Sudan, Chad, Somalia

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Sudan, Chad, Somalia

A Comparative Analysis of State Failure as a Carte Blanche for Spoilers in Protracted Social Conflicts

Student: N.D. van der Pers, M.A.

Supervisor: Dr. Ir. M.R. Kamminga University of Groningen

Faculty of Arts

MA International Relations and International Organization International Security

8 July, 2011

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CONTENTS

Abstract 4

Preface 5

Abbreviations 6

Maps and tables 7

Introduction 8

Analytical methodology 11

Hypotheses 17

Chapter 1 Protracted Social Conflict Context Sudan, Chad, Somalia

Introduction 18

1.1. Africa’s post-colonial historical background 20

1.2. Sudan

1.2.1. Country profile 22

1.2.2. The North-South conflict (1956-1972 / 1983-2005) 23

1.2.3. The Darfur conflict (2003-present) 24

1.3. Chad

1.3.2. The North-South conflict (1965-present) 25

1.4. Somalia

1.4.2. Civil war, state collapse, and clan rivalry (1991-present) 27

1.5. Global, regional, and domestic sources of conflict 29

1.5.1. Global sources of conflict 30

1.5.2. Regional sources of conflict 32

1.5.3. Domestic sources of conflict 34

Conclusion 38

Chapter 2 Protracted Social Conflict Analysis Sudan, Chad, Somalia

Introduction 40

2.1. Conflict drivers, conflict actors, and conflict dynamics 42 2.2. Sudan

2.2.1. Conflict drivers 43

2.2.2. Conflict actors: SPLM/A, SLM/A, JEM 44

2.2.3. Conflict dynamics 45

2.3. Chad

2.3.2. Conflict actors: FAN, FAB, RFC, UFDD 47

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2.4. Somalia

2.4.2. Conflict actors: Clans, militias, and Somali pirates 49

Conclusion 53

Chapter 3 Protracted Social Conflict Resolution Spoilers Sudan, Chad, Somalia

Introduction 55

3.1. The role of the government in relation to spoilers 3.2. Sudan

3.2.1. The role of the Sudanese government in relation to spoilers 57

3.2.2. The Janjaweed in the Sudan-Chad border 59

3.3. Chad

3.3.1. The role of the Chadian government in relation to spoilers 60 3.4. Somalia

3.4.1. The role of the Somali government in relation to spoilers 61

3.4.2. Al Shabaab in Somalia 62

3.5. Al Qaeda’s growing interest in the SCS-states 64

3.6. Link Analysis Al Qaeda, Janjaweed, and Al Shabaab 66

3.7. SWOT Analysis

3.7.1. Al Qaeda 68

3.7.2. Janjaweed 70

3.7.3. Al Shabaab 71

Conclusion 74

Conclusion and recommendations 77

Bibliography 82

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ABSTRACT

From an international perspective, failed states, characterized by incessant conflict, are considered a threat to regional and global stability in view of spill-over effects and the absence of a rule of law, which gives rise to local armed groups and creates an open invite to outside terrorist networks like Al Qaeda. This master thesis presents the findings of a comparative study on the three leading failed states of the world Sudan, Chad, and Somalia, which are weakened by protracted social conflicts and ineffective governance. The purpose of the present study is to determine the nexus between the failed status of the SCS-states, the continuation of violent conflict, and the spoilers involved. The central question concerns the social-political-economic consequences of protracted social conflicts and how these should be addressed. Edward Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflicts and Paul Wehr’s Conflict Mapping model are used to guide through the complex relations between state failure, protracted conflicts, and spoilers. In particular, the role of the government, Al Qaeda, the Janjaweed, and Al Shabaab is highlighted for their obstruction of conflict resolution. In the final analysis, the results of this research will demonstrate the importance of good governance in breaking the cycle of violence. Significantly, this study indicates that systematic violence in the SCS-states is structural for it is embedded in the nature of the post-colonial political system and the social structure, which is key to understanding why it is so difficult to end conflicts in these states.

KEY WORDS: Sudan, Chad, Somalia, state failure, protracted social conflicts, government, Al Qaeda, Janjaweed, Al Shabaab.

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PREFACE

I have written this master thesis as part of the study ‘International Relations and Organization’ at the University of Groningen. Within this master course, I consciously chose the specialization

‘International Security’, since it is my ultimate goal to work within the Defense (Intelligence) Organization. After having written several research papers on Islamic terrorism, including one on Somali piracy, I came to think of a topic for my master’s thesis fairly quickly. My interest in the growing threat posed by African failed states as a hotbed for domestic violence and international terrorism gave rise to examine the nexus between state failure, ongoing civil conflicts, and conflict actors. Edward Azar’s original interpretation of protracted social conflicts inspired me to use his theory as an analytical tool to understand the roots of conflict.

My special interest in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia stems from a shift in terrorist activities in the Middle East to Africa, specifically East Africa and the Horn. Following this shift and the increased terrorism activity, in the coming years the military focus will most likely expand from Iraq and Afghanistan to the respective regions. Ideally, my interest turned to fit well with those of my internship provider: the Defense Intelligence and Security Institute (DISI).

