MANAGE TO STAY IN YOUR POSITION:
THE INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP OF POWER AND STABILITY WITH
ERROR STRATEGIES
Master thesis, MscBA, specialization Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
ABSTRACT
Although previous research has indicated the difference in error prevention and error management, few empirical investigations have examined factors that influence the preference of a certain error strategy. The present study theorized and tested an increased error prevention when power was unstable (versus stable), and a decreased error management when power was unstable (versus stable). Using survey data, collected from powerholders and their subordinates covering multiple types of industries in the Netherlands, we found that power motivation and actual power are associated with, consecutively, a decreased error prevention practice, and an increased error management practice, when instability was low. Contradicting to our hypothesis, sense of power was associated with increased error prevention when instability was low. The findings suggest that an interaction effect of power and stability should be seen as an important antecedent of the chosen error strategy, and that organizations should be vigilant about the stability in their power structures. Implications of these findings and future research considerations are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
“Mistakes are a fact of life. It is the response to the error that counts”
~ Nikki Giovanni, writer and activist
To learn is to make errors. (e.g. Chialvo & Bak, 1999; Edmondson, 1996; Fischer et al., 2006; Seifert & Hutchins, 1988). So when people want to learn more, they should make as much errors as possible? Both theorists and managers are aware of the possible negative consequences of error, such as lower profits or increased recovery costs (e.g. Reason, 1990; Rybowiak, Garst, Frese & Batinic, 1999; Zapf, Brodbeck, Frese, Peters & Prümper, 1992), as well as their positive consequences, such as learning opportunities which could increase the organizations’ performance in the long run (e.g. Fisher et al., 2006; Harteis, Bauer, Gruber, 2008; Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodriguez & Velamuri, 2010; Van Dyck, 2009). Therefore, it is an important dilemma for powerholders within organizations to decide how to deal with errors.
communication (Edmondson, 1996), and less risk taking (Maner, Gailliot, Menzel & Kunstman, 2012). We believe that these effects of stability being low, could indicate a powerholders’ error strategy preference.
Although previous research has indicated the difference in error prevention and error management, to date we know little about error strategy preference of powerholders. Previous research indicated that error management exceeds error prevention in terms of group task focus (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), and individual motivation (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Wood, et al., 2000). Nevertheless, it is mostly error prevention which is incorporated in powerholders’ operations, instead of error management (Reason, 1990; 1997; Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 2005). Therefore it is interesting to examine the current literature on differences, such as openness to errors, communication about errors, and long term view, on both error prevention and error management in regard to the powerholder. Furthermore we will investigate the current literature on effects of instability of the powerholders’ position and its emotional and behavioral response, such as stress, risk taking, and self-interest. Commonalities between both investigations will indicate hypothetical suggestions for error strategy preference of the powerholder. A field study in multiple industries within the Netherlands will reveal if these indications have corresponding effects, and try to answer our research question; how does the stability of power of powerholders influence the relationship between power and the preference for an error strategy?
THEORY
Errors are an important issue within the business literature for various reasons. First of all every organization is confronted with errors (Reason, 1997; Van Dyck et al., 2005; Seifert & Hutchins, 1998; Dimitrova 2014). They can result in negative human and economic consequences such as stress, accidents, loss of control, and performance problems (Reason, 1990, Rybowiak et al., 1999, Zapf et al., 1992). However, organizations can benefit from unavoidable occurrence of error if they are designed to facilitate learning from it (e.g. Harteis et al., 2008; Seifert & Hutchins, 1998; Fisher et al., 2006; Sosna et al., 2010; Van Dyck, 2009). Attitudes towards errors and how one deals with them are indications of the organizational culture and the behavior of the people in it. Bureaucratic organizations usually attempt to prevent errors at all costs, while entrepreneurs have a more positive attitude towards errors and what one can learn from them (Rybowiak et al., 1999).
