The history of international relations is fraught with encounters and correspondences between individuals to discuss the state of affairs within and between their respective countries. First accounts of what would only be defined as ‘diplomacy’ thousands of years later, can be found from as early on as the 14th century BC in Egypt. Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, written in the 8th century BC, bear traces of Greek diplomacy. In the 12th century, Byzantium sent out first professional diplomats and in the 15th century the first embassies were set up by Italian city-states during the Renaissance.1 Evidently diplomacy has been applied consistently and in all corners of the world through the ages and thereby become an essential component of international politics. In the process, much like the countries that practiced it, diplomacy has been in flux. Whilst it was often the prerogative of those educated to exercise it, modern diplomats, politicians have not shied away from using it as a means to their ends. That is not to say that foreign policy was once, or ever, made solely by diplomats, but rather that politicians have discovered diplomacy as an effective strategy for themselves.

There has emerged a trend of heads of states forging personal relationships with those of other nations, both of enmity and of amity. The friendships between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, as well as the consultations between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan - though arguably more tense - for example, have spurred the title of a Special Relationship between their nations. Though perhaps most prominent in the British-American alliance, these personal contacts were by no means limited to their bilateral ties. John F. Kennedy won African support during the Cold War, amongst other things by having unusually cordial meetings and inviting leaders like Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré to spend time with his family.2 His successor Lyndon Johnson met repeatedly with Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos in order to successfully put an end to the Chamizal dispute.3 All of these were instances of what can be called ‘personal diplomacy’.

1_{Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Diplomacy.” Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009.}

2_{Philip Muehlenbeck, “Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 19} (2008).

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Theoretical Background

Personal diplomacy is defined as a type of diplomacy conducted largely in private “by means of direct human contact … by those who are not diplomatic agents … but whose personal standing ensures that they will be heard. A head of state … may engage in such activity”.4 The motivation behind its use is to avoid involving the public in foreign policy-making, as “engaging the public raises the stakes, creating public demand that may be unpredictable over time, and may have small payoffs in terms of national security or electoral favor”.5 Personal diplomacy is therefore different from ‘public diplomacy’, which as its name suggests takes place in the open and is aimed at foreign publics, rather than one’s own national population, and has therefore been likened to propaganda (though there exist various, and at times, contradictory definitions of the term).6_{Of course, though the}

two types differ in their nature and stand in opposition, one does not exclude the other. A president may choose to apply whichever he considers more fitting case by case. To appeal to a public may at times not be feasible, while personal contact may have the desired effect, and vice versa. Alternatively, it is possible to use both types of diplomacy simultaneously. Indeed, historically presidents have typically used a combination to achieve their goals.

While the occurrence of personal diplomacy has been acknowledged by academia, it has thus far been treated foremost in singular cases, rather than as a perpetual theme. Thus, there exist scattered historical works on instances in which especially American presidents are believed to have used personal diplomacy, as mentioned above, but not a single one devoted to the phenomenon itself. It has not been conceptualized or been treated as a deliberate strategy. However, as the circumstances and manners in which personal diplomacy can be said to have taken place indicate that it is not incidental, the aim of this thesis shall be to demonstrate that it is in fact a foreign policy methodthat has been applied fairly consistently in transatlantic relations and thereby become a standard practice.

4_{Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, s.v. “Personal Diplomacy,” Basingstoke: Palgrave} Macmillan, 2012.

5_{Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha, Encyclopedia of Political Communication (Thousand Oaks:} Sage, 2008): 633.

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As indicated, few have treated personal diplomacy as a recurring, or ongoing, phenomenon. In the field of diplomatic studies, professor at the University of Maryland Elmer Plischke does acknowledge its existence as such, though he devotes far more attention to ‘summit diplomacy’. As its title implies, summit diplomacy regards only the encounter of politicians in the scope of a conference and is therefore limited to a few, predominantly public, meetings between individuals. As Plischke remarks about its longevity however, “it is erroneous to maintain that personal diplomacy at the summit and ministerial levels is a new phenomenon … (there is a) remarkable resurgence since the 1930s”.7 Furthermore, he considers personal diplomacy somewhat of an extension of summit diplomacy, in arguing that the former “has been broadened in scope and currently encompasses … personal presidential communications, the use of presidential personal representatives or special agents, visits of world leaders to the United States, presidential visits and tours abroad”.8 The question of which came first deserves an entire debate of its own, but what transpires from Plischke’s analysis is that the two are closely interlinked and that summit diplomacy is essentially a form of personal diplomacy. Having said that, there is an argument to be made that summit diplomacy may also be linked to public diplomacy due to its publicity. Jan Melissen of the Clingendael Institute characterizes the ambiguous nature of summit diplomacy, by pointing out that “focusing on the physical meeting without much reference to the wider diplomatic context does tend to reinforce the cliché of the summit as an example of improvised diplomacy,”9 when in reality there are text writers, rehearsals and many other preparations involved. He also specifies that the reporting media impacts on the event as “diplomacy at the highest level thrives in the limelight (and) involves an important element of drama”.10 This suggests that meetings at the summit, as they are essentially staged, may be less indicative of personal relationships than could be assumed.

7_{Elmer Plischke, “American Ambassadors – An Obsolete Species? Some Alternatives to Traditional} Diplomatic Representation,” World Affairs 147 (1984): 5.

8_{Elmer Plischke, Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans (Washington: American Enterprise Institute} for Public Policy Research, 1979): 69.

9_{Jan Melissen, Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age: Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (The Hague:} Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2003): 7.

