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History, Memory and Resistance in Northern Nigeria
The Transformation of Boko Haram
Barkindo, Athanasius Atta
October 2016
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department of Politics and International
Studies, SOAS, University of London
Declaration
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.
Signed: ____________________________ Date: _________________
Abstract
Since the violent Boko Haram uprising in 2009, many studies have emphasised the socio- economic factors that led to the emergence of the group. This thesis is designed to achieve two purposes. The first is to develop a theory that goes beyond ‘emergence’ to explain Boko Haram’s ‘transformation’. This also provides empirical material that contributes significantly to the academic debate about the Boko Haram conflict. The second purpose is to use this understanding to suggest ways in which counter terrorism policy may be improved in Nigeria and around the Lake Chad border region. The phases of Boko Haram’s transformation include the transition from a local to a national and regional group, with cross-border links. The elements of this transformation comprise the formulation of a central ideology, structural organisation, the evolution of a group identity, and the transformation of its tactical, operational and strategic approaches. Evidence suggests that five factors have facilitated Boko Haram’s transformation: the manipulation of memory and the historical narrative of Islam and the Kanem-Borno Empire; the politicisation of the Boko Haram conflict; the consequences of the government’s military offensive; the impact of environmental degradation and weak cross-border institutions of law and order around the Lake Chad border region; and the influence of globalisation. Understanding the causes of Boko Haram’s transformation is likely to assist the government in thwarting other emerging Islamist sects that retain the capacity for transformation in northern Nigeria.
Table of Contents
Title page ... 1
Declaration ... 2
Abstract ... 3
Table of content ... 4
Dedication ... 8
List of figures ... 9
List of abbreviations ... 10
Glossary of foreign terms ... 12
Acknowledgements ... 14
Chapter One Boko Haram’s emergence and transformation ... 17
Introduction ... 17
The nature of the Boko Haram conflict ... 19
Emergence and transformation of Boko Haram: conceptual and theoretical clarification .... 21
Resistance in the north: background to Boko Haram’s emergence and transformation ... 24
Figure 1: showing the northeastern region, the geographical base of Boko Haram ... 25
The emergence of Boko Haram ... 30
The pre-Yusufiyya period (1995-2003) ... 30
The transformation of Boko Haram ... 33
The Yusufiyya period (2003-2009) ... 34
The Shekawiyya period (2010-present) ... 37
Factions and Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to Islamic state ... 40
Conclusion ... 41
Chapter Two Literature review, research design and methodological approach ... 44
Introduction ... 44
Boko Haram conflict and the contending theoretical perspectives ... 45
Religious discourse ... 45
Socio-economic perspective ... 48
Historical discourse ... 50
International relations argument ... 52
Critical observations on the contending theoretical perspectives ... 55
Research design ... 57
Research question ... 58
Relevance of the study ... 58
Methodological approach: mixed-methods research ... 61
Data collection ... 63
Table 1: mixed-methods approach ... 69
Data analysis ... 69
Data interpretation and explanation: multi-disciplinary approach ... 70
Sources ... 73
Structure of the research ... 74
Ethical issues ... 77
Chapter Three
Memory and historical narrative, and the transformation of Boko Haram ... 79
Introduction ... 79
Memory, historical narrative and terrorist group transformation: the theoretical debates ... 80
Brief history of Islam and the Kanem-Borno Empire ... 83
The dominance of the Kanem-Borno Empire ... 85
Subjugation of the Kanem-Borno Empire, the an-Nakbah ... 86
Figure 2: present-day Kanuri land in Lake Chad 4-country border region ... 88
Testing memory and historical narrative, and Boko Haram’s transformation ... 88
Stage one: data selection and collection ... 89
Translation and remarks on some Boko Haram publications ... 89
Table 2: some pre-2009 Boko Haram publications ... 90
Chart 1: frameworks supported by the 12 sampled Boko Haram pre- 2009 publications ... 91
Table 3: some 2010-2014 Boko Haram publications ... 91
Chart 2: frameworks supported by the 43 sampled Boko Haram 2010-2014 publications ... 93
Interview findings and remarks ... 94
Stage two: data verification ... 96
Survey findings and remarks ... 96
Table 4: survey on historical narrative and Boko Haram’s transformation .... 97
Analysis: the formulation of a central ideology using memory and historical narrative ... 99
The colonial domination of the former Kanem-Borno Empire ... 100
Western subjugation of Islam ... 104
Conclusion ... 110
Chapter Four The politicisation of terrorism and the transformation of Boko Haram ... 113
Introduction ... 113
Terrorism and the politicisation of terrorism: the theoretical perspectives ... 114
The politicisation of the Boko Haram terrorism ... 115
Local level politicisation ... 116
National level politicisation ... 119
Regional-international level politicisation ... 121
Testing the politicisation of terrorism theory in the transformation of Boko Haram ... 123
Stage one: data selection and collection ... 124
Open source data, interview findings and remarks ... 124
Stage two: data verification ... 126
Survey findings and remarks ... 126
Table 5: survey on politicisation of terrorism and Boko Haram’s transformation ... 126
Analysis: the politicisation of terrorism and the transformation of Boko Haram ... 128
Boko Haram’s local structures ... 128
Boko Haram’s national and regional structures ... 132
Conclusion ... 137
Chapter Five
Military force and the transformation of Boko Haram ... 139
Introduction ... 139
Military force and terrorist group transformation: the theoretical perspectives ... 140
Joint Task Force (JTF) against Boko Haram: formation and deployment ... 142
Table 6: the operational evolution of JTF ... 143
Consequences of the use of military force ... 145
Testing the military force approach in the context of Boko Haram’s transformation ... 148
Stage one: data selection and collection ... 149
Translation of Boko Haram’s publications and remarks ... 149
Table 7: 2004-2009 publications ... 149
Table 8: 2010-2014 publications ... 150
Interview findings and remarks ... 152
Stage two: data verification ... 154
Survey findings and remarks ... 154
Table 9: survey on military force and Boko Haram transformation ... ... 154
Analysis: military offensive and Boko Haram’s transformation ... 156
Ideological reinforcement ... 156
Identity transformation ... 158
Evolution of tactical, operational and strategic approaches ... 159
Conclusion ... 169
Chapter Six Environmental degradation, poverty and the transformation of Boko Haram ... 172
