Peering out of Plato’s Cave

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Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture

University of Göttingen (Home) University of Groningen (Host)

July 2018

Peering out of Plato’s Cave

A New Model to Address the Democratic Legitimacy of EU Policies

through Issue-specific Public Opinion Polling

Tobias Hofelich Student no. Göttingen: 211619173 Student no. Groningen: S3317196 tel.: +33 7 50 63 28 21 email: tobias.hofelich@icloud.com

Supervised by: Dr. Tobias Jakobi (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)

Dr. Francesco Giumelli (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)

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MA Programme Euroculture Declaration

I, Tobias Hofelich, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Peering out of Plato’s Cave - A New Model to Address the Democratic Legitimacy of EU Policies through Issue-specific Public Opinion Polling,” submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed _________________________

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Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded.

David Hume 1

David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, Literary (1777), ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis:

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Liberty Fund, 1987): 32, accessed 28 Jul 2018, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ 704#lf0059_label_131

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1. Introduction

There is a well-known catchphrase in Brussels that goes something like this: ‘If the European Union was a country and applied for membership of the Union, the application would be rejected.’ What sounds at first like the kind of blunt cynicism that is typical for the argumentation of vanguard Brexiteers, alludes in fact to a much 2

debated issue in academic circles. Usually, this idiom is followed by an explanation for 3

why the fictitious EU country’s application to the EU would be turned down: the EU itself, so they say, presently fails to meet the democratic standards required for accession to the Union. In academia, this alleged lack of democratic principles is commonly termed ‘democratic deficit.’

The debate on the EU’s democratic deficit(s) gained momentum only in the early 1990s. Over the first three decades, the process of European integration was (with some exceptions) fuelled by unanimously pro-European political elites, and legitimised through citizens’ so-called ‘permissive consensus.’ However, this situation changed at 4

the latest when the European Union began to take the shape of a supranational polity in its own right after the Maastricht Treaty came into effect in 1993. Suddenly, the EU had to cope not only with increased politicisation and public opposition, but also with 5

politicians and academics who increasingly raised concerns about its democratic legitimacy as a result of its newly gained political competencies. 6

Since then, a plethora of criticisms regarding the EU’s democratic legitimacy and deficits in democratic practices were voiced, which sparked a rather lively academic

This idiom is indeed frequently used in eurosceptic discourse, see for example Daniel Hannan,

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Why Vote Leave (London: Head of Zeus, 2016).

Anand Menon, and Martin Schain, Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the

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United States in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006): 235.

The term alludes to the depoliticised nature of European integration, which allowed progress

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largely free from public contestation. It was initially coined by Leon Nord Lindberg, and Stuart A. Scheingold in Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970).

Ian Down, and Carole J. Wilson, “From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘Constraining Dissensus’:

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A Polarizing Union?” Acta Politica 43, no. 1 (2008): 26-49.

Richard Bellamy, and Dario Castiglione, “Legitimizing the Euro-‘Polity’ and its ‘Regime’ -

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debate on the EU democratic deficit. Certainly it is true that scholarly dissent on this 7

issue is to a large extent related to competing ideological convictions of what the European Union is, or what it should become, as well as different conceptions democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, this is far from an arcane debate, detached from 8

reality. In fact, Eurobarometer 87, conducted in autumn 2017, suggests that not even half of EU citizens are satisfied with ‘the way democracy works in the EU.’ Although the EU has recently taken several steps to become more democratic — as for example increased the power of the European Parliament — citizens’ satisfaction with EU democracy is today on the same level as it was fourteen years ago. Moreover, 9

participation in European Parliament elections is steadily declining, and eurosceptic parties keep winning seats in national parliaments.

At a time when the international world order seems to be in flux, and fierce contestation is looming in the form of a growing number of eurosceptic parties across Europe, the European Union would do well to reduce its points of attack. Of course, the issue of democratic legitimacy is only one of many weak points anti-European forces frequently exploit, but it is nonetheless an important one. The magnitude of this problem shows for example in a recent study by Pippa Norris, who has demonstrated that (democratic) regimes are more likely to collapse if they lack in public legitimation. Hence, if the goal is to keep the European Union alive, the signs of the 10

time call for timely solutions to the EU’s everlasting issues with democratic legitimacy.

Research aims

Most attempts to cure the European Union of its alleged democratic deficits seem to follow all-or-nothing approaches, and thus call for far-reaching institutional reforms that

For an excellent overview of the debate, and a list of the five most common democratic

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deficits see for example Andreas Føllesdal, and Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 3 (2006): 533-562.

Giandomenico Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards,”

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European Law Journal 4, no. 1 (1998): 5-28.

“Standard Eurobarometer 87” (Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for

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Communication, 2017): 128.

Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit - Critical Citizens Revisited (New York: Cambridge

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would solve all issues at once. In anticipation of widespread public and political 11

reluctance to make grave changes to the EU’s current form, I take a more modest approach in this thesis. I propose a new model based on public opinion, that seeks to alleviate no more than one aspect of the EU’s democratic deficit. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the implementation of this model, I set great store by making this model compatible with the EU’s current institutional structure.

In essence, I seek to address the very core of democratic governance. According to Robert A. Dahl, “a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.” 12

Recent literature suggests that the EU presently lacks said responsiveness, which in turn adds to citizens’ rather high levels of discontent with the EU, and ever decreasing participation in its democratic processes. Hence, policy responsiveness is the aspect of 13

the EU’s democratic deficit I address throughout this work. Put succinctly, the solution I propose and discuss in this thesis is the institutionalisation of consultative issue-specific public opinion polls (henceforth called CISPOP). The purpose of this is to gauge and amplify European public opinion on major EU policy proposals, and thereby increase EU decision-makers’ policy responsiveness.

The stated aim of my thesis is to discuss the potential merits and pitfalls of CISPOP. In order to do this, I address three distinct aspects related to the functionality of the model. First, and most obviously, I assess whether CISPOP is theoretically able to increase the democratic legitimacy of EU policies. Second, I take into account the controversial nature of public opinion, and examine how the most frequently raised concerns regarding its integrity may affect the proper functioning of CISPOP. Third, I deal with the accuracy and representativeness of public opinion surveys in measuring and expressing EU citizens’ specific policy preferences. The analysis of these three aspects works towards the overall goal of this thesis, which is less to advocate this particular model, but rather to address the more general research question: What are the

Three such solutions are presented in Erik Oddvar Eriksen, The Unfinished Democratization

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of Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 57-84.

Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy - Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale

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University Press, 1971): 1.

Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Citizens in Europe - Essays on Democracy,

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theoretical potentials and pitfalls of public opinion-centred approaches to increase the democratic legitimacy of policies made at the European Union level?

Methodology and limitations

The above expressed aims are theoretical and analytical, rather than empirical in nature. Hence, my contribution to the scientific debate on the EU’s alleged democratic deficits is not based on gathering empirical data. Instead, I develop a novel approach to tackle the issue of democratic legitimacy by applying insights from public opinion research. While new, or additional empirical data is never a bad thing, both subjects I touch upon have, over the past decades, or even centuries, produced a large body of theoretical and empirical knowledge. This allows me to test my claims and assumptions in a sufficiently scientific manner by drawing upon existing data. In this sense, each main chapter of this thesis comprises an extensive literature review of the most relevant and most recent scientific works on its respective subject. In parallel, I use these findings to detect CISPOP’s strengths and weaknesses, and to assess the overall viability of public opinion-centred approaches.

Using this method, however, inevitably means that my research makes no assumptions as to whether or not my proposed model, or any other model based on the institutionalisation of public opinion polling, works in practice. In order to assess the practicality of CISPOP, it would be necessary to analyse existing cases in which public opinion polls were specifically used to enhance a polity’s democratic legitimacy. The present use of public opinion polls in the European Union does not compare to the political clout of the issue-specific type of polling envisioned in CISPOP, and thus fails to meet the requirements of a suitable case study. On the other side, case studies on other polities where a similar model might have been tried, would evoke methodological issues in view of the debate surrounding the EU’s sui generis design. 14

In any case, the scope of this thesis did not allow me to conduct elaborate case studies and address the practical issues aligned with public opinion-centred models in sufficient

There is a non-negligible fraction of scholars in the field of comparative politics who posit

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that the EU’s uniqueness forbids comparisons to other democratic institutions. See for example Jens-Uwe Wunderlich, “The EU and Actor Sui Generis? A Comparison of EU and ASEAN Actorness,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no. 4 (2012): 654.

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detail. Therefore, my research and its results do not go beyond their theoretical foundations.

Moreover, my theoretical analysis is not all-encompassing. Considering the multifaceted nature of both democratic legitimacy and public opinion, I decided to focus on an in-depth examination of what I consider the most important aspects. Naturally, this means that some other aspects had to be left out. In the respective chapters, I outline in further detail why I dealt with some aspects, and avoided others.

Structure

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two illuminates the background of my thesis. First, I first provide a working definition of democratic legitimacy. Subsequently, I develop my argument on why the European Union even requires democratic legitimation, and thereby I delve into the debate on the existence and problematic nature of democratic deficits in the EU. Lastly, I discuss divergent takes on where the EU derives its legitimacy from. Based on this, I build the argument that EU policies lack in input legitimacy.

From this background, chapter three introduces the previously mentioned CISPOP model, with which I seek to increase the input legitimacy of EU policies. Since the model relies on public opinion, this chapter begins with an overview of various (opposing) definitions of public opinion that exist to date. Following this, I outline the functioning of the envisioned model and how it generally fits with input-oriented approaches to legitimacy. The last section of this chapter answers the question of whether and how CISPOP is in theory able to increase the input legitimacy of EU policies.

Chapter four deals with some of the most persistent points of critique on public opinion, that could potentially impede the functioning of my proposed model. I begin with a discussion on the common criticism that regards the formation of public opinion as being less so a result of public deliberation, rather than a product of elite and media influence. Subsequently, I shed light into the debate concerning the public’s alleged lack of political knowledge, which would render the measurement of public opinion on political subjects practically useless.

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The fifth chapter in the first place addresses the viability of public opinion polls to adequately gauge public opinion. Therefore, I discuss the known technical difficulties of conventional opinion surveys, that can hamper the representativeness and accuracy of results. The final section of this thesis delivers a final verdict on whether the public is able to form sound opinions on specific policies, and whether opinion polls are capable of transmitting these.

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2. Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union

Despite having celebrated its sixtieth birthday earlier in 2018, the nature and purpose of the European Union remains a conundrum to its citizens, academics who study it, and in some cases even politicians who work for or with it. Fittingly, the long-serving and highly influential former president of the EU Commission, Jacques Delors, allegedly once called the EU ‘un objet politique non identifié.’ Having essentially been dubbed the UFO of international institutions, the EU in effect invites scholars and politicians alike to interpret this polity in which ever way suits them best. Neofunctionalists tend to avoid attempts to describe the EU’s present state, and instead point out that it is a political body still in formation. Federalists dream that this formation will eventually 15

culminate in a pan-European federal state, whereas scholars leaning towards 16

intergovernmentalism generally see the EU as an international institution that has already gone a step too far. The European Commission itself contributes to its own 17

apparent lack of direction. In a 2017 white paper, it presented five possible scenarios for what the Union could become when it comes of age. 18

The EU’s rather mysterious state of being, along with scholars’ divergent ideological viewpoints, has over time produced a variety of perspectives on the source of this polity’s legitimacy. Different standards and concepts of legitimacy have led to academic opinions that range from seeing the Union as sufficiently legitimised, to 19

there being numerous democratic deficits. It is not the purpose of this chapter to name, 20

explain, and discuss all scientific contributions to this issue and make a final statement

Philippe Schmitter, “What is there to Legitimise in the European Union…and How Might

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This be Accomplished?” IHS Working Papers, Political Science Series 75 (2001): 1, accessed 13 Jun 2018, http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21976.

Altiero Spinelli, “Atlantic Pact or European Unity,” Foreign Affairs 40, no. 4 (1962): 547.

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Norman Barry, “Constitutionalism, Federalism and the European Union,” Economic Affairs

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24, no. 1 (2004): 11-16.

