Jelle S. Burgers

Sensitivities:

Attention Guiding Dispositions Shaping the Media- and Art Experience By

Jelle S. Burgers

Master Thesis Culture, Arts and Media

Specialization: Analysis and Criticism (Film)

Student number : 1703366 Course code : LWX99M20

Credits : 20

Instructors : dr. A.M.A. van den Oever and dr. M. Kiss Date of submission : 29-08-2011

Place of submission : Groningen

I

Preface

Writing this paper has been a task the likes of which I had never before undertaken. As an academic endeavor, it has proved a stimulating process during which my interest in cinema got elevated to a higher level. As the pièce the résistance of my studies here, at the University of Groningen, this thesis represents the zenith of my academic vocation. On a personal level, a course year exclusively focused on cinema has reignited my lifelong passion for the moving image in every form. Completing the program and writing this thesis gives me the confidence to pursue my interest in cinema further in any way I can.

Starting out as a basic idea about the connection between technology and

the reception of media and art, the concept of media-sensitivity came to life and

became the centerpiece around which my thinking process has revolved over the

course of the last four months. As work progressed and my desk got increasingly

cluttered with stacks of articles and books—the relevance of which I had

sometimes forgotten completely—I could always revert back to my anchor point,

medium-sensitivity, which existed conceptually in my mind but that sometimes

proved difficult to verbalize. I must extend my gratitude to my supervisors who

helped me do so. First of all, I would like to thank dr. Annie van den Oever for

guiding my thought processes, keeping my attention focused on the bigger picture

and suggesting new angles of approach. Comments like “what do you want to do,

why, and how?” kept me from digressing into technicalities or diverting too far

from my basic argument. I am equally thankful to dr. Miklós Kiss who was kind

enough to take on the task of second supervisor. Although officially second

supervisor, Miklós was willing to spend as much time supervising me as would a

first supervisor. Due to his extensive involvement with the development of this

thesis, he could best be labeled as the “second-first” supervisor. With pin-point

precision, Miklós helped me verbalize those ideas I struggled to verbalize, right

II down to the level of individual word-choice. Finally, my gratitude goes out to prof. dr. Ed Tan, who was kind enough to review my thesis as part of the grading process.

As this thesis marks the end of a period in my life and the beginning of a new one, I cannot refrain from thanking all those who have made my stay in Groningen pleasant and my academic pursuit possible. A special thanks goes out to my parents who encouraged me to undertake an academic endeavor after my brief stint in business economics. Also, I must thank my good friends Ragnar Dienske, Ward van Hoof, Mans van Rooijen, Rob Schuffel, and Marc Balder without who my stay in Groningen would not have been the same.

All things said and done, I am left with nothing but to express the hope that you will enjoy reading my work.

Jelle Burgers

Groningen, August 2011

1

Table of Contents

PREFACE I

INTRODUCTION 2

CHAPTER 1: EXPLORING SENSITIVITIES 10

PREVIOUS USES OF SENSITIVITY 11

SENSITIVITIES AS CONTINGENT UNIVERSALS 13

COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURES 15

CONCLUSION:CONCEPTUALIZING SENSITIVITIES 18

CHAPTER 2: DEFAMILIARIZATION 20

THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF REPRESENTATIONS FROM A COGNITIVIST PERSPECTIVE 20

OSTRANENIE 24

TWO TYPES OF DEFAMILIARIZATION (TECHNICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL

DEFAMILIARIZATION) 26

HOW CAN TECHNOLOGY DEFAMILIARIZE REPRESENTATIONS? 29 CAUSES FOR DEFAMILIARIZATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 32

CONCLUSION 35

CHAPTER 3: THE AUTOMATIZATION OF PERCEPTION 36

THE MIMETIC TRADITION 37

AUTOMATIZATION 40

PERCEIVED (UN)NATURALNESS AS TRADITION 44

NATURALIZATION 46

CINEMA AND EMOTIONS 49

CONCLUSION 51

CHAPTER 4: CHANGING THE DIRECTION OF ATTENTION 53

TRANSPARENCY 54

IMMEDIACY 56

REMEDIATION 60

THE SALIENCE OF CINEMA 64

CONCLUSION 67

CONCLUSION: SENSITIVITIES AS ATTENTION GUIDING DISPOSITIONS SHAPING

THE MEDIA- AND ART EXPERIENCE 69

WORKS CITED 73

2

Introduction

“What can we learn from a cultural history of technology?”

–Tom Gunning, “Re-newing Old Technologies”.

Tom Gunning wrote these words in 1998. Perhaps for film scholars, the answer to his question is more relevant today than it has been for some time.

As we drew near the end of the first decade of the 21

century, 3-D technology experienced its revival with the box office hit Avatar (2009). Yielding over two billion U.S. dollars, Avatar is the highest grossing film in the history of cinema. The unmatched popularity of Avatar is followed by a whole range of 3-D films, all of them emphasizing the spectacular qualities of 3-D technology. It seems that technology has taken the center stage as the defining feature of big- budget Hollywood productions.

When I first saw Avatar in an IMAX 3-D theatre I experienced the emotional appeal of the spectacular visual effects of 3-D cinema first hand. The size of the screen was perplexing on its own. Combined with the special 3-D glasses and the magnificent sound effects, the 3-D illusion was truly a celebration of technology. Having enjoyed the film the first time, I decided to watch it again.

This time however, I did not see Avatar projected on the largest screen I ever saw

nor could I experience the 3-D effect; I watched it on the fifteen inch screen of my

laptop computer. The difference between these two viewing experiences could

hardly have been bigger. Whereas time flew by during the initial viewing in the

IMAX theatre, Avatar progressed painstakingly slow when I attempted to watch it

again. After thirty minutes my attention span had reached its limit and I turned it

off. Afterwards, I reflected on my initial viewing experience in the IMAX theatre

and concluded that when Avatar was not shown on a huge screen and I was

unable to experience the 3-D effect, its emotional appeal is very limited. In a

sense, my first viewing experience had been a truly naive one: I was preoccupied

3 with the astonishing visual effects of IMAX and 3-D technology which had obscured the fact that I was not really concerned with Avatar’s narrative development. I had a somewhat similar experience as audiences over a hundred years earlier had when the cinema was first introduced; I experienced the celebration of technology and technology alone (Gunning, “Renewing Old Technologies”).