The literature distinguishes between two types of error strategies: error prevention and error management (Frese, 1995; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck, et al., 2005, Dimitrova 2014). The goal of both strategies is similar, minimizing the negative consequences of errors, but the way in which the two strategies go about to achieving this goal is different (Chillarege et al., 2003; Dimitrova, 2014; Frese, 1995; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag & Keith, 2003; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom, Wendland & Williams, 1998; Van Dyck et al., 2005). Error prevention stresses the importance of working flawless and minimize the possibility errors occur. Error management on the other hand is a strategy that accepts errors as unavoidable and does not focus on completely removing all errors. Instead, people with an error management strategy try to detect, correct, and minimize the potentially negative consequences of errors after its occurrence, while simultaneously maximizing the potential positive consequences of errors, in terms of learning (Dimitrova, 2014; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2008, Van Dyck et al., 2005).
purposefully incorporating error management in their operations are the exception, rather than the rule (e.g., Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 2005). Paradoxically, error prevention seems to be as ubiquitous in most organizations as are errors (Reason, 1990; 1997).
Power
In the present research we try to extend previous work about error strategies examining the role of power and the stability of the powerholders’ position for error strategies. Power is a basic force in social relationship (Russel, 2004). Therefore power plays a vital role in social interactions and is an omnipresent force in organizations (Fehr, Herz & Wilening, 2013; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). The behaviors of the powerholders have an inordinate pull, in that their actions have greater impact and matter more compared to those without power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Understanding what influences the influencer can play vital role in understanding the behavior of powerholders’ and thus the error strategy they adopt.
Within the literature, conceptual and operational definitions of power are traditionally focused on the control over valued resources. Power has often been construed as the control over information, money, or decision making premises (Anderson, John & Keltner, 2012; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). However, power is not simply the control over resources or a derivative solely of one’s social position. Power can also be seen as a psychological state, a perception of one’s capacity to influence others (Bugental, Blue, & Cruzcosa, 1989; Galinsky et al., 2003). Therefore, in line with many other theorists, we define power as ‘an individual’s relative capacity to influence others’ states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments’ (Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991).
(Anderson et al., 2012; Bandura, 2001; Bugental & Lewis, 1999). Furthermore the desire for power distinct itself from the perceived power position in the extent to which an individual considers possessing power to be a focal goal (Winter, 1973). It represents an enduring affective preference for having impact on other people or the world at large. All in all those three perceptions of power should be considered when examining the effects of power for error strategies.
Stability
Research has shown that the effects of power are dependent on the stability of one’s power position. Limitations of most existing research on power is the presentation of the variable as static and dichotomous (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003; Magee, Galinsky & Gruenfeld, 2007). Within organizations, power is seldom an either-or construct (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). According to Keltner et al. (2003), the stability of the power relationship moderates the effect of power on approach. Thus, the effects of power on the preference of an error strategy are dependent on the stability of the power, and the interaction of power with its stability.
Research on the interaction effect of power and stability already presented multiple effects on the powerholders’ emotions and behavior, which could indicate an error strategy preference. These indications mainly rise from the unequal privileged position a power holder has compared to his or her subordinates (Keltner et al., 2003; Van Vugt, 2006). Power inequalities are perpetuated in part because there is a strong motive to defend and justify the status quo (Georgesen, 2006). That this motive would exist in powerholders is not particularly surprising; after all, people in powerful positions typically reap the greatest benefits and resources, so they would presumably be especially motivated to maintain their position.
