IS THE GROUP HIERARCHY FAIR?
Intragroup competition as a response to influence hierarchy illegitimacy
moderated by the steepness of the influence hierarchy
Master Thesis
Master Human Resource Management
University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
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ABSTRACT
As hierarchy legitimacy is mostly researched on a society level (i.e. system justification theory), this research sheds a different light on hierarchy legitimacy, by looking at it from a group level. While people on a society level react on an illegitimate hierarchy by justifying it for their own feeling of fairness, people on a group level try to re-establish the legitimacy of the hierarchy by intragroup competition. The steepness of the influence hierarchy is considered as a possible moderator for the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition, as in a steep hierarchy the distance between positions is larger and therefore the difference in positions achieve more relevance. Two hypotheses were tested in a field study of 47 work groups drawn from a wide range of industries. Results confirm the first hypothesis, showing that influence hierarchy legitimacy is negatively related to intragroup competition. The study showed no support, however for the second hypothesis, that the steepness of the influence hierarchy moderates the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition. This study contributes to theory as it can help to clarify and advance research on the effects of influence hierarchy legitimacy on a group level.
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INTRODUCTION
Hierarchy, characterized by an implicit rank order which is based on a social dimension, exists in virtually every society, organization or group (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Theories on societal hierarchies postulate that the legitimacy (i.e., the perceived fairness) of hierarchies is a crucial characteristic that can lead to the success or failure of whole societies (Jost & Hunyady, 2003). A theory that explains the process of legitimation is system justification theory. This theory states that people legitimize the existing social order out of a belief in a just world, because it is only in such a world that they get what they deserve (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Hierarchical inequality among individuals is accepted, even by the individuals who are worst of (i.e., those lower ranked in hierarchies), because they believe that the maintenance of a hierarchical system is in the long run beneficial to all parties involved (Jost, 2001).
Though system justification theorists have demonstrated the importance of hierarchical legitimacy for the maintenance of large-scale groups, we know little about the importance of hierarchy legitimacy in smaller groups where all group members interact with each other on a day-to-day basis. Such groups are also inevitably characterized by hierarchies, which may be perceived as more or less legitimate by its members depending on the fairness of the procedures that formed the hierarchies (Tyler, 2006). As described before, in societal hierarchies, it matters for the success or failure of the society if people consider their hierarchy as legitimate or illegitimate, even if they are a small part of a larger society (Jost & Hunyady, 2003). Interestingly, in smaller groups, such as work groups in organizations, people interact with each other personally, and the illegitimacy of hierarchies may be all the more confronting when individuals have to work with unfairly dominant or submissive individuals every day.
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Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008). The empirical work cited here mostly investigated formal hierarchies, in which the rank order of all members is formalized. In the current paper, I research whether similar relations exist for influence hierarchies (i.e., informal hierarchies that emerge from social interactions between group members, see Magee & Galinsky, 2008). More specifically, based on the idea that intragroup competition can lead to rearranging the positions and thereby re-establishing the legitimacy in the influence hierarchy, I argue that an illegitimate influence hierarchy can lead to intragroup competition. People can increase their effort and commitment to try to outperform others.
Although I expect influence hierarchy legitimacy to negatively relate to intragroup competition, research has demonstrated that not all informal hierarchies are equally strong, or in other words, equally hierarchical. That is, the absolute distance between positions in a hierarchy can differ dramatically (Christie & Barling, 2010). For example, Halevy, Chou, Galinsky and Murnighan (2012) identified informal hierarchies ranging from relatively flat and egalitarian to tall and strongly hierarchical in groups of the National Basketball Association. I argue that this steepness (i.e., the absolute difference between positions in the group) of the influence hierarchy is an important moderating factor that affects the strength of the relationship between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition. Specifically, I expect that in steeper hierarchies where the absolute difference in group members’ positions is large, the negative effects of influence hierarchy illegitimacy are strengthened (Christie & Barling, 2010). This is because the difference in benefits for each position in the influence hierarchy increases and therefore the stakes are higher (Anderson & Brown, 2010).
I will test the hypotheses in a field study among 47 work groups from different types of organizations. In doing so, this research strives to make two important theoretical contributions. First, as mentioned before, legitimacy is mainly described on a societal level as a crucial characteristic that can determine the success or failure of a society (Jost & Hunyady, 2003). This research extends prior work on hierarchy legitimacy by demonstrating that the effects of legitimacy on society level versus group level are different. The group level is very distinct from the society level as groups are smaller, with more face-to-face contact. The results of the current study will demonstrate that, due to the different characteristics of these hierarchies, people respond differently to an illegitimate hierarchy. Legitimacy in a group will provide more clear and direct results than in a society. Thus, the effects of legitimacy on the behaviour of people are even stronger in a group.