Under the collective noun of early cinema studies, multiple scholars have investigated the introduction of cinema and its effect on contemporary audiences.

These early audiences were medium-sensitive audiences who “went to see a film show in order to experience the new medium more than to see a specific film”

(Gunning, “Foreword” XXI). Their medium-sensitivity was accompanied with a specific discourse of modernity, one in which the new technology was deployed in such a way as to maximize the experience of astonishment and wonder (43).

Tom Gunning and André Gaudreault introduced the concept of the cinema of attractions to describe how this discourse shaped the viewing practices and form of early cinema as distinctly different from narrative cinema, which developed at a later stage in the history of cinema (Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions” 229).

The cinema of attractions became a benchmark term for the study of early cinema and has been worked through by multiple scholars since (See Strauven, The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded). The concept of the cinema of attractions allowed for a historical analysis of early audience responses independent from the hegemony of narrative cinema (227). It lead to the recognition that overexcited audience responses were most likely due to the experience of an incredible and magical illusion made possible by the technology that created the illusion of movement (Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Illusion” 120).

Prior to Gunning’s work on early cinema, the exuberant audience

responses which were recorded in the days of early cinema had been often

explained by underestimating the capacity of these early audiences to distinguish

between a projection and reality. By mistakenly believing that the projected image

Introduction J.S.Burgers

4 was reality—the myth goes—audiences fled in terror at the sight of a train moving towards them (Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment” 114). Rather than underestimating their capacity to distinguish reality from illusion, Gunning suggests that these early audiences responded the way they did because “[t]he movement from still to moving image accented the unbelievable and extraordinary nature of the apparatus itself” (“An Aesthetic of Astonishment”

120). Therefore, Gunning labeled these medium-sensitive audiences as incredulous spectators; as spectators who experienced wonder and amazement, not terror, as they witnessed a projected train moving towards them (“An Aesthetic of Astonishment” 114). The work done by Gunning and others on early cinema has resulted in valuable insights which may shed light on audience responses following the introduction of 3-D cinema.

Gunning’s work on medium-sensitivity is derived from observations made by Viktor Shklovsky who described how the deployment of technology has a distinct impact on perception (“Art as Technique” 18). Although Shklovsky never uses the term medium-sensitivity, his pioneering work has paved the way for other theorists working on the influence of technology and technique on perception. According to Shklovsky, there is a correlation between technique and art. He writes: “[t]he technique of art is to make objects “unfamiliar,” to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged” (“Art as Technique” 18). Recently, Shklovsky’s work has been read with renewed interest.

Among those scholars rediscovering his ideas are Tom Gunning, Frank Kessler, Laurent Jullier, Lázló Tarnay, Annie van den Oever, and Miklós Kiss. Not surprisingly, their work takes a prominent place in this paper about the impact of contemporary technological developments on the process of perception.

I believe that early audiences were drawn to the cinema in a comparable

way as contemporary audiences are drawn to 3-D cinema; the astonishing

illusions that 3-D cinema produces is enough to keep modern audiences occupied.

5 Prior to anything else, these spectators come to experience the technological wonder that 3-D cinema is. These two instances of astonishment are fundamentally related. The celebratory experience of technology is a historical phenomenon, observable every time a new technology is introduced (Gunning,

“Renewing Old Technologies” 43). Although occurring over a hundred years after each other and thus in different historical and cultural contexts, it is possible to find correlations between the celebrations of early- and 3-D cinema. Examples of such correlations are the advertising campaigns of early cinema and 3-D cinema.

In the early days of cinema, “[i]t was the Cinématorgraphe, the Biograph, or the Vitascope that were advertised … not The Baby’s Breakfast or The Black Diamond Express” (Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions” 231). Similarly, Avatar was advertised as a true cultural event. Rather than focusing on the narrative, Avatar’s advertising campaign revolved around the spectacular visual effects that 3-D technology promised to bring to the theatre (Stanley 13-16).

However, instead of focusing on artifacts—on 3-D cinema or advertising campaigns—I will attempt to find correlations between modern instances of technological celebration and earlier ones by describing the dispositions of the audience to respond with amazement and wonder to new technological innovations. In order to do so, I will rely on a specific branch of film studies known as cognitive film studies.

Cognitive scientists have researched the operations of the human mind

extensively from the late 1950s and their work has been transposed into the realm

of film studies since the 1980s by so-called cognitive film scholars. This branch

of film studies concerns the structure of the embodied mind and its engagement

with the world, and therefore also its engagement with film and media. Cognitive

film studies provide a framework through which medium-sensitivity can be

explicated. Most cognitive studies deploy theoretical models used to gain a better

understanding of the mind and its operations (Sun 341). These models take into

account both the innate structure of the mind as well as those structures that “are

Introduction J.S.Burgers

6 not innate, that have resulted from ontogenetic development under the influence of physical, social, and cultural environments” (Sun 343). In other words, theoretical cognitive models are used to explicate both those structures that are natural as well as those that develop later in life under the influence of cultural forces. Since the mind is both natural—in the sense that the cognitive framework is biologically determined—and cultural—in the sense that this cognitive framework develops through experience—cognitive film studies provide the best possible theoretical framework which can incorporate the two sides of this nature- nurture dichotomy.

Describing the dispositions of the mind is a truly monumental task. My aim here is far more modest. I will attempt to connect some of the basic concepts used in the realm of cognitive film studies to the observations made by Viktor Shklovsky and others (most notably Tom Gunning) about the transformation of astonishment into familiarity. Gunning—following Shklovsky—noticed how wonder and astonishment are inherently temporal phenomenon (“Re-newing Old Technologies” 41). He states that in time, “[a]stonishment gives way to familiarity” (41) and when it does we have to “imagine an old technology as something that was once new [and thereby] try to recapture a quality is has lost”

(39) in order to understand the full impact that new technology has on audiences.

