Master thesis, MSc Supply Chain Management
University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
21 February 2014
Author:
Hendrik Tolsma
Student number:
S2241463
E-mail address:
h.h.tolsma@student.rug.nl
Supervisor University of Groningen:
Prof. dr. I.F.A. Vis
Co-assessor University of Groningen:
drs. S.K. Thunnissen
Supervisor Groningen Seaports NV:
drs. T. Smit
1 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
Abstract
2 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
Table of content
Abstract ... 1 Table of content ... 2 List of figures ... 4 List of tables ... 4 Preface ... 5 Management summary ... 6 1 Introduction ... 8 2 Research framework ... 11 2.1 Literature study ... 112.2 Single case study ... 11
2.3 Data analysis ... 12
3 Literature study ... 14
3.1 The roles and financial revenues of a port authority as a cluster manager ... 14
3.2 The roles and financial revenues of a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis ... 16
4 Case study... 20
4.1 Case Chemelot Industrial Park ... 20
4.1.1 Case selection Chemelot Industrial Park ... 20
4.1.2 Data collection Chemelot Industrial Park ... 20
4.1.3 Results Chemelot Industrial Park ... 20
4.1.4 The role of USG in industrial symbiosis ... 21
4.1.5 The financial revenues of USG in industrial symbiosis ... 21
4.1.6 Conclusion ... 22
4.2 Case Groningen Seaports NV ... 22
4.2.1 Case selection Groningen Seaports NV... 23
4.2.2 Data collection Groningen Seaports NV ... 23
4.2.3 Results Groningen Seaports NV ... 24
3 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 4.2.5 The financial revenues of Groningen Seaports as a public port authority in industrial
symbiosis ... 25
4.2.6 Conclusion ... 26
5 Discussion ... 27
5.1 Developing the industrial symbiosis of steam ... 27
5.2 Operating the industrial symbiosis of steam... 27
5.3 Exploit the industrial symbiosis of steam ... 28
5.4 Maintain the facilities of the industrial symbiosis of steam ... 29
5.5 Shareholder of an utility company ... 29
5.6 The impact of the corporatization on the role of Groningen Seaports NV ... 30
5.7 Provisional framework ... 30
6 Improvement and validation of the framework ... 32
6.1 Development of industrial symbiosis of steam... 32
6.2 Exploit and maintain the industrial symbiosis of steam ... 32
6.3 Validated framework ... 33
7 Conclusion ... 35
7.1 Limitations and suggestions for further research ... 35
References ... 37
Appendices ... 40
Appendix 1. Interviews ... 40
Unstructured interviews... 40
Structured interviews ... 40
Appendix 2. Interview protocol – Case study ... 41
Interview 1. Projectleider WTB/E Groningen Seaports ... 42
Interview 2. Business operations manager Groningen Seaports ... 43
Interview 3. Manager Commercial Affairs Utility Support Group BV ... 44
Interview 4. Controller Utility Support Group BV ... 45
4 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
Interview 6. Business operations manager Groningen Seaports ... 47
Interview 7/8. Huidige leverancier van stoom in het havengebied van Groningen Seaports ... 48
Interview 9/10. Potentiële leverancier van stoom in het havengebied van Groningen Seaports ... 49
Interview 11/12. Huidige afnemer van stoom in het havengebied van Groningen Seaports ... 49
Interview 13/14. Potentiële afnemer van stoom in het havengebied van Groningen Seaports ... 49
Questions interviews 7-14 ... 50
Interview 15. Field expert on industrial symbiosis... 50
Interview 16. Port expert ... 52
Appendix 3. Encoding scheme ... 54
Appendix 4. Encoded data ... 55
List of figures
Figure 0.1. Validated framework... 7Figure 1.1. The objective of this research ... 10
Figure 2.1. Research methodology ... 11
Figure 3.1. Conceptual framework of a port authority ... 16
Figure 3.2. Conceptual framework of a coordinating body ... 18
Figure 4.1. The role of USG in industrial symbiosis of steam ... 22
Figure 4.2. Financial revenue of Groningen Seaports ... 26
Figure 5.1. Possible opportunities for role expansion ... 27
Figure 5.2. Provisional framework ... 31
Figure 6.1. Validated framework... 34
List of tables
Table 3.1. Literature overview of a cluster manager and a coordinating body ... 195 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
Preface
I have conducted this research at Groningen Seaports NV in the period from August 2013 to February 2014, in order to write my Master Thesis in the field of Supply Chain Management. While writing my Master Thesis, I have had the support of many people I would like to thank. But firstly I would like to thank Groningen Seaports NV for giving me the opportunity to write my Master Thesis within their organization. In particular I would like to thank my supervisor drs. T. Smit, who has provided me with valuable feedback and introduced me to the right companies and people.
I also would like to thank my supervisors prof. dr. I.F.A. Vis and drs. S.K. Thunnissen from the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. They also provided me with a lot of valuable feedback and were always available for questions.
Finally, I would like to thank all the interviewees of the structured and unstructured interviews for the provision of information, knowledge and expertise. It was a pleasure to take off these interviews, since these interviews are carried out to collect and validate my data, but at the same time was it also very interesting to listen to stories from practice. As a result, I learned a lot about ports and industrial symbiosis.
6 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
Management summary
In deze Master scriptie is beschreven welke rollen Groningen Seaports NV kan vervullen in de coördinatie van industriële symbiose van stoom. Groningen Seaports NV is onderhevig aan zware concurrentie van andere haven- en industriegebieden. Daarom is het voor Groningen Seaports NV belangrijk de concurrentiepositie van het havengebied zo sterk mogelijk te maken, waardoor het aantrekkelijk is voor bedrijven zich te vestigen in het havengebied van Groningen Seaports NV. De concurrentiepositie van het havengebied kan men versterken door de beschikbaarheid van utilities tegen een concurrerende prijs.
