former chapter, which assesses China’s foreign policy principles at the start of the research period. This is helpful in order to identify the resolutions, which touch upon these principles.

The thesis concludes by analysing the statistical results and their relation to the hypotheses. This should shed light on the viability of the presence of socialization in this case. In doing so this thesis should contribute to the body of research intended to explain and understand state behaviour (development) in general and the empirical basis on which it is funded. Moreover, this thesis should pose an addition to the body of research that is committed to explaining and understanding China’s foreign policy behaviour.

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Chapter1 Socialization theory

1.1 History of Socialization

1.1.1 Origins

Socialization is a well-‐known and accepted theoretical concept in the field of social science. It is mainly used in the fields of pedagogics, psychology and sociology. Halfway in the 20th_{century
the
concept
of
socialization
was
used
in
a}

more or less normative sense. In this sense socialization entailed the teaching and learning of desired social norms to children. Through active socialization young individuals would adhere to accepted social norms.

Later on and especially since the 1970’s socialization theory has found more sophisticated methodological, conceptual and statistical tools.2_{This
more}

explanatory and analytical application of socialization theory has contributed to the theory’s impact on science in general and the social sciences in specific. In the 1980s and onward the focus of socialization theory expanded from ‘children in the family’ to ‘people in society’, marking the sociological applications of the socialization concept.

1.1.2 Substance of socialization theory

The definitions used to describe what socialization theory entails depend highly on the purpose one has with the application of the theory. As mentioned the applications of socialization differ fundamentally on their purpose; a normative purpose in earlier applications versus an analytical/explanatory purpose later on. Another evident difference is the field of research. Pedagogics is interested in other aspects of socialization than sociology.

The common ground of socialization theorizing is that it is concerned with the relation between an actor and its social environment. Secondly it assumes that this social environment influences behaviour somehow.

2_{J.E.
Grusec,
&
P.D.

Hastings,
(ed.)
Handbook
of
Socialization
Theory
and
Research
Guilford
Press}

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Thirdly it holds that this influence essentially leads to convergence3

between the behaviour of the actor and the norms, rules and values of the social environment. Essentially the actor’s behaviour will ultimately resemble the behaviour encouraged by the structure in which it acts.

Behind these assumptions lie a number of ontological presuppositions. These are for example that the behaviour of an actor is changeable; that there are social structures present and that there is (constant) interaction between the actor and that social structure.

One can imagine that in the field of pedagogics these presuppositions are self-‐evident. Few would question that children change their behaviour through time, that the family provides a social structure for small children and that parents are actively or passively engaged in an interaction process we call an ‘upbringing’.

In other scholarly applications of socialization theories these presuppositions may be under more scrutiny.4_{In
the
field
of
International}

Relations scholarship in socialization theory is relatively novel in its application. Moreover there can be (and is) debate about the analogy in characteristics of new-‐born babies and complex nation states. This debate will be discussed in the next section, in which socialization theory in the field of IR will be addressed.

1.2 Socialization in International Relations

1.2.1 Materialist-‐Rationalist Tradition

The next two sections provide a very brief overview of theoretical traditions in IR. The brief and general overview will naturally do little right by the complex and diverse nature of traditional IR-‐theorizing. However, by showing the development of IR-‐theory building we can position socialization theory more easily, and provide for a context in which international socialization theory has emerged.

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it
should
be
noted
that
exceptions
to
this
principles
are
also
apparent,
especially
in}

pedagogics, for instance adolescents frequently show anti-‐normative behaviour through socialization.

4_{P.
Teunissen,
Sociologie
van
de
Internationale
Betrekkingen,
probleemstelling
en
onderzoek}

(10)

Until the 20th_{century,
the
main
theoretical
paradigm
in
International
Relations}

theory is referred to as realism. This paradigm holds that states are independent unitary actors that struggle for power. Behaviour is essentially rational and costs and benefits are perceived in material terms5_{.
That
means
that
actors
assess}

their actions in terms of the consequences these actions will have for their (relative) power positions (Logic of consequence).6_{In
this
sense
realism
is
an}

essentially rationalist paradigm, defining state interests in material terms and assuming that actors weigh costs and balances in choosing their actions, cumulated as behaviour. And since states are regarded as unitary and

autonomous these cost-‐benefit analyses depend mostly on external factors, since internal factor are more or less constant.