With the revival of 3-D cinema this quality does not have to be captured through imagination; it can be directly experienced by any viewer that has not seen a 3-D film before. In this paper, I will use the findings of cognitive film scholars to explain how the experience of watching a 3-D film for the first time is fundamentally different from watching a 3-D film once astonishment has given way to familiarity.

Most cognitive film scholars argue from a position in which astonishment

has already been displaced by familiarity. Their work often revolves around our

engagement with the cinema as informed by experience. However, the

introduction of new technology is an instance in which our experience might not

7 be able to facilitate our understanding of a representation. In other words, by arguing from a situation in which experience facilitates our understanding of the cinema, cognitive film scholars often start out from a position of relative stability.

In order to describe how the introduction of a new technology has an impact on the reception of representations, arguing from a position of relative stability is unsatisfactory. Hence, by describing instances in which the introduction of new technology causes amazement and wonder, I must argue from a position of instability brought about by the introduction of unfamiliar new technologies. In order to do so, I must investigate what the impact of unfamiliarity is on the reception of representations. Such an investigation must connect unfamiliarity to the operations of the mind and to a theoretical framework that can clarify the process of media- and art reception.

Scholars writing on media- and art reception often focus on the message a film conveys; that is, they focus on what is represented in film and how audiences distillate meaning from these representations. I will try to refrain from doing so as much as possible since hermeneutics are a highly complicated matter in itself.

Moreover, since my work is informed by formalism, hermeneutics are less relevant. As Shklovsky himself writes, “[a]rt is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: the object itself is not important” (“Art as Technique 18).

So, instead of proposing a theoretical framework that meticulously describes the process of media- and art interpretation, I will attempt to show how one element in particular—emotional appeal—may influence the reception of representations.

My investigation into the emotional appeal of the cinema will not be conducted independently from the observations made in the field of cognitive film studies and early cinema studies but I will attempt to integrate all three respectively. It is not until the very end of this paper that I will suggest a possible relation between hermeneutics and emotional appeal.

Instead of assigning meaning to an instance of unfamiliarity, I will limit

myself to the observation that the unfamiliar has an emotional appeal. As

Introduction J.S.Burgers

8 attention-guiding constitutions, emotions help us to quickly respond to unfamiliar elements in our environment (See Torben Grodal’s discussion on the PECMA- flow in Embodied Visions 145-157). Interestingly, most of the scholars working on the emotional in the cinema point to narrative engagement as the primary source of emotional appeal (examples are Noël Carroll’s and Dirk Eitzen’s contributions in Passionate Views and Carl Planting’s Moving Viewers). It seems that these scholars, like those writing on the reception of early cinema before Gunning and Gaudreault introduced their concept of the cinema of attractions, construct their arguments under the hegemony of narrative cinema. This however does not mean that their work is less interesting for research on the influence of medium-sensitivity on the reception of film. After all, unlike most of the film in the era of the cinema of attractions, 3-D films like Avatar are narrative films. That means that since these 3-D films convey a narrative, they have the potential to elicit emotions based on the audience’s engagement with that narrative. In terms of media- and art reception, these two emotion-eliciting instances (unfamiliarity and narrative engagement) are of crucial importance since they potentially influence the audience’s direction of attention. The relation between these two emotion-eliciting instances and their impact on the process of media- and art reception will be the subject of further scrutiny in chapters three and four.

Every so often, the impact of the initial unfamiliarity of technology can be

experienced first-hand, as it can today. As both modern audiences and the very

first film audiences experienced wonder and amazement during their very first

confrontation with a new technology, it is possible to draw an analogy between

them. What both these audiences have in common is the fact that they were (and

are) medium-sensitive; they come to see the medium, not the film. However, as

Gunning already noted, wonder and amazement are temporal phenomenon (“Re-

newing Old Technologies” 41). As audiences become familiar with a specific

media technology they lose their capacity to be wondered and amazed by that

technology alone. As this happens, the newly introduced technology starts to

9 function differently; whereas it first primarily functioned as device used to create incredible and magical illusions it gradually starts to function differently: as a device that can be used for mimetic purposes. Whenever a device can be used for mimetic purposes it can be used to create representations which are perceived as being realistic.

This gradual process through which an audiovisual device can be used for mimetic purposes is known as media-appropriation (Van den Oever,

“Ostranenie”). It is this process that the concept of media-sensitivity helps clarify.

As far as the relevance of this concept for studies on media- and art reception goes, media-sensitivity predicts that different degrees of familiarity influences the emotional appeal of a representation which in turn might even influence our understanding of that representation. Whereas the illusion of movement was used as a spectacular attraction in the early days of the cinema, the illusion of 3-D is used as a spectacular attraction today. Hence, it is not the artifact that has an innate capacity to induce wonder. If it did, modern audiences would still be amazed when confronted with the illusion of movement. Instead, what matters is not the capacity to amaze but the capacity to be amazed. In other words, whenever the audience has little or no experience with a new technology it is more likely that they will experience amazement and wonder by technological means alone.

Therefore, sensitivities are subject-specific dispositions that shape the spectator’s

media- and art experience. As such, they are pivotal in the process of media-

appropriation which constitutes the transformation from medium-sensitivity into

familiarity. Hence my focus on medium-sensitivity.

10

Chapter 1: Exploring Sensitivities

Since the concept of sensitivities is crucial for the development of my argument I am inclined to devote a chapter to it. Fostering an understanding of sensitivities must begin with a contextualization of the term and its usage by other authors writing on film- and media reception. I will begin this chapter by focusing on the work of other authors and by illustrating how their understanding of sensitivities can be helpful in conceptualizing my own use of the term. To my knowledge, no other author writing on film or media has conceptualized sensitivities as specifically as I will attempt to do in this paper. Clearly, I am not just interested in what sensitivities are but—more importantly—I am interested in what causes sensitivities and how sensitivities surface during the process of film- and media reception. I will use the concept of sensitivities within a theoretical framework provided by cognitive film studies in order to answer these questions. After these questions have been answered the concept might be used as an analytical tool that can generate new insights into the process of media- and art reception. Since I will relate sensitivities to the human cognitive framework it is crucial that I accompany my exploration of the term with some basic concepts which are used by cognitive film scholars in order to explain the mind’s engagement with film.