The reason I study more than one region is the fact that a comparative analysis is scientifically more sound. Additionally, I noticed that these countries display several similarities given that they are the leading failed states characterized by protracted social conflicts, accommodating increasingly violent armed groups, with suspected links to Al Qaeda. With this thesis I aim to highlight the significance of studying conflict actors in understanding what motivates them to maintain the cycle of violence. One of my ambitions has been to avoid the obvious by discussing a unique case which has practical use.

The relevance of this research in a broader context is that it partly served as a preliminary study for the DISI, which develops courses for intelligence analysts of the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and operational units. Presently, a course scenario of Sudan is developed to train intelligence analysts to support a potential military operation. I would like to express my gratitude to Captain Onno Goldbach (PhD student at the DISI) for his comments which contributed in shaping the final manuscript.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya AMISOM African Mission in Somalia

ARS Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia

ASWJ Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a

CIC Council of Islamic Courts

CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement North-South Sudan CRD Revolutionary Democratic Council

DPA Darfur Peace Agreement

FAN Armed forces of the North

FAP People’s Armed Forces

FROLINAT National Liberation Front

GoNU Government of National Unity

GWoT Global War on Terrorism

ICU Islamic Courts Union

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

JEM Justice and Equality Movement

NDA National Democratic Alliance

NIF National Islamic Front

NRF National Redemption Front

PPT Chadian Progressive Party

PSC Protracted Social Conflict

RFC Rally of Forces for Change

RPJ Popular Rally for Justice

SAF Sudanese Army Forces

SLA Sudan Liberation Army

SNM Somali National Movement

SPF Sudanese Police Forces

SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SSDF Southern Sudan Defense Force; Somali Salvation Democratic Front SSIM/A Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army

SSLM Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

TFG Transitional Federal Government

UFDD Union of Forces for Democracy and Development

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MAPS AND TABLES

Maps

Map 1 The post-colonial African continent 20

Map 2 Sudan 22

Map 3 Chad 25

Map 4 Somalia 26

Map 5 Chad-Cameroon pipeline 46

Map 6 Area of control Janjaweed 59

Map 7 Area of control Al Shabaab 62

Tables

Table 1 Conflict Mapping model: indicators, sources, elements, 16 and consequences of Protracted Social Conflicts

Table 2 Country profile and historic timeline 28

Table 3 Global, regional, and domestic sources of conflict 38

Table 4 Conflict analysis matrix 52

Table 5 SWOT Analysis matrix Al Qaeda, Janjaweed, Al Shabaab 73

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INTRODUCTION

Protracted conflicts not only destroy human, physical, and social infrastructure, but also deplete the economic resources and military capabilities of states and organized communities. All parties to protracted social conflicts become victimized, by being trapped in the vicious spiral of hostility and violence.¹

Of the many problems that face Africa, the most pressing is state failure. The resulting security vacuum breeds violence and seriously undermines basic human needs. Domestic and outside interest groups further destabilize the system. Without prospect for a better future, the local population struggles daily to survive oppression, marginalization, and insecurity. While the international focus remains on the failed states Iraq and Afghanistan, societies in African failed states further disintegrate due to the chronic instability of regimes and violent internal conflicts.

In a serious attempt to contribute to conflict analysis, this master thesis revolves around the current three primary failed states Sudan, Chad, and Somalia (hereafter SCS-states), which are entangled in protracted social conflicts and encounter similar challenges. In general, a failed or weak state is characterized by political, economic and social failure.² The term protracted social conflicts was originally coined by conflict analyst Edward Azar and generally refers to enduring violent conflicts.³

The absence of a rule of law is distinctive to these troubled states in which extremely violent interest groups seem to thrive. Sudan is plagued by two separate conflicts: between the north and the south, and the conflict in Darfur. While the North-South conflict appears to have reached its end with the impending independence of the South, political disagreement and violent clashes block satisfying arrangements and lasting peace. Meanwhile, the future of the people in Darfur remains uncertain with little attention to its suffering. The conflict in Chad cannot be viewed separately from the one in Sudan with violence and refugees crossing the border. News coverage on Somalia focuses on fighting piracy in Somali waters, which distracts from the underlying issues and uncontrollable forces on land.

To grasp the impact of the ongoing violence, the central research question for this study is: What are the social-political-economic consequences of protracted social conflicts in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia, and how should these be addressed? A response to this question will be presented in the final conclusion. In the preceding three chapters, a separate sub-question will be examined in order to answer the central question.

The first chapter explores the sub-question: Are the sources of state failure and conflict in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia primarily global, regional, or domestic? In seeking to understand why these states have failed and seem to continue to fail, I will study the context of its conflicts by means of conflict mapping. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary background to the roots of state failure and conflicts in the post-colonial period. Subsequently, the global, regional, and domestic sources of conflict will be compared, which is important for a broader understanding on the causes of

1 Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity,” in National Security in the Third World:

the Management of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), 88.