Even when realism was contested by liberalism in the beginning of the 20th_{century,
the
assumptions
on
what
explained
a
state’s
behaviour
essentially}

did not change. Liberalism indeed expanded the number of factors that would influence a state’s behaviour. For instance, to liberalists economic interests were also relevant. In economic cooperation, such as free trade arrangements,

liberalists saw the falsification of the realist assumption that international cooperation is essentially a zero-‐sum game.7_{Cooperation
as
a
positive-‐sum}

game would explain why states as rational actors would cooperate with each other. However this does not mean that the way a state determines its behaviour is different from the realist paradigm. The shifting of interests does not occur out of sympathy for other states, but because the interdependence has caused their cost-‐benefit calculus to shift. This implies liberalists and realists still share the ontological assumption that states are rational and their interests are material. They both adhere to the ‘logic of consequence’. Both paradigms are therefore essentially materialist-‐rationalist in nature.

5_{S.
Burchill,
e.a
Theories
of
International
Relations,
Palgrave
MacMillan
New
York
2009
p.230} 6_{M.
Finnemore,
National
interests
in
International
Society
Cornell
university
Press
New
York}

1996 p.29-‐30

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1.2.2 Do norms matter?

Over time insights in International Relations started to shift. The rational and materialist nature of states was contested by a strand of researchers that have later been named ‘social constructivists’. Social constructivism basically lifts the sociological approach to the interstate level. It criticizes the traditional IR paradigm for disregarding the social nature of international relations. State interests are not only defined by material but also by social factors.8

An essential element in this critique is that constructivism juxtaposes the ‘logic of consequence’ to the ‘ logic of appropriateness’.9_{This
logic
of}

appropriateness means that the behaviour of the state is not only the product of a cost-‐benefit analysis but it may also be the product of a state adhering to some deeply held norm or to socially expected behaviour.

Another essential point of critique on traditional approaches is that they consider ontological elements such as structure and interests to be ‘given’ and more or less autonomous. 10_{Constructivists
however
consider
interests
and}

structures to be constructed by agents that operate within these structures.11

The importance of this claim is, however, not that structures have changed in a certain way, but that they are, hence, viable for change in the future as well. This ontological assumption is known as the ‘mutual constituency of agents and structures’.12

1.2.3 Socialization as a IR-‐concept

When looking at the ontological foundation of socialization as elaborated in paragraph 1.1.2 of this chapter we can see a resemblance with the ontological aspects of the social constructivist approach on IR Therefore it will not be difficult to grasp why socialization theory in IR has blossomed in the constructivist tradition of IR.

From 1980 onwards socialization theory has progressively found a way into how scholars think about international relations. The theory’s empirical

8_{S.
Burchill,
e.a
Theories
of
international
Relations,
Palgrave
MacMillan
New
York
2009
p.223} 9_{P.R.
Viotti,
&
M.V
Kauppi,
International
Relations
Theory
Pearson
2010
p.287}

10_{T.L.
Knutsen,
A
history
of
International
Relation
theory,
Manchester
University
Press,
New
York}

1997 p.270

11_{S
Burchill,
e.a
Theories
of
International
Relations,
Palgrave
MacMillan
New
York
2009
p.221-‐}

222

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substantiation has improved over the years and has made the presence of socialization as an actual and relevant process in international behaviour of states more robust. Where earlier studies of socialization in IR merely had the purpose to cast doubt over strictly material explanations of state behaviour13_,

later studies tried not only to explain that socialization was at work but also how it was at work.

An example of the last is the comprehensive analysis of socialization theory in IR by Alastair Iain Johnson in Social States China in International

Institutions, 1980-‐2000. Johnson assesses China’s behaviour in international

security institutions. Johnson’s case is particularly interesting since he uses ‘hard tests’. Johnston tries to refute traditional materialist and/or realist claims. He tries to do so by choosing cases that are most viable to these traditional materialist and/or realist claims, in his case the field of international security arrangements. Johnston then juxtaposes socialization theoretical explanations to those of more materialistic-‐rationalist explanation that are provided by

(structural) realism.