When the powerholders’ position is stable, this person would have a relatively lack of vulnerability to punishment, power may cause errors associated with his action weighed less strongly. Conversely, an unstable position may lead the powerholder to prioritize avoiding potential threat and, in doing so, may reduce his actions that might increase the possibility of harm. Thus, power and instability may lead to adaptively motivated changes in the way people prioritize avoiding particular type of errors which could result in a loss of resources (Maner et al., 2007), or even worse, the privileged position that gives opportunities to allocate them. Effect on emotions and behavior
strategy preference. Sapolsky (2005) showed that powerholders within a primate group tend to experience relatively low levels of stress when the power hierarchy was stable. When instabilities within the hierarchy arise, however, the powerholders experience higher psychological and physiological stress and react in ways aimed at maintaining their position atop the hierarchy. The same effects where studied by Roskies & Louis-Guerin (1990) were power-holding people, who were insecure about their job position, showed a proportioned higher level of distress with the degree of instability about their position. According to Zapf et al. (1992), errors contribute to an increased amount of stress at work. They state that people who could decrease the error recovery time encountered less stress. A decreased error recovery time would indicate a higher error management practice, and a lower amount of stress as a result. In contrast, powerholders encountered with stress due to an unstable position therefore tend to show less of an error management practice.
Besides negative emotions, instability of power also influences the behavior of the powerholder due to their privileged position. Powerholders are faced with a disproportionate exposure to rewards versus punishment (Anderson & Galinksy, 2006; Keltner et al., 2003), which is likely to have direct implications for decisions pertaining to risk. Previous studies showed that power might not affect perceptions of risk, but increase risk propensity when the powerholder is feeling confident about him- or herself and its abilities to deal with potential negative consequences should their risky behavior fail to pay off (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Krueger & Dickson, 1994). In this case, risk propensity can be interpreted as an openness to possible negative consequences, therefore show affinity with an error management strategy. In contrast, as risk avoidance can be interpreted as the avoidance of negative consequence, this indicates that powerholders in an unstable position show an increased error prevention practice because they feel less confident in their error management abilities.
teams to discuss and correct errors (Edmondson, 1996), and therefore the long term positive outcomes of group effort.
Overall suggestion
Instability about a powerholders’ position can signal threats to his/her power (Maner & Mead, 2010). Power might lead individuals to become especially vigilant to the potential for loss of power (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Power-oriented people are typically focused to retain those positions (e.g. Sapolsky, 2005; Williams, 2014). Thus, power is expected to elicit conservative choices aimed at retaining one’s current position (Maner et al., 2007). Furthermore instability may lead people to prioritize avoiding potential errors (Maner et al., 2012) which could be a threat for one’s position. Therefore this anxiety could lead to a propensity of preventing further errors from happening which could harm the privileged position as a powerholder. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis (see figure 1):
Hypothesis 1: Power and stability interact to influence error prevention such that power is associated with increased error prevention when power is unstable (versus stable).
People whose power is threatened and whose role in the organizations is insecure may pursue personal goals above group-centered aims (Williams, 2014), which will result in a decline of communication about errors. (Edmondson, 1996). When a person is in an unstable powerful position, one cannot afford more risk of making errors (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Krueger & Dickson, 1994). If errors occur, the powerholder faces the possibility of losing his position which could lead to being more closed for errors and its possible positive consequences, such as learning. This indicates that when the powerholder is in an unstable position he/she will have less tendency towards an error management strategy. Therefore we hypothesize the following:
FIGURE 1 Theoretical Framework
METHOD
Data Collection and Sample
The data for our study was collected from people in powerful positions, such as managers or supervisors, picked from random organizations through the Netherlands with a minimum requirement of having at least more than one subordinate (see Appendix A for respondents’ industries deviation). Powerholders where approached through phone, e-mail or face-to-face. When they were willing to cooperate, an e-mail with a link to the online survey was sent to them. Within the survey they were asked to add the e-mail address of their subordinates, who afterwards got an invitation for an online survey themselves. A unique code, which the powerholder had to fill in at the beginning of the survey, corresponded with his/her subordinates code so that the powerholders’ data and the subordinates could be merged for analysis.