Introduction ... 172
Environmental degradation and violent conflict: the theoretical perspectives ... 173
Lake Chad border region: history, environmental degradation and impact ... 175
Figure 3: showing Lake Chad in environmental terms ... 176
Figure 4: showing the disappearance of Lake Chad ... 177
Testing the theoretical perspectives on environmental degradation and violent conflict .... 180
Stage one: data selection and collection ... 181
Open source data, interview findings and remarks ... 181
Stage two: data verification ... 183
Survey findings and remarks ... 183
Table 10: survey on environmental degradation and Boko Haram transformation ... 184
Analysis: environmental degradation and Boko Haram’s transformation ... 185
Mobilisation and recruitment among jobless youths and cross-border migrants .... 186
Clandestine economy, organised crime and funding ... 190
Weak institutions and safe havens ... 193
Conclusion ... 197
Chapter Seven Globalisation and the transformation of Boko Haram ... 200
Introduction ... 200
Globalisation and the transformation of terrorist groups: the theoretical perspectives ... 201
History: globalisation, Nigeria and the general impact on terrorist organisations ... 203
Testing the globalisation theory in the context of Boko Haram’s transformation ... 205
Stage one: data selection and collection ... 206
Translation and remarks on some Boko Haram publications ... 206
Table 11: Boko Haram anti-globalisation publications ... 207
Interview findings and remarks ... 207
Stage two: data verification ... 209
Survey findings and remarks ... 209
Table 12: survey on globalisation and Boko Haram transformation ... 209
Analysis: theory of globalisation and Boko Haram’s transformation ... 211
Globalisation as a means of constructing an anti-globalisation ideology ... 211
The impact of globalisation and Boko Haram’s transformation ... 216
Structures of globalisation and Boko Haram’s transformation ... 220
Conclusion ... 226
Limitations of the thesis ... 227
Chapter Eight Conclusion ... 229
Introduction ... 229
Section I: introductory section ... 229
Section II: empirical section ... 230
Scholarly contributions of the thesis ... 230
Policy contributions of the thesis ... 233
Bibliography ... 242
Books ... 242
Academic journals ... 251
Magazines and newspapers ... 259
Archival sources ... 263
Unpublished works ... 264
Internet sources ... 265
Public documents and reports ... 268
List of some of Boko Haram’s YouTube videos translated by the author ... 270
List of some Qur’anic verses used in the text ... 272
List of some of those interviewed ... 273
Appendix ... 275
Team list for data collection ... 275
Chapter 3: interview and survey tables ... 276
Chapter 4: interview and survey tables ... 279
Chapter 5: interview and survey tables ... 283
Chapter 6: interview and survey tables ... 288
Chapter 7: interview and survey tables ... 292
Dedication
Private Abel Su’Isari Barkindo (Nigerian Army), killed in Baga by Boko Haram while on active military service in March 2014.
List of figures
Figure 1: showing the northeastern region, the geographical base of Boko Haram ... 37
Figure 2: present-day Kanuri land in Lake Chad 4-country border region ... 78
Figure 3: showing Lake Chad in environmental terms ... 160
Figure 4: showing the disappearance of Lake Chad ... 161
List of abbreviations
AFRC Armed Forces Ruling Council
AMBON Association of Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria
ANC African National Congress
ANSARU Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (also JAMBS)
APC All Progressives Congress
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU African Union
AUN American University of Nigeria BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BH Boko Haram
BSU Borno State Union
BYM Borno Youth Movement
BYVG Borno Youth Vigilante Group
CAN Christian Association of Nigeria
CBN Central Bank of Nigeria
CFA Francs Currency - West African CFA franc/Central Africa CFA franc CJTF Civilian Joint Task Force
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
DBA Directorate of the Behavioural Analysis
DFRRI National Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure
DIA Defence Intelligence Agency
DMI Directorate of Military Intelligence
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna - Basque Homeland and Freedom
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FARC Forces of Colombia
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOB Forward Operation Battalion
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
GOC General Commanding Officer
GGSS Government Girls Secondary School ICC International Criminal Court
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IGP Inspector General of Police
IMAM Institute for Access to Modernity
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRA Irish Republican Army
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks
IS Islamic State
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LGA Local Government Area
JASDJ Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah Li-l-Dawa’ah wa-l-Jihaad JIBWIS Jama’at ‘izalat al-bid’a wa iqamat al-sunna
JNI Jama’atul Nasril Islam
JTF Joint Task Force
JTI Jama’atul Tajdidi Islam
JTFORO Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
MASSOB Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MAT Muslims Against Terror
MBM Mokhtar Belmokhtar
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta MNJTF Multi-National Joint Task Force
MUJWA Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDLEA National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NEEDS National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIA National Intelligence Agency
NIS Nigerian Immigration Service
NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NOA National Orientation Agency
NSA National Security Adviser NSO National Security Organisation OAU Organisation of African Unity OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPC Odudua People’s Congress
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDP People’s Democratic Party
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army
QONR Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies
SOB Special Operations Battalion
SSS State Security Services
SWAPO South West African People’s Organisation
TFM Task Force Mike
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
USD United States Dollar
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VEO Violent Extremist Offender
VIED Vehicular Improvised Explosive Device
VOA Voice of America
WEF World Economic Forum
YIM Yusufiyya Islamic Movement
Glossary of Foreign Terms
Allahu Akhbar Allah the greatest
Almajiris Qur’anic students
Al-Salaf al-Saleh The virtuous forefathers and those who draw on the Qur’an as sources of Islam (including the companions of the Prophet) Al-Shabaab The youths (a Somali terrorist group)
Amaryar Boko Fake bride
Amir al-Aam Commander-in-Chief Amir al-Mu’minin Commander of the faithful.
