TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ... 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NYE’S CONCEPTS OF HARD AND SOFT POWER ... 5
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ... 6
Three Dimensions of Power ... 8
HARD, SOFT AND SMART POWER ... 11
Nye’s Aspects of Soft Power ... 13
Soft Power Debated ... 17
ANALYSIS: AMERICAN POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY ... 27
THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN POWER AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEW CENTURY ... 27
HARD POWER DURING THE BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS ... 31
Military Power ... 31
Economic Power ... 32
SOFT POWER DURING THE BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS ... 34
Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project ... 34
Soft Power during the Bush Administration ... 38
Soft Power during the Obama Administration ... 42
INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN POWER ... 45
Bush’s View of U.S. Power ... 46
Domestic and Foreign Influences ... 54
CONCLUSION ... 58
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the 20th century politicians, scholars and the public, both in the United States and abroad, all seemed to agree with French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, who summarized the US power position as predominant “on the economic level, the monetary level, on the technological level, and in the cultural area in the broadest sense of the word…It is not comparable, in terms of power and influence, to anything known in modern history.”1 However, since the turn of the century, and especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, America’s power has become an intensified source of debate. During the onset of the Iraq War there was talk of an “unleashed, and unchecked, hyperpower,” but since the economic crises and the rise of other powers like China, there has been more and more talk of America as a “great power in decline.”2
To discuss America’s power position, it is important to specify what this power exactly entails. A discussion about military power will have a different outcome than one about hegemonic power, or legitimate power. In this paper I will look at American power as a combination of hard power and what foreign policy expert Joseph Nye has labeled soft power. By hard power, or command power, is meant power that rests on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). It is often tangible, like the police, financial power, or the ability to hire and fire people. Soft power, or co‐ optive power, on the other hand is less tangible. When a country has soft power it can get the outcomes it wants by setting the agenda or attracting others to their values and points of view— without using threats or payment.3
the foreign policy record of the Obama Administration, but generally agree that its more cooperative approach has increased America’s soft power.
crises of the 1970s and during the Reagan presidency because of the major budget deficits.9 Many of them do agree with the declinist, however, that the U.S. will not remain a dominant power forever and that foreign policymakers should start preparing now for a future in which America has less power. According to Nye, and many other soft power advocates, this includes focusing more on cooperation and less on force.
The power debate is very important because the way power is viewed—by the next president, future policymakers, influentials, and the public—will influence America’s foreign policy course and thus the future of the country; and in the case of America, the future of the country also affects the future of the entire international community. In my contribution to this debate, I will explore the usefulness of the concept of soft power and the influence of the presidents on this aspect of American power.
In the theoretical framework I will consider how the concept of soft power fits into the broader debate about power which has raised many questions, disagreements and possible solutions over the years. I wanted to look at power in the 21st century, because, although power is always a highly debated subject, an extra impulse was given to the debate in the 2000s due to the many changes in power as a result of globalization, 9/11, the rise of new powers and the economic crises. I chose to look at these changes in power in through the concepts of hard and soft power because they seemed most suitable to highlight the differences between the foreign policy approaches of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
One of the most general definitions of power comes from the British philosopher John Locke, who believed it to be the ability “to make, or…to receive, any change,” but even this definition makes certain assumptions.14 Locke sees power as the potential to make or receive change, which means that it does not need to be realized to be considered power. He also believes that power always entails “some kind of relation.”15 German sociologist Max Weber’s definition of power makes even more assumptions, but it has influenced the writings of many other theorists.16 By describing power as the “opportunity to have one’s will prevail within a social relationship, also against resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on,” he agrees with Locke that power is a relation and that it includes the ability to act.17 He is more specific than Locke, however, by also including that resistance is not necessary, thus suggesting that power could also be a plus‐sum game where both parties in the power relationship benefit. This latter assumption was not taken over by realist theorists who often adopted (a version of) Robert Dahl’s definition of power as “A getting B to do something B would otherwise not do.”18 The concept of power in International Relations is often associated with realism. Classical realists from Thucydides, to Machiavelli, and Hans Morgenthau have argued that international politics should be viewed, first and foremost, as a struggle for power between states. The latter, for example, argued that “statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power” and that, for states, power is always “the immediate aim.”19 Among realists there are many different definitions of power, but there are several assumptions about power upon which they generally agree.
According to realists, states are only safe if they have more power than their competitors, and are thus able to defend themselves against attacks. Berenskoetter explains that for realists power often equals “the ability to win wars,” which is why realists tend to measure power by measure military resources.20 In the almost 100 years since International Relations became a separate academic discipline, realism has been the most dominant approach to explain international politics, and thus their idea of power and measuring power was also dominant.21
Over the past few decades, however, realist ideas have increasingly been challenged and numerous other approaches have arisen. Even though power is most often associated with realism, many of these other approaches also see it as a central concept in the study of world politics. Renowned constructivist political scientist Alexander Wendt notes that the idea that international politics is shaped by power is not “a uniquely realist claim,” but the way they believe power can be measured, “the hypothesis that the effects of power are constituted primarily by brute material forces,” is typically realist.22 Many non‐realist theorists have pointed out that by defining power in solely military terms, realism succumbs to several “fallacies.”