This thesis builds on this research strategy. It will try to study fields of IR that are closest to the essence of traditional rationalist ideas. In order to find evidence of these elements we need to find first what socialization theory implies specifically for states participating in a social environment.

1.3 Theoretical applications

1.3.1 Working definition

When looking for a univocal definition for socialization one easily ends op in the field of psychology. Johnston names a few in Social States. In general terms, he says, socialization can be described as a process that leads newcomers to endorse “expected ways of thinking and acting”.14_{A
classical
psychological}

definition can be found in Stryker and Statham who see Socialization as “the

13_{M.
Finnemore,
National
interests
in
International
Society
Cornell
university
Press
New
York}

1996

14_{A.I.
Johnston,
Social
States,
China
in
International
Institutions,
1980-‐2000
Princeton
University}

(13)

process by which the newcomer becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction”.15

When trying to transfer this psychological definition to the demands of the field of IR research, Johnston quotes Kupchan and Ikenberry, who define

socialization as “a process of learning in which norms and ideals are transmitted, by one party to another.”16

Drawing from the pedagogical/psychological tradition the working definition of socialization in this thesis will be as follows: Socialization is a process in which actors show increasing pro-‐normative behaviour as they interrelate increasingly with a structure that adheres to certain norms.

In Social States Johnston distinguishes different forms of socialization17_.

Johnston uses mimicking, social influence and persuasion to describe the three micro-‐processes of socialization. He uses these micro-‐processes to show how socialization works. Since that is not the purpose of this thesis we will not adopt these three micro-‐processes. However they do point to a relevant distinction between two fundamental different ways of socialization, namely, whether or not the actor internalizes the norms constituting pro-‐social behaviour. As Johnston puts it: “I thought the answer was X, but everybody says it is Y. And I don’t want to rock the boat, so I’ll also say Y”.18_{The
actor
does
not
agree
with
the}

pro-‐social choice, but behaves pro-‐socially nonetheless. One could say that his underlying beliefs have not changed. In case of internalized pro-‐social behaviour, the actor reasons as follows: “I thought the answer was X, but everybody says it is Y. So it really must be Y”.19_{In
this
case
the
actor
is
actually
convinced
of
his}

choice for B, although he was inclined to choose A. One could say that the norms of the social structure have changed the beliefs or norms of the actor. This could be regarded as internalization of pro-‐social behaviour. This distinction between action with and action without changing underlying norms will also be

elaborated on in the next section.

15_{S.Stryker&
A.Statham}_{Handbook
of
Social
Psychology
Randomnhouse
New
York
1985}_{p.
325} 16_{G.J.
Ikenberry&
G.A.
Kupchan
Socialization
and
hegemonic
power,
Cambridge
University
Press}

1990 p.289-‐290

17_{A.I.
Johnston,
Social
States,
China
in
International
Institutions,
1980-‐2000
Princeton
University}

Press Princeton 2008 p.20-‐32

18_{Idem
25}

19_{A.I.
Johnston,
Social
States,
China
in
International
Institutions,
1980-‐2000
Princeton
University}

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1.3.2 Application

Since the working definition is quite abstract we need to define the elements of the definition further.

The actor in this case is a state. For reasons of analytical focus we will regard the state as unitary. The structure is an international institution. The choices for China as selected state and the United Nations Security Council will be commented on in the next paragraph.

To analyse the actor as an element in this research design we will put its relevant features in algebraic terms. At the starting point of the research period the actor shows certain behaviour (bA). This behaviour is based on certain underlying beliefs or norms of the actor (nA). The starting point of analyses will be referred to as time t.

Following constructivist assumptions, structure is changeable through interaction with actors. The transformation of an international institution through the participation of a certain state is by no means an uninteresting phenomenon in International Relations. However, it is not the purpose of inquiry here, so for analytical purposes we will regard a structure to be more or less stable. This constant represents the social norms of the structure (nS).