The study initially included 59 people in powerful positions and 132 subordinates. After merging the data 53 complete sets of powerholders with at least one subordinate remained. Of the powerholders 69.4% where male. Their age ranged from 22 to 62 years (M = 45.32, SD = 10.28) with an average tenure of 10.6 years (SD = 8.19); 26.5% of the powerholders finished university education, 44.9% finished higher education and 28.6% finished only secondary school; 85.7% of the powerholders worked 36 hours a week or more against 48.8% of the subordinates. Of all subordinates, 49.2% was male. Their average age ranged from 16 to 64 years (M = 39.7, SD = 12.59) with an average tenure of 7.1 years (SD = 7.77); 12.7% of the
STABILITY
subordinates finished university education, 35.2% finished higher education and 51.6% finished only secondary school.
Measures
Unless indicated otherwise all items were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale ranging from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (7) ‘strongly agree’.
Actual Power was measured with one item that asked to ‘point out were your current
position is between operational work floor and top’ on a scale ranging from 0 (operational work floor) to 100 (top).
Sense of power was measured with the eight items sense of power scale (Anderson &
Galinsky, 2006). The scale included four negative items (e.g. ‘Even if I voice them, my views have little sway’) and four positive items (e.g. ‘I can get people to listen to what I say’). The reliability of the scale is low but tolerable (α = 0.51).
Power motivation was measured with three items using Schwartz (2001) namely ‘It is
important for me to be rich. I want a lot of money and expensive items’, ‘It is important for me to be in charge and explain others what they have to do. I want people to do what I say’, and ‘It is important for me to be the one who makes the decisions. I want to be the leader’. The first item was considered to be more materialistic, in contrast to the other two items which we interpreted to be measuring a motivation of having power in a form of social interaction. After reconsideration we found that the last two items were more valid to measure power motivation. Furthermore, the reliability of the scale was at first low (α = 0.60), and turned out to improve, after deleting the first item, to an acceptable reliability (α = 0.70).
Stability. We measured stability of power using three items measuring the sense of
demotion a powerholder has; namely ‘there is a possibility that I could be demoted to a lower position’, ‘I think my position in the organization will deteriorate’, and ‘I think I will be demoted to a lower position in the near future’. The reliability of the scale was sufficient (α = 0.76). Since demotion has a negative effect the more it increases it is similar to instability. From here on we will call the measurement variable ‘demotion’, measuring the instability of power.
Error strategies. We measured error strategies according to Rybowiak et al. (1999) and
After checking for normality, all variables were significantly normally distributed with the exception of error prevention (p = .14). We evaluated the values of skewness (Zskewness =
.63, SE = .33) and kurtosis (Zkurtosis = .61, SE = .64) of error prevention and considered the
normality of the variable as not seriously violated (Hopkins & Weeks, 1990). Control Variables
Several control variables were explored for their viability that could provide alternative explanations for the interaction depicted in our model:
Age. The age of the respondent was included as a control variable and was measured in
the questionnaire. Age could imply a higher life experience with managing errors, but on the other hand also a higher necessity of keeping the job and therefore a higher fear of position instability.
Gender. According to Pratto, Stallworth & Sidanius (1997), men show a stronger
preference for hierarchical relations and therefore might be more prone towards risk when in powerful positions (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). This could imply less error prevention behavior. Therefore this variable was included as control variable and measured in the questionnaire.
Tenure. The years an employee is working at an organization could make this person
more experienced with managing errors and less afraid of losing the job because of the many years of trust between the employee and the organization. Therefore the years of employment was included as a control variable.
Working hours. The amount of working hours a week was included as a control variable
in the questionnaire. The higher the amount of work hours might suggest a higher productiveness due to more hours spend at the organization. Furthermore this could lead to a feeling of being irreplaceable which altogether might give the powerholder a feeling of having a stronger and more stable position in the organization.
Education. It is possible that people low in social-economic standards are less educated
Analyses
Several analyses were performed for this study. The main descriptive and bivariate correlations were analyzed for a first impression of the data. Next, six regression analyses were performed to determine the interaction of our power variables and stability on both error strategies. All control variables were included in these analyses. Furthermore simple slopes analyses were performed to analyze the difference between low and high scores on power stability.