European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, Brussels, 1 Mar 2017, accessed

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13 Jun 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf.

see for example Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing

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Legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 603-624.

for a list of the five most common ‘democratic deficits’ see for example Andreas Føllesdal,

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on how I evaluate the EU’s state of legitimacy. Instead, I argue that EU policies are in need of further legitimation, due to the European Union being deficient in democratic participation and the inclusion of citizens in policy-making processes.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide an overview of the various factors that play into determining a polity’s democratic legitimacy. This allows me to subsequently discuss why in addition to indirect legitimation derived from its member states, I believe the EU is in need of democratic legitimation in its own right. Building on this, I elaborate on a specific deficit in what Scharpf coined ‘input legitimacy,’ and why this is relevant for the proper functioning of the EU as a democratic polity.

2.1. Concepts of legitimacy

Legitimacy is a particularly vague term with countless slightly different interpretations and concepts. Bellamy and Castiglione for example define legitimacy succinctly as “the normatively conditioned and voluntary acceptance by the ruled of the government of their rulers.” More precisely, Eriksen distinguishes three concepts of legitimacy: de 21

facto legitimacy is given when decisions are generally accepted by decision-takers (i.e.

citizens); de jure legitimacy describes acceptance grounded in “compliance with legally binding law;” and normative legitimacy sees legitimacy bound to normative considerations that emerge from a “rational process of deliberation among affected parties.” 22

Andreas Wimmel took the task of developing a comprehensive model of legitimacy that is applicable to the European Union. Following his model, these concepts of legitimacy can then be applied to three different objects of legitimacy: political system; (EU) institutions; (EU) policy decisions. The evaluation of these objects’ legitimacy in turn depends on changeable, quasi-independent factors that he calls variables of legitimacy. Relevant to the EU context are again three distinct

Richard Bellamy, and Dario Castiglione, “Legitimizing the Euro-‘Polity’ and its ‘Regime’”:

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10.

Erik Oddvar Eriksen, The Unfinished Democratization of Europe: 27.

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variables, describing phases in policy-making processes: participation (input); process (throughput); and results (output). 23

The categorisation of democratic legitimation into input and output variables dates back to Fritz Scharpf who first established this division in his pathbreaking work

Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung. In his later work, he describes

input legitimacy along the famous lines of Abraham Lincoln as ‘government by the people,’ which is given if citizens are provided sufficient means for democratic participation and the ability to influence and control political processes. Output 24

legitimacy, on the other side, is labelled ‘government for the people’ and legitimises governments based on their capacity to “solve problems requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved through individual action.” 25

The term throughput was coined later by Vivien Schmidt who recognised that legislative processes, as the step in between the public’s indication of preferences and the final results of government action, are equally in need of democratic legitimation. These processes of governance account for throughput legitimacy depending on “efficacy, accountability and transparency of the EU’s governance processes along with their inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people.” The question which 26

of these variables should and can be applied to assess the EU’s legitimacy is at the heart of the debate on the EU’s alleged democratic deficit, and is dealt with in the following sub-chapter.

Equally contestable and relevant to the debate on democratic deficits are what Wimmel calls standards of legitimacy, i.e. the evaluation of a polity’s legitimacy through comparison. These standards can be counterfactual ideal-types, nation states, and international institutions. The implications of judging the EU’s legitimacy by 27

Andreas Wimmel, “Theorizing the Democratic Legitimacy of European Governance: a

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Labyrinth with No Exit?” European Integration 31, no. 2 (2009): 188-190.

Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (New York: Oxford

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University Press, 1999): 10. Ibid: 11.

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Vivien A. Schmidt, “Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input,

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Output and ‘Throughput,’” Political Studies 61, no. 1 (2013): 2.

Andreas Wimmel, “Theorizing the Democratic Legitimacy of European Governance”:

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using either nation states or international institutions as standards were touched upon in the introduction. Counterfactual ideal-types understand the application of normative criteria derived from theoretical models to real-world examples. It is important to recognise that this must not imply that the functioning of the EU should be tested against classical democratic models, as Moravcsik accuses many critics to do. It 28

should be clear that in modern democratic societies these models are hardly ever workable in full. Instead, this calls for the application and development of theories that 29

respect and acknowledge the EU’s unique constitution. Table 1 is adopted from Wimmel and serves to recapitulate the different layers on which the debate on the EU’s democratic legitimacy takes place.

Table 1 30

Considering the sheer number of possible combinations of factors by which a polity’s legitimacy can be assessed, it becomes clear that there are equally innumerable areas where the EU potentially may be deficient. The following subchapter does not venture into listing, explaining and discussing the whole spectrum of democratic deficits political scientists have accused the EU of suffering from. Instead, the following paragraphs shed light into the debate on whether the EU even requires legitimation in its own right.

Concepts of legitimacy Objects of legitimacy Variables of legitimacy Standards of legitimacy

Legality Political system of the

EU Participation (input) Counterfactual ideal-type Acceptance /

compliance EU institutions Process (throughput) Nation-states Normative justification EU policy decisions Results (output) International organisation

Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit,’”: 605.

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Elmer Eric Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in

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America (1960) (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1975): 133.

Andreas Wimmel, “Theorizing the Democratic Legitimacy of European Governance”: 195.

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2.2. A polity in need of direct legitimation

Does the European Union need to legitimise its actions based on criteria commonly applied to full-fledged democratic institutions, or is it sufficient for it to be recognised by its member states who are themselves adequately democratically legitimised? The existence of any democratic deficit that is worth to be discussed depends on the answer to this question. Therefore, this chapter discusses the rather dated core arguments on both sides and illuminates the debate from a contemporary perspective. In order to do this, one must first understand the EU’s institutional nature. Beetham and Lord argue that a precise definition of the type of polity the EU constitutes is not necessary. Instead, in order to justify its need for legitimation in its own right, it suffices to acknowledge that the EU is quite different to common international institutions. 31

This difference manifests in the EU’s somewhat hybrid structure. On the one side, the EU bears aspects of a supranational political entity in its own right, whereas on the other side it remains an international institution at the mercy of its member states’ governments. The lofty goals of its founding fathers should serve as an indicator that the European Economic Community was designed to be more than merely a trade union. Nevertheless, at its outset, respect for its member states’ sovereignty was an important selling point to convince the six founding states to cooperate.

