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University of Groningen Faculty of Economics and Business MSc International Business and Management
The acquisitiveness of Board Characteristics: Female Board Representation, CEO Age and M&As
University of Groningen
International Business and Management Faculty of Economics and Business
2 ABSTRACT
Despite a massive amount of literature examining the relationship between the board and corporate strategies and performance, few of them concentrate on the linkage of board characteristics (e.g., gender and age) and the company’s ‘aggressive’ business strategies which in this research is mergers and acquisitions (M&As). In order to fill this gap and generate a broader perspective for later researchers, this paper applies and amplifies the upper echelon framework and gender in organizations to the female board representation as well as CEO age and inspects the impact of female representations on the corporate-level strategic outcome as well as CEO age focusing on the scope of M&As. However, this input-process-outcome model remains deficient without taking innovation into consideration as innovation is the essence of corporate core competence. Core competence influences business activities, especially when it comes to M&As. In this case, organization innovation performance is treated as a moderator in order to explain the diversified results of the relationship. Two hypotheses are proposed which suggest a positive relationship between the female representation, CEO age and the number of M&As. The results of this study show that organization innovation performance moderates both of the relationship.
The requisite data are extracted from the sample of 500 firms worldwide chosen from the Fortune Global 500 list. Besides the theoretical relevance, this research also has its own implications with an authoritative illustration of striving for female representations in different positions against discrimination, especially on the board.
3 Table of contents 1. Introduction ... 4 1.1 Initial motive ... 4 1.2 Research questions ... 6 2. Literature review ... 6
2.1 Reflection of Upper echelons theory: Female board representation ... 6
2.2 Does age really matter? ... 9
2.3 Strategic management and M&As ... 10
3. Hypotheses ... 11
3.1 Female board representation and the number of M&As ... 12
3.2 CEO age and the number of M&As ... 13
3.3 Innovation ... 14
3.4 Conceptual model... 16
4. Methodology ... 16
4.1 The type of the investigation ... 17
4.2 Sample description and data collection ... 17
4.3 Description of variables ... 18
4.3.1 Independent variables ... 18
4.3.2 Dependent variable... 19
4.3.3 Moderating variables ... 19
4.3.4 Control variables ... 20
4.4 Endogeneity issue and analytical approach ... 20
4.5 Model formulation ... 21
5. Results ... 23
5.1 Description statistics ... 23
5.2 Correlations and multicollinearity ... 28
5.3 Robustness test ... 29
6. Conclusion ... 29
6.1 Discussion ... 29
6.2 Contributions ... 31
4 1. Introduction
1.1 Initial motive
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Other than gender, Chen et al. (2011) conducted a survey with the sample size of 602 companies and shows that the age level of CEO is positively related with R&D intensity when CEOs are less than 45 years old. When CEOs are equal to or more than 45 years old, their willingness to innovate drops significantly. Moreover, Elsaid and Ursel (2012) find the prove that board age is associated with corporate risk-taking which board with an average younger age tend to pursue more firm risk-taking activities such as M&As.
In the research of Ruiz-Jiménez and del Mar in 2015, they indicated that innovation performance is positively associated with female representation and management capabilities. From a sample of 205 questionnaires answered by technology-based firms in Spain, the result shows that more women on the Board seem to encourage diversified work styles, beliefs, and abilities which can influence the strategic arrangement. This conclusion supports the assumption that female representation is positively related to innovation performance and strategic management. In this paper, the studied domain will be narrowed down, focusing only on M&As as this strategic behaviour is risk-taking due to a high level of uncertainty compared with other strategic choices. This paper will also demonstrate whether innovation, as a moderator, intensively impacts the relationship between female representations and M&As.
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with acquisitions. A moderator- innovation is added as well to see how it impacts both of the relationships. Lastly, this paper stands on the ground of an international perspective and selects a sample from the Global 500 corporations. This sample is more inclusive and diversified compared with their datasets based on only U.S public firms.
1.2 Research questions
As stated above, to investigate how female board representation and CEO age impact the outcomes of acquisitions and how innovation plays a role in both of the relationships, the research question is generated as followed:
How do female board representation and CEO age impact the outcomes of acquisitions and does innovation intensify both relationships?
