Proposing a multi-dimensional, context-sensitive approach to the study of ideological (a)symmetry in emotion

Proposing

a

multi-dimensional,

context-sensitive

approach

to

the

study

of

ideological

(a)symmetry

in

emotion

Ruthie

Pliskin

,

Anat

Ruhrman

and

Eran

Halperin

Politicalpsychologistsstudyingideologyhavebeen

increasinglyexaminingitsrelationshipwithemotion.Muchof thisworkhasfocusedonpotentialideologicaldifferencesinthe intensityofemotionalexperiences,leadingtoconflicting findings.Someworkhassupportedtheperspectiveaccording towhichfundamentalpsychologicaldifferencesexistbetween ideologicalleftistsandrightists,whileotherworkhas challengedthisview,demonstratingideologicalsymmetryin emotion.Thepresentreviewhighlightsrecentadvancesthat canshedfurtherlightonthisdebate,adoptinga multi-dimensional,context-sensitiveapproachtothestudyof ideologicaldifferencesinemotionalprocesses.Accordingly, weproposethatinsteadofaskingwhetherornotideological differencesinemotionexist,researchersshouldaskwhen,in whatways,andunderwhatcircumstancestheyexist.

Addresses 1

LeidenUniversity,Wassenaarseweg52,2333AKLeiden, TheNetherlands

2_{HebrewUniversity,MountScopus,Jerusalem9190501,Israel}

Correspondingauthor:Pliskin,Ruthie(r.pliskin@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)

CurrentOpinioninBehavioralSciences2020,34:75–80 ThisreviewcomesfromathemedissueonEmotion,motivation, personalityandsocialsciences-*PoliticalIdeologies* EditedbyJohnJost,EranHalperinandKristinLaurin

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.01.005

2352-1546/_ã2020TheAuthors.PublishedbyElsevierLtd.Thisisan openaccessarticleundertheCCBY-NC-NDlicense( http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Emotions,definedas‘statesthatcomprisefeelings,

physio-logicalchanges,expressivebehaviorsandinclinationstoact’

[1,p.5],havecapturedtheinterestsofscholarsforcenturies

[e.g.Refs.2–4].Becausetheyserveaspowerfulenginesof

behavior anddecisionmaking,the studyofemotionshas

rapidly evolved in recent years, with ‘affective science’

emerging as afield of researchin itsown right[5]. This

fascinationhasnotescapedtheresearchagendasofpolitical

psychologists studying ideology, and the last decade has seen

an accumulation ofresearch on the relationshipbetween

ideologyandemotion[e.g.Refs.6,7,8,9].Suchinterestis

only natural, as emotions drive appraisals of all new

information,shapinghowweseetheworldandinfluencing

decision-making across domains [10–12], rendering

emotions fundamentally important forour understanding

ofcomplexsocialrealitiesandsocialchange.This

perspec-tive, based on the Appraisal Tendency framework [12],

meansthatemotionscanbothshapeideologicalworldviews

and—becausethemotivationsassociatedwithideologies

influenceappraisals[13]—beshapedbythem.

Nonethe-less,mostoftheresearchconductedthusfarhasaskedsome

formofthefollowinggeneralquestion:Arethereideological

differencesintheseaffectiveprocesses?Wearguethatthis

question,thoughinteresting,maybetoosimplistic.

In addition to being multi-dimensional processes [1],

emotions are highly context-dependent, with different

targets and situations shaping them in important ways

[14,15]. Any attempt to boil the ideology-emotion link

down to whether or not emotional processes are

symmetrical across the ideological spectrum is thus all

but doomed todeliver apartial answerthatmaynotbe

replicable across processes and situations. Accordingly,

we argue that to fully understand the relationship

between ideology and emotions we need to a) study

multipleelementsoftheemotionalprocess,

complement-ing thecurrentfocus onintensity; and b) contextualize

the examination of ideological differences in these

emotionalprocesses. Tothisend,wefirstbrieflyreview

theideologicalsymmetryversusasymmetrydebateasit

relatestoemotionalintensity.Next,weelaborateonour

argumentand reviewresearch thatlendssupportto our

approach. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of

the promisecontained in amulti-dimensional,

context-sensitive approach to thestudy of potentialideological

differencesinemotion.