RESULTS
Main Descriptives and Correlations
Table 1 presents the mean values, standard deviations for all measured variables. The means of the power variables show that actual power (M = 81.98 out of 100, SD = 16.42) and sense of power (M = 5.57, SD = .66) where rated quite higher than power motivation (M = 4.22,
SD = 1.21), although power motivation had a bigger standard deviation. Regarding the error
strategies, error prevention was rated much lower (M = 2.86, SD = 1.05) and its mean is almost on the opposite site of the seven-point Likert scale compared to error management (M = 5.30,
SD = .91).
Besides the main descriptives, the correlation table (Tabel 1) displays a first impression of the relationship between our variables, including the control variables. When looking at our independent variables, two of our power variables correlated negatively with our moderator, demotion. Sense of power correlated negatively with demotion (r = -.32, p < .05), the same holds for actual power (r = -.24, p < .10). Furthermore, our dependent variables error prevention and error management do negatively correlate to each other on a weaker significance (r = -.25,
p < .10). Finally, some control variable correlated significantly with one or more variables in
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1. Actual power 81.98 16.42 2. Sense of power 5.57 .66 .31* 3. Power motivation 4.22 1.21 .02 -.19 4. Demotion 1.86 1.02 -.24† -.32* .00 5. Error management 5.30 .91 .17 -.08 -.08 .17 6. Error prevention 2.86 1.05 -.04 -.01 -.09 -.03 -.25† 7. Age 45.32 10.28 .23 .01 -.01 .38* .29† .08 8. Gender .31 .47 -.21 -.06 .21 .15 .17 -.10 -.13 9. Tenure 10.58 8.19 -.27 -.01 -.03 .24 -.16 .12 .39* -.14 11. Working hours 3.80 .54 .26† .14 -.07 -.12 -.14 -.09 .18 -.41** .03 12. Education 4.65 1.25 .20 .07 .04 .06 .33* -.29* -.09 .33* -.15 -.11
a Note. Gender: 0 = Man and 1 = Woman; Working hours: 1 = 0 - 12 hours, 2 = 12 - 24 hours, 3 = 24 - 36 hours, and 4 = 36 hours or more; Education: 1 = Primary school, 2 = MAVO/LBO,
3 = HAVO/MBO, 4 = VWO, 5 = HBO, 6 = WO.
† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01
All tests are two tailed.
Main Analysis
Actual power. Table 2 depicts the results of the moderated hierarchical regression analyses for actual power, demotion, and error prevention. The expected interaction between power and stability was not observed (β = -.01; p = .95). Table 3 depicts the results of the moderated hierarchical regression analyses for sense of power, demotion, and error management. Analysis revealed the expected interaction effect of sense of power and stability for error management (β = -.43; p = .003; See Figure 2). Simple slope analysis revealed that, when demotion is low, there is a significant positive relationship between actual power and error management (-1 SD; β = .52; SE = .16; p = .002). When demotion is high, there is no significant relationship between actual power and error management (+1 SD; β = -.19; SE = .18; p = .31).
TABLE 2
Two-Way Interaction of Actual Power and Demotion Predicting Error Prevention
B SE t R2
Step 1 .00
Actual power -.04 .17 -.24
Demotion .01 .22 .03
Step 2 .00
Actual power x Demotion -.01 .18 -.07
Notes. N = 47
TABLE 3
Two-Way Interaction of Actual Power and Demotion Predicting Error Management
B SE t R2
Step 1 .09
Actual power .15 .13 1.18
Demotion .05 .16 .32
Step 2 .17**
Actual power x Demotion -.43 .14 -3.12**
Simple Slopes for Error Management including Actual Power
Actual Power
Sense of power. Table 4 depicts the results of the moderated hierarchical regression
analyses for sense of power, stability, and error prevention. Analysis revealed an opposing
interaction effect than was expected of sense of power and stability for error prevention (β = -.41; p = .007; See Figure 3). Simple slope analysis revealed that, when demotion is low,
there is a significant positive relationship between sense of power and error prevention (-1 SD;
β = .52; SE = .24; p = .038). When demotion is high, there is no significant relationship between
sense of power and error prevention (+1 SD; β = -.15; SE = .16; p = .36). Table 5 depicts the results of the moderated hierarchical regression analyses for sense of power, stability, and error management. The expected interaction between sense of power and stability was not observed (β = -.16; p = .23).