Socialization theory holds that there is to be a positive correlation between the number of interactions of the actor with the structure and the pro-‐normative behaviour of the actor. Given that over time more interaction will take place, at time t+x we will see a positive correlation between x and the conformity of bA to

nS at time t+x. Note that not time, as such, but the number of interactions

between actor and structure instigates change. T+x hence, implies that if time elapses, the number of interactions will increase.

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would follow its own course rather than act sociable. Arguably, this would mean that if bA at t+x is structurally different from nA at t, even on issues deemed of vital importance to a state, this could indicate the changing of actual norms.

1.3.3 Case selection

In Social States Johnston argues convincingly why China would make a good case to examine socialization theory between 1980 and 2000. For this, he names three main arguments.20

Firstly, he describes China as a more or less atomic state, where internal political currents only modestly change domestic political alignments. China’s centrally lead socialist structure minimizes domestic influence on foreign policy. Secondly, China can be seen as a ‘novice’ in international institutions. After relations with the west normalized in the 1970’s, China very slowly entered international institutions, lacking experience in functioning in this sort of

structure. China therefore was a newcomer to the structure, like a new-‐born baby is a newcomer to the social structure that is its family.

Thirdly and most importantly, Johnston names China’s realpolitik

worldview. Johnston therefore sees China as a soft case for structural realism and a hard case for socialization theory. This would imply that if ‘even’ China would prove to be subjected to socialization, it would make a solid point for the case that socialization is apparent and relevant in thinking about state

behaviour. This alleged realpolitik worldview will be addressed further in the next chapter.

As a case for a structure we follow Johnston’s choice for international institutions as relevant normative structures. Johnston explicitly chooses security institutions as cases of inquiry. He claims that institutions that cooperate on matters of international security provide a hard test for socialization theory, as security issues are considered to be more on the

‘territory’ of realism. Johnston argues that “if there is any [..] Socialization going on, it ought to be happening in particular kinds of security institutions”.21_This

20_{A.I.
Johnston,
Social
States,
China
in
International
Institutions,
1980-‐2000
Princeton
University}

Press Princeton 2008 p.32-‐39

21_{A.I.
Johnston,
Social
States,
China
in
International
Institutions,
1980-‐2000
Princeton
University}

(16)

line of reasoning is continued in this thesis. As a specific case we will take the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The UNSC pre-‐eminently deals with international security, a theme that is deemed ‘High Politics’ in the realist school of thought. The Unites Nations

Security Council has far-‐reaching powers in the area of international security politics.22_{Following
Johnston’s
reasoning,
looking
for
socialization
processes
and}

norm alteration in this setting might be the ultimate test for socialization theory.

The chosen timeline differs from Johnston’s. Whereas Johnston chooses

1980 as starting point we will use 1972. Johnston’s choice for 1980 is mainly substantiated by the coming-‐to-‐power of Deng Xiaoping and China’s first engagement in arms limitation institutions in the early ‘80’s. Since the Peoples Republic of China (Communist China) obtained the UNSC seat from the Republic of China (Nationalist China on Taiwan) in 1971. 1972 might be a more fitting starting point for this analysis.

Regarding the end of the timeframe of analysis, the main interest of this thesis is not to give a full overview of China’s foreign policy after Mao. The purpose is to produce data significant enough to draw conclusions on the hypotheses of socialization theory. By choosing the 1972-‐2000 timeframe we will have 28 years and 1000 adopted resolution of data to build on. This should be sufficient in order to draw more or less decisive conclusions on the validity of socialization theory.

1.4 Hypotheses

1.4.1 Case

When we apply the theoretical implications of socialization theory to the China/UNSC case we can come up with a first set of theoretical hypotheses. These hypotheses apply to the statistical assessment of Chapter 3 and contain a comparison between what we would expect to see using (social) constructivist assumptions and what we would expect to see when we would use rationalist-‐

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Kooimans,.
Internationaal
publiekrecht
in
volgelvlucht,
Kluwer
Deventer
2002
p.150,}

A.G. Harryvan, e.a. Internationale organisatie, Samenwerking en Regimevorming in de

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materialist assumptions. The hypotheses mentioned in this paragraph are still abstract and will be specified in the next two Chapters.