An-Nakba Disaster or catastrophe
Annasara Christians
Ansar The helpers – the name of the people of Medina who converted to Islam and came to be referred to as the helpers of the Prophet (Ansar al-Nabi)
Ansaru al-Deen Supporters of religion (Islam) Banu Isra’il Taraba state local militia group
Bayat An oath of loyalty
Boka Witch doctor
Dar al-Islam The abode of Islam – part of the world ruled by Islamic law Dar al-Harb The abode of war – part of the world not ruled by Islamic law
Dawla Islamic state
Dawa’ah The call to propagate Islam
Fai’u’ Robberies
Fard wajib Compulsory duty binding on individual Muslims (prayer, fasting) Fard al-Kifaya Communal duty binding on Muslims as a group (visiting the sick) Ghanima Booty, or the spoils of war taken from Islamic battles
Halal Permissible – that which is lawful and allowed
Haram That which is sinful and forbidden, and will be punished on the day of judgement
Hajj Pilgrimage
Hijra Emigration – Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina (Yathrib) on 16 July 622
Ikhwan Brethren
Ikhwan al-Muslimin Islamist movement – Muslim brotherhood
Ilimi Education
Ilimin Islamiyya Islamic Education
Kafir An unbeliever – also an infidel
Kala-Kato Islamic sect found in Bauchi and Gombe
Kama To catch
Khadiriyyha (Qadariyya) A Sufi order named after Shaykh ‘Abdul Qadir al-Jilani (1088- 1166)
Kasan amana Trust territory
Mai King (a Kanuri royal title)
Makruh Disliked acts – Behaviour in Islamic law that is reprehensible but not forbidden, and therefore not punishable.
Mubah Neutral acts – An action that is neutral – neither recommended nor disapproved, and may be left undone without fear of divine punishment
Mujaddid A renewer or reformer, especially of religion – Islam Mujahideen Jihadis – Fighters in a holy war (jihad)
Mushrikeen Those who associate Allah with other gods – Christians Mustahabb Recommended acts
Na’ib Amir al-Aam Deputy Commander-in-Chief Ohanaeze Ndigbo Igbo cultural organisation
Popsie Dad
Qur’an Islamic Holy Book
Salat Prayers (Islamic prayers) Sara-Suka Gombe state local militia Sarkin Musulmi A Muslim ruler
Sarkin Sokoto Traditional ruler (Chief) of Sokoto
Shirk Association – giving partners to God. It is a sin that cannot be forgiven.
Shura Advisory council
Sunna The life and teachings of Prophet Mohammad (traditions)
Takfirism Excommunication - The declaration of other Muslims as apostates or infidels
Tafwid Delegated authority
Tawhid Monotheism – The doctrine of the unity of God
Tijjaniya A Sufi order founded in the 19th century by Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Tijani (1737-1815) in Fez, Morroco
Ummah The Islamic community
Yahoo Yahoo Boys Nigerian internet scammers Yan Baka or Yan Tauri Archers (local hunters)
Yan Shinko Political thugs based in Yola, the Adamawa state political capital.
Acknowledgements
First, I wish to thank God for the faith and courage to embark upon this research and for its successful completion, and even more so, for all the opportunities that came my way during my years of studies at SOAS. I want to sincerely thank late Bishop Christopher Abba who gave me the permission to proceed on further studies. I also thank the Most Rev. Stephen Mamza Dami, the Catholic Bishop of Yola, for permitting me to continue with my postgraduate research on Islam, politics and terrorism, and to engage with the issues of conflict, security and peace in Africa. Furthermore, I thank him for all the support and encouragement I received throughout my years of studies. I am grateful to my supervisor, Doctor Phil Clark, for all the painstaking and critical correction he carried out on my work. His diligence, patience and commitment to detail greatly enriched the thesis. To my second and third supervisors, Professor Stephen Chan and Doctor Tom Young, I am most grateful for their objective and insightful observations. I want to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to all my colleagues at the Global Initiative on Civil Society and Conflict (GICSC), University of South Florida, and I want to thank especially Professor David Jacobson and Durriya Badani for helping shape the direction of my research.
The Global Initiative provided me with funds to travel and conduct interviews around the Lake Chad border region.
I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Doctor Abdul Raufu Mustapha of the Oxford Department of International Development, Professor Murray Last of University College London, Mr. Ahmed Salkida, a frontline journalist with extensive field knowledge and contacts within Boko Haram, Doctor Freedom C. Onuoha, National Defense College, Abuja, Professor David Cook of Rice University, Doctor Muhammad Nur Alkali, the Centre for Trans Saharan Studies, University of Maiduguri, Doctor Muhammad Kyari, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology (MAUTECH), Yola, Doctor Charles Abiodun Alao, King’s College, London and Mr. Michael Nwankpa, University of Roehampton.
Their major contributions to the understanding of Islamic sects in northern Nigeria as well as their work on the emergence of Boko Haram provided a fertile background for my thesis. I must also acknowledge the contributions of Jacob Zenn, a West African Security Analyst and a research fellow with the Jamestown Foundation, Washington. Jacob provided me with in-depth analysis, journal articles and documents relating to Boko Haram’s local, regional and global networks, as well as its leadership structure and funding activities. Similarly, I would like to thank Elizabeth Pearson, a PhD candidate at King’s College London and a specialist on Boko Haram’s
use of female suicide bombers. Her contributions helped define some of the evolving strategies of Boko Haram in my research.