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Academic literature on summit diplomacy will certainly be taken into consideration, though it will be treated with caution and as one element of its encompassing superior, personal diplomacy. To focus only on summit diplomacy would be to magnify what is in most interpersonal relations a minor factor, meetings during conferences, and to overlook personal correspondences and one-on-one visits, which are arguably more important in the making of a personal relationship. Oddly enough, there exists more literature on summit diplomacy than on the broader phenomenon of personal diplomacy, perhaps due to its visibility and prominence in the news (see the G8 summits). As it sheds light on specific events, it will be contemplated where individuals’ meetings in the setting of a conference were instrumental in their friendship or possibly, enmity.

Whereas personal diplomacy is largely overlooked in the fields of study in which you would expect to find references to it, namely political science, international relations and diplomatic studies, some attention has been devoted to this topic in the field of political psychology (though it draws on some of the other fields). As the name suggests, political psychology analyses political behavior (both of politicians and the people in general) from a psychological point of view, with the main goal of understanding the motivations behind individual and group decision-making. Political scientists Margaret and Charles Hermann for example focus on different presidents’ ‘leadership style’11 and contributor to Foreign Affairs Lloyd Etheredge analyses the emotional base of their policy decisions.12 Theirs and their colleagues’ research thus focuses foremost on personality traits and how they impact on politicians’ policies, but some attention has nonetheless also been devoted to the idea that interpersonal influence may well do the same. Naturally, their emphasis on single politicians requires an interpretation of politics in which individual actors matter and thereby they distance themselves from the realist school of international relations, according to which states are the most important actors and ones who operate with a unitary voice. This may give rise to criticism.

11_{Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann, “Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: an empirical} inquiry,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989).

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Firstly, political psychologists’ focus on individuals could be interpreted as approval of, and alignment with, the Great Man Theory. Popularized in the 19th century by Scottish writer Thomas Carlyle, its supporters claim that history is predominantly made by ‘great men’. Although political psychologists indeed contend that “explanations of many consequential historical events give considerable weight to the role of individual political leaders” and that therefore “who leads matters”,13 they distance themselves from the Great Man Theory.14 The purpose of their research is not to explain political realities entirely through the involvement of individuals nor do they consider it the decisive factor. Rather, they seek to contribute one element to the larger analysis of political processes. As Jack Levy, Professor at Rutgers University, specifies in the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, “individual-level psychological variables cannot by themselves provide a logically complete explanation of foreign policy, which is a state-level dependent variable. Psychological variables must be integrated into a broader theory of foreign policy that incorporates state-level causal variables and that explains how the preferences, beliefs, and judgments of the leading decision-maker (along with those of other key actors) get aggregated into a foreign policy decision for the state”.15

Secondly, as Professor Dumbrell of Durham University points out with regards to personal relations between British prime ministers and American presidents, “concentration on personal relations … risks over-simplifying a complex web of interests and multi-layered connections … Prevailing interpretations of international politics emphasize power considerations and national advantage, rather than personal relationships”.16 True as this may be, he himself goes on to argue, that “the fact that the study of leader relations is notoriously susceptible to sentimentalism and over-simplification is not, in itself, a reason for abandoning it”.17

13_{David Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford:} Oxford University Press, 2003).

14_{Jeanne Knutson, ed., Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973): 208.} 15_{David Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford:} Oxford University Press, 2003).

16_{John Dumbrell, “Personal Diplomacy: Relations between prime ministers and presidents,” in}

Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (New York:

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The same caution shall be applied in this thesis. Though the focus lies on personal relationships and their potential impact on politicians’ policies, this should by no means be understood as an attempt to explain the history of transatlantic relations solely through personal ties. Rather, it is assumed at the outset that an examination of politicians’ personal diplomacy can contribute to the understanding of historical events. However minor it may be, the personal diplomacy factor remains noteworthy.

Methodology

Bertram Raven, Professor at UCLA and contributor to Political Psychology, explicitly backs the idea that interpersonal relations between politicians have an influence on policy outcomes. As he argues, “there have undoubtedly been many major political events which have hinged on the successful or unsuccessful attempts of one major political figure to influence another”.18 In collaboration with John French, Professor at the University of Michigan, he established the so-called ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’, in which social influence is defined as “a change in the belief, attitude or behavior of a person (the target of influence) which results from the action, or presence of another person (the influencing agent).19 The power applied to achieve such an outcome can be divided into different strands of social power, namely informational, coercive, reward, legitimate, expert and referent power.

Informational power occurs when the influencing agent uses information (for example intelligence reports) or logical argument in order to influence his target. Naturally, in order for informational power to be effective, its target must be open to alternative positions and accept the other’s arguments. It is unlikely to work on a stubborn partner. Coercive power involves the threat of punishment and can thus only be effective if the target of influence is under the impression that the announced threat is likely to be carried out. Its use also risks alienating the target, as he or she may develop negative feelings towards the influencing agent. As implied, reward power takes place where the target is promised some type of perk in turn for their compliance. It should be noted that although

18_{Bertram Raven, “Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power,”}

Political Psychology 11 (1990): 494.

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“we usually think of coercion and reward power in terms of tangible rewards and real physical threats, we should recognize that the possibility of personal approval from someone whom we like, can provide considerable coercive power”.20 Legitimate power is exercised when the agent reminds the target of his or her obligation to comply with his demands. Expert power is based on the target’s assumption, whether correct or not, that the agent ‘knows best’ due to having superior knowledge or more experience regarding a specific issue. Referent power is based on the agent’s appeal to a sense of mutual identity with his target. That is to say that he will seek to emphasize their similarities in order to create a bond. Out of these types of power, especially coercive, reward and referent power are likely to be relevant to this research, as they are the least antagonizing exercises of influence.

