University of Groningen
Network games and strategic play Govaert, Alain
DOI:
10.33612/diss.117367639
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Publication date: 2020
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Govaert, A. (2020). Network games and strategic play: social influence, cooperation and exerting control. University of Groningen. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.117367639
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Propositions
belonging to the thesis
Network games and strategic play
by
Alain Govaert
1. A combination of social learning and rational behavior can help individuals to reach satisfactory decisions that preserve publicly available goods in the absence of external governing. – Chapters 3 and 4
2. Differentiation of strategic decisions is beneficial when facing many distinct opponents. However, it can become detrimental when the number of oppo-nents is relatively small. –Chapter 5
3. A strategic individual can unilaterally enforce a potentially large group of selfish players to mutually cooperate in a social dilemma with a finite but undetermined number of rounds. – Chapters 6 and 7
4. In a finite population, generous strategies promote the evolution of cooper-ation in social dilemmas only if the number of players in each interaction is relatively small with respect to the population size; otherwise, extortionate strategies are favored by evolution. – Chapter 8
5. To unilaterally exert strategic influence in a distant future, strategic deci-sions must be adjusted to the uncertainty of future events. – Chapter 9
6. In periods of great risk, a strategic individual must be “overly” generous to unilaterally promote mutual cooperation in a social dilemma. On the other hand, strong extortion requires sufficiently patient decisions that can only be effective when the future is sufficiently certain. – Chapter 9
7. The conservative has but little to fear from the man whose reason is the servant of his passions, but let him beware of him in whom reason has become the greatest and most terrible of the passions. – J.B.S Haldane, Daedalus, or Science and the Future