Many others read this work at various stages and I would like to thank them. Nicola Ajibike Tofowomo, a graduate of the University College London, my friend and student, whose friendship went beyond the call of duty. She is an experienced, efficient and diligent reader who went through the first draft of each chapter. Her patience and sacrifice helped clarify some of the grammatical errors. Mr. Benjamin Gudaku, a research fellow with Edu-watch Consult and Research, Abuja who read the draft to examine and clarify some of the empirical data issues. I appreciate the efforts of my data collection and translation team both in Maiduguri and around the Lake Chad border region for assembling the data, and for reviewing some of the translated Boko Haram publications. I thank especially my copy editors, Elizabeth Wareham and her husband Andrew for their interest in the work, and for dedicating their time, energy and resources to give the draft the final edits. Similarly, my appreciation goes to Ruth Hunter and Ann Smith for their thoroughness and devotion to detail in editing the final draft of the work.
The writings and speeches of Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah, an alumnus of SOAS, inspired me to undertake my postgraduate studies at SOAS. Unbeknown to him, he has had a tremendous influence on my life and I want to thank him for that. I wish to thank in a very special way the families of Sr. Eucharia Tan, Francis Ng, Mr. Victor Seng, Candy Lim, Mrs. Helen Tan and her husband Kwan and all the staff of St. Theresa’s Home in Singapore, Rev. Fr. Oscar Raynal from Mexico, Rev. Fr. Andrew Wong, the parish priest of Holy Spirit Church, Singapore, Frs. David Barrow and Agustin Conesa of the Archdiocese of Westminster, Miss Angela Ho Kim, Mrs.
Veronica Verghese and her children, Mark and Sarah, the members of the GIFT group and all my friends in Singapore. Your financial and moral contributions will remain indelible in my heart. And to my dear friend Mr. Richard Dick Lilly and his family in New England, USA, I wish to express my profound gratitude for all your financial support and prayers. In the same way I want to thank Mrs Elizabeth Onyejiaku and her children who provided me with accommodation when I first arrived London for my studies in 2011. Finally, I wish to thank my parents and my siblings for their constant encouragement to remain strong and committed. I want to thank all the priests and religious congregations of the Catholic Diocese of Yola, northeastern Nigeria for their prayers and love. I want to thank Frs. John Bakeni, Ephraim Sani and Jacob Yebsonya OSA for their exceptional friendship and for all the scholarship we share. Your belief in education as a human right inspired me to be what I am today. And for those who because of
space constraints cannot be mentioned here, you are all dear to me. While thanking you all, I bear responsibility for all the mistakes that still surface in this work.
Chapter One
Boko Haram’s emergence and transformation
It seems that Nigerians have been so saddened by the viciousness and devilish atrocities of Boko Haram that no one has cared to seek for deeper truths about the sect. In discussions, whenever I have tried to make a case for our trying to even understand this devil, many simply wonder, ‘‘are you in sympathy with them?’’ Yet I believe that even the devil needs to be understood if at all we are to
avoid him.1
Introduction
The central goal of this thesis is to explain the transformation of Boko Haram. This includes the phases, the constitutive elements and the structural causes of this process. While the phases comprise a transition from a local to a regional group with cross-border links, the constitutive elements include the construction of a central ideology, structural organisation, evolution of the group’s identity, and a tactical, operational and strategic transformation. Based on the evidence collected and verified, this thesis broadly makes four arguments. First, over the years, key studies on the Boko Haram conflict have failed to make a distinction between ‘emergence’ and
‘transformation’ of the group. This failure has created a lack of understanding that the factors responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram in 1995 are only some of the factors that facilitated its transformation until 2016. Furthermore, it has led to the lack of incisive academic and policy analysis on the phases, constituting elements and causes of Boko Haram’s transformation.
Second, many researchers and security experts have analysed the Boko Haram conflict using the general idea of jihadi-salafi ideology and poverty in northern Nigeria. There is no in-depth scrutiny of how Boko Haram absorbs, understands, interprets and expresses this ideology and for what purpose. Additionally, while the Boko Haram conflict is constantly linked to the issue of relative deprivation, evidence is lacking on how the group utilises poverty as a conflict strategy in the quest for transformation. Third, the thesis argues that it is important to examine how Boko Haram combines historical narrative, Islamist ideology and socio-economic deprivation to reject what it perceives as the terrorism of neo-liberal policies, and to motivate group followers for transformation. Fourth, the thesis identifies five other factors that have contributed to the transformation of Boko Haram: the exploitation of memory and historical narrative, the politicisation of the conflict, globalisation, the use of military force, and the consequences of environmental degradation, including weak cross-border institutions of law and order.
1 Kukah, Matthew Hassan, 2014. After the Insurgency: Some Thoughts on Reconciliation in Nigeria. Text of the 43rd Convocation Lecture delivered at the University of Nsukka, 27 March, 2014, p. 8.
Examining the transformation of Boko Haram is important for various reasons. The study provides fresh facts and new data on the evolution of the conflict. It helps to create a new theoretical framework in the study of the conflict which indicates that Boko Haram’s transformation is as important as its genesis. This pushes for a new approach in the study of why and how Islamist groups transform in Nigeria. The study also offers empirical evidence on the phases, the constituting elements and the causes of Boko Haram’s transformation. This evidence reveals the new reality of Islamist extremism and violence in Nigeria. The revelation also calls for an innovative academic framework in the study of history, religion and politics in Nigeria. At the policy level, understanding Boko Haram’s transformation will assist in identifying factors that support the group’s operational capabilities. It will also help the Nigerian government in constructing effective counter terrorism policies, including thwarting the ambition of other groups that are likely to transform in the same manner as Boko Haram.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a general historical analysis of the emergence and transformation of Boko Haram. This chapter makes three vital arguments: first, it argues that there is a fundamental distinction between ‘emergence’ and ‘transformation’, and it calls for the need to use the principles of social movement and organisational transformation theories to demonstrate the process of Boko Haram’s transformation. Second, it maintains that to understand Boko Haram’s emergence and transformation, it is necessary to examine the history and forms of Islamic resistance in northern Nigeria. Third, it argues that Boko Haram’s transformation is an ongoing process which does not exclude internal tensions within the group or the possibility for the group to decline. The chapter prepares the ground to argue that the current literature as presented in chapter two dwells more on the emergence of Boko Haram, rather than an in-depth analysis of the group’s transformation. The chapter presents briefly the nature of the Boko Haram conflict and the prevailing controversies therein. It provides a conceptual clarification of ‘emergence’ and ‘transformation’. It also offers the theoretical principles for the analysis of Boko Haram’s transformation, and provides a comprehensive history of the ‘emergence’ and ‘transformation’ of Boko Haram. This is important in order to give a general overview of the problem under consideration. It is also essential to provide evidence for the distinction between ‘emergence’ and ‘transformation’ in the historical development of Boko Haram. It shows which stage of Boko Haram’s history is considered as emergence and which stage is considered as transformation. Internal divisions within the sect, including the current government offensive against the group may signal a new phase of transformation.