Ideological

(a)symmetry

in

affective

processes

Much of the ongoing research on the psychology of

political ideology — defined as an ‘interrelated set of

attitudes,values,andbeliefswithcognitive,affective,and

motivationalproperties’[10,p.315]—hasfocusedonthe

task of identifying differences between ideological

leftists and rightists in fundamental psychological

processes. Several prominent researchers [13,17,18]

have repeatedly and consistently demonstrated such

differences,arguingthattheyareacentralfactorbehind

differential gravitation towards competing ideologies.

Challenging this ideological asymmetry approach,

assumptionsunderlyingit,themagnitudeofasymmetry

identified, or specific findings that have been used to

supportit[19,20,21].

Ofparticularrelevancetothepresentreview,partofthis

debatehas centered onaffective processes, focusingon

ideologicaldifferencesintheintensitywithwhichpeople

experience negative affect. For example, extensive

researchsuggests thatrightistsaremorereactivein their

responses to fear-inducing [17,22,23,24] and

disgust-inducing[25–28,29,30,31]stimuli,and thattheseemotions

canevenshiftpeoplefurthertotheright[22,32–34].More

recent research has challenged these prior conclusions,

proposing certain boundary conditions for ideological

differences or arguing that the processes are actually

symmetrical.Forexample,ChomaandHodson[35]have

foundgreaterreactivitytofear-inducing(i.e.threatening)

stimulitobeassociatedwithcertaindimensionsofrightist

ideology(i.e.right-wingauthoritarianism),butnotothers

(i.e.socialdominanceorientation).Similarly,proponentsof

the symmetrical approach argue that physiological data

provide no evidence for asymmetry [6], that different

fear-inducingstimulishiftattitudestoeithertherightor

the left [36], or that extremity rather than ideology

influences fear reactions [21]. Crawford [37] echoes all

of these critiques, proposing that both rightist ideology

(i.e.conservatism)andthreatweretoobroadly

conceptual-izedinpreviousaccounts,andthatdifferencesarelimited

tohowintenselysocialconservativesversusliberalsreact

specifically to physical threats (for similar arguments

regarding ideological differences in disgust sensitivity,

seeRefs.[7,26]).

Thesedisagreements among researchershavenot been

limited to negative affect, with some of thediscussion

focusing on more positive emotional processes, such

ashappinessandempathy.Examininggeneralhappiness,

several researchers have found that rightists (i.e.

conservatives) report higher levels of happiness than

leftists (i.e. liberals) [38,39,40]. The reason for this

appears to be that rightist ideologies serve a palliative

function,allowing people to better manage threat [40]

andexposuretodifferentformsofinjustice[41].Work

by Wojcik and colleagues; however, has yielded

seeminglycontradictory results, suggesting that despite

greater self-reported happiness among rightists, leftists

actuallyexperiencemorepositiveaffectasjudgedbased

ontheirfacialexpressions[42].Nonetheless,recent

find-ingssupportthe notionof aself-protective mechanism,

demonstratingalinkbetweenrightisteconomicideology

anddampened negativeemotional reactions—bethey

self-reported,physiologicalorexpressive—toinstances

ofeconomicinequality[41].Thisdebate,therefore,has

alsoyettobedefinitivelyresolved.

Finally, scholars have also tried to determine whether

ideological differences also relate to differences in

empathic reactions. Initial findings suggest ideological

asymmetry in the experience of empathy, with leftists

experiencing more empathy in general [43–45] or in

specificcontexts[46]andextendingempathyacrossmore

distantsocialcategoriesthandorightists,whoseempathic

concernislimitedto membersofmore proximalgroups

[47].Acentralreasonforthisappearstobedifferencesin

tendencies towards universalism — more in line with

leftists’viewsonsocial equality — versuspatriotism or

nationalism—moreinlinewithadesiretoseeone’sown

grouptriumphwithinsocialhierarchiesthatareperceived

asmoreinevitablebyrightists[44,47].Theideathatthese

differencesarelimitedtolessproximalgroups,however,

challengesthenotionthat thereare actualfundamental

differences in empathy between rightists and leftists,

arguing that previously documented differences may

have stemmed from the specific empathy targets

employed[47].

