Effectively Controlling a Public Private Partnership and Creating Value for Money

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Effectively Controlling a Public Private Partnership and

Creating Value for Money

Author: Andreas J. Nederhoed Student number: S1921460

Email address: a.j.nederhoed1@student.rug.nl University University of Groningen

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Master of Science in Business Administration

Specialization Organizational and Management Control Supervision: First supervisor: Dr. E. P. Jansen

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1 INTRODUCTION

Public private partnerships (PPPs) are a more common appearance in recent years as public organizations that enter into relationships with private partners in order to benefit ‘through harnessing the economies of the private sector’ (Bing and Akintoye, 2003). Although PPP have become a common appearance, high failure rates are reported in the literature (Johnston and Gudergan, 2007; Klijn and Teisman, 2003) and there is a need for control associated with the use of private partner consortia in a public sector environment (Torres and Pina, 2001).

One of the first PPP projects in the Netherlands by the Government Building Agency (Rijksgebouwendienst, RGD) is the Kempkensberg. The Kempkensberg is the construction of public housing for the Dutch Tax Administration and the Service Execution Education. The RGD sees the Kempkensberg as a successful project; the objectives that were set in advance of the project were achieved or exceeded. During the selection stage the quality level of the project concept was higher than the output specification stated by the RGD. During the building stage the project concept with the higher quality level was executed and within the time schedule. During the operating stage there is a low level of reductions given to the private party, based on the cooperation between the

partners. The Kempkensberg is based on a partnership and evolved into a true partnership in the operating stage.

The project concept of PPP is based on the idea that if a private partner is responsible for different risks and activities during different stages, goal congruence between the partners is created. The public party tries to create a long-term view with the private party, the objective is that the private party will act based on this long-term view. The responsibility of risks and future activities has the advantage that during construction the private party thinks ahead of activities that will occur in the future, achieving quality improving or cost reducing for the project. The quality improvement or cost reduction objective is called value for money which is the main objective for a PPP that is based on the cost saving of the public administration through harnessing ‘the economies of the private sector’.

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3 maintenance and facilitating services, for example the security, cleaning or canteen. The terminating stage includes transferring the activities to the public partner and ending the partnership.

1.1 Relevance of thesis

The main objective for entering into relationships with private partners is to create value for money (VFM). VFM is a higher quality level for the same price level or a lower price level for the same quality level. The justification for choosing PPP is that this approach creates more VFM (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011). Empirical evidence that supports the creation of VFM based on the PPP model is relatively scarce (Shaoul 2005; Reeves and Ryan 2007; McQuaid and Scherrer 2010). On the contrary, a growing body of literature reveals that many PPPs have not achieved the expected VFM objective (Edwards and Shaoul 2003; Pollitt 2002). For a PPP not achieving the expected VFM objective, controlling risk is associated as a factor causing this failure (Edwards and Shaoul 2003; Jin and Doloi 2008).

A PPP could achieve VFM by introducing a management control system (MCS) to address goal incongruence (Clifton and Duffield 2006; Smyth and Edkins 2007) as MCS could help direct, motivate and monitor behaviors (Merchant and van der Stede 2007). Because of the nature of PPP

arrangements, a mix of controls may have to be used to influence the behavior of the partners involved. The type and degree of use of these controls would vary across different stages of a PPP project depending on the nature of the potential risk associated with those stages. A number of studies have highlighted the need for effective management of risks in PPPs (Broadbent et al. 2008; Hood and Mcgarvey 2002) and the use of MCS for that purpose (Smyth and Edkins 2007. However hardly any analysis has been undertaken so far of the use of MCS of a PPP that created VFM.

1.2 Research Question

The Kempkensberg is based on the PPP method for creating the highest level of VFM. The

Kempkensberg is at this moment in the operating stage what will continue for more than eighteen years; only the VFM that is created at this moment can be analyzed. Currently during the selection, build and operate stage value for money is achieved. The mix of controls that are used are effective to control the private party. Based on the three components of a PPP: partnership, control and value for money the main research question is:

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1.3 Problem and method outlined

Where a growing body of literature reveals that many PPPs have not been achieving the expected VFM objective. At the Kempkensberg the public party is effectively controlled by a mix of controls resulting in the creation of VFM. The public funding for the project is a fixed amount leaving the private parties competing over the level of quality. During the selection stage the relation between the partners was based on power where the public party dominated, the project concept of the private party was higher than the output specification. During the build stage the project concept was of a higher level was executed and the construction was finished within the schedule. During the operating stage there was a high level of contact between employees that have a high level of understanding facilitating services. There is high level of understanding and negotiation are more based on performance than on the contract this results is a low level of reductions given to the private party and the cost of control are minimized.

The Kempkensberg is for the housing of education service execution and tax administration and based on an integrated contract DBFMO (abbreviation for design, build, finance, maintenance and operate) used for the construction and operating of buildings. A DBFMO contract is often established for public housing function. At central government level there are at this moment only four completed projects meaning that these are in the operating stage. Eight potential projects that are in the orientation stage of potentially becoming a DBFMO contract (PPS projects huisvesting). Operate are the facilitating services in the building, general operating services are cleaning, canteen and security.

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Figure 1: research objectives and possible biases from research methodology

1.4 Structure thesis

This paper tries to examine effective use of controls and creating value for money in a PPP. The PPP is characterized based on an integrated contract for the life cycle of infrastructure and utility and is labeled DBFMO. First the theoretical framework is established based on an introduction of PPP, what the advantages are of PPP. After the introduction of PPP management control mechanism are outlined based on the framework of Ouchi (1979), whose views have been widely adopted in organizational theory. After the theoretical framework the research method is establish, here the methodological considerations, selection research element and research instruments are outlined. Subsequently the case Kempkensberg is introduced and analyzed in the fifth section, based on the four areas of the sub-questions, value for money, market, bureaucratic and market control. Finally the conclusions and recommendations are formed based on the research question and the answers for the four sub-questions.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

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6 organized relation (IOR), focusing on management control systems in PPP categorized by market, bureaucratic and clan control.

2.1 Introducing PPP

Starting partnerships is of all times, even partnerships between a public and a private organization can be found from the golden century on. In the Netherlands one famous PPP was the ´Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie’ (VOC), in 1602 the VOC was an example of a public private partnerships. The city of Amsterdam anticipated for more than fifty percent of the risk-bearing capital with the establishment of the VOC. The VOC was also directly involved by the design of the city. The

Amsterdam town hall the was finished in 1662, was a symbol of the Amsterdam Exchange Bank and the civic room (burgerzaal) the partnership between government and private organizations for prosperity in the city.