The nature of the Boko Haram conflict
An extremist Islamic group popularly known as Boko Haram (Western education is forbidden) but officially named Jamaa’atu Ahlis-Sunnah lid Da’awati wal Jihaad (people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad) emerged around 1995 as a non-violent Islamist group seeking the moral reformation of Muslims and Nigeria as a nation. By 2009, the group has evolved into an extremist violent group. It has bombed the facilities of the United Nations in Abuja, and destroyed mosques as well as churches. It has abducted both Muslim and Christian girls and women, marrying some of the girls off, and indoctrinating others who later became suicide bombers. It has targeted many Muslims as well as Christians, irrespective of the ethnicity of their victims as well as traditional rulers, religious leaders, security forces and politicians. In January 2012, a major faction denounced Boko Haram’s strategy of killing innocent civilians and broke away, calling itself Jamaa’atu Ansaril Muslimeen fi Biladis Sudaan (‘vanguard for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa’) or ANSARU.2 Nevertheless, in August 2014, Boko Haram declared an Islamic caliphate in Gwoza, Borno state, controlling swathes of land across the northeastern region. Shortly before Nigeria’s general elections in March 2015, a massive military offensive forced Boko Haram to retreat and to declare allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), calling itself Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyyah (Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP).3
There is an ethnic dimension to these events, as members of Boko Haram are drawn primarily from the Kanuri tribe (roughly 4% of the Nigerian population), who are concentrated in the northeastern states of Nigeria such as Borno, Bauchi and Yobe.4 The Kanuri ethnic group also inhabits regions across the northern border in Niger, Chad and Cameroon, and there is evidence to suggest that these tribal relationships facilitate weapons trafficking and other cross-border smuggling transactions.5 Within the political establishment, Boko Haram has been seen as a northern opposition, cleverly crafted to make President Goodluck Jonathan appear politically incompetent and to undermine his 2015 re-election bid. Other politicians have seen Boko Haram as President Jonathan’s ploy to postpone the 2015 elections (which he lost), and to extend his stay in office by a few more years, in other words a third term, via terrorism. Indeed, the
2 Onuoha Freedom, 2013a. ‘‘Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan: Nigeria’s Evolving Terrorist Group’’, Aljazeera Centre for Studies (accessed 12 October, 2014):
http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/3/14/2013314103734423734Nigerias%20Evolving%20 Terrorist%20Group.pdf. p. 2.
3 Dabiq, 2015a. ‘‘Sharia Alone will Rule Africa’’, Issue 8 (accessed 18 November, 2015), http://counterjihadreport.com/2015/03/31/islamic-states-dabiq-8-focuses-on-unifying-ummah-criticizing-islamists/, p. 14-16.
4 Forest James, 2012, Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Tampa, USA: Joint Special Operations University, p. 1.
5 Menner Scott, 2014. ‘Boko Haram’s Regional Cross-Border Activities.’ In CTC SENTINEL 7(10): 10-14. For more evidence on arms, funding and recruitment activities of Boko Haram at this border region, please cf. Onuoha Freedom. 2013b. Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria, Mecca: Aljazeera Centre for Studies. Zenn Jacob. 2014. ‘Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region’. In CTC SENTINEL 7(10): 4-9.
ideology and activities of Boko Haram ‘‘Have left Nigeria a nation of the walking wounded’’,6 divided along ethno-religious lines, with the Nigerian authorities scrambling for effective military and political responses.
Existing efforts to define, categorise and explain the Boko Haram conflict remain at best fluid, and at worst confusing. The initial assumption made by the Nigerian government and the security officials was that Boko Haram was a band of disorderly, deluded and poverty ridden individuals, obsessed with domestic grievances based on local salafism. Former President Goodluck Jonathan referred to Boko Haram members as ‘‘ghosts and faceless masquerades.’’7 Meanwhile, the meaning and use of the name Boko Haram remains highly contentious within scholarly circles. In defining haram, Adamec refers to it as that which is forbidden and sinful and will be punished on the Day of Judgment.8 This is based on the hierarchy of moral acts in Islam, which are in five categories from permitted to non-permitted: fard wajib (compulsory duty), mustahabb (recommended), mubah (neutral), makruh (disliked) and haram (forbidden). The sanctuaries in Mecca and Medina, Islam’s sacred sites, are called haramayn (plural for two) and are forbidden to non-Muslims.9 Zimmer argues that haram as a concept entered Hausa from Arabic10 carrying the same meaning, something impermissible under Islam, which remains forbidden no matter how good the intention or how honourable the purpose.11 However, understanding the meaning of boko has been very controversial. It has been wrongly translated as book, education or Western education. The closest understanding of the word boko comes from the first Hausa dictionary published in 1934 by a missionary George Bargery who listed eleven meanings of boko most of which were concerned with fraud and deceit.12 Kukah corroborates this by examining two perspectives within the socio-cultural milieu of northern Nigeria to unpack the meaning of boko. The cultural perspective delineates boko as counterfeit or fake, a reference to the cultural practice of most northern Islamic societies where amaryar boko (fake bride) acts as a decoy for the
6 Kukah Mathew Hassan, 2011. Witness to Justice; An Insider Account of Nigeria’s Truth Commission. Ibadan: Bookcraft, p. 3.