TABLE 4
Regression Analysis on Error Prevention including Sense of Power
B SE t R2
Step 1 .00
Sense of power .17 .17 1.04
Demotion -.19 .19 -1.03
Step 2 .15**
Sense of power x Demotion -.41 .14 -2.83**
FIGURE 3
Simple Slopes for Error Prevention including Sense of Power
Sense of Power
TABLE 5
Regression Analysis on Error Management including Sense of Power
B SE t R2
Step 1 .04
Sense of power .04 .15 .27
Demotion .13 .17 .78
Step 2 .03
Sense of power x Demotion -.16 .13 -1.23
Notes. N = 51
Power motivation. Table 6 depicts the results of the moderated hierarchical regression analyses
TABLE 6
Regression Analysis on Error Prevention including Power Motivation
B SE t R2
Step 1 .01
Power motivation -.03 .16 -.17
Demotion -.14 .19 -.72
Step 2 .10**
Power motivation x Demotion .47 .20 2.30**
Notes. N = 49; **p < .01
FIGURE 4
Simple Slopes for Error Prevention including Power Motivation
Power Motivation
TABLE 7
Regression Analysis on Error Management including Power Motivation
B SE t R2
Step 1 .06
Power motivation -.11 .14 -.75
Demotion .25 .17 1.48
Step 2 .00
Power motivation x Demotion -.02 .18 -.14
DISCUSSION
The primary objective for this study was to find new factors that influence the preference for a certain error strategy. Using three types of power variables, this research suggests that an interaction effect of power and stability should be seen as an important antecedent of the chosen error strategy. Therefore we proposed the following research question; ‘how does the stability of power of powerholders influence the relationship between power and the preference for an error strategy?’
The results revealed that, power motivation is negatively associated with error prevention when instability (demotion) is low; while no support is found that power motivation is associated with increased error prevention when instability is high. Furthermore, our data provided the evidence that actual power and stability interacted to influence error management, such that actual power is associated with an increased error management when instability (demotion) is low; while again, no support is found that actual power is associated with decreased error management when instability is high. Our data, however, provided a positive relationship, which was contradicting to what was expected, between the interaction of sense of power and low levels of instability on error prevention; while no support is found that sense of power is associated with decreased error prevention when instability is high. Thus, when being in a less unstable position, and motivated to be in power but not having a feeling of being in power, leads to a decreased propensity of preventing further errors from happening, and subsequently results in a decreased error prevention practice. When actually being in power, and the powerful position is less unstable, one will increase its openness about errors, which leads to an increase in error management practice.
Theoretical Implications
instability is low. These results are in line with the theory in that, people whose power is secure, in contrast to insecure, may pursue group goals over personal goals (Williams, 2014), and communicate more about errors (Edmondson, 1996) and their potential learning possibilities. Therefore, they will have more tendency towards an error management strategy.
However analysis show that sense of power is positively associated with error prevention when instability is low; while no support was found that sense of power is associate with decreased error prevention when instability is high. This does not support our theoretical evidence provided by previous literature. Reasons for this contradicting outcome could be due to the low reliability of the sense of power scale. On the other hand, there is a clear difference between the definition of three power variables, in this case the difference in defining power as a property of social relationships (Emerson, 1962), compared to interpreting power as a structural variable (Ng, 1980) or as a psychological property of the individual (Bugental et al., 1989; Galinsky et al., 2003). The use of the three different power variables, sense of power, actual power, and power motivation, provided us three different outcomes in the current study, therefore, they show evidence for a distinct interpretation between those three power variables. Furthermore, a negative and a positive relationship was found between, consecutively, the two power variables, power motivation and sense of power, for low levels of instability. A positive relationship was found between actual power and error management for low levels of instability. These results suggests that the effect of power on error strategies is becoming of opposing importance to the powerholder, when instability is becoming low. This provides evidence for the importance of the level of stability as a key factor in determining the effect of power on error strategies.