PPP originated from New Public Management (NPM) based on more market and less government. NPM is not a practice it is a scientific movement behind the thought of a more businesslike government. Reforms from traditional public administration to NPM first emerged in the Netherlands in the late 1980s. Hood (1995) compared the traditional and the modern

government, and formulated characteristics that are typical NPM movement: the orientation for performance and performance indication, decentralization of responsibilities (like in contract management), promote competition and the orientation of the private sector as guideline. With the changing public administration to a more businesslike orientation, the government departments and organization in the Netherlands started systematically adapting models of management similar to those used in the private sector. Based on the more businesslike methods used in the public

administration also the premises changed. More freedom for the decentralize manager, more a focus on output and less on input, the usage of product budgets, more initiatives of civil servant to achieve get better results and more efficiency. The different concepts that are all part of NPM went over the entire world; NPM is in fact a global concept (Commons 1998).

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7 purpose of achieving a common outcome, which previously cannot be reached by any party alone (Akintoye et al, 2003).

PPP is widely used and can have different activities and features. There is no precise and widely accepted definition of PPP and the concept of PPP is still contested, the use of PPP is often ambiguously or is loosely defined. PPP is in debate, the arguments are about the definition, reason and existence is still in debate. A high number of definitions can be found for PPP, most of them stress different aspects of PPP as they derived from different context and represent different point of view (Hodge and Greve 2007).

There are some common agreements in most PPP literature which focus on

inter-organizational arrangements. First, PPP is cooperation between organizations. The second aspect is sharing risks. Risk sharing is viewed as an important incentive for both the public and private sectors, since it is assumed that risk sharing could benefit both actors. The third prospect is that these types of that no single organization either the public or the private could produce better alone. Finally, it has been noted that in a PPP a partnership involves a longer-term commitment which can continue for a number of years, e.g. 10 to 30 years. The definition by van Ham and Koppenjan (2001, 598) is seen as the most complete picture for this thesis, ‘cooperation of some sort of durability between

public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services, and share risks, costs, and resources which are connected with these products’.

The primary objective of any contract and therefore for a PPP is risk allocation between the parties. A method dominantly used in the construction literate for the allocation of risk “The Abrahamson principles” (Mead, 2007). The principle allocates risk based on who is best able in managing the risk what is based on five guidelines. The first is the risk is for the party that can control the risk. The second the party can transfer the risk (e.g. through insurance) and is economically beneficial to deal with the risk. the third the controlling party has the economic benefit of controlling the risk, placing the risk upon the party in question is in the interest of efficiency (e.g. including planning, incentive and innovation efficiency). Finally when the risk occurs the loss falls on that party that is responsible for that risk.

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8 incomplete because not all possible contingencies can be dealt with at the time the parties enter into the contract, especially because of the long term of a PPP contract (Quick, 2003).

Because a PPP contract uses the economies of the private sector a PPP project are arguably more efficient than standard government procurement, this is based on the risks that are transferred to the private partner who have the expertise such as design and construction. The private party is better able to handle these risks better than the public sector (Quick, 2003). The allocation of risk has to be based on the Abrahamson principle for creating VFM. The following section will focus on the Dutch PPP literature, especially the DBFM(O) contract.

2.1.1 The DBFM(O) contract

In the Dutch public administration literature the forms of public private partnership (PPP) have been reduced into two main types of PPP, the concession model and the alliance model (van Ham and Koppenjan, 2002: 23; Bult-Spiering et. al., 2005: 55; Eversdijk and Korsten, 2009: 25). The alliance model is cooperation between public and private parties where generally a joint venture is created. The alliance model is a used by integrated areal development and an important character is that both public and private actor are closely related from the start to the finish. An example is that both parties participate in a joint venture that is made for the project. The project characterizes often by complex content and the agreements that are made are known as intention and cooperation agreements. Both actors contribute to the parties and share the risks. This type of PPP will not be studied in this thesis.

The second type of PPP is the ‘concession model’. In PPP as a concession the public client buys a service. Here PPP is seen as a form of tender or contracting-out. The service exists from the availability of a product for a certain time and a certain capacity. The service is obtained through granting a concession: the concession holder finances the service. The control is with the public sector: the client. The risks are for the private party. Added value in PPP as a concession lies in innovation and quality of product and process, the life-cycle approach, the transfer of risks and efficiency in terms of gain of time and cost savings. Examples of PPP as a concession are:

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9 DBFM(O) contracts are characterized by an integration of different disciplines from the value chain and finance as an additional element. Finance is in standard government procurement a public matter, with DBFMO contract financing of the project is a private matter. DBFMO is one contract between public and private parties, where the private party is active as one consortium. The differences with standard government procurement are that instead of different contracts with different private companies, the different construction disciplines are combined in one contract. The government does not buy an object or project with a DBFM(O), but pays for the service provided (Kenniscentrum, 2003:4). Within the utility of the public sector the service exists out of the availability of that office an example is if in the contract is mentioned that an office space needs a nice temperature to work, the building is cleaned properly and there is security for the building. The service provided with a DBFMO must meet functional demands where with standard government procurement it was based on product demands. The performance of the private party is measured based on working environment of the employees of the public party.

With a DBFM(O) there is private financing and public funding (Ruding, 2008: Eversdijk and Korsten, 2009). Financing refers to the source of financial resources, public funding refers to who eventually pays the costs of investment (Ruding, 2008). In the case of standard government procurement funding of projects was public financed and public funding. An important aspect of DBFM(O) is the principle of transferring risk between public principal and private agent. In standard government procurement ‘all contract risks are for the public principal with the ‘exception of’, with DBFM(O) the risk are for the party that is best capable of managing risk (Leathy, 2005; Everdijk and Korsten, 2009). The role of a project financier or banker is a new aspect in the partnership between the public principal and private agent. The duration of the DBFM(O) contract is longer than the standard government procurement; in the Netherlands the duration of the contracts vary between 15 to 30 years. The length of a contract dependent on the availability, the yield and repayment of private capital.