Related to this is a third fallacy, the “exercise fallacy,” which is committed by those who argue that power always has to be an act or an event.26 Viewing only an act as power, however, ignores the fact that not acting can also be a sign of power (for example, not succumbing to international pressure to ratify a treaty), and that often the most powerful are those who do not need to act to show their power or to get the outcomes they want (for example because of fear for an anticipated reaction). Political theorist Steven Lukes thus rightfully concludes, “power is a capacity, and neither the exercise nor the vehicle of that capacity.”27
Three Dimensions of Power
Many theorists, thus, disagreed with the realist definition of power. Liberal internationalist, for example, argued that power does not have to be a zero‐sum game, states can work together to improve all of their standings in the world. For them, diplomacy and multilateralism are at least as important in determining the power of a country as military resources are. This vision gained in influence after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.28 Constructivists, such as Wendt, especially took issue with the “concrete fallacy,” and argued that ideas also play an important role and that the concept of power politics (states protecting only their own interests by using force) is only one of many ideas that influence international relations and the power position of states. Non‐material factors such as legitimacy can be very important aspects of power.29
To differentiate between all of the different views and aspects of power, many theorists talk about three dimensions, or three faces, of power. There are some dissimilarities in the exact categories and definitions that are used, but the general conceptions are well presented in Felix Berenskoetter’s “Thinking About Power,” which I will discuss below. His dimensions are based on Steven Lukes’ famous, and often adopted, theory of the three faces of power. The first dimension is called “winning conflicts” and is generally associated with realism; the second, termed “limiting alternatives,” is often linked to institutionalism and regime theory; and the third, associated with constructivism, is named “shaping normality.”30
realists, he argues, understood that there was more to power than military capabilities.31 Hans Morgenthau for instance admitted that power and influence was always dependent on the context, and E.H. Carr noted that power was not always tangible: “Power over opinion is… not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them.”32 Especially in the U.S. during the Cold War, these classical interpretations where replaced by neo‐realists who wanted to measure power and thus defined it in terms of concrete resources.33 Three noted advocates of these newer realist ideas are Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Robert Gilpin. Waltz has argued that “in international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one (italics in original)”; Mearsheimer has written that “power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses”; and Gilpin defined power as “the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states.”34 Events such as the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War, however, were difficult to explain by the neo‐realists and thus more and more alternative views of power were created and increasingly favored over a discredited realism.
suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decisionmaking area.”36 In this dimension, the power thus lies with those who can influence the structure or system in which decisions are being made. The focus has shifted away from a zero‐ sum relationship between two actors, in which either the one with the most resources, or the one who wins a conflict is considered most powerful. Instead, theorists study the context in which conflicts are fought or decisions being made, and look for the actor who is best able to shape the conditions to his advantage.37
Nye first used the term soft power in his 1990 book Bound to Lead and describes it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”47 He stresses that soft power is just as important, if not more important, as hard power. Hard power alone is often not enough to get the intended outcomes; you cannot win a war just by eradicating the enemy, you have to convince the population that you are fighting the right cause. Hard power alone was not enough to win the war in Vietnam or prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Also, hard power is often a lot more expensive than soft power. When a country can get others to follow it because they identify with the values it represents, it will cost less than when it has to bribe them with money or goods, or threaten them with police or military force.48 Nye thus argues that hard power alone is not sufficient, but he is also admits that neither is the use of only soft power. Countries should use power that is a combination of both hard and soft power; the job of policymakers is to find the right balance between the two and use the right tool for the right problem. Too much hard power can undercut soft power and result in the opposite of the intended effect, as was the case in the Iraq War. Nye explains:
The hard power of military and police force was necessary to counter Al Qaeda, but the indiscriminate use of hard power illustrated by the invasion in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prison pictures, and the Guantanamo detentions without trial served to increased the number of terrorist recruits…The absence of an effective soft power component undercut the strategy to respond to terrorism.”49
Too little hard power, on the other hand, can limit achievements. Thus it is important for an administration to find the right balance of power that makes sure that things get done the way it wants, but that does not scare or alienate its friends and enemies.50
important not to think too lightly about these decisions. Force should only be used in events where all alternative ways of exercising power are believed to be insufficient or more costly. The focus should be on other sources of power (such as diplomacy), but military power should be kept in the background in case other power fails, and as a warning to other nations that it can and will be used if necessary.54
Because of its tangibility and clear acts of power, hard power falls under the first dimension of power. Soft power could be placed both in the second and in third dimension, because it can influence agendas and structures, but it can also influence the interests of other actors. Even though Nye sometimes refers to soft power as the second face of power and acknowledges the influence of Bachrach and Baratz on his work, several commentators have noted that, especially in later years, soft power has shifted more towards the third face of power.55 Steven Lukes notes that Nye’s soft power could be seen as “a cousin of what I have called power’s ‘third dimension’: the power to shape, influence or determine others’ beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance.”56 Before discussing some of the critiques on soft power, I will give an overview of the aspects Nye considered to be part of soft power.