Throughout the history of European unification, critics of the project bemoaned the loss of national sovereignty that goes along with continuous deepening of integration. The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, initiated a shift towards more supranationalism. Highly contested at the time, the EU’s competencies expanded into several policy areas — most prominently monetary policy but also foreign and security policy — which used to be sovereign territory of its member states. Bellamy and Castiglione note that this was the incisive moment that intensified debates on democracy and legitimacy of the European Union. While at first being an elite-driven 32

project, the EU could henceforth no longer rely on citizens’ ‘permissive consensus,’ but

David Beetham, and Christopher Lord, “Legitimacy and the European Union,” in Political

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Theory and the European Union - Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, ed. Albert

Weale and Michael Nentwich (London: Routledge, 1998): 17.

Richard Bellamy, and Dario Castiglione, “Legitimizing the Euro-‘Polity’ and its ‘Regime,’”:

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was instead confronted with ‘constraining dissensus,’ which complicated the 33

legitimation of further integration steps primarily through the acceptance of its member states’ governments.

Today, it seems as if the trend towards more supranational competencies has proliferated. Take for example foreign affairs. The European Union now has a seat at the table at G7 summits, and plays an active role in international negotiations — e.g. the Iran nuclear deal, or the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, as a result of the European financial crisis, the ECB became an important actor, imposing fiscal policies on some EU member states. Indeed, all member states have effectively had to surrender their sovereignty over their own national budgets, which now have to be approved by the EU Commission.

At the same time, intergovernmentalism is still highly present in the EU. Despite growing powers of the European Parliament, decision-making remains firmly in the hands of the EU Council and the Council of Ministers, where national interests largely determine the direction of policy. Hence, the EU neither fits the mould of being a full-34

fledged supranational polity, nor of being just an intergovernmental institution. This rather unique institutional design is often termed the European Union’s sui generis approach, which for its lack of precedence complicates the question of which standards should be applied to asses the EU’s democratic legitimacy.

Despite this uncertainty, the European Union itself has a rather clear position on how it derives its legitimacy. Under article 8A in the Treaty of Lisbon it is stated that “the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.” Democratic legitimacy is thus provided on the one hand by citizens’ direct representation in the European Parliament, and on the other hand through indirect representation by their heads of government in the EU Council. Public and scholarly 35

debate on the EU’s democratic legitimacy and potential deficits revolves around this

Ian Down, and Carole J. Wilson, “From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘Constraining Dissensus’:

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26-49.

Ronald Holzhacker, “Democratic Legitimacy and the European Union,” European Integration

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29, no. 3 (2007): 260.

The European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon - Amending the Treaty on European Union and the

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Treaty Establishing the European Community,” 2007, C 306/01, accessed 17 June 2018, https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12007L/TXT.

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dichotomy of direct and indirect representation. On the one side, a lack of direct legitimacy is made out as a result of the EP’s notorious weakness in comparison to the Council and the democratically not accountable EU Commission. The following 36

paragraphs deal with scholars on the other side of the dispute, who generally believe that the EU does not require direct legitimation.

Proponents of the latter argument contest the very notion of a ‘democratic deficit.’ Giandomenico Majone is one of the most prominent scholars who claim that the European Union is sufficiently democratically legitimised. He chastens scholars who accuse the EU of suffering from democratic deficits of falsely applying legitimacy standards of parliamentary democracies. He argues plainly that the European Union is no full-fledged federal state, and is therefore by nature unable to fulfil these criteria. 37

He, of course, rightfully asserts that any evaluation of a polity’s legitimacy depends first and foremost on the standards by which it is measured.

Majone argues from an output-oriented, intergovernmentalist perspective. His argument is based on the premise that the EU constitutes a ‘regulatory state’ whose purpose it is to produce Pareto-efficient policies for its citizens and member states. Efficiency and credibility is guaranteed by decisions being made by independent regulatory agents, whereas interference by democratically accountable bodies such as parliaments would be an impediment. Furthermore, he alludes to the concept of de facto legitimacy and argues that in view of citizens’ overall acceptance of the polity, the democratic deficit is the price Europeans seem to willingly be paying in order to remain on the path of “far-reaching economic integration,” while preserving national sovereignty. 38

Majone does not tire of arguing that the elimination of what is perceived as a democratic deficit would require the establishment of parliamentary democracy at the European level, and consequently call for the formation of a full-fledged federal union.

see for example Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, trans.

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Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Malden: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Giandomenico Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’”: 5-28.

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Ibid: 7.

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This, he argues, is at present not the intention of European citizens. He does, however, 39

concede that there is a deficit in accountability which has become an ever more pressing issue since European policies increasingly affect citizens’ day-to-day life. The solution he proposes is not the apparently unwelcome transformation of the EU into a “federal super-state,” but rather a limitation of the EU’s supranational capacities along with a restitution of power to national parliaments which are directly accountable. 40

Nine years after his article was published, it can be said with certainty that his remark concerning European citizens’ reluctance of creating a pan-European federal state still holds true. In fact, the present political landscape, where eurosceptic and outright anti-European forces continuously gain ground, seems to block overly far-reaching integration steps. In light of this, however, it also appears questionable whether EU citizens still willingly accept how little influence they have on decisions made in Brussels.

Although it may sound appealing to some, Majone’s proposal to roll back the Union to the state of a predominantly intergovernmental institution appears rather nostalgic and no longer viable considering how far integration has already progressed. The common currency is but one example of why turning back the time is not as easy in practice as it sounds in theory. Monetary policy has been in the hands of the European Central Bank for roughly two decades. The ECB is a prime example for an extremely autonomous European institution with very little, if any, democratic accountability. Nonetheless, if 19 individual states with often competing interests shared monetary policy, a rather chaotic outcome can be expected. As a consequence, the Euro could most likely not be sustained if not in the hands of a supranational body. Given that this, or other significant backward steps are considered undesirable, attempts to alleviate certain defects in public influence on decision making should avoid abolishing a number of significant integration steps already made, as well as going all-in on European integration in the sense of founding a European federation.

Alongside Majone, Andrew Moravcsik offers normative justification for why he thinks the EU is sufficiently legitimised through the recognition of its member states.

Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-Be World Power (New York: Cambridge

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University Press, 2009): 154. Ibid: 175.