The DBFMO contract also contains some disadvantages over the standard government procurement, especially in the start of the project. In a DBFMO contract there are higher transaction costs for the public party (Ruding, 2008). The preparation of the long tender procedure and the arrangements of the DBFM(O) have a high legal and financial complexity (Minister V&W, 2005). Another disadvantage is the long tenderprocedure (Kerr, 2006) in comparison with a standard government procurement procedure. This causes the private party have a longer period to actively have tender teams what increases the transaction costs (Knibbe, 2002).

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10 the relation between the public and private partner stays hierarchal. With both forms of contract there is an agent principle relation and not an equal partnership. The second similarity is that the public party keeps the directing role and the private party still has the executing role. Choosing the most appropriate private party is in both contracts based on competitive bidding, competitive bidding is the best means of securing value for money (Leahy, 2005). DBFM(O) is an integrated contract with all the parties with private financing, risks are for the party that is best capable of managing risk and the duration of the contract vary between 15 and 30 years. In the following section the main objective of PPP, value for money, is outlined.

2.1.2 Creating value for money within a PPP

In the previous section DBFMO contract is outlined, in the following section the advantages for DBFMO are outlined and the creation of VFM based on these advantages. Although a DBFMO starts with additional transaction cost the partnership can result in a better, less expensive and faster public administration based on DBFM(O) (Voortgangsrapportage DBFM(O)). The government wants to be delivering high service with less involvement. With innovative contracting fewer personnel are needed (Min. V&W, 2004). By giving the private parties a bigger role in the design, build,

maintenance and/or operate of projects, there is a possibility for the private party to apply more innovation and creativity. In figure 2 is shown how value is created in a DBFMO contract based on the higher transaction cost, the private party have a role in the different stages what causes cost

reductions in the built and exploitation stage and the value of the risk of the public partner.

Figure 2: Cost structure of DBFMO and standard government procurement (Source: RGD)

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11 government procurement the main objective does not change it is creating value for money. The choice for PPP or standard government procurement should be simple and is based on creating the highest possible VFM. However in practice the value for money objective is very difficult to measure at ex ante, some factor are forcing towards standard government procurement and other factors force towards PPPs. VFM includes both qualitative and quantitative aspects and typically involves an element of judgment on the part of government. A broad measurement of VFM is possible, but a precise measure does not exist.

For comparing VFM between standard government procurement and DBFMO contract, there are in general five reasons in the literature for the usage of DBFM(O) contract (Eversdijk and Korsten, 2009). The first advantage is value for money based on efficiency because of lifecycle optimizing. By combining multiple constructions disciplines in one contract, the private consortium is better able to use its creativity and innovative thinking over the complete lifecycle of the building and not the only stage that private company is active in. For the private consortium there is an optimal balance between the cost efficiency that is made in the design, build and maintenance and/or operating stage. This is distinctive for the standard government procurement form of contracting where the private parties separately execute the activity that is asked without searching for efficiency within the lifecycle of the project.

The second advantage is less fragmentation for the public party there is only contact with the consortium. In the standard government procurement different private parties were responsible for different activities within different stages. The responsibility after the activity is minimal and the public party became then responsible. With a DBFMO contract there is one private contact point and that is the consortium that is responsible for the entire lifecycle. This integral approach makes the public principal doesn’t bear the risk that falls between separate contracts for design, build, and maintenance and operate. There are different private parties that are active in the consortium; they are jointly responsible in the consortium. The risk that falls between separate contracts is

responsibility of the consortium.

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12 The fourth advantage is the finance part in the DBFM(O) because banks are involved for financing there is a stricter policy for the private consortium. The financiers in the project is expected to give positive effect on the control of costs (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003) because they are in the consortium and communicate with the other private partners to search for an optimal efficiency between investment cost and maintenance costs and the risk during the building and maintenance/operate stage. The banks want the private consortium to repay the loan; therefore the discipline of banks is involved. Although the government is a certain distance and leaves the

government sees the banks an ally that functions as controlling the consortium.

The fifth and last advantage that DBFM(O) is developed on time or faster than originally planned (Commission Ruding 2008a: 35). If DBFM(O) is the reason for the construction within the planning isn’t empirically tested. A shorter developed time than planned can be expected, because the faster building in finished, the faster the construction can be used means extra income based on availability and the private consortium can pay off the loan of the banker or project financier. The service exists from the availability of a product for a certain time and a certain capacity. Based on the theory there are in general five advantages for the use of DBFMO contract, these advantages are the quantitative and qualitative advantages for using the DBFMO contract. Based on the five advantages from the literature for the usage of DBFMO the VFM can be determined. The first sub-question:

based on the advantages of PPP is value for money created by the public partner at the DBFMO project Kempkensberg?

2.2 Management control mechanisms

In the previous section PPP and the five reasons for using DBFMO and the creation of VFM are introduced. In this section subsequently management control mechanism are outlined, where the first section control is introduced. In latter section subsequently controls are specified based the different mechanism formed by Ouchi (1979) based on market, bureaucratic and clan mechanism. First market control mechanism where the focus lay on the power relation between the partners. Second bureaucratic control where the focus is based on effective control. The third is clan mechanism where the focus lay on the different usage of control by different employees.

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13 determine and influence what the private partner will do. Level of control is the direct outcome of the controlling process, the degree to which one believes that proper behavior of the other partner is ensured. Merchant (1984) stated that “good control means that an informed person can be

reasonably confident that no major, unpleasant surprises will occur”. Control mechanisms are assigned to help achieve an adequate level of control, by establishing proper control mechanisms reaching the partnerships objectives becomes more predictable. The purpose of control is to

influence behaviors in accordance with expectations so that the objectives of the partnership can be reached. Control mechanism can be used to routinize the activities of the partner, like cleaning, security and canteen activities or promote non-routine activities such as risk managing, innovation and collaborate (Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Schroeder, 1994). Control is used in a partnership to control the partner and makes reaching the objectives of the partnerships more predictable, this ensures more certain outcomes. More certain outcomes based on effective control helps to generate a sense of controlling the outcomes for the partnership (Das and Teng, 1998).

A useful classification of the mechanism of control is the distinction between formal and informal control mechanisms (Smith, Carrol and Ashford, 1995). Formal control consists of a

contractual obligations and formal organizational mechanisms for cooperation and can be subdivided into outcome and behavior control mechanism. Informal control also referred to as social control and relational governance, relates to informal cultures and system influencing partners and is essentially base on mechanism inducing self-regulation (Ouchi, 1979).