Nye’s Aspects of Soft Power
Joseph Nye divides soft power resources into three broad categories, “culture, political ideals, and policies.”57 He notes, however, that these resources will only produce soft power when they are considered attractive, and that the unattractiveness of resources in one category can lead to a decline in soft power despite the attractiveness of resources in other categories. For example, having an attractive culture can be undermined by policies that are seen as unfair. Creating a soft power strategy is thus not an easy task and consists of many different elements that need to be taken into account.
their core values like democracy, freedom and free trade. This gives them power in countries where their culture and values are admired, but it can also have an adverse effect. Nye warns that, for example, “exporting Hollywood films full of nudity and violence to conservative Muslim countries may produce repulsion rather than soft power. And Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts that extol the virtues of government policies that are seen by others as arrogant will be dismissed as mere propaganda and not produce the soft power of attraction.”58 Having a culture that is spread all over the world, thus, is not automatically a source of soft power.
Even when a country’s culture and values are admired and welcomed, there are other factors that need to be taken into account. The soft power that is produced by these aspects can be easily undermined when the country’s policies undermine its credibility and/or legitimacy. In an age where there is a seemingly endless supply of information available to large parts of the world, reaching audiences is not very difficult; maintaining their attention is the new challenge. To make a message stand out in the 21st century, credibility is very important. A country needs to build, or maintain, a reputation for being trustworthy, honest and acting in accordance with the messages it presents. If a country’s actions are at odds with what it is saying, it loses credibility and risks that future messages are discarded as propaganda and are not taken seriously. To support this notion, Nye uses examples of American foreign policy after 9/11: Exaggerated claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and ties to Al Qaeda may have helped mobilize domestic support for the Iraq war, but the subsequent disclosure of the exaggeration dealt a costly blow to American credibility. Similarly, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo in a manner inconsistent with American values led to perceptions of hypocrisy that could not be reversed by broadcasting pictures of Muslims living well in America. 59
Administration, is one of many commentators who warns that acting with confidence in world affairs, which is good, should not turn into acting arrogantly and thinking that America can do whatever it wants without serious consequences.61 He has discovered firsthand how difficult it can be in the U.S. to be taken seriously, but also remain critical; initially being a fervent supporter of the Iraq War while later advocating that it should have never taken place, Gelb explains, “My initial support for the war was symptomatic of unfortunate tendencies within the foreign policy community, namely the disposition and incentives to support wars to retain political and professional credibility.”62 Nye argues that without credibility, cultural and other resources cannot be translated into soft power.63 Closely tied to credibility is the need for legitimacy, which is generally attained through acting in accordance with international law and the rules of international institutions. When a country loses its legitimacy, other countries will start to distrust its policies, giving it less leverage in international politics.64 Constructivist Christian Reus‐Smit argues that legitimacy is one of the most important non‐ material aspects of power. As an example he uses the debate in the U.N. Security Council over the Iraq War, arguing that America had the material resources to defeat Saddam Hussein, but that this victory has been clouded by a lack of support from the United Nations, which has made rebuilding the country more difficult: “Without Security Council endorsement [the U.S.] has struggled to shake off an aura of illegitimacy and illegality, seriously undermining its capacity to socialize the costs of the occupation and reconstruction.”65 As with power, it has proven difficult to give an exact definition of legitimacy, mostly because whether or not a country has it does not depend on specific policies, but on how those policies are viewed by others. Nevertheless, many IR experts and theorists agree that it is a very important quality for states to have.66
than produce soft power.”67 When the policymakers of a foreign country believe that America does not only serve its own interests, but that helping the U.S. will also help their own country, they will be inclined to comply with U.S. wishes and accept their leadership. On the other hand, when they believe that supporting the U.S. will only help America, and might even be counterproductive to their own interests, they will fight U.S. wishes and try to undermine their leadership. This view is advocated by many other theorists and commentators, who all believe that American power will be opposed when it is not applied in the interests of the international community. When the U.S. uses its power to built and protect international institutions it will be considered more legitimate and their leadership will be embraced (at least by its allies) instead of opposed.68
International cooperation can thus produce very important goodwill, credibility, and give a country’s policies more legitimacy. However, Americans have always had an ambivalent attitude towards international institutions and international law, because they do not like to be bound by rules or agreements that are not solely their own. Nye states that the U.S. should be less skeptical of international rules, because when countries share the same values, cooperation only makes it easier to promote these values and gain legitimacy for the policies that follow from these values. Especially in a world with increasingly global problems such as terrorism and a deteriorating environment, cooperating will become increasingly important, because states will not be able to solve these problems by themselves. Nye concludes that “the country's capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of its hard and soft power.”69 Liberal theorist John Ikenberry reaches a similar conclusion and argues that U.S. alliances are essential if it wants to continue its role as leader of the international community, because it gives the country more legitimacy and more leverage. He warns that, if the U.S. is not seen as cooperative it will prompt foreign policy makers to consider how to oppose the U.S. instead of how to help them.70
the collection, Nye adds that, throughout history, public diplomacy has played an important role in the promotion of soft power. Especially in the 21st century, because of the spread of democracy, policymakers increasingly respond to the demands of their public, so if the public does not view a country positively, its leaders will not want to cooperate with this country because it could harm their domestic political career. There are many ways to attract foreign publics, such as “broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports [and] arranging exchanges.”72 In recent years, the Internet and other new media have opened up a whole range of new possibilities to reach audiences, but it they have also made it more difficult to make one message stand out because there is an abundance of (false) information available. So not only does a country have to maintain good relations with foreign governments, but also with schools and universities, research companies, businesses, the media, and many other organizations.73
Another important aspect of soft power is that policymakers do not only send out messages, but also listen to what their audience has to say in response. As explained before, whether or not soft power resources such as legitimacy and having a widespread culture are translated into soft power depends on how it is received; if the audience does not find a country’s culture attractive it will not lead to soft power, and if it does not consider the country’s policies legitimate they will also not generate soft power. It is thus important to listen to the public to understand how they are viewing a certain country and which parts are considered positive and which negative. Nye explains, “by definition, soft power means getting others to want the same outcomes you want, and that requires an understanding of how they are hearing your messages and adapting them accordingly.”74 Soft power resources need public diplomacy to be translated into actual power, but public diplomacy also needs good soft power resources, it cannot sell something that is flawed. Creating an effective soft power strategy is thus not as easy as some theorists or policymakers make it out to be; a country needs an attractive culture and ideals, credibility, policies that are considered fair and legitimate, and a good public diplomacy to make sure that foreign publics know about its soft power resources. Also, while not all resources have to be equally strong, all aspects are linked and a complete lack of one of them can negatively affect the others.