2 A more specific definition of failed states is offered in Chapter 1.

3 A more specific definition of protracted social conflicts is offered in the methodology section of the Introduction.

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state failure. A level of analysis is used to locate the sources within the international system, the regional system, and the national state system.

Following the conflict context, Chapter 2 offers a conflict analysis which is guided by the sub- question: Which conflict drivers, actors, and dynamics are central in the protracted social conflicts in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia? This descriptive analysis revolves around identifying the most influential actors and issues within the SCS-states. Even though International Relations studies often emphasize the negative influence of international interests, in line with Azar, I believe that protracted conflicts are caused and should be addressed mainly by domestic policies. In finding out what drives conflicts, social, political, and economic forces will be distinguished. The main actors, often rebel groups in opposition to the government, could be determined only after extensive study, which was complicated by the continuous change of group name and composition. The last issue discussed in this chapter is dynamics, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the changes in conflict over time.

Chapter 3 presents the study’s major findings on the role of the government and spoilers in PSCs.

The sub-question for this chapter is: To what extent do the government and the spoilers contribute to the domestic cycle of violence in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia? For the purpose of this thesis the term

‘spoiler’ is used to refer to groups which profit most from chaos and pose the greatest threat to peace, including terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s growing interest in the SCS-states and the nature of their relation with the Islamic groups Al Shabaab and Janjaweed will be assessed. If these groups, which respectively operate in the Sudan-Chad border area and Somalia, are inspired by and find support in advancing their cause, then it will be even more difficult to contain their security threat. This chapter looks specifically at the local and global impact of these linkages, which is essential to predict future threats and effective ways to counter them. Moreover, the applied Link Analysis and SWOT Analysis could lead to new insights on their characteristics and objectives.

A justification for the three sub-questions is provided in the section on analytical methodology.

Finally, a general conclusion will be provided that reflects upon the outcomes of the analysis in an attempt to put the central theme of protracted social conflict in the SCS-states and the involved spoilers in perspective. Ultimately, the central research question will be answered including recommendations on possible remedies.

My justification for selecting these states derives from four motivations. First, from the circa 60 failed states in the world Somalia, Chad, and Africa’s largest country Sudan are leading in the Failed States Index.⁴ Second, the continuous conflicts in these states have a regional spill-over effect. Third, these three states share the security threat as a breeding ground for terrorism. After a period of international neglect, September 11 (9/11) renewed strategic interest in these parts of Africa for their potential significance in the global war on terror. The fourth and final motivation is that not their regional similarities or differences are important here, but the causal connection between the first three motivations.

The purpose of this thesis is to help fill the research gap on the relationship between state failure, perpetual conflict, and conflict actors which intentionally disrupt peace processes (hereafter spoilers).⁵

4 The Failed States Index 2010, Foreign Policy Page,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (accessed September 7, 2010).

5 A more specific definition of conflict spoilers is offered in Chapter 3.

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There are a number of reasons why it is significant to understand this relation. One reason is that it is important to uncover the history and sources of state failure. Another reason is the need to examine the major driving forces, actors, and dynamics of conflict. The final reason is to recognize the opportunity provided by the cycle of violence to spoilers.

The value of this study is that it examines the role of spoilers in conflict within the SCS-states which has received little to no attention in international relations theory. This comparative analysis intends to offer a broader understanding of these severely divided societies, to identify and link conflict actors, patterns and changes over time, and to analyze connections between the major spoilers. An understanding of spoilers is critical because they pose a significant threat to state stability, human security, and peace-building efforts. Moreover, their threat often seems to be reinforced by government support, or as in the case of Somalia by government weakness. Apart from examining the threats of the Janjaweed and Al Shabaab, it will be questioned if assumed fears of Al Qaeda using these states as a staging ground are well founded. Misunderstanding on this subject has already created too many counterproductive interventionist efforts.

While it is wise neither to underestimate nor to overstate any security threat, it should be acknowledged that increasing terror activities in Central Africa and the Horn is serious reason for concern, therefore a main stimulus for this research. In Francis Fukuyama’s words: “[S]ince the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the single-most important problem for international order.”⁶

The empirical foundation for this thesis is based on Edward Azar’s Protracted Social Contract theory and Paul Wehr’s Conflict Mapping model, supported by expert opinions who studied state failure, conflicts, and conflict actors in the SCS-states. With respect to recent history and the causes of state failure in Africa historian Roel van der Veen’s What Went Wrong With Africa proved to be a useful source in offering very extensive and comprehensive historical descriptions.

An expert analysis on the case of Sudan will be provided by historian Jok Madut Jok. Expert on Darfur issues Alex de Waal describes the role of the Janjaweed and other armed groups. Concerning Chad, African historian Mario Azevedo proves to be one of the very few experts. According to Azevedo, little is written on Chad because of its complex features and its landlocked position, which is of no strategic interest.⁷ With respect to Somalia, William Zartman’s study on collapsed states and Ken Menkhaus’ reflections provide important insights on the ‘drivers and dynamics’ of clan rivalry in Somalia.