In the analyses of personal relationships to follow, Raven and French’s model can be applied to seek out which type of power individuals have applied, or at least attempted to, in their personal relations with others. The underlying premise of this research is thus that politicians do apply some strategy in their meetings. That is not to say however that the modus operandi is to approach a partner with the conscious agenda of exerting particular types of power. Presumably, politicians do not think: “I will apply informational power”. Personal diplomacy does however entail meeting with others with the specific aim of having altered their viewpoint by the end of the encounter, by pointing out information the other may have been unaware of. Such meetings are not random, instead they are planned in advance and both participants enter the dialogue with a goal in mind.

Besides pointing out the applied types of power, the analysis of interpersonal relationships will also be framed in the historical political context. A personal relationship between senior politicians is of course largely dependent on their countries’ bilateral relations. In the case studies to follow, these will therefore constitute a starting point and thereby provide the necessary background knowledge to understand the potential impact the personal relationship may have had on the evolution of their respective countries’

20_{Bertram Raven, “Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power,”}

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foreign policies towards each other. Thus, when analyzing the selected pairs, the procedure shall be to briefly describe the political context in which the personal ties between two individuals formed, the evolution of their relationship itself, including where applicable the exercise of power as defined in the Power/Interaction Model and lastly, the impact thereof on their respective countries’ bilateral relations.

Case Studies

In order to demonstrate the validity of said model as well as the usage of personal diplomacy in foreign policy making, it will be necessary to examine in detail the historical personal relationships pertaining to one bilateral political partnership. For obvious reasons, it would be impossible to attempt tracing the use of personal diplomacy in world history in the scope of a thesis. Equally, the standard practice of personal diplomacy can best be proven to exist by examining historical instances between the same two countries throughout. For this reason, the case study of this thesis shall be the German-American relationship since the end of the Second World War. While much has been written about the Special Relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the personal relationships amongst their representatives, far less has been said about those within the German-American relationship. Besides expanding on the topic of personal diplomacy, this research thus also has the potential to improve the understanding of the historical bilateral ties between these countries.

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An examination of these relationships requires the use of different kinds of sources. Next to the general literature on German-American relations, which will provide the historical context, the bibliography will further include in-depth descriptions of specific events or individual pairs, as well as personal correspondences. Where available, these will be offered as evidence of a couple’s contact and relationship. Predictably, more correspondences will be accessible for the personal relationships that date back more years, due to having meanwhile been published as well as having been the standard means of communication. As of late, the exchange of letters for example has become less prominent and therefore may not be available in the examination of recent personal relationships. Adding to this, biographies and autobiographies will be used as they bear the potential of reporting on what went on ‘behind closed doors’. They are however prone to flaws and will therefore be treated with caution. Especially autobiographies are inherently biased and thus “offer a special kind of biographical truth: a life, reshaped by recollection, with all of recollection’s conscious and unconscious omissions and distortions”.21 This implies that the information contained therein may be flawed, making it an unreliable source. However, as long as there is an awareness of this possible deficiency, it is nonetheless possible to include this genre of literature and to draw from it only that information that is deemed historically accurate and otherwise verifiable. Sentiments expressed here may also be included, as these emphasize feelings of enmity or amity, provided that they are consistent. In the first case study for example, the relationship between German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Adenauer’s elaborate memoirs have proven to be an essential source for the analysis of their personal as well as their nations’ bilateral relations.

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Pioneers of the Alliance: Konrad Adenauer & John Foster Dulles

The end of the Second World War was closely followed by the onset of the Cold War, a long-lasting conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs, led by the United States and the Soviet Union. While the world around them was ideologically divided, former Nazi Germany was itself de facto split. Out of four parts became two when in 1949 the allies France, the United Kingdom and the United States combined their three parts to found the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) or simply West Germany, while the USSR made their section the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), otherwise called East Germany. It was within this historical context that Konrad Adenauer and John Foster Dulles came to cooperate, amongst other things to discuss West Germany’s reconstruction, rearmament and European integration.

Adenauer and Dulles met prior to Germany’s East-West division in 1947 at the World Church Congress held in Amsterdam. Given that it took place at a summit, their first encounter was so brief only to allow for a superficial evaluation of the other. Nevertheless, Dulles, then serving as republican presidential candidate Dewey’s foreign policy advisor, evidently made an impression, as Adenauer later stated about this meeting that he came away from it sensing that his new acquaintance would one day play an important role in US foreign policy-making.22 He was not mistaken. Six years later, Dulles became the secretary of state of the Eisenhower administration. Meanwhile, Adenauer had himself become the first chancellor of the newly founded Bundesrepublik.

Before their second encounter in these new capacities, Adenauer, who had also had a good relationship with Dulles’ predecessor Dean Acheson of the Truman administration, mentioned his concern over the change of government.23 Due to his mediation of the Treaty of San Francisco (1951) between Japan and the Allied Forces, he perceived Dulles to be far more interested in Asia than Europe. Nevertheless, the chancellor of West Germany expressed his interest and openness to working together with the new secretary of state. In fact, prior to meeting the man himself, he met with Dulles’ younger sister Eleanor, who was