Such a basic cognitive architecture can be used to explain what the relation is

between the operations of the mind and the phenomenon of sensitivity. Even

though such a cognitive architecture might be used to account for individual

instances of sensitivity, I will refrain from doing so. Rather, the aim of this paper

is to explore some basic operations of the mind which can account for the

existence of sensitivities in general. The relation between the basic operations of

the mind and the phenomenon of sensitivity, as I will argue in this chapter, is

determined by the success or failure of the mind to process perceptual input

effortlessly.

11 Previous Uses of Sensitivity

In her chapter “Time and Timing” in Passionate Views, Susan Feagin uses the term sensitivities which she considers to be “dispositional states or conditions such that if one were to encounter a certain kind of thing one would respond in a certain kind of way” (172). Situating her argument within a cognitivist theoretical framework, Feagin considers dispositions of the mind and body to be the cause of sensitivity. As such, her usage of the term provides an appropriate starting point for a paper seeking to connect the basic cognitive processes of perception to the phenomenon of sensitivity. Feagin’s connection between audience responses and the conditions of the mind and body is a basic one, commonly recognized by researchers working on film- and media reception. This connection predicts that the conditions of the body and mind will influence audience responses. Despite the basic validity of Feagin’s concept of sensitivity it is too crude and vague in order to function as an analytical tool to be used for further research. Critical elements in her definition, most notably “dispositional states or conditions”, remain unexplained. Also, the connection between these conditions and audience responses is not elaborated upon. Such an elaboration requires a basic understanding of the most relevant cognitive process operational in the process of media- and art reception.

Another author that refrains from including a basic description of the

cognitive architecture of the mind while using the term sensitivities is John

Bender. Despite this, his work is useful here because he connects sensitivity to

artistic appreciation. Bender distinguishes sensitivities from something he calls

sensibilities. Sensibilities are matters of allocating artistic relevance to one aspect

over the other (74). In other words, sensibilities are not the result of capacities but

of appreciation. To illustrate this with an example, two people might both have

the capacity to perceive the blue color of the Na’vi in Avatar. One of those people

might consider this blue color to be beautiful and appropriate considering that the

Chapter 1 J.S.Burgers

12 Na’vi are aliens, while the other person might find it atrocious and completely ridiculous. By contrast, sensitivities are “capacities to react to certain properties or magnitudes” (77). In case of the Na’vi, someone who is colorblind will not be able to perceive their blue color and hence will not have the capacity to react to it.

Bender’s definition reveals a fundamental condition of sensitivity; the body’s capacity to perceive an incoming stimulus. A colorblind person can never be sensitive to the blue color of the Na’vi. The basic premise of Bender’s argument is that a difference in sensitivities will result in a difference in artistic appreciation.

Hence, sensitivities are independent from the individual’s conscious deliberation to appreciate one element or the other. Rather, they are determining factors in the process of artistic appreciation which are beyond the spectator’s control. This understanding is crucial since it reveals the relevance of sensitivities which is not secondary or complementary in the process of film- and media reception but rather primary and pivotal. Sensitivities are conditions independent of the individual’s control. An understanding of sensitivities must therefore include the recognition that the conditions of the mind and body will influence artistic appraisal.

Sensitivities function beyond the spectator’s control; that is, they must be experienced and cannot willingly be disengaged. As Bender’s definition of sensitivities already showed, the capacity of the body to perceive a stimulus is a condition for sensitivity. The colorblind spectator cannot be sensitive to the blue color of the Na’vi nor can a deaf spectator display sensitivity to sound effects he or she cannot hear. As long as this condition is met, sensitivities can surface.

Since they function beyond the spectator’s control, sensitivities are a pivotal element in the process of media reception. A spectator who has the capacity to perceive color cannot observe the Na’vi and decide not to perceive their color.

Obviously, sensitivity is not limited to the perception of color but can also be

observed in other instances, for example following the introduction of 3-D

technology in big-budget Hollywood productions.

13 Sensitivities as Contingent Universals

As the conditions of the mind are not limited to mere biological dispositions, it is crucial to adopt a theoretical framework that can also account for dispositions that develop as a result of cultural exposure. Sensitivity, as a condition of the mind, must therefore be explicated through a theoretical framework that can handle both biological and cultural dispositions. Cognitive film studies provide the best theoretical frameworks available to do so. The theoretical concepts that this particular branch of film studies provides are specific enough to account for sensitivities that occur as a result of cultural exposure yet can feasibly be deployed in a discussion on media- and art reception.

Some sensitivities are innate, or at least appear that way. These sensitivities are shared among all audiences, irrelevant of their cultural context.

Torben Grodal for instance argues that underlighting—the phenomenon of lighting people and objects from below—is cross-culturally considered to be unnatural and unaffected by habituation (153). Therefore, Grodal concludes that

“[t]he perception of the form of objects thus takes place by means of a hardwired assumption that directed light comes from above and has a single source” (154).

Constructing an argument on how this particular sensitivity for underlighting has developed would lead down the path of evolutionary biology which is well beyond the scope of this paper. What is particularly valuable is the fact that Grodal points to the link between everyday perception and sensitivities. Indeed, we perceive light as coming from one source above us. Hence, our everyday perception of the world will influence our sensitivity to perceptual input. Since some elements of perception are universal—such as light coming from the sun—

some sensitivities will develop universally. Sensitivity for underlighting is such a universally developed sensitivity.