With regard to Al Qaeda, expert David Shinn’s study is used to explain Al Qaeda’s presence in East Africa and the Horn. Due to very limited open source material on Al Shabaab and the Janjaweed, the DISI has provided documentation from the subscriber journal Jane’s Terrorism & Security. This recent open source intelligence material has supplemented my research on spoilers in a valuable way by providing the most up-to-date information on some of the most violent groups in the world.

Finally, in this thesis various analysis techniques are used. A generic analysis is applied in Chapter 1 by describing the conflict context. A current analysis is used throughout Chapter 2 by explaining the conflict drivers and dynamics. To conclude with a group profile analysis in Chapter 3, complemented

6 Francis Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century (London: Profile, 2005), 92.

7 Mario J. Azevedo, Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad (Amsterdam [etc.]: Gordon and Breach, 1998), 2 and 3.

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by a Link Analysis and SWOT Analyses. In addition, two hypotheses will be proposed based on assumptions of possible research outcomes which will be tested by further study.

Analytical methodology

Since there is no study available that focuses on the type of actors discussed, this thesis uses both a theory and a model to guide the analysis of the relation between state failure, protracted conflicts, and spoilers: Edward Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflict and Paul Wehr’s Conflict Model. The chosen methods complement each other well in illustrating the complexity of prolonged conflicts. The methodology offers both descriptive concepts for analysis and prescriptive concepts to the extent of recommendations for organization.

With regard to the theoretical framework, Edward Azar, an early 1970s international relations scholar and former director of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, developed the notion of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC).⁸ He was one of the first to explain the complex nature of this type of intra-state conflict. Due to the complexity of these conflicts, Azar developed a rather unique, though neglected within mainstream international relations, theory to study its sources. Even in this post-9/11 era, Azar’s PSC theory still offers useful indicators on conflict sources.

By the term ‘protracted social conflict’ Azar means “the type of on-going and seemingly unresolvable conflict that is our current concern.”⁹ More specifically, he defines PSC as “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation.”¹⁰ Azar considers the fear of marginalization as the main cause of protracted social conflicts.

PSC theory emphasizes that the sources of conflict and failures of governance in development countries are principally within states instead of between states. Therefore, PSC ascribes the prevention or promotion of conflicts to the state which can either “satisfy or frustrate basic communal needs.”¹¹ Azar then sets out the following ten features of protracted social conflicts:

First, protracted social conflicts have typical characteristics which explain their continued nature.

Lasting features mentioned by Azar include “economic and technological underdevelopment, and unintegrated social and political systems.”¹² Changeable features include distributive injustice.

Second, protracted social conflicts are characterized by features that form the basis for uncontrollable conflict, which are: “multi-ethnic and communal cleavages and disintegrations, underdevelopment and distributive injustice.”¹³

Third, although ethnic and communal division is an important feature of protracted social conflicts its primary characteristic is the deprivation of human needs including “security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation.”¹⁴

8 Edward Azar was born in 1938 in Lebanon and died in 1991 in the United States.

9 Edward E. Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions,” in International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, ed. Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1986), 28.

10Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, 2^nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 84.

11 Ibid., 84.

12 Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts,” 28.

13 Ibid., 29.

14 Ibid., 29.

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Fourth, a significant feature of protracted social conflicts is that they have certain behavioral and structural characteristics in common, such as: “a denial of separate identity of parties involved in the political process; an absence of security of culture and valued relationships; and an absence of effective political participation through which victimization can be remedied.”¹⁵ All these characteristics make this type of conflict predictable.

Fifth, conflicts are often characterized by the neglect of underlying causes. It is emphasized that human needs and cultural values are non-negotiable, therefore agreements resulting from negotiations that ignore fundamental origins of the conflict do not last. After all, unresolved tensions would risk a return to violence.

Sixth, in line with the previous, it is argued that conflict resolution requires more than just conflict management given the complexity of PSCs. To achieve a stable long-term solution, conflict resolution must take into account underlying issues and the many different interests at stake. This requires a thorough analysis of the parties involved and their interests.