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working at the State Department of German Affairs. She recalls the chancellor’s curiosity about her brother John in her memoir.24 He also gained some idea about Dulles’ character through their mutual friend and later fellow founding father of the EU Jean Monnet, who had been friends with the American since meeting him in Paris in 1919. Arguably Adenauer thus approached Dulles differently than he might have done otherwise. That is to say, having been given a positive attitude towards Dulles by his friends and especially Monnet, whom he incidentally credits with having contributed to ensuring that their relationship got off to a good start,25 their first meetings were bound to be friendly in nature. Once these initial encounters also made them aware of their many similarities, in particular in their ways of thinking, nothing stood in the way of a personal friendship. As they soon discovered and historians have since considered the foundation for their friendship, what connected the two was especially their devotion to Christian values. They both founded their political doing on their beliefs: The catholic Adenauer and founder of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) “saw in Christianity one of several bases for the union of Europe”26 just as the protestant Dulles, the son of a Presbyterian minister who was known to quote the bible in his press conferences saw in religion an organization with the ability to “cut across national boundaries”.27 Thus, they shared an understanding of religion in terms of its practical utility. Beyond that, they were both ardent opponents of communism (so much so that Dulles found containment to be too weak a policy and promoted ‘roll-back’) and totalitarianism (Adenauer had in fact briefly been imprisoned during the Nazi regime).28 They were also supporters of Westbindung, a deepening of West German-American ties.29 Indeed, given Adenauer’s atlanticism and Dulles’ emotional attachment to Germany, stemming amongst other things from his father’s accounts of his studies in Göttingen, his travels to the country and “his admiration for Germany’s centuries

24_{Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and their secret world war (New York:} Times Books, 2013): 154.

25_{Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 161.}

26_{Frederick Marks, Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (Westport: Praeger, 1995): 121.} 27_{Idem, 122.}

28_{Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier} Verlag, 1993): 145.

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of achievement and the rigor of its social order”,30 it was only a logical conclusion that the two should seek a closer a cooperation between their respective countries. Not only did they agree on the BRD’s positioning towards the United States, but also about its future within Europe. Following in Acheson’s footsteps, Dulles advocated for a political reorganization of Western Europe in the form of a commonwealth,31 in which the Bundesrepublik was to play an important part. For this reason, like Adenauer, he too saw the necessity to restore a strong position for West Germany, if only for the sake of European integration. Of course, to argue that their resemblance (which incidentally further applies to their character as both were known to be stubborn yet flexible if their tactics required it and possessed extraordinary willpower)32_{by itself accounts for their good}

relationship and fruitful collaboration would be a simplistic statement to make. However, their mutual understanding did allow for open and immensely honest talks and made sure that they often saw eye to eye. Not only in their personal lives but also in their political negotiations, they almost always agreed with each other. Naturally, as is common in any friendship, they did need some time to get used to one another (as well as their political roles) and arrive at a state of mutual trust. This can be said to have taken place in the early years of John Foster Dulles’ tenure.

Shortly after becoming secretary of state in 1953, Dulles travelled to Bonn to meet Adenauer. On this occasion, Adenauer perceived his visitor to be withdrawn and very serious,33 quite unlike Acheson who had a more informal style. From then on, the two warmed to each other. Later in the same year, Adenauer went on his first trip to the USA, which came to be regarded as an essential milestone in the reconciliation of West Germany and America. Besides pushing for the BRD to be given a larger role in international affairs in his personal discussions with Eisenhower (for example in Korea), Adenauer used the occasion to initiate negotiations for a German-American trade and shipping contract with Dulles. But most of all, the two worked together on the European Defense Community. The

31_{Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 86.}

32_{Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier} Verlag, 1993): 146.

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EDC was a project initiated in 1950 by French prime minister at the time René Pleven that aimed to create a European-wide military made up of national groups. It was to include Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Ideally, it would at once contribute to European integration and keep German militarism in check. Adenauer and Dulles, both proponents of the EDC, exerted great pressure on France to ratify the treaty and closely cooperated on this. Initially, they communicated through US ambassador to West Germany James Bryant Conant but found him to be inept in his professional role and thus Adenauer “repeatedly bypassed the high commissioner’s office and dealt directly with Dulles”34 or met him in person. In fact, Dulles and Eisenhower later chose to replace Conant a mere three days after Adenauer had requested this.35_{Despite their efforts, the}

EDC failed to reach ratification in France due to fears that it would threaten its national sovereignty and rebuild a German military, however limited it would have been. Nevertheless, their endeavors were not entirely in vain. They were themselves the sign of growing mutual trust and essential in that very growth. In fact, when France announced its ‘no’ on the 30th of August 1954, Dulles came to Adenauer’s aid knowing that the flop had put the chancellor in a precarious position domestically and with his neighbors alike. To do so, Dulles held a speech the following day stating: “the Western nations now owe it to the Federal Republic of Germany to do quickly all that lies in their power to restore sovereignty … It would be unconscionable if the failure to realize the EDC through no fault of Germany’s should now be used as an excuse for penalizing Germany”.36 But most importantly, besides announcing continued American support for West Germany, Dulles personally made a flying visit to Bonn for some much-needed crisis management and thereby ultimately cemented his friendship with the grateful Adenauer.37 As shall be discussed below, even later predicaments in the German-American relationship could not unmake the trust thus gained – the silver lining to the downfall of the EDC.

34_{Suzanne Brown-Fleming, “Personalities and Politics: The American Ambassadors to the Federal Republic”} In The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War 1945-1990: A Handbook, Volume I, ed. Detlef Junker et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 150.

35_Idem.

36_{Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain}

Challenged (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 36.

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From then on, Adenauer and Dulles cooperated even more closely. Together, they sought West Germany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Whilst unthinkable in the immediate aftermath of WWII, when even the mention of the possibility of German membership was met with such stark criticism that it could hardly be pursued, in the early 1950’s the United States made it increasingly clear that they backed the German NATO bid. Dulles personally exerted tremendous pressure on the French government to allow for German accession, which proved to be a successful strategy when the country was permitted to join in 1955.