7 Chioma Gabriel, 2013. ‘‘Boko Haram: Finally, Amnesty comes to Ghosts’’. Vanguard, 13 April, 2013.
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/boko-haram-finally-amnesty-comes-to-ghosts/ (accessed 5 May, 2016)
8 Adamec, Ludwig, 2009. Historical Dictionary of Islam, 2nd Edition. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, Inc. p. 119, 102.
9 Ibid: 102.
10 Zimmer, Ben, 2014. ‘‘The Words for a Ruthless Insurgency’’. The Wall Street Journal, 9 May, 2014.
11 Al-Qardawi, Yusuf, 1999. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. Plainfield, IL: American Trust Publications, p. 31.
12 The concept of Boko has caused considerable debate. At first, it was asserted that Boko comes from the English word book.
However, a Hausa-English dictionary published in 1934 by the missionary George Percival Bargery listed eleven meanings of
‘Boko’, most of which are to do with fraud and deceit. George was ordained as a chaplain for the Church Missionary Society in 1899. In 1900 he went to Northern Nigeria, where he served as a missionary until 1910. After joining the Colonial Education service, he founded the first government school among the Tiv people on the Benue, but later turned his attention to the Hausa language and compiled the Hausa dictionary starting in 1921. cf. Bargery, George Percival, 1934. A Hausa-English Dictionary and English-Hausa Vocabulary, London: Oxford University Press.
real bride during a wedding procession. The sociological perspective presents boko as a corrupt adaptation of the word boka, which means sorcery or witchcraft.13
Boko was therefore understood to mean counterfeit, fake, inauthentic, fraud or not original. Boko came to be used by Hausa speakers to denote the inauthenticity of the old British colonial education policy that they saw as an attempt to colonise their minds.14 Thus Boko Haram implies that anything unislamic is considered fake and therefore forbidden. It also means that the Western constructed Nigerian state, its elites and values are fake, unislamic and should be rejected. Although the name Boko Haram is used throughout the thesis due to its general acceptance among the public, it neither defines the core ideological principles of the group nor clearly represents its motivations. Importantly, the name Boko Haram was given by a local journalist in Bauchi and accepted by the public, as ‘‘a succinct critique and implied rejection of Yusuf’s teachings.’’15 It was a hurried summary of what the public thought the group was, rather than what its core ideologies were. In fact, the group rejected the name Boko Haram, and preferred to be called Jamaa’atu Ahlis-Sunnah lid Da’awati wal Jihaad.16 This is because the new name projects the group’s core ideological aspirations. Despite these controversies, the significant hypothesis addressed in this thesis is why and how Boko Haram has achieved such a sudden transformation in Nigeria. To address this question, the thesis analyses the conceptual distinction between emergence and transformation below. It equally provides a historical analysis of Boko Haram’s emergence and transformation.
Emergence and transformation of Boko Haram: conceptual and theoretical clarification The concept of emergence is broadly defined as “the coming into being of something’’17 either intentionally or by chance.18 In this thesis, emergence simply refers to the origin, the beginning of an organisation, or the starting point of socio-religious movements. With the increasing growth of terrorist organisations in sub-Saharan Africa, many studies are dedicated to the socio- economic conditions that lead to the emergence of these groups.19 However, the other factors
13 Kukah, Matthew Hassan, 2010. Boko Haram: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects. Unpublished Article, p. 1-2.
14 Dan Murphy, 2014. ‘‘Boko Haram’ doesn’t really mean ‘Western education is a sin’’. The Christian Science Monitor, 6 May, 2014.
15 Walker Andrew, 2012. What is Boko Haram? Washington: United States Institute of Peace, p. 7.
16 Sani, Umar Mallam, 2009. “Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares total Jihad”. Vanguard, 14 August, 2009.
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-resurrects-declares-total-jihad/ (accessed 14 August, 2013).
17 Hovorka, Dirk and Germonprez, Matt, 2013. ‘Perspectives on Emergence in Information Systems Research’. Communications of the Association for Information Systems 33(20): 353–364, p. 354.
18 Meehl, Paul and Sellars, Wilfrid, 1956. “The Concept of Emergence”. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, edited by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, 239-252.
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press
19 Howard, Tiffiany, 2010. ‘Failed States and the Spread of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33(11): 960-988; Krueger, Alan and Malecˇkova, Jitka, 2003. ‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?’
Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4): 119-144.
that facilitate their substantial transformation in terms of ideology, structure, goals and tactical approaches are often neglected. Since the main objective of this thesis is to examine specifically Boko Haram’s transformation, there is less focus on defining the concept and analysing the theoretical framework of emergence. More emphasis is placed on defining the conceptual and theoretical notion of transformation. Mazade claims that ‘‘Transformation is derived from the Latin roots ‘trans’, which means across and ‘forma’ referring to that which shapes or has been shaped.”20 This implies that transformation is conceived as a deliberate, conscious act in which one party initiates a process to alter the nature of something from one state of being to a different envisioned state. Thus, transformation becomes bound by specific rules, defined principles and goals to be achieved.
Regarding terrorist organisations, Daszko and Sheinberg add two important elements to the definition of transformation. First, transformation means creating something new out of an existing organisation, something that could not have been predicted. Second, transformation begins with the radicalisation of the individual; grasping and submitting to the ideology and expectations of the group.21 Following this perspective, Boko Haram’s transformation indicates the creation of something new, something many in Nigeria’s political circle never predicted. It equally suggests increasing levels of individual radicalisation to achieve group transformation.