Whereas some sensitivities have developed everywhere—as a result from

the conditions of living on earth—other seem to be limited to specific cultural

Chapter 1 J.S.Burgers

14 contexts. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish between universal sensitivities and culturally acquired ones. To illustrate this point the example of disgust might be invoked here. Disgust is a biological function developed to increase the likelihood of survival (Panksepp 1819). In that sense, it is as innate as our capacity to develop sensitivities is (Grodal, Embodied Visions 18). Moreover, some objects are universally considered to be disgusting, such as bodily excretions (Jones 56). However, other objects that induce disgust are not universally considered disgusting (Jones 53). That is, some people are disgusted by things that other people are not. Researchers found distinct differences between disgust-inducing instances between cultures such as “beef for Hindus [or] pork among many Jews and Muslims” (56). Hence, the capacity to feel disgusted by certain objects partially develops in different ways, depending on cultural context. These findings can be extended to the realm of sensitivities.

Whereas some sensitivities develop universally, others are culturally acquired.

In order to cope with the universal development of some sensitivities versus the specificity of others, the concept of contingent universals should be invoked. In Poetics of Cinema, David Bordwell argues that the nature-nurture dichotomy can be eluded by focusing on contingent universals instead (61).

“[These universals] are contingent because they did not, for any metaphysical reasons, have to be the way they are; and they are universal insofar as we can find them to be widely present in human societies” (61). Bordwell uses these contingent universals as an explanation for the “naturalness” of certain artistic conventions, such as the shot/reverse shot (61). His argument goes that although such artistic conventions must be learned, we are in fact hard-wired to learn them.

He uses a vivid analogy with language to illustrate his point. Bordwell states that

“[t]he individual’s development of language … is as much a biological capacity

as the inclination to grow arms rather than wings” (61). Hence, we are

biologically hardwired to develop certain skills, although this development does

not necessarily need to occur in a predetermined way. In the same sense we are

15 hardwired to have sensitivities, yet there is no ontogenetic reason for all sensitivities to be similar.

Sensitivities are subject-specific dispositions because the development of certain sensitivities differs among individuals. As the disgust example illustrated, cultural exposure will influence the development of some sensitivities. In order to cope the specificity of sensitivities yet still be able to use the term as an analytical tool that can be used for an investigation of media- and art reception, this paper will distinguish between historically specific spectators. The exposure to different media may differ between cultures, but in an increasingly globalized world, historical specificity adds a useful dimension in order to distinguish between spectators who are and spectators who are not exposed to specific media.

However, cultural and historical specificity remains an abstraction. In order to be able to understand how sensitivities appear and disappear, a more specific theoretical framework is required that can even account for individual instances of sensitivity. Even though this theoretical framework could be used to account for individual instances of sensitivity, the aim of this essay is not to map out all possible sensitivities but to provide a very basic account of the architecture of the mind which is helpful in explaining how sensitivity functions. Cognitive film studies can provide such an account by, paradoxically, relying on an abstraction of the spectator.

Cognitive Architectures

A model of the human cognitive architecture consists of a detailed and highly

conceptual model of the mind that is used for the analysis of cognition and

behavior (Sun 341, Ramirez 1). As such, it functions as an initial set of

assumptions and concepts which are used for further research on the process of

media reception. A vital one of such concepts—derived from artificial intelligence

Chapter 1 J.S.Burgers

16 research—is the concept of cognitive frames; frames which are used for the everyday interaction between the spectator and the world.

Cognitive frames are conceptual frameworks that the spectator uses in order to make sense of the world. Cognitive frames functionally structure knowledge regarding the world (Ramirez 2). In other words, frames arrange the knowledge of the spectator in such a way as to provide that spectator with meaningful inferences about what is happening around him or her. Thus, the outputs of cognitive frames are hypotheses regarding the spectator’s surroundings (Ramirez 3). Individual frames are not autonomous; they are connected to form

“an information retrieval network, which is in charge of dealing with situations where a retrieved frame cannot be made to fit the present event” (Ramirez 3).

Obviously, this functional knowledge of the world is not inherently present in these frames. Therefore, they are not static but incorporate new information as the spectator is exposed to its surroundings. In a very commonsensical way, the incorporation of new information in cognitive frames is known as learning.

The mind makes sense of its surroundings through limited perceptual input that is used to make inferences about those surroundings (Berliner and Cohen 53).

Berliner and Cohen use the term active perception to refer to “the cognitive and perceptual processes for selecting and encoding stimuli in the physical world”

(47). Through active perception, the spectator selects those elements from his’ or hers environment that are most relevant and mentally reconstructs a model of the whole (47). Hence, the actual physical world is never directly experienced.

Rather, the mental model of that physical world is. This mental construction of the world relies on the hypotheses the spectator makes about that world. “Because survival hinges on an accurate-enough perception of the physical world to enable safe navigation, the brain has evolved automatic cognitive processes—termed

“unconscious inferences” because perceivers perform them automatically and

unaware” (Berliner and Cohen 53). Hence, the spectator’s hypothesis-making

processes that are involved in perception are usually automatic and unconscious.

17 In order for these processes to function properly the knowledge stored in cognitive frames should correspond to the conditions of the physical world.

The automatic cognitive processes that rely on the information stored in cognitive frames are obstructed when this information does not correspond to the conditions of the physical world. As Berliner and Cohen have argued, we can distinguish these automatic cognitive processes from non-automatic processes known as controlled processes (47). The difference between these types of processes lies in the attention they require from the spectator. Whereas automatic processes require zero attention and are executed effortlessly, controlled processes demand the spectator’s focused attention which will necessarily lead to conscious awareness (Berliner and Cohen 47). When our cognitive frames are unable to provide appropriate hypotheses concerning the physical world, automatic processes are obstructed and controlled processes take over. When this happens, not only does perception require the spectator’s full attention, he or she will most likely take a reflexive stance towards what is perceived (Sun 362). Instead of relying on automatic processes that lead to an unproblematic mental representation of the physical world, the spectator is forced to use conceptual thinking in order to make sense of the perceived.

There is a relation between the adequacy of cognitive frames and the attention that some abnormalities demand. Automatic processes are obstructed when “normal circumstances are changed and routines interrupted” (Sun 363).