This paper is structured as follows. First, essential pieces of literature regarding female representation in a professional environment, especially on board, strategic management focusing on acquisitions and age of CEOs, innovation performance are reviewed. Fundamental concepts involved in the related domains are defined, and the position of female directors will also be addressed. Moreover, based on the conceptual model, hypotheses will be formed, raised, and tested to finalized this research.
2. Literature review
2.1 Reflection of Upper echelons theory: Female board representation
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markets, they rarely use adventurous foreign market entry mode such as M&As (Khaw & Liao, 2018). Besides, Chen, Crossland, and Huang (2016) used a difference-in-differences analysis which suggests that a greater female representation has a negative impact on both the rate and the size of M&As. This underlying phenomenon can be explained as feminine nature in terms of cautiousness, adaptiveness, and high efficiency in monitoring (Gul et al., 2011). However, Khaw and Liao failed to implement the underlying theoretical reason which can be explained by the Upper Echelons Theory. The upper echelons theory suggests that the specific personal characteristics of members of Board impact their decision-making which leads to changes in organizations when the situations differ (Hambrick, 2007). In this case, the paper intends to build the linkage in between to further illustrate the relationship between female representation on board and the outcomes of M&As.
9 2.2 Does age really matter?
Besides gender composition on board and how it affects M&A, age is another strong incentive when executives make strategic decisions. Yim (2013) argues that younger CEOs have more preference to perform risky strategic arrangement such as M&As as they have relatively long career period to benefit from the outcomes compared with older CEOs. There is other literature also demonstrate that CEO age influences firm performance as well as M&As. Roberts and Rosenberg (2006) prove that when people start ageing, their level of energy drop and they prefer a quieter life. On the contrary, undertaking risky strategic operations such as M&As can be quite energy-consuming. In that case, this undeniable psychological change will lead older CEOs to conduct fewer or less scalable acquisitions. Other than that, overconfidence also positively related to overinvestment and leads to value-destroying (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). This means that young board executives tend to prefer higher firm risk-taking but higher rewarded operations such as M&As. Ackert et al. (2002) also come up with the conclusion that older investors possess fewer equities in their assets if making a comparison with bonds or other assets. All these pieces of evidence are aligned with the statement that ageing is positively associated with risk aversion in terms of investments or other strategic operations.
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demographic variables. It is still considered to be a substantial influencer in general when it comes to individual risk-taking (Elsaid & Ursel, 2012). Vroom and Pahl (1971) started paying attention to the relationship between age and risk-taking among managers. They performed a test and came up with the conclusion that age is negatively related to both risk-taking and the value placed upon risk with high significance no matter the sectors and companies. Deakin et al. (2004) claim that ageing makes both risk adjusting and the quality of the decisions making declined. When it comes to the top of the management team, CEOs are more willing to undertake high-risk activities such as acquisitions when they are young. The explanation of why ageing impacts an individual's behaviour and cause behaviour change can be underpinned by psychological characteristics ones possess. These mental characteristics can be wisdom, optimism, willingness to take risks, confidence, etc. From the research of Yim (2013), he illustrates how overconfident young CEOs overinvest, especially in these cash-rich companies while older CEOs tend to be more cautious about the risky investments. This suggests that how age can impact executives' level of confidence and thus their decision-making processes.
2.3 Strategic management and M&As
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faster than their competitors and fully utilize the local resources. It is crucial to point out here that although mergers and acquisitions are always mentioned and studied together in most of the researches, these two have separated meanings and cause the different influences of strategies, policies of finance, tax and culture (Refsnes, 2012). According to Peng (2006:377), Merger is defined as "the combination of assets, operations, and management of two firms to establish a new entity" and acquisition is defined as "the transfer of control of assets, operations, and management from one firm (target) to another (acquirer)." One of the management purposes of mergers and acquisitions is due to the hubris hypothesis, which suggests that operators seek to acquire firms to fulfil personal motives and judgments made by themselves (Gaughan, 2011). This can be explained by the Upper Echelons Theory that personal characteristics make managers tend to operate the business and make strategic decisions based on their own values, interests, and tastes. If the decision to merge or to acquire is made solely based on that reason, then it could lead to the failure of M&As as the operations are taken based on operators’ unprofessional sensibilities or misassumptions of corporate performance without considering the actual circumstances thoroughly and comprehensively.