1.4.2 Pro-‐Social behaviour

From a social-‐constructivist point of view we would expect that as more interactions take place between China and the UNSC as an institution, China should progressively show pro-‐social behaviour. In the algebraic terms of paragraph 1.3.2, bA would increasingly correspond to nS.

To put it graphically: Pro-‐normative behaviour N of interactions

In a rationalist-‐materialist framework however, states would behave in a way that would suit their interests best. It does not entirely exclude the possibility that states can show pro-‐normative behaviour. Instead it would correlate with their calculation that it would suit their interests to behave as such. They would pragmatically or strategically use their voting in a way, which would suit their best interest. Therefore there is not a stable pattern to be expected, as one would expect when a state would vote out of principle. Principles are expected to be ‘sticky’, which means they are not easily altered. Principled voting would therefore show a more consistent and gradual pattern. Principles are by

definition dominant in an actor’s behaviour on essential issues. If an actor would deviate from its principles on a fundamental issue it would either mean

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Pro-‐normative behaviour N of interactions 1.4.3 Norm convergence

As mentioned in former paragraphs, socialization theory would also expect an eventual convergence of norms between the actor and the structure. As is commonly assumed however and as mentioned, norms are ‘sticky’. From a constructivist perspective, therefore, we would expect to see eventual

convergence of norms. However this change would not be visible immediately, the arrow indicates a certain ‘lag’ before norm alternation becomes visible To put it in terms of development of pro-‐normative behaviour

Pro-‐normative Behaviour on Fundamental issues N of Interactions

Rationalists, on the other hand, do not consider norms very important in analysing state behaviour; one could argue that there would be no Materialist perspective on this hypothesis. However since materialism (realism) also holds that interests are constant, one could derive that norms constituting interests are also constant in that case. We could hypothesize the follow graph from a realist perspective:

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Pro-‐normative Behaviour on Fundamental issues N of Interactions 1.4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explained socialization theory, discussed its implications in international relations and tried to outline a preliminary application to the China/UNSC case. Naturally, to come up with an effective measurement of all mentioned variables we need to go deeper into the characteristics of the norms that China and the UNSC hold in 1972, i.e. time t, the beginning of the period under investigation. The purpose of the following Chapter will be to provide for these characteristics. The third Chapter will complete the research design with indicators on how to measure the other variables mentioned above, before turning to the empirical data.

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Chapter 2. China and the UNSC

2.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1 we have come up with a number of hypotheses of Socialization theory. The purpose of this chapter is to specify these hypotheses further and apply them to the case at hand.

As our goal is to compare behaviour in a set period of time, we first need a zero-‐measurement. We need to assess what the actors’ norms (nA) and related behaviour (bA) are at t0, which was around 1972. This means we need to see China’s foreign policy attitude at the beginning of its accession to the UNSC. 1972 is the first full year that the PRC acted as the legitimate representation of China in the UNSC. Secondly, in order to compare the actor, with the structure, we need to analyse the norms that are held by the UNSC and which behaviour it tries to promote.

The international legitimization of the PRC rule in 1971 is seen as the starting point for PRC-‐engagement in multilateral arrangements23_{.
In
order
to}

assess if behaviour and norms have actually converged, we need to put the characteristics of both China and the UNSC in the same terms. Therefore the characteristics of China’s norms and that of the UNSC will be described along the same themes. Namely the promotion of international cooperation in general, normative regimes, and collective security Since we hold the structure to be constant as the independent variable we will assess these themes for the UN first.

2.2. Norms of the United Nations (Security Council)

2.2.1 Introduction

When looking at the UNSC as a normative structure that we take as relatively constant, there are of course a number of rightful questions to be asked. One of them is to what extent the UNSC can be seen as an autonomous structure, apart

23_{J.F.
Kornberg,
&
J.R.
Faust,
China
in
World
Politics,
Policies,
Processes
and
Prospects
Lynne}

(21)

from the actors that constituted and are still dominant the UNSC, i.e. the

permanent members in the UNSC. Accordingly, if there is a dependency between agent and structure how can we see actor-‐change independent of structural change? Or in short: Can the UNSC as a structure really be regarded as constant?