When the information stored in cognitive frames is inadequate to provide the spectator with reliable hypotheses, he or she will switch to controlled processes which require conscious attention. Hence, abnormalities will capture the spectator’s attention if the spectator’s cognitive frames produce multiple incompatible hypotheses. In such an instance, the abnormality is an anomaly.

Since humans rely on an unambiguous mental representation of the world, the

ambiguity that this framing problem results in presents a problem. Resolving this

ambiguity is achieved by switching to controlled process and hence by utilizing

Chapter 1 J.S.Burgers

18 conceptual thinking. Constructing an unambiguous mental representation of our surroundings is a biologically developed necessity. Since the unknown might potentially be harmful, it is absolutely vital that abnormalities that present a framing problem demand conscious attention (Grodal 160). As the laws of active perception would predict, our attention will be geared towards the unfamiliar as we attempt to resolve this framing problem since it is in our interest to construct an unambiguous mental representation of the physical world (Berliner and Cohen 47).

Conclusion: Conceptualizing Sensitivities

From a cognitivist perspective, sensitivities are the result of a framing problem.

Hence, sensitivities are closely aligned to anomalies; both are the result of cognitive frame’s incapacity to provide the spectator with reliable hypotheses.

The major difference between the two lies in the fact that anomalies can be

anything unfamiliar or strange that presents a framing problem, while sensitivities

as used in this paper will refer to specific instances of unfamiliarity as brought

about by technologies or technique. The case of underlighting might provide an

appropriate illustration of this point. Underlighting is the result of a specific

technique, made possible by the existence of a specific technology (in this case,

artificial lighting). Although anomalies manifest themselves without technology,

sensitivities—in the sense used in this paper—do not. They are the result of

specific instances of inherent unnaturalness; of a fundamental mismatch between

the perception of reality as opposed to the perception of representations. This

illustrates their relevance in the field of film- and media studies since

representations can never be identical to their referent for they would stop being

representations if they did, a problem that is extensively discussed in the works of

Rudolf Arnheim and André Bazin. Therefore, the concept of sensitivities is not

complementary or secondary in the field of film- and media studies but rather

19 primary and pivotal, despite the fact that it may not appear that way to trained audiences who have been extensively exposed to film or other media. For trained viewers, the image and its referent might appear indistinguishable (Tarnay 4), in which case the salient experience of the technique and technology that makes representations possible fades from consciousness.

Sensitivities are subject-specific dispositions of the mind. They are subject-specific because some audiences display sensitivities that others do not.

Despite the fact that not all audiences share the same sensitivities, they do share the same cognitive architecture. Therefore, all audiences are hard-wired to have sensitivities, yet this does not necessarily mean that all sensitivities have to be similar. Therefore, sensitivities are best understood as contingent universals.

Cognitive studies show that humans in everyday life apply cognitive

frames in order to create a mental representation of their surroundings. When this

mental representation does not correspond to the actual physical world, these

cognitive frames have failed to perform adequately and as a result the spectator’s

mental construction of its surroundings has become ambiguous. The spectator

cannot rely on the automatic processes which utilize the information stored in

cognitive frames and therefore he or she must switch to controlled processes

which demand conscious attention in order to resolve ambiguity. The impact of

ambiguity on the perceptual-cognitive processes of the mind is crucial when using

sensitivity in a cognitive context. Since sensitivities demand attention, they have a

profound effect on the reception of media. Drawing attention to techniques and

technology, media-sensitivity shapes the spectator’s media- and art experience in

ways that have not been properly recognized as of yet.

20

Chapter 2: Defamiliarization

Medium-sensitivity revolves around the inclination of the audience to respond to elements in a representation that are unfamiliar. As the previous chapter illustrated, sensitivities are the result of the failure of cognitive frames to present us with reliable hypotheses concerning what we perceive; sensitivities surface whenever our cognitive frames fail to provide short-cuts to understanding. In order to be able to understand an abnormal sight, the brain must resort to non- automatic perceptual processes and utilize conceptual thinking which designates conscious perception. This chapter will try and illuminate why unfamiliar elements in a representation will draw conscious attention. In order to do so, it is important to first understand how we understand representation in general. The first section of this chapter will deal with this question by illustrating how we engage with our surroundings and how this engagement relates to our engagement with representations. The second section of this chapter is devoted to the capacity of representations to make the familiar strange and to create perceptual input that is defamiliarizing. As the discussion on sensitivities in the previous chapter already showed, whatever is unfamiliar to one may be familiar to another. In other words, whatever counts as defamiliarizing is a matter of individual sensitivity.

Sensitivities therefore designate the individual’s capacity to experience defamiliarization by a specific stimulus. Defamiliarization is a pivotal aspect of the process of media- and art reception since the unfamiliar guides attention.

The Ontological Status of Representations from a Cognitivist Perspective

The ontological status of objects as representations is determined by the

conceptual relationship between the image and its referent. That is, those basic

concepts that we live by must be retrievable from an object in order for that object

to be considered a representation. To put this in yet another way, the ontological

21 status of any representation is determined by the applicability of the concepts that foster our understanding of the world. This is why, even though new media technology might produce representations that have a defamiliarizing effect, they are nevertheless recognized as being representations. To illustrate this, the dual representation hypothesis might be invoked. “According to the dual representations hypothesis, it is difficult for young children to represent and focus on the symbolic role of an object if their attention is captured by the object itself”

(Troseth and Deloache 951). Since these young children do not have enough symbolic experience in order to make sense of the representation as a representation, they will consider it an object in itself. The failure to deploy symbolic thinking to a representation results in a failure to detect the representational qualities of that representation.