Seventh, Azar holds that PSC-research aims to correct the neglect of the identity group in international relations study, because the identity group is viewed as the most useful PSC-analysis tool. Particularly Azar sees the identity group as “the key to research and to conflict resolution” as it is

“more informative than the nation-state.”¹⁶

Eighth, this feature is based on research claiming that PSC-actors seek to “do all things they see as serving their interests, as they set out to accomplish the task of satisfying their basic needs […]

Ultimately, actors behave in order to satisfy domestic social needs and not international ones […] there are international and national interests which actors manipulate and exchange in return for the opportunity of satisfying domestic needs.”¹⁷

Ninth, Azar advocates a model of decentralization in order to resolve continued conflicts and to pursue “human and societal needs, because in protracted conflict situations, highly centralized political structures are sources of conflict. They reduce the opportunity for a sense of community among groups. They increase alienation and they tend to deny groups the means to accomplish their needs.” Decentralized structures, by contrast, promote a “sense of identity, participation and security.”¹⁸

Regarding the tenth and final feature Azar stresses the importance of studying the historical development of protracted social conflicts as they are “reshaping the societies involved, and have a considerable spill-over effect into the international society.”¹⁹ Especially when many conflict parties and issues are involved, conflict resolution becomes more difficult. The notion of PSC offers a better understanding of these conflict parties and issues by studying “motivations of those involved, authority roles, political and social structures, behavior patterns, needs and interests, and other aspects.”²⁰

Next, Azar identified four sources of protracted social conflict.²¹ His classification of sources is similar to Wehr’s who arranges sources by a global, regional, and domestic level. Accordingly, Wehr’s

15 Ibid., 30.

16 Ibid., 31.

17 Ibid., 32 and 33.

18 Ibid., 34.

19 Ibid., 36.

20 Ibid., 38.

21 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 85–87.

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first global and second regional level can be perceived to be the same as Azar’s fourth source ‘role of international linkages’. Wehr’s third domestic level is comparable to Azar’s domestic sources:

‘communal content’, ‘deprivation of human needs and neglect human grievances’, ‘cycle of fear and violence’, and ‘increased dependency and cliency’. Wehr’s fourth conflict actor level and fifth elite/individual level resemble Azar’s ‘process dynamics’.²² Finally, Wehr’s level of ‘spoilers’ is parallel to Azar’s ‘identity groups’.

Azar’s first source for PSC, ‘communal content’, focuses on identity groups in which the relationship between the state and these dominant groups is viewed as the core problem.²³ Examples include ‘colonial legacy’, explained by Azar by stating that: “in many postcolonial multicommunal societies the state machinery comes to be dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society which strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict.”²⁴ Thus, according to Azar, for the resolution of protracted conflicts it is essential to explore the needs of the parties involved “and the ways and means of satisfying them.”²⁵ In this thesis, Azar’s term ‘identity groups’ has been replaced by the currently more suitable term ‘spoilers’.

The second underlying source of PSC is the ‘deprivation of human needs’ and the neglect of consequent grievances by the authority. By needs Azar means “security needs, development needs, political access needs and identity needs (cultural and religious expression).”²⁶ Failure to address these needs may cause a protracted social conflict. In particular, access to social institutions is deemed crucial but is limited by dominant power groups. This concept of human needs is most important in understanding the power imbalance in the SCS-states, where dominant group interests are prioritized at the expense of the needs of socially marginalized groups, Azar’s so-called ‘winner-take-all’ norm.

As a third PSC source Azar emphasizes the ‘role of the governance and the state’. In practice, a state needs to regulate society and protect its citizens. States which experience protracted social conflict, however, tend to be “incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments fail to satisfy basic human needs.”²⁷ Furthermore, he notes that dominant identity groups who “use the state as an instrument for maximizing their interests at the expense of others” obstruct effective governance.²⁸ Again, here I would like to refer to these groups being renamed ‘spoilers’ for the purpose of this study.

The fourth and final source concerns the role of ‘international linkages’, arguing that not only the national system but also the international system influences protracted social conflicts. Azar asserts that “particularly weak states are porous to the international forces operating within the wider global community: the formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkage within the international system.”²⁹ Accordingly, he distinguishes two models of international linkage.³⁰ The first model focuses on

‘economic dependency’, which limits the autonomy of the state and distorts political and economic

22 Ibid., 97.

23 Ibid., 85.

24 Ibid., 86.

26 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 86.

27 Ibid., 87.

28 Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1990), 10.

29 Ibid., 11.

30 Ibid., 11 and12.

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systems. The second model stresses ‘political and military client relationships with strong states’, which also reduces state autonomy.

Finally, Azar sets out four consequences of protracted social conflicts.³¹ The first consequence is

‘deterioration of physical security’, by which he means insecurity and underdevelopment owing to the destruction of infrastructure owing to the priority of most African autocratic governments of military spending. Azar stresses that “reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment.

Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society.”³²

A second consequence is ‘institutional deformity’, which refers to the limitation of access to social institutions as a result of weak regulation by the government. But also as a result of fragmentation of society in which dominant identity groups take over control.

‘Psychological ossification’ is the third consequence mentioned by Azar, which concerns the stress of the cycle of fear and violence that contributes to a ‘war culture’, further weakening interactions between conflict parties.

The fourth and final consequence concerns ‘increased dependency and cliency’, referring to aid and conflict intervention by external actors. Effective assistance to conflict resolution is still insufficient.

The overview of the features, sources, and consequences of protracted social conflicts in Table 1 shows how the status of these conflicts can be identified and studied. Azar’s ‘features’ has been replaced by the term ‘indicators’, as used in contemporary conflict analysis. The indicators will mainly show in Chapter 1 in the first part on the historic country and conflict profiles. The sources will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, since they have an explanatory quality for a structured analysis.