Soft Power Debated
rationalist approaches, because the latter take interests as a given, while the former look at how interests are shaped in the first place. This distinction, however, does not always hold up. Nye himself, for instance, is considered to be a neo‐liberalist, or liberal institutionalist, and liberalism is a rationalist approach. It is logical, however, that liberalists are more inclined to agree with (some of the) soft power claims than realists, because their theories are focused less on military and other hard power resources, and more on the possibilities of finding ways to cooperate without the use of force, which is also the goal of soft power.
Placing Nye’s concept on a conservative‐liberal scale, it would lean more towards the liberal side because conservatives and Republicans are generally associated with a strong military and appearing tough in international relations, while liberals and Democrats are associated with international institutions and forums, and solving problems through cooperation. Again, however, there are plenty of exceptions, Republicans advocating cooperation, or Democrats wanting less talk and more action. In 2003, for example, during the controversy of unilateral action in Iraq, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel argued for the importance of the U.N. and Security Council support, claiming that “this world is very complicated, very dangerous. The United States, as powerful as we are, cannot go it alone. We need friends, we need allies, we need partners.”75
The concept of soft power is by no means accepted by everybody, however, there has also been quite a lot of criticism on Nye’s theory. Some dismiss the entire idea of soft power, while others have issues only with certain aspects of theory. First, I will discuss some of the general criticism towards the concept of soft power, after which I will present the comments of Benjamin Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, Janice Bially Mattern and Steven Lukes, who do believe in (a form of) soft power, but do have some concerns about Nye’s presentation of it.
As Nye and many other theorists have noted, soft power is a difficult and sometimes seemingly amorphous concept which has led to many misunderstandings. A lot of criticism towards Nye and the idea of soft power comes from commentators who have a wrong view of soft power, or at least one that differs considerably from how it was meant by Nye. The conservative Niall Ferguson, for example, dismisses U.S. soft power because “All over the Islamic world kids enjoy (or would like to enjoy) bottles of Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears and DVDs starring Tom Cruise [but this does not] make them love the United States more.”79 He thus equates soft power with American culture and products, but those are not the only, and not the most important, aspects of soft power. As noted earlier, Nye identifies three broad types of soft power, of which culture is only one and he never argues that resources of soft power will always be effective among all people, everywhere; culture is only a source of power “in places where it is found attractive,” political values can be a source “when [the country] lives up to them at home and abroad,” and foreign policies only foster goodwill “when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.”80
Another reason for many to dismiss the concept is that they find it too complicated, too vague, or too difficult to apply. Especially in Asia, there are a lot of different perceptions of soft power, leading to much confusion. President of the Japan Foundation Kazuo Ogoura, as a result, argued that “soft power as an actual political theory is loaded with ideology and riddled with contradictions and hypocrisy,”84 and IR experts Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos argue that even Nye’s own definitions sometimes seem to contradict themselves and that “the definition of soft power given by Nye lacks rigor; its use is problematic and uncertain, making a strict definition of the concept hard to obtain.”85
advocates of soft power themselves. The concept has become very popular and has been taken over by many theorists, analysts and even government officials, many of whom use their own definitions which differ (sometimes greatly) from Nye’s definition. Of course it is important that Nye’s ideas are not taken over without scrutiny, but some advocates do more harm than good to the concept, because they have defined it too narrowly as only ideology or culture, or too broadly as anything besides military power. I want to consider the comments of some theorists who believe, as I do, that soft power is indeed a difficult concept, and that Nye’s concepts do deserve close scrutiny, but who do not believe that this should lead to a complete dismissal or disregard of the concept.