Voor de beschikbaarheid van utilities vervult Groningen Seaports NV op dit moment de rol van een “cluster manager”, oftewel het coördineren van problemen in collectieve acties. Hier valt onder het samenbrengen van partijen en het stimuleren van de communicatie tussen partijen, dus het opbouwen van vertrouwen tussen partijen. Daarnaast valt hieronder het investeren in infrastructuur, dus het op zich nemen van het investeringsrisico, indien gebruikers niet bereid zijn hierin te investeren. Door de verzelfstandiging heeft Groningen Seaports NV echter meer vrijheid gekregen van haar aandeelhouders om op een gepaste manier te gaan ondernemen in commerciële activiteiten. Daarom is de vergelijking gemaakt met industrieparken om te onderzoeken welke commerciële activiteiten een coördinerende organisatie van industriële symbiose uitvoert. Hiervoor is een literatuurstudie uitgevoerd en een case study uitgevoerd bij het industriepark Chemelot, te Geleen, waar Utility Support Group BV verantwoordelijk is voor de coördinatie van industriële symbiose. Hierbij is gekozen om de utility stoom te onderzoeken, omdat stoom een energiebron is met een hoge economische waarde ten opzichte van andere utilities. Daarnaast is stoom locatiespecifiek georganiseerd, waardoor de organisatie ervan makkelijker te beïnvloeden is. Uit dit onderzoek is gebleken dat een coördinerende organisatie van industriële symbiose naast de rol van “cluster manager”, ook stoom kan produceren, exploiteren en onderhouden.
7 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 verantwoordelijke voor het onderhoud. Het belangrijkste tegenargument van leveranciers en afnemers van stoom is dat Groningen Seaports NV een monopolie gaat vormen. Daarom de suggestie van een aantal partijen om handel en transport van stoom van elkaar te scheiden. Daarnaast hebben deze rollen in de huidige situatie geen toegevoegde waarde, omdat Groningen Seaports NV dan tussen een directe verbinding tussen leverancier en afnemer komt te zitten, wat extra communicatie en hogere prijzen oplevert. Het belangrijkste argument voor is dat Groningen Seaports NV een onafhankelijke partij is. Daarnaast zien partijen graag dat de bestaande hegemonie van leveranciers wordt doorbroken.
Het advies aan Groningen Seaports NV is om het stoomnetwerk uit te breiden zodat meerdere leveranciers aangesloten worden op één stoomnetwerk, waardoor de dominantie van leveranciers wordt verminderd. In een dergelijke situatie is coördinatie van exploitatie en onderhoud noodzakelijk. Groningen Seaports NV zal in deze situatie alsnog een monopolie gaan vormen door de exploitatie en het onderhoud op zich te nemen. Vandaar het advies om het transport en handel van stoom ook in deze situatie van elkaar te scheiden. Hierdoor kan de handel van stoom aan de leveranciers en afnemers overgelaten worden, waar de marktwerking de prijzen laag zal houden. Het transport kan aanbesteed worden op de markt, waar de marktwerking ook de prijzen van het transport laag zal houden. In het geval van een slecht functionerende markt kan het zo zijn dat partijen niet bereid zijn de verantwoordelijkheid voor het transport van stoom op zich te nemen. In dat geval kan de havenautoriteit deze rollen op zich nemen, indien de functie van zodanig belang is voor de concurrentiepositie en de aantrekkelijkheid van het havengebied. Deze uitkomst van dit onderzoek is in Figure 0.1 visueel weergegeven. In de overige situaties is het als Groningen Seaports NV niet verstandig het transport van stoom te verzorgen, omdat Groningen Seaports NV met deze rol concurreert op de private markt, waarvan een aantal bedrijven ook hun klanten zijn.
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1
Introduction
Port authorities expand their role as a landlord as a result of the highly competitive environment in which they are acting (Verhoeven, 2010; Van der Lugt et al., 2013). This competitive environment forces port authorities to develop commercialized activities and commercialized spin off activities to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of the port area, which changes the role and the position of a port authority within the supply chain (Notteboom & Winkelmans 2001; Cullinane & Song 2002; Bichou & Gray 2004; Baltazar & Brooks 2006; Verhoeven 2010; Van der Lugt et al. 2013). The extent to which a port authority has developed commercialized activities is influenced by the institutional structure of a port authority, which refers to the degree of governmental influence (Van der Lugt et al., 2013). A public port authority has a high degree of governmental influence and this limits the abilities to invest and participate in commercial activities beyond its jurisdiction (Heaver, Meersman, & Van de Voorde, 2010). Although the formerly public port authority of Rotterdam and the Antwerp Port Authority prove that it is not impossible to participate in commercialized activities by, among others cooperations with inland nodes and terminals (Notteboom, De Langen, & Jacobs, 2013). Port authorities corporatize to reduce the supervision of its public shareholders in the decision-making process, which results in opportunities to undertake commercial activities in an appropriate way (Verhoeven, 2010). Furthermore, the corporatization creates greater autonomy for the port authority to enter capital markets (Christensen & Laegreid, 2003). As a result, corporatized port authorities have more freedom to participate in commercialized activities to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of the port area.
9 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 problems (De Langen, 2008). Similar studies of Chlomoudis & Pallis (2004) and De Langen & Pallis (2007) focused on the coordinating role of a port authority with the aim to reduce entry barriers for port service providers, for instance by ensuring fair and efficient pricing to reduce the advantage of incumbent service providers. The financial revenue of port authorities in these activities consists of the rent they get for the land and for the infrastructure and site-specific assets they built to facilitate the cooperations (Heaver, Meersman, Moglia, & Van De Voorde, 2000; Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2001; Chlomoudis & Pallis, 2004; Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2005; De Langen & Pallis, 2007; De Langen, 2008; Mclaughlin & Fearon, 2013). These financial revenues are also generated by a landlord port
authority, which is responsible for the development and management of the land, infrastructure and facilities in the port area and the corresponding policies and strategies (Verhoeven, 2010). So it
concerns expansions of the existing financial revenues. Expanding the financial revenue model is important for corporatized port authorities, since the financial support of the government decreases (Stiglitz, 2000). However, it is not clear if and how a corporatized port authority can carry out the role of a cluster manager in a different way, resulting in new ways of generating financial revenue.