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Being one of the most prominent and loyal followers of the intergovernmentalist school, his line of argumentation presumes that the EU is rather to be seen in line with other international organisations such as the WTO or the UN. His main point is that the EU’s most important source of legitimation lies in being accountable to its member states’ governments, which in turn are democratically elected, and thus legitimised by their citizenry. 41

In many ways, relying solely on indirect legitimation appears somewhat problematic. This shows for example in matters of economic integration, where decisions in the EU council are made by qualified majority voting. This implies that in some instances national governments can in principle be overruled. Acknowledging that the EU’s approach to decision-making relies mostly on making consensual decisions, there is still the possibility that a government which does not retreat from its minority opinion is forced to implement an EU regulation the majority in the Council agreed upon. For the citizens of this country, this regulation lacks indirect democratic legitimisation, in that it goes against public preferences. Even if the EP opposes this policy, the Council is not legally obliged to take this decision into account. As a result, the EU’s institutional framework theoretically allows policies to be enacted that are neither directly, nor indirectly legitimised. Bordering on ‘foreign rule,’ this institutional characteristic is a particularly easy target for anti-European parties. 42

Beetham and Lord contradict the views of Majone and Moravcsik and claim that aside from indirect legitimation, the EU requires more direct or substantive legitimacy. In fact, they argue that EU legitimacy is derived from the same normative criteria which apply to nation states, while recognising that the EU’s institutional setup forbids the fulfilment of all criteria. This argument is based on three simple points. First, the EU’s 43

laws and regulations directly impact the lives of its citizens. Second, the EU did not fare particularly well as an elite project and is in desperate need of public support as was shown by the debates on Maastricht, and even more so later when lack of public support led to the failure of the attempt to ratify a constitution. Third and most importantly, the

Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’”: 612.

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Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Citizens in Europe: 355.

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David Beetham and Christopher Lord, “Legitimacy and the European Union”: 18-19.

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EU’s “legitimacy of political authority is now a ‘two-level process’ (…) of interaction between the EU and its member states,” which requires legitimation in its own right because it (negatively) affects its member states’ legitimacy by interfering in some of their key competencies. 44

Beetham and Lord articulated these points almost twenty years ago. As was mentioned before, the EU has since then made significant steps towards becoming a polity with more supranational capacities. Consequently, I argue that all three points mentioned above have been reinforced. Firstly, the EU’s impact on citizens’ day to day life has noticeably increased with the introduction of the common currency, a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, and a plethora of new laws and regulations that directly affect citizens in their roles as consumers, employees, or employers. The manifold ways in which the EU now interferes in citizens’ lives and domestic politics makes it incomparable to other international institutions such as the UN, NATO, or the WTO. Secondly, the recent Europe-wide emergence of anti-establishment movements suggests that purely elite-driven projects are at this time less likely as ever to receive wide public acceptance. Lastly, policies such as the fiscal compact, which significantly limits member states’ independence in making decisions on matters of fiscal policy, are only one example of ever more far-reaching political competencies the EU persistently takes over from its members.

Like it or not, the EU has long ago left the boundaries of simply being an international institution. In light of recently articulated plans to increase the EU budget, respectively create a Eurozone budget, and establish joint European military forces, a direction towards more, rather than less supranational EU governance is indicated. Obviously, this view is fiercely challenged by numerous eurosceptic and anti-European parties across Europe. Considering all this, the EU would do well to seek additional legitimation that matches its growing capabilities and fends off criticism of being undemocratic. The following subchapter sheds light into where this additional legitimacy can be found, based on the earlier introduced legitimacy variables of input and output.

Ibid: 17-18.

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2.3. Deficits in input legitimacy

Already in 2001, the European Commission strikingly acknowledged that primarily output-oriented approaches are no longer sufficient, and that “legitimacy today depends on involvement and participation.” Nonetheless, output-oriented 45

approaches have thus far dominated scholarly debate on the EU’s democratic legitimacy. Although it is commonly acknowledged that the EU does not meet the standards of input legitimacy, this element was until recently largely neglected.

This position is supported most notably by Fritz Scharpf, who throughout his earlier works claimed that the EU is only able to legitimise itself through output in the sense of finding solutions to problems where collective action is required. Input-oriented ideals such as ‘participation’ and ‘consensus’ among individuals, he argues, can only be reached if a) the distance between citizens and their representatives does not exceed a certain limit; and b) if in the absence of win-win situations, decision-making by majority rule can be justified.

Justification for majority rule, he contends, is only given if citizens pursue the common goal of increasing the welfare of all. This, in turn, would require certain pre-existing commonalities, i.e. a ‘thick’ collective identity. Consequently, and in line with most constructivist scholars of the European Union, he concludes that the “historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and institutional diversity of [the EU’s] member states” obstructs the development of a ‘thick’ European identity. Thus majoritarian decision-making cannot be justified, and input-oriented approaches to legitimacy must therefore be neglected. 46

However, since qualified majority voting was implemented in the EU council when the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, decision-making at the EU level has become significantly more majoritarian. Furthermore, the European Parliament has grown more powerful due to the co-decision procedure and quasi-veto power in the election of the Commission. 47

European Commission, European Governance - A White Paper, Brussels 25 Jul 2001,

45

accessed 03 Jul 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/european-governance-white-paper_en. Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?: 7-9.

46

Simon Hix, What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity

47

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The recent European crises laid bare the EU’s ineffectiveness in developing policy responses at a time when collective action was desperately needed. In view of this, Scharpf concedes that there is a deficit in output legitimacy. He traces the cause for this to what he calls the joint decision trap, a term describing the highly consensus driven multiple-veto system of EU decision-making. In reaction to the absence of consensus among national representatives, the crisis was managed by increasing the power of “non-accountable supranational actors,” and “through intergovernmental negotiations outside the Treaty,” which suffered from “asymmetric bargaining powers.” 48

Meanwhile, Cooper argues that this shift of power was not balanced out by a similar shift in terms of representation or accountability. Correspondingly, Hix and 49

Føllesdal argue that this calls for more direct legitimation of the EU’s institutions. Further, they contend that being a democratic polity, the EU requires some sort of political contestation, and must allow for participation and representation of the public’s preferences not only at the national level. Scharpf acknowledges these deficits and 50

points out that the EU’s system of governance does not provide the means for input-oriented democracy as it misses “a common public space, (…) Europe-wide political debates, party competition, and political accountability.” 51

From citizens’ perspective, support for the EU has shown to be more influenced by their perception of being properly represented, than by sheer evaluation of economic benefits. Scharpf concedes that the legitimating power of output-oriented approaches 52

has declined and warns correspondingly, that “the lack of input legitimacy in the present European context will constrain and may ultimately destroy the effectiveness of

Fritz Scharpf, “De-Constitutionalisation and Majority Rule: A Democratic Vision for

48

Europe,” European Law Journal 23, no. 5 (2017): 323.