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Previous work on both society-level hierarchies and on formal hierarchies in large scale groups has not considered the strength of such hierarchies. The current research will contribute to this work by showing that influence hierarchy steepness (i.e. the strength of the influence hierarchy) is an important factor for the strength of the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition.
Practically, the conclusions of this research can help organizations to improve the effectiveness of their work groups. That is, empirical work has demonstrated that intragroup competition can negatively affect group effectiveness and success (Tyler & Blader, 2000; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and may in fact lead to sabotage and breaking rules because people are trying to outperform one another (Sivanathan, 2008). Especially when groups perform cooperative tasks, competition has to be minimized (Beersema, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, Conlon & Ilgen, 2003). Based on the current research, it appears that organizations have to ensure that influence hierarchies are legitimate in order to minimize intragroup competition, especially when influence hierarchy is steep. Organizations can do this by making the managers monitor how informal relations develop in a group. Managers have to be part of a group as that gives the manager knowledge of the different influence positions people deserve based on their qualities. The manager can thereby see if the current influence hierarchy is legitimate or not.
THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK
Group level influence hierarchies
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determined. However, these influence hierarchies are sometimes perceived as legitimate and sometimes perceived as illegitimate by group members.
Legitimacy of the influence hierarchy
Hierarchy legitimacy can be defined as a feeling of an individual that his or her position has been determined by appropriate, agreed-upon means (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In a legitimate hierarchy, all positions are appropriate and deserved (Hays & Goldstein, 2015). For example, when individuals do not have enough knowledge or experience to solve an issue, exerted influence by this individual is perceived as illegitimate. In contrast, when a group member has the knowledge or skills needed for a particular situation, this group member is expected by other group members to exert influence (Aime, Humphrey, DeRue & Paul, 2014). When the hierarchy is legitimate, people feel personally obligated to defer to decisions, rules and procedures (Tyler, 2006).
Scholars generally assume that people have a striving for status and influence, which suggests that lower-ranked individuals would always resist the current hierarchy or never find it legitimate. Empirical work contradicts this by showing in an experimental sample that when the assignment of influence is legitimate for a group, even members with a low influence will view their position as acceptable and will identify and commit to their group (Ellemers, Wilke & Van Knippenberg, 1993). Also, another empirical paper shows in an experimental sample that in a legitimate power hierarchy, group members are inclined to promote cooperation, order and stability in the power hierarchy (Lammers et al., 2008). However, when the power hierarchy is illegitimate, this can motivate group members to take corrective action to re-establish the legitimacy of the power hierarchy (Lammers et al., 2008). As the empirical work of Lammers et al. (2008) is on power hierarchies, I suggest a similar relation for influence hierarchies.
Intragroup competition
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suggests that high rank has a lot of benefits such as more credit for the work, and more prestige and respect in the eyes of others (Anderson et al., 2012), and low rank has a lot of downsides such as less social recognition, and less participation (Anderson & Brown, 2010), group members also recognize the positive side of taking a position that contributes to the group goals. This is because eventually the group’s success or failure directly affects individuals’ own outcomes (Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major & Phillips, 1995). However, group members will only accept these positions when they are established in a fair way (Taifel, 1982). In case of an unfair procedure, the resulting hierarchy will be considered illegitimate (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), which will result in resistance among group members.