The causal connections which can be derived from relating the indicators, sources, and consequences, will be addressed in the final conclusion. As each country, conflict and group is unique, it is important to establish that the proposed framework is adjusted to the specific context of this thesis.

Azar concludes by stating that there are no winners in this endless form of conflict which poses a serious challenge to peace-building.³³ His concluding remark is very relevant for this study by suggesting that “the increase of state-sponsored terrorism and the disruption of trade and commerce are a by-product of these conflicts, thereby making their resolution all the more important.”³⁴

For the purpose of mapping the protracted social conflicts as mentioned by Azar, expert on peace and conflict studies Paul Wehr’s Conflict Mapping model will be used. His method is most instructive:

it serves as a roadmap for the conflicts in the SCS-states consisting of two central themes: conflict context and conflict analysis. Regarding the conflict context, Wehr stresses the significance of understanding the origins of conflict through studying information on the history and sources of conflict.³⁵ The subsequent conflict analysis includes four components: 1. conflict drivers, 2. conflict actors, 3. conflict dynamics, and 4. spoilers. The history and sources are covered in Chapter 1, the drivers, actors, and dynamics are addressed in Chapter 2, and the spoilers are the main theme of

31 Ibid., 16 and17.

33 Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, 17.

35 Paul Wehr, “Conflict Mapping,” Beyond Intractability Page, September 2006,

http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict_mapping/?nid=6793 (accessed September 4, 2010).

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Chapter 3. These Conflict Mapping elements are summarized in Table 1 (p. 16). The sub-questions in each of these chapters are based on the main themes.

Conflict mapping is a useful method since it serves as an essential means to structure and understand the complexity of PSCs in order to develop recommendations towards a possible resolution. According to Wehr, an important purpose of mapping is “to help opposing parties to distinguish their goals/positions from their true interests/needs and bring those goals and interests as close to unity as possible.”³⁶ In many respects, conflict mapping is an indispensable tool for every party involved.

In sum, Wehr’s conflict model fits well with Azar’s PSC theory. In the chapters that follow, both will be used to examine the continued conflicts in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia, drawing on Azar’s arguments through a level of analysis approach. The assessments might be of use to analysts who need to estimate the gravity of the political and security challenges of the SCS-states. The main conclusion that can be taken from the described analytical methodology is that though originated in the 1970s, Azar’s theory is still relevant in studying contemporary conflicts. This also applies to Wehr’s more recent model, since each study needs a good map.

36 Ibid.

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Table 1. Conflict Mapping model: indicators, sources, elements, and consequences of Protracted Social Conflicts Conflict context Indicators

1. Underdevelopment

2. Ethnic and communal division 3. Denial human needs

4. Absence effective political participation 5. Neglect underlying causes of conflict 6. Insufficient conflict management 7. Neglect identity group

8. Self-serving interests PSC-actors 9. Highly centralized political structures 10. Spill-over effect

Sources

Domestic:

1. Communal content

2. Deprivation of human needs and neglect human grievances 3. Relationship state and identity groups

Global/regional:

4. Role of international linkages (economic and military) Conflict analysis Elements

1. Drivers 2. Actors 3. Dynamics 4. Spoilers Conflict resolution Consequences

1. Insecurity and underdevelopment 2. Limited access to social institutions 3. Cycle of fear and violence

4. Increased dependency and cliency

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Hypotheses

Within this thesis two hypotheses are formulated in order to make the assumptions on the causal relationship between failed states, continued conflicts, and spoilers more explicit. They are also meant to minimize the risk of bias and self-serving analyses. These hypotheses will be evaluated against measurable observations. On the basis of the analytical methodology (H1) and based on my own reasoning (H2), I would like to propose the following expectations on the outcomes of this study:

Hypothesis 1: The prolonged nature of conflicts in the SCS-states is rooted in the structural imbalance of domestic forces

Finding proof of this relation is important in order to recognize and explain the negative impact of domestic power imbalance. Political strife between the dominant elites and marginalized ethnic groups is a recurring theme in the SCS-states. In a hierarchical society, often those in power view violent tactics as the only way to maintain the status quo. This has a profound influence on the escalation of conflicts and the polarization of society. When the problems of these dysfunctional societies are embedded in the structure of society then they cannot be solved by outside interference. If the hypothesis is correct, then this would demonstrate the priority of studying domestic rather than international actors. Hypothesis 1 will be addressed in response to the sub-question of Chapter 2.

Hypothesis 2: Government leaders mobilize spoilers which makes them primarily accountable for the consequences of conflict

Identifying the principal responsible party in conflict is crucial to determine which actor(s) pose(s) the greatest challenge to conflict resolution. These may be political leaders, as in the SCS-states the focus is on military rule, in which power is centralized around autocratic state leaders who aim to secure their power position by all means. In doing so, state leaders seem to profit from national chaos and incline to fuel rather than end conflicts. In this last respect, social divisions are often exploited and proxy forces may be used to maintain the monopoly of power. In turn, violent oppression usually increases resistance from opposition groups. This way, peace processes are severely disrupted, leaving no room for either compromise or change. If the hypothesis proofs to be correct, then the first step toward resolution is governance reform. Hypothesis 2 is linked to the sub-question in Chapter 3.