Thesecontradictory approachesandseemingly

contradic-tory findings paint the picture of an intractable conflict

between two camps — ideological symmetry versus

asymmetry.Thisconflictappearstobecomemore

ideologi-calandmorepolarizedasthedebatescontinue.Wesuggest,

however,thatthedisputeis,infact,tractable,atleastwhenit

comestothestudyofideologicaldifferencesinemotional

processes.Nonetheless,theroadtoitsresolutionisnotas

straightforwardastheargumentsofeithercamp—takento

theirextreme—wouldsuggest.

Adopting

a

multi-dimensional,

context-sensitive

approach

to

the

ideology-emotion

link

Aswehavereviewedabove,thelion’sshareofthedebate

onideological (a)symmetry in emotions has focusedon

emotionalintensity.Butintensityisonlyoneelementof

theemotional process, which is in its essence complex

and multi-dimensional. In fact, individuals’ emotional

reactions reflect a combination of automatic and more

deliberative,regulatedprocesses.Furthermore,emotions

areassociatedwithactiontendencies,butthelattermay

be activatedto varying extents depending on multiple

factors.Tounderstandindividuals’emotional processes,

wethusneedtounderstand howandwhytheyregulate

their emotions, the action tendencies associated with

their emotions, and the ways in which the features of

thecontextshapeallofthese.Accordingly,wearguethat

in order to truly understand potential ideological

differencesin emotionalprocesses,wemust teasethese

elementsapartand examinethem in context.By doing

this,wecandistinguishfundamentaldifferencesinfully

automatic reactions from differences stemming from

more symmetrical ideology consistent motivations and

regulatorystrategies.Verylittleresearchhasthusfarbeen

undertaken towards this end, but ongoing efforts have

First,animportantconstructthatdramaticallyinfluences

boththeintensitieswithwhichpeoplefeelemotionsand

how they express them isemotion regulation, meaning

the strategies people employ to alter the magnitude,

frequency,experience,andexpressionoftheiremotions

[48].Itisthusimportanttoconsideremotion regulation

when trying to understand the emotions that people

ultimately experience. Cognitive reappraisal — an

emotion regulation technique involving changing the

meaning ofastimulus— isoftencitedas anespecially

constructivestrategy,asusingiteffectivelymodulatesthe

emotional experience (at least for lower intensities of

emotion) while maintaining long-term benefits such as

recall and improvedlong-term coping [48,49].

Interest-ingly,thereisevidencethatincreasedreappraisalleadsto

reduced support for conservative policies [50] and

increased support for dovish policies relating to leftist

ideologyin intergroupconflict[51–53],perhapsbecause

supportforthesepoliciesdemandstheconsiderationofan

issue from multiple perspectives — an element of

reappraisal. More recent research has demonstrated

possible links between ideology and expressive

suppression, a strategy associated with modulation of

theexpression—butnottheexperience—ofanemotion

[48]. Specifically, both self-reported and physiological

evidence indicates that ideological rightists’ (versus

leftists’) faces are less emotionally expressive [18],

findings that match earlier work demonstrating that

rightists view emotions less favorably than leftists [54].

Such fundamentaldifferencesinexpressivesuppression

canalsohelpsettletheseeminglycontradictoryfindings

that leftists express more happiness than rightists,

despitereportinglesshappiness[42].Justasideological

differences have been identified in reappraisal and

suppression, they may emerge in other emotion

regulationstrategiesaswell.Forexample,previous

find-ingsongreateruncertaintyavoidanceamongrightists[16]

may indicate that rightists would be more likely to

employ situation selection to regulate their emotions,

avoiding novelsituationsthatarerifewithuncertainty.