This research elaborates on a specific form of clustering called industrial symbiosis. Industrial
symbiosis includes a collective approach regarding utility sharing, service sharing, and the physical exchange of materials and/or by products by a group of industrial companies in a particular area
(Chertow 2000; Chertow 2007; Chertow et al. 2008). Industrial symbiosis is an interesting topic for industrial areas with regard to the economic crisis and the importance of sustainability. Industrial symbiosis is commonly applied to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of industrial parks (Mirata & Emtairah, 2005). The responsibility of coordinating industrial symbiosis may be delegated to a coordinating body (Chertow 2007; Costa et al. 2010; Gibbs & Deutz 2007; Mirata 2004; Schwarz & Steininger 1997), which performs therefore the role of a cluster manager. In this study, the
coordination of industrial symbiosis refers to the development and management of industrial symbiosis. A coordinating body can be established in various forms like a private organization, a
10 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 Seaports NV revealed that the competitiveness and attractiveness of a port area improves through
the availability of utilities at a competitive price.
So in conclusion, several commercialized activities for port authorities are described in literature to improve the competitiveness and the attractiveness of the port area (Notteboom & Winkelmans 2001; Bichou & Gray 2004; Cullinane & Song 2002; Baltazar & Brooks 2006; Verhoeven 2010; Van der Lugt et al. 2013). However, there is no research available about how a port authority can coordinate industrial symbiosis and whether this coordinating role provides opportunities to generate financial revenues in a new way. That is why the intended goal of this research is to gain insight in how a
port authority can coordinate industrial symbiosis, firstly to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of the port area, and
secondly to generate financial revenues in a new way (Figure 1.1). In
order to achieve the intended goal of this research, the existing knowledge about port authorities as cluster managers and coordinating bodies of industrial symbiosis are described, by answering the following sub questions by means of a literature review:
1. What are the roles and financial revenues of a port authority as a cluster manager? 2. What are the important factors in coordinating industrial symbiosis?
3. What are the roles and financial revenues of a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis? 4. What are the similarities and differences between a corporatized port authority as a cluster
manager and a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis?
The literature study is conducted after describing the research methodology, which is the next chapter in this research. The literature review is followed by the results of the case studies at Chemelot Industrial Park and Groningen Seaports NV. The results of these case studies are then discussed and followed by conclusions.
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2
Research framework
The objective of this research methodology is to describe the research methods used in order to answer the research questions. The methods used includes a literature study and two single case studies. This chapter ends with a description of how the collected data of the single case studies are analyzed.
2.1 Literature study
A literature study is carried out to answer the first four sub-questions, resulting in a conceptual list of the roles and financial revenues of a
port authority as a cluster manager and a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis (Figure 2.1). This literature study is supported by unstructured interviews with staff of the finance department at Groningen Seaports NV, which are used to determine directions for the literature study. The roles and financial revenues of a port authority acting as a cluster manager are described to examine how these activities can be expanded later on in this research. Then are the
factors which play an important role in the coordination of industrial symbiosis described, to be able to describe the function of the coordination of industrial symbiosis. Then the role and the financial revenues of coordinating bodies of industrial symbiosis are described, to serve as input for the expansion of the roles and financial revenues of a corporatized port authority. The similarities and differences between the roles and financial revenues of a port authority as a cluster manager and a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis are clarified in a table, to identify possible expansions of the role and the financial revenue model of a corporatized port authority. This table serves as input for the single case studies.
2.2 Single case study
Two single case studies are conducted to gain insight in how a corporatized port authority can coordinate industrial symbiosis. There is academic literature available on the role of a port authority
12 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 in cluster activities, but not on the specific form called industrial symbiosis, which therefore requires explorative theory building. Case study research is a strong tool for explorative theory building (Voss, 2009). The unit of analysis in these case studies is industrial symbiosis of steam, which is investigated in two different contexts. One utility is chosen as unit of analysis for these cases, since it cannot be assumed that the coordination of each utility is the same. The utility steam is chosen based on an unstructured interview with the Manager Strategic Development at Groningen Seaports NV. This manager is responsible for utility projects and revealed that steam is a source of energy with a high economic value with respect to other utilities. In addition, the utility steam is site specific organized, which means that the competitiveness and attractiveness of a port area can be improved with a competing network of steam. This unit of analysis is studied in two different contexts, in the port area of Groningen Seaports NV and at the Chemelot Industrial Park, which makes it two embedded single case studies (Yin, 2009). An interview protocol is written for the interviews at these cases to strengthen the reliability of this research (Yin, 2009). The interviews are audio recorded and transcribed afterwards to get a detailed view on the answers of the respondents, which increases the reliability and reduce the personal biases of the researcher (Voss, 2009). The reliability of this research is also strengthened by triangulation by conducting interviews and doing content analysis of documents (Voss, 2009).
2.3 Data analysis
A coding scheme is developed after transcribing the interviews in order to maintain an overview of the large amount of data (Appendix 3. Encoding scheme). This coding scheme is used to categorize the data and to identify certain patterns within the gathered data. The categories consist of the possible roles and financial revenues of a corporatized port authority. After conducting and transcribing the interviews, the most important parts are highlighted. The highlighted parts are encoded and categorized. The patterns within cases are analyzed. Then a cross-case analysis is executed to compare the analysis of the potential suppliers, the current suppliers, the potential buyers and the current buyers of steam in the port area of Groningen Seaports NV. The purpose of this cross-case analysis is to find similarities and differences between the different stakeholders. A within-case analysis and a cross-case analysis ensures that the data is viewed from different angles which strengthened the internal validity of the results (Voss, 2009).
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3
Literature study
The objective of this literature study is to gain more insight into the roles and financial revenues of a port authority acting as a cluster manager and of a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis. The comparison between these two organizations serve as input for the two single case studies at Chemelot Industrial Park and Groningen Seaports NV. First is described how a port authority is generating financial revenues in coordinating clusters. Then the important factors which play an important role in the coordination of industrial symbiosis are described, followed by a description of the financial revenues of a coordinating body in the coordination of industrial symbiosis. This literature study results in two conceptual frameworks of the roles and the financial revenues of the different organizations.