I therefore argue that intragroup competition arises as a result of an illegitimate influence hierarchy. When group members see the positions of themselves and/or others as illegitimate, they may feel that the positions in the influence hierarchy need to change resulting from the realization that there are legitimate alternatives to the existing influence hierarchy (Caddick, 1982). This increases the likelihood of challenging the current system of hierarchical relations (Hays & Goldstein, 2015). In fact, people do not feel obligated to support illegitimate influence hierarchies (Tyler, 2006) because their own and others opportunities are unfairly limited (Ellemers et al., 1993). Besides a limitation of opportunities, illegitimacy leads group members to deal with other group members that are wrongly in a certain position (Aime et al., 2014). The low ranked have to deal with people who have influence over them, but do not deserve that influence position. This results in a disagreement on who deserves the high influence position, which can end up in group members following different high positioned group members in their instructions (Gardner, 2010). Also, these group members with an illegitimate high influence position will be assigned to difficult tasks while their competences are insufficient which leads them struggling with tasks beyond their capabilities (Gardner, 2010). This illegitimacy leads people to compete with each other by increasing their effort and commitment to raise their ranking or to bring down people who have an unfairly high rank (Baron & Pferrer, 1994; Festinger, 1954), motivated by a desire to restore influence hierarchy legitimacy (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Together, these arguments suggest that the legitimacy of the influence hierarchy has a negative influence on intragroup competition, because the more legitimate an influence hierarchy, the lower the intragroup competition. In case of an illegitimate influence hierarchy, competition will increase between group members. Stated formally:
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Moderating effects of influence hierarchy steepness
As mentioned before, there is always a rank order in groups (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) that results in a differentiation between group members. In this rank order, it matters how large the differences between the positions are for how important the positions are (Christie & Barling, 2010). Therefore, I expect influence hierarchy steepness to moderate the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition.
According to Christie and Barling (2010), influence hierarchy steepness can be defined as the distance between influence positions in a hierarchy. In a flat (i.e., low steepness) influence hierarchy group members are ranked relatively closely together, while in a tall (i.e., high steepness) influence hierarchy the influence differences between group members are large. As the influence hierarchy is getting steeper, the differences in positions achieve greater relevance and importance (Anderson & Brown, 2010).
High influence hierarchy steepness. In a situation of high influence hierarchy
steepness, the differences between group members are large and the gains associated with such positions are therefore more valuable. That is, higher positions in an influence hierarchy have social and psychological benefits such as increased prestige (Berger, Rosenholtz & Zelditch, 1980), more credit for group successes (Fan & Gruenfeld, 1998), permission to interrupt others (Bales & Slater, 1955), and better overall well-being (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). On the opposite side, lower positions in an influence hierarchy come with less participation, more blame for group failures (Weisband, Schneider & Connolly, 1995), expressing appreciation (Tiedens, 2000), and increased feelings of fear, shame, and anxiety (Mazur, 1973; Tiedens, 2000). Under high influence hierarchy steepness, I expect the relation between influence hierarchy legitimate and intragroup competition to be more negative due to the large distance between positions within that hierarchy. This is because the difference in benefits gets larger, which makes the higher influence positions more valuable (Christie & Barling, 2010). Therefore I expect that an illegitimate influence hierarchy results in even more intragroup competition when the influence hierarchy is steep.
Low influence hierarchy steepness. In case of low influence hierarchy steepness,
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hierarchy and making it more legitimate. The illegitimacy matters less because the difference in benefits of the higher position is not that different from the current position.
Based on the arguments above, I propose that influence hierarchy steepness moderates the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition. With this moderating model, it is clarified in what situations the negative relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition is strong and in what situations this relation is weaker. These arguments suggest that influence hierarchy legitimacy will be even more negatively related to intragroup competition when the influence hierarchy is steep. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 2. Influence hierarchy steepness moderates the relationship between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition; influence hierarchy legitimacy is more negatively related to intragroup competition when the influence hierarchy is steep.
This results in the following model:
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METHOD
Sample and Procedures
To test the hypotheses, data was collected among 56 work groups (consisting of 56 leaders and 258 group members) from all different kinds of organizations. First, group leaders were contacted to participate. When they agreed, all the group members were informed about the research and asked for consent. Groups had to meet the following criteria: they must have at least 4 members, perform organizationally-relevant work, interact often face-to-face, share resources and information, and combine efforts to meet common goals (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). Online data collection was used by sending questionnaires via e-mail to group members. The questionnaires were about different social processes within the group. Participation was voluntary and confidentiality was guaranteed.
Out of the 56 groups, 47 groups had sufficient response rates to be included in the sample, resulting in a response rate of 62% of the group members and 80% of the group leaders. Groups from different organizations operated in industries such as education (15%), healthcare (13%), and business services (11%). Other industries were financial institutes (2%), ICT (4%), industrial (8%), government (7%), and agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishery (2%). The rest of the organizations operated in other industries (38%).
Group size varied from 4 to 12 members (M = 5.47, SD = 2.16). For the group members the male to female ratio was 42% male, 58% female, and the mean age was 36.19 years (SD = 12.40). The educational level was 6% secondary qualification, 23% intermediate vocational qualification, 44% higher vocational qualification, 26% university degree, and 1% PhD.