The first commentary I want to discuss is that of Benjamin Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, although I do believe that their portrayal of Nye’s views is too simplistic, they do present a useful contribution to the debate. They argue that Nye’s theory does not focus enough on “foreign policy views of the public in the targeted countries [emphasis in original],” while they believe this to be the most important aspect of trying to influence other countries through soft power.87 They argue that a country A’s “values, culture, institutions, and past policies”88 do not directly affect how country B responds to country A. Rather, they argue, this response is determined by how country B views the current policies of country A, which might be influenced by these other factors but not determined directly by them. Their study investigates this aspect of how a country’s current views are perceived, and concludes that “public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the U.S.”89 Their study is a valuable admission to the debate about soft power, but rather than providing what they believe is lacking from Nye’s concept, they provide a closer and more detailed look at what is in fact an important part of Nye’s theory as well. Nye names foreign policy as one of the three main types of soft power, and his writing on public diplomacy shows that he indeed does understand the importance of the perceptions of foreign publics. Although their view of Nye’s soft power is not as narrow as that of critics like Niall Ferguson, their suggestion that Nye sees soft power in things like “the popularity of Nike goods, admiration for the US Bill of Rights, or opinions about the Vietnam War,” does omit some important nuances that Nye did provide in his work.90
beyond the academic sphere. She calls Nye the “premier contemporary analyst and advocate of soft power,” but is disappointment in the fact that, although he does look at how interests can be influenced, he does not explain clearly how interests arise in the first place.91 This, she argues, is the problem with most soft power studies, they talk about the power of attraction, without explaining where this attraction comes from. In her essay, Bially Mattern therefore presents her theory of how certain ideas and interest become attractive. This “alternative framework,” she argues, will lead to “a more rigorous, logical and…practically useful model of soft power.”92
Bially Mattern bases her theory on the constructivist belief that “‘reality’—the broadly accepted facts of the world and the socially expected behaviors that are implied by those facts—is not pre‐given and objective, but socially constructed through an ongoing collective process.”93 She thus believes that all “realities” are simply one interpretation of events that has defeated other versions and has become commonly accepted. The only way for a subjective and personal thought to turn into something that is publicly accepted and considered a “reality” is for that thought to be communicated through language. Therefore, Bially Mattern argues, reality is not just socially constructed, but sociolinguistically constructed. If all reality is constructed this way, she continues, attraction is also sociolinguistically constructed, and thus not something natural or predetermined.94
The problem with Nye, according to Bially Mattern, is that he is often vague about the origin of attraction, and when he does write about it, he seems to be contradicting himself by suggesting that certain values like democracy and peace are universal, while also suggesting that attraction in socially constructed.95 In a reaction to this criticism, Nye responds that he does not believe that the two are necessarily contradictory. He argues that looking at a certain time, certain ideas can be considered universal or seen as a given, while over time ideas change and new ones are created and what is considered universal or natural changes. Nye thus agrees with Bially Mattern that truths, including attraction, are socially constructed, but he also believes that at specific times there are constructed truths that are so commonly accepted that they can be called universal.96
argues that “verbal fighting” is the best strategy, and thus the one most likely to be used. The reason for this is that in other strategies—such as persuasion, bargaining, manipulation and seduction—the subject is left with the possibility to refuse the version of reality that the actor is presenting; in the case of verbal fighting, Bially Mattern argues, they do not have this choice.97
Verbal fighting, or the strategy of representational force as she also calls it, threatens its subject(s) with unthinkable harm, unless they accept the reality that is presented by the author who is threatening them. Representational force is different from hard power, which relies on physical force, in that it does not threaten physical harm, but rather unthinkable harm to the subject’s identity. The author has to construct his or her version of reality in such a way, that if the subject does not accept it, this would lead to the destruction of how the subject sees itself.98 The concept is best explained by the example Bially Mattern uses of the Bush Administration trying to create support for the war on terror during the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. She argues that by using the term “you are either with us, or with the terrorists,” President George W. Bush and his administration were using representational force. They presented themselves as good and noble, and the terrorists as wrong and evil; as a result, being against the war on terror meant being evil in the eyes of the Americans. For the countries whose status as “good” was not yet very secure, and thus relied heavily on America’s approval, being against the war on terror was not an option, because it would jeopardize their identity. This was the case for countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, resulting in strong support for the war on terror, at least among important government officials and policymakers.99
In her eyes, the differentiation between hard power being built on force and soft power being built on attraction, is thus no longer applicable, because attraction often relies on force. Seeing soft power as representational force would lead to different strategies for policymakers. They would, for example, not have to focus on convincing foreign publics through public diplomacy, because it would be enough to threaten other policymakers through verbal fighting. Also, listening to other would be considered dangerous instead of helpful, because it could lead to becoming the victim instead of author of representational force. Soft power would also not need to be built and kept over the years, but used only in specific cases when it could be useful.100
policymakers should change their soft power strategy to representational force. Verbal fighting is one way of attracting others, but it certainly is not the only way, and I also do not think it is the best way. In cases where it can be applied it might be the most effective strategy because it leaves the subject with no escapes, but the author would have to make sure the threat constantly remains in place, because when it is gone, the subject will have grown to resent the author and go out of its way not to comply with him or her in the future. Also, it is difficult to find a threat that works on many people at the same time. In the case of the war on terror, for instance, the threat did not work countries whose identities as being good were secure enough that did not need U.S. approval—like many in Western Europe. Even if verbal fighting would be the most effective strategy, this does not necessarily mean that it is also the most common; there are many countries that still rely heavily on other strategies such as persuasion and seduction. I believe that this is a good thing, because the result of these strategies might take longer and fail sometimes, but they do create goodwill in the long term, whereas verbal fighting creates resentment and hostility and always using force to get what you want will eventually backfire, whether it is physical force or representational force.