The choice for a formal control is based on two task characteristics task programmability (or knowledge of the transformation process) and output measurability (Eisenhardt 1985). Task

programmability refers to the knowledge of the degree to which the partner understands the transformation process that are taken place. Output measurability refers to the ability to measure the output in a precise and objective manner (Das and Teng, 2001). The two control modes are seen as fundamental, based on the literature for the existing both traditional organizations and inter-organizational relationships (IORs) ( Appuhami, Perera & Perera 2011; Das and Teng, 2001; Ouchi, 1979; Dekker, 2003).

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14 with certainty and be measured precisely. Outcome based control are expected to minimize

performance risk, they are based on the clear identification of performance measurement standards. Behavioral control is based on the task programmability, for behavioral control the task programmability needs to be high. The public partner needs a relatively clear understanding of the behavior necessary to undertake specific tasks. In addition the public partner needs to be able to determine the relevant activities and processes from the more ‘simple routine to the more complex behavior’ (Challagalla and Shervani 1997: 160). Behavioral control tries to minimize the relational risk and is applied if there is clear understanding of the behavior that is needed for a specific task, and uses the pre-determined standards to control the behavior. Behavioral control is less effective if the public partner has limited information about the behavior of the private partner.

When partners of a IOR have a trust-based relationship , the risk of opportunistically

behavior (relational risk) by the private partner is minimized and react to changing circumstances by focusing on the goals (minimizing performance risks). The question is if trust is a control instrument and active in the transactional relation be installed. Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2000 Nooteboom et al., 1997; Zaheer en Venkatraman, 1995; Adler, 2001; Das en Teng, 2001 argue that there is an important role for trust in the relation. Chiles and McMackin (1996) argue that economic importance of trust as is there is a higher or lower level of trust; the parties will calculate the risk of incorrect information and the positive effect on the level of transaction costs. Trust can be based on rules, regulations or values in the institutional area of the transaction relation. But can be created in a specific transactional relation by active negotiating of the partners, basically parties can invest in trust (Sako, 1992). Trust leads to expectation that the other party will honor the contract. These moral values will be transmitted to individuals by processes of socialization and education is at the basis of the selection stage for transactional relation (Durkheim, 1947).

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15 theory (Eisenhardt 1985; Dekker 2004; Das and Teng 2001). In the following sections the focus lay on Ouchi’s framework.

2.2.1 Market control mechanism in a public private partnership (PPP)

In the previous section a distinction is made between formal and informal control now based on the different mechanism formed by Ouchi (1979) based on market, bureaucratic and clan mechanism. First market control mechanism is outlined. With the market mechanism, the partners are

autonomous and price is the principal carrier of information. Using a pure market mechanism isn’t possible for a PPP, because a PPP implies a continued interaction between two specific partners and additional information than can’t be fitted into the price (Cäker, 2008). The problem with market mechanism is that price cannot include all the information needed (Langfield-Smith, 2003). Additional information is often required for a PPP to “create trust and check on the state of the relationship” (Dekker, 2004) ”coordination of task” and “management appropriation concern”. The cooperation between partner’s makes it possible to create higher value in their exchange and the additional created value can be shared (Dekker, 2003).

With a partnership the market mechanism is for the public partner after the selection of the private partner to some extend restricted. Market mechanism can still be of relative high importance for the coordination process for two reasons. First is that it can act as a threat for the partnership, when the results aren’t met by the private partner and this information is transparent the pubic partner will only fund the made results (Cäker, 2008). Secondly, the coordination process can be influence in a subtle way. The inter-organizational relationship is influenced by the market setting and the power relations between the partners. An example is that because of the current market conditions for construction companies tenders are issued below the cost price what can have price advantages for the public partner. The public partner can pressure the potential builders for a DBFMO project for changing conditions or price reductions. The public party can claim a mayor part of the VFM created by the changing conditions or demanding a lower price (Frances & Garnsey 1996).

How market mechanism influences a PPP relationship could be expected to be related to the market setting and the power-relations between the actors. In a DBFMO contract the private party finances the project and the public funding starts only when the building is in operating stage. The private party almost completely finance the selection and build stage and face a risk of losing investment that are made when the public partner chooses to use its dominant position for price reduction or changing conditions (Baiman and Rajan, 2002). The private party risks losing

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16 Dekker (2003) stated that trust is an important element to avoid cooperation being restricted by fear of dominating actors misappropriating their position within the relationship. Dekker claims that dominated actors need to trust that value will be distributed fairly in order to involve them in inter-organizational control. Dominating partners consider their reputation in the market and are therefore are not taking short-term advantage of their position. Solely reliance on trust in the relationship between partnerships, exposing to risk of losing relation-specific investments is debated by Bachmann (2001) and Cäker (2008). Asset specific investment must be made by the dominated partner in order to establish or continue the relationship between partners. The dominating partner has the power to enforce the relationship, since the dominated partner is interested in keeping the partnership. Bachmann (2001, p 350) states “Trust works on the basis of positive assumptions about alter ego’s willingness and ability to co-operate, while power is constitutively based on the selection of a negative hypothetical possibility regarding alter ego’s (re)actions“. Based on power and trust the dominated partner is capable in understanding there partner and choosing whether to be in a relationship or not. Power set in the partner relation can be seen as enabling the relationship (Seal, Berry and Cullen, 2004). The dominant partner takes on a managerial role in the relationship based on the power over there dominated partner.

Both power and trust are interesting aspects because of their potential to enable a

relationship between partners. A relationship based on trust can be preferred due to partners will to engage in cooperative and efficiency seeking activities and creating value for money. A relationship based on power can be characterized by dominated partner doing what they need to do in order to keep the relationship, and can cause the dominated actor to gain knowledge and competiveness. Although trust can be preferred, it is on the other hand a more fragile basis for a relationship than power, Bachmann (2001) state that the influence of trust has to be studied more critically any lack of trust will be a problematizing situation. If the dominated partner start suspecting changes of

conditions of price reductions, trust may be lost and the relationship will be in crisis. In a power-based relationship, the dominated partner can expect that information that is given to the partner can be used for changing conditions or price reductions. In this scenario there is no rust lost in the relation and the relation is not in a crisis. Power can also be lost in a relationship because of changing conditions or the stop of fearing sanctions from dominant partners, the loss of power wouldn’t harm the relationship as hard as the loss of trust because of the emotional factor isn’t present in a

relationship based on power (Bachmann, 2001). Trust and power are part of every relationship, and need to be considered in order to understand the relation between the partners in a PPP.