Whiletheabovefindingspointtopotentially

fundamen-tal ideological differences in emotion regulation, other

differences may be more context-dependent. For

example, a cognitive reappraisal-based intervention to

reducepoliticalintolerancewasmoreeffectivein

reduc-ingrightists’thanleftists’intolerancetowardsmembersof

theadversarygroup inaviolentconflict,buthadsimilar

effects on both groups when the targets of intolerance

weremembersofeachindividual’sleast-likedgroup[52].

Similarly,ideologicaldifferenceshavebeenidentifiedin

howpeoplechooseamongemotionregulationstrategies,

butthesedifferencesarealsodependentonthecontentof

the emotion-provoking stimuli [9]. Congruent with

previousfindingsthatpeoplepreferdisengagingemotion

regulation strategies (i.e. distraction) over engaging

strategies (i.e. reappraisal) when experiencing higher

intensities of emotion [49], ideological differences in

thechoicebetweenengagingand disengaging

emotion-regulatory strategiesemergedonlyfor content towhich

leftists responded moreintensely thanrightists(i.e. the

suffering of an adversary outgroup). Interestingly,

leftists were more likelythan rightiststo disengage from

this content due to their more intense experiences of

it [9]. In other words, the ideologically congruent

differences between hawks and doves in emotional

intensity — echoing the above-reviewed findings on

theexpanseofempathy—fullyexplainedtheirdiffering

regulatory choice patterns. Furthermore, these

differences were limited to a certain kind of

emotion-inducing content, suggesting context-dependent rather

thanfundamentalideological differences.

Beyond modes of emotion regulation, the motivations

people have —be they hedonic or instrumental — are

knowntoimpactthedirectiontowardswhichtheyregulate

theiremotions[55],therebyshapingtheiremotional

expe-rience. Forexample,Poratet al.havedemonstratedthat

ideologyisacentralpredictoroftheemotionspeoplewant

to feeltowardsthe adversarygroupin aviolent conflict, with

leftists more motivatedto experienceempathyand rightists

more motivatedto experienceanger—motivationsthat

partiallyexplainobserveddifferencesinemotional

experi-ence [46]. They have also found that when faced with

existential threat, leftistsare motivated to feelcollective

angst—relatedtoexistentialfear—becausethisemotion

can promptandjustify support foraggressivepoliciesto

protecttheingroup[56].Thisfindingmayofferinsightinto

theabove-reviewedevidencethatfearmovespeopletothe

right. Relatedly, in the context of intergroup conflict,

leftistsandrightistsmaybothmanagetheirfearthrough

reappraisal,butthenewcognitivemeaningtheygive

fear-inducingstimuliappearstobeshapedbytheirmotivations

tomaintainideology-congruentbeliefsabouttheingroup

andoutgroup[57].Finally,previousfindingsonideological

differences in empathy appear to at-least-partially stem

fromdifferencesinthemotivationforempathy:Whileboth

rightistsandleftistsappeartohavealowermotivationfor

outgroup-targeted empathy than for ingroup-targeted

empathy in the context of ideological conflict, leftists

generallyhaveahigher motivationforempathy thando

rightists, across targets [8]. Individuals’ motivation for

empathy is known to determine whether they try to

upregulate or downregulate their empathy [58], which

may explain how, as stated above, leftists’ stronger

adherencetouniversalistbeliefsleadsthemtoexperience

more empathy through the motivated upregulation of

this emotion. Taken together, this body of research

demonstrates that previously-observed ideological

differences in emotional intensity, often thought of as

reflecting purelyautomaticreactions,can atleastin part

be explainedby similarmotivations to experienceemotions

ormaintainbeliefscongruentwitheachcamp’sideological

Theactiontendenciesassociatedwithemotionsconstitute

another important attribute, and a central reason for

researchers’ interest in emotions [1,59]. An underlying

assumption of much of the research referenced above,

then,isthatideologicaldifferencesinemotionare

impor-tant because they predict corresponding differences in

behavior.Interestingly,however,recentresearchhasfound

thatemotionsmaynotequallymotivatechangesinattitudes

andbehaviorforleftistsandrightists.Forexample,within

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, emotions — even when

experienced at similar intensities across the ideological

spectrum — have been found to lead to corresponding

changesin policysupport only or mostlyamong leftists,

having little or no effect on the policy preferences of

rightists[60].Similarly,aspects of conservative ideology

intheU.S.appeartodampenorevenreversetheeffectsof

empathy[61]and anger[62]inductionsonsupportfor social

welfareand racialequalitypromotingpolicies, respectively.