These assumptions, however, call for a thorough analysis of protracted conflicts, starting with the conflict context as described in the first chapter, with the introduction on the next page.

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Chapter 1

Protracted Social Conflict Context Sudan, Chad, Somalia

Introduction

Chapter 1 prepares the grounds for this study by providing the fundamental historical base. This chapter revolves around state failure which is studied within the context of conflicts. Often, decades of conflict precede state failure. In this thesis the term failed states will be used as defined by Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick: “countries that lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population.”³⁷ In other words, governments in failed states fail to guarantee the fundamental rights and basic needs of its citizens as well as protecting the population from violence.

In this chapter, the following sub-question will be addressed: Are the sources of state failure and conflict in Sudan, Chad and Somalia primarily global, regional, or domestic? As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter will be guided by Paul Wehr’s Conflict Mapping model based on the two thematic categories: conflict history and sources of conflict, supported by arguments from Azar’s PSC- theory.

Since a state does not fail without a cause, it is important to explore its historical context. I have chosen the post-colonial period as a starting point because of two reasons: first, I consider it the most relevant period for this context, and second, the decolonization period is the most recent significant turning point in African history. The sources of conflict significantly contribute in distinguishing the causes and consequences of state failure.

Within the two main themes, subcategories have been selected in order to fit this research and to promote clarity. In selecting each category, the following criteria were used: the reliability of the data and the relevance of the information to state failure in relation to the rise in terrorist activity. The focus of discussion concerns the political and security function of the SCS-states. Political indicators include accountability and level of corruption, while security indicators include conflict intensity, political instability, and terrorist activity.

The structure of this chapter is organized around four sections based on the Conflict model categories, which are specifically applied to the country cases Sudan, Chad, and Somalia. First, section 1 sets out a general African historical background. Section 2, 3, and 4 provide a country profile and outline of the history of conflict in the SCS-states. Finally, section 5 explores the global, regional, and domestic sources of conflict. The main goal of this chapter is to show in more detail how the sources of conflict can explain the continuing character of conflicts.

This chapter is significant in order to obtain a broader understanding of state failure in the SCS- states. It is based on the analysis of cross-national data in which the role of the African state, mostly

37 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World,” The Brookings Institution (2008), 3.

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authoritarian in nature, is an important one. Apart from the state, international linkages increasingly play an important role. This cross-country comparison provides a detailed analysis of each state’s weaknesses and may serve as a useful guidance to institutions that need to assess its security threat.

Equally important, this model may be a tool to provide insight into the profile of this unique triangle in order to determine to what extent these countries should be given priority.

Lastly, whereas most has been written on Sudan and Somalia, less literature is available on Chad, therefore the observed data in this comparative study will vary in length. Incomplete information does indicate that more current data is needed for a more accurate picture. In creating a more insightful comparison between the SCS-states, the text on history is translated in Table 2 (p. 28) and the sources in Table 3 (p. 38).

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1.1. Africa’s post-colonial historic profile

A historical context is provided to distinguish African history from histories of other civilizations.

Whereas an ahistorical approach risks the neglect of influential past events, a historical context perspective reflects on these events and reduces false assumptions. Before discussing the SCS-states separately, Wehr’s conflict model requires outlining a broad historical context for it is important to recollect on how African colonized states came to develop its present structure. It is also meant to increase understanding on the nature of the state. This argumentation is supported by Azar who stresses the importance of a holistic approach to problems by studying its historical and cultural background.³⁸

Post-colonial historical background Africa

Map 1. The Post-colonial African continent (Source: ec.europa.eu) After a process of decolonization

around 1960, at a time when the norm of self-determination was promoted, many former European colonies were unprepared for political independence. Although the end of colonial dominance gave way to democratic rule, newly independent African regimes continued the colonial divisive rule, encouraging domestic struggle between the major ethnic groups. As illustrated by historian Roel van der Veen, “African politics became increasingly

autocratic in the 1960s and 1970s. The necessary checks and balances entirely disappeared. Heads of state had absolute power…”³⁹ As a result, Azar argues that nation-building as we experienced in the West never was completed in many African countries.⁴⁰ Subsequently, underdevelopment created social unrest, undermining stability. Ever since, and despite a wave of democratization in the late 1980s, conflicts dominate the African continent, which weakens the already fragile countries. To date, some African states still prove incapable of self-rule and experience severe political instability. As might be expected, this situation causes social, political, and economic imbalance, including the marginalization of certain ethnic groups. Over time, this imbalance was institutionalized since it has become a permanent feature of this type of system.