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17 is clearly present based on the competitions between the private parties, to the other stages when the contract is signed and relation becomes bilateral. Based on the two types of relation between partners the second sub question: how are the market controls design at the Kempkensberg and is

the relation based on power or trust during the different stages.

2.2.2 Bureaucratic control mechanism in a public private partnership (PPP)

The bureaucratic mechanisms are based upon standard to which managed partners should conform to (Ouchi, 1979). These standards are either how activities should be carried out or the outcome of those activities. The coordination of relation with a PPP is labeled as a horizontal relation (source), where the focus lay on how the activities should be performed. Dekker (2003) states that when there is a partner that dominates the relationship, the stronger actor decides the agenda for the PPP relationship and deciding which bureaucratic mechanism should be employed.

A public partner wants to decide the agenda for the PPP relationship and the bureaucratic mechanism that should be employed to effectively minimize the behavior of the private partner that is not in the best interest of the partnership. By effectively controlling the partner the public party tries to increase efficiency and/or to exert cost pressure on the private party and creating value for money (Frances & Garnsey 1996). A dominant partner is therefore pressuring to a strong

bureaucratic approach to management, what Vosselman (2002, 135) stated as “The emphasis will be on pre-action reviews and action accountability controls using detailed qualitative and quantitative information”. That is different than the traditional, financial accounting, that tries to “consider the organization function by function in a hierarchical manner” (Otley, 1994, p. 294). In the traditional role of financial accounting there is a low level of information processing (Merchant & Stede, 2007). The horizontal focus leads to additional complexity and as consequence cost to the managing process.

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18 accounting is decisive who is inside a network and who is not. Rejecting accounting can be rejecting a relationship. This claim is important for setting where the dominant partner tries to protect a

position within a relationship.

The dominating partner often seeks to engage in partnership control that implicates a need for in-depth information of the organizations in the partnership. It appears to be a highly complex task that a dominant partner seeks to perform. This functional reasoning about complexity may point at an incentive for partners to reduce inter-organizational control. In a PPP bureaucratic control is viewed as more that supporting cost-pressure or search for efficiency. Bureaucratic mechanism “renegotiation‟ of the relationship in itself or to leave the relationship. Therefore the third

sub-question is: How are the bureaucratic controls designed for supporting effective control.

2.2.3 Clan control mechanism in a public private partnership (PPP)

There are transactions, activities and behaviors that cannot be controlled effectively by either market or bureaucratic control mechanism. Market control is less effective when there is a high level of uncertainty or asset specificity (Willamson, 1979). A DBFMO contract is known as complex and for a long period, therefore it can be difficult for public parties to specify measurable performance (Bloomfield 2006).

When there are high levels of uncertainty the PPP may fail to comply with pre-determined plans, time schedules, activities and budgets, which are considered as important components of the bureaucratic control mechanism. When market and bureaucratic control provide limited assistance in addressing risks caused by various contingent factors, for control the PPP needs the clan control. In the literature is stated that when asset specific and uncertainty are high, clan control can successfully manage human behavioral risks (Spekle 2001; van der Meer-Kooistra). When there is a low level of task programmability and output measurability the need for clan control also arises (Ouchi, 1979). Clan control is also capable for organizations where parties have to work closely together, such as inter-organizational relationship (IOR) (Das and Teng, 2001). In clan control trust is the main control strategy (Adler, 2001) and it emerges from values and norms developed by clan control (Sako 1992; Ouchi 1980). The parties that participate in transaction can develop trust by acknowledging and understand the moral standards based on ‘socialization and education’ van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000; 57). The literature suggests that in a PPP the public party is known for the usage of clan control (Broadbent; 2003).

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19 Grönlund (1988) show how employees take responsibility and are willing to account for other with whom they interact, actively seeking information in order to solve the task at hand. Often employees take up responsibility for their actions and have commitments towards others without the formal enforcing of this behavior (Willmott, 1996).

An interesting article that is the article of Donada and Nogatchewsky’s (2006) who argue that different employees within an organization perform with different type of control. They performed a case study based on three companies where the purchaser relied on market power and the operative managers moderate this by relying on social, informal coordination. There is a possibility that social coordination mechanism enables flexibility in the coordination processes and depends on the type of employees in a partnership. Different stages in a PPP mean different employees that corresponds and coordination toward each other. The fourth sub-question is: How is the use of clan control

influenced by different employees that correspond and coordinate during the different stages of the Kempkensberg?

3 RESEARCH METHOD

In this section first the case is introduced, second the methodological considerations where the type of research and why the case is selected. Third the selection research elements where is shown that there are two types of interviewed, for the case Kempkensberg and for understanding the process of PPP. Finally the research instruments are introduced where the link of the interview questions and the theoretical framework is outlined.

3.1 Kempkensberg

The case that is selected is the Kempkensberg in Groningen and is one of the first major office projects in the Netherlands based on PPP. It provides design, construction, financing, maintenance and operation in a package for a period of twenty year. The contract is known as a DBFMO (Design, Build, Finance, Maintain and Operate) where a single private party provides these different services. The public party exists of Dienst Uitvoerende Onderwijs and the Belastingdienst who are the users of the building and the Rijksgebouwendienst who is the owner of the building and responsible for the building process. In 2005 and 2006 studies were done over the possible adverse effects of

construction to its environment. The announcement of the project was made public in accordance with European rules on September 20, 2006. From the applications that were received after the announcement five private parties were selected on December 19 2006. In the summer of 2007 with a further selection three parties remained. In late August 2007, three building designs were

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20 award the contract went to DUO². The DUO² exist of Strukton that develops, builds and manages large-scale infrastructure projects, construction company Ballast Nedam and investor John Laing.

3.2 Methodological considerations

This research is a descriptive and exploratory case study, which is less suitable for conclusions to be drawn. Exploratory studies can, however, provide valuable new insights, and due to the fact that the central research question (with relevant constructs) is not yet known, conducting an

exploration first is more feasible than immediately drawing conclusions. Furthermore, according to Eisenhardt (1989), opportunities may rise during the exploration to conduct a cross-literature or cross-case study, which may provide even a better chance of gaining new insights (e.g. from constructs not yet associated with each other). Literature will be used to assess MCS in a PPP and describing the importance.