3. Hypotheses
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moderator, the third and fourth hypothesis will illustrate whether innovation has an impact on the relationship of both gender and age and the corresponding acquisitions.
3.1 Female board representation and the number of M&As
As stated above, different proportions of gender composition on board can result in a more diversified and extensive decision-making process in terms of strategies, compared to the all-male Board. Krishnan and Park (2005) suggest that women hold a stronger possibility to perform a “feeling” cognitive style which accentuates harmony. In this way, their colleagues and subordinates feel more confident to express their ideas and face challenges. As an ensemble, the team is more prior to solving the conflict through internal channels. To be able to maintain the stability of the organization, fewer “fierce” conflicts on the Board would occur. Decisions regarding whether to perform M&As will be treated with more scrutiny. This means that the possibility of proposing to conduct M&As is generously less than the Board that are all comprised of males. A balanced composition of the TMT is associated with fewer aggressive entry activities.
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from severe shareholder wealth losses after the acquisitions were announced. Later, Belda-Ruiz& Marin (2015) connect this conclusion with gender and demonstrate that female representation lowers the risk of conducting business activities by taking a low-level strategic move. In this case, from the perspective of the long-term oriented benefit of the organization, fewer acquisitions would be preferred by a more balanced gender composition of the board. Therefore, the first hypothesis is formed below:
Hypothesis 1: Female representation on the board has a negative impact on the number of M&As.
3.2 CEO age and the number of M&As
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Heppard, 2003). In other words, executives who are elderly are prone to stick with traditional disciplines of regular improvement rather than brand new, diachronous innovation. Thus, the second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Older CEO has a negative impact on the number of M&As.
3.3 Innovation
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innovation support each other and together strengthen the core competence of the corporations. When a company plans to conduct a merger or an acquisition, this core competency of that company gives it an advanced bargain power during the negotiation thus impacts the result of M&As. On the other side, the idiosyncrasies of females, such as the preference of taking a "learning" approach resonate with organization innovation which suggests a more diverse TMT is willing to apprehend and absorb from others’ innovative suggestions especially handling deals with strategic changes (Krishnan and Park, 2005). Hypotheses 1 suggest that a balanced composition of female representations on board will lead to fewer M&As. However, adding organization innovation as a third variable influences, the relationships as innovation means change and this kind of change challenges female representations as well as old CEOs to play the safe card and make more bold decisions instead (Ruiz-Jiménez & Fuentes, 2016). The more innovative the organization is, the more confident and willingness the older CEOs will show and conduct more and more prominent M&As in order to achieve full coverage in its leading domain. Moreover, as innovative organizations tend to be creative and adjustable; these features are the ice breaker to push older CEOs to conduct more M&As; thus, it is logical to infer these two hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 3: Innovation will intensify the negative relationship between Female representation on the board and the rate of M&As.
16 3.4 Conceptual model
The conceptual model (Figure 2.1) is defined based on the literature review and hypotheses above. This model visualizes the negative relationship between female board representation and the number of M&As, and the negative relationship between CEO age and the number of M&As. Besides, innovation as a moderator has a positive influence on the relationship of female board representation and the number of M&As, and also a positive impact on the relationship of CEO age and the number of M&As.
4. Methodology
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moderating and control variables), endogeneity issue and analytical approach and model formulation.
4.1 The type of the investigation
The purpose of this research is to gauge the influence of board gender composition, CEO age to M&As. Due to the availability of accessible data online and time limitation of this research, secondary data was collected as the objective for this analysis. Besides, this research focuses on quantitative data and is a panel data study, as all datasets employed in this research are time series and multi-dimensional.
4.2 Sample description and data collection
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(Z value)2 * standard deviation (1-standard deviation)/(margin of error)2 = n.