At the same time, Dulles and Adenauer’s friendship reached its peak. After ‘getting rid’ of Conant, Adenauer continued to attach great importance to his personal contact to Dulles, telling for example the newly elected Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Heinrich Von Brentano in 1955 that he reserved the right to communicate with Dulles himself.38 Whenever Dulles travelled to Bonn, and he did so often, Adenauer personally called for him at the airport. Habitually, “the two men would start talking business as soon as they stepped into the Chancellor’s waiting Mercedes, with Heinz Weber, Adenauer’s able personal translator, sitting between them. They scarcely waited a moment in amenities. They made maximum use of the half-hour drive in complete privacy from the airport to the Palais Schaumburg … [Dulles] made it a habit of conferring with Adenauer with only Weber present in the room”.39 When they were apart, the two corresponded regularly through letters, as Adenauer refers to in his memoirs. There, he also describes their relationship as follows:

I appreciated Dulles dearly. Once you had gained his trust, won his friendship, you could be sure not to lose it again. We became close friends. This friendship was based not least on the fact that we always spoke openly to one another.40

38_{Siegfried Westphal and Joachim Arendt, Uncle Sam und die Deutschen: 50 Jahre deutsch-amerikanische}

Partnerschaft in Politik, Wirtschaft und Alltagsleben (Bonn: Aktuell, 1995): 100.

39_{Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles’ Command of American}

Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960): 41.

40_{“Ich schätzte Dulles sehr. Hatte man einmal sein Vetrauen, seine Freundschaft gewonnen, so konnte man} sicher sein, sie nicht wieder zu verlieren. Wir wurden enge Freunde. Diese Freundschaft basierte nicht zuletzt darauf, dass wir stets sehr offen zueinander sprachen.” Erinnerungen, 1955-1959, Konrad Adenauer

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As mentioned before, “the Dulles-Adenauer relationship was not always a bed of roses” though.41 Much like any friendship, theirs too had its ups and downs. In particular, in the coming years there occurred two misunderstandings that would have an impact on both their personal and political relationships (which are intertwined). In August 1956 the Radford Plan was announced, which set out to reduce the American military presence in Europe and increase the American reserve of nuclear weapons as part of Eisenhower’s preventive war strategy against the Soviet Union. If realized it would thus make Adenauer’s worst fears come true. Having just returned from a visit to the United States and subsequently assured the German people that relations with the Eisenhower administration were good, when a plan was announced a week later that indicated the opposite it made Adenauer look like a fool. Given that Dulles had failed to make any mention of Radford’s proposals Adenauer felt deceived, so much so that he continued to mistrust him for half a year even after the solution of the crisis, which was incidentally done through a prime example of personal diplomacy. Dulles’ first reaction was to send Adenauer a letter explaining the American position, in which he reassured him that the United States had no intention of launching an atomic war and that he personally fully agreed with Adenauer’s concerns. Therein, he also proclaimed his friendship:

This letter is kept very personal and expresses what moves me at the moment. It does not constitute an official explanation of my government, but is a manifestation of my deep personal convictions; I am writing as a friend to a friend, whom I hold in high esteem and admire.42

Adenauer on his part, rather than to mail them, sent German Ambassador to the USA Heinz Krekeler to the department of state to communicate his concerns over the Radford plan in person. He further arranged for Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Adolf Heusinger to travel to the States to discuss the issue with the leaders of the military.43_This

only goes to show that Adenauer was not only himself a practitioner of personal diplomacy but a great believer in the concept too. Evidently so was Dulles, as he sent his brother

Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960): 45.

42_{“Dieses Schreiben ist sehr persönlich gehalten und will ausdrücken, was mich im Augenblick bewegt. Es} stellt keine offizielle Erklärung meiner Regierung dar, sondern ist Ausdruck meiner tiefsten persönlichen Überzeugungen; ich schreibe als Freund an einen Freund, den ich zutiefst achte und bewundere.”

Erinnerungen, 1955-1959, Konrad Adenauer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 211.

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Allen, head of the CIA, to meet with Adenauer to settle both the political and the personal crisis. Allen vouched that no final decision had been taken yet.44 In the end, Eisenhower let go of the Radford plan and Adenauer forgave his friend.

Two years later, a similar incident caused a further rift in their relationship. In July 1958, as a civil war threatened to break out between the Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon, president Eisenhower launched Operation Blue Bat despite premier of the Soviet Union Krushchev’s threat to use nuclear weapons should the US intervene. The Bundesrepublik was inadvertently involved in the conflict, because “the United States’ blitz in landing marines at Beirut involved the use of American air bases in West Germany … (and) these steps were set in motion before Adenauer was informed”.45_{Adenauer who was}

critical of Dulles’ Middle East policy as it were was all the more enraged when his country was dragged into it. Nevertheless, this dispute too could be settled. Dulles purposely flew to Bonn to meet with Adenauer and again, managed to regain his trust.

As the nadirs of their relationship demonstrate, in their case the political was personal. The two misunderstandings were neither understood nor treated merely as an international issue, but as personal attacks. Taking Dulles’ actions to heart is thus not a sign of sensibility on Adenauer’s behalf. Rather, there was a mutual understanding on both sides that given the special nature of their honest and open friendship, an omission of information, whether political or not, was an offense to their relationship. Furthermore, the fact that the statesmen chose to straighten out their political misunderstandings through private negotiations, and most importantly that it worked, is a decisive indicator that personal diplomacy proved to be an effective tool in the Adenauer-Dulles era. This begs the question: did they use personal diplomacy strategically?