Ian Cooper, “A ‘Virtual Third Chamber’ for the European Union? National Parliaments after

49

the Treaty of Lisbon,” West European Politics 35, no. 3 (2012): 441-465.

Andreas Føllesdal, and Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU”: 533-562.

50

Fritz Scharpf, “Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity,” European Political Science

51

Review 1, no. 2 (2009) : 178.

Robert Rohrschneider, “The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-wide

52

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measures based on non-accountable supranational authority.” While clearly still 53

following an output-oriented approach to the EU’s democratic legitimacy, he recognises the signs of the times which indicate the need to place more emphasis on the EU’s input legitimacy.

Scholars concerned with input legitimacy at the EU level have thus far come up with a variety of democratic deficits. Summarised by Føllesdal and Hix, these include 1) a shift of power towards executive actors away from national parliaments; 2) the notorious weakness of the European Parliament; 3) a lack of political contestation over EU matters and no opportunity for citizens to express preferences in truly European elections; 4) the commonly mentioned distance between Brussels and EU citizens; and last but not least 5) a policy drift to the political right of the majority of voters’ preferences. 54

Offe and Preuss address the third point of critique (according to Føllesdal and Hix the only one that is relevant) from a perspective of de facto legitimacy, as its ramifications are reflected in the low and declining turnout rates in European Parliament elections. While this phenomenon is commonly explained by accusing citizens of being rather indifferent to EU politics, here citizens’ abstinence from the voting booth is understood as an “expression of feelings of frustration and perceived powerlessness.” 55

This perceived powerlessness refers to citizens’ inability to influence EU politics through EP elections. Offe and Preuss contend that voters in EP elections effectively do not have the chance to choose between true alternatives in EU policy, but instead are relegated to express support or disproval for national parties. 56

This alludes to the argument of European elections being ‘second order national elections,’ which is as old as the first ever EP election in 1979. This notion, however, 57

does not quite hold true in light of the 2014 European elections, which were clearly

Fritz Scharpf, “De-Constitutionalisation and Majority Rule”: 315.

53

Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU”: 534-537.

54

Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Citizens in Europe: 354.

55

Ibid: 354.

56

Karlheinz Reif, and Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections - A

57

Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results,” European Journal of

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about European issues. In fact, the main topic was the European Union itself which culminated in the surge of eurosceptic parties in the EP.

The immense success of eurosceptic parties in that cycle must be seen as an indicator of public dissatisfaction with the EU’s performance; Some have suggested that the election of eurosceptic parties should be seen as a rebuke of the much-loathed austerity measures enacted against some countries. In addition, 2014 marked the first year in which citizens were allowed to vote for the future president of the Commission by casting a vote for a European instead of a national party.

Despite this added incentive and the apparent chance to determine the direction of EU policy, turnout at the 2014 elections reached an all-time low at 42.61% across all member states. Franklin and Nielsen thus argue that if not second-order, the elections 58

can at least be considered second-rate. The changes that were made still fail to fulfil the purpose of first-rate elections, i.e. indicating direct consequences for policies at the EU level, mainly because policies are primarily decided on by the Council on which EP elections have no effect. 59

To conclude, the European Union is no longer merely an intergovernmental institution but has acquired far-reaching policy-making competencies which directly impact its citizens. As a consequence, the standards by which its legitimacy are assessed must be derived from similarly powerful polities. Moreover, it is safe to say that unless one argues from the perspective that European integration should regress to being nothing more but an intergovernmental trade bloc, the lack in input legitimacy poses a problem.

While many of the Union’s alleged democratic deficits are at least contestable, 60

the argument persists that citizens are currently unable to express policy preferences in institutionally meaningful channels. Improvements have been made, considering that the most recent EP elections seemed to give citizens a choice between political alternatives, albeit only between pro and anti-EU camps. Still, at least citizens were

European Parliament, “Results of the 2014 European elections,” accessed 28 Jun 2018, http://

58

www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html.

Julie Hassing Nielsen, and Mark N. Franklin, The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament

59

Elections - Second Order or Second Rate? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 246.

Andreas Føllesdal, and Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU”: 533-562.

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somewhat able to determine the direction of EU policy. The extent to which this actually influences policy is questionable since the last word on decisions still rests with the Council.

At present, public interest in regards to concrete policies is mainly represented by organised interest groups. While lobbyism at times plays a significant role in EU policy-making and can potentially have a positive effect on the EU’s democratic legitimacy, the influence of these groups depends on their respective resources, and 61

hardly ever is the entirety of EU citizens represented in an interest group’s policy proposal. Philippe Schmitter criticises this development and warns that instead of individual human beings, “organisations have become the predominant and effective citizens of national democratic polities.” Considering the EU’s notoriously tight 62

relationship with lobby groups, the same could be said about the EU.

Arguing from the standpoint that neither EP elections nor national elections provide citizens with real alternatives in regards to EU policies, individual citizens are limited to few, rather powerless channels to express their policy preferences. At the EU level, individual citizens can address issues and propose change through petitions or the recently introduced citizen’s initiative. Both methods, however, require some level of organisation, and thus predominantly attract politically active citizens. The one remaining method that voices the collective policy preferences of all EU citizens is Europe-wide public opinion polls. In the following chapter I discuss the possibility of using public opinion polling to increase citizens’ influence on individual EU policies. Therefore, I introduce a novel model which employs issue-specific polls to achieve this.

Alexander Katsaitis, “EU Democratic Deficit(s) and Legitimacy; System Versus Sub-System

61

Level,” in The European Union in Crisis - Explorations in Representation and Democratic

Legitimacy, ed. Kyriakos N. Demetriou (Cham: Springer, 2015): 181-199.