Royston and Hinnings identify four types of transformation: convergent, radical, revolutionary and evolutionary. Convergent transformation is when existing organisations undergo a structural overhaul without breaking into factions. Radical transformation involves breaking away from an existing group to transform into a new one. Revolutionary transformation is defined by the scale of the changes, which happen swiftly, affecting all parts of the organisation. Evolutionary transformation is linked to the pace of change, occurring slowly and gradually.22 Evidence suggests that Boko Haram’s transformation is convergent, radical and revolutionary with considerable changes in its structural organisation, goals and strategies. Whether Boko Haram’s significant loss of territory in 2016 or the surrender of some of its members to the Nigerian military signals its decline is difficult to predict. While Leonard and Louise identify three stages of terrorist group transformation: emergence, escalation and de-escalation,23 Lockett recognises
20 Mazade, Noel, 2005. Concepts of Transformation. Alexandria, Virginia (USA): NASMHPD Research Institute, Inc., p. 9.
21 Daszko, Marcia, and Sheinberg, Sheila, 2005. Survival is Optional: Only Leaders with New Knowledge Can Lead the Transformation, Aberdeen: Robert Gordon University, (accessed 12 June, 2015), http://www.mdaszko.com/theoryoftransformation_..., p. 1
22 Greenwood, Royston, and Hinnings C. R., 1996. ‘Understanding Radical Organisational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism’. Academy of Management Review 21(4): 1022-1054, p. 1024.
23 Weinberg, Leonard and Richardson, Louise, 2004. “Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe”, in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, edited by Andrew Silke, 138-160, London: Routledge; Martha Crenshaw, 1991. “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 3(1): 69-87, p. 73. For further reading on the decline and demise of terrorist organisations, cf. Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, 1989. “Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative
four elements that constitute terrorist group transformation: changes in structure, tactics, identity and strategy.24 In line with this, the thesis also recognises four constituting elements of Boko Haram’s transformation: the formulation of a central ideology, structural organisation, evolution of the group’s identity, and the transformation of its tactical, operational and strategic approaches.
To understand why Boko Haram has achieved this level of transformation, the thesis adopts two important theoretical approaches: social movement theory and organisational transformation theory. Both theories outline the conditions under which the emergence and transformation of movements occur. According to Wiktorowicz, ‘‘Social movement theory is rooted on the structural and psychological causes of mass mobilisation intended for group emergence and transformation.”25 In other words, various strains such as modernisation disrupt social life and accepted routines. Consequently, ‘‘A psychological sense of isolation and impotence in the face of broad societal changes prompts individuals to form and to join social movements.’’26 These movements become escapist coping mechanisms through which individuals regain a sense of belonging, empowerment and identity. Islamist terrorism is substantially a part of this kind of social movement. The elites of many Muslim majority countries, soaked in corruption, frequently advocated Western values, leave the vast majority of the people deprived and socially excluded.
Some choose to join extremist groups to feel a sense of belonging.
Wiktorowicz identifies three important elements within social movement theory that are significant to the study of Boko Haram’s transformation: the concepts of internal mechanisms, political opportunity and resource mobilisation. Regarding internal mechanism, he argues that socio-economic strains cause societies to naturally generate internal mechanisms to make demands on the state. State failure to respond can lead to political disorder.27 The concept of political opportunity refers to the notion that factors such as state repression, divisions among the elite and access to influential allies28 influence the mobilisation and transformation of social movements. Finally, the concept of resource mobilisation rejects the view that social movements are constituted by irrational or psychologically deprived individuals who join in response to
Study of Canada and the United States,” Comparative Politics 21(4): 407–408; Audrey Kurth Cronin, 2006. ‘How al-Qaida Ends:
The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups’. International Security, 31(1): 7-48, p. 17.
24 Lockett Charles. 1994. We Bomb, Therefore We Are: The Evolution of Terrorist Group Life Cycle, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, p. 45-50.
25 Wiktorowicz 2002: 191.
26 Ibid: 192.
27 Huntington, Samuel, 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 49-51.
28 McAdam, Doug, McCarthy, John and Mayer, Zald (eds.), 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 30-55.
structural strains. Rather, it sees movements as rational and organised manifestations of collective action. These movements and their leaders retain the capacity to create vehicles of mobilisation and to set up structures designed to coordinate their grievances and contentions.
Organisational transformation theory explores how organisations undergo a rapid transformation in a particular society. Romanelli and Tushman contend that for organisations to transform, they must enjoy a certain level of continuity punctuated by patterns of fundamental change.29 Such a change will include structural modification, changes in group ideology and the formulation of new missions and goals. According to Greve, organisational transformation is dependent on three principles: the motivation, the opportunity and the capability to change. The motivation to change is dictated by how a central ideology and expected goals combine to inspire members to embrace group transformation. The opportunity to transform is led by the strategic creativity of the organisation’s leaders, regarding when, where and how to initiate changes for effective transformation. The capability to transform is based on the organisation’s ability to acquire the necessary skills and resources, and to develop the routines for ensuring transformation.30 Boko Haram was transformed because the motivation, opportunity and the capability to change became available as explained in detail in the empirical chapters. Having examined the conceptual and theoretical framework of Boko Haram’s transformation, there is the need to consider the historical evolution of the group. This will explain how Boko Haram’s transformation fits into the conceptual and theoretical principles.
Resistance in the north: background to Boko Haram’s emergence and transformation Boko Haram’s emergence and transformation is necessarily linked to the radical tradition of Islamic resistance in northern Nigeria. It is therefore important to examine this historical narrative as a background to Boko Haram’s motivation, capability and opportunity to transform.