3.1 The roles and financial revenues of a port authority as a cluster manager
15 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 of chains of transportation. And the final role for port authorities is to ensure competition in transport chains to lower entry barriers. As a part of collective action is a cluster manager also coordinating the maintenance of relationships between buyers and suppliers to build trust (Verhoeven, 2010; Chlomoudis, Karalis, & Pallis, 2003). The supplier-buyer relationship between the involved companies is an important aspect in the process of clustering, with commitment, trust and conflict as important factors (Henry Xie, Suh, & Kwon, 2010). So a port authority acting as a cluster manager has a coordinating role to avoid collective action problems within cluster activities. Generating financial revenue by charging the companies that make use of the infrastructure is the only way of how port authorities as cluster managers generate financial revenue mentioned so far. Several authors have described that a port authority also has to invest in site-specific assets and to lease these assets to the users (Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2001; Chlomoudis & Pallis, 2004; De Langen & Pallis, 2007; Mclaughlin & Fearon, 2013). Examples of these assets are warehouses, office space for third parties and cranes (De Langen & Pallis, 2007). The aim of these investments is to reduce entry barriers by lowering the required investments in site-specific assets for customers and therefore increasing the attractiveness of the concerning area (De Langen & Pallis, 2007). Weiss & Kurland (1997) mention that investments in specific assets increase the dependence between companies and the chance that companies will terminate a relationship decreases, which is also a goal of port authorities. However, investments of the port authority are only required when market players are not willing to invest (De Langen, 2008). Reasons for the unwillingness can be that market players do not have incentives to invest (De Langen, 2008) or because of the ‘free rider’ phenomenon, which means that other market players benefit from infrastructure or site-specific assets without having invested in them (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2005). So investing in site-specific assets is another role for a port authority acting as a cluster manager. The generation of financial revenue by leasing site-specific assets is the second financial revenue for a cluster manager mentioned.
16 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 3.2 The roles and financial revenues of a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis Industrial parks improve the competitiveness of their area by developing industrial symbiosis (Mirata & Emtairah, 2005). Benefits of industrial symbiosis can be realized in the environmental field, like reduced pollutant emissions, and the economic field, like reductions in waste management costs. Benefits can also be realized in the business field, like improved relationships with external parties, and in the social field, like the creation of a cleaner working environment (Mirata & Emtairah, 2005). Several factors have to be taken into account during the coordination of industrial symbiosis. In literature are five influencing factors of industrial symbiosis defined (Mirata, 2004; Sakr et al. 2011; Costa et al., 2010). The first influencing factor is technology, which refers to the availability of the required technology. The second factor is politics, like restrictions and drivers by laws and regulations. The third factor is finance, which refers to the required investments and the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis. The fourth factor is informative, like the exchange of reliable information. The last factor is organization, like trust and openness to each other. To examine how a port authority can expand its role in the coordination of industrial symbiosis, is now first described how a coordinating body at an industrial park manage these influencing factors.
18 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 In conclusion, the roles and the financial revenues of a port authority acting as a cluster manager and a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis are described now based on academic literature, which have many similarities (Figure 3.1/Figure 3.2). The difference is that a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis can generate financial revenue by sharing in the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis (Figure 3.2). A single case study is performed at the coordinating body of industrial symbiosis at the Chemelot Industrial Park, in order to get a detailed description of how a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis is sharing in the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis. Main research question in the single case study at Chemelot Industrial Park:
“How is a coordinating body of industrial symbiosis coordinating industrial symbiosis and sharing
in the economic benefits of it?”
To examine whether a corporatized port authority can also coordinate industrial symbiosis and share in the economic benefits of it, is a second single case study performed at Groningen Seaports NV. A corporatized port authority is selected, since it has more freedom to participate in commercialized activities as described in the introduction. Later on in this research is examined whether the results also apply to public port authorities, based on an interview with a port expert. Main research question in the single case study at Groningen Seaports NV:
“How can a corporatized port authority coordinate industrial symbiosis and generate financial revenues in a new way?”
19 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 Table 3.1. Literature overview of a cluster manager and a coordinating body
Authority Authors Develop infrastructure Port authority as a
cluster manager
Heaver et al. (2000)
Notteboom & Winkelmans (2001) Notteboom & Rodrigue (2005) De Langen & Pallis (2007) De Langen (2008)
Mclaughlin & Fearon (2013) Coordinating body Mirata & Emtairah (2005)
Paquin & Howard-Grenville (2009)
Develop site specific assets Port authority as a cluster manager
Notteboom & Winkelmans (2001) Chlomoudis & Pallis (2004) De Langen & Pallis (2007) Mclaughlin & Fearon (2013) Coordinating body Mirata & Emtairah (2005)
Paquin & Howard-Grenville (2009)
Share in the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis
Coordinating body Behera et al. (2012)
Remaining collective action problems
Port authority as a cluster manager
Chlomoudis et al. (2003) De Langen & Chouly (2004) Notteboom & Rodrigue (2005) Van der Horst & De Langen (2007) Van der Lugt & De Langen (2007) De Langen (2008)
Verhoeven (2010)
Van der Horst & Van der Lugt (2011) Coordinating body Chertow (2000)
Gibbs (2003) Heeres et al. (2004) Van Beers et al. (2007)
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4
Case study
This chapter describes the results of the two single case studies at Chemelot Industrial Park and Groningen Seaports NV. First the case Chemelot Industrial Park is described, followed by a description of how Groningen Seaports NV can coordinate industrial symbiosis based on the literature study and the single case study at Chemelot Industrial Park.
4.1 Case Chemelot Industrial Park
The description of Chemelot Industrial Park provides more insight into the main research question of this single case study: “How is Utility Support Group BV coordinating industrial symbiosis of steam and sharing in the economic benefits of it?”.
4.1.1 Case selection Chemelot Industrial Park
Chemelot Industrial Park is chosen as case, since this industrial park is a good practical example of clusters (Dervojeda, Warmenhoven, & Lenton, 2012). At Chemelot Industrial Park is a coordinating body called Utility Support Group BV (USG), which is responsible for the coordination of industrial symbiosis in the industrial area. Part of the established companies in the industrial area of Chemelot Industrial Park consists of chemical industry who use multiple utilities, including steam. In addition, USG is jointly responsible for the exploitation of utilities, that allows them to share in the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis (http://www.usgbv.com/nl/over-usg). Therefore, USG is a suitable case for answering the research question of this single case study in order to get a detailed description of how a coordinating body can share in the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis. 4.1.2 Data collection Chemelot Industrial Park
How USG is coordinating industrial symbiosis of steam is outlined based on an interview with the Manager Commercial Affairs of USG. How USG is sharing in the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis of steam is outlined based on an interview with the Controller of USG. These interviewees are designated by the contact person at USG as the appropriate persons to answer the questions. These interviews result in an improved list of the roles and financial revenues of a coordinating body, with the focus on industrial symbiosis of steam (Figure 2.1). The questions of the interviews are based on literature and the preceding unstructured interviews (Appendix 2. Interview protocol – ). The encoded data of the structured interviews are displayed in Appendix 4. Encoded data.