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Much has been written about what contemporaries nicknamed Adenauer and Dulles’ ‘love affair’.46 Though historians agree that their friendship was genuine, there is no consensus about whether or not it had an impact on either statesman’s formulation of foreign policy. According to Felken and Schwabe, it would be wrong to assume so. They find that both Dulles and Adenauer knew how to separate their personal sympathies from their national interests and so their friendship supposedly had no bearing on their policies.47 Paradoxically, both authors go on to say that it was Adenauer’s great fortune that he should have had a good relationship with the American secretary of state at such a crucial time,48 thereby contradicting their earlier statements. Indeed, given the evidence, it is hard not to agree with Dulles’ assistant Roderic O’Connor who asserted that, as his superior had supposedly been well aware of, “the personal relationship provided him with a great international political advantage”.49_{The same goes for Adenauer of course. It is no}

coincidence that he should become friends with one of the most influential secretaries of state in history. Indeed, “the overwhelming consensus among analysts of United States foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration is that it was dominated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles”50 and Adenauer too believed this to be true. In his evaluation Dulles was almost solely responsible for the implementation of US foreign policy whilst Eisenhower occupied himself with domestic politics.51 Debatable as this is, what is important to note is that Adenauer perceived Dulles to be very powerful which explains his motivation for wanting to forge a relationship with him. For obvious reasons, to influence someone who has a significant say bears a large potential to achieve one’s intended goal. Arguably their friendship is thus unlikely to have been incidental. Nevertheless, this in itself does not clarify whether they strategically employed personal diplomacy strategies to achieve their goals. As shall be explained, there is evidence to suggest that they did though:

46_{Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier} Verlag, 1993): 146; Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles’

Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960): 38.

47_{Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier} Verlag, 1993): 148; Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 84.

48_{Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier} Verlag, 1993): 149; Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 84.

49_{Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 84.}

50_{Richard Immerman. “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who made the decisions?.” Political Psychology 1 (1979):} 21.

51_{Gero Von Gersdorff, Adenauers Außenpolitik gegenüber den Siegermächten 1954: Westdeutsche}

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When applying the ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’ to the case study, it is noticeable that both Adenauer and Dulles exerted most of the types of influence previously defined. With regards to informational power, as shown, the two corresponded through letters and therein updated each other on the latest news. Especially the older Adenauer would frequently lecture Dulles on political developments,52 (which is also a sign of the use of expert power) though this was not always welcome. However, due to their similitude in thought, informational power may not have been as relevant in their relationship as it is expected to be in those to follow. Noticeably, Adenauer also used coercive power. Just after the publication of the Radford plan for example, he sent undersecretary Von Eckardt to the USA to “start building bridges to leading Democrats”,53

a not-so-subtle threat to the republican Eisenhower administration with which he was disgruntled, that he may shift his support elsewhere. Despite the fact that this was not conducted by himself or directly addressed to Dulles, the latter was without a doubt intended to find out about the talks. Dulles on the other hand mostly applied it with his French counterparts, whom he threatened with an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of their transatlantic relationship after they failed to ratify the EDC. With regards to reward and coercive power alike, it must be stated that both Dulles and Adenauer quite clearly wished to be liked by the other (as their efforts to reconcile in times of discord demonstrate) and thus, are bound to have factored it in to their deliberations. The extreme pressure Dulles put on the French to ratify the EDC and his actions in the aftermath of their rejection for example, admittedly foremost a means to his ends, can however also be regarded as a demonstration to Adenauer how far he was willing to go to support West Germany and its chancellor. In fact, throughout his time in office he focused his attention solely on Adenauer and did not mind that in so doing he alienated especially his French and British peers.54 Furthermore, Adenauer allowed John’s brother Allen “to proceed with one of his most ambitious early projects, the digging of a tunnel from West Berlin to a point in the

52_{Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier} Verlag, 1993): 148

53_{Steven Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953-1960 (Plymouth:} Lexington Books, 2010): 172.

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East from which the CIA could tap Soviet-bloc communication systems”.55 Former New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer attributes this authorization to Adenauer’s friendliness with the Dulles family. Most likely neither of the two exercised legitimate power, though it is possible that in their private talks there occurred more examples of the aforementioned means to exercise influence.

Evidently, both Adenauer and Dulles thus exerted influence on one another, and not just subconsciously either. The fact that they did should by no means be understood as a trivialization of their friendship however. Theirs was not a friendship of utility as much as an authentic bond from which both knew they (as well as their counterpart) could benefit politically, and did. Beyond advancing their individual careers, with Dulles her b becoming as powerful as he did because of his ties and Adenauer potentially being re-elected (repeatedly) because of his ability to influence the United States, their bond had a lasting impact on their individual nations and their transatlantic relationship: Their collaboration in Dulles’ six years in office was essential in the German rearmament process, which would have been impossible or at least delayed had it not been for Dulles’ strong endorsement. If Germany resurged and thrived under Adenauer, this was also due to the good ties to the USA that he established and which would set the stage for what has since been called a ‘special relationship’. As Professor Grabbe states, “the alliance with America has been called the ‘second Grundgesetz’ of the Federal Republic. This foundation … is to no small degree the result of the relationship between Dulles and Adenauer … The ‘personal factor’ must be considered exceptional in the German-American relationship”.56

However, Dulles and Adenauer’s friendship also had less positive implications. As previously stated, it marginalized other European heads of state and consequently bilateral ties suffered, especially those between America and France. Furthermore, it was to some extent due to his loyalty to Dulles that Adenauer would later have an exceptionally bad relationship with president John F. Kennedy, who arranged for both of Dulles’ siblings

56_{Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, “Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles and the West German-American Relations” In}

John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, edited by Richard Immerman (Princeton: Princeton

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Eleanor and Allen to be fired on accounts of the latter’s involvement in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba. Granted, their mutual dislike mostly stemmed from ideological differences, their age gap of 40 years (Adenauer, now in his eighties, had since long been nicknamed the ‘Old Man’ while Kennedy was the youngest president ever to have been elected) and JFK’s faux-pas in prematurely declaring in 1957, still as senator, in a Foreign Affairs article that “the age of Adenauer was over”.57 Their animosity even extended to members of their administrations like Diplomat Wilhelm Grewe, selected by Adenauer and disapproved of by Kennedy (who preferred his admirer from the CDU’s counterparty Willy Brandt) and thus “the German-American relationship experienced an era of diplomatic discord, produced by … personalities that failed to comprehend each other’s policies”.58