With a confidence interval of 4 and a confidence level of 95 per cent, 273 companies out of Global 500 are selected as not all companies made acquisitions and this research excludes financial and insurance companies. The reason is that these companies apply different rules in terms of financial calculation. Besides, this research lists a five firm-year period (2014-2018) for these companies that have operated acquisitions for three reasons. First, the sample was chosen from the Global 500 in 2018 and this research takes lagged year into consideration. Second, the time of female representations on the board needs to align with the years these acquisitions present. Lastly, there are time and database restrictions of this research. In order to get the innovation performance of the chosen firms, this research obtains the relevant information of patents from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to get the correct numbers of patents of each company. The final sample used to test all Hypotheses is generated based on the merged results.
4.3 Description of variables
4.3.1 Independent variables
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This data is gathered from the datasets of BoardEx, Orbis combined with official websites on the list of Global 500 firms.
4.3.2 Dependent variable
The acquisitiveness is the firm's acquisition intensity. To calculate this intensity, the number of deals successfully made in the given five years is counted. In this research, the dependent variable is the number of acquisitions. The Corporate Finance Institution suggests that the completion of acquisitions takes at least six months and can last for several years. The number of acquisitions activities is calculated using the database of Zephyr from the year 2014 to 2018 and excluded rumours and unaccomplished deals from the list.
4.3.3 Moderating variables
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the given firm-year. The corresponding sample is merged with other datasets to reflect the impact on the relationships.
4.3.4 Control variables
In order to alleviate the effects of potential influencing variables, an extensive list of control variables is included in this research. For Hypothesis 1, the first control variable is firm size as it influences firm performance since larger companies are less profitable but more capable of surviving (Kalleberg & Leicht, 1991). This variable is counted as the number of employees. The second control variable is board size as small board size tends to have better financial performance, thus impacts the acquisitiveness (Guest, 2009). Board size is calculated as the number of all executive board members of the company. The third and fourth are Tobin’s q and ROA as they are the external and internal indicators of firm performance (Chen, Crossland, and Huang, 2016). For Hypothesis 2, besides the control variables mentioned above, firm age is controlled because new corporations expense more when trying to capture market share. Thus, they have difficulty in surviving after acquisitions (Jovanovic, 1982). Firm age is calculated as the number of incorporation years. Besides, time in role is also controlled as more experience in certain industry leads to corresponding business patterns and that relationship influences M&As (Yim, 2013). All control variables mentioned above are included in Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4.
4.4 Endogeneity issue and analytical approach
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are two potential explanations for the existing problems, which are reverse causality and unobservable variables (Dezsö and Ross, 2012). First, to check for reverse causality, it’s unlikely for female directors to choose for certain companies just because of the number of acquisitions companies completed. Second, the acquisitiveness and internal environment can be influenced by unobservable variables (Chen, Crossland, and Huang, 2016). To avoid this situation, a fixed-effect model is added in this research to make the assumption that those unobserved variables have a correlation with independent variables (Koberg, Detienne & Heppard, 2003). Since this research is a panel data investigation, both time and corporation fixed influence are implanted into all regression models to check how differences in firms and years impact this diversity.
4.5 Model formulation
Model (1) is formulated to test hypothesis 1 and it tests the relationship between female board representation and acquisitiveness.
Model (1): ACt,i = α0 + β1FBRt,i + β2FSt,i + β3BSt,i + β4TQt,i + β5ROAt,i + μt + λi + εt,i
Model (2) is formulated to test hypothesis 2 and it investigates the relationship between CEO age and acquisitiveness.
Model (2): ACt,i = α0 + β1CEOAt,i + β2FSt,i + β3BSt,i + β4TQt,i + β5ROAt,i + β6 FAt,i + β7TRt,i
+ μt + λi + εt,i
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Model (3): ACt,i = α0 + β1FBRt,i + β2IPt,i + β3FSt,i + β4BSt,i + β5TQt,i + β6ROAt,i + μt + λi +
εt,i
Model (4) is formulated to test hypothesis 4 and it examines how organizational innovation performance influences the relationship between CEO age and acquisitiveness.
Model (4): ACt,i = α0 + β1CEOAt,i + β2IPt,i + β3FSt,i + β4BSt,i + β5TQt,i + β6ROAt,i + β7FAt,i
+ β8TRt,i + μt + λi + εt,i
Where t refers to year and i refers to the corporation. ACt,i means the dependent variable
acquisitiveness (the number of successfully accomplished acquisitions). FBRt,i refers to the
independent variable female board representation. FSt,i represents Firm size. BSt,i means
board size (number of board members). TQt,i refers to Tobin’s q(external firm
performance). ROAt,i means Return on Assets (internal firm performance). α represents
constants. Β represents parameters of the coefficients. μt represents time (year) fixed effects
and λi represents firm fixed effects. Lastly, εt,i means error.