There are three interesting reasons for choosing for the Kempkensberg as a case study for this thesis. The first reason is that the Kempkensberg is one of the three pilot DBFMO projects of the RGD. Because it is one of the first projects the first conclusions can be drawn based on the

Kempkensberg. The second reason for choosing the Kempkensberg is that the decision makers during the different stages were accessible for in depth interviews. The final reason for choosing the

Kempkensberg is that of the three projects the Kempkensberg is known by RGD as a successful project where value for money is created Final the Kempkensberg is a DBFMO project that is known as a success where the potential of creating value for money is high.

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3.3 Selection research elements

For general information about DBFMO contract interviews are held with two employees of the DBFM/PPS, namely the director PPP unit Rijkswaterstaat and senior advisor PPP unit. Of the

PPSsupport three interviews with two senior advisors and the director. In-depth interviews are held to analyze the situation of the Kempkensberg. The first interview was with the senior project

developer of the public party. Who was a decision maker during the design and build stage and is still active for the Kempkensberg during the operate stage. This interview was an open interview

analyzing the entire process and establishing situation that are interesting in the field of

management control. The second interview was with the exploitation manager of DUO² who was active in the build and operate stage. The exploitation manager was responsible for the maintenance activities during the build stage and is during the operating stage responsible for the maintenance and facility activities in the Kempkensberg. The third interview was with the facility manager of the public party who is responsible for the facilitating services during the operating stage. The fourth interview was with the project director who was responsible during the selection stage for DUO². The fifth interview was with the same senior project developer of the public party of the first interview.

3.4 Research instruments

The questionnaires for in depth interview are established based on the literature. The questionnaire contains four types of questions based on the literature. The first type questions about the potential of value for money for the Kempkensberg based on the five advantages. The second type of

questions is based on market based control what type of relation is established and is this relation based on power or trust. The third type of questions are based on bureaucratic control, how are the formal controls designed. The fourth type of questions is based on how clan control is used and who is active during the different stages. The complete questionnaire can be found in appendix 3. The interviews are recorded and transcribing than sent to every interviewed to respond within two week if they agreed on the content and wanted any changes.

4 THE CASE KEMKENSBERG

In the following section the case Kempkensberg is analyzed based on the theoretical framework. The VFM in the case Kempkensberg is analyzed, after analyzing VFM the three control mechanisms are analyzed market, bureaucratic and control.

4.1 Value for money

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22 a higher level of value for money is created by using the DBFMO method instead of the standard government procurement can be answered for the selection, build and start of the operating stage. Based on the theory there are five advantages for the DBFMO method that can cause a higher level of value for money. In the following section the first sub-question is answered.

The first advantage is optimizing of the lifecycle of the building and creating value for money based on efficiency. In the case of the Kempkensberg the DBMFO contract has duration of twenty years, containing conditions for construction, like building and maintenance, but also additional activities like facilitating services and financing. During the different stages there are two parties the private and public that are interdependence towards each other. Because of the long term of the relationship the private party receives an incentive for a higher level of efficiency over all the stages combined. In the standard government procurement the private party receives an incentive for efficiency for the process they have to produce. For the construction company efficiency is received based on efficient construction, this can cause additional cost in other stages. In the DBFMO method the private party is responsible for all stages and if efficiency is created in one stage that negatively influences other stages, these additional costs are for the private party. The carpet in the

Kempkensberg is made of recycled car tires and this needs an intensive level of cleaning based on the output specifications. In the standard government procurement the public party would be responsible for the cleaning now the private party is responsible for cleaning and the carpet causes for additional costs. Because of the high level of cleaning the private party is at this moment negotiating new carpet and trying to reduce the fines for the time the rooms are unavailable. (Exploitation manger and project manager)

In the Kempkensberg an example of additional cost for the DUO² is “DUO² will need to find long lasting solution for the carpet on the first two floors, and this will eventually mean a new carpet on the first two floors” Project manager RGD. DUO² is responsible for choosing the carpet, installing and cleaning, cleaning is very time consuming and DUO² has to choose between installing a new type of carpet and cleaning intensively, both creating additional cost for DUO². The public party is not responsibility it doesn’t create additional cost, they are only interested that the carpet looks clean. In

the Kempkensberg building the private party is responsible for the energy usage of the employees of the public party. The private party has invested high amounts to develop an energy saving,

environment friendly is an important factor for the public party (project manager, exploitation manager).

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23 different stages during the selection stage creates a project concept that contains creative solutions that are still easily implemented and thought over for all the different stages of the Kempkensberg. The private actors needs to create the project concept of the entire life cycle; this causes the DBFMO contract to have higher tender cost and more negations are needed at the start of the project. For

the Kemkensberg the walkways in the building, location of the canteen, work plan and employment plan were negotiated during the selection stage with the private party. The private party needed to create innovations that were efficient over the entire lifecycle (project manager).

With the standard government procurement the public party contracted different private parties for different activities. Causing the private party to be responsible for only the activity they had to execute. All these parties need to be contracted, monitored and controlled for doing the activities that were stated in the contract. There were many parties and there was a high level of parties and a high level of fragmentation. With a DBFMO contract the private party contracts different parties to do the different activities. For the public party contracting, monitoring and controlling one party is more efficient. There is no fragmentation of activities the responsibilities are for one party and the public party only communicates with this responsible partners.

An advantage for the public party is that with the DBFMO method financing is the

responsibility of the private partner. The financiers in the project is expected to give positive effect on the control of costs (Flyvbjerg,Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003).The private financer is part of the DUO² and they performed additional monitoring if the objectives that are contracted are kept. The financer communicates with the other private partners to search for efficiency between investment cost and maintenance costs and the different risks during the building and

maintenance/operate stage. The Kempkensberg is financed by a private financer; there was a private actor that was the construction of the building. At the end of the selection stage the financer

performed due diligence on the project concept that was developed by the DUO². The financer is risk averse and wants to minimize the risks. “The driving force in the project to keep it within the

proposed planning came not from the public party but from the financer. When the Kempkensberg would be delayed the public funding would be delayed until the building was operational. The public party former offices were still operational, so a delay would be a problem for the public partner” (exploitation manager).