Young children find it difficult to understand the connection between a representation and reality because they have very limited symbolic experience (Troseth and Deloache 962).When children gain more symbolic experience, they

“become more likely to entertain the possibility that a new entity is a

representation of something other than itself and to accept a novel use of a

familiar type of symbol” (Troseth and Deloache 962). In adults, this experience

has developed up to a point that the symbolic connection between a representation

and reality is self-evident. The retrieval of relevant information from a

representation is hence governed by the viewer’s ability to recognize symbolic

connections. These symbolic connections develop through exposure to cultural

and physical surroundings. Hence, as the usage of the word experience already

suggests, these symbolic connections are not biological, although they are the

result of embodied existence (Lakoff and Johnson 14). They are the result of

embodied experience since our most basic symbolic connections develop as a

result of our constant embodied experience of living in the physical world (Lakoff

and Johnson 56-57).

Chapter 2 J.S.Burgers

22 If the basic concepts that inform human experience cannot be retrieved from a representation, this representation will not function as such. Hence, the determining factor for the assignment of an ontological status to representations is the symbolic relation between the image and its referent. Or rather, the symbolic relation that exists—or must exist—in order for an image to function as a representation exposes the fundamental connection between a representation and its referent. Although this connection is a non-material one, it nevertheless is a fundamental one since the basic concepts that apply to everyday existence must also be applicable to the representation. In that sense, concepts (in the broadest sense) function as the index of embodied existence. The basic validity of representations as corresponding to the conditions of embodied existence is the reason that audiovisual representations are so accessible to first time viewers. “If these audiovisual stories are so successful, it is above all because they are understood, and they are understood because they appeal to a perceptive-cognitive knowledge acquired in real life” (Jullier 120). Representations utilize those basic concepts we have acquired through the experience of embodied existence. These are the natural qualities of representations. To label all representations—and especially photographic representations—as unnatural does not do justice to the perceptive-cognitive processes that determine our understanding of those representations. From a cognitivist perspective, the ontological status of the image is therefore not so much an intrinsic quality of the image as it is the result of a process of allocation. It is the mind which allocates an ontological status to the seen, it are not the perceived objects themselves that determine what ontological status the mind will allocate. For example, a rather extensive discussion on what counts as realism can be avoided by limiting oneself to a description of those perceptive-cognitive processes that determine the assignment of ontological statuses.

The concepts we use in everyday life are fundamentally metaphorical, that

is, we understand most concepts in terms of other concepts (Lakoff and Johnson

23 56). Hence, the capacity to understand symbolic connections is in the capacity to deploy the concepts that inform our everyday experience in relation to other concepts. Our concepts, as Lakoff and Johnson’s book title already reveals, are what we live by. They state that “[o]ur concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people” (3). If our concepts are crucial for human experience and thought, as Lakoff and Johnson argue, and our concepts are almost without exception metaphorical, than the concepts we use when watching representations created through new technology are informed by old technology. In other words, the “new” cannot be understood in any other way than in terms of the “old”. This argument is easily transposed to the realm of cognitive science; the unfamiliar can only be grasped by using the cognitive frames that are already in place.

The fact that the new cannot be understood in any other terms than those of the old allows for a rereading of Shklovsky’s statement that “the new arrives unnoticed” (qtd. in Gunning, “Re-newing Old Technologies” 44). Conceptually, the new can only be understood by comparison to the old due to the metaphorical nature of concepts and as a result, the impact of the new cannot be fully grasped immediately after its introduction. This might explain why 3-D cinema is commonly understood as a technological reconfiguration of cinema and not as a new medium, despite the fact that they do not share one fundamental characteristic—the flatness of 2-D cinema’s surface versus the depth of field of 3- D cinema. Obviously, the fact that 2-D cinema also created the illusion of three- dimensionality helps bridge the gap between these two forms of cinema.

Therefore, the potentially revolutionary impact of 3-D cinema might not have

surfaced just yet.

Chapter 2 J.S.Burgers

24 Ostranenie

In order to understand how the introduction of a new media technology might complicate our conceptual engagement with representations the concept of defamiliarization might be invoked. Defamiliarization—or ostranenie—

designates the process of making the familiar strange through technique (Shklovsky, “Art as Technique” 17-23). This connection between technique and defamiliarization has first been recognized by Viktor Shklovsky as early as 1913.

As one of the pioneers of Russian Formalism, Shklovsky’s work provided the theoretical framework which could clarify the connection between technique and art (Van den Oever, “Ostranenie” 33-34). Techniques, Shklovsky’s argument goes, are able to defamiliarize the familiar; in effect making us look at the known anew. “We do not experience the commonplace, we do not see it; rather, we recognize it” (Shklovsky, The Resurrection of the Word). Shklovsky’s observation on the difference between experiencing and recognizing remains highly relevant in the era of cognitive film studies. The two designate different degrees of attentiveness which is not only relevant for the perception of art but also for the perception of media (which is not to say that art and media are necessarily a dichotomy). Shklovsky points to the fact that techniques can be deployed to complicate perception, forcing us to experience a familiar object in an unfamiliar way (“Art as Technique” 12-22). Not surprisingly, these observations—although highly influential—do not include an elaboration on the cognitive processes of the mind which can explain the defamiliarizing power of techniques. Sensitivities can do just that.

Sensitivity designates the capacity to be defamiliarized by a specific

stimulus. The connection between conceptual experience and sensitivities is of

vital importance in order to explain the defamiliarizing effects that techniques

might have. As the information stored in the individual’s cognitive frames must

come from experience—and new techniques may generate new experiences—our

25 cognitive frames may struggle to handle these new experiences effortlessly, depending on how radically different they are compared to previous experiences.

Therefore, sensitivities are not “created” but are a result of the status quo of conceptual experience. They only surface when this status quo is disrupted, as it is when techniques are used to create new, previously non-existing experiences. In such an instance, the concepts used in everyday life may prove insufficient to instantly make sense of the perceived. If our concepts do in fact prove insufficient, we are sensitive and will experience defamiliarization when exposed to the new stimulus.

Shklovsky was interested in how techniques could be used to defamiliarized the familiar. In other words, he recognized that through the deployment of techniques the everyday perceptual experience of familiar objects could be influenced. As a result of defamiliarization, we perceive aspects of these familiar everyday objects that previously were unnoticed. In Shklovsky’s words,

“art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony (“Art as Technique” 12). Shklovsky’s argument can easily be adopted as an explanatory framework that illuminates the difference between unmediated stimuli (everyday perception) and mediated stimuli (as possible complicated perception through technique). His notion of ostranenie explains how a qualitatively different perception of everyday objects can be realized through the intervention of technique.