Evidently, there were many reasons for the poor personal relations (which were later in part to blame for the critical 1961 Berlin Crisis), but it certainly did not help that that Kennedy let go of the very Americans to whom Adenauer felt most connected. Incidentally, after her resignation Eleanor continued to travel to Germany, amongst other things to attend Adenauer’s funeral in 1967.59 Prior to this, the two mourned another death together in Washington in 1959 though, namely that of Eleanor’s brother. If there was any doubt left about the authenticity of Dulles and Adenauer’s friendship, the latter’s description of their last meeting in February and his sorrow at hearing of John’s illness and death should easily sweep it away. Noticing Dulles’ weakness during the visit to Bonn, Adenauer arranged for his cook to make groats. After his departure, the chancellor had the recipe and ingredients delivered to his friend in the USA; it was the last thing he ate before he passed away. 60 Dulles died in May and was clearly missed by Adenauer, who wrote in his memoirs:

John Foster Dulles’ death was a heavy blow to the entire Western world, but especially for us Germans and for me personally.61

57_{Frank Mayer, “Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era of Distrust in German-American Relations?,” German}

Studies Review 17 (1994): 83.

58_{Idem, 98.}

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The ‘Old Boys’: Helmut Schmidt, Gerald Ford & Henry Kissinger

Between the end of the fruitful collaboration between Adenauer and Dulles in 1959 and the beginning of the cooperation between Schmidt, Ford and Kissinger in their highest capacities,62 lie fifteen years. In this interim period, the cold war had not eased off; Instead there had been the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises. The West German political landscape too had changed dramatically. After Adenauer retired from his fourteen-year chancellorship in 1963, he was succeeded by a series of politicians who unlike the ‘old man’ failed to hold on to their position for long. Until Schmidt became chancellor, there had not only been three different holders of the office, Erhard, Kiesinger and Brandt, but also a change of government from CDU to SPD, the Social Democratic Party. Beyond the internal change, there also occurred a shift in West Germany’s foreign policy. While Erhard had concentrated almost solely on domestic economics (which was only to be expected from the former Minister for Economic Affairs), Kiesinger and Brandt focused their attention foremost on the East, thus successfully reducing tensions with Soviet bloc countries and through Ostpolitik also with its immediate neighbor, the DDR, from whom they were now physically separated by the wall erected in 1961. All in all, although they were by no means neglected (as previously mentioned, Willy Brandt had quite close ties to Kennedy), in the post-Adenauer era transatlantic relations were not at the forefront of West German politics. Under Helmut Schmidt however, the Bundesrepublik once again played a prominent role both in and outside of Europe, for which his predecessor had paved the way. Though he would work with three US administrations during his tenure that began in 1974 and it could be assumed that his ability to collaborate with overseas counterparts would only increase with experience, by his own accounts it was the first administration that he was most in tune with:

The combination Ford/Kissinger was ideal for the German chancellor. In the two and a half years overlap of our times in office there has never been a problem that we could not solve within little time through trustful openness ... The Atlantic alliance was stable again.63

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Personal relations were key in this success. Schmidt befriended both the president and his secretary of state, though these friendships differed in their scope and longevity. While noticeably closer to the like-minded Ford during their governments’ cooperation, he continues to stay friends with both him and German-born Kissinger, despite their somewhat more tense relationship at the time. Typically the chancellor tends to be on good terms with either the president or the secretary of state, but in the case of the Ford administration Schmidt was thus exceptionally close to both, as demonstrated for instance by him dedicating a chapter each to the two statesmen in his book Weggefährten (1996).

As he describes there, Helmut Schmidt and Gerald Ford met in 1975 when the latter visited West Germany. Their friendship grew rapidly over the year when they reconvened at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (which resulted in the Helsinki Accords) and the first G6 Summit, thought up and launched by Schmidt and his friend and French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,64 which by his own account was a political and psychological success as it fostered trust between the involved politicians. Evidently Ford agreed with this evaluation, since he organized the following world economic summit, now with seven members due to the addition of Canada’s Pierre Trudeau to the original six heads of state of France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA. It was in the aftermath of this G7 summit held in Puerto Rico in 1976 that Ford proved his loyalty to the West German chancellor. After Schmidt shared with journalists that if the Italian government were to include communists, the big four (England, France, West Germany and the USA) would cease to grant the country credit, those involved were naturally outraged. Italians heavily criticized the intended meddling with domestic issues and in France, thousands protested with posters of the ‘ugly German’ chancellor. Though they usually portrayed him rather favorably (in no small part due to his friendship with publisher of the weekly paper ‘Die Zeit’ Marion Dönhoff) the press too turned against Schmidt. Ford however, though it in no way benefitted him bar gaining the chancellor’s trust, came to Schmidt’s defense and thereby sealed the friendship.65 The fact that he thereby put himself at risk of being condemned and disliked by others yet was willing to stand by Schmidt’s

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side nonetheless, clearly indicates that there had developed a bond between them. Having said that, Ford is known to have had a forgiving nature since he also pardoned Nixon despite the obviously negative implications thereof for his reputation, an act of bravery that Schmidt had incidentally admired greatly.66 It was not the only time that Ford, whom Schmidt later affectionately called ‘Jerry’,67 helped him out.