But context seems to be central here: Thisdampening

effectwasreplicatedwhenexaminingtheeffectsoffearon

fleeing tendencies further to an ideologically-relevant

stimulus(i.e.apoliticaluprisingbyanoutgroup),butthe

effectwas reversedwhenrespondingto anideologically

irrelevant threat(i.e. anepidemic) [15].In other words,

rightistsmaybelessemotion-driventhanleftists,butonly

when their ideology provides clear guidelines on the

‘appropriate’attitudinalresponse—indicatinga

context-specific motivated process rather than a fundamental

psychologicaldifference.

Finally,itisimportant to notethatemotions ingeneral

and ideological differences in emotions in particular

cannotbeexaminedinavacuum,astheyare

fundamen-tally embedded in social reality and context [63,64].

Indeed, for each element above, we have already

identified contextual factors that dramatically alter

the extent and/or direction of ideological differences.

Onesuchfactoristhecontentofstimuli.Thismayrefer

to the identity of a group towards which emotion is

experienced,which weand others havefound to shape

theeffectivenessor modeof emotionregulation[9,52],

motivations for emotions (e.g. empathy [8]), and the

intensity of intergroup negativity [19]. Likewise, it

can refer to whether or not a given stimulus directly

relatestothecontentsofone’sideologicalbeliefs,

deter-mining whether those beliefs can provide motivations

and/or guidelines for specific reactions [15]. Another

relevantcontextualfactorisemotionalclimate.Research

hasshownthatindividuals’emotionsareoftenshapedby

intragroup emotional influences [65], meaning that

different emotional norms could explain ideological

differencesinemotionontheindividuallevel,andthese

maybefurther exacerbatedbydocumented ideological

differencesin needsfor asharedreality[66].Theseare

onlyexamples,buttheypowerfullyillustratehowcontext

fundamentally shapes eachand every process reviewed

above.Accordingly,weproposethatfeaturesofthesocial

context be taken into account when examining

ideological differencesin emotional processes. In other

words, we argue that instead of asking whether or not

ideologicalasymmetryexistsinemotional processes,we

shouldaskwhen,inwhatways,andunderwhatcircumstances

suchasymmetryexists.

Conclusion

Taken together, these advances in the study of the

ideology-emotionlinksupportourcontentionthatamore

nuanced,context-sensitiveexaminationofemotionholds

thekeytounderstandingtheextenttowhichrightistsand

leftists differ in theiraffective processes. More

specifi-cally,theseadvancespointtoapotentialresolutionofthe

debate on ideological symmetry versus asymmetry:

certain processes appear to more fundamentally differ

acrosstheideologicalspectrum(e.g.theregulatory

strat-egiesthatpeopleemploywhenexperiencingemotionsin

their daily lives), while others reflect motivated

differences stemming from more symmetrical

motiva-tionsto experience the worldin an ideology-congruent

manner.Future research can test thesepropositions by

furtherbreakingdownemotionsinto theirvariousparts

whenassessingpotentialideologicaldifferences.

Further-more,studyingeachelementacrossmultiplecontextscan

offer the best tool for distinguishing between more

fundamentaldifferences and those that depend on the

relationship between the content of one’s beliefs and

specificstimulior outcomes.

Author

contributions

RuthiePliskinandAnatRuhrmanconductedtheliterature

review.RuthiePliskinledthewritingofthemanuscript,

and all authors provided feedback at different stages,

reviewed,edited,andapprovedthemanuscript.

Conflict

of

interest

statement

Nothingdeclared.

References

and

recommended

reading

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