4.1.3 Results Chemelot Industrial Park
21 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 for 90% the users of the utilities. The other 10% are other companies in the industrial area of Chemelot Industrial Park which consume utilities. The most important activities of USG relates to the purchase of electricity, steam, natural gas and other utilities, technological support, managing contracts, CO2 emissions management and lobbying activities. In short, USG is the caretaker of utilities for the companies. The mission of USG is a reliable and sustainable supply of utilities at the lowest cost to the Chemelot Industrial Park site.
4.1.4 The role of USG in industrial symbiosis
USG is a 50% shareholder of EdeA, which is the manager of all utility-related assets. The other 50% shareholder is Essent. EdeA is a cost-plus tolling company with a fixed profit. EdeA builds, operates and maintains the utility assets at the Chemelot Industrial Park site. So EdeA produces steam in steam boilers as well as collecting and re-distributing the returned steam. Next to the produced steam by EdeA, the flows of steam are the waste streams of companies, which can be used by other companies for their production process. The return flows are used until the steam is condensed. The condensed steam is feed water for the boilers of EdeA. Next to the steam produced in steam boilers, an important part of the required steam is produced in a combined heat and power plant owned by Essent. USG is the commercial party in this system which is managing the contracts of suppliers and buyers of steam.
4.1.5 The financial revenues of USG in industrial symbiosis
A coordinating body generates financial revenue by the rent of site specific assets, rent of infrastructure and sharing in the economic benefits, as described in the literature study (Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2009; Mirata & Emtairah, 2005; Behera et al., 2012). USG has a fiscal cost company status, which means that they do not make a profit or a loss. USG is a company that supports the processes of the shareholders and these shareholders are the main off-takers of utilities. The benefits are realized by USG for all shareholders, meaning that the shareholders have to pay taxes on the benefits instead of USG.
22 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 proportion to the consumption passed on to the customers of the utilities. The development consists of advising potential suppliers and buyers
about the opportunities of utility flows, drawing up contracts with suppliers and buyers of utilities and the construction of the infrastructure or specific assets. The operation consists of the planning of utility flows, controlling the operation of utility flows and producing or buying the residual demand for an utility. Exploitation of utility flows consists of billing suppliers and buyers of utilities. Maintain utility flows consists of the planning of maintenance and perform maintenance on the infrastructure and specific assets. So for example steam, several assets are available
like steam turbines and boilers and the infrastructure consist of pipelines. The financial revenues arise in passing on the cost incurred for development, operation, exploitation and maintenance of the utility flows between consumers (Figure 4.1).
4.1.6 Conclusion
The main research question of this single case study can now be answered. USG fulfills an active role in the management of industrial symbiosis of steam, since they also operate, maintain and exploit steam flows. The financial revenues arise in passing on the cost incurred in these activities. The next section describes how Groningen Seaports NV can fulfill an active role in the management of industrial symbiosis of steam like USG.
4.2 Case Groningen Seaports NV
The results of the single case study at Groningen Seaports NV provides more insight into the main research question of this single case study: “How can Groningen Seaports NV coordinate industrial symbiosis and generate financial revenues in a new way?”. To answer this main research question are first the roles and financial revenues of Groningen Seaports as a public port authority described by answering the following sub-questions:
1. What was the role of Groningen Seaports as a public port authority in the coordination of industrial symbiosis of steam?
23 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 2. How was Groningen Seaports as a public port authority generating financial revenue in the
coordination of industrial symbiosis of steam? 4.2.1 Case selection Groningen Seaports NV
Groningen Seaports NV is chosen as case for this research, since chemical companies are located in the port area of Groningen Seaports NV who use multiple utilities, including steam. In the port area of Groningen Seaports NV are several synergies realized like a steam network and a nitrogen network (http://www.groningen-seaports.com/Business/Chemie/tabid/2135/language/nl-NL/Default.aspx). Furthermore, this port authority is corporatized at June 14th 2013. Therefore is Groningen Seaports NV a representative case (Voss, 2009) to answer the main research questions of this case study. 4.2.2 Data collection Groningen Seaports NV
The role of Groningen Seaports as a public port authority is described based on an interview with a Project Leader of among other utility projects at Groningen Seaports NV. This interview is supported by the document “Service Agreement” between Havenschap Groningen Seaports and Groningen Seaports NV, in which all roles of Groningen Seaports NV are described. The financial revenues of Groningen Seaports as a public port authority are described based on an interview with the Business Operations Manager of Groningen Seaports NV, who is in charge of the financial department. This interview is supported by the document “Budget 2014”, in which the financial revenues of Groningen Seaports NV are described. To describe the roles and financial revenues of Groningen Seaports as a public port authority, are the answers of the interviewees based on the situation of the first half year of 2013, so before the corporatization of Groningen Seaports at June 2013. The roles and financial revenues of Groningen Seaports are each described based on one interview, since these questions can be reliably answered by the interviewees mentioned (Voss, 2009). Furthermore, these two interviews support each other, since the financial revenues are based on the role they perform. In a second interview with a Project Leader and the Business Operations Manager of Groningen Seaports NV is examined how Groningen Seaports as a corporatized port authority can coordinate industrial symbiosis of steam. The Business Operations Manager is also a member of the Management Team of Groningen Seaports NV, so this manager knows exactly what the capabilities are of Groningen Seaports NV. The coordinating roles are based on the literature study and the results of the single case study at Chemelot Industrial Park. These interviewees have indicated the applicability of the new roles for Groningen Seaports NV in the coordination of industrial symbiosis of steam (Figure 2.1).