When engaging in in-‐depth analysis of the development of the UNSC since its establishment, the answer to this question probably will be ‘No’. However, there are some arguments for assessing certain aspects as constant. The most important argument is the fact that the UN and the UNSC have been erected to pursue a certain purpose. This purpose has not changed significantly and can be taken as a constant normative basis for the purposes of this research. We can find all necessary elements that define this purpose in the UN Charter. This means it will not be necessary to study scholarly work on the development of the UN since its establishment. Naturally this is a simplification, but justifiable given the purpose of this thesis; analysing state behaviour.

With this normative ‘assignment’ in the charter the UN has been given its mission as an institution. This mission is relatively autonomous in its intentions, although of course it is dependent on its members for the effectiveness of its execution. Moreover, because the UN Charter has remained to be relatively unaltered since its codification, its normative basis has remained more or less constant throughout the years.

The UN has three main goals. The first is to promote and enhance cooperation amongst states. The second is to promote norms of freedom, equality and (other) human rights and the third is to ensure collective global security.

On an institutional level the UN is essentially very progressive. It aims at more cooperation, better implementation of global norms and the strengthening of the global collective security system. The hypotheses for the UNSC therefore are that it tries to have a positive influence on its members’ tendency to

cooperate, to engage in normative action and that they will increasingly contribute and adhere to collective security arrangements.

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2.2.2 The Charter

The United Nations was established to be the most inclusive dominant

international organisation, articulated by article 103 of the UN Charter, stating that members’ obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations under other international agreements, confirming the UN’s status as paramount international institution.

The purpose and mission of the UN can be found in the first article of the United Nations Charter, which was established in 1945. The article formulates the following goals:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-‐determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-‐operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Paragraph 1 of the article defines the ends in peace and security. This article clearly provides for a mission for collective security to ensure peace and security worldwide. The second and fourth paragraph both more or less aim for the same goal: improving interstate relations to ensure peace and justice. The third

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2.2.3 The Security Council

The liberal purpose of the UN is framed by a number of more state-‐centred provisions in the Charter under article 2 stressing the principles of sovereignty and non-‐interference24_{.
However,
in
pursuing
the
provisions
under
article
1}

there is an exception to the principle of sovereignty, stating: “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll”.25_{In
the} UN framework, only the United Nations Security Council can adopt binding

measures under Chapter VII.26

Under Chapter VII the United Nations Security Council is endowed with the responsibility of maintaining peace and security.27_{The
competences
of
the}

Council can be divided in two categories: Peaceful settlement of disputes and the adoption of enforcement measures.28_{The
provisions
for
the
peaceful
settlement}

of disputes are laid out in Chapter VI of the Chapter, which gives the UNSC the power to investigate and propose solutions to any dispute that is a potential threat to the peace.29

As mentioned before the UNSC’s most far-‐reaching powers are laid out in Chapter VII. In articles 39 through 51 the Charter lays down the conditions under which the UNSC can impose violent and non-‐violent measures on States. This competence to punish a misbehaving state collectively constitutes the United Nations collective security system.30

The UNSC has the most far-‐reaching competences in enforcing normative regimes. Moreover it is the main platform for establishing multilateral and collective security actions.

2.2.4 Conclusion: Cooperation, Normative regime & Collective Security

In short the promotion of cooperation means that the UNSC promotes states to cooperate and to engage in multilateral action in order to reach their respective goals. The promotion of normative regimes means that the UN actively

encourages the codification and enforcement of principles of human rights, good

24_{http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml}_{paragraph
1&7}

25_{UN
Charter
Article
2,
paragrah
7}

26_{M.N.
Shaw
International
Law
Cambridge
U.P,
Cambridge.
2003
p1100} 27_{Articles
23-‐26
of
the
UN
Charter}

28_{M.N.
Shaw
International
Law
Cambridge
U.P,
Cambridge.
2003

p.1086} 29_{Article
34
of
the
Charter}

Socialization or Strategy?