Measures
Influence hierarchy legitimacy. Group members reflected on influence hierarchy
legitimacy with five different items based on a self-developed scale. Influence hierarchy legitimacy was measured on group level with items as “The degree of influence of team members based on their contribution to the success of the team.”; “Within my team, team members obtain influence over decisions in the right way.” and “In my team the right people influence the important decisions.”. All answers were on a Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). The scales were translated into Dutch for the Dutch respondents. Scale reliability was reached with a Cronbach’s alpha of .82, and aggregation statistics supported aggregating to the group level: ICC1 = .14; ICC2 = .35; mean rwg = .85.
Intragroup competition. Group members reflected on intragroup competition in the
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(2012). Intragroup competition was measured on group level with items as “My team members frequently take sides (i.e., form coalitions) during conflicts.”; “My team members experience conflicts due to members trying to assert their dominance.”; “My team members compete for influence.” and “My team members disagree about the relative value of members’ contributions.”. All answers were ranging on a Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). The scales were translated into Dutch for the Dutch respondents. Scale reliability was reached with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .85, and aggregation statistics supported aggregating to the group level: ICC1 = .18; ICC2 = .43; mean rwg = .78.
Influence hierarchy steepness. Group members reflected on the differences in
influence in their group. They were asked to evaluate the influence of each of the members of their work group. Group members’ answers ranged on a 3-point scale (0 = not at all, 1 = somewhat, 2 = a lot). To measure steepness, participants’ answers on these items were first averaged for all individuals separately, and then the average influence scores of individuals were used to calculate the standard deviation. This resulted in a steepness measure of the influence within the group (for a similar operationalization, see Greer & Van Kleef, 2010). This procedure resulted in an appropriate measure of influence hierarchy steepness when modeling interaction effects (Roberson, Sturman, & Simons, 2007). The scales were translated into Dutch for the Dutch respondents.
Measures Additional Analysis
Current empirical work often characterizes informal hierarchy by its steepness, in which low steepness (i.e., a flat informal hierarchy) is considered to be a weak hierarchy in terms of strength, and high steepness (i.e., a tall informal hierarchy) is considered to be strong in terms of strength. There are, however, different ways of operationalizing hierarchy strength. As an additional exploratory analysis these variables are also included.
Acyclicity. Acyclicity is a form of dyadic dominance, it represents which group
members defer to which other group members (Bunderson, Van der Vegt, Cantimur & Rink, 2015). Group members in a perfectly acyclical (i.e., strong) hierarchy never have direct or indirect influence over a member who has direct or indirect influence over them (Krackhardt, 1994). We presented the group members with a list of all the group members, in which they were asked to rate how much influence this individual had over them. Their answers were coded into two categories in which 0 = “not at all” and 1 = “somewhat” or “to a large extent”. Acyclicity was computed with Krackhardt’s (1994) network hierarchy measure:
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where v is the number of pairs in the network where influence is symmetric (A influences B and B influences A, directly or indirectly) and max(v) is the total number of pairs.
Centralization. Centralization is conceptualized as inequality in a hierarchy where influence is concentrated in one member or in a small number of members of a group (Bunderson et al., 2015). In a perfectly centralized (i.e., strong) hierarchy one group member scores the maximum influence score and all other group members score the minimum influence score within the group. Centralization is minimized when all group members have the same influence score within the group. Based on the same scores as used for the hierarchy acyclicity measure, we calculated hierarchy centralization, using the Freeman (1979) centralization index:
Centralization = ∑ (Imax – Ii) / (n-1)
where Imax is the maximum individual influence score within a group, Ii is the influence score of an individual member i, and n is the total number of group members.
Linearity. A hierarchy is perfectly linear (i.e., strong) when group member A is
influential over all other group members, B is influential over all but A, C dominates all but A and B, and so forth. There is absolute clarity about who dominates whom in a group (Bunderson et al., 2015). Group members were asked to evaluate which group member in a pair-wise encounter would be dominant. All scores were summed up per individual and resulted in a dominance score per individual. Finally, a linearity score was calculated for the whole group using the h index (Singh, Singh, Sharma & Krishna, 2003):
Linearity = [12/(n3 – n)] ∑ [da – (n – 1)/2]2 Where da = ∑ Pa
where Pa refers to the proportion of pairwise comparisons in which a group member is rated as influential, and n indicates group size (number of members).