24 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 2.1). Two current suppliers and two current buyers within industrial symbiosis of steam are interviewed. In addition, two potential suppliers and two potential buyers within the industrial symbiosis of steam are interviewed. At each company are the managers interviewed who are closely involved in the realization of industrial symbiosis of steam. These interviewees are suggested by the Manager Strategic Development at Groningen Seaports NV, who knows which persons are involved in the industrial symbiosis of steam at each company. Both current and potential stakeholders are interviewed to hedge the risk that there can be a difference between developing new industrial symbiosis and managing current industrial symbiosis. Two of each type of stakeholder are interviewed to increase the reliability of the results (Voss, 2009).
The questions of the interviews are based on literature and the preceding unstructured and structured interviews (Appendix 2. Interview protocol – ). The encoded data of the structured interviews are displayed in Appendix 4. Encoded data.
4.2.3 Results Groningen Seaports NV
Groningen Seaports NV manages several areas at the region Eemsdelta, namely the seaport at Delfzijl, the Eemshaven including the surrounded industrial area, the inland ports called Farmsumerhaven and Oosterhornhaven and the business area called Fivelpoort. Furthermore, Groningen Seaports NV manages the inland rail terminal at Veendam called Groningen Rail port. The main responsibility of Groningen Seaports NV is to conserve and develop the ports and the business and industrial areas. Moreover, Groningen Seaports NV provides infrastructure in the various areas such as pipelines and transport routes. The focus of Groningen Seaports NV is on facilitating the spearhead sectors energy, data, chemistry, recycling, logistics, agribusinesses, metal and small and medium-sized enterprises.
25 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 needed. Groningen Seaports took the initiative of an industrial symbiosis, when Groningen Seaports considered the utility as an added value for the port area. This to develop the industrial symbiosis in a wider and larger way, resulting in more companies which are connected to the network. This increases the dependence between companies within the port area, as described in 3.1 (Weiss & Kurland, 1997).
Groningen Seaports transferred the management of the industrial symbiosis of steam to a market player, when the industrial symbiosis of steam was realized. Which means that among other the planning, exploitation, billing and coordination of stops for maintenance in industrial symbiosis of steam are coordinated by a market player. The procurement of maintenance is done by Groningen Seaports. In the coordination of industrial symbiosis of steam are two elements important for Groningen Seaports. First, constantly monitoring that the network is in use and that the network meets the principles for which it was conceived. Groningen Seaports concludes a multiyear contract with the users of the facilities of a steam network. A supplier can decide to stop with the supply of steam, when the supply of steam is no longer profitable. In that case, the supplier still has to pay the rent for the facilities because of the multiyear contract, but are the facilities not in operation. That means that the financial risks are hedged for Groningen Seaports, but the main objective is not achieved. The main objective is the availability of a common steam network where multiple companies can benefit from. Furthermore, that new entrants can be connected to this network and do not have to invest first in this utility. This is also the second important element, to make it possible for new entrants to have access to the steam network, resulting in an attractive area for new companies. In addition, Groningen Seaports stimulates the cooperations in their port area by bringing parties together and stimulate the communication between parties, so building trust as described in section 3.1 as roles of a cluster manager (De Langen, 2003).
4.2.5 The financial revenues of Groningen Seaports as a public port authority in industrial symbiosis
26 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 its customers is not affected by Groningen Seaports. It is up to the suppliers to ensure that the costs of the facilities are included in the prices for the use of steam.
4.2.6 Conclusion
The sub-questions five and six can now be answered. Groningen Seaports was as a public port authority already performing the role of a cluster manager in the industrial symbiosis of steam by coordinating collective action problems, as bringing parties together and stimulate the communication between parties, so building trust. In addition were
they facilitating the infrastructure for the industrial symbiosis of steam and generating financial revenue by leasing the infrastructure to the users.
Table 4.1. Examples of financial revenues of Groningen Seaports
Financial revenue Example Shipping movements Rental of berths
Shipping related Rental of scaffolds
Grounds core business Rental of land
Grounds non core business Rental of utility facilities
Result land transactions Sale of land
Other financial revenues Rental of heliport
27 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
5
Discussion
To examine how Groningen Seaports NV can coordinate industrial symbiosis of steam, are the potential roles and financial revenues for Groningen Seaports NV discussed in this chapter (Figure 5.1). The potential roles are first discussed with the Business Operations Manager and the Project Leader of Groningen Seaports NV. Then the opinions of the eight current and
potential buyers and suppliers of steam in the port area of Groningen Seaports NV are discussed. The encoded data of the interviews can be found in Appendix 4. Encoded data. This chapter ends with the a provisional framework, which shows the roles of Groningen Seaports NV in the industrial symbiosis of steam.
5.1 Developing the industrial symbiosis of steam
Groningen Seaports NV can perform the role of a cluster manager in the development of industrial symbiosis of steam, as they already do according to the Project Leader and the Business Operations Manager. The development role includes the roles of a cluster manager as described by De Langen (2008) as coordinating collective action problems. Groningen Seaports NV is already generating financial revenue by renting out the facilities for the industrial symbiosis of steam.
All the interviewed suppliers and buyers of steam indicate Groningen Seaports NV as the most appropriate party to develop the industrial symbiosis of steam, so performing the role of a cluster manager. All the potential and current buyers mainly see developing infrastructure as an important role for Groningen Seaports NV, since buyers see the investment as a problem for themselves. 5.2 Operating the industrial symbiosis of steam
Groningen Seaports NV can build an installation to produce steam by itself and sell the steam at a higher price than the cost price according to the Business Operations Manager. However, this installation requires an investment which is difficult to recoup. Steam is a waste product of companies, so for Groningen Seaports NV will it be difficult to apply the same selling prices with a specially designed installation for steam. In addition is Groningen Seaports NV competing with its customers by performing this role, which should be well thought. Another way to exert influence on the production of steam is to become shareholder of an utility company as in the Chemelot Industrial Park, which is described in sub-paragraph 5.5.