The most convincing critique comes from Steven Lukes, the “creator” of the third dimension of power. Like Bially Mattern, Lukes argues that too many IR approaches are explanatory approaches that take interests, and a conflict of interests between states, as a given. Lukes notes that Nye’s theory of soft power is part of this tradition in the sense that its main focus is on the agents, not the subjects, and that its main goal it to try to explain state behavior. He also notes that it goes beyond these approaches, however, by seeing interests not as a given, but as an aspect of power that can be influenced.102
Without this distinction, Lukes finds soft power to be a “blunt instrument.”105 He argues that studies of (soft) power should neither be focus solely on agents, nor be completely subject‐centered; it should also consider the mechanisms used to shaped interests and the contexts of the power relationship. He thus believes that soft power can be a useful analytical tool, but that it should be applied more carefully and more precisely. I believe this to be the most important lesson that can be drawn from his essay.
All of the writings and critical comments on soft power show that there are many different ways to view soft power, which lead to many different conclusions about its usefulness and how it can or cannot be applied to actual politics. The most important thing to take away from these debates, I would argue, is not that there is one definition that is right while all the others are wrong (although some are more convincing than others), but that soft power can mean many different things, so in using, applying, or critiquing the term theorists and commentators should be very careful in explaining which definition they are referring to. Soft power can be culture, it can be verbal fighting, and it can be used to recruit new terrorists, but they all have very different implications, and they deserve to be studied, and critiqued, in their own right.
punishment. Also, it has become more difficult to coerce or induce countries, because it has become easier for the “target” to turn to other countries or international institutions who will not force him to do something he does not want to do. Thirdly, the use, or even the threat of the use of force has become increasingly dangerous because of the development and spread of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, also because of globalization (and democratization), smaller nations, non‐ governmental institutions, and even individuals have more political influence and can persuade governments not to use force, because doing so would have severe political consequences. Fifthly, the world has become more towards economic welfare and less towards military dominance, and lastly, the increase in international institutions, networks, and rules has increased cooperation, and made it an easier alternative for solving problems than (military) conflict.108
I agree that because of these developments—most notably increasing interdependence and the availability of more and more possible strategies and allies—the use of force has become a less suitable solution for solving international conflicts. As many theorists, including Nye, have pointed out, hard power is not obsolete, however, and in some cases it is still essential, but it is becoming a more of a back up strategy that can serve as an incentive to take soft power seriously and that should be applied only when other option are impossible or insufficient. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Susan Rice, aptly concludes, “Like it or not, we live in a new era of challenges that cross borders as freely as a storm—challenges that even the world’s most powerful country often cannot tackle alone. In the 21st century, indifference is not an option. It’s not just immoral. It’s dangerous.”109
ANALYSIS: AMERICAN POWER IN THE 21st CENTURY
As touched upon in the introduction, the start of the 21st century saw agreement among most observers and practitioners of international relations on the dominant power position of the United States. Some referred only to their military and economic power, but more and more people started to realize that the threat of military retaliation or the promise of economic wealth, were not the only reasons for America’s dominance. The general consensus is aptly described by renowned foreign policy expert, and former adviser to Bill Clinton, Michael Mandelbaum who started a 2002 article with an account of what he believed to be American supremacy, consisting of both hard and soft power:
[The U.S.] possesses the most formidable military forces and the largest and most vibrant national economy on the planet. From within its borders emanate the social and cultural trends that exercise the greatest influence on other societies. In the league standings of global power, the United States occupies first place—and by a margin so large that it recalls the preponderance of the Roman Empire of antiquity. So vast is American superiority that the distinction bestowed upon it and its great rival, the Soviet Union, during the Cold War no longer applies. The United States is no longer a mere superpower; it has ascended to the stares of “hyperpower.”110
Before discussing how this power has changed over the last decade and what the role of the presidents was, I will briefly consider how the U.S. has arrived at this position and look at some of the challenges to American power in the 21st century.
THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN POWER AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEW CENTURY
Since the start of the 20th century America’s military and economic power was growing exponentially, but it was not until after World War II that the U.S. was truly considered to be a superpower. As Mandelbaum notes, after the fall of the Soviet Union, America’s dominance became even greater and many believed that the term superpower was no longer sufficient, so the U.S. was referred to as hyperpower, hegemon or even empire. This latter also led to comparisons with previous great powers such as the Roman Empire. Many critics, however, also note the major differences between American power and that of its predecessors.
The main difference that is often referred to is the fact that America’s power is more stable because it is not just built on its own power but on that of the entire Western world order that it has built around itself. Previous empires tried to rule on their own and make other countries submissive; although Americans do often see the U.S. in the role of a leader, they have tried to create international institutions in which all countries have a say and build world order of states with values similar to theirs. Americans have brought likeminded countries together, creating an international community that favored values that were important to them, such as democracy and free trade.