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combining with standard errors to check the board will be conducted to see whether this company has at least one female on the board in the prescribed firm-year. Hypothesis 3 which is whether the number of patents possessed by companies impacts the relationship between female representation on the board and the number of acquisitions. This is suitable for multilevel regression analysis as well as for Hypothesis 4 because of multiple control variables.
First, this research adds control variables in the model and then the independent variables, the change in R2 (squared correlation coefficients) is observed between the two models with the control variables being restricted. The correlation coefficient is standardized by the square root of the variance. Then the coefficient results illustrate whether organizational innovation performance impacts the relationships.
5. Results
5.1 Description statistics
24 2 1 1 3 4 40 1 17 19 7 1 1 3 24 1 1 1 1 7 3 1 1 1 9 4 1 5 1 8 1 72 1
HQ location
Australia Austria Belgium
Brazil Canada China
Denmark France Germany
India Indonesia Ireland
Italy Japan London, Britain/Netherlands
Luxembourg Malaysia Mexico
Netherlands Russia Norway
Saudi Arabia Singapore South Korea
Spain Sweden Switzerland
Thailand UK United Arab Emirates
USA Venezuela
25 Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for variables
Note: Table 1 provides the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum for each variable of 133 Global 500 corporations from the year 2014 to 2018. All firm-level variables are calculated at 1stand 99th percentiles.
This table provides basic descriptive statistics for all ten variables. The mean of female board representation which is close to 20 %. The minimum of female board representation is 0 which suggests that there is a company that has no female on executive board. The innovation performance which is the number of patents the company possesses shows a high standard deviation. The reason behind this could be the massive investigated countries and diversified industries of those involved companies. In terms of control variables, the average firm age is around 53 years. The mean value of board size is around 13.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
Acquisitiveness 618 2.390 3.641 0 30
Independent variables
Female Board Representation 618 0.187 0.132 0 0.579
26 Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Acquisitiveness 1
2 Female Board Representation -0.056 1
3 CEO age 0.0487 -0.071 1
4 Innovation Performance 0.0955 -0.234 -0.0288 1
5 Number of employees 0.0349 0.0812 -0.0689 0.0965 1
6 Board size 0.0203 0.2913 -0.1684 0.0601 0.0983 1
7 Firm Performance- Tobin's q 0.1219 0.107 0.0117 -0.054 0.1047 -0.094 1
8 Firm Performance- ROA 0.0406 -0.033 -0.0197 0.0375 0.1037 -0.015 0.3529 1
9 Firm age 0.1309 0.162 -0.0343 0.2707 0.0632 0.2748 -0.015 0.0107 1
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Table 5.3: Influence of female board representation and CEO age on acquisitiveness
Acquisitiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.571*** 0.119 0.657*** -0.001
-0.09 -0.16 -0.1 -0.17
Female board representation -1.055*** -1.047***
-0.22 -0.24
Female board representation (Dummy) - 1.03*** -1.052***
-0.17 -0.21 CEO age 0.007** 0.009*** 0 0 Number of employees -0.223 -0.217 -0.315 -0.326 0.021 0.02 0.03 0.032 Board size 0.019*** 0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Firm Performance-Tobin’s q 0.320*** 0.277*** 0.321*** 0.292*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Firm Performance- ROA -0.025 -0.032 -0.029 -0.039
0.123 0.134 0.023 0.024
Firm age 0.003*** 0.003***
0 0
Time in role -0.014* -0.005
-0.01 -0.01
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Innovation Performance 0.101 0.112***
0.001 0.014 Female board representation * Organizational
innovation performance 0.201***
0.051
CEO age * Organizational innovation performance -0.002*
0.031
R2 0.217 0.235 0.329 0.228
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.213 0.312 0.218
Corporations 133 133 133 133
28 5.2 Correlations and multicollinearity
Table 5.2 shows the correlations among all the variables in this research. To begin with, multicollinearity was inspected since this research contains more than one independent variables (Female board representation and CEO age) and moderating variable (organizational innovation performance). In Pearson correlations, any parameters below -0.7 or above -0.7 suggests multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2009). In this case, there is no correlation in this table above 0.7 or below -0.7 which indicates that there is no multicollinearity issue in this research. It is quite clear to observe that female board representation is negatively associated with the number of acquisitions. However, CEO age shows a positive correlation with acquisitiveness which suggests from this correlation matrix, CEO age is positively associated with acquisitiveness.