28 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 5.3 Exploit the industrial symbiosis of steam
Groningen Seaports NV can exploit the industrial symbiosis of steam, including the purchase and sale of steam according to the Business Operations Manager and the Project Leader of Groningen Seaports NV. Groningen Seaports NV is responsible for the billing of steam infrastructure, which means that they are able to bill companies. However, the Business Operations Manager indicated that Groningen Seaports NV does not have the right knowledge to draw up contracts for the purchase and sale of steam. Reason for this is that there are several risks associated with the purchase and sale of steam, like the quality of steam and the reliability of delivery of steam. High cost arise when buyers of steam cannot produce because there is no steam available or they receive steam of bad quality. Producers of steam can be made responsible for such costs, depending on the agreements. So a risk analysis has to be made and clear agreements must be made by contracts with suppliers and buyers to cover these risks. Specialists out of the market are needed to draw up these contracts according to the Business Operations Manager.
Groningen Seaports NV can generate financial revenues in a new way in the exploitation of steam by selling the steam at a higher price than the purchase price. Performing this role in the current situation has no added value, since there are two suppliers of steam which provide steam for their surrounding area. The steam networks consist of one supplier and several buyers, so prices of steam will only increase when Groningen Seaports NV will perform the exploitation role.
One potential supplier and one current buyer of steam have indicated that Groningen Seaports NV is a suitable party to exploit steam. Reason for this is that Groningen Seaports NV is an independent party with a common interest. Another current buyer is positive about reducing the current dominance of suppliers, but prefers to separate the parts trade and transport of the exploitation of steam. A potential supplier supports this idea arguing that it prevents that a party will form a monopoly, which is responsible for the trade and transport of steam. The transport will then be tendered and the suppliers and buyers are responsible for the trading of steam. Groningen Seaports NV will form a monopoly by exploiting steam, that is why Groningen Seaports NV is not a suitable party for the exploitation of steam according to one current supplier, one potential supplier, one current buyer and one potential buyer of steam. A current supplier also argued that Groningen Seaports NV is not capable to do the exploitation of steam, since the alignment of the daily process is a specialty.
29 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 return flows of steam. One current supplier indicated that return flows of steam represent a lower economic value, which makes it difficult for companies to recoup the required investment. So when there are several companies with return flows of steam, can Groningen Seaports NV set up a network for these return flows of steam to increase the energy efficiency in the port area, since Groningen Seaports NV has cheap access to money according to a current supplier of steam.
5.4 Maintain the facilities of the industrial symbiosis of steam
Groningen Seaports NV can coordinate the maintenance of the facilities of the industrial symbiosis of steam according to the Project Leader. Groningen Seaports NV is not able to perform the maintenance by themselves, but is able to make a call for tender of the maintenance and to contract a maintenance company as they already do according to the Business Operations Manager. Suppliers of steam are currently arranging the maintenance of the steam network separately. Coordinating these maintenances makes it possible to combine them, resulting in cost savings. Groningen Seaports NV generates financial revenues by incorporating the cost of maintenance in the rental prices of the facilities.
One current supplier, one potential supplier and one current buyer of steam see it in the current situation not as an added value when Groningen Seaports NV will coordinate the maintenances. In the current steam networks in the port area is one supplier of steam, who schedule the maintenances with its customers. So extra communication is needed with Groningen Seaports NV as coordinator, which make it not efficient to make Groningen Seaports NV coordinator of the maintenances in the current situation. Proponents argue that Groningen Seaports NV is responsible for the coordination of the maintenance of the infrastructure, once they exploit steam. So the conveyer of the steam is also responsible for scheduling the maintenances. Secondly, when a common network of steam is realized is coordination needed according to a potential supplier, to coordinate maintenances in such a way that customers do not have to shut down for every maintenance. So when one supplier of steam cannot supply steam because of maintenance, is it important to ensure that other suppliers can supply steam to the users.
5.5 Shareholder of an utility company
30 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 and a maintenance company can also become a shareholder of this utility company according to the Project Leader, so that each shareholder makes its contribution.
The opinions of suppliers and buyers of steam are divided about an utility company in the port area of Groningen Seaports NV. A few interviewees are positive about an utility company, provided that the utility company is competitive. Half of the interviewees are hesitant because the utility company is also forming a monopoly. The establishment of an utility company is not part of the further discussion, since no further research is done about the establishment of an utility company.
5.6 The impact of the corporatization on the role of Groningen Seaports NV
The recent corporatization of Groningen Seaports NV has made it easier to exploit and maintain the industrial symbiosis of steam according to the Business Operations Manager. Groningen Seaports NV had as a public port authority no permission of its shareholders to undertake. The supervision of the shareholders has changed because of the corporatization, which makes it possible for Groningen Seaports NV to undertake in an appropriate way.
5.7 Provisional framework
The main research question of this single case study can now be answered for Groningen Seaports NV, which is visually displayed in a provisional framework (Figure 5.2). Groningen Seaports NV can coordinate industrial symbiosis of steam by developing, operating and exploit and maintain the industrial symbiosis of steam. Groningen Seaports NV can share in the economic benefits of industrial symbiosis of steam by selling steam at a higher price than the cost price and incorporating the cost of maintenance in the rental prices of the facilities.
Develop the industrial symbiosis of steam by coordinating collective action problems is a suitable role for Groningen Seaports NV (Figure 5.2). The port authority is an independent party with contacts at each company within the port area, since these companies are their customers. In addition, a port authority aims to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of its port area, what can be achieved by the realization of industrial symbiosis. So as a port authority is it important to bring the right companies together and to stimulate collective action in the field of industrial symbiosis. An extra stimulus is to invest in the required infrastructure as a port authority. However, investing in infrastructure is only required when users of it are not willing to invest (3.1), as is the case at Groningen Seaports NV.
31 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 will only cause extra communication and an increase in the prices. Coordination of exploitation and maintenances is really necessary when multiple suppliers are connected to a steam network, to avoid that buyers of steam have to shut down for every maintenance and to coordinate which supplier supplies steam to each buyer. So it depends on the number of suppliers whether it is wise to exploit and maintain the industrial symbiosis of steam (Figure 5.2). However, prices of steam are competitive as the supplier of steam is selected based on the price, which is kept low by market forces. Groningen Seaports NV will form a monopoly by exploiting and maintaining the industrial symbiosis of steam, and this is what suppliers and buyers of steam want to avoid (Appendix 4. Encoded data). Therefore, some suppliers and buyers of steam suggest to separate the trade and transport of steam. This suggestion is further elaborated in the next chapter, which is the reason to put this role first in parentheses (Figure 5.2).