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24 operational, and therefore the repayment of the consortium to the financer also starts at 14 March. If the planning was delayed the private consortium had to finance the repayment on the reserves. The construction was finished on the day the exact of the planning, on time at 14 March 2011. “The

pressure to finish construction within the time schedule came from the financer, for the public party the time schedule was less important, the payment for the public party only started when the building was ready” (exploitation manager).

The advantages that are mentioned in the literature are all established in the Kempkensberg. The first advantage is the VFM objective due to the efficiency based because the private party is

responsible for the constructing the building and maintenance of the building. The second advantage is the that there is no fragmentation, DUO²is responsible for the different stages and is therefore better able to use creative and innovative thinking over the complete lifecycle of the building and is responsible for elaborations of their ideas example: carpet. DUO² is responsible for the different stages the third advantage is the optimal risk distribution between the partners. The distribution of risk is based on the level on who of the parties is better able of managing risks. The fourth advantage is based on the private financing, this causes that there is a financer that is monitoring the

performance of the private party. The fifth advantage is the construction is developed on time or faster than originally planned. With the Kempkensberg the construction of the building was on time. In addition the “Project leader of the RGD said for the used public funding of the Kempkensberg, this construction wasn’t possible with the standard government procurement” (project manager). Based on the above mentioned advantages for using the DBFMO contract VFM is created for the

Kempkensberg.

4.2 Control mechanisms during the different stages

The MCS during the stages of the DBFMO contract used by the public partner exist of three

mechanism of control namely, market, bureaucratic and clan. The stages between the parties contain of the selecting, building and operating stage. The Kemkensberg is currently in the operate stage and therefore the termination stage isn’t included in this chapter.

4.2.1 Market control mechanism

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25 Selection stage

During the selection stage (see appendix 1) three private parties developed a complete tender, the dominating public partner set the guidelines and the dominated private party competes against each other for receiving the project. During the selection stage there is a need for competition causing the private parties to develop a high quality project concept based on the output specifications and the fixed public funding. Competition is one of the best market mechanisms to create value for money (Smyth, 1997). The public party can demand conditions and when a private party underperforms there are other private parties developing a project concept.

For the private party there are high costs for developing the project concept because the concept is for a twenty-year period. When more than three parties are participating high cost for the private parties occur with a lower change of receiving the project for the private party. The risks increases that private parties withdraw and the public party needed to keep contact with multiple parties causing additional control costs for the public partner. The tender of the different private parties are compared based on conceptual scope, guidelines and output specifications. There is room to develop their own ideas; an example is that a project concept of architect is different of every party. On the other hand the public funding is fixed, causing the comparability to be based on the quality level of the project concept.

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26 Build stage

When the building stage starts (see appendix 1) the public partner has chosen DUO² as the private partner. During the selection stage the tender procedure is like a market, the dominant public party making their demands known and the dominated private party developing project concepts based on these demands. The private party is the dominated party and has performed at the objectives of the pubic party. Based on these demands choosing the best project concept for the Kempkensberg. In the build stage the relation changes to a bilateral relationship between the public partner and DUO². The interdependence between the partners increases; this causes the power of the public party to decrease. The relation between the partners was based on a dominated private party and a dominating public party.

“During the selection stage of the team of employees active for the private party the objective was receiving the project……. during the build stage the team of employees changed and the objective changed to minimize the cost for their organization”. The conditions in the contract were set in an environment where competition was active. The power relation changed causing the private party to have a more dominant position. Although the DBFMO contract is signed and agreed between the parties, based on bounded rationality the contract is incomplete leaving room for opportunistic behavior (Willamson, 1979). During the Kempkensberg there was a high need for controlling the behavior of the private party during the build stage. The relation was based on power, but power of the dominating public party decreases by the dissolving of competition.

Operating stage

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27 needs to be measureable easily. During the operational stage some activities can be measured, while others are very difficult to measure. This makes the BOM mechanism effective for some activities where for other activities negotiations between the partners are needed. “A PPP relation is constantly negotiating, negotiating and negotiating” (facility manager). Although there is still a bilateral relation, DUO² execute during the build stage activities that are depending. There is intensive contact between the partners and for some activities output is difficult to measure. The output specifications are incomplete for solving this gap. This causes that agreements are more based on negotiations that are based on the incomplete contracts.

The public party is during the operating stage the dominant power, based on the contract that was signed during the selection stage. The output of the private party is for sometimes more difficult to measure, this causes negotiation between the partners. Power is insufficient because of the operational activities, the high level of contact and the constant negations. There is more intensive contact and negations between the parties and trust is becoming a more dominant force. 4.2.2 Bureaucratic control mechanism

It is interesting now after the market control outlined how during the different stages of the partnership the relationship between the partners influences the bureaucratic control mechanism. The bureaucratic mechanism and the effect of the type of employees during the different stages. Is bureaucratic control needed during the selection stage where market control seems a dominant force? In other stages after the contract is signed the relation becomes bilateral where an increase of bureaucratic control may be needed. In the following section the second sub-question is answered for the different stages.

The bureaucratic mechanism forced by dominating partners is likely to be interpreted by the dominated party reviewing their potential meaning to the relationship. This has implications on the processes that are initiated by working with the bureaucratic mechanism that are introduced and the processes of trying to change or disregard them. Rejecting accounting can be rejecting a relationship. This claim is important for setting where the dominant partner tries to protect a position within a relationship. In a PPP bureaucratic control is viewed as more that supporting cost-pressure or search for efficiency. Bureaucratic mechanism “renegotiation‟ of the relationship in itself or to leave the relationship. In this section the third sub-question is answered.

Selection

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28 projects. Based on the portfolio the private parties were reduced from five to three private parties. After the portfolio there are two dialogue rounds where the project concepts of the private parties are discussed. “Not all aspects of the project could be communicated by output specification therefore there were two dialogue round to align the thoughts and ideas” project manager. One aspect of the conditions of the public party was that the public funding was fixed.

The structure of the selection stage was designed by the public party. During the selection stage the bureaucratic control is focused on the outcome of the portfolio and the project concept of the Kempkensberg in different stages. There is competition between the private parties this causes that the portfolios and project concepts can be compared. Because bureaucratic control is based on output there is only contact when the portfolio is analyzed or when a new or more detailed project concept is presented. Another aspect is that the financer approves the project concept. The financer performs due diligence helps the public party to ensure that the private party can be held on the contract. When the private party does not perform as agreed in the contract the private party will reduce funding causing risks for the financer.