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a moderator, in model 3, the effect of the interaction between female board representation and Organizational innovation performance on the number of acquisitions is positive (0.201) at a significance level of 1%. This can be interpreted as when organizational innovation performance increase by one, the influence of female board representation on acquisitiveness increase by 20.1%. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. However, in model 4, the result shows an opposite result from what Hypothesis 4 suggests, the effect of the interaction between CEO age and Organizational innovation performance on the number of acquisitions is negative (-0.002) with the significance level of 10%. This means that when organizational innovation performance increase by one, the effect of CEO age on the number of acquisitions decrease by 0.2%. Consequently, Hypothesis 4 was not supported according to this parameter.
5.3 Robustness test
In this section, the purpose is to test the reliability of the results by applying the same analytical approach within different conditions to see if the final result differs from before (Heyden et al., 2001). First, the independent variable - female board representation is dummy coded and treated as a dummy variable. The value 0 represents there is no female executive on board, and otherwise, this value is 1. From table 5.3, the result shows that the model is robust.
6. Conclusion
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Many previous types of research have investigated and proved that firm performance, and strategic deployment is influenced by the compositions of characteristics on board. However, few of them have demonstrated whether these characteristics such as gender and age have an impact on M&As. In order to fill this theoretical gap, a compound model is constructed to manifest the research questions. With the combination of social identity theory, upper echelons theory and social cognitive theory, this research proposes a theoretical framework and inspects the influence of female board representation and CEO age on acquisitiveness under the moderator of organizational innovation performance. Due to the extension of acquisitions with the elements of time series and cross-sections, this research uses an unbalanced panel data to probe with 133 Global 500 corporations from year period of 2014 to 2018. Six control variables, namely firm size (number of the employees), the board size, firm performance – Tobin's q, firm performance – Return on assets, firm age and time in role are added in order to verify all four hypotheses and receive unbiased results. Year fixed effects are included for two-year lagged of female board representation variable in order to deal with reverse causality issue. Corporations fixed effects is applied to in order to avert the issue of unobservable variables. In this way, all four models are examined from endogeneity problems.
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support of highly supported Hypothesis 3 is simultaneously in line with the conclusion of Krishnan and Park (2005) that organizational innovation changes the dynamic and "force" female representations to make bolder decisions. However, Hypothesis 2 is not supported, which suggests that the age of CEOs does not have a negative impact on the number of acquisitions. This finding is conflicting with previous researches such as Koberg, Detienne and Hepperd (2003) as they present those old executives are more obligated to long but stable reward thus favour less risky strategic operations and investments. The alternative explanation for the finding of this research could be that prior experiences other than age can be a more prominent influence on the acquisitiveness and the age effect might not be the explanation of declining confidence and selected young CEOs by acquisition-prone corporations (Yim, 2013). Moreover, hypothesis 4 is also not supported which suggests that innovation has no positive impact on the relation of CEO age and the number of acquisitions.
6.2 Contributions
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From a social and financial perspective, this research investigates the effect of board characteristics (gender and age) on strategic decision-making (acquisitiveness). An additional perspective which is corporate innovation performance is added as a moderator to check whether and how it impacts the relationships. Since the dependent variable is a time-series variable, this research is an unbalanced panel data investigation with cross time and industries. The final sample of 133 companies is collected from 26 countries from both developed and developing countries. Compared with other researches in this topic (Yim, 2013; Chen, Crossland, and Huang, 2016), this sample is more country and region diverse. The findings of Hypothesis 1 and 3 further International business area with social identity theory and can be a positive predictor for future equality research.
6.3 Limitations and future research
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