Some scholars such as Dike argue that unlike the many manifestations of resistance to colonial rule in southern Nigeria,31 resistance in the north is fairly new. This is because the north was ethno-religiously too diverse and the Hausa-Fulani concept of obedience as one of the principles of Islam - addininmu addinin biyaya ne - (our religion is a religion of obedience) weakened any resistance.32 Many youths in the north were sons of high-ranking officials absorbed in native
29 Romanelli and Tushman, 1994:1141-1166.
30 Greve, Henrich, 1998. ‘Performance, Aspiration, and Risky Organizational Change’. Administrative Science Quarterly 43(1): 58-86, p. 58-59
31 Dike, Onwuka, 1956. Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 10, 212.
32 Coleman, James, 1965. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 354-355.
administration and not British firms,33 and because they did not suffer personally from the prejudice of expatriates, the psychology of revolt was weak. It is unfair, however, to suggest that resistance in northern Nigeria is a recent phenomenon. Historically, Islamic resistance has been considerable, both during and since colonial rule. In the 15th century, Islam was firmly established in the Kanem-Borno Empire,34 and by 1804 Shaikh ‘Uthman Dan Fodio established the Sokoto caliphate35 centred on Islam, with spiritual and political authority over the greater part of northern Nigeria.36 Kano was famous for embroidery, the tanning of skins, and ornamental leatherwork, known as ‘‘Morocco leather’’, exported to North Africa.37
Figure 1: showing the northeastern region, the geographical base of Boko Haram
Source: http://www.google.co.u/url
The British conquest of the caliphate in March 190338 disrupted the socio-economic life of the region and provoked resistance against British rule.39 Emirs were made to take an oath of allegiance to the colonial state.40 As the first conceptual element of social movement theory indicates, societies are likely to generate mechanisms of resistance when confronted with social strains. In this case, the conquest was understood by the majority of Muslims as the destruction of their religious dignity, identity as well as socio-economic livelihood by Christian British
33 Northern Regional Government. Report on the Kano Disturbances. Kaduna, 16– 19May, 1953, p. 2, 100.
34 Brenner Louis, 1971, The Shehus of Kukawa: A History of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty of Bornu, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 6-99; Paden John, 1986. Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto, Values and Leadership in Nigeria, London: Hodder and Stoughton, p. 335-336.
35 Kane, Ousmane, 2003. Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition. Leiden: Brill, p. 33; Boyd, Jean and Shagari, Shehu, 2003. The Life and Legacy of Shehu Uthman dan Fodiyo. Malaysia:
Macmillan Publishers Ltd, p. 1-19.
36 Abubakar, Sa’ad, 1984. ‘‘The Northern Provinces under the Colonial Rule’’. In Groundwork of Nigerian History, edited by Ikime Obaro, 447-463. Ibadan: Historical Society of Nigeria.
37 Coleman, 1965: 39.
38 Auwalu, Anwar, 2013. From Maitatsine to Boko Haram: Examining the Socio-Economic Circumstances of Religious Crisis in Northern Nigeria. Unpublished Paper, p. 2.
39 Adeleye, Rowland, 1972. ‘Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906’. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 6(2): 193-203, p. 193-194.
40 Kukah, 2014: 3.
invaders. The Tijaniyya sect, one of the two dominant Sufi groups to have emerged during the Dan Fodio jihad in 180441, was made up of relatively rich farmer-traders, and since colonial interference upset their businesses, resistance became a valuable alternative.42 There is no evidence to suggest that the Tijaniyya sect underwent the same transformation as Boko Haram, with structural changes and regional alliances with other terrorist groups. This lack of transformation is linked to the absence, at that time, of a contemporary jihadi-salafi doctrine that justifies terrorism in Nigeria. Again, the Tijaniyya sect was more committed to its rivalry with the Qadariyya sect, opposing the aristocratic politics of the NPC-led northern regional government.
Another factor that led to the emergence of Islamic resistance groups was the lack of a united front within the Muslim community. The political opportunity element of social movement theory sustains that state repression and elite division may lead to the emergence of resistance groups. Colonial invasion caused division, as many British appointed emirs became liable to taunts of treachery, deception and disrespect.43 It also created what Adeleye calls the ‘‘unresolved dilemma of the waziri’’ (the vizier).44 The dilemma stemmed primarily from differences in opinion among the Muslims on how best to confront colonial rule. The first group led by the Sarkin Musulmi (Muslim leader), Attahiru Ahmadu I, who constituted an army to fight the British.
When he was killed at the battle of Bormi on 27 July, 1903, the decision fell to the waziri, Muhammadu Buhari Ibn Ahmad (1886-1910). The second group argued for hijra (migration) to demonstrate their rejection of colonial rule, and the third, to which the waziri belonged, believed in collaboration so that Islam could survive.45 This unresolved dilemma produced Islamic resistance led not by the Western educated Muslims but by Islamic scholars with extremist views.
One such extremist group was the Mahdi movement, which opposed the British from 1903. The first Mahdi movement was started by Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah in Sudan in 1844. He claimed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad’s family and organised a rebellion against the Ottoman caliphs who had conquered Egypt and sought to extend their rule to Sudan.46 Muhammad linked the concept of the Mahdi to what the Prophet is alleged to have said: ‘‘There will be caliphs…and tyrants after me, but then a man from my house will appear to fill the earth
41 Loimeier, Roman, 1997. Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, p. 20-51.
42 Ibid: 21. For instance, of the 12 Emirs that were imprisoned by the British in Lokoja in 1903, six were affiliated to Tijaniyya, one to the Qadiriyya, and one to Mahdiyya. Four were not affiliated to any Islamic sect.
43 Adeleye, Rowland, 1971. Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906. Harlow: Longman, p. 231.
44 Adeleye, Rowland, 1968. ‘The Dilemma of the Waziri: The Place of Risalat al-Waziri’ ilaahlal ‘ilmwa‘t-tadablur in the History of the Conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate’. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 4(2): 285-311.
45 Anwar, 2013: 7-8.
46 Bonney, Richard, 2004. Jihad: From Quran to Bin Laden. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 184.