The private party needed to create a final project concept where the public funding wasn’t above the fixed public funding. Because there was a fixed price the private parties were only able to compete on the performance level of the project concept. One of the private parties had developed a project concept where the public funding was higher than the fixed amount. “That private party thought every final offer of the private parties would be above the fixed price” Project manager. This party was rejected based on the demands that the public funding would be higher.

Build

During the build stage the relation changes in a bilateral relationship between the partners. Because of the changing relationship between the partners there is a higher possibility of opportunism (Hardt, 2009). “Builders have a short term view and go to a project to finish it and then go to another

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29 public party. Delay had less impact for the public party than for the financer, they wanted no delay because than the first interest payment and repayment of the loan would be delayed or the payment would be forming the private partner’s reserves.

The performance evaluation was based on the staged delivery of the Kempkensberg; errors that occurred could be prevented during the following construction activities. “with the stage delivery monitoring wasn’t based on checking if every aspect of the building was present, but based on the output specifications, is it possible for an employee to work here comfortable, questions were asked like are their enough sockets to work here comfortable.” Project manager.

Operate

During the operate stage there is frequent contact between the partners “There is daily contract

between the employees of the public and private party. There is weekly contact between the

exploitation manager and facility manager resolving disputes unresolved at operational level” facility manager. Because of the high level of contact, the frequent negotiations over daily activities control

became more informal. The bureaucratic mechanism is based on the BOM mechanism (appendix 2) the BOM mechanism is based on the output specification. All activities that the DUO² performs are based on output specification during the operating stage. The activities DUO² performs some the output is more easily measured than other activities. The output of cleaning or canteen activities can be found in the feedback that is given by the users of the building. The security is more difficult to measure based on output, making output specification more difficult to use.

4.2.3 Clan control mechanism

Finally it is interesting how during the different stages of the partnership the informal relationship between the partners evolves. Especially what the influence is of functions of both parties and how these negotiate towards each other. There is a possibility that social coordination mechanism enables flexibility in the coordination processes and depends on the type of employees in a

partnership. A different stage in a PPP means different employees that corresponds and coordination toward each other. In this section the fourth sub-question is answered.

Selection stage

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30 Build stage

With the DUO² as partner the build stage started, the relation became a bilateral relation where the partnership was formed. At the DUO² consortium another team of employees took over the

negotiation with the public party. The DUO² consortium went from a situation where they were competing with other private parties for the contract to executing the terms that were agreed on in an environment of competition. The best and final offer (BAFO) contained aspects that were of a higher quality level than was required based on the output specifications. In the build stage the DUO² wanted to build based on the output specification and the public party based on the BAFO. The private party tried to reduce the project concept to the quality level of the output specifications “Builders have a short term view and go to a project to finish it and then go to another project, don’t feeling related to the project….. Construction activities are on a tight schedule causing the builders to have very little time for negotiations” exploitation manager. The public party reacted toward this behavior with tight bureaucratic control shown by the reporting structure, payment mechanism, performance evaluation, and dispute resolution. The reporting structure is that these private party needs to update the public party monthly on the progress that is made in comparison with the planning. This caused goal incongruence between the parties, and a high possibility of opportunistic behavior. During the build stage the level of trust between the partners was low based on goal incongruence.

The DUO² was responsible for the service plan, monitoring plan and security plan. During the previous stages many resources are invested for the partnership in jointly creating of the service plan, monitoring plan and security plan. From the start there were employees of the public party active in the creation of these plans. These plans are made by both parties and therefore more accepted by both parties.

Operate

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31 important than performing in line with the contract creating shared believes. “In other PPP of the RGD the entire facilitating services are outsourced as a result the public party has no facility

manager. The exploitation manager of the private party negotiates with the contract manager of the public party. Negotiation is more based on the contract than on the facilitating performance of private partner”. In other projects there are many disputes because of the different views these employees have and the incomplete aspects of the contract.

Most of the activities during the operating stage are outsourced by DUO²; they are still responsible for the performance for the activities that are executed. Contracts of 20 year aren’t normal for the other parties, and therefore these contracts are for a shorter period. The parties that are contracted to execute the activities based on the output specification have a more traditional view for the activities that have to be exploited. It is difficult to transfer the agreements between the DUO² the other private parties. The BOM mechanism is a result-based system, where operate activities like canteen activities and cleaning are more based on a traditional view. An example with cleaning activities is that traditionally is the times the room needs to be cleaned, with the BOM system result is important, and therefore the focus is the level of cleanness.

During the operate stage the contact between is intensive and the performance of the private party is control based on negations between the partners. There is a decreasing power distance in comparison with the standard government procurement. The contract is still important but the performance is based on the facilitating and maintenance services and not on the aspects.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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32 Especially where one PPP created VFM and the other project didn’t create VFM may provide new insights.

The Kempkensberg is based on the PPP method for creating the highest level of VFM. The Kempkensberg is at this moment in the operating stage what will continue for more than eighteen years, only the ex post VFM that is created can be analyzed. Currently during the selection, build and operate stage value for money is achieved. The economies of the private sector were successfully harnessed for the Kempkensberg project. The mixes of controls that are used are effective to control the private party and minimize behavioral risk. Based on the three components of a PPP: partnership, control and value for money the main research question is: How can the private partner in a public

private partnership (PPP) are effectively controlled to realize value for money (VFM)?

Important for the case the Kempkensberg is that VFM is created during the different stages and can be analyzed. The advantages that are mentioned in the literature are all established in the Kempkensberg. The first advantage is the VFM objective due to the efficiency based because the private party is responsible for the constructing the building and maintenance of the building. The second advantage is the that there is no fragmentation, DUO² is responsible for the different stages and is therefore better able to use creative and innovative thinking over the complete lifecycle of the building and is responsible for elaborations of DUO² ideas. The third advantage is the optimal risk distribution between the partners. The distribution of risk is based on the level on who of the parties is better able of managing risks. The fourth advantage is based on the private financing, this causes that there is a financer that is monitoring the performance of the private party. The fifth advantage is the construction is developed on time or faster than originally planned. With the Kempkensberg the construction of the building was on time. In addition the “Project leader of the RGD said for the used public funding of the Kempkensberg, this construction wasn’t possible with the standard government procurement method” (project manager). Based on the above mentioned advantages for using the DBFMO contract VFM is created for the Kempkensberg.

Effectively Controlling a Public Private Partnership and Creating Value for Money