We can distinguish two major differences between mediated perception

and non-mediated perception; one concerns the formal characteristics of

representations, the other the cultural and physical context in which these

representations function. Concerning the latter, “[m]ediated stimuli—by

definition—are perceived in a different context in which they occur” (Bradley

218). The physical context has its influence on the perception of a stimulus. This

context itself can be the object of the perceiver’s attention. In film studies, the

socio-cultural and physical context in which a representation is perceived is

Chapter 2 J.S.Burgers

26 referred to as the dispositif (Kessler, “The Cinema of Attractions as Dispositif”

59). Since the argument presented in this essay relies heavily on the characteristics of the cognitive architecture, the cultural context in which 3-D cinema is perceived is highly relevant since cultural exposure is reflected in the audience’s cognitive frames and concepts. Since the relevance of the cultural context is engrained in the argument on sensitivities which has been explicated in the first chapter, it seems redundant to do so again. At this point, the first major difference between mediated and non-mediated stimuli—the formal characteristics of representations—deserves more attention.

Two Types of Defamiliarization (Technical and Technological Defamiliarization)

Reverting back to Shklovsky’s “Art as Technique” for a moment, the translation of his pivotal concept “ostranenie” as “making strange” (Van den Oever,

“Ostranenie” 34-35) aptly illustrates a distinction between defamiliarization in art

and defamiliarization as a result from the introduction of new technology. This

translation suggests the vital importance of agency; it suggests the presence of an

acting agent who deploys those techniques that technology allows it to deploy, be

it in an artful manner. As Shklovsky himself writes, “[t]he technique of art is to

make objects “unfamiliar,” to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and

length of perception” (“Art as Technique” 18) (my emphasis). Since Shklovsky’s

manifesto was concerned with art it comes as no surprise that he did not extend

his argument to include the unintentional effects which the introduction of new

media technologies bring about. However, as media-sensitivity can be observed

every time a technological innovation is introduced, the impact of technology

alone should not be underestimated. Avatar might not seem to be the best example

to argue in favor of unintentional defamiliarizing effects of new technology since

it clearly intentionally exploits these effects. Since much of the screen time is

dedicated to the presentation of fantastic beings and surroundings, it is clear that

27 Avatar has been created with this defamiliarizing capacity in mind. However, in terms of agency, Avatar’s defamiliarizing capacity is not primarily achieved through an innovative use of familiar devices but predominantly through the deployment of new technology.

I propose a distinction between defamiliarization as brought about by technique and as brought about by technology. Technique refers to the deployment of technology in a particular way. Defamiliarization by technique can be achieved by deploying familiar techniques in an unfamiliar (or unconventional) way (Kessler, “Ostranenie, Innovation, and Media History” 71). This type of defamiliarization does not require new technologies in order to be realized.

Hence, the techniques of cinema consist of the deployment of the technologies available at a specific historical moment—be it in a conventional or non- conventional way. Art cinema is concerned with sensitivity since audiences will respond differently to the unfamiliar and unconventional as opposed to the familiar and conventional. The focal point of this paper is however not on defamiliarization by technique but rather on medium-sensitivity; that is, on the audience’s sensitivity to the new perceptual input generated by new technologies.

The impact of artistic techniques and the technology that comes with a new medium “may be analyzed, regardless of the fact whether triggered intentionally by an artist or accidentally by a new technology” (Van den Oever, Ostrannenie 56). Clearly, medium-sensitivity is concerned with the unintentional defamiliarizing effects that new technologies might bring about.

Distinguishing between techniques and technologies reveals a fundamental difference between two ‘forms’ or ‘levels’ of defamiliarization. As Kessler writes,

“defamiliarization can take a variety of shapes” (“Ostranenie” 73). New

technologies can defamiliarize by changing the formal characteristics of

representations and by making completely new techniques possible whereas old

technologies can defamiliarize by deploying unconventional techniques. Hence,

defamiliarization works on two distinct levels; on the one hand, the familiarity of

Chapter 2 J.S.Burgers

28 technology can be disrupted by deploying it unconventionally, on the other hand, representations can be defamiliarizing due to unfamiliarity with the technological means that made them possible. This is why sensitivity to 3-D technology is referred to as medium-sensitivity and not as sensitivity to artistic techniques. By relying on new technological means instead of a reallocation of familiar technology, 3-D cinema can be considered a technological reconfiguration of 2-D cinema which causes the sensation of defamiliarization. Therefore, Avatar is not typically considered art cinema. It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between technique and technology since new technology might facilitate new techniques.

Hence, it might prove difficult to determine if defamiliarization is a result of technology or technique. However, Avatar shows that defamiliarization can occur through technological means alone; it does not feature techniques that are wholly unprecedented since it deploys classical editing conventions. Even though 3-D technology is exploited in Avatar, the film’s fundamental defamiliarizing effects are not due to an acting agent.

To illustrate the difference between defamiliarization due to medium- sensitivity and defamiliarization due to the unconventional use of familiar techniques the example of Pierrot le Fou might be invoked. This film contains a sequence that, in terms of the conventional practice of continuity editing, deviates from the norm. This sequence is ordered in a non-linear way; that is, the separate shots making up the scene are not ordered chronologically (Bordwell Narration in the Fiction Film 318-320). With regard to the usage of technology, the non-linear scene in Pierrot le Fou is created using the same technology as are the rest of the scenes in the film. What makes this scene different from the others is the use of familiar technology in a non-familiar way, which has a defamiliarizing effect.

Notice the structural difference between defamiliarization in Pierrot le Fou and

defamiliarization due to sensitivity to 3-D technology. The leading example in

this work has been Avatar, a film that rigidly follows the Hollywood practice of

continuity editing. As such, it deploys techniques that are familiar to audiences