Operating steam flows is not an appropriate role for Groningen Seaports NV, since then it is not a waste product anymore which makes it difficult to compete and this mode of production is not subject to industrial symbiosis.
The above findings have resulted in a provisional framework with the roles for Groningen Seaports as a corporatized port authority in the industrial symbiosis of steam. The number of suppliers is the only variable that have been discussed up to now. The role of Groningen Seaports NV is further discussed in the next chapter, supported by the input of a port expert, with the aim to improve and validate the framework.
32 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
6
Improvement and validation of the framework
In this chapter is the role of Groningen Seaports NV in the industrial symbiosis of steam further discussed, supported by the input of a port expert, in order to improve and validate the provisional framework. The generalizability of each role is also examined with the port expert, in order to design a validated framework for both public and corporatized port authorities. The interviewed port expert is drs. L.M. van der Lugt, who is Senior Researcher Port Economics and Management at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. She is for about thirteen years involved in research projects in the field of port and maritime economics, port management and port related logistics development. The encoded data of this interview can be found in Appendix 4. Encoded data. This chapter ends with the validated framework, in order to answer the main research question of this research and to fill in the identified gap in the academic port literature.
6.1 Development of industrial symbiosis of steam
A port authority has the objective to develop the port area and to create networks allowing companies to develop optimally, contributing to the economic growth, the activity and the employment in the region. Performing the role of a cluster manager as a port authority to coordinate collective action problems in the industrial symbiosis of steam is therefore a suitable role, which can be performed by all public and corporatized port authorities according to the port expert (Figure 6.1). Companies may have several reasons why they are not willing to make major investments for the development of industrial symbiosis of steam, as described in the literature study (3.1). However if it makes a major contribution to the attractiveness and competitiveness of the port area, is it a wise choice of a port authority to act as a cluster manager and invest for example in the infrastructure needed for the industrial symbiosis of steam. The port authority is in that case taking over the risk of investment of the companies involved. As a result, the industrial symbiosis of steam will be realized and this improves the attractiveness of the port area for companies that use steam in their production process.
6.2 Exploit and maintain the industrial symbiosis of steam
33 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 assets to them. Competing with your customers can cause complicated situations, since firstly bad experiences in the private market caused by the port authority may have a bad influence on the negotiations of public tasks. Secondly, the port authority can also disturb the market conditions, for example by knocking out competitors. So instead of improving the competitiveness and attractiveness of the port area, there is a risk that the port authority does the opposite by exploiting steam. So there must be a good reason for a port authority to carry out the exploitation role in the industrial symbiosis of steam.
A good reason for a port authority to exploit steam is that the industrial symbiosis of steam is not a well-functioning market. It is possible that the market of steam is not functioning properly, because suppliers of steam are for example in a position where they have the ability to exercise power or they are not subject to competition. Then there is a good reason for a port authority to take a different position in the supply chain of steam to improve the market conditions according to the port expert. However, the port authority first has to check the impact of taking this position, to examine whether the market conditions indeed will improve or even get worse, since the port authority forms a monopoly. Hence, the suggestion to separate the trade and transport of steam to improve the market conditions. In that case are suppliers and buyers responsible for the trading of steam, in which multiple suppliers of steam will cause market forces resulting in competitive prices of steam. These prices will increase by a port authority that is interfering in the trade of the industrial symbiosis of steam, which is therefore not a suitable role for a port authority. The transport can be tendered to the private market, which will also cause market forces resulting in competitive prices for the transportation of steam. It may be that there is not a market player who wants to be responsible for the transport of steam, because of the risk of investment for example. In that case may a port authority decide to carry out the transportation of steam and charge the users of the transportation network, if the function is of such importance for the competitiveness and attractiveness of the port area (Figure 6.1).
6.3 Validated framework
34 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14 steam and without market players who are willing to be responsible for the transportation of steam. Financial revenues will then be generated by charging the users of the transportation network and incorporating the cost of maintenance in these transportation costs. Charging users for the transport of steam is a new way of generating financial revenues for a port authority, which also fills a gap in the academic port literature. A port authority should not be fully responsible for the exploitation of steam, since it will form a monopoly and their interference in the trade of steam is only increasing the price of steam, and this will decrease the competitiveness and attractiveness of the port area.
35 Master thesis Hendrik Tolsma 21/02/14
7
Conclusion
A validated framework is developed in this research which fills the gap in the academic port literature of how a port authority can coordinate industrial symbiosis of steam, in order to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of the port area and to generate financial revenues in a new way. The validated framework displays that port authorities can develop the industrial symbiosis of steam by performing the roles of a cluster manager, so coordinating collective action problems. Investments of the port authority in the necessary infrastructure are only required when users of it are not willing to invest. Port authorities can also transport and maintain the industrial symbiosis of steam, when multiple suppliers of steam are available and market players are not willing to be responsible for the transportation of steam. Financial revenues are then generated by charging the users of the transportation network. Exploiting steam as a port authority is not appropriate, because the port authority forms a monopoly in that case.
7.1 Limitations and suggestions for further research
The unit of analysis in this research is the industrial symbiosis of steam. The question is whether this also applies to other utilities like water, heat and cold, ICT, electricity, commodities, gases, waste and consumables as defined by Groningen Seaports NV. The generalizability of the results for other utilities is examined in an interview with drs. W. Spekkink, who is an expert on industrial symbiosis. He is a PhD student at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and published several academic articles on industrial symbiosis. The encoded data of the interview can be found in Appendix 4. Encoded data. This interview has revealed that these roles cannot be generalized for other utilities, except that an intensive interaction process must precede in the coordination of industrial symbiosis. This intensive interaction process indicates the importance of a cluster manager. The other roles cannot be generalized, since each industrial symbiosis has its own specifications and conditions like distances between suppliers and buyers, which appointments should be made, the processes in which companies use the utility and which technical changes are needed. So there is not an one size fits all strategy for the coordination of industrial symbiosis of utilities according to the field expert on industrial symbiosis.
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