Control variables. Group size, gender diversity, and group tenure were considered as
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commitment to the established situation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). A group with high tenure can have an influence on the amount of intragroup competition.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Since the data was on an individual level, it was aggregated to group level. All variables were standardized. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all variables are reported in Table 1. In line with the first hypothesis, influence hierarchy legitimacy correlated significantly with intragroup competition (r = -.38, p = .009). This correlation indicated a negative linear association between these variables, meaning when influence hierarchy legitimacy increased, intragroup competition decreased.
Interestingly, influence hierarchy legitimacy correlated significantly with influence hierarchy steepness (r = .38, p = .009). This correlation indicated a positive linear association between these variables, indicating when influence hierarchy steepness increased, influence hierarchy legitimacy also increased.
To see if results changed with certain characteristics of a group, three control variables were taken into account: group size, gender diversity, and group tenure. The correlations of these control variables are shown in Table 1. As the control variables did not correlate with intragroup competition - results showed similar patterns when the control variables were included in the regression analysis - they were not added to the moderation analysis.
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations
Variables Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Control variables 1. Group size 5.47 2.16 2. Gender diversity 1.60 .37 .37 3. Group tenure 3.72 5.26 .22 .69 Independent variables
4. Influence hierarchy legitimacy 5.23 .59 .10 .12 .08 5. Influence hierarchy steepness
Dependent variable
.49 .19 -.12 -.08 -.12 .38**
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Hypotheses testing
For testing the hypotheses, the regression method PROCESS (Hayes, 2012) was used to perform a moderation analysis. Hypothesis 1 posited that influence hierarchy legitimacy was negatively related to intragroup competition. As shown in Table 2, influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition were negatively associated (B = -.46, SE = .16, p < .01) supporting the first hypothesis. This result means that there was a negative relationship between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that influence hierarchy steepness moderates the relationship between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition. As depicted in Table 2, the interaction coefficient for influence hierarchy legitimacy × influence hierarchy steepness was not associated with intragroup competition (B = .03, SE = .19, p = .87). Thus, hypotheses 2 received no support, meaning there was no moderating effect of influence hierarchy steepness on the relationship between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition. The moderation effect of influence hierarchy steepness is displayed in Figure 1.
Table 2. Linear model of predictors of intragroup competition
b SE B t p Constant -.00 .16 -.00 .99 Moderator (influence hierarchy steepness) .03 .17 -.17 .86 IV (influence hierarchy legitimacy) -.46 .16 -2.80 .007** Interaction .03 .19 .15 .87 R2= .17, R2Δ= .0005, F(2.9140)=.02, p = .87 Conditional effect of IV on DV at different values of the moderator
95 % Confidence Interval LLCI ULCI
- 1SD -.98 -.00 …
M -.79 -.13 …
+ 1SD -.95 .09
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Variables additional analysis
The moderating effects of three different hierarchy strength variables were tested to see if these variables gave a significant interaction effect. The moderating effects of acyclicity showed a small improvement of the interaction effect (B = .16, SE = .16, p = .34), not resulting in a significant interaction. The moderating effects of linearity also showed an improvement of the interaction effect (B = -.16, SE = .14, p = .27), but still not a significant interaction. Finally, the moderating effects of centralization showed an increase of the p-value (B = -.01, SE = .17, p = .97). These results have shown that none of the hierarchy strength variables moderated the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition.
DISCUSSION
Drawing from psychology research (Hays & Goldstein, 2015; Lammers et al., 2008; Ellemers et al., 1993; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), I predicted that influence hierarchy legitimacy would relate negatively to intragroup competition. Furthermore, I predicted that influence hierarchy steepness would moderate the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition. In a study of 47 work groups I found support for the first hypothesis that influence hierarchy legitimacy is negatively related to intragroup competition, but no support for the second hypothesis concerning the moderating effect of influence hierarchy steepness.
-0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0 0,2 0,4 0,6
Low influence hierarchy legitimacy
High influence hierarchy legitimacy In tr ag ro u p c o m p e titi o n
Figure 1. The moderation effect of influence hierarchy steepness on the relationship between influence hierarchy
legitimacy and intragroup competition
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Theoretical contributions
In this research, the first hypothesis concerning the negative relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition is confirmed. This means that when the influence hierarchy is considered as legitimate, intragroup competition is low. This research thereby sheds new light on system justification theory by examining this theory on a group level. According to this theory, people have a general motivation to believe in a just world (Jost, 2001). Living in circumstances that are illegitimate would be psychologically threatening (Jost, 2001), and therefore people (unconsciously) decide to believe that the system they are in is legitimate which stabilizes the hierarchy (Jost & Banaji, 1994). However, on a group level, I have demonstrated that an illegitimate influence hierarchy leads to competition. This finding does not fit the system justification perspective. This means that the system justification perspective holds in large system hierarchies, but in groups where people engage in face-to-face interactions, it appears that people try to restructure the system when they consider it as illegitimate.