Whereas other great powers were challenged by smaller states that felt oppressed, American power is (unintentionally) strengthened by smaller powers who participate in international institutions that were created for a large part by the U.S. Because the U.S. continued to work together with other powers and generally abide by international laws even after they reached superpower status, American power seemed more legitimate and was thus less opposed than that of other great powers.111
What has made the Western world order so successful is it openness and ability to incorporate new powers; if nobody feels left out, nobody feels the need to oppose the system. It offers possibilities for large and old powers to maintain their power and status, but it also accommodates the rise of smaller and newer states through expanding their economic and political possibilities. Ikenberry explains that this inclusiveness is what makes the current world order different from others, “any international order…is based on a mix of coercion and consent, but the U.S.‐led order is distinctive in that it has been more liberal than imperial—and so unusually accessible, legitimate, and durable.”112 Several critics have argued that this openness of the Western order is the direct result of America’s liberal values and that the U.S. is different from many other states who want power solely to serve their own interests, whereas the U.S. in the 20th century was able to serve their own interests while also helping others, and created an international order that favors the use of cooperation over force to solve conflicts.113
War and the economic crises, together with ongoing processes such as globalization, democratization and the rise of the Internet and social media have influenced U.S. power dramatically. These developments increase the fact that the U.S., despite its dominant position, has to share its power and take the wishes of others into account. America is sometimes still referred to as a hegemon because it is the most powerful single country, but it is not as dominant as some of the previous hegemons were, who could make decisions almost solely on their own.
The changes in power have led to a new cycle of declinism. As their name indicates, declinists believe that American power is declining, and most believe that this warrants action—though some are quite pessimistic on whether anything can be done about the decline. One of their advocates, Fareed Zakaria, who has argued that “on every dimension other than military power—industrial, financial, social, cultural—the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance,” believes that we are entering a post‐American phase where the world is no longer shaped by the U.S. (or any other single great power for that matter), but by many different actors and institutions all over the world.114
Other theorists and commentators have also argued that the U.S. has to accept the fact that it can no longer dictate the rules of international relations as it once could.115 As noted earlier, after the Second World War the U.S. started building its power on a foundation of cooperation and consent; in the 20th century it was mostly in control of how this cooperation was shaped, in the 21st century, however, this control has been declining. International affairs professor Stephen Walt uses the term “soft balancing” to describe this decline, arguing that there is not (yet) a traditional realist balance of military power against the U.S., but that countries are “coordinating their diplomatic positions to oppose U.S. policy and obtain more influence together.”116
cannot always get exactly what they wanted. When they accept this, they can start working towards a world in which they may not be the sole superpower, but in which the international community is nevertheless shaped to advance their interests.
One of the most important challenges in adapting to this new situation will be dealing with rising powers such as Brazil and India, and most importantly China. Zakaria has called the present time “the third great power shift of the modern era—the rise of the rest.”118 Many critics, from all sides of the declinism debate, agree that the U.S. should not fight the rise of these new powers, but try to incorporate them into the existing world order. If they become part of the current world order, they will not try to fight it, whereas if they are rejected from (equal) participation now, they might try to build their own world order, which could replace the current one and would be less accommodating to America’s interests.
Those who are pessimistic about the future expect to see a big collision between the U.S. and China. Realist John Mearsheimer, for example, believes that “the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”119 Many other commentators, however, believe that China’s rise can and will be more peaceful. Their main reason for this conclusion is that the U.S. does not stand alone against China, it has the entire Western order behind it. Ikenberry explains, “If the defining struggle of the twenty‐first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph.”120 He does warn that, for the West to triumph, it is important that the U.S. realize the importance of its alliances and starts strengthening the current world order. If they manage to do this, and incorporate the rising powers into this order, the shifts in power will be peaceful. Nye agrees with this view and adds that China also cannot rely solely on its hard power to gain more influence in the international community. The country is not (yet) strong enough to directly challenge the U.S. and win, so it will also favor more cooperative approaches in order not to isolate themselves from important economic and political partners.121
HARD POWER DURING THE BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS
At the start of the 21st century the U.S. was responsible for more than a third of all military spending globally and over a quarter of all economic output, while having only five percent of the total world population.122 Nevertheless, the rise of China and other former underdeveloped countries, the economic crises and increasing debt, and the long‐lasting military expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan, have raised doubts about the future of American military and especially economic dominance. Below I will present some of the statistics on these aspects of power, and how they were viewed by analysts. Military Power In terms of military spending, since the Cold War, no country has come close to America. At the end of the Cold War the U.S. accounted for roughly 40 percent of global military spending. When George W. Bush took office the percentage was slightly lower, but after 9/11 it increased dramatically and in 2004 America was responsible for almost 50 percent of the world total military spending. Since then the percentage has decreased to approximately 41 percent in 2011. In comparison, China’s spending has increased significantly over de past decade, but still accounted for only 3.4 percent of global spending in 2004, and 8.2 percent in 2011. Contrary to popular belief, the Obama Administration has not spent less on the military than the Bush Administration, in fact spending has only increased. As a percentage of American GDP military spending declined after the Cold War from 5.7 percent in 1988 to 3 percent in 2000. In the 2000s it has been increasing under both the Bush and Obama administrations to 4.8 percent in 2010. In military spending, the US is still clearly unrivaled.123