Finally, the results contribute to the demand for a systematic search to antecedents concerned with error strategies (Reason, 1997; Van Dyck et al., 2005). By interacting power and stability on error strategies, we developed an idea, and found evidence, that this interaction affects the error strategy practice of a powerholder. This approach is the first of its kind to address such a moderation model within the current literature, and provides possibilities for potential research.
Practical Implications
The HR department in organizations can improve the stability of people by providing the possibility to utilize their skills to the degree that their importance to the organization will guarantee acceptance of their current position and personal growth (Dienhart & Gregoire, 1993; Kooij, Jansen, Dikkers & De Lange, 2010). Furthermore, transparency in communications is important to have positive influence on the position stability (Dienhart & Gregoire, 1993).
Limitations
As which every research, this study should be considered in light of its limitations. First, we used a cross-sectional research design, which did not allow us to determine the causality direction among the study variables. This means that the study results are vulnerable to bidirectional and to opposite relationships because of the possibility that error strategies might influence sense of power or power motivation. Additional research, such as longitudinal designs are necessary to cross-validate the findings.
Second, all variables power variables and stability were provided by the powerholders, which could give room for false correlations and incorrect research results, due to common-source bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). Although Podsakoff, MacKenzie and Podsakoff (2011) suggest obtaining measures of predictor and criterion variables from multiple sources: they present a few exceptional cases where this is not required or appropriate. Namely, when the predictor and criterion variables are capturing individual’s perceptions, beliefs, judgments or feelings. The present research model can be grouped under this exception, and therefore counters the difficulties with common source bias.
Third, there could be concerns with regards to the use of self-report measures of stability, which increases possible difficulties of social desirability. Future studies should explore the option of non-self report measures of stability, by for example letting subordinates rate powerholders’ stability, or measuring the turnover rate for certain positions within the organization.
Finally, the research was conducted solely in the Netherlands, therefore the results may not be generalizable to other countries and cultures. Further research could improve their sample when containing the interaction effects on multiple periods in time and/or in other countries and cultures.
Future research
powerholder. According to recent research, the effectiveness of error management training was dependent on individuals’ levels of conscientiousness and extraversion (Cullen, Muros, Rasch, & Sackett, 2013). Furthermore, the characteristics of the subordinates could even so be of importance to determine the preference of error prevention and error management. Other studies can take this into account to determine an even more precise prediction of powerholders’ error strategies.
Secondly, the organizational culture could be an interesting indicator for person’s attitude towards errors (Rybowiak et al., 1999). In certain negative cultures, those errors that appear will be concealed and there will be little individual and organizational learning from errors. In contrast, organizational cultures with a more positive attitude towards error can be more action-oriented, innovative, and experimental. These types of cultures are clear indicators for, consecutively, error prevention and error management, and possibly influence the preference for a certain error strategy. Yet, despite the encouraging examples about advantages of error management, the potential for error management culture to provide organizations with a competitive edge has not been fully realized (Van Duck, 2005).
Finally, the validity of error prevention’s instrument can be improved in further research. Error prevention was measured with items indicating rather negative emotions towards error. When concluding this research I belief that powerholders who try to prevent errors from happening still can look optimistic towards the positive consequences of error. Therefore, future research instruments on error prevention should present the items measuring error prevention strategy focused more on the importance of preventing errors instead of fearing them.
Conclusion
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1
Respondents’ Industries Deviation
Sector Percent Agriculture 7.5 Business services 1.9 Communication 1.9 Construction 13.2 Cultural institution 7.5 Education 1.9 Financial services 3.8 Healthcare 11.3
Hotel, restaurants, catering 3.8
Industry 11.3
Public service 15.1
Trade 1.9
Transport 1.9