As writer for Foreign Affairs Barbara Heep points out, the friendship between Schmidt and Ford led to the dismissal of what had long been a contentious issue in the transatlantic relationship, namely foreign exchange offset agreement payments (Devisenausgleichszahlungen).68_{In 1976 the chancellor managed to convince the American}

president to discontinue the renewal of further offset agreements, which had up to then taken place biannually. After having paid an estimated eleven billion US dollars to the USA between 1961 and 197569 to contribute to the costs arising from stationing soldiers in their country, West Germans were naturally relieved to know that this significant cost would no longer come up. Not only would the FRG’s economy benefit but also the country’s image abroad, as it no longer appeared to be the only European nation to co-finance American troops, which were at the time just being pulled out of the controversial Vietnam War. Though it was also a logical conclusion of the fact that the American government no longer required the West German payments,70 both Heep and contemporary news outlets identified the personal relationship between the statesmen as the decisive factor in this development.

Ford also listened when Schmidt gave him political advice. Amongst other things, the two came together during the Détente era to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the development of NATO. The dialogue on SALT between the USSR and the USA was launched as a result of the ongoing nuclear arms race, with the aim to limit each of the superpowers’ accumulated nuclear arsenals, necessary for peace efforts just as much as for these two nations’ suffering economies. The Nixon administration already finalized SALT I in 1972, which resulted in the agreement to limit anti-ballistic

66_{Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 302.} 67_{Idem, 304f.}

68_{Barbara Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika: Eine schwierige Partnerschaft (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990): 243.} 69_{Ulrich Schiller, “Bonn wird nicht mehr zur Ader gelassen, ”Die Zeit, July 23, 1976.}

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missiles (ABMs) in both countries. After his resignation over Watergate, his successor Ford wished to go further with SALT II, by not only reducing ABMs but also preventively banning new missile programs from being established in the first place. In his private conversations with the president in 1975 and 1976, from which Kissinger was exceptionally excluded, Schmidt pointed out the danger of the recently deployed Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles that had not been included in the SALT talks, which merely accounted for long-range ones. Thereupon the American president promised to account for the risky weapon in future negotiations, though given that he was in the middle of an election campaign it would have to be done after his re-election, which never took place; Neither did the addition that the West German chancellor had demanded (though the SS-20 weapons were in fact later destroyed as agreed by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty), as the Carter administration with which he was faced as of 1976 was far less open to foreign advice, or at least Schmidt’s. Ford’s assurance was never put into writing as, given their relationship of mutual trust, neither he nor the Bundskanzler had deemed it necessary to do so. 71 As Heep asserts, whether Ford would realistically have pushed for the banning of the SS-20 is open for debate. Nevertheless, it remains notable that Ford took into account Schmidt’s advice and was inclined to arrange for it, admittedly by Schmidt’s accounts, without his secretary of state’s consent (or anybody else’s for that matter) who was expected to be critical of any amendments that would further slow down the already lengthy SALT negotiation process.72

Although he bypassed the secretary of state on this occasion, Helmut Schmidt and Henry Kissinger were otherwise good friends. In fact, the argument could be made that it was in part due to their cordial relationship that Ford would strike up a friendship with the German chancellor, about whom he would of course have heard from his secretary of state. Indeed, though they disagree on where and when exactly they first met, Kissinger and Schmidt met some time in the 1950s. According to Kissinger, the two met in 1957 in the scope of a panel discussion at the Amerikahaus in Hamburg. Prior to their meeting

71_{Herbert Dittgen, Deutsch-Amerikanische Sicherheitsbeziehungen in der Ära Helmut Schmidt:}

Vorgeschichte und Folgen des NATO-Doppelbeschluss (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1991): 138; Barbara

Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika: Eine schwierige Partnerschaft (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990): 243.

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Kissinger had mistakenly expected to be acquainted with the academic and politician Carlo Schmid as he had never previously heard of Schmidt.73 Schmidt on the other hand believes to have met Kissinger at Harvard University in the United States in 1953.74 Be that as it may, it was their political work that brought them together again. At the end of the 1960s, both were appointed to similar positions in their respective governments, Kissinger as Nixon’s National Security Advisor and Schmidt as Brandt’s Federal Minister of Defense. Though little is known of their contact during this time, as Kissinger affirms, “we stayed in touch over the years”.75 This statement and their ease at communicating once they reached their highest official postings must lead to the belief that the two met on several occasions. Indeed, as Kissinger’s description of their talks in his office prior to the Energy Conference in Washington in 1974 (at which Schmidt incidentally backed the American proposals)76

demonstrates, the two had meanwhile become trusting friends:

There were two key conversations before the opening of the conference … The first was … with my old and cherished friend Helmut Schmidt … Our friendship soon transcended the tasks that destiny imposed on us. We both knew that we served our countries not by imposing our views but by seeking solutions both of us could believe in. 77

Noticeably, their cooperation was one in which both sought compromise. Now that one was the secretary of state of the United States and the other the Bundeskanzler of West Germany, their functions required them to meet all the more, especially to negotiate on behalf of their respective nations regarding issues such as armament control and the oil crisis. As mentioned before, the cooperation between the Ford and Schmidt administrations could not have been more harmonious and Kissinger of course helped create said environment. As the case of the SS-20 goes to show however, Schmidt and Kissinger did not always think alike. On various political issues their opinions differed tremendously. One before anything else a scholar, the other foremost a politician, their approaches to international politics were bound to diverge and neither made a secret out of their disapproval of the other’s policies.

73_{Matthias Naß, “Ich finde Helmut ziemlich sentimental,” Die Zeit, June 25, 2009; Henry Kissinger, Years of}

Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982): 908.

74_{Helmut Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte (Berlin: Siedler, 1987): 168.}

75_{Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982): 908.} 76_{William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill} and Wang, 1998): 459.

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