38 Edward E. Azar, and John W. Burton, “Lessons for Great Power Relations,” in International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, ed. Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1986), 117.

39 Roel van der Veen, What Went Wrong With Africa: A Contemporary History (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2004), 26.

40 Edward E. Azar, and Chung-in Moon, “Towards an Alternative Conceptualization,” in National Security in the Third World:

the Management of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), 279.

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UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s conclusion in a UN Security Council report is quite illustrative:

The nature of political power in many African states, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflict across the continent. It is frequently the case that political victory assumes a winner-takes-all form with respect to wealth and resources, patronage, and the prestige and prerogatives of office. Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high. (Annan, 1998)⁴¹

After decolonization the new African elites used the state to pursue their individual interests in order to secure their own survival instead of using it in the common interest of developing their country.

What makes it particularly difficult to change these regimes is that African rulers are supported by patronage networks, defined by Van der Veen as “rulers [who] derive their support from ‘clients’, people [a.o. the army and the police] who are tied to them by virtue of services rendered.” These ties are personal rather than formal in order to maintain the traditional power structures. As pointed out by Jok, the ruling Arab elite remain “fearful about the consequences of sharing power and resources with the non-Arabs.”⁴² Yet, owing to ineffective government, their power is challenged by rebel groups who seize the opportunity to profit from the growing instability and weakening law enforcement.

Furthermore, Van der Veen stresses the importance of the impact of the Cold War on Africa by arguing that on a local level conflicts increased as a result of ethnic tensions, damaging socioeconomic development, while on a global level Africa was not up for the challenge of globalization due to its “lag in technological development and limited integration into world markets.”⁴³ Since the state system had not developed either, still based on absolute rule of elites, corruption intensified. In addition, after the Cold War the West reduced development aid because they were losing interest in the troubled continent. This combination of factors further weakened states and strengthened fragmentation.

The next section will focus on the three African countries discussed in this study. Two of these countries were former colonies: Sudan was a British colony, while Chad was colonized by the French.

Although Somalia was not colonized, it was occupied by Italy (Italian Somaliland), Britain (British Somaliland and British East Africa), France (around the city of Djibouti) and Ethiopia (the Ogaden) (see also Table 2).⁴⁴ Immediately after their independence, internal rivalries intensified. As a result, nation-building failed and a lack in national unity and increasing ethnic tensions caused continuous armed ethnic conflict. In particular Azar stressed the importance of studying the historical development of protracted social conflicts as they are “reshaping the societies involved, and have a considerable spill-over effect into the international society.”⁴⁵

41 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 102.

42 Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007), 275.

43 Van der Veen, What Went Wrong With Africa, 50 and 139.

44 Ibid., 46.

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1.2. Sudan

1.2.1. Country profile Map 2. Sudan (Source: lib.utexas.edu/maps) The Republic Sudan, a federation of 25 states, is located

in northern Africa, and shares a border with Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, and Libya (see map 2).⁴⁶ The largest African country Sudan consists of sub-states and districts with an estimated population of 41 million (2010).⁴⁷ In the last fifty years the population has quadrupled. The population is made up around 600 tribes and 57 ethnic groups of which almost 40 percent considers itself of Arabic origin, however, mixed marriages cause most Sudanese to be of mixed blood.

North Sudan with the capital Khartoum is mainly inhabited by Arabic Sudanese and nomadic people such

as the Beja, Rashaida and Nuba. The major ethnic groups in South Sudan are the Dinka and the Nuer.

The northern Sudanese have always been in the majority and more developed than the southern Sudanese. Compared to North Sudan, the south is rather weakly developed, despite its large oil reserves.

The largest non-Arabic group is the Fur in West-Sudan, therefore called Darfur. One of the major Arab tribes is the Baggara or Shuwa-Arabs. Darfur is characterized by contrasts between nomadic, Arab-speaking tribes from North Darfur, and non-Arabic speaking farmers in the southern part of Darfur. However, the ethnic distinction between Arab and African tribes is not always clear. In West Darfur the African tribe Masalit dominated until continuous attacks by the Janjaweed made them seek refuge in Chad.

Because of the great ethnic diversity the number of languages spoken in Sudan is over a 100, although Arabic is promoted as the national language by the Arab ruling elite. As for religion, the majority of the northern Sudanese is Muslim, while in South Sudan animism [secular local belief] or the Christian belief is most common.

Economically, oil and petroleum products are the major exports of Sudan. Despite large oil revenues, these are not invested in social-economic infrastructure, leaving the majority of the population to live under poor conditions without future prospects.

This largest African nation was colonized by the British in 1898 and gained independence in 1956.

A fragile state, a country of contradictions that even before its independence knew civil war between the north dominated by Arabic Muslims and African Animists/Christians in the south.

46 For a map of the continent of Africa see p. 20.

47 The World Bank, Country Brief Page, March 2009,

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXTN/0,,menuPK:375432~pagePK:14113 2~piPK:141107~theSitePK:375422,00.html (accessed September 28, 2010).