It is thus not very surprising that most analysts, both now and at the beginning of the century, do not seem very worried about America’s military power position. The 2002 article “American Primacy in Perspective” political scientists Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, accurately reflects the confidence in U.S. military dominance that was present among most commentators at the time:
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had shattered Americans’ sense of inviolability, and as a result, many (American) analysts and commentators wanted to show that the U.S. was still the most powerful country in the world. 125 Despite worries about what the Iraq War was doing to America’s political power, at the end of Bush’s second term there was still little worry about its military power, because in this realm the U.S. was considered to be “in a league of its own.”126
As most Democratic presidents before him, Obama has been attacked frequently by conservatives for not appreciating America’s military power as much as he should.127 Despite many successful attacks against Al Qaeda leaders, including of course the killing of Osama Bin Laden, authorizing more drone attacks (primarily in Pakistan) than his predecessor, and increasing the number of Americans in Afghanistan, Obama is still often portrayed as a “peacenik.”128 Several people thus have articulated worries about the America’s military expenditures during his presidency. These worries, however, were mostly limited to the (perceived lack of) actions of the president; there were still very few worries about America’s military capabilities. Economic Power Unlike in military power, in terms of economic power, the US has had to share its dominance, and in the 2000s it has lost some of its lead on other countries. In 2000 American GDP was 23.5 percent of the world total GDP, since then it has been slowly declining to 19 percent. To compare, the combined GDP of the countries in the European Union was 25 percent in 2000 and 20 percent in 2011. Both the US and the EU have had to hand over some of their economic power to rising countries like India (3.7 percent in 2000, 5.6 percent in 2011) and especially China (7.1 percent in 2000, 14.3 percent in 2011). So on the economic level, the US cannot claim to be the sole power, although it does still have the largest GDP of any country.129
worries. Many commentators quoted reports, or presented their own research, that predicted China would overtake the U.S. economically within the next few decades and much greater progress in rising countries such as China, India and Brazil than in older powers like the U.S., Japan and European countries.130 One of the most negative predictions, by International economics expert Arvind Subramanian, anticipates that “the gap between China and the United States in 2030 will be similar to that between the United States and its rivals in the mid‐1970s, the heyday of U.S. hegemony, and greater than that between the United Kingdom and its rivals during the halcyon days of the British Empire, in 1870.”131
Not all economic analyses of the last decade, however, were pessimistic. One of the more optimistic accounts surprisingly comes from the declinist Fareed Zakaria. In the same 2008 article in which he argues that on every dimension power is shifting away from the U.S., he also still seems rather positive about America’s economic power, arguing that the U.S. still has the largest economy in the world at the time and in the foreseeable future. Contrary to Subramanian, he believes that in 2025 America’s GDP will be twice as large as that of China, even though America’s economic dominance will become somewhat smaller.132 Nye adds that even if China’s total economy would equal or overtake that of the U.S. in the coming decades, it would still have a significantly lower per capita income, and thus, relatively, a weaker economy.133
SOFT POWER DURING THE BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS
The fact that America is still dominant when it comes to hard power resources does not mean that they can still use these resources in exactly the same way as they did during for example the Cold War. The theoretical framework showed that a smart power approach combines hard power resources with soft power resources, and earlier in the analyses it was established that soft power is especially important for the U.S. because their power is built on consent, and that soft power is becoming increasingly important in a globalized and interdependent world.
In 2001, when only influential opinion leaders were interviewed, the U.S. image was still mainly positive in most nations. Except for those interviewed in the Middle East and conflict areas, a majority of influentials was convinced that the “ordinary” people in their country had a positive overall view of America.139 Since 2002, surveys have been more widely spread among the general public. In the report of December 2002 it becomes clear that the initial sympathy that most people felt for America directly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks started to wane as people became increasingly dissatisfied with the U.S. and its policies. Even though the U.S. was still rated favorably by majorities in 35 of 42 countries in which people were interviewed, its ratings had fallen in 19 of 27 countries where previous figures were known. Declining sympathies were visible in countries were US image was already quite low, as well as in allied countries were ratings had been mainly positive.140 This descending trend remained visible throughout both Bush administrations.
presence of the U.S. in Iraq.145 Another year later polls showed a favorable opinion of America among majorities in 25 of 47 countries. However, these were not always very large majorities and did not include some very important countries such as Russia, China, France, Germany and Brazil. Also in 26 of 33 countries for which benchmarks were available, ratings continued to be lower than they were in 2002.146 In June 2008, ratings were still nowhere near those at the beginning of the century, but in most countries they did finally stop declining and in 10 out of 21 countries they were even improving slightly.147 These improvements turned out to be only the beginning of renewed confidence in the U.S. The main reason for this was the election of Barack Obama to become the next president. Ratings in most countries returned (almost) to the positive levels of the time before Bush took office. Especially in Western Europe favorable ratings increased dramatically ending well above 50 percent in all surveyed countries, and even more than doubling in Germany (31 percent in 2008, 64 percent in 2009). Attitudes towards the U.S. also became decidedly more positive in most of Latin America, Asia and Africa; and even in the Middle East and other conflict areas—where ratings did remain well below average—an increase was visible.148
In most countries, the U.S. managed to maintain a positive image throughout Obama’s term. However, the initial optimism for the new president and the related favorable ratings did decline somewhat between 2009 and 2012. Still, in almost all countries attitudes towards the U.S. are more positive now than they were at the end of Bush’s second term, especially in Europe where favorable ratings in France, Spain and Germany have increased at least 20 percentage points since 2008. Overall, America’s allies continue to be quite confident in Obama and the Muslim public remains very critical.149