Philippe C. Schmitter, How to Democratize the European Union…and Why Bother?

62

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3. A new input-oriented model

Solutions to the democratic deficit in input legitimacy often demand far-reaching reforms of the EU’s institutional structure. Depending to a large extent on ideological standpoints, Eriksen shows that proposals range from scaling down the Union to a free-trade agreement, to forging a closer Union that draws upon its peoples’ shared heritage and common identity. He himself suggests a (slightly) less incisive measure and proposes to form what he calls a rights-based union in which constitutional patriotism moulds its citizens together and culminates in a full-fledged parliamentary democracy. 63

In view of the current eurosceptical political climate, far-reaching reforms of the EU that seek to introduce public participation at a level comparable to parliamentary democracies appear unfeasible. At the same time, it seems unrealistic that the European Union will be scaled down to the state of being a purely intergovernmental trade bloc. If at all such reforms should be considered desirable is another question, and the answer depends mostly on one’s ideological perspective. In light of the general public and political reluctance to revolutionise the EU’s institutional framework in either direction, more modest reforms that can be implemented into the current institutional setting are called for.

The aim of this thesis is to assess whether modest reforms based on public opinion polling are capable of alleviating the above mentioned legitimacy issues of EU policies. Therefore, in this chapter I develop a model that seeks to improve the input legitimacy of EU policy decisions by increasing the influence of public opinion on policy. In a nutshell, the envisioned model would employ consultative issue-specific public opinion polls (CISPOP) that measure citizens’ (dis-)approval of each major policy proposal, and urge policy makers to act correspondingly. Considerations on the functionality of this proposed model are essentially the heart of this thesis and will spread over the remaining chapters.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether and how CISPOP can achieve the desired result of an increase in input legitimacy of EU policies. The first section of this chapter provides a working definition of public opinion. Subsequently, I delineate the basic functioning of CISPOP, and detail how the reform fits the criteria of

Erik Oddvar Eriksen, The Unfinished Democratization of Europe: 57-84.

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oriented approaches to legitimacy. Lastly, I theorise on CISPOP’s potential to further legitimise EU policy.

3.1. Definition(s) of public opinion

Researchers venturing the perilous attempt to define public opinion encounter an enormous amount of divergent, often contradicting definitions. Carroll J. Glynn et al.’s compendium on public opinion research shows that academic interpretations of public opinion range from doubts in its very existence to blind trust in civic competence. These stark differences seem to arise from the respective proponents’ political orientations. Simply put, scholars leaning towards more elitist interpretations of democracy are generally speaking rather sceptical of public opinion, whereas those favouring forms of direct democracy tend to place greater value in public opinion. Nevertheless, it is inevitable to agree upon a working definition of the term that is at the heart of this research. Adapted from Carroll J. Glynn et al., table 2 lists five different categories of 64

definitions for public opinion and its most prominent contributions:

1. An aggregation of individual opinions (e.g. Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”; Benjamin Page and Robert Y. Shapiro The Rational Public)

Public opinion is simply the sum of individual opinions

2. A reflection of majority beliefs

(e.g. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “The Spiral of Silence”)

Public opinion is understood as the opinion dominating in society

3. Found in the clash of group interests

(e.g Herbert Blumer, “Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling)

Public opinion is the result of public debate among interest groups

4. A reflection of media and elite influence (e.g. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion)

Public opinion is the product of elite opinions (including journalists, politicians, pollsters, etc.)

Glynn et al., Public Opinion (Boulder: Westview Press, 2016): 13-18.

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Table 2

The first category is by far the most popular line of thought. Here, public opinion is simply understood as the sum of individual opinions. Consequently, this definition more or less justifies the use of public opinion polls which themselves rest on the assumption that a scientifically correct sample of individual citizens is in sum able to represent the entirety of a public. While definitions 2 to 5 are rather ideology-laden, definition 1 is a functional, pragmatic definition of public opinion, with a relatively neutral standpoint on public opinion and democratic theory.

Seeing public opinion through this lens makes no assumptions about individual citizens’ capability of forming and expressing sound political opinions, or participating in politics, respectively. Philip E. Converse certainly subscribes to the first definition, in that he understands public opinion as “what opinion polls try to measure (…) with modest error.” Although he later relativised his initial points and claimed to have been 65

misunderstood all along, his seminal article of 1964 suggests that he is rather critical 66

of the average citizen’s capability to understand political affairs. His argument goes that a profound lack of knowledge and interest in political subjects are responsible for what he later famously termed irrational ‘nonattitudes’ when citizens are asked to produce an opinion on a complex political subject. 67

While (mis-)reading Converse might urge policymakers and researchers to exert caution when it comes to evaluating or following public opinion, Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro come to an entirely different conclusion, albeit arguing from the same conceptual understanding. They refer to public opinion as collective policy preferences

5. A complete fiction

(e.g. Pierre Bourdieu, “Public Opinion Does Not Exist”)

Public opinion is manufactured to function as a political tool. True public opinion cannot be measured

Philip E. Converse, “Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process,”

65

Public Opinion Quarterly 51, no. 4 part 2 (1987): 14.

Philip E. Converse, “Democratic Theory and Electoral Reality,” Critical Review 18, no. 1-3

66

(2006): 297-329.

Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” (1964), Critical Review

67

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derived from individuals’ opinions. Despite recognising deficiencies in the quality of 68

individuals’ opinions, evidence drawn from a time series analysis that encompasses public opinion and policy data from 1935-1990 leads them to place great trust in citizens’ ability to form stable, sophisticated, and rational opinions when looked at as a collective. 69

Therefore, definition 1 fits best to the purpose of this research. First, in order to assess the potential of CISPOP, a neutral and unbiased starting point is necessary to discuss the elevated role of public opinion in policy-making processes. Second, since this method relies on public opinion in the form of polling data, it is an obvious necessity that the working definition of public opinion in this work does not per se rule out the practicality of opinion polls. However, the remaining four definitions listed above shall not be relegated to being decorative objects. Their significantly different view on public opinion is based on certain characteristics and shortcomings associated with the concept of public opinion, predominantly its measurability and its formation. This is picked up again in chapters four and five.