An examination of the moderation of influence hierarchy steepness revealed that this moderation is not proven for the relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition. Initially, I expected influence hierarchy steepness to moderate this relation as the benefits and losses associated with rank in steeper hierarchies are more pronounced, therefore people will be more prone to change the system when it is unfair. However, the moderation turned out not to be significant. An explanation of the lack of moderation of influence hierarchy steepness might be that it does not matter how large the differences between positions are, and what the associated costs and benefits of those positions are. Illegitimacy makes group members realize in all positions that there are alternatives to the existing hierarchy (cf. Hornsey, Spears, Cremers & Hogg, 2003). Overall fairness is therefore maybe more important than the benefits and losses associated with rank. This suggests that the psychological effects of illegitimacy are strong overall, regardless of the strength of such differences.
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Practical implications
This research provides valuable insights for practitioners. As mentioned before, empirical work has demonstrated that intragroup competition can be negative for the effectiveness of a group (Tyler & Blader, 2000; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Therefore it is important to make sure the influence hierarchy is legitimate, as this minimizes the amount of competition in a group. In order to have a legitimate influence hierarchy, group members should be in the position they deserve. According to Magee & Galinsky (2008), when the competence level of a group member is related to his or her position in the influence hierarchy, the position is considered as legitimate. An organization can compare if the group members that have the highest influence, also have the highest competence in the group. If this is not the case, other group members that deserve a higher influence position should get more influence, or the high-influence group members should be trained to increase their competence and be able to fulfill their position successfully and to be beneficial to the group.
Limitations
This research has multiple strengths. For example, data was collected from a diverse sample of groups from different industries. This makes the results of this research generalizable across different organizations. However, in this research some limitations can be identified. First, due to time limitations the sample size was relatively small (n = 47). This results in a low statistical power of this research. Second, time limitations also had a negative influence on the response rate (group leaders = 80%, group members = 62%). The relatively low response rate shows a result that does not represent the full sample. This means for instance that the influence measure is for some groups incomplete which could cause an incorrect result. Third, this research used cross-sectional data, which means that the data was collected at one point in time. When the questionnaire was conducted a second time after a certain time period, this would have increased the value of this research. Fourth, influence was measured using ratings of group members, instead of direct indicators of influence. Direct indicators would measure the actual influence of group members instead of the perception of influence that is now measured. Examples of direct indicators are the expertise and formal authority of a group member (Bunderson, 2003).
Future research directions
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example, this could be influenced by the inconsistency between different hierarchies a group member is a part of (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). When a group member has a high position in the formal hierarchy and a low position in the influence hierarchy, he or she can consider the influence hierarchy as illegitimate because it is inconsistent with his or her position in the formal hierarchy. Another example is that hierarchies can be considered legitimate or illegitimate as a result of the strength of the relation between the expertise of each group member and the position he or she gets in the influence hierarchy. This relation is suggested before by different sources (Ellemers et al., 1993; Fisek & Ofshe, 1970; Aime et al., 2014; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), but is not proven on what specific elements of expertise a group member deserves a certain position. These sources state that when the procedure that leads to the differentiation in positions is fair, the hierarchy is considered legitimate. However, it is not yet known how such a procedure should look like.
Another research direction is related to system justification theory. This theory is until now mostly researched on a society level. In this research I tried to apply system justification theory on group level. As there is not much known on this level of research, further theoretical and empirical work is needed to examine the effects on group level. This research is especially needed in defining what a small group is and what a large (society level) group is. The distinction between these groups is important, because this illustrates when the effects of hierarchy legitimacy shift from an acceptance of the illegitimacy to intragroup competition to re-establish the hierarchy legitimacy.
In this research I confirmed the negative relation between influence hierarchy legitimacy and intragroup competition, which was already proven for formal hierarchies (Hays & Goldstein, 2015; Lammers et al., 2008). A question that arises from the similarity on this subject for formal and informal hierarchies is if there are more of such relations that are similar in both types of hierarchies. And also, in terms of group processes, in what way formal and informal hierarchies are distinctive from each other.
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CONCLUSIONS
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