3.2. The consultative issue-specific public opinion poll

In this section I outline my envisioned model (CISPOP), which seeks to increase the legitimacy of EU policies by way of intensifying the use of public opinion polls. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the EU, or rather its policies, mainly lack input-oriented criteria of legitimacy. Therefore, the focus of CISPOP must, by definition of input legitimacy, lie on both fostering political participation and on ensuring that individual citizens’ preferences on EU policies are heard and taken into account by decision-makers.

CISPOP aims to achieve this by giving European citizens the opportunity to directly express their support or disapproval of individual policies through institutionalised Europe-wide public opinion polls on far-reaching policy proposals. In view of the apparent reluctance to implement grave institutional changes, this model

Benjamin I. Page, and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public - Fifty Years of Trends in

68

Americans’ Policy Preferences (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992):

16.

Ibid: 383-389.

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decidedly avoids venturing into these presently utopian spheres. Therefore, the polls are designed to be of a solely consultative nature. This ensures that no alterations have to be made to the EU’s current sui generis institutional design, which combines intergovernmental and supranational decision-making bodies.

This subchapter is divided into three sections. First, I specify how CISPOP could function. Second, I argue that this model fulfils the criteria of input-oriented approaches to legitimacy in that it encourages public participation, and raises the influence of public opinion on policy although the polls only have a consultative capacity. The last section deals with potential challenges that could result from the implementation of CISPOP.

Functioning of the model

The CISPOP model rests on a three-layered process. First, it must be decided whether an issue will be taken to the polls, or not. Considering the cost and the time it generally takes to conduct opinion polls, it is clear that not all EU policies, regulations, and directives can be put to vote. Moreover, there is a considerable amount of EU laws that are commonly perceived to have almost no impact on citizens’ day-to-day life and therefore are not of interest to the EU’s citizenry. Hence, restrictions would have to be made in order to limit the number of policies that apply to CISPOP.

This new model should only be applied in decisions over policies that are particularly salient, or are expected to have far-reaching consequences. The decision on which policies would fall into this category could be left to the European Parliament. For one thing, members of the European Parliament should know the content and possible implications of policies sufficiently well. Furthermore, MEPs act as EU citizens’ direct representatives, and should thus be able to detect if their constituents perceive a policy as important or not.

Subsequently, once a policy proposal has been worked out, formulated, and decided upon according to the current modes of policy-making in the EU, the opinion poll would come into play. A representative sample of voting-age EU citizens would then be randomly selected and asked to vote upon the policy. Much like in referenda, the poll would consist of only one question. Acknowledging the difficulties with the wording of referendum questions, the responsible pollsters should perhaps provide two

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or three alternative answers, not just ‘yes’ and ‘no’, and perhaps include a neutral option.

Considering the at times high complexity of public policy, it is paramount that participants are provided with all necessary information on the policy’s contents, as well as its potential consequences, expressed in understandable terms. Therefore, leaflets could be sent out a few weeks in advance to all participating households, so that participants have the chance to develop a sound opinion on the matter.

Since the poll consists of only one question, a handy way of collecting citizens’ responses would be via mail or online. In order to reduce the possibility of fraud, participants would need to identify themselves for example via their passport number. Once the responses have been collected and evaluated, the results are to be made public. This adds weight to the otherwise only consultative polls. Ideally the placement in the EU member states’ media would be at least similarly, better even more prominent as that of Eurobarometer surveys. The consultative nature of the proposed poll, of course, implies that decision-makers would not be legally obliged to follow public opinion, and could theoretically still enact policies as they please.

CISPOP as an effective input-oriented approach

Despite the polls’ consultative nature and the avoidance of drastic institutional change, CISPOP is not designed to be toothless. Indeed, it is expected that the proposed reform meets the criteria of input-oriented approaches to legitimacy. According to Scharpf’s definition, input legitimacy entails two interrelated aspects: 1) the provision of sufficient means of democratic participation; and 2) the ability of citizens to influence and control political processes. 70

In order to assess the first aspect, it suffices to understand the basic idea of public political participation. The most commonly referred to definition of political participation originates from Verba, Schlozman and Brady.

By political participation we refer simply to activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action — either directly by affecting the making or

Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: 10.

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implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies. 71

It appears only logical to assume that public opinion polls fit this rather spacious mould. More precisely, the proposed issue-specific poll model constitutes a “legally embedded activit[y] aimed at influencing public officials,” and can thus be labelled conventional or institutionalised participation. Consequently, one can draw the simple conclusion 72

that conducting more polls equates with more public participation in politics.

In comparison to this, estimating whether CISPOP would improve on the second aspect is a far more complicated matter. In order to increase citizens’ ability to influence and control public processes, there would have to be a positive relationship between the intensified use of issue-specific polls and the impact public opinion has on public policy.

To begin with, public opinion polls, if properly conducted, certainly contribute to politicians’ awareness of citizens’ preferences. At present, however, issue-specific 73

public opinion data is not always readily available to either the public or policy-makers. While political parties and governments frequently gauge public opinion before making policy proposals, this is arguably less the case for policies made at the EU level. The introduction of CISPOP would change that and raise policy-makers’ awareness of their constituents’ position on EU policy.

Moreover, EU matters are currently often seen as less important due to low levels of public interest. The publication of the proposed poll’s results promises that citizens become more aware if decisions at the EU level are made against their preferences. Consequently, one would assume that elected officials who knowingly act against their constituents’ preferences would lose votes. As a result, it can be expected that the polls lead to an increased fear of electoral sanction, which should motivate politicians to take public opinion more seriously when making policy.

Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality - Civic

71

Voluntarism in American Politics, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995): 38.

Rik Linssen et al., “Trends in Conventional and Unconventional Political Participation in

72

Europe, 1981-2008,” in Political Trust and Disenchantment with Politics, ed. Christina Eder, Ingvill C. Mochmann, and Markus Quandt (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2015) : 31-58.

John G. Geer, “Critical Realignments and the Public Opinion Poll,” Journal of Politics 53, no.

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Peering out of Plato’s Cave

Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture

Peering out of Plato’s Cave

A New Model to Address the Democratic Legitimacy of EU Policies

through Issue-specific Public Opinion Polling

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union

3